Research-Driven Cardano DEX White Paper v1: Maladex
Research-Driven Cardano DEX White Paper v1: Maladex
Jarek Hirniak
21 October 2021
Abstract
2
1 Disclaimer
Cardano is a new, third generation blockchain, with a novel Extended Unspent Transac-
tion Output (EUTxO) model and the Plutus smart contract programming language under
active development. Maladex is a platform proposing a series of innovative and revolution-
ary concepts. Therefore, matters described in this white paper are subject to potential
change in the future, carry unknown risks that might impact parts of the project, and
create opportunities for new discoveries that could require rethinking some of the initial
assumptions. We reserve the rights to adjust the plan. Any new endeavours are filled
with discoveries and novel ideas, and we plan to capitalize on them and adjust to them.
Below is the vision of the Maladex platform in the long term and does not represent a
feature list planned for launch.
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Contents
1 Disclaimer 3
2 Introduction 9
2.1 Market participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Automated Market Makers & Decentralized Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Constant-Function Market Makers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6 Concentrated Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7 Capital Efficiency ξ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8 Impermanent Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.9 Risk Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.10 Cardano Blockchain & EUTxO Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.11 What’s Next . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 Programmable Swaps 20
4.1 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Commit Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 Execution Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4 Maladex Execution Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5 Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.6 Memory Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.7 EOL of Programmable Swaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.7.1 NFT Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.8 Theoretical Model Performance Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.9 Fragments Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.9.1 Market Order Matched by Limit Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.9.2 Market Order Matched by AAMM -LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.9.3 Limit Order Matched by the Order Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.10 Programmable Swaps Domain-Specific Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4
4.11 User Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.12 Fundamental Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7 Yield Curve 49
7.1 Yield Farming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.2 ADA Staking Rewards from Smart Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
9 Indexes 51
9.1 Index Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9.2 Index Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9.3 Cryptocurrency Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10 Synthetics 53
10.1 Advantages of Using Synthetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.2 Synthetic Token Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11 Financial Derivatives 55
11.1 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.2 Advantages of option trading on the blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.3 Option Trading Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5
11.3.1 Bull Call Spread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11.3.2 Bear Put Spread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11.3.3 Long Straddle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.3.4 Long Strangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.3.5 Other Option Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12 Arbitrage 60
13 Oracles 61
14 Risk Control 62
14.1 Why do people take risk? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
14.2 Market Maker Risk Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
14.3 Dynamic Risk Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
14.4 Token Trust Scores & Whistleblowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
14.5 Quantification of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
14.6 Moment Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
19 Tokenomics 69
19.1 MAL Token Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
19.2 MAL Token Vesting Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
19.3 MAL Token Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
19.4 Maladex Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Acronyms 72
Glossary 73
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List of Figures
1 Constant product Automated Market Maker (AMM) formula (Uniswap’s
model). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Constant mean AMM formula (Balancer’s model). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Hybrid Constant-Function Market Maker (CFMM) of Curve’s stableswap
vs constant-product CFMM comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 Convergence onto geometric price distribution of concentrated liquidity
model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5 Percentage Divergence Impermanent Loss (Duplicate of Figure 17 for Eas-
ier Reading). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6 Maladex programmable swap protocol execution stages. . . . . . . . . . . 22
7 Active and inactive frontiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8 Maladex protocol (off-chain order matching engine) execution pipeline. . . 25
9 Fragmented (virtual) liquidity pool’s initial state S0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10 Transaction executing M0 using LS,1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11 State of the fragmented liquidity pool after executing T0 . . . . . . . . . . 29
12 Transaction executing M1 using A3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
13 State of the fragmented liquidity pool after executing T1 . . . . . . . . . . 31
14 Order book crossover. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
15 Transaction matching 3 order book transactions: LB,1 , LB,2 , and LS,1 . . . 34
16 State of the fragmented liquidity pool after executing T2 . . . . . . . . . . 34
17 Percentage Divergence of Impermanent Loss on Initial Investment of $1, 000.00
at valuation of $2.00 and 1 Token X at valuation of $1, 000.00. . . . . . . 41
18 Divergence of Impermanent Loss in USD on Initial Investment of $1, 000.00
at valuation of $2.00 and 1 Token X at valuation of $1, 000.00. . . . . . . 41
19 Liquidity Provision Asset Ratios Impact on Impermanent Loss . . . . . . 43
20 Stochastic Price Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
21 Stochastic Process Reversal to the Mean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
22 Bull call spread with strike prices K1 (low strike price) and K2 (high strike
price). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
23 Bear put spread with strike prices K1 (low strike price) and K2 (high strike
price). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
24 Long straddle with strike price K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
25 Long strangle with strike price K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
26 MAL token allocation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
27 Plutus Application Back-end schematic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7
List of Tables
1 Exchange Amount of Transactions per Day, Week, and Month. . . . . . . 65
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Maladex: Research-Driven Cardano DEX 9 of 88
2 Introduction
In this section, we lay the foundations for the rest of the paper, introducing fundamental
financial engineering concepts, with a focus on their application in DeFi. We firmly
believe that DeFi is a young ecosystem that can benefit in a significant way from the
application of a wealth of existing knowledge in Quantitative Finance (QuantFi) and the
discovery of financial engineering concepts unique to the nature of DeFi and blockchain.
Let’s start at the beginning – agents who create the market.
• (market) takers – are agents who wish to exchange assets. They take liquidity away
from the market by exchanging one asset for the other. They need the market to be
liquid in order to guarantee that they can both exchange the assets (immediately)
and at the same time that the asset price is not significantly affected by the mere
fact of the exchange.
• (market) makers – are agents who provide liquidity to the market. In TradFi, mar-
ket makers profit from excellent market price predictions and providing liquidity at
small profits (e.g., a cent on each share). When applied to as many market partici-
pants as they do, it guarantees them a significant over day profit. In DeFi, this role
is often deferred to the algorithm that models the liquidity curve, automatically
updates the price, and distributes market maker rewards to the liquidity providers.
As demonstrated above, both parties are fundamental for exchange operations to function.
On the one hand, without market makers, market takers would often be forced to overpay
for the assets and be limited to waiting for a party willing to take the opposite side of
the trade. On the other hand, without market takers, market makers would not be able
to generate a steady profit.
2.2 Liquidity
We have seen in 2.1 the crucial role that market makers play in the creation of liquidity,
in this section we will explore what liquidity is, and some known ways of providing it.
Liquidity is the efficiency and ease with which an asset can be converted into another
one without affecting its price. In TradFi, the most liquid asset of all is fiat (cash), and
among them the most liquid is USD.
In traditional finance, liquidity is provided by large and sophisticated institutions, from
investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse to High-Frequency Trading
(HFT) companies such as Citadel Securities, Jane Street, and Virtu Financial.
Those sophisticated algorithms and trading strategies1 competing against each other lead
to an extreme optimisation of the market making process. Strategies are devised by world-
1
A trading algorithm is a computer program that based on the data, such as price, order book,
external signals, risk-profile, execution costs, etc., decide what is the optimal portfolio to hold at any
class mathematicians and analysed for predictive capabilities. As for speed, specialised
hardware such as Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) are programmed, hardware is
co-located in the exchange, the cable from the box to match making engine is measured
to be the same for each co-located participant, shortest possible paths to send signal
between exchanges are constructed, and much more. As a result, traditional markets
have liquidity provision optimized to the physical and computational limits.
