STUDY GUIDE NO.

3 (PART II)
EVIDENCE

3. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

SECTION 27. Admission of a party. – The act, declaration or

omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him or her.

1. What is an admission?

Admission is the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant

fact may be given in evidence against him.

2. Read and digest the case of Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15,
April 3, 2001.

FACTS: Singson went on-air and accused Estrada, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

Filing of the Articles of Impeachment against Estrada

Jan. 18, 2001 – People’s call for his resignation intensified. A 10-km
line of people of people holding lighted candles former a human chain
from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to
the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people’s solidarity in demanding
Estrada’s resignation.

Jan. 20, 2001 – Arroyo took her oath as President of the Philippines.
Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.

Jan. 22, 2001 – Arroyo, after taking her oath, immediately discharged
the powers and the duties of the Presidency.
After Estrada’s fall from the pedestal of power, his legal problems
appeared in clusters. (Cases were filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman)

ESTRADA filed the following cases:

1. Petition for Prohibition with a prayer of a writ preliminary injunction.
2. Sought to enjoin the Ombusman from conducting further
proceedings.
3. Quo Warranto
4. Prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office.

Estrada denies that he resigned as President or that he suffers from a

permanent disability. He submits that the office of the President was
not vacant when Arroyo took her oath.

Evidence Considered by the Court to resolve the issue on whether

Estrada Resigned:

1. Whether or not Estrada resigned has to be determined from his acts

and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

a. The intent to resign is clear when Estrada said “x x x Ayoko na

masyado nang masakit.” “Ayoko na” are words of resignation.

2. Second round of Negotiations – negotiating the terms of the

peaceful turn over.

a. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the

Estrada has resigned.

3. Statement/Press Release from President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on

the day he left Malacanang.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts and declarations of Estrada in this case
may be given in evidence against him.

RULING: Yes. Whether or not Estrada resigned has to be determined

from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001
 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

“Using this totality test, we hold that Estrada resigned as President

Section 27, Rule 130. – Admission of a party

The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may

be given in evidence against him or her.

In the press release containing final statement

1. Estrada acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo.
2. He emphasized that he was leaving the palace, the seat of
presidency, for the sake of peach and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation.
3. He expressed gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them.
4. Estrada made a reference to his future challenges after occupying
the office of the president which he has given up.
5. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not
be attained if he did not give up the presidency.

The press release was Estrada’s valedictory, his final act of farewell.
His presidency is now in the past tense.

3. Distinguish ADMISSIONS under Section 27 of Rule 130 from JUDICIAL

ADMISSIONS under Section 4 of the same rule.

Rule 129, Sec. 4 Rule 130 Sec. 27

Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An Section 27. Admission of a party. —
admission, verbal or written, made by The act, declaration or omission of a
the party in the course of the party as to a relevant fact may be
proceedings in the same case, does not given in evidence against him.
require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.
 It is conclusive upon the admitter The admission is admissible only if it
whether in writing or oral. This applies is against the interest of the admitter.
to civil, criminal cases and even special
proceedings.

4. State the rule on admissibility as evidence of an offer of compromise

in civil cases.

As provided in Section 28, Rule 130 on the Revised Rules on Evidence,

in civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability
and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. Neither is
evidence of conduct nor statements made in compromise negotiations
admissible, except evidence otherwise discoverable or offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of under delay or proving an effort to obstruct
a criminal investigation or prosecution

5. Read and digest the case of Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, G.R. No. 168071,
December 18, 2006.

FACTS: A space in the Ides O’Racca Building, known as Botica Divisoria

was subleased to Luciano Tan. Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the Ides
O’Racca Building since 1959. The Ides O’Racca Building, located at the
corner of M. de Santos and Folgueras Streets in Binondo, Manila, is
owned by the Republic of the Philippines. Rodil Enterprises sublease
various units of the property to members of the Ides O’Racca Building
Tenants Association, Inc.

