ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO, 

Petitioner,
vs.
ELIZA M. TORTOGO, LEONILA FLORES, ANANIAS SEDONIO, ADELINO MONET, ANGIE
MONET, JUANITO GARCIA, ELEONOR GARCIA, BENITA MOYA, JULIO ALTARES, LEA ALTARES,
CLARITA SABIDO, JULIE ANN VILLAMOR,JUANITA TUALA, VICTOR FLORES III, JOHNNY
MOYA, HAZEL AVANCEÑA, SONIA EVANGELIO, and GENNY MONTAÑO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 156358   August 17, 2011

Doctrine:

“Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable.  The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded, for the
immediate enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the
ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the full execution of final
and executory decisions.”

Facts:

On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for ejectment with
prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the respondents herein,
from his properties, docketed as Civil Case No. 23671 and raffled to Branch 6 of the MTCC.

The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two discrete groups. The first group,
represented by Atty. Romeo Subaldo, included those defendants occupying Lot 641-B-1, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-167924; Lot 641-B-2, covered by TCT No. T-167925; and Lot No.
641-B-3, covered by TCT No. T-167926, all owned by the plaintiff. The defendants in this group relied on
the common defense of being agricultural tenants on the land. The second group, on the other hand,
was represented by Atty. Ranela de la Fuente of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) and counted the
defendants occupying Lot No. F-V-3-3749-D, covered by TCT No. T-55630, also owned by the plaintiff.
The second group’s common defense was that the plaintiff’s title was not valid because their respective
portions were situated on foreshore land along the Guimaras Strait, and thus their respective areas were
subject to their own acquisition from the State as the actual occupants.

MTCC ruled in the favor of the Plaintiff.

1. Ordering the affected defendants or any person or persons in acting in their behalf, assignees or
successors-in-interests including members of their family to vacate portions of Lot No. 641-B-1 covered
by TCT No. 16742, Lot No.641-B-2 covered by TCT No. T-167926 and Lot Plan-F-V-337490-D covered by
TCT No. T-55630 which they occupy and turn over the possession of the said property to the plaintiff,
and to pay the cost of the suit.

The prayer for preliminary injunction/restraining order is denied for lack of basis.

Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTC’s decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA), insisting that the land was foreshore land and that the petitioner’s title (TCT No. 55630)
was not valid.

The CA dismissed the second group’s appeal, and later denied their motion for reconsideration on April
17, 2000.
On April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner’s motion.

On April 20, 2001, the respondents filed a motion to quash against the April 5, 2000 writ of execution and
its aliases, and a motion to stay the execution of the March 17, 1999 decision and the February 16, 2000
amended decision. They anchored their motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot
covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to the State.

They argued that such supervening event directly affected the execution of the March 17, 1999 decision
and its amendment, whose continued execution affecting foreshore land would be unjust to the
occupants or possessors of the property, including themselves.

On May 4, 2001, the MTCC denied the respondents’ motion to quash, observing that the cancellation of
the petitioner’s TCT No. T-55630 was an event that might or might not happen, and was not the
supervening event that could stay the execution.

The story would have ended then but for the fact that on October 1, 2001, or more than a year after the
writ of execution was served upon the defendants in Civil Case No. 23671, the respondents, led by
respondent Elisa M. Tortogo, and now assisted by Atty. Leon Moya, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order) in the
RTC in Negros Occidental, docketed as SCA Case No. 01-11522.

The RTC gave credence to the remedy filed before it.

Issue/s:

a.  Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the November 12, 2002 order of the RTC;
and

b.  Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin
the execution of the already final and executory March 17, 1999 decision of the MTCC.

Ruling:

We give due course to the petition as a petition for certiorari.

The RTC was guilty of manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of SCA Case No. 01-11522 and in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction to restrain the execution of the final and executory decision of the MTCC.

With the petition being self-styled as a petition for review on certiorari, a mode of appeal, we have first
to determine whether the assailed order of November 12, 2002 was an interlocutory or a final order. The
distinction is relevant in deciding whether the order is the proper subject of an appeal, or of a special civil
action for certiorari.

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be
done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.

The petition, by alleging acts constituting manifestly grave abuse of discretion, was a petition for
certiorari

Without disregarding the rule that an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of appeal, the Court is
constrained to treat the present recourse as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court of record, or other tribunal or officer,
exercising a judicial function, requiring the certification and return to the former of some proceeding then
pending, or the record and proceedings in some cause already terminated, in cases where the procedure
is not according to the course of the common law. The remedy is brought against a lower court, board,
or officer rendering a judgment or order and seeks the annulment or modification of the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and the granting of such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. It is available when the following indispensable elements concur, to wit:

1. That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

2. That such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; and

3. That there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

March 17, 1999 Decision of the MTCC, being already final and executory, could not be assailed; nor could
its execution be restrained.

Respondents had no existing right violated by the implementation of the writ of execution.

Here, the respondents did not establish the existence of an actual right to be protected by injunction.
They did not, to begin with, hold any enforceable claim in the property subject of the MTCC decision and
of the writ of execution.

We further note that the RTC Judge expressly made the TRO effective until further orders from him. He
thereby contravened explicit rules of procedure.  He knowingly did so, considering that he thereby
disregarded the nature and purpose of the TRO as a temporary and limited remedy, instead of a
permanent and unrestricted relief. He disregarded Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which
expressly stated that the life span of a TRO was only 20 days from service of the TRO on the party or
person sought to be enjoined. Considering that the limited life span of a TRO was a long-standing and
basic rule of procedure, he consciously arrogated unto himself a power that he did not have. Ignoring a
rule as elementary as the 20-day life span of a TRO amounted to gross ignorance of law and procedure.
 [G.R. No. 188360: January 21, 2010]

SPS. HEBER & CHARLITA EDILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. NORBERTO & DESIDERIA
DULPINA, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

On February 21, 2006, plaintiffs-respondents Spouses Norberto and Desideria Dulpina ( plaintiffs-
respondents) filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against the defendants-petitioners with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Del Carmen-San Isidro-San Benito, Surigao del Norte (MCTC).

The plaintiffs-respondents alleged that they purchased from Wencelito Camingue a 235-square meter
residential lot and house located in Poblacion, San Isidro, Surigao del Norte, through a Deed of
Sale dated May 14, 1990. On August 8, 2005, defendant-petitioner Heber Edillo, without their consent
and against their express prohibition, suddenly fenced off and occupied a 50-square meter portion of the
western part of the disputed property while uttering threats against plaintiffs-respondents. On January
26, 2006, they sent the defendants-petitioners a notice to vacate the disputed property, but the
defendants-petitioners refused to comply.

In their Answer dated March 1, 2006, the defendants-petitioners countered that the Complaint states no
cause of action because the plaintiffs-respondents failed to allege that they were in prior physical
possession of the disputed property. They also alleged that they acquired the disputed property through
three (3) separate Deeds of Absolute Sale from Apolinar Saragoza, Felomino Forcadilla, and Wenceslao
Caunzad.

THE MCTC RULING

On May 23, 2007, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC decided the appeal on November 7, 2007. It set aside the MCTC judgment and ordered the
defendants-petitioners to vacate the subject property and to restore the plaintiffs-respondents to their
possession. It likewise ordered the payment of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.

THE CA RULING

The CA dismissed the Petition in its Resolution of January 28, 2009 on the ground that it does not contain
a statement of the factual background of the case, in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. A special division of five (5) justices, with Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson dissenting rendered
the resolution.

THE PETITION

The defendants-petitioners argue that the CA's outright dismissal of the petition was unwarranted since
the Petition for Review and the Amended Petition (filed with the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Dismissal of the Original Petition) sufficiently recited the factual background of the case. They submit that
the annexes to the original and amended petitions, consisting of the Complaint, the Answer, the other
pleadings, and the MCTC and RTC Decisions, also contain this factual background. They point out that a
relaxation of technical rules is justified by the merits of the case - the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain
the plaintiffs-respondents' appeal because the MCTC Decision had become final and executory; the
Motion for Reconsideration the plaintiffs-respondents filed is a prohibited pleading in summary
proceedings and did not stop the running of the period for the decision's finality.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition outright.

Ruling:

We find for the defendants-petitioners.

Procedure on Appeal; Liberal

We find for the defendants-petitioners.

Procedure on Appeal; Liberal

An appeal to the CA from an RTC Decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is via a
Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 42 prescribes the
following requirements:

SEC. 2. Form and contents. -- The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of
fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible
duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by
the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action
or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts
and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis supplied.)

Non-compliance with these requirements is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the Petition, pursuant to
Section 3 of the same Rule, which reads:

SEC. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. -- The failure of the petitioner to comply with any
of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for
costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany
the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

In not a few cases, we have ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of law allowing the appeal.

But while we have so ruled, we recognize nonetheless that the right to appeal is an essential part of our
system of judicial processes, and courts should proceed with caution in order not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal.

In this line of rulings, we have repeatedly stressed that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities.
The law and jurisprudence grant to courts - in the exercise of their discretion along the lines laid down by
this Court - the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the
parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.

The defendants-petitioners'
meritorious case; a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading in summary procedure.

Specifically, Section 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Section 13(c) of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court consider a motion for reconsideration of a judgment a prohibited pleading.

The Doctrine of Immutability

A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable; the judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. While there are recognized exceptions
- e.g., the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable- none of these exceptions apply to the present case.
 A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000

GLORIA LUCAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS, MeTC, Branch 9,

Facts:

In a verified complaint dated May 20, 1997, complainant Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge Amelia
A. Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave
Abuse of Discretion relative to Civil Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by Elenita F.
Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment".

Complainant, who was the defendant in the aforecited case, alleged that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued
an Order dated February 26, 1997 granting the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
January 13, 1997, which dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the
Preliminary Conference.

Complainant averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure that
a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the
motion for reconsideration. She added that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had
pointed out in open court that the case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the judge
ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to complainant.

On June 18, 1997, respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint. In her
Comment dated September 16, 1997, she admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration even
if the same is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She explained, however, that it was granted in
the interest of justice.

In her Comment, respondent stated:

"The Order subject of this complaint is the Order dated January 13, 1997 dismissing the complaint for
ejectment for failure of the plaintiff to appear for preliminary conference and more importantly her
lawyer, Atty. Jose Suing, who was duly empowered to appear for preliminary conference by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney.

Immediately upon learning the said order of dismissal and awarding of attorneys fees, Atty. Suing filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on January 17, 1997 (Annex "A") stating that he failed to appear due to a
sudden excruciating stomach pain. He further stated that his Secretary called the Court but to no avail
until finally the call came through and she was informed that the case was dismissed. Over the objection
of the defendant that the Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading which this Presiding
Judge is fully aware of under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the Motion for Reconsideration was
nonetheless granted in the interest of justice. The question is poised. Are the actuations of judges to be
governed strictly by the Rule on Summary Procedure despite their belief in good faith that in special
cases, its observance would result in a miscarriage of justice?

Judges are supposed to responsible Public Officials and should be able to perceive and discern
circumstances which might lead to miscarriage of justice, thus, negating the very purpose and essence of
the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Rule on Summary Procedure is not a straight-jacket and it is
believed it was never meant to be that. This is the reason why we have in the Rules of Court Section 5
(g) of Rule 135 which is one of the inherent powers of the Court, that is, to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

With respect to the allegation that the charge of ignorance of the law was compounded by the failure to
issue a writ of execution, it bears stressing that the Order dated January 13, 1997 never gained finality
because the plaintiff was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration within the fifteen (15) day period,
that is, on January 17, 1997.

Issue:

Whether or not there a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Judge in granting the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Ruling:

Respondent Judge Fabros maintained that she could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law as she
knows that a motion for reconsideration of judgment is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She
explained that although there is already a judgment dismissing the case, she granted the plaintiffs motion
for reconsideration in the interest of justice since the reasons stated in the motion for reconsideration are
meritorious.

Respondent failed to realize that the first duty of the court is to apply the law and that when the law is
clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation. Although her intention was good, this could
not free her from liability.

Respondent should have denied the motion since the plaintiff had other judicial remedies like appeal."

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of
P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion. The Court, however, finds this recommendation without
factual and legal basis.

As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thus,

"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the
merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion
prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after
trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of
a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial
of the case.
 [G.R. NO. 156809: March 4, 2009]

ESTATE OF FELOMINA G. MACADANGDANG, represented by Court Appointed Administrator

Facts:

On 18 January 2000, Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Atty. Macadangdang), acting as administrator of the
Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang (petitioner), filed an action for Unlawful Detainer with Damages
against Lucia Gaviola, Agapito Romero, Cristina Quiñones, Boy Laurente, Agustina Tuna, Sotero Tapon,
Buenaventura Muring, Sr., Rogelio Pasaje, Fe Tuboro, Estanislao Pen, Pablo Navales, and Jose Dagatan
(respondents). Respondents were occupying, by mere tolerance, portions of four parcels of land in the
name of the late Felomina G. Macadangdang, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-6084, T-
6085, T-6086, and T-6087, all in the Registry of Deeds of Davao City.

In a Decision dated 27 June 2000, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Davao City, ruled
in favor of petitioner.

Respondents appealed from the MTCC's Decision.

RTC Ruling:

In an Order dated 14 September 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City dismissed the appeal
for respondents' failure to file an appeal memorandum.

On petitioner's motion, the RTC remanded the case to the MTCC for execution of judgment in its Order
dated 22 September 2000.

Respondents filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC's 14 September
2000 Order.

CA Ruling:

In its Decision promulgated on 26 July 2002, the Court of Appeals set aside the 14 September 2000
Order and remanded the case to the RTC.

The Court of Appeals ruled that as a matter of policy, the dismissal of an appeal on purely technical
grounds is frowned upon. The Court of Appeals ruled that rules of procedure are intended to promote
and not defeat substantial justice and should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The Court
of Appeals further ruled that litigants should be afforded every opportunity to establish the merits of their
cases without the constraints of technicalities.

The Court of Appeals ruled that a distinction should be made between failure to file a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period and failure to file the appeal memorandum within the period granted by
the appellate court. The Court of Appeals ruled that failure to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period would result to failure of the appellate court to obtain jurisdiction over the appealed
decision. Thus, the assailed decision would become final and executory upon failure to move for
reconsideration. On the other hand, failure to file the appeal memorandum within the period granted by
the appellate court would only result to abandonment of appeal, which could lead to its dismissal upon
failure to move for its reconsideration. Thus, the RTC erred in denying respondents' motion for
reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that while the negligence of counsel binds the client, the rule is not
without exceptions such as when its application would result to outright deprivation of the client's liberty
or property, or when a client would suffer due to the counsel's gross or palpable mistake or negligence.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

In its 10 December 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.

Issue:

The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's dismissal of
respondents' appeal for failure to file an appeal memorandum.

Ruling:

The petition has merit.

Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred when it allowed the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC. Petitioners allege that the case stemmed from an unlawful detainer case
where the Rules on Summary Procedure apply. Petitioners allege that under the Rules on Summary
Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners also allege that due to the
mandatory character of Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the RTC correctly
dismissed the appeal. Petitioners also pointed out that respondents' Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial
was neither verified nor accompanied by affidavits of merit as required under Section 2, Rule 37 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Since the
case before the the MTCC was an unlawful detainer case, it was governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays in the disposition
of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is prohibited, including the filing of a motion
for reconsideration.

Procedure on Appeal

Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. -

(a) Upon receipt of the complete records or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court shall notify the parties of such fact.

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be
furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant's
memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a
memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the case
shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed.
(Emphasis supplied).

In this case, the RTC dismissed respondents' appeal for their failure to file an appeal memorandum in
accordance with Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC's dismissal of the appeal.

The Court of Appeals ruled that while the negligence of counsel binds the client, the circumstances in this
case warrant a departure from this general rule.

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in
the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality.

In this case, respondents' counsel advanced this reason for his failure to submit the appeal
memorandum:

c. That there was a delay in the filing of defendants-appellants appeal memorandum due to the heavy
backlog of legal paperwork piled on the table of the undersigned counsel, and he realized his failure to
submit defendants['] appeal memorandum when he received a copy of the dismissal of the case. This is
to consider that he is the only lawyer in his law office doing a herculean task.

We find no reason to exempt respondents from the general rule. The cause of the delay in the filing of
the appeal memorandum, as explained by respondents' counsel, was not due to gross negligence. It
could have been prevented by respondents' counsel if he only acted with ordinary diligence and prudence
in handling the case. For a claim of gross negligence of counsel to prosper, nothing short of clear
abandonment of the client's cause must be shown.

Finally, respondents were not deprived of due process of law. The right to appeal is not a natural right or
a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.