SMARTBOOK Peabo esate! Bo Small Unit by Seba Ti Wert es CET) ae nian gE TT haOPFOR. SMARTBOOK Ces Pe Riera b RED TEAM ARMY Forces, Operations & Tactics Second Edition (OPFOR3-2) The Lightning Press Fg Dr. Christopher Larsen Norman M. WadeThe Lightning Press 2227 Arrowhead Blvd. Lakeland, FL 33813 24-hour Order/Voicemail: 1-800-997-8827 E-mail: [email protected] www.TheLightningPress.com (OPFORS-2) OPFOR SMARTbOOK 3 - Red Team Army, 2nd Ed Forces, Operations & Tactics OPFOR3-2 is the second edition of OPFOR SMARTbook 3 - Red Team Army, completely revised for 2019. In addition to the base FM 100-2-1/2/3 Soviet Threat series, new/updated material includes the FM/TC 7-100 Opposing Forces series, FM 3-0 Operations (Oct '17), ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Aug ‘18), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May ‘13), a review of modern (present-day) Russian forces, and more than a dozen historical vignettes. 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All other public domain imagery sourced from the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation official website (http://eng.mil.ru) Printed and bound in the United States of America. View, download FREE samples and purchase online: www.TheLightningPress.com(OPFOR3-2) Notes to Reader Red Team Army (Forces, Operations & Tactics) In today’s complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact na- ture of future conflict that might involve U.S. forces. This is the nature of the contem- Porary operational environment (COE), and training for such an environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past. It has been nearly thirty years since a holistic explanation of the Soviet-based Opposing Force (OPFOR) was examined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-2 series. Recognizing this, “OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army” re-examines and outlines the doctrinal operational construct and historical foundations of Soviet-era military forces from the FM 100-2 series, which is now out-of-print and largely unavailable. Second, OPFOR SMARTbook 3 reorganizes that foundational material and aligns it in keeping with contemporary military doctrinal taxonomy to include the FM/TC 7-100 Opposing Forces series, FM 3-0 Operations, ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense, and FMs 3-90-1 & -2 Tactics. Third, OPFOR SMARTbook 3 translates and bridges the strategic- and operation- al-level doctrine into tactical application at the small-unit level. Through this triangulation, a more modern rendition of Red Team Armies emerges. OPFOR3-2 is the second edition of OPFOR SMARTbook 3 - Red Team Amy, revised for 2019. In addition to the base FM 100-2-1/2/3 Soviet Threat series, new/updated material includes the FM/TC 7-100 Opposing Forces series, FM 3-0 Operations (Oct ‘17), ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Aug ‘18), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May ‘13), a review of modern (present-day) Russian forces, and more than a dozen historical vignettes. Opposing Forces (OPFOR) From the U.S. doctrinal perspective, an enemy is an individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. Apotential adversary is sometimes designated as a threat. Once hostilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy. An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow U.S. forces to train against a challenging and plausible spar- ring partner that represents the wide range of possible opponents the military could face in actual conflict. 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Notes to Reader-1Prologue: Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Doctrine and the Historical “Soviet Threat’ Model When the Army established its OPFOR program in 1976 with Army Regulation 350-2, it defined an OPFOR simply as “an organized force created by and from U.S. Army units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force.” Thus, all OPFORs were originally threat-based, in the sense that they replicated the forces, capabilities, and doctrine of a particular country officially recognized as a threat or potential adversary. In the midst of the Cold War, the 1976 regulation identified only one potential adversary against which to train: the Soviet Union. Over time, the Army developed other OPFORS. The Soviet threat was described in great detail in the 80s with the FM 100-2 series. The three-volume set was the definitive source of unclassifed information on Soviet ground forces and the Soviet model of combined arms warfare. Used together, the series provided a thorough reference on the Soviet Army. Initiatlly, these publications were distritubution- restricted publications limited to US Government agencies. In Sept ‘94, they were marked as “Approved for