RODIL ENTERPRISES filed on on March 13, 2000 a Complaint for

Unlawful Detainer against LUCIANO TAN with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila. Rodil Enterprises alleges that under a Contract
of Sublease, Tan bound himself to pay P13,750.00 as monthly rentals.

However, Tan refused to pay the rentals from September 1997 up to

the time of the filing of the Complaint. Luciano Tan insists that he is a
legitimate tenant of the government who owns the Ides O’Racca
building and not of Rodil Enterprises. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal
of the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil
Enterprises had collected from 1987 to 1997, or during such time when
he was still paying rentals to the latter. On second call, the parties and
counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to put
an end to this civil case between them:

That [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from

September, 1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation
of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000; and
[Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750 on or
before the 5th day of each month after June 30, 2000.

Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals,

averring therein that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the
subject premises and to pay subsequent monthly rentals as they fall
due. The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil
Enterprises. The court said that Luciano Tan did not contest the
sublease on a monthly basis, and in fact admitted to his liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tan’s offer of compromise, made in open court

and reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals can
be taken as an admission of his liability

RULING: YES. Section 27. Offer of Compromise not admissible. – In

civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability
and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases,
except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromised by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of

guilty to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the
accused who made the plea or offer.

An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses

occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil
or criminal liability for the injury.
 In this case, the MeTC properly appreciated Luciano Tan’s admission
as an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. Tan did not
contest the existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank
representations anent Tan’s liability in the form of rentals. This
expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The
Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the
MeTC as an explicit acknowledgement of Tan’s liability on the
subleased premises.

A judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the course of

the proceedings in the same case, for purposes of the truth of some
alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove.

6. State the rule on admissibility as evidence of an offer of compromise

in criminal cases.

Under Section 28 of Rule 130 on the Revised Rules on Evidence, in

criminal cases except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise buy the accused may be received as an implied admission
of guilt.

7. Cite instances where laws allow compromise in criminal cases.

In criminal cases involving tax, under the National Internal Revenue

Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has the power to
compromise tax cases.

Another instance where compromise in criminal cases is allowed are

criminal offenses in violation of the Local Government Code provided
the penalty for which is imprisonment only for one (1) year or less, but
not grave offenses such as murder.

8. Read and digest the case of San Miguel Corp. v. Kalalo, G.R. No.
185522, June 13, 2012.
FACTS: Helen Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products since 1998.
She has a credit overdraft arrangement with SMC whereby, prior to
the delivery of beer products, she would be required to issue two
checks to SMC. SMC’s agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated
checks to cope with. The probable increase in orders during the busy
Christmas season, without informing her of the breakdown of the
balance. She complied with the request however she noticed that she
still owed SMC a substantial amount. She then insisted that SMC
provide her with a detailed statement of account, but it failed to do so.

Instead of updating the account of Kalalo, SMC sent her a demand

letter for the value of seven dishonored checks. In the face of constant
threats made by the agents of SMC, Kalalo’s counsel wrote a letter (the
“offer of Compromise”) wherein Kalalo acknowledged the receipt of
the statement of account demanding the payment of the sum of P 816,
689.00 and submitted a proposal by way of Compromise Agreement
to settle the said obligation.

SMC did not accept the proposal and filed a complaint against Kalalo
for violating the Bouncing Checks Law. The Statement of Account
showed that the net balance of the amount owed to SMC was only
P71,009.15. Kalalo thereafter recanted her offer of compromise and
stated that, at the time she had the letter prepared, she was being
threatened by SMC agents with imprisonment, and that she did not
know how much she actually owed SMC.

ISSUE: Whether the offer of compromise can be admitted as evidence

against Kalalo.

RULING: No. RULE 130 SECTION 28. OFFER OF COMPROMISE NOT

ADMISSIBLE - “In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror.

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal

negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
 The Offer of Compromise dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to
the filing of the criminal complaint on 9 March 2001 for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not mad
in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be
considered as an implied admission of guilt.

