STATE OF TEMIL NADU AND ORS. V. UNION OF HINDIA AND ORS.

May it please this honourable court, I am the CO-counsel on behalf of the

Petitioner representing State of Temil Nadu &ors. In the case concerning State
of Temil Nadu &ors. v. Union of Hindia & ors. Your lordship today I shall
speak for 11 minutes and deal with the issue 2 & 4 respectively. If the lordships
have no any preliminary query, the Counsel would like to proceed with the
merit of the case.

2. IS TEMIL LANGUAGE IMPLEMENTATION ACT, 2019 ULTRA VIRES THE

CONSTITUTION?

Under this very issue the counsel from the side of Petitioner would seek to
establish that Temil Language Implementation Act is not ultra vires the
Constitution. For that, the council would like to submit 4-Fold Arguments.

Coming upon the very first fold that:

1. It passes the test of Article 14

It is most respectfully submitted that principle of Art. 14 does not take away
from state, power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes. (Ameerunnissa
Begum and Ors. Vs. Mahboob Begum and Ors., AIR 1953 SC 91, FT. 31 PG. 5)
PG. 1[5-Judge: Sastri, M. Patanjali (Cj), Mukherjea, B.K., Aiyar, N.
Chandrasekhara, Bose, Vivian, Hasan, Ghulam] [YOUR LORDSHIPS, FOR
AUTHORITY YOU MAY REFER TO PAGE 36, PARA 14 OF THE
COMPENDIUM] The Temil Language Implementation Act is in consonance
with Art. 14 as there is intelligible differentia and rational nexus to the object
because the act is for the interest of general public. Intelligible differentia
encompasses within its scope whether classification is rational and is capable of
being understood. (K. R. Lakshman v. Karnataka Electricity Board, (2001) 1
S.C.C. 442, FT. 33 PG. 5)PG. 2 [2-Judge: THE HONOURABLE MR.
JUSTICE G.B. PATTANAIK & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.N.
AGRAWAL]

Furthermore, the act carries with it a presumption of Constitutionality. Relying

upon the case of Hanif Qureshi (Mhd) v State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731
FT. 41 PG.6 PG. 3 [5-Judge: Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Aiyyar, T.L.
Venkatarama, Das, S.K., Gajendragadkar, P.B., Bose, Vivian] where the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, ‘in order to sustain the presumption of
constitutionality the Court may take into consider matters of common
knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume
every state of facts which can be conceived existing at legislation.’
Coming upon the second fold that:

2. The Act is not Ultra vires as it qualifies test of substantive due

process and procedure established by law

If any Act is introduced in interest of general public, it shall not be held as ultra
vires unless contrary is proved as held in case of Bharat Sevashram Sangh and
ors v. State of Gujarat and ors., (1986) 4 S.C.C. 51 FT. 44 PG. 6 PG. 4[ [2-
Judge: E.S. Venkataramiah and Ranganath Misra] [YOUR LORDSHIPS, FOR
AUTHORITY YOU MAY REFER TO PAGE 40, PARA 17 OF THE
COMPENDIUM] In Casu, Chapter II of Part XVII deals with Regional
language. Art. 345 states that subject to the provisions of Art. 346 and 347, the
Legislature of a State may by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use
in State.

Coming upon the third fold that:

3. The Act is in accordance with Intention of Legislature as State has

acted in accordance with doctrine of necessity
It is humbly contended that intention of the Legislature must be found by
reading the statute as a whole. (Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, A.I.R. 2005
S.C. 648 FT. 50 PG. 7) PG. 5[5-Judge: N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N.
VARIAVA, B.P. SINGH, H.K. SEMA & S.B. SINHA]Court should understand
need of society, which legislature tries to satisfy, and the judicial review of such
legislation should be dynamic, pragmatic and elastic, examining whether it
satisfies need prevailing in society. (Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats
Ltd., A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2200 FT. 52 PG. 7 PG. 5) [1-Judge: Ray, G.N. (J)] In
arguendo, in Ajai Kumar v. Union of India and others, (1990) N.O.C. 84 All
FT. 53 PG. 7 it was held that the policy decision taken by the Government did
not contravene Articles 351, 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. It was
observed that proficiency in language other than Hindi, if needed for efficiency
and discharge for official business, would not offend against directive principles
contained in Article 351 or the same could not be questioned as infringing any
right vested on any citizen.