In contrast, the DeFi scenario is quite the opposite. In TradFi all mathematical models,
hardware, and software are optimized to perfection, whereas in DeFi basic and simple for-
mulas and solutions are in use. This is purely due to how young and small (in comparison
to TradFi) the cryptocurrency market is, and especially DeFi.
The formula for Liquidity Provision in TradFi has geometric distribution, very well de-
fined higher moments, and is provided in very tight ranges. Contrarily, in DeFi most
liquidity formulas (such as CFMM) believe that it is as likely to buy asset X for $20, as it
is for $1, 000, 000, 000 or $0.000001. The inefficiency of the formulas utilized in DeFi are
the source of impermanent loss, capital inefficiency, inefficient and slow price discovery,
and loss to both market makers and market takers.
• completely rational;
• that everyone’s beliefs can be reflected in the market due to the availability of
financial instruments (e.g., shorts).
However, this is often not true [122, 128, 123, 124, 125]:
• there is limited access to reflect the market beliefs (e.g., shorting is only available
for sophisticated investors);
• agents do not act only on the information available, but also on their own personal
judgement, sentiment, fear, and many other emotions;
• not all agents are able to derive as efficient conclusion from the same data;
• agents are easily deceived by poor sources of information and market manipulation;
• investors are prone to take decisions hindered by different biases, e.g. loss aversion
in the case of trader who booked just a series of loses, confirmation bias in the case
of trader who just had a successful strike, overconfidence bias where trader believes
stronger in their abilities than the market data and signals, etc.
Taking into the account behavioral aspects of investing, 3 forms of EMH are proposed:
weak, semi-strong, and strong. In the case of weak form, the market price barely reflects
fundamentals and existing information. The cryptocurrency market specifically is in the
weak-form of EMH due to:
• small size when compared to the size of markets in TradFi where a single company,
Apple Inc, has larger market capitalisation than that of all crypto (on October 15,
2021), which amplifies the effects in the market;
• pricing models are flawed and lead to slower convergence on the market price, for
instance by the usage of CFMM[135];
• there is an evident lack of tools to reflect market sentiment, financial derivatives are
limited, and centralized exchanges (CEXs) are ineffectively implemented, leading
often to losses on non-losing shorts, etc.;
• there is a large network effect at play, where financial advice is derived from the
network effect, which is often exploited by malicious parties, who instead of focusing
on building fundamentally-sound products, rather focus on creating network effects;
• lack of clarity from the government on the regulation of crypto, preventing wider
adoption and causing investors to include other information than financial and
performance when making their predictions;
• cryptocurrency markets are open 24/7, meaning there is an inevitable necessity for
active participants to exit the market or take sub-optimal positions in it, in order
to be able to sleep and fulfill their physiological needs – this is not an inane matter,
as active participation in the market requires sophisticated tools and is limited
by human capabilities (e.g., active crypto traders will often set up multiple alarm
clocks during the night to check on the key risk metrics and their positions);
• Hybrid CFMMs, which are modified in such a way as to achieve the desired prop-
erties based on the characteristics of the assets being traded.
n+1
Ann i xi + D = ADnn | + nnDQ xi , where x are the asset reserves, n is the number
P
i
of assets, D is an invariant representing the value in the reserve, and A is the
“amplification coefficient”, which is tuneable constant.
This produces an effect similar to leverage, and influences the range of asset price
volatility[39] (the higher the asset volatility the higher A should be set)[132].
Fragmentation leads to much more complex routing. In the case of Ethereum, where
all code execution happens on-chain, with a global memory (and hence high transaction
costs), this also has the inadvertent effect of increasing transaction prices. As the user
has to specify the price range when creating a concentrated liquidity pool, for weakly
correlated and non-correlated pairs the range will become obsolete quickly. This will
require the user to unstake their liquidity and resubmit it at the new range, spending
even more gas (and hence taking away from the market making profits they generated).
In contrast to these problems on Ethereum, there is fertile ground for concentrated liq-
uidity on Cardano. Due to the nature of the Extended Unspent Transaction Output Model
(EUTxO) model, concentrated liquidity can be smoothly implemented in such a way that
the off-chain code ensures the expensive computation can happen off-chain and only be
validated by on-chain validators, resulting in no impact on transaction costs from complex
routing.
That is exactly what Maladex achieves via its programmable swaps, defined in section 4,
and goes one step beyond with sophisticated and dynamic liquidity pool modelling, called
Algorithmic Automated Market Maker, as outlined in section 6.
users always have the alternative of keeping their assets in their wallets instead of locking
them in a liquidity pool. Now, as the asset ratios in the pools change, impermanent loss
starts to occur, as summarized in Figure 5.
The main challenge is the exponential nature of impermanent loss. For small asset ratio
variations, the loss is negligible, but for large shifts it easily eradicates all the profits from
providing liquidity and from governance tokens earned from yield farming.
Maladex aims to eliminate impermanent loss completely (property derived from the pro-
tocol design), and where the user desires to provide liquidity via a specific model (even
including CFMM), it provides means to statistically eliminate it as well via asset ratio
management, arbitrage, and dynamic risk compensation, all outlined in subsection 6.1.
• portfolio allocation that achieves the optimal expected return given fixed maxi-
mum accepted level of risk σ such as done in Markowitz’s Modern Portfolio Theory
(MPT)[27, 26];
• providing tools and data to the user when engaging in the market, e.g., creating
liquidity pool, helping to achieve a much better outcome;
• actively calculating and monitoring risk metrics such as VaR (Value at Risk), volatil-
ity, Sharpe ratio, etc.[40, 41, 43];
• dynamically hedging the risk, e.g., buying inversely correlated assets to offset the
investment risk, and updating this hedge dynamically to maintain the risk level
below desired levels;
• integrate fuses and other market stress scenario control mechanisms, including off-
setting sudden crashes to other parts of the network (e.g. when a rug-pull is iden-
tified, performing swaps on all other DEXs to convert and remove the risky asset
from the portfolio[27]);
• provide verification of policy ids, but also trust scores, and ability to whistleblow.
We delve deeper into how the Maladex platform enables management of risk in section 14.
• Smart contracts are composed of on-chain validators and off-chain code; on-chain
validators provide the same level of assurance as any other blockchain model, but
at the same time Turing-complete off-chain code, enables performing complex and
resource-consuming computation without any impact on transaction cost; this is
revolutionary, as ideas such as programmable swaps and algorithmic automated mar-
ket maker (AAMM) would not be possible to implement without it. What’s more,
on-chain validators provide full scope of smart contract security, meaning that de-
spite the off-chain code, the entire protocol is equivalent to being fully executed
on-chain as all security is achieved on-chain.
• Hydra head – fast and isomorphic state channels allowing for straightforward usage
of the same transaction settlement code in the local hydra head formation. This
enables a significant performance improvement without incurring layer 2 software
engineering cost.