Finally, during the testimony of Kalalo and after her receipt of the
Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer
of Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the letter
prepared, the final amount owed to SMC was yet undetermined; and
that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from SMC’s
agents.

The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against

Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to SMC in the amount of
₱ 921,215.

9. Read and digest the case of People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 180915,
August 9, 2010.

FACTS: Nazareno was charged with murder in the RTC for killing one
Romeo de Guzman. The RTC found him guilty to which the CA
affirmed.

The records disclose nothing that would indicate any motive on the
part of Jericho Capanas to testify falsely against appellant. Absent any
showing that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper
motive, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand,
under the solemnity of an oath, deserve full faith and credence. In the
case at bar, the identity of the killer of Romeo de Guzman is not
unknown. Not only was appellant positively identified by an eyewitness
as the assailant, but no less than appellant himself, on two occasions,
admitted authorship of the crime, one is through a letter of forgiveness
and second is through judicial admission while on re-direct
examination on the witness stand.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pleading for forgiveness can be received as

an implied admission of guilt.
 RULING: Yes. On 14 October 2001, while in detention, appellant wrote
a letter to the victim’s brother asking the latter’s forgiveness for the
killing of Romeo de Guzman. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court
held that appellant’s act of pleading for forgiveness may be considered
as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn, can be
received as an implied admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.

10. Read and digest the case of People v. Abadies, G.R. Nos. 139346-
50. July 11, 2002.

FACTS: This case is an appeal by Jose Abadies y Claveria against a

conviction of sexually molesting and abusing his daughter. He was
found guilty of molesting the girl in the absence of the girl's mother on
various occasions. In the last instance of abuse, he had brought her to
a vacant house where he molested and threatened to kill and rape her.
The girl managed to escape and on arriving home revealed to her
mother the final incident and all past abuses. A police report was made
immediately and the accused was arrested and subsequently convicted
of sexual abuse by the regional court. During his trial, a letter, which
he wrote to his daughter seeking forgiveness, was also provided as
evidence at his trial, along with the girl’s testimony.

In the current appeal, the accused argued that the fact that the
daughter had not reported the alleged abuses earlier amounted to an
implied pardon of his acts and that there exists no factual basis for the
trial court to consider his plea of forgiveness in the letter as an implied
admission of guilt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plea of forgiveness made by the accused

be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

RULING: Yes. A cursory reading of the relevant parts of the letter will
readily show that accused-appellant was indeed seeking pardon for his
misdeeds. Some of the pertinent portions read as follows: "I made this
letter to ask your 'forgiveness.' xxx Alam mo bang sobra-sobra na ang
 pagsisisi ko sa ginawa kong iyon. x x x Parang awa mo na Ne hirap na
hirap na ako at ang lahat ay buong puso ko ng pinagsisisihan.
Patawarin rno na ako anak. xxx"

There is no iota of doubt that accused-appellant was asking

forgiveness for having committed the acts with which he now stands
charged. Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled through
mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Evidently, no one
would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and
a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt
to compromise. Under the circumstances, accused-appellant’s plea of
forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt.

11. Is the flight of an accused, after the commission of a crime, an

implied admission of guilt? How about non-flight?

Yes. Flight is an implied admission of guilt in criminal cases such as if

an accused jumps bail, hides, or goes to another country. It is evidence
on collateral matters which shows the probability or improbability of
the fact in issue. It is a subsequent collateral matter because after the
commission of the crime, the offender runs away.

As to non-flight however, the Supreme Court said that there is no

contrary rule. There is a rule that flight is indicative of guilt, but there
is no rule that non-flight is evidence of innocence.

12. Read and digest the case of People v. Bangcado, G.R. No.
132330, November 28, 2000

FACTS: At around 8:30 in the evening, Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and

Lino were at the Skyview Restaurant, Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City,
drinking and listening to folksongs. Moments later, a group of five (5)
arrived and sat one table away from Cogasi and his friends. Among the
newcomers was SPO1 Bangcado, and $PO3 Banisa. The rest of their
group were not identified.
At that time, members of the police force of Baguio City were
conducting Operation Kapkap at the Skyview Restaurant. They
however exempted the table of PO3 Cesar Banisa as they knew him to
be a fellow policeman.