In Casu, one nation, one language, is itself a European Idea, whereas India
always believed in Unity in diversity. Here considering the constitutional aspect
of this notion, it goes against the constitution as well because Article 29 of the
Indian Constitution has given the right to a distinct language, script & culture to
the India citizen and imposing the notion of one nation, one language is against
this because this notion prefers having one language over all other languages.
As per Articles 344(1) and Article 351 of the Indian Constitution, the eighth
schedule includes the recognition of the 22 languages and all languages listed in
this Schedule of the Constitution are national languages and must be treated
equally. Any attempt to impose any one language will lead to the disruption of
our country’s unity and integrity.
Coming upon the last fold that:
 4. The act cannot be struck down as being redundant and otiose as it is
in accordance with spirit of law

In order to determine object and purpose of statute, we may refer to

circumstances which prevailed that time and necessitated passing of act.
(Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr., A.I.R.
1990 S.C. 2114 FT. 62 PG. 8) PG. 6[1 judge Verma, Jagdish Saran (J)]The
relevant factors which must be considered in order to ascertain the pith and
substance of a statute are: (i) the object and purpose; (ii) the scope and; (iii) the
effect of the provisions. (Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore
Development Authority and Ors., (2011) 3 S.C.C. 139 FT. 68 PG. 9) PG. 7 [5-
Judge: S.H. Kapadia, C.J., Mukundakam Sharma, K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan,
Swatanter Kumar and Anil R. Dave, JJ.] [YOUR LORDSHIPS, FOR
AUTHORITY YOU MAY REFER TO PAGE 48, PARA 20 OF THE
COMPENDIUM]

Hence, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Temil
Language Implementation Act is not ultra vires to the Constitution.

4. CAN THE STATE DECIDE THE MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION FOR THE

CHILDREN AT THE EARLY AGE OF EDUCATION? WHAT CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS MOTHER TONGUE?

Under this very issue the counsel from the side of Petitioner would seek to
establish that the State can decide the medium of instruction for the children at
the early age of Education and Native Language can be considered as Mother
Tongue. For that, the council would like to submit 2-Fold Arguments.

Coming upon the very first fold that:

 1. Deciding Medium of Instruction is within the legislative competence
of the State Legislatures.

In English Medium Students Parent Association vs. State of Karnataka, (1994)

1 S.C.C. 550 FT. 80 PG. 12 PG. 7 [2-Judge: M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J. and S.
Mohan, J.] [YOUR LORDSHIPS, FOR AUTHORITY YOU MAY REFER
TO PAGE 60, PARA 26 OF THE COMPENDIUM] it has been held that
particular State can validly take a policy decision to compulsorily teach its
regional language. States have been reorganised on a linguistic basis and the
unit for determining linguistic minorities is the state. (T.M.A. Pai Foundation
and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 355 FT. 87 PG. 13)
PG. 8 [7-Judge: Quadri, S.S.M. (J), Pal, Ruma (J), Variava, S.N. (J),
Balakrishnan, K.G. (J) Reddi, P.V. (J), Bhan, Ashok (J) Pasayat, Arijit (J)] This
point was brought forward in case of Usha Mehta v. State of Bombay, (2004) 5
A.L.D. 33 FT. 88 PG. 13 PG. 8 [2-Judge: Cji. Dr. Lakshmanan, G.P. Mathur]
The words ‘by law’ are of great significance here. Sec 29(2)(f) of the RTE Act
provides “medium of instruction shall, as far as practicable, be in child's
mother tongue.” The decision in case of Umid Singh v. Jodhpur University,
A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 204 FT. 90 PG. 13 an amendment in the Ordinance No. 35
framed under Sec 34 (1) of Jodhpur University Act 1962 was made making
English language compulsory for Intermediate Examination Certificate in order
to obtain admission in IInd year T.D.C. of Jodhpur University. It was held that
such an amendment is not violative of Art 351 as there was no Constitutional
requirement for having education in Hindi and Hindi only and the University
should stop studies in other languages.

Further, in Gujarat University v. Shri Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar, A.I.R.

