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G.R. No. 141066             February 17, 2005

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

TOPIC: Suppletory application of the RPC

Crime charged: Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law (3 counts)

Decision of RTC: the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22

Decision of CA: the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner

Decision of SC: The instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED 

Information:

That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping with one another,
knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB
Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND
FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter
that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam
by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee
bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with the United
Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.

The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except
for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that is:

(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱12,730.00;3

(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱8,496.55.4

Facts:

Version of prosecution:

The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses
Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by
Adronico;8 sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26,
1990 issued by Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the
amount of ₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by
Adronico;10 the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; 11 when the
Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against
them.

Version of defense

Ladonga vs People G.R. No. 141066

While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the
account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation,
with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a
signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P.
Blg. 22

Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable
for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special
law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

It held that the provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of
this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.2It noted that Article 10 of the Revised
Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the
contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory
character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to
cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or
sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes
a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that
in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA

Ruling: Yes, it is applicable

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court
applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 3932 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the
provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary
to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they
can perfectly be reconciled.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to
offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that
special legal provisions prevail over general ones. 24 Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be
considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of
the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be
supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.

Ladonga vs People G.R. No. 141066

The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests on a
firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code to special
laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 2228 of the Code to violations of Act No.
3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs.
Ponte involved the application of Article 1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of
principals in the commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act
No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the
instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.

All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.

Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.34 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the criminal plan.35

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was
merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068. 36 With respect
to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did
not specify the nature of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of
participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act
that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this
inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. 37 Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.39

As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:40

To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal
concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any
element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient
and simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.

The instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED 

Ladonga vs People G.R. No. 141066