Public Release, Distribution is Unlimited" by TRADOC. The series is now out-of-print and largely unavailable. FM 100-2-1: The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul ‘84) This field manual describes the operations and tactics of Soviet general purpose ground forces. The content is based on infor- mation in Soviet writings and other open source literature. Most available information is focused on potential battle in Central Europe, This manual reflects that focus. Though Soviet military activity extends to other parts of the world, the Soviet forces opposite NATO represent a general model for Soviet forces elsewhere, as well as for forces of Soviet allies and surrogates. FM 100-2-2: The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul ‘84) The term “specialized warfare," used in the title of this FM, is intended to be an abbreviated, collective description of combat actions which, in US terminology, may be described as “special operations.” or “operations in special conditions.” Special operations include airborne, heliborne,and amphibious operations, and unconventional warfare in the enemy rear. The Soviet concept of the “rear area’ visualizes modern war in an unprecedented spatial scope. This rear area concept stretches from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) back to the national capital. FM 100-2-3: The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment (Jul ‘91) The Soviet armed forces include five separate components: the strategic rocket forces, the ground forces, the air forces, the air defense forces, and naval forces. The generic term “Soviet Army" normally includes all but naval forces. This manual concentrates on the largest of the these components, the Soviet ground forces. Highly modernized organization and equipment combine to make the Soviet ground forces the most powerful land army in the world, with unprecedented flexibility, mobility, and firepower. 2-PrologueIn today’s complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict that might involve U.S. forces. So the military must be ready to meet the challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats. This is the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past. From the U.S. perspective, an enemy is an individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. A potential adver- sary is sometimes designated as a threat. In this sense, the military defines threat as “any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.” Once hostilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy. An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow U.S. forces to train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the wide range of possible opponents the military could face in actual conflict. It enables training of all branches of the military and prepares forces for potential combat operations. In its time, the threat-based OPFOR served the Army very well, particularly for units tar- geted against specific threats. The benefits of this training were borne out, for example, in Operation Desert Storm. Techniques and doctrine, including deep attack and the intel- ligence preparation of the battlefield, developed to cope with specific threats and honed against the OPFOR, enabled the Army to achieve decisive results on the battlefield More recent recent endeavors to describe threats include a strategic perspective explored in FM 7-100 Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy (MAY 2003). Contemporary operational warfighting capabilities of the OPFOR are described in FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations (DEC 2004); TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat (NOV 2010); and TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces (JAN 2014). Additional OPFOR resources include Red Team University and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). In the FM 7-100 series, TRADOC has created a flexible baseline for an OPFOR that can be adapted to meet a variety of different training requirements in a number of differ- ent scenarios that reflect the current operational environment. The OPFOR operational doctrine outlined represents a realistic composite of potential adversaries the Army might encounter in the real-world situations of the foreseeable future. However, the world is continually changing, as are the threats and challenges for which the Army must be prepared. The Army must remain flexible, as must the OPFOR designed to serve as a challenging sparring partner in the training environment. Glaringly, a gap exists in our explanation of small-unit tactics, techniques and proce- dures of potential adversaries, threats, and enemies - particularly regarding how those tactics bridge up to operational and strategic frameworks. This gap of tactical description encompasses “state actors” within Red Team Army doctrine, as well as “non-state ac- tors” such as insurgents, guerillas, terrorists, pirates, bandits, and crime cartels. One of the goals of this work, therefore, is to enable the development of a robust OPFOR at the small unit level in live tactical simulation, based on the construct of the historical founda- tions and doctrinal underpinnings of available OPFOR doctrine. This work does not purport to define a single military by name, However, it assumes that contemporary Red Team Army doctrine has evolved from the Soviet tradition. And while the now-defunct Soviet Amy is not inherently synonymous with Red Team Army, the doctrinal underpinings, historical foundations and cultural lineage of the military forces is established. For editorial convenience, this manual may refer to the two as if synonymous. When “Soviet” is used, it is based on the historical foundations from the FM 100-2 series of the 80s and 90s (and is used in the present tense); when ‘Red Team Army (RTA)” is used, it refers to an amalgamation of historic enemies and current antagonists. Through a triangulation of potential, actual and historic threats, a credible OPFOR may be scripted, trained, and developed into a robust training simulation scenario. Prologue-3(OPFORS-2) References The following references were used in part to compile “OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army.” All military references used to compile SMARTbooks are in the public domain and are available to the general public through official public websites and designated as approved for public release with unlimited distribution. The SMARTbooks do not contain ITAR-controlled technical data, classified, or other sensitive material restricted from public release. SMART- books are reference books that address general military principles, fundamentals and concepts rather than technical data or equipment operating procedures. OPFOR3-2 is the second edition of OPFOR SMARTbook 3 - Red Team Army, completely revised for 2019. In addition to the base FM 100-2-1/2/3 Soviet Threat series, new/updated material includes the FM/TC 7-100 Opposing Forces series, FM 3-0 Operations (Oct ‘17), ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Aug ‘18), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May ‘13), a review of modern (present-day) Russian forces, and more than a dozen historical vignettes. Army Publications/Field Manuals ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, Aug 2018. FM 3-0, Operations, Oct 2017 (wiChg 1) FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Volume 1, Mar 2013 and FM 3-90-2, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 1, Mar 2013 FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics. Washington DC: Headquarters De- partment of the Army, July 1984. FM 100-2-2, The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support. Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, July 1984 FM 100-2-3, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment. Washington DC: Head- quarters Department of the Army, July 1984 FM 100-63, Infantry-Based Opposing Force: Organization Guide. Washington DC: Head- quarters Department of the Army, April 1996. FM 100-7.1, Opposing Force Operations. Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2014. TC 7-100, Hybrid Threat, Nov 2010. Other References Blank, Stephen J. “Afghanistan and Beyond: Reflections on the Future of Warfare.” Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, June 28, 1993. Frasche, Robert M. The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion. Washington, DC: Defense Intel- ligence Agency, September 1978. Grau, Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan Washington DC: National Defense University Press, August 2010. Sharp, Charles C. Soviet Infantry Tactics in World War Il: Red Army Infantry Tactics from ‘Squad to Rifle Company from the Combat Regulations. West Chester, OH: George Nafziger Collection, 1998. Sasso, Claude R. Leavenworth Papers: Soviet Night Operations in World War Il. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, December 1982 Toppe, Alfred, BG. CMH Pub 104-3: Night Combat. Washington DC: Center of Military History US Army, 1986. Retrieved 22 May 2011. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/104-3/fm.htm. 4-References(OPFOR3-2) Table of Contents Opposing Forces (Overview/Introduction) Opposing Force (OPFOR) Overview... |. Contemporary Operational Environment (CoE) A. Critical Variables B, Today's Operational Environment... C. Anticipated Operational Environment.... D. Multi-Domain Extended Battlefield. Il. Enemies, Threats, and OPFOR A. Opposing Force (OPFOR). B. Cold War OPFOR.......... C. Contemporary OPFOR. Ill, Contemporary Threats and Actors... IV. Anticipated (RTA) Threat and the Future Operating Environment. - DNI Worldwide Threat Assessment (2019). A. Competing PowerS......c:ocne ~ Russia....... - People's Republic of China (PRC)... B. Regional Powers : Han... - Democratic People's Republic of Korea ea (DPRK)... C. Transnational Terrorist Organizations ... D. Large-Scale Combat Operations V. Hybrid Threats... VI, Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) i : VII. Peer Threats (in Large-Scale Combat Operations)... Red Team Armies (RTA) |. Military Doctrine .. 1 |. The Soviet Concept of War. 14 Il. The Structure of Soviet Military Thought - 1-1 Ill. Principles of Military Art (& Laws of Wa. 13 IV. Soviet Military Principles... 1-4 - Classic Russian Military Principles. 1-4 - Russian Military Principles of the 1970s sata - Modern Operational and Tactical Principles..c.c.c.0..- es V. Norms, Initiative, and Flexibility . 6 Table of Contents-1Il. Operational Concept.. |. The Soviet Categorization of Combat Actions ... A. Offensive Actions B. Defensive Actions . Il, Combined Arms Offensive Warfare . Ill, Nuclear Warfare........ IV. The Attack in Depth .... The First Echelon The Second Echelon The Mobile Group... The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG).. V. Force Ratios . : VI. Echelons. on A. First Echelon... B, Second Echelon... C. Reserve Forces Vil. Chemical Warfare. lll. Personnel & Training. |. Historical Lineage . I, Personnel Officers : Warrant Officers Noncommissioned Officers - i Il, Process-driven Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures (TTPs) IV. Training the RTA Force. ee oe IV. Force Structure. |. Troop Categories ‘A. Combat Arms Branches... B. Special Troops..... C. Services : Il, Groupings of Forces... = FLOM esse MAT cseseoensensneenene - Maneuver Divisions. Il, Force Structure. Major Geographic Groupings..... V. Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) |. The Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR)..... Il, Organizational Structure of the MRR... A. Motorized Rifle Regiment. B Motorized Rifle Battalion C. Motorized Rifle Company .. D. Motorized Rifle Platoon E. Motorized Rifle Squad F. Motorized Bronegruppa II. MRR Equipment A. Tracked ITVs.. B. Light Armored Vehicles C. Wheeled Transports... D. Small Arm Weapons E. Communication Systems F. Navigation Systems. G. Targeting Systems........ IV. On Point: Deep Battle & the Kalashnikov. VI. Modern (Present-Day) Russian Land Forces . 2-Table of ContentsOffensive Operations Overview. Offensive Operations A. Attack... B, Meeting Engagement... C. Pursuit... Tasks of Decisive Action (U.S. Military Doctrine)... : Second Chechen War, August 1999 ~ April 2000 (Historical Vignette). | Front & Army Operations |. TVD Offensive ..... Il. Front Offensive ... A. Offensive Planning... B. Offensive Phasing... Russo-Georgia War, August 2008 (ristonca Vignette), C. Rapid AVANCE... .sernesenes i D. Concentration of Forces . E. Attack Echelons............ F. The Front Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) G. Nonnuclear Front Offensive......scssetninse lll. Army Offensive : A. Echelonment of Forces... 8. The Army Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) Il. Division & Lower Tactics . Principles of Attack Doctrine... Planning for the Attack... Fire Planning....... |. The March Il. Prebattle Formation Ill, Attack Formation - Tactical Objectives - Forms of Maneuver i Battle of Hwanggan, July 19 A. Division Attack... B, Regimental Attack. C. Battalion Attack. IV. Conduct of the Attack . V. The Meeting Engagement . VI. Pursuit. A. Planning for the Pursuit. B. Conduct of the Pursuit Tactical Pursuit Frontal Pursuit Parallel Pursuit. Combination Frontal and Parallel Pursuit Ill. Small Unit Tactics (Offensive). |. Small-Unit Offensive Tactics ..... I. Hammer & Anvil Attack... Ill. Special Purpose Attacks A. The Raid ....... B. The Parallel Ambush... aa Blue House Raid, January 1968 (Historical Vignette) (Historical Vignette Table of Contents-3Defensive Operations Defensive Operations Overview.. I. The Role and Nature of the Defense A. Prepared Defense. B. Hasty Defense C. Withdrawal... II. Conduct of the Defense A. Division-level Defense B. Regimental-level Defense C. Battalion-level Defense . Ill. Defensive Planning Fundamentals... I. Prepared Defense |. Concepts of the Prepared Defense A. Security Echelon B. Main Defensive Area... C. Fire Sacks... D. Minefields and Obstacles... Battle of Laoshan, April-July 1984 (Historical Viana) ee E. Anti-Tank Defense = scene F. Counterattacks ......... Il. Characteristics of the Defense (U.S. Military Doctrine) Il. Hasty Defense... |. Concepts of the Hasty Defense A. Reverse Slope Defense........ B. Support Elements.......... lll. Withdrawal & Relief... |. Withdrawal..... - Covering Force... - Rear Guard... - Main Body Il. Relief Ill The Retrograde (U.S. Military Doctrine) IV. Small Unit Tactics (Defensive) |. Small-Unit Defensive Tactics II, Stongpoint Defense = ‘A Array the Combat Power of the Strongpoint Defense B. Special Considerations for Strongpoint Defense C. Establish the Strongpoint Defense .. Ill, Tactical Outpost = A. Array the Combat Power of the Tactical Outpost B. Special Considerations for the Tactical Outpost... Battle for Hill 3234, January 1988 (Historical Vignet) C. Establish the Tactical Outpost. : IV. Rearguard Retrograde. A Array the Combat Power of the Rearguard... B. Special Considerations for the Rearguard...... C. Establish the Rearguard \V. Small Unit Forms of the Defense (U.S. Military Doctrine) 4-Table of ContentsSpecialized arfare Specialized Warfare Overview.. |. Airborne Operations... |. Preparation of Airborne Forces II. Airborne Forces in the Offense........ Operation Black Thunderstorm, April-June 2009 (Historical Vignette) Ill. Airborne Forces in the Defense ... oe Il. Heliborne Operations... |. Preparation of Heliborne Forces... Il, Heliborne Forces in the Offense....... Battle of Jijiga, March 1978 (Historical II Heliborne Forces in the Defense......... Il. Amphibious Operations. |. Preparation of Amphibious Forces. II. Amphibious Forces in the Offense II. Amphibious Forces in the Defense : Amphibious Operations (U.S. Military Doctrine) IV. Unconventional Operations |, Preparation of UW Forces Il. UW Forees in the Offense ... Russian Involvement in Syria, 1966 to Present (Historical Vignette) Ill. UW Forces in the Defense. : : Tactical Enabling Tasks Tactical Enabling Tasks Overview .. Tactical Enabling Tasks.......... ‘Taxonomy of Army Tactics (U.S. Military Doctrine). ~ Elements of Decisive Action (and Subordinate Tasks)... - Tactical Enabling Tasks... - Tactical Mission Tasks. I. Reconnaissance . |. Reconnaissance Elements....... II. Reconnaissance Organizations... Ill, Principles of Soviet Reconnaissance. : IV. Conducting Reconnaissance Operations...... Operation Storm, August 1995 Historical Vignette) Special Considerations. : Table of Contents-5Il. River Crossings... |. Equipment and Organization 5412 Il. Tactical River Crossings 5-413 ‘A. Assault Crossing from the March... 544 B. Prepared River Crossings. 5-16 Ill. Troop Movement. |. Troop Movement I. Convoy Operations. ‘A. Coordination of Convoy Operations. B. Special Considerations IV. Relief in Place |. Relief in Place. 7 a ‘A. Coordination of the Relief in Place B. Special Considerations . V. Passage of Lines |. Passage of Lines A. Coordination of Passage of Lines... B. Special Considerations VI. Checkpoints/Roadblocks . |. Checkpoints/Roadblocks . Il, Coordination of Checkpoint Operations Russian Annexation of Crimea, Feb-Mar 2014 (Historical Vignette) . Small Unit Drills Overview... |, The Tactical Level of War (U.S. Military Doctrine) - Individuals, Crews and Small Units - Battles, Engagements, and Small-Unit Actions. Il. The Art and Science of Tactics A. The Art B. The Science...... 1. Movement and Formations... 1. Small Unit Battle Drills . - |l. Movement Techniques and Battle Formations. A. The Motorized Rifle Company B. The Motorized Rifle Platoon... C. The Rifle Squad Il. Dismounted Drills. |, Immediate Action Drills - Dismounted Squad A. Contact Front B. Contact Right... C. Contact Left D. Break Contact E. React to Indirect Fire. 6-Table of ContentsIll. Mounted Drills. |. Immediate Action Drills - Mounted Squad. A. Dismount Front B. Dismount Right... C. Dismount Left.............. Il. On Point: Evolution of RTA Platoon and Squad Tactics... Urban & Regional Environments Urban and Regional Environments Overview... |. Urban Operations : Il. Mountain Operations lll. Desert Operations... IV. Cold Regions Operations * Jungle Operations ... I. Urban Operations .. |. Impact on Maneuver, Fire Support and Command I, Offense in Urban Areas... ae Battles of Donetsk Airport, May 2014 — Jan 2016 (Historical Vignette) 75 Ill. Defense in Urban Areas. : esse Sennen es) IV. Logistical Support Il. Mountain Operations. |. Impact on Maneuver, Fire Support and Command. II. Offense in Mountain Regions ....... Battle of Chamdo, October 1950 (Historical Vignette). lll. Defense in Mountain Regions. i IV. Logistical Support..... Ill. Desert Operations . |. Impact on Maneuver, Fire Support and Command... Il. Offense in Desert Areas. : Desert Operations (U.S. Military Doctrine) Ill. Defense in Desert Areas. : IV. Logistical Support... IV. Cold Weather Operations ... |, Impact on Maneuver, Fire Support and Command. Il. Offense in Cold Regions... Ill, Defense in Cold Regions... IV. Logistical Support... V. Nighttime Operations |. Nighttime Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) -Special Considerations of Nighttime Operations. Table of Contents-7