1963 S.C. 703 FT. 92 PG. 13 PG. 8 [6-Judge: B.P. Sinha, C.J., J.C. Shah, K.
Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo, N. RajagopalaAyyangar and Syed Jaffer Imam, JJ.]
[YOUR LORDSHIPS, FOR AUTHORITY YOU MAY REFER TO PAGE
71, PARA 31 OF THE COMPENDIUM] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that: The power to legislate in respect of primary or secondary education is
exclusively vested in States by item No. II of List II, and power to legislate on
medium of instruction in institutions of primary or secondary education must
therefore rest with the State Legislatures.

Furthermore, it is in accordance with Article 350A

The Division Bench of this Court in English Medium Students Parents
Association v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 1 S.C.C. 550 FT. 93 PG. 14 PG. 7 [2-
Judge: M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J. and S. Mohan, J.] held that in any case if the
State takes a policy decision that the medium of instruction for the children
studying in classes I to IV will be their mother tongue, such a policy decision of
the State Government will be within the regulatory powers of the State.
Further, Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21A is subject to reasonable restrictions
This Court has held in Usha Mehta &Ors. v. State of Maharashtra &Ors.,
(2004) 6 S.C.C. 264 FT. 94 PG. 14 PG. 8 [2-Judge: Cji. Dr. Lakshmanan, G.P.
Mathur] that the State can impose reasonable regulations for protecting the
larger interests of the State. Article 21A is thus the sole depository of the right
to education and it is not open for any citizen to invoke any other fundamental
right like Article 19(1)(a) or Article 21 to contend that he has a right to be
educated in a medium of instruction of his choice.
Coming upon the second fold that:

2. The Native Language can be considered as Mother Tongue.

“Mother tongue” is one’s native language and a ‘native language’ is defined as

the first language a person learns to speak, which he is born into and has grown
up speaking. (FT. 95) Article 350A is the only article in the Constitution that
has the word mother tongue and the text of Article 350A makes it clear that the
state has to merely provide facilities to linguistic minority groups for education
in their mother tongue at the primary stage.

In the case of Tamil Nadu Tamil & English Schools Association v. The State of
Tamil Nadu rep. by its Secretary to Government School Education Department,
(2000) 2 C.T.C 344 FT. 101 PG. 15 PG. 9 [3-Judge: A.S. Venkatachala
Moorthy, S. Jagadeesan and N. Dhinakar, JJ.] [YOUR LORDSHIPS, FOR
AUTHORITY YOU MAY REFER TO PAGE 74, PARA 32 OF THE
COMPENDIUM] the case stated that the understanding of the word ‘mother
tongue’ is the language that the child is brought up with and most comfortable
speaking. A child’s mother tongue provides facilities for the acquisition of early
cognitive skills and provides a foundation for learning. Learning the mother
tongue properly enhances learning of other languages. In the latest Supreme
Court judgement on this issue, in State of Karnataka &Anr v. Associated
Management of (Government Recognised – Unaided – English Medium)
Primary & Secondary Schools &Ors., a constitution bench comprising of
Justices R.M. Lodha, A.K. Patnaik, S.J. Mukhopadhaya, Dipak Misra and
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla placed reliance on Article 350A and have
defined mother tongue as “the language of the linguistic minority in a state”.

Hence, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the State can
decide the medium of instruction for the children at the early age of Education
and Native Language can be considered as Mother Tongue.

If your lordship satisfied with all the submissions, the counsel would like to
move to the prayer.

PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of issue raised, argument advanced, authorities cited and
pleadings made, the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. The Indhi Language Implementation Act, 2019 is Constitutionally invalid.
2. That the Parliament doesn’t have any Unilateral power to impose One
language throughout the Nation and to decide medium of transaction by
various Constitutional Institutions including Judiciary.
3. That the Temil Nadu Language Implementation Act, 2019 is
Constitutionally valid and is well with in the Legislative competency of the
State.

AND / OTHERWISE

PASS ANY OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION THAT THIS HON’BLE

COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND
GOOD CONSCIENCE.

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE COUNSELS SHALL FOREVER

PRAY.

WITH THIS THE COUNSEL RESTS ITS SUBMISSION, IT WAS

PLEASURE TO ARGUE BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT.