SCRIPT:

TOTAL SLIDE 14.

FIRST SEVEN MEGHASHRITA DAS(1-7)

NEXT SEVEN RISHITA RAJ(8-14)

FIRST SEVEN MEGHASHRITA DAS(1-7)

(script)

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Slide 1
Good afternoon everyone, I am meghashrita das, a second year ug student……..
On behalf of my team m.C, I would like to start today’s presentation.
We have worked on the topic- Regulatory
framework for Corporate
Governance mechanisms, influenced on audit committees and
their impact on the financial reporting quality for Singapore
listed companies

Slide 2
So, why are we taking Singapore listed companies?
We have taken at most 9 companies for our discussion on
cg,ac,covid impacts and studied their financial reporting qualities.

Slide 3
Following a series of high-profile corporate scandals, many of which were later discovered to
have insufficient or ineffective governance processes, there has been a renewed focus on
corporate governance over the last 20 years. Structured audit committees will raise the quality
of financial statements while ensuring the independence of the audit.

More prescriptive audit committee legislation has prompted a flood of research into very
specific aspects of audit committee characteristics and operations, with a focus on how these
characteristics impact specific aspects of the financial reporting process, over the last decade.
We also look at a few studies that looked at how shareholders responded to audit committee
characteristics in order to be comprehensive.
In addition, audit committees with accounting experts are divided into four categories:
accounting experts only, accounting and finance experts only, accounting and supervisory
experts only, and audit committees with all three expertise. The findings indicate that audit
committees composed solely of accounting professionals have no effect on the consistency of
financial reporting.

Slide 4
Singapore's corporate governance regulatory framework is based on a set of mandatory rules,
primarily the Companies Act (CA), the Securities and Futures Act (SFA), and, in comparison
to companies listed on the Singapore Exchange (SGX), best practice recommendations,
which are primarily laid out in the form of the Code of Corporate Governance and the
accompanying Practice Guidance (MAS).

The regulatory structure for corporate governance in Singapore can be broken down into two
groups. They are, indeed-

1. legal regulation (including quasi-legal regulation).

2. Codes and practice (particularly, the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance

2005).

Slide 5
Their structure and control

There are three aspects to the regulatory mechanisms relating to the structure and control of
companies.

1. Company’s Shareholding and organizational structure

2. Management of the Positions
3. Misuse of the Dominant Authority
Directors’ appointments and duties

the legislation often imposes stringent responsibilities on company directors. The following
are examples of common law remedies:
 ● The duty to act with reasonable care, skill, and diligence
● The duty to act in good faith and in the interests of the company
● The duty to use powers for proper purposes
● The duty to avoid conflicts of interest
● The duty to retain discretions in the performance of their obligations to the company.

Slide 6

Codes and best practice – the singapore code of corporate governance 2005:

In addition to legislative and quasi-legislative regulation, codes and best practice also play a
crucial role in regulating corporate governance. Unlike the previous , regulation under the
latter generally doesn't take the shape of mandatory rules. Instead these function as a guide,
designed to encourage voluntary practices that are aimed toward giving stakeholders greater
confidence within the governance standards of the corporate .

The main source of best practice in Singapore is the Singapore Code of Corporate
Governance 2005 (‘the Code’).

The key practices encouraged include:

● having an effective board which is aware of its roles and responsibilities

● having formal and transparent processes for board appointments, board performance,
and board and executive remuneration.
● emphasising the importance of accountability and audit, and requiring the
establishment of audit committees and the internal audit function
● having strong internal control processes
● promoting greater disclosure for, and communication with, shareholders.

Slide 7

The strength of the Audit committee:

In Singapore, every publicly traded company must have its own audit committee, which must
have at least three members( CA,1994). An effective audit committee should play a key role
in structuring a company's financial controls. They should enhance the effectiveness for both
internal and external auditors.
An audit committee should be reliable, with a majority, if not all, of its members being
independent and knowledgeable about accounting, auditing, and control issues (Cohen,2000).
Furthermore, the committee should meet on a regular basis , and strong contact networks with
both the external and internal auditors should be in place (Cadbury, 1992; Deloitte 1998).
Investors, auditors, and directors all agree that a solid, efficient audit committee aids external
auditors in performing the audit, according to Goodwin and Seow (2000).

Slide 8 :
For detailed analysis of financial reporting and other factors we are considering the top 3
largest companies among 9 companies listed in our research paper. We have gone through
their cg,ac and impacts of covid19 on their economic growth by SWOT theory that is
strength, weakness, opportunities and threats.

Slide 9 :
DBS HOLDINGS:
Competent leadership, robust internal controls, a strong risk culture, and stakeholder
responsibility are all part of their governance system. Strength part of this corporate
governance system are,
their leadership model that maintains an effective balance of authority, transparency, and
independence in decision making across our various functional and regional divisions, and
their Board plays a key role in determining our governance standards to meet our
stakeholders' expectations.
As the Covid-19 pandemic unfolded in 2020, causing unprecedented uncertainty in all of the
Group's key locations, the Board spent considerable time reviewing and discussing with
management.
They must prepare properly post-Covid-19 and look for business opportunities that may arise
from the changes necessitated by Covid-19 (for example, increased cyber security risk
resulting from a substantial increase in staff working from home); and for these, they must
prepare properly post-Covid-19 and look for business opportunities that may arise from this
crisis.
Slide 10:
Its management is concerned with both the direct management of the Company's own
activities and the supervision of the operations of other publicly traded firms within the
Group.
The Group recognizes the importance of good corporate governance in achieving long-term
sustainability and values the corporate stability that effective governance provides. It is
committed to high governance standards and has built a policy that both it and its
stakeholders believe is suitable for the nature of its business and the long-term strategy it
pursues in Asian markets over several years.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a major negative effect on the Group's results. It's
impossible to say how much of a negative effect the pandemic would have on future trading
results. As a result, determining the effect of the pandemic on some aspects of the financial
statements is fraught with risk.
The assumptions supporting the valuation of investment properties have been updated to
reflect management’s best estimate of the impact of [Link] assumptions in
management's estimated credit loss models used to assess the provisions for consumer
financing debtors have been updated to include expected potential losses.

Slide 11:
The Directors are responsible for preparing financial statements in compliance with the
relevant structure and ensuring that they present an accurate and fair picture, as outlined more
thoroughly in the Responsibility Statement and the Corporate Governance [Link] Board
of Directors is also responsible for implementing any internal controls they deem appropriate
to ensure that financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or
[Link] auditing of financial statements is the responsibility of the auditors. Their goals
are to obtain fair assurance that the financial statements as a whole are free of material
misstatement.
The most important effect of COVID-19 on the financial statements has been in the
assumptions that support the valuation of investment assets, which have been revised to
reflect management's best estimate of COVID-19's effects. COVID-19's effect on the Group's
liquidity and ability to survive as a going concern was also considered.. COVID-19 has had
an effect on management's way of operating, including the execution of controls, as a result
of staff members working remotely at times.
Slide 12:
The role of audit committees in corporate governance has gotten a lot of attention in the last
two decades. Most of this stems from regulators who see audit committees as a critical
governance tool with the ability to greatly enhance the consistency of corporate financial
statements and, as a result, ensure greater accountability for both financial markets and
individual shareholders.
More recent research recognises that audit committees are now quasi-mandatory in many
countries, so academic focus has shifted to topics such as their composition, competence, and
relationship with other aspects of corporate [Link] independent audit committees
and those with greater accounting/financial experience seem to have a positive effect on
financial statement consistency.
Most of the evidence examined here shows that the independence and experience of the audit
committee have a positive effect on a variety of governance outcomes. This is significant
because it aligns with the tenor of most governance changes, in which these variables are
increasingly being recognised as critical for ensuring audit committee effectiveness in
improving the financial reporting process.

Some of our future research can be beneficial in gaining a deeper understanding of the
essence of these relationships. For example, there is some confusion about the specific
standards of independence and whether fully independent committees are more successful
than partially independent committees. Future research may be useful in determining the
effect of more specific indicators of independence and competence on audit committee
governance.
Slide 1:

Hello everyone, we are a team of undergraduate students from Indian Institute of Technology
Kharagpur, here to present our endeavour on Regulatory framework for Corporate Governance
mechanisms, influence on audit committees and their impact on the financial reporting quality. I
am meghashrita das and I am joined today by Rishita Raj.