At around 9:00 o'clock that evening, Cogasi and his friends left the
restaurant to go home. They were residents of La Trinidad, Benguet.
As they went behind the restaurant where their Ford Fierra was
parked, they noticed SPO1 Bangcado and PO3 Banisa following them.
Banisa asked Richard Lino for a light. Then Bangcado and Banisa asked
the group if they were willing to be frisked. Since the two (2) police
officers were armed with handguns and smelled of liquor, the group
agreed to be frisked. Bangcado, with Banisa standing guard behind
him with a drawn gun, ordered Adawan, Lino, Cogasi, and Clemente
to form a line against the Ford Fierra facing him in that order. Without
any warning, Bangcado suddenly fired his gun in quick succession at
the four (4) persons lined up against the Ford Fierra. Cogasi saw
Adawan and Lino fall down. Cogasi then felt he was hit on the left side
of his neck and he also fell down. He managed however to crawl away
and run. He woke up to find himself confined in a hospital together
with Clemente. There Cogasi learned that Lino and Adawan died from
gunshot wounds in their heads. Cogasi himself suffered a gunshot
wound at the neck, at the junction of his left jaw near the ear, while
Clemente received two (2) gunshot wounds on his right shoulder with
one (1) of the bullets being lodged just below his right eye.

ISSUE: Whether or not non-flight of the accused is a proof of

innocence.

RULING: No. While flight of an accused is competent evidence to

establish prima facie guilt, there is no law or principle that non-flight
per se is proof, let along conclusive proof of innocence. Non-flight
cannot prevail against the weight of positive identification of the
accused.

Moreover, Section 27 of Rule 130 contemplates an offer of compromise

from the accused himself. There is no showing that the visits were
 made with the knowledge or upon the instructions of the accused. An
offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to
an admission of the party himself. For a compromise to amount to an
implied admission of guilt, the accused should be present or at least
had authorized the compromise.

SECTION 29. Admission by third party. – The rights of a party

cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided.

13. What is the RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE?

The res inter alios acta rule means that an act of admission of a
party does not bind another. It cannot prejudice another as one’s
act or declaration can only prejudice himself.

14. Read and digest the case of People v. Cachuela, G.R. No.
191752, June 10, 2013.

FACTS: Appellants here were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt

for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information from an asset
that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in
the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking
for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment
team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon
their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he
had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms.
The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were
conducting an entrapment operation against the suspects of the
robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police and gave the
names of the other persons involved in the crime.

In the entrapment operation, the NBI arrested Cachuela and Ibanez.

At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police
line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the
killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession
implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
The prosecution filed an information for robbery with homicide before
the RTC. The accused all pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on
the merits ensued thereafter. During trial. Zaldy died.

The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt to which the
CA affirmed with modifications. Hence, petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by Nabilgas

is admissible in evidence.

RULING: No. The res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another; An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission
made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. ―At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta
rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not
admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as
hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is
an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may
be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order
that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved
by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates
to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there
was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial
confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in
committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and
must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself.
 Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency
of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.

Section 30. Admission by co-partner or agent - The act or

declaration of a partner or agent authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or within the scope
of his or her authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such
party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to
the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.

15. What are the requisites for the declaration made by a

partner/agent to be binding upon the partnership/principal?

The following requisites must be present:

1. The statement refers to a matter within the scope of the partner's

authority; Anything beyond the partner's scope is not covered.
2. The admission or statement is made DURING the existence of the
partnership; If the partnership is dissolved, any statement made by a
partner will no longer bind his copartner.
3. The existence of the partnership must be proven by evidence other
than such set or declaration. One must show that there really is
partnership. The existence of the partnership must be shown b
independent evidence other than such act or declaration.

16. What is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Estrada
v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001 in relation the
exceptions on the RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE?

In the case of Estrada vs. Desierto, the Supreme Court ruled that the
use of the Angara diary did not violate the rule on res inter alios acta.
The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
viz: “The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided."
The res Inter ailos acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is
provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-
partner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego
of the petitioner. He was the Little President, indeed, he was
authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days
before he abandoned Malacañang Palace. Thus, according to the
Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary i Angara: "Mula umplsa pa
lang ng kampanya, Ed, Ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang
sa huli,iIkaw pa rin." (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have
been the only one I've listened to. And now at the end, you still
are.)"

This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary
Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to
this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would
already leave Malacañang after taking their final lunch on January 20,
2001 s < at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner
as saying to Secretary Angara: "ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do
I have to leave now?)" Secretary Angara told him to go and he did.

Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of

negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss
the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after, his relinquishment of
the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was
always briefed by Secretary Angara on the w progress of the
negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and In behalf of the petitioner
in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts pi and
declarations of Secretary Angara. Under our rules of evidence,
admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal
(petitioner). Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz:
"What Is done, by agent, is done by the I principal through him, as
through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either
In making a, contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying
the performance of any act within the scope of 'his authority, having
relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular
contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language
 of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, In legal effect, said by his
principal and admissible In evidence against such principal."

Section 31. Admission by conspirator - The act or declaration

of a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and during
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.

17. Read and digest the case of Salapuddin v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 184681, February 25, 2013.

FACTS: On November 13, 2007, shortly after the adjournment of the day's
session in Congress, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing
lobby of the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex. The
blast led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar and several others.
The explosion was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle
that was parked near the entrance stairs of the South Wing lobby.

Acting on a confidential information, the police raided an alleged ASG

safehouse located in Payatas, Quezon City, leading to the arrest of several
persons, one of which was Ikram Indama, who was the driver of petitioner
Gerry Salapuddin. In one of the affidavits executed by Ikram, he said that
he heard Salapuddin ordering Redwan to kill Rep. Akbar of Basilan.

The prosecution later on included Salapuddin in the complaint for

murder and multiple frustrated murder based on the affidavits of Ikram.
Later on, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution excluding Salapuddin
from the charges.

Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed a petition for

certiorari before the CA questioning the Secretary of Justice's resolution. The
CA reversed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice stating that the totality
of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent
moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the
commission of the crime.”
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for Salapuddin to be included in the
case.

RULING: No. An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant.

It cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as
hearsay against them. Tamargo vs. Awingan, elaborated on the reason for
this rule, viz.: [O]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s
own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him.

The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the
rule allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment
of the conspiracy by evidence other than the confession. In this case, there
is a dearth of proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a
conspiracy to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill
Congressman Akbar. Not one of the other persons arrested and subjected to
custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was involved in the plan to
set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating prosecutors
did no more than to rely on Salapuddin’s association with these persons to
conclude that he was a participant in the conspiracy, ruling thus: Respondent
Gerry Salapuddin’s participation in the foregoing, cannot be downplayed just
because he did not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it
has hands written all over it. The circumstances, the people and place used
are all, one way or another, associated with him. It cannot be mere
coincidence.

18. What are the requisites for the exception provided for under
Section 31?

The following are the requisites:

1. That the statement, act or declaration relates to the purpose or
object of the conspiracy;
2. The statement, act or declaration must be made during the
existence of the conspiracy, NOT before or after;
 3. The conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration (Independent evidence).
4. The existence of the conspiracy must be established by evidence
other than such act or declaration

Section 32. Admission by privies - Where one derives title to

property from another, the latter’s act, declaration, or omission,
in relation to the property, is evidence against the former if done
while the latter was holding the title.

19. When is there privity under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court?

There is privity when one is a successor-in-interest of another person.

20. Read and digest the case of Gevero v. IAC, [Link]. 77029,
August 30, 1990.

FACTS: DELCOR purchased a parcel of land from one Luis Lancero,

and the latter purchased the same on February 5, 1952 per deed of
sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated at the back
of the OCT covering mother lot identified in the names of the Geveros.
Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six
children.

The heirs of Babangha executed an extra-judicial settlement and

partition of the estate of Babangha, consisting of two lots, amon them
was the subject lot. By virtue of the exra-judicial settlement and
partition executed by the said jeirs of Babangha, the lots were
adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-
judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff filed an action with
the CFI to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of
Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a
portion of the subject lot.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of Lanceros be binding upon

DELCOR.
 RULING: No. Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one
derives title to property from another the act, declaration, or omission
of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is
evidence against the former." It Is however stressed that the
admission of the former owner of a property must have been made
while he was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be
binding upon the present, owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts
of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR,
the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.

SECTION 33. Admission by silence. - An act or declaration

made in the presence and within the hearing or observation
of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment
if not true, and when proper and possible for him or her to do
so, may be given in evidence against him or her.

21. What is the ruling in the case of Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15. April 3, 2001 related to ADMISSION BY SILENCE
(ADOPTIVE ADMISSION)?

It was held by the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Desierto that an

adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by
another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as
an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person. Jones explains that the “basis for the admissibility of
admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification
or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person
has made.” To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, “this
process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense.” In the
Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the
armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and
commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask
Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option
of “dignified exit or resignation.” Petitioner did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country.
 Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken
as an admission by him.

22. Read and digest the case of People v. Castañeda, G.R. No.
208290, December 11, 2013.

FACTS: Myrna Garcia and Custodio Vestidas, Jr. were charged before
the CTA of falsely declaring goods (Sec. 3602 Various Fraudulent
Practices Against Customs Revenue). Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their
Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. CTA dismissed the case against
Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. The prosecution filed its motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the CTA in 15 May 2013 resolution.

On 24 July 2013, the Run After the Smugglers Group, Revenue

Collection Monitoring Group, as counsel for the BOC, received a copy
of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of
judgment in the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA when in ruled that: 1) the
pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were
inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the
alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the
witnesses failed to positively identify the accused as responsible for
the misdeclaration of goods.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA erred in dismissing the case.

RULING: No. The CTA is correct in dismissing the case since the
prosecution failed to present the certified true copies of documentary
evidence, identify the misdeclared goods as well as the accused in
court, and file the petition on time. The government lawyers displayed
inefficiency in the administration of justice. The Court reminded the
government lawyers that they still remain officers of the court who are
expected to be competent. The Code of Professional Responsibility
likewise applies to lawyers in government service. Thus, the RATS
lawyers should be efficient in the administration of justice.
23. Read and digest the case of People v. Guillen, G.R. No. 191756,
November 25, 2013.

FACTS: At around 12 midnight, x x x "AAA" was inside her room on the

second floor of a two-storey house located at x x x Sampaloc, Manila.
At that time "AAA" was playing cards x x x while waiting for her
common-law husband to arrive. Momentarily, someone knocked at the
door. When "AAA" opened the door, appellant Jonas Guillen y Atienza,
who was her neighbor, entered the room and suddenly poked a
balisong on her neck. Appellant then turned off the lights, removed his
clothes, placed himself on top of "AAA," and inserted his penis inside
her private parts. After the rape was consummated, appellant stood
up and casually left the room. "AAA" immediately went out and x x x
sought assistance from her sister-in-law. After being told of the
incident, "AAA’s" sister-in-law contacted the police. When the
responding police officers arrived, appellant, who was readily identified
by "AAA" since he was her neighbor, was immediately arrested.

Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he had a

drinking spree at Galas, Quezon City and went home to Sampaloc,
Manila at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of May 20, 2002. He
surmised that "AAA" filed the charge against him because of his prior
altercation with "AAA’s" husband.

The RTC found appellant guilty as charged to which the CA affirmed.

Records show that appellant remained silent and passive despite being
confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at the police station
immediately after his arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not his silence when confronted by the accusation

of AAA at the police station is an implied admission of guilt.

RULING: No. It should be borne in mind that when appellant was

brought to the police station, he was already a suspect to the crime of
rape. As such, he was already under custodial investigation. Section
12, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz: Any person
 under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted
by the accusation of “AAA” at the police station, he was exercising his
basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence
should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the
trial court to state that appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied
admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation
of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence.

SECTION 34. Confession. – The declaration of an accused

acknowledging his or her guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him or her.

24. What is the ruling in Salapuddin v. CA, G.R. No. 184681, Feb. 25,
2013 related to extrajudicial confessions?

As to extrajudicial confessions, the Court held in Salappudin vs. CA that

an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot
be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay
against them. Tamargo vs. Awingan, elaborated on the reason for this
rule, viz.: [O]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against
him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be
bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought
not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.

4. PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE

 SECTION 35. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he or she did or did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like.

25. What is the second rule of RES INTER ALIOS ACTA?

Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
NOT ADMISSIBLE to prove that he or she did or did not do the
same or similar thing at another time. The exception of which is
evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

26. Read and digest the case of People v. Losano, G.R. No. 127122.
July 20, 1999.

FACTS: On March 13, 1996 Jovito Losano was charged with raping his
daughter Rowena. The Information alleges that the offense happened
sometime in May 1995, Rowena being only 6 years old when the
incident happened.

Losano entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued, prosecution

presented as witness Veronica Losano, the grandmother of Rowena
and mother of Jovito.

Veronica had Rowena examined by Dr. Ronald Bandonill, a medico-

legal officer on October 3, 1995. Bandonill issued a medical certificate
which states that 1) at the time of the examination, there were no
extra-genital injuries on Rowena's body; and 2) that her physical
virginity was preserved. It did however state that: “The presence of
congestion and inflammation at the vestibular mucosa and the
hymenal area coupled with intense pain and tenderness indicates the
probability of attempted penetration of the area by the hard erect male
organ which was not successful.”
Rowena testified that the rape happened in their house. She
remembers that her father took her clothes off, fondled her breast,
and got on top of her. She testified that it happened at night. She was
sleeping with her older sister and their grandmother Veronica when
Jovito came in and carried her outside and raped her.

On cross examination, Jovito Losano admitted that his other daughter

Maricel, age 11, had filed a criminal case for acts of lasciviousness
against him.

The trial court, in its assessment of the evidence, found that Jovito
admitted that a case for acts of lasciviousness. The trial court drew the
conclusion that the Jovito had the propensity to prey on his daughter
based on Section 34 (now 35 ) of Rule 130. The Regional Trial Court
found Jovito guilty and was sentenced to death penalty, thus it was
subject to the automatic review of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the trial court to hold that
Jovito Losano had the propensity to abuse his children on the basis of
a pending case of acts of lasciviousness filed against him by another
child.

RULING: No. SECTION 35. Similar Acts as Evidence. — Evidence that

one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he or she did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like.

The admission of Jovito that he was facing a charge of acts of

lasciviousness filed by his eleven-year old daughter only proves that
such a case was filed and pending with the municipal court.

It does not prove the propensity of Jovito to crave for his children. The
pendency of the case of acts of lasciviousness is not equivalent to
evidence that Jovito was guilty of the same. In equating the pendency
 of said case to his guilt thereof, the trial court ignored the constitutional
presumption of innocence afforded to Jovito Losano.

Thus, it was not proper for the trial court to hold that Jovito had then
propensity to sexually abuse his children based on the pending case,
but this error was not material in this case, as the prosecution was able
to prove by other evidence that Jovito raped his daughter.

27. Read and digest the case of People v. Nardo, G.R. No. 133888,
March 1, 2000.

FACTS: Accused was found guilty of raping his 14-yr old daughter, and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. For humanitarian
reasons, however, the trial court recommended that the DEATH
penalty be commuted to RECLUSION PERPETUA. Thereafter, Lorielyn
wrote to Atty. De Guzman a retraction letter regarding his father’s
innocence.

ISSUE: Whether or not retraction would negate an earlier declaration.

RULING: No. During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray

Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn
supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents’ permission to
leave the house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court
provides that: “Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same
or a similar thing at another time; but may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage, and the like.” While lying may constitute a habit, we
believe that the falsehood committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for
the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as
serious as charging one’s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with
all its serious repercussions.

28. Read and digest the case of People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644,
May 27, 2004.
 FACTS: Rolando Pineda together with several others allegedly staged
a hold-up while on board a bus. The police invited Ferrer, bus driver,
to identify the perpetrators if the crime from photographs the police
showed to him. Like Ferrer, Ramos also gave a statement regarding
the incident. Unlike Ferrer, Ramos candidly admitted that he could not
identify any of the perpetrators.

The police later arrested appellant based on an out-of-court

identification by Ferrer. Thereafter, the prosecution dug up other
criminal cases filed against appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not previous criminal charges independent from

the offense for which the accused in on trial may be admitted as
evidence.

RULING: No. In its attempt to pin the crime on appellant, the

prosecution dug up other criminal cases filed against appellant.
Appellant was previously charged with robbery and illegal possession
of a deadly weapon, concealing a deadly weapon, and assault, for
which he was released after posting bond.

Evidence is not admissible when it shows, or tends to show, that the

accused in a criminal case has committed a crime independent from
the offense for which he is on trial. A man may be a notorious criminal,
and may have committed many crimes, and still be innocent of the
crime charged on trial.

29. Read and digest the case of People v. Magpayo, G.R. Nos. 92961-
64, September 1, 1993.

FACTS: Magpayo here was accused in 4 cases (rape, robbery, robbery

with holdup, and forcible abduction with rape). It can be observed from
these cases that the victims are usually young girls under the age of
12. What Magpayo would do is that he would accuse these minor of a
crime then he would bring them to an isolated place them he would
rape or rob them. The trial court jointly tried these cases and found
Magpayo guilty of all of them. Magpayo assails the trial court’s
application of the doctrine of res inter alios acta (Sec. 35, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence) allegedly because the similarity of the
acts involved (i.e., molestation) was not sufficiently established.

ISSUE: Whether the Trial Court erred in the application of Section 35

of rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence.

RULING: No. Rule under Section 35, Rule 130:

Evidence which shows that the accused in a criminal case has
committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is
on trial is not admissible.

Exception: When such evidence tends directly to establish the

particular crime, and it is usually competent to prove the motive, the
intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each
other that proof of one tends to establish the other, or the identity of
the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.

In this case, the evidence introduced in the Forcible Abduction with

Rape was not introduced as evidence of similar acts to prove that the
accused also committed a similar act in the other rape and robbery.
These offenses are separate crimes and are the subject of separate
complaints and proofs although they were jointly tried.

The evidence was not offered and admitted to prove the other but only
to show the plan, scheme or modus operandi of the offender.

As observed by the Trial Court, the modus operandi of the offender is

that of approaching young girls of not more than twelve years of age,
and taking advantage of their innocence, imputed to them the
commission of a crime and brought them to an isolated place where
the offenses charged were committed.

Section 35, Rule 130 provides that evidence that one did or did not do
a certain thing at one time may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage
and the like.
 SECTION 36. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in writing to pay a
particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or
specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money,
instrument, or property.

30. Under the Civil Code, what constitutes a valid tender of payment?
What the relation of the civil law concept of tender of payment to
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court?

A valid tender of payment must be accompanied by delivery of money.

Under the law, if the offer payment is in writing and is refused without
a valid cause, the law presumes that at the time of the giving of the
letter, there was already a tender of payment. This is because “tender”
means offer of money. But if it was rejected, and if the supporting
letter was given within one year, but the case is filed beyond one year
one cannot claim that there was a valid tender of payment.
In relation to Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, although
there is no valid tender of payment, if a party makes the tender, and
the other party refuses it without a valid cause, the offer is considered
to be payment.