Slide 2:

During the last two decades audit committees have become a common mechanism of corporate
governance internationally. Recent years have seen attempts to enhance the role of the audit
committee to address governance issues in Singapore, followed by significant corporate failures in
which the adequacy of the audit committee has been questioned. So we move forward by targeting
the Singapore market.

Slide 3:

Audit committees may consider information about the characteristics of the audit firm itself,
such as size, financial strength and stability, presence in key markets, approach to
professional development, technological capabilities, nature of the audit approach, quality of
thought leadership, and eminence in the marketplace. Following a series of high-profile
corporate scandals, many of which were later discovered to have insufficient or ineffective
governance processes, there has been a renewed focus on corporate governance over the
last 20 years. Structured audit committees will raise the quality of financial statements while
ensuring the independence of the statutory audit. We also look at a few studies that looked
at how shareholders responded to audit committee characteristics in order to be
comprehensive. In addition, audit committees with accounting experts are divided into four
categories: accounting experts only, accounting and finance experts only, accounting and
supervisory experts only, and audit committees with all three expertise. The findings indicate
that audit committees composed solely of accounting professionals have no effect on the
consistency of financial reporting.

Slide 4:

Our very first modus operandi was to analyse regulatory frameworks. Singapore's corporate
governance regulatory framework is based on a set of mandatory rules, primarily the
Companies Act (CA), the Securities and Futures Act (SFA), and, in comparison to companies
listed on the Singapore Exchange (SGX), best practice recommendations, which are primarily
laid out in the form of the Code of Corporate Governance and the accompanying Practice
Guidance (MAS).

The regulatory structure for corporate governance in Singapore can be broken down into two
groups. They are, indeed-

1. legal regulation (including quasi-legal regulation).

2. Codes and practice (particularly, the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance

2005).

Slide 5:

There are three aspects to the regulatory mechanisms relating to the structure and control of
companies.

[Link]’s Shareholding and organizational structure

[Link] of the Positions
[Link] of the Dominant Authority

Directors’ appointments and duties

the legislation often imposes responsibilities on company directors. The following are
examples of common law remedies:

● The duty to act with reasonable care, skill, and diligence

● The duty to act in good faith and in the interests of the company
● The duty to use powers for proper purposes
● The duty to avoid conflicts of interest
● The duty to retain discretions in the performance of their obligations to the company.

Slide 6:

Codes and best practice – the singapore code of corporate governance 2005:
In addition to legislative and quasi-legislative regulation, codes and best practice also play a
crucial role in regulating corporate governance. Unlike the previous , regulation under the
latter generally doesn't take the shape of mandatory rules. Instead these function as a guide,
designed to encourage voluntary practices that are aimed toward giving stakeholders greater
confidence within the governance standards of the corporate .

The main source of best practice in Singapore is the Singapore Code of Corporate
Governance 2005 (‘the Code’).

The key practices encouraged include:

● having an effective board which is aware of its roles and responsibilities

● having formal and transparent processes for board appointments and board
performance,
● emphasising the importance of accountability and audit, and requiring the
establishment of audit committees and the internal audit function
● having strong internal control processes
● promoting greater disclosure and communication with shareholders.

Now i would like to handover to rishita.

Slide 7:

The best audit committees are those that set the appropriate tone at the top where the focus is on
ensuring the organization acts in accordance with the best interests of its stakeholders. Fundamentally,
this can only occur in environments where in-depth knowledge, integrity and an unbiased perspective
pervade and are brought to bear at the board and audit committee, senior management and leadership
levels. The best audit committee members demonstrate a high level of involvement and engage in
frequent communications, ensuring that a two-way constructive dialogue occurs at all times whereby
appropriate information-and knowledge-sharing takes place between all parties involved.

In Singapore, every publicly traded company must have its own audit committee, which must have at
least three members( CA,1994). An effective audit committee should play a key role in structuring a
company's financial controls. They should enhance the effectiveness for both internal and external
auditors.
An audit committee should be reliable, with a majority, if not all, of its members being independent
and knowledgeable about accounting, auditing, and control issues (Cohen,2000). Furthermore, the
committee should meet on a regular basis , and strong contact networks with both the external and
internal auditors should be in place (Cadbury, 1992; Deloitte 1998). Investors, auditors, and directors
all agree that a solid, efficient audit committee aids external auditors in performing the audit,
according to Goodwin and Seow (2000).

Slide 8:

We have divided the analysis of financial reporting of top 3 out of 9 mentioned companies on the
basis of corporate governance, audit committee, and impact due to covid 19.

We have gone through their corporate governance, audit committee and impacts of covid19
on economic growth by performing SWOT analysis

Slide 9

DBS Group Holdings

Competent leadership, robust internal controls, a strong risk culture, and stakeholder
responsibility are all part of their governance system. The leadership model that maintains an
effective balance of authority, transparency, and independence in decision making across
various functional and regional divisions, and Board plays a key role in determining
governance standards to meet stakeholders' expectations.

As the Covid-19 pandemic unfolded in 2020, causing unprecedented uncertainty in all of the
Group's key locations, the Board spent considerable time reviewing and discussing with
management.

They must prepare properly post-Covid-19 and look for business opportunities that may arise
from the changes necessitated by Covid-19 (for example, increased cyber security risk
resulting from a substantial increase in staff working from home); and for these, they must
prepare properly post-Covid-19 and look for business opportunities that may arise from this
crisis.

SLIDE 10:

Jardine Matheson Holdings

Its management is concerned with both the direct management of the Company's own
activities and the supervision of the operations of other publicly traded firms within the
Group.
The Group recognizes the importance of good corporate governance in achieving long-term
sustainability and values the corporate stability that effective governance provides. It is
committed to high governance standards and has built a policy that both it and its
stakeholders believe is suitable for the nature of its business and the long-term strategy it
pursues in Asian markets over several years.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a major negative effect on the Group's results. It's
impossible to say how much of a negative effect the pandemic would have on future trading
results. As a result, determining the effect of the pandemic on some aspects of the financial
statements is fraught with risk.
The assumptions supporting the valuation of investment properties have been updated to
reflect management’s best estimate of the impact of [Link] assumptions in
management's estimated credit loss models used to assess the provisions for consumer
financing debtors have been updated to include expected potential losses.

SLIDE 11:

Hongkong Land Holdings

The Directors are responsible for preparing financial statements in compliance with the
relevant structure and ensuring that they present an accurate and fair picture, as outlined more
thoroughly in the Responsibility Statement and the Corporate Governance [Link] Board
of Directors is also responsible for implementing any internal controls they deem appropriate
to ensure that financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or
[Link] auditing of financial statements is the responsibility of the auditors. Their goals
are to obtain fair assurance that the financial statements as a whole are free of material
misstatement.
The most important effect of COVID-19 on the financial statements has been in the
assumptions that support the valuation of investment assets, which have been revised to
reflect management's best estimate of COVID-19's effects. COVID-19's effect on the Group's
liquidity and ability to survive as a going concern was also considered.. COVID-19 has had
an effect on management's way of operating, including the execution of controls, as a result
of staff members working remotely at times.

Slide 12:
The role of audit committees in corporate governance has gotten a lot of attention in the last
two decades. Most of this stems from regulators who see audit committees as a critical
governance tool with the ability to greatly enhance the consistency of corporate financial
statements and, as a result, ensure greater accountability for both financial markets and
individual shareholders.
More recent research recognises that audit committees are now quasi-mandatory in many
countries, so academic focus has shifted to topics such as their composition, competence, and
relationship with other aspects of corporate [Link] independent audit committees
and those with greater accounting/financial experience seem to have a positive effect on
financial statement consistency.
Most of the evidence examined here shows that the independence and experience of the audit
committee have a positive effect on a variety of governance outcomes. This is significant
because it aligns with the tenor of most governance changes, in which these variables are
increasingly being recognised as critical for ensuring audit committee effectiveness in
improving the financial reporting process.

Some of our future research can be beneficial in gaining a deeper understanding of the
essence of these relationships. For example, there is some confusion about the specific
standards of independence and whether fully independent committees are more successful
than partially independent committees. Future research may be useful in determining the
effect of more specific indicators of independence and competence on audit committee
governance.

THANK YOU