• providing the tools that allow everyone to create sound and efficient ways of invest-
ing;
• increasing the efficiency of the cryptocurrency market and accelerating the transi-
tion from TradFi to DeFi;
4 Programmable Swaps
In this section, we introduce the concept of programmable swaps, swaps composed of:
Programmable swaps provide an elegant and automated way for the execution of many
order types, just to give a few examples:
• limit order – an order that executed at specified price or better; limit order can
be executed partially; this programmable swap has 1 trigger - the best available
price is specified by least upper bound (LUB) for sell orders (the lowest price at
which a trader is willing to sell the asset) and greatest lower bound (GLB) for buy
orders, the maximum price for which a buyer is willing to buy a specific asset; this
programmable swap is composed of order type limit-order, LUB /GLB (for sell, buy
respectively), and assets to swap;
• engage arbitrage bots that exploit pricing inefficiencies of models used by other
exchanges, to both increase the profits of arbitrage bot funders, increase the overall
market efficiency and to ensure that the Maladex platform reflects the true market
price, regardless of TVL (Total Value Locked);
rise, the programmable swap is converted into ADA (the asset that investor prefers
to hold) and the swap is terminated. This allows the market maker the ability
to earn rewards from market making, but prevents being locked out of the pre-
ferred asset as its relative price to USD starts to rise. This programmable swap is
composed of a trigger that defines the safe trading range, once it is crossed, the
programmable swap isn’t executed anymore, actions – provide liquidity according
to efficient market formula, all assets being exchanged;
4.1 Architecture
The Maladex programmable swap protocol is composed of 2 parts:
• the commit phase – send commitment onto the blockchain to perform a certain
action; each commitment can be cancelled by sending a cancel order as another
programmable swap; each commitment is an NFT and can be produced in parallel
using a minting policy;
• the execution phase – all commitments are executed against each other each block,
resulting in trades happening; due to high fragmentation and optimized routing,
transactions take much less memory and can be efficiently managed.
cution and once executed, back to layer 1 to settle the trades on the base layer. As each
programmable swap is the smallest possible intent, it presents the most optimal exchange
of information between layers.
What’s more, this design means that even when executed on layer 1, much less memory
needs to go into all trades. The minimum possible amount of information is expanded
in the execution of programmable swaps, hence the memory used and cost is minimal as
well. Traditional AMM models, with a single EUTxO representing the entire liquidity
for a given pair, need to be included in all transactions, leading to large transaction sizes,
and hence larger costs and lower total throughput (or TPS - transactions per second).
• active frontier A - the set of all programmable swaps schedulable in the current
block, defined as A - the set of all programmable swaps of which all triggers are all
active, defined as A(b) := {s ∈ S | kactive triggers(s, b)k = ktriggers(s, b)k} = {s ∈
S | kinactive triggers(s, b)k = 0};
• inactive frontier I - the set of all programmable swaps of which at least one trigger
is inactive, defined as I(b) := {s ∈ S | kactive triggers(s, b)k < ktriggers(s, b)k} =
{s ∈ S | kinactive triggers(s, b)k > 0}
where
• b - block id;
• s - programmable swap;
• active triggers(s, b), inactive triggers(s, b), triggers(s, b) - functions that return cor-
respondingly all active, inactive, and just all the triggers for the given swap s during
the block b.
The Cardano blockchain architecture specifies the smart contract architecture of:
• on-chain validators – scripts validating that the submitted transaction, with speci-
fied input and output EUTxOs, can be executed; this part is executed on-chain by
block producing nodes;
• off-chain code – Decentralized Application (dApp)’s code, responsible for all plat-
form functionality and most importantly, preparation of the transaction to be sub-
mitted onto the blockchain, to be validated and executed by validators, and con-
firming the desired state transition.
• Plutus Application Backend (PAB) (or its equivalent) to interact with Cardano
nodes and a smart contract enabled wallet via dApp connectors;
• smart contract enabled wallet (Cardano wallet capable of storing dApp endpoints
and interacting in the smart contract execution);
• Cardano node to monitor and query the blockchain.
From the point of view of Maladex protocol implementers, we see this architecture as
highly beneficial, as it allows for the implementation of an advanced order matching
engine, which we outline in the below section, subsection 4.4, and expand in full detail
in section 5.
• processes cancel order requests and cancels all non-EOL (end of life) programmable
swaps;
• partitions the set of all programmable swaps S into the active frontier A and inactive
frontier I;
4.5 Scalability
The process of minting NFTs can be done completely in parallel (see *parallelism). Hence,
it is possible to create a programmable swap, and interact with the Maladex protocol, with
minimal risk of delays and requirement for sequencing. NFT minting is parallelizable.
Once minted, NFTs storing the programmable swap code and assets required to transact
are ready to interact with the market. Hence, the commitment phase achieves the highest
level of concurrency possible (full parallelism).
On the other hand, in the execution phase, multiple EUTxOs can be matched against
many other EUTxOs, meaning that we need to implement an efficient routing mechanism.
This is explained in detail in section 5. Due to optimal EUTxO fragmentation and graph-
based execution scheduling, it results in the most scalable routing mechanism possible
(limit of which is defined by Amdahl’s law).
The proposed scaling design is not only an elegant solution to the concurrency challenge,
stemming from the lack of global memory (distributed state) and the ability to spend only
once each EUTxO per block, but also one resulting in a much smaller memory footprint
as only the information required for the execution of the order goes into the transaction.
This is the opposite of the popular Uniswap-style designs, which in the context of the
EUTxO model, leads to including all available information for the given liquidity pool
into a transaction (which is the least memory-efficient solution possible).
• all assets in the programmable swap are returned to the wallet from which they
originated;
NFT receipt is an NFT containing the information about how the trade was executed
and might contain a graphical visualisation of the performed tasks, for instance:
• market orders (swaps) and limit orders will just include information about the
execution price and time;
• Dollar-Cost Averaging (DCA) would contain a record of all buy orders, assuming
DCA is executed daily over a period of 30 days, that would contain 30 records
similar to market order / limit order outlined above;
• liquidity pool fragment minting using one of the available formulas and parametri-
sation (stochastic models) will contain the pictorial representation of the model
(distribution, its moments, and sensitivity to market dynamics), etc.
• book-keeping – providing information to the user about how the orders were exe-
cuted;
• Profit & Loss (P&L) tracking – tracking performance of the executed strategies;
• collectibles – best trades (achievements), first trade to exchange some newly listed
asset, etc.
• limit order matched by limit order on the opposite side of the order book.
Let’s assume market order M0 being committed in the previous block B−1 .The Market
order is executed as long as there is liquidity, at the best available price. In this example,
let’s assume that the best available price is provided by limit order LS,1 and that the
amount of assets being sold by LS,1 is sufficient to cover the entire M0 (if it wouldn’t
2
Fragmented liquidity pool can also be called virtual due to the fact that it is not a pool, but multiple
fragments (separate EUTxOs) from which properties a liquidity pool naturally emerges (by liquidity pool
we mean here pooled resources that give the impression of the market being liquid.
simply the next best available limit order or AAMM would be used, whichever provides
the best price).
Now, a transaction T0 is submitted that uses both M0 and LS,1 as input EUTxOs and
creates as output:
• EUTxO with swapped assets, spendable by the agent that submitted M0 (hence
swapped assets are directly sent to that user´s wallet);
• a new EUTxO with remaining assets from LS,1 after executing M0 .
As we can see LS,1 and M0 are spent, LS,E with remaining liquidity is created and * the
result of market order (swap) is returned to the wallet of the M0 submitter3
The presented approach has multiple benefits:
• thanks to commit phase the transaction M0 is submitted without any delays and
bereft of concurrency issues immediately onto the ledger;
• off-chain components match LS,1 with M0 , which provides the best execution price;
• the transaction created by off-chain match making engine has minimum possible
size, only EUTxO with the market order (swap) is consumed and only single EUTxO
providing liquidity. In contrast to entire liquidity pools stored in a single EUTxO
(the biggest possible footprint of transaction memory per transaction) it offers the
highest possible optimisation. In a sense, this is not much different from a regular
transaction on the Cardano blockchain, which automatically allows high scalability
of Maladex on layer 1; this cost memory size minimisation means that market taker
pays the smallest possible transaction fee for having their transaction executed;
• limit order is free of impermanent loss and represents the price the user wants to
get for the exchanged assets, plus provides market maker fees to the limit order
owner;
• sell limit order LS,1 is only spendable at the preset price of S + 1 in this example,
hence there is no other way to redeem this EUTxO than at this price;
Let’s assume market order M1 being committed in the previous block B−1 . Market order
is executed as long as there is any liquidity, at the best available price, same as in the
previous example, subsubsection 4.9.1, however now the best available price is provided
by Algorithmic Automated Market Maker (AAMM) A3 .
Now, a transaction T1 is submitted that uses both M1 and L0 as input EUTxOs and
creates as output:
• EUTxO with swapped assets, spendable by the agent that submitted M1 (hence
swapped assets are directly sent to that user´s wallet);
3
The assets are not sent per se, simply the output is only spendable by the creator of M0 wallet
address, which is the EUTxO-native way of returning assets.
We can see that A3 and M1 are spent, A5 with updated asset balance and distribution
model has been created and * the result of market order (swap) is returned to the wallet
of the M1 submitter.
The presented approach has multiple benefits:
• thanks to commit phase, the transaction M1 is submitted without any delays and no
concurrency issues, immediately onto the ledger (this is the same as for the previous
example, and is an invariant that holds regardless of the transaction type);
• off-chain components match A3 with M1 which provides the best execution price;
• the transaction created by the off-chain match making engine has the minimum
possible size, only the EUTxO with the market order (swap) is consumed and
with only a single EUTxO providing liquidity. In contrast to entire liquidity pools
stored in a single EUTxO (the biggest possible footprint of transaction memory
per transaction), it offers the highest possible optimisation, this is the same as a
regular transaction on the Cardano blockchain. which allows high scalability of the
Maladex Protocol on layer 1; this cost memory size minimisation means that the
market taker pays the smallest possible transaction fee for having their transaction
executed;
• programmable swaps and liquidity pool moment-based distribution allows for smooth
adjusting based on market conditions and the pool composition, providing contin-
uous liquidity at the true market price plus minus volatility S ∓ σ, for all requests
coming at the prices close enough to the true market price, or better.
• sell limit order A3 is only spendable in the present geometric distribution around
mean S and within the volatility σ, further precised by the higher moments of
the distribution (skew, kurtosis, etc.), hence there is no other way to redeem this
EUTxO than at the fair and efficient market price plus/minus market volatility σ;
• market order M1 is executed at the best market price by the transaction input of
the transaction at the current market price plus/minus accepted volatility: S ∓ σ.
The final example deals with limit orders matching each other, this happens when the
order book sides cross over (that is if there is a buy order with the price equal or greater
than the cheapest sell order), i.e.
In the figure provided, the following 3 limit orders cross over: LB,1 .price = LB,2 .price =
LS,1 .price. That means they should execute immediately among each other. They
provide liquidity to each other, and in this case the total volume of LS,1 .volume >
LB,1 .volume + LB,2 .volume meaning that both LB,1 and LB,2 will be executed completely
and the remaining liquidity of LS,1 will return as a fragment to the virtual liquidity pool.
Now, a transaction T2 is submitted that uses LB,1 , LB,2 , and LS,1 as input EUTxOs and
creates as output:
• 3 EUTxOs with swapped assets, spendable by agents that submitted by LB,1 , LB,2 ,
and LS,1 respectively (hence swapped assets are directly sent to that user´s wallet);
• a new EUTxO with remaining assets from LS,1 after executing LB,1 and LB,2 .
Figure 15: Transaction matching 3 order book transactions: LB,1 , LB,2 , and LS,1 .
We can see that all LB,1 , LB,2 , and LS,1 are all spent, LS,E with remaining liquidity is
created and * the results of limit orders are returned to the corresponding wallet owners.
The presented approach has multiple benefits:
• as before, thanks to the commit phase design, all LB,1 , LB,2 , and LS,1 could be sub-
mitted at block B−1 and executed at block B0 right away, without any concurrency
and memory related issues;
• off-chain components match LB,1 , LB,2 , and LS,1 together, which provides the best
execution price for all 3 orders;
• the transaction created by the off-chain match making engine has the minimum
possible size, only EUTxOs with the required assets and data are consumed, with
only a single EUTxO providing liquidity. In contrast to entire liquidity pools stored
in a single EUTxO (the biggest possible footprint of transaction memory per trans-
action), it offers the highest possible optimisation. In a sense, this is not much dif-
ferent from a regular transaction on the Cardano blockchain, which automatically
allows high scalability of Maladex on layer 1; this cost memory size minimisation
means that market taker pays the smallest possible transaction fee for having their
transaction executed;
• limit order is free of impermanent loss and represents the price the user wants to
get for the exchanged assets, plus provides market maker fees to the limit order
owner;
From the security point of view, sell limit order LS,1 is only spendable in the present price
of S + 1 in this example, hence there is no other way to redeem this EUTxO than at the
set price.
• develop a secure and easy to use DSL for defining all potential trading strategies;
• provide means for composing financial contracts, creating a sound financial system
(you compose contracts, hence there is no material risk as in TradFi);
• be able to develop an easy GUI (Graphical User Interface) on top of it, for the most
popular types of contracts, such as market orders (swaps), limit orders, DCA, etc.
• a simple market order (swap) interface for selecting the trading pair and specifying
the exchanged amount;
• a simple limit order interface for specifying the price bounds and the amounts of
tokens to transact;
• a simple interface for DCA specifying the interval, frequency, and methodology,
etc.;
What is more, based off of programmable swaps, DSL will allow for specification of end-
points, and thus automated generation of user interfaces.
• an index as a programmable swap, that includes the rules for index composition
(what assets and in what amount go into the index during each rebalancing opera-
tion), and the assets that the index is composed of;
• synthetics, which might include just the rules for the asset collateralization, liqui-
dation triggers, and the collateral;
• options and futures, which contain assets in question locked into the contract, au-
tomatically settled upon the option expiration;
• option structures that can contain just different options defined at different strikes
and expires, and code that defines their composition;
• and many more, the design scales to any types of financial instruments.
5.1 Architecture
Maladex Order Matching Engine is an independent component deployed on machine with
Cardano Node. Cardano Node provides the state and ability to query the blockchain,
the functionality required to get the list of all existing programmable swaps S and to
communicate the orders (state transition).
• market order – execute at the immediately available price, given that within the
slippage range;
• limit order – execute only if at given or better price;
• liquidity pool – providing liquidity to the market at the current price;
• DCA – slightly more sophisticated order types, in this case market order executed
T
f
(where T is period and f is frequency) times over the span of the contract;
• sophisticated portfolio management strategy – composed of many conditions and
rebalancing strategies.
It is clear that due to the composability of the protocol, all that is required to guarantee
fairness of all programmable swaps is to guarantee fairness of the fundamental building
blocks, e.g., DCA will be guaranteed to be fair, if its’ building blocks, i.e., market orders
are guaranteed to be fair. This means that in the version 1 of programmable swaps we
only need to guarantee fairness of the the fundamental building block, market orders and
limit orders for all programmable swaps, regardless of how complex, to be fair.
The routing order to ensure fairness is as follows:
1. All cancel order requests are processed. This guarantees that if someone wishes to
cancel their order it is done before orders are executed. This creates a potential
vulnerability where a user might submit an order in one epoch and immediately
cancel it in the next, but a fee (denominated in MAL) for order cancellation will
remediate it.
2. All market orders are processed in the order of submission (FIFO - first in, first
out). For market orders to be processed the price must be within the requested
slippage.
The actions of more complex programmable swaps boil down to the guarantee of market
orders and limit orders, thus ensuring that all programmable swaps are fair.
5.3 Security
The safety of programmable swaps is guaranteed by the conditions encoded in the rede-
meer, i.e.,
• order can only be cancelled from the wallet that created it (potentially in the future,
from a wallet that contains the appropriate $handle);
• order can only be executed if there is on-chain proof that it is the best available
price and within defined limits of execution, such as slippage.
Those metrics do not depend on any additional sources of security, but rather simply on
the market conditions. There is no more security needed, as all required conditions are
to be included within the redeemer and are provided already by Cardano blockchain.
5.4 Scalability
A naı̈ve implementation of the order matching engine would allow for deployment of
multiple instances N , all executing and submitting transactions in parallel. This would
lead to unnecessary transactions spamming the mempool with requests, and inefficient use
of resources. Only one transaction would be validated successfully onto the blockchain,
very inefficient usage of the Cardano infrastructure.
A proposal will be created to implement a consensus mechanism between the engine nodes
that elect the block leader (block leader as opposed to Cardano’s slot leaders), i.e., the
node responsible for submitting transactions in the next block.
A series of metrics for all engine nodes is going to be tracked, such as successful sub-
mission of all orders into the next block and in fair order, and upon any deviations the
underperforming node would be automatically deprioritised from the network, and in
extreme cases (e.g., submitting unfair ordering) permanently banned from the consensus
circle.
The ability to disconnect nodes is going to be guaranteed by the challenge included in the
nodes, which the disconnected node would not be able to acquire information required
to solve.
5.5 Decentralization
The aforementioned mechanism presents a unique ability to decentralize order execution,
by sharing the engine binary with Stake Pool Operations (SPOs). SPOs would then be
able to partake in order execution and hydra head (layer 2) formation for participation
in the DEX rewards.
• increase capital efficiency by utilising the capital more efficiently and keeping it
constantly at work;
• use realistic pricing and liquidity curve models, as known from QuantFi and TradFi;
• dynamically adjust to market conditions and maintain liquidity pool properties via
dynamically adjusting its parameters;
Most established liquidity models do not model markets well (see model, EMH, and
impermanent loss in the glossary for a detailed rundown), leading to low capital efficiency,
expenditure of large amount of energy (see money ≡ energy) compared to the total value
locked, and have inherent scaling limitations due to global memory limitation (akin to
Ethereum´s account-based model architecture). The AAMM model attempts to bridge
that gap by applying more financial engineering scrutiny and bespoke methodologies.
25-times, while the price of ADA remained constant, we incur the loss of −61.5% (or the
loss of 16, 000$ given the initial investment of 2, 000.00$. All those losses are defined in
percentage-terms in Figure 17 and in absolute USD terms in Figure 18.
Figure 17: Percentage Divergence of Impermanent Loss on Initial Investment of $1, 000.00
at valuation of $2.00 and 1 Token X at valuation of $1, 000.00.
Figure 18: Divergence of Impermanent Loss in USD on Initial Investment of $1, 000.00
at valuation of $2.00 and 1 Token X at valuation of $1, 000.00.
It is worth noting that, as the name indicates, the loss is impermanent, meaning it is not
yet realized. If the liquidity pool would return to the original asset ratio there would be no
impermanent loss. Impermanent loss is realized in the moment of withdrawing liquidity
from the pool; once withdrawn, it is realized and can never be changed. However, due to
the highly volatile nature of crypto assets, keeping liquidity in the pool longer leads to
an increase in impermanent loss in the majority of cases.
Hence, we observe that changing initial CFMM AMM asset ratios causes impermanent
loss, but what causes the ratios to change? On the surface, the answer is simple, the price
divergence between assets being part of the pool leads to different ratios. Price itself can
be modelled using Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) with drift and volatility; as such,
we can classify the below cases, in order from the worst to the best, in terms of loss due
to impermanent loss:
1. A cryptocurrency asset with a fixed max supply or with a burn mechanism (the
decrease or fixed supply leads to natural price appreciation over time), paired with a
fiat stable coin (which aims to achieve 2-4% over year level of inflation). Such a pair
is negatively correlated by design and will result in consistent loss of liquidity pair
value. For a liquidity pool open for an extended period of time (multiple years),
this can get very severe due to the fact that most CFMM move along a x1 line,
meaning that initially the loss is small, but then becomes very sharp. Given the
nature of this pair being negatively correlated, it is bound to go to 0, accelerating
along the way.
2. Cryptocurrency assets with misaligned drift5 . For instance, a new project with a low
starting price and high potential, and an established currency such as a blockchain
primary asset (e.g., ADA for Cardano), with high market cap and price stability.
The initial drift of the novel project and much lower market cap will lead to high
misalignment, and hence getting into the far parts of x1 impermanent loss causing
curve.
3. Cryptocurrency assets with similar drift. For instance, well established projects
such as Uniswap token and ETH. This kind of pair, due to relatively aligned drifts
and ecosystems, means a low impermanent loss, even smaller due to the fact that
1
x
gives very small impermanent loss within the local vicinity of the initial supply
ratio.
4. Assets reflecting the same underlying price, for instance stable coins of the same
currency, e.g., DAI, BUSD, USDC, and USDT. As those assets basically have ex-
actly the same drift, there is no impermanent loss present, only local divergence
to volatility σ between different pairs. That, combined with x1 impermanent loss
dynamics curve, means this is not noticeable, except in the case of black swan event
events.
Therefore, by addressing the above issues, one can eliminate completely the effect of
impermanent loss. This is achieved by using sophisticated modeling to asses the perceived
asset value and price dynamics, converging to desired assets ratios, the ability to start
from the preferred liquidity pool asset ratios, and dynamic market maker reward scaling
for providing liquidity in the market stress conditions, leading to a market net neutral
position.
Not only does this help to reduce impermanent loss and converge onto the market maker
desired token allocation ratio, it also enables a series of interesting mechanisms, for
instance:
• Let´s take a new project launching its token X that wants to both bound liquidity
and to collect development funds. It could start with a 100% X based pool and
converge on the desired liquidity ratio of 20:80 (20% token X and 80% ADA), once
the pool stabilises on the 20:80 ratio, the project can withdraw 60% of liquidity
in form of ADA to finance the project development. Then, we would have 20% of
the initial token X provided into the smart contract and the 20% remaining after
withdrawing 75% of all ADA, leaving bounded liquidity with a 50:50 ratio and the
value of 40% of the initial supply.
• Balancing the risk appetite in holding the assets by using, for instance, Modern
Portfolio Theory (MPT)[27, 26] or other portfolio allocation techniques, taking
risk / volatility as a parameter to construct liquidity pool with the desired risk to
expected revenue profile;
• By allowing every user to provide liquidity in the form of a different ratio, market
participants are able to reflect their true belief about the assets provided into the
liquidity pool.
As we can clearly see, the above probability distribution does not reflect reality, and
unnecessarily distributes TVL equally across the entire (0, ∞) domain.
In QuantFi, sophisticated models have been developed to precisely define price distri-
bution and dynamics and predict the market conditions, those methods are most often
based on a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) defining stochastic process St , following
GBM as
where
• µ is drift;
• σ is volatility.
Using stochastic processes, we can predict and model realistic price probability distribu-
tion, and create liquidity models concentrating around moving drift µ, provided in a form
of oracle, and higher distribution moment:
q PN
(xi −µ)2
• volatility σ = i
N
– expected deviation from µ;
PN
(Xi −X)3
• skew µ
e3 = i
(N −1)·σ 3
- asymmetry around the mean µ;
• kurtosis κ = µ4
σ4
– tailedness;
• spot pools, pools converging to specific asset ratios according to the pricing formula.
The reason for all prices to be geometric in nature is the relationship between ratios and
logarithm, and ratios being how we express dynamic systems (in relation to themselves).
Unfortunately,
Q the majority of market making formulas have a constant form such as
x ∗ yconst, i∈I xi = const or similar, leading to high inefficiency in the pool price
discovery process. You can model any process iteratively with the worst model; given
a step is small enough, it will eventually converge, but in practice it gives rise to such
issues as:
• slippage – the execution moving the price significantly leading in overpaying for the
transaction;
• inertia – the pool is unable to update its price due to the astronomic size of the
total value locked, having single trades with very little effect on the price expressed
by the pool;
Maladex protocol will support models suited to different cryptocurrency asset types and
families of quantitative models to express the automated liquidity. The protocol will
support a rich family of quantitative models for minting liquidity pools, giving information
on what is the ideal pool in a given case and its parameterization, as well as allowing for
dynamic on-chain updates of the liquidity pool parameters via programmable swaps.
• market maker fee – during the period of high traffic or rapidly changing price
distribution, the fee collected by market maker should increase; this is a fee for
6
Despite the fact that legacy liquidity formulas are much less effective, we predict that there might
be some uses, or users who will simply want to create them, and the premise of programmable swaps is
customizability, hence it only makes sense to include one of the most popular models as an option as
well.
• yield farming – depending on the available liquidity in the market versus demand
for the liquidity from market takers, the rewards for providing liquidity will increase
in the form of MAL. As part of its role as unit of account MAL fees dynamically
adjusts to the market conditions, incentivizing action where it is needed.
Maladex platform will provide information to the user derived from on-chain and external
data (via easy to understand user interfaces), performance metrics, aid in providing
quantitative feedback on the pool parameters selected by the user, and help to optimize
them to achieve the user’s goals. The visual cues will be especially helpful when trying
to understand the impact of parameters on the capital efficiency and the risks involved
(e.g., automatically alert if the pair reserves are negatively or weakly correlated). This
way market makers will be able to make far sounder decisions. Maladex Protocol further
incentives sound liquidity nodes with platform tokens, thus rewarding sound decision
making.
8
Central Limit Theorem article on Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_limit_
theorem
7 Yield Curve
Yield is the product of engaging funds in a revenue producing activity, the higher capital
efficiency and the lower risk the better. The Cardano protocol and Maladex platform
have additional riskless sources of yield. We outline those yields in this section.
9
Cardano staking reward act as network’s internal risk-free rate r.
• Freedom from impermanent loss due to all mechanics implemented into AAMM
• High capital efficiency, meaning higher revenue generating potential on the same
unit of money.
• Increased market efficiency, giving investors access to the true asset prices and a
trove of investment educational content and data.
9 Indexes
An Index is a financial instrument representing a basket of instruments, allowing users
to track the performance of a group of assets in a standardized way[8]. Index allows you
to invest into the entire market, market sector, or a group of similar assets, such as DeFi
projects, DEXs, NFTs, etc.
The main advantage of holding an index, as compared to single crypto assets, is that
they often guarantee much more stable returns, at the efficient market rate, without too
much risk exposure. Take for instance smart contract blockchains; instead of placing all
bets on one horse or spreading bets according to your own metrics, one might buy shares
of a smart contract top 20 index, gaining exposure to the entire smart contract market
with allocation to specific assets correlated to market capitalization. As such, investors
are betting on smart contracts being successful overall rather than any specific project.
In summary, the advantages of investing in an index, compared to manual portfolio
management are:
• wider market exposure, increasing the market coverage and reducing volatility by
the fact that basket is comoset of different assets,
• protection as in hedge against single asset failures, e.g., if one DEX fails to perform,
then others in the portfolio will absorb its share, hence in that sense the risk is
neutral as the index represents the entire sector.
Some of the most popular examples of indexs from the world of TradFi and DeFi include:
• S&P 500 - tracking composed 500 largest companies stocks, weighted by market
capitalisation and representative of the entire US economy;
• FTSE 100 - 100 largest companies listed on the UK exchanges, weighted according
to their market cap;
A good example of a similar project from the Ethereum blockchain is TokenSet, which
provides indexes for a range of Ethereum blockchain tokens, e.g., DeFi Pulse Index. In
this case, a trader buys a stake of the index that represents the market composition, by
the capitalization for the specific group of assets (e.g., top 100 cryptocurrencies, top 25
DeFis, top 10 smart chain cryptos, etc.). The index is rebalanced at a constant interval
(typically 3rd week of every month) and maintains specific index properties (e.g., in the
case of TokenSet they limit max position to 25%).
• a centralized on-chain Oracle provider taking data from price trackers such as Coin
Market Cap, CoinGecko, and such data providers as CoinAPI, or
• from purely on-chain data build using Maladex protocol pricing models that should
reflect the true asset price on-chain in a trustless manner.
The index rebalancing can be achieved with one of many existing centralized price Oracles
and the typical index rebalancing of every 3rd week of the month.
• NFT indexes - index composed of NFTs bought and sold based on the current price,
valuation, and market sentiments, starting with art, but with the growth of NFTs
in the future potentially also representing all the deeds stored on the blockchain;
• Cardano delegation index - an aggregated way to delegate ADA via smart contract
to a portfolio of pools according to a specified condition, e.g., single stake pool
operators, ecosystem developers, mission-driven pools, etc. Each pool considered
for the index would need to meet the block production and reward requirements.
• Top 50 cryptos;
• Top 25 DeFi;
• Top 25 oracles;
• and others.
10 Synthetics
Mirrored (a.k.a. synthetic) assets are financial instruments deriving their value from the
underlying[15, 9, 12]. The underlying can be anything from real objects such as land,
art, or gold ownership to abstract such as commodities, indexes, stocks, equities, and any
existing financial instrument.
The name of this asset class is derived from their functionality, i.e. mirrored implies that
the asset mirrors the price behavior of its underlying asset which can be simple 1-1, but
also can represent an inverted (short), where the price is followed in inverse (e.g., a loss of
$10k in the underlying value is gain of $10 k in the inverted synthetic token). Synthetic,
on the other hand refers to a specific way of issuance of the mirrored tokens, namely by
not backing them with the actual underlying assets, but rather providing collateral acting
as insurance, providing the guarantee of the price. That collateral can be auctioned at
a discount to acquire back synthetic tokens and balance the value at risk requirement or
liquidated at the margin being returned as collateral to the token owners.
• Low transaction costs: brokerages often charge significant fees for order execution.
In the case of exchanges or market makers, the provided options to trade in frac-
tional shares always come at a premium. The blockchain implementation both
provides transparency of what liquidity fees are, creates a peer to peer transaction
network, removing the intermediary and hence the cost, and provides much quicker
settlement mechanics.
• Mint: provide collateral and the price oracle minting synthetic tokens.
• Burn: return synthetic tokens, burn them, and receive the stake of collateral rep-
resented by them.
The critical functionality of synthetic tokens is the ingestion of asset price and the eval-
uation of whether the provided collateral is sufficient. If it’s not, then either the syn-
thetic tokens need to be repurchased at a premium using the collateral (which is simi-
lar to Maker’s Collateralized Debt Position - CDP) or the contract must be liquidated
[13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 9, 10, 11, 12].
It’s worth noting that the risk can be shared among a pool of similar or even all synthetic
instruments. The settlements would still reflect the price movements, but the risk can be
collateralized for the system altogether. [17]:
11 Financial Derivatives
11.1 Options
An options contract is a right, but not an obligation, to buy (or sell) the underlying
asset at a specific price at a specific time[25]. Options are great instruments to increase
the money making potential (as it allows the trader to take a larger exposure to the
price movements in the market), allow for risk control by providing inversely correlated
instruments (calls/puts), allow for structuring trades to bet on specific outcomes (e.g.,
take limited exposure to price increase via bull spread), and provide efficiency to the
market[25, 31, 32].
Options are priced using the Black-Scholes formula[25, 33]. Options derive their price
from the assumption that market dynamics follow a Generalized Brownian Motion and
the underlying asset volatility, free interest rate, and the option parameters themselves
(type - call or put, strike price, the expiration date).
Call option price C is defined as
where
• K – strike price;
• r – risk-free interest rate (in the case of Cardano, this should be equal to the staking
reward);
• Covered options, where the option writer owns an equivalent amount of the under-
lying security. This means that the underlying is locked into the contract when the
covered call option is minted. This provides the guarantee that the option can be
exercised as per specification (according to the option type - European, American,
Bermuda and the price oracle). For covered option creators, it generates income in
the form of options premium.
• No middle man - options are minted by people on the blockchain and available to
everyone else on the blockchain. Thus, the execution fees are low, and the premium
is only paid for the service provided by the writer and the risk that they take;
• Fractional shares - options can be traded in much smaller units and even in fractions;
Structure:
This type of vertical spread is used when the investor is moderately bullish on the under-
lying asset and protects themselves from the maximal potential loss, but also caps the
total profit if the contract expires above the strike price K2.
Figure 22: Bull call spread with strike prices K1 (low strike price) and K2 (high strike
price).
Structure:
Similar to bull call spread, bear put spread is a tool for moderately bearish investors,
who wants to protect against the upside risk, and accept the potential limitation of the
income if the put expires deeper into the money.
Figure 23: Bear put spread with strike prices K1 (low strike price) and K2 (high strike
price).
Structure:
Long straddle does not provide risk protection, however it´s a bet on volatility, i.e., that
the underlying will move significantly off the strike price K, but without knowing in which
direction.
Structure:
There are many other option trading strategies that can be structured from simple call
and put options, once those are available on the platform. We will provide the description
on the below strategies and more in the near future.
To mention a few other option strategies:
• Short Straddle,
• Barrier options,
• Collars,
• Iron Condor,
• Iron Butterfly,
• Fig Leaf,
• Double Diagonal,
12 Arbitrage
Arbitrage is the act of exploiting the market inefficiency between trading venues (ex-
changes). In the most simple case of the arbitrage, let’s say ADA is priced at $3 at
exchange A and at $2.95 at exchange B. The arbitrage bot will find this information and
will attempt to buy ADA at exchange B for $2.95 and sell it immediately at exchange
A at $0.05 profit per ADA. The act of arbitrage moves the price, as after the execution,
the price at the exchange B will be higher (e.g., $2.98) due to purchasing the discounted
ADA, and on exchange A it will be cheaper due to selling it (e.g., $2.98).
As long as there is a price difference between exchanges, so that when these trades
are executed they are more profitable than the execution cost, arbitrage is possible.
Arbitrage on exchanges will lead to them converging on the central limit value (true
market sentiment from the aggregated exchanges) of the asset price. The arbitrageur
earns profits by buying at a discount from exchange B and selling at the premium at
exchange A, hence both exchange B sellers and exchange A are the source of income for
the arbitrage bot.
Finally, the mentioned example is the most basic case of arbitrage (pure arbitrage), there
are a multitude of arbitrage styles, including statistical, where arbitrage is based on the
market movement predictions and the average expectation of reward10 . Arbitrage leads to
efficient price discovery, but at the cost of market participants (both takers and makers).
Information about the makers and takers of asset prices is spread across multiple ex-
changes; this leads to such gross discrepancies as the 3rd largest crypto (by market cap)
sometimes having 10-20 cents difference between exchanges. This gets only more extreme
for smaller cap coins, as while Bitcoin, Ethereum, and to a lesser extent Cardano, are
actively arbitraged, the smaller caps are deemed not worthy of running arbitrage bots.
This creates market segregation between exchanges and a lack of information flow. Arbi-
trage is a valuable and necessary information exchange mechanism and leads to efficient
price discovery and convergence to the same price +/- delta delays on participating ex-
changes.
The Maladex protocol with its fragmented liquidity, where each fragment can act as
supplied funds to a swap order on any Cardano-native DEX, will be able to capitalize
on inefficiencies on all other exchanges. Employment of arbitrage bots in liquidity pools
for ratio rebalancing and via arbitrage vaults means users can generate higher profits
compared to other platforms.
In the EUTxO model and script validation mechanism model, such arbitrage can be in-
corporated into a liquidity protocol. It will put market makers in the role of performing
additional transactions (and earning additional fees), for takers it will provide market
efficient price reflecting the true market price at any given time, and for the other appli-
cations it will provide invaluable on-chain price oracle data, not approximating the true
price, but having on-chain arbitrage proof of it. Such on-chain price Oracle does not have
any lag, meaning it is much more efficient than any other on-chain price Oracles (it is
the optimal state), only subject to lack of liquidity not allowing for convergence of price
in the market.
10
You can explore a few additional types of arbitrage by checking this Wikipedia article: https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrage#Types
13 Oracles
Maladex protocol is going to make use of oracles including pricing information and market
data. A series price and trading indicators, high quality moments of distribution (based on
stochastic modelling), and additional financial indicators such as Greeks (risk sensitivity
parameters)11 .
11
Greeks are a fundamental signal for trading options will eventually be available to users. You can see
the list of all (financial) Greeks in Wikipedia article, here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greeks_
(finance)
14 Risk Control
Risk is an inseparable part of any investment, the most optimal trading strategy is always
the one that has higher revenue generating potential, without introducing additional risk.
In TradFi there is a plethora of measures to classify the level of risk such as VaR (Value
at Risk), volatility or potential loses. In addition, there are mathematical tools to classify
how good a given trading strategy is, taking the risk into account, such as Sharpe ratio,
and there are portfolio management theories that help to optimally allocate the capital,
given an acceptable level of risks, such as MTP (Modern Portfolio Theory).
Maladex Protocol design allows for the incorporation of risk control tool. Before we get
into the solutions, we shed light on why people take risk in the first place and what the
price of risk is.
a big announcement where the fundamental value of the asset changed significantly, e.g.,
dropped to 0), this mechanism is able to put market makers in a risk neutral position
(remove risk from providing liquidity).
Finally, in the extreme case, of the disclosure of new information in the market (e.g., a
project turning out to be a scam and token fundamental values changing to 0 in a blink
of an eye), risk management would be covered by market maker fuses, outlined in ??.
Be that as it may, there is one more thing that can be done to protect market makers
in the face of an extreme event, where one of the assets suddenly loses all of its value,
namely arbitrage.
• mint information (how many tokens have been minted, is the policy locked, etc.);
The last point, information provided by the community, can be especially effective at
performing the role of project information aggregation, as users share:
• suspicious activity;
The information provided by the users could be compiled down into a trust score and
provided alongside the tokens, and all objective information could be included alongside
the score for each user’s review.
• Markowitz’s
P Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) with the
PNportfolio’s returns defined
as µp = N 2
PN
w µ
i=1 i i and portfolio’s variance as σp = i=1 j=1 ij i wj. Portfolio
σ w
might include a single liquidity pool with the desired risk profile of σp .
• Value at Risk (VaR) which simplifies the question of potential loss compared to both
above models to the question “How much can one expect to lose, given cumulative
probability ζ, for the given time horizon T , defined as F (Z(T ) ≤ VaR) = ζ, where
F is cumulative distribution function, Z(T ) = S(0) − S(t) is the loss for an asset
S at time t, and ζ is a cumulative probability function associated with threshold
value VaR, on the loss distribution of Z(t).
• Coherent risk measures such as CVaR (Coherent VaR), defined as CVaR = E[Z(T ) |
Z(T ) > VaR] and copulas.
All the above risk metrics can be used both in portfolio construction and rebalancing.
It is worth noting that, for the sake of risk management, portfolio can refer to almost
anything, most importantly including liquidity pool where it is used to actively balance
the risk of AMM providing liquidity to the market. Note that this mechanism offers
means for automated risk management (for the risk appetite defined by the user) using
programmable swaps and Algorithmic AMM.
• on-chain price oracles based on asset valuation model as outlined in section 6; those
oracles will provide high quality and accurate indicators from asset price to a wide
range of indicators, most importantly moment-based ones, fundamental for writing
algorithmic trading strategies;
• data lab – data warehouse and live data streams interactions, generalized strategy
writing API, and is a convenient way to perform backtesting and simulations.
Access to data will involve payment in MAL utility token for the higher levels of con-
sumption.
19 Tokenomics
Maladex platform has a Cardano-native utility token called MAL. MAL token is shared
across all Maladex products and is the platform native unit of account which enables
access to platform functionality. MAL has a fully diluted supply of 42, 000, 000 and
approximately a 5 year gradual vesting period.
• 20% allocated to the team; with 4% vested every year, over a total period of 5
years, reserved for yearly team performance bonus;
• 25% reserved for treasury liquidity bonding over the span approximately 5 years
(minimal amount of tokens will be bounded at launch only to guarantee the liquidity
of MAL tokens and the rest is going to be released over years);
• 45% incentivization rewards, 40% reserved for rewards for using the platform, such
as yield farming, DeFi educational content creation, etc., and 5% reserved directly
for the airdrops to incentivize and reward actions outside of the mentioned ones
(e.g., reward for moving liquidity from different exchange, reward for having used
the platform before date X, etc.).
Team
Y1 Y2
Airdrops Y3
Y4
Y5
Rewards
Liquidity bonding
Treasury
• platform rewards will unlock gradually and will be dynamic to incentivize specific
behaviors (providing new liquidity pairs, creating healthy liquidity, content creation,
etc.); we expect that it will take multiple years (about 5) for all rewards to be
distributed;
• airdrops will be applied in response to specific events, hence it will be less gradual,
but only small portions will be used at times.
MAL initial supply at launch will be around 4, 200, 000 (10%) coming from both private
and public allocation and potentially small amount (about 1%) of initial liquidity bonding.
• native settlement unit of account for hydra head (layer 2) execution and pro-
grammable swap resources;
• computational credits for back-testing and access to high volumes of historical data;
• locking a specific amount of tokens (without spending them) will give access to a
series of professional data;
• be distributed to the platform users in the form of incentives (once the initial 5
year supply of reward allocation is exhausted the incentives will be funded from the
treasury);
• provide MAL incentives for creation of mathematically sound liquidity pools and
instruments;
• be used to fund the rewards distribution for DeFi educational content writers,
We project that healthy inflow of MAL tokens from the protocol usage and its reinvest-
ment into the platform will lead to a very healthy positive-feedback loop ensuring.
Acronyms
AMM Automated Market Maker (AMM). 7, 12, 13, 15–17, 28, 40, 41, 43, 44, 64, 77,
78
CFMM Constant-Function Market Maker (CFMM). 7, 10–12, 14–16, 40–44, 46, 47, 78,
80
DeFi Decentralized Finance (DeFi). 1, 9, 10, 18, 49, 51, 68, 69, 71, 77, 80, 81
DEX Decentralized Exchange (DEX). 12, 17, 27, 39, 47, 48, 51, 60, 65, 74, 76, 80
EUTxO Extended Unspent Transaction Output Model (EUTxO). 15, 17, 24–33, 35,
48, 49, 60
TradFi Traditional Finance (TradFi). 1, 9–11, 15, 18, 35, 40, 51, 62, 65, 77, 80
Glossary
account-based model A ledger model used by Ethereum, and majority of smart con-
tract enabled blockchains, where the global state is shared, and all operations are
applied sequentially, one after the other based on tips. Due to possible impact on the
ordering of transactions via tips it is prone to front-running and Miner Extractable
Value (MEV).. 40
Amdahl’s law The theoretical speedup limit in the latency of the execution of a task
at fixed workload that can be expected of a system whose resources are improved,
it also is used to define the theoretical limit of the system scalability due to im-
provements in concurrency and parallelism of the system. Amdahl’s law is defined
1
as Slatency (s) = (1−p)+ p .. 25, 27, 74
s
arbitrage Exploiting the market inefficiency between trading venues (exchanges); in the
most simple case of the arbitrage, let’s say ADA is priced at $3 at exchange A
and at $2.95 at exchange B. The arbitrage bot will find this information and will
attempt to buy ADA at exchange B for $2.95 and sell it immediately at exchange
A at $0.05 profit per ADA. The act of arbitrage moves the price, as after the
execution, the price at exchange B will be higher (e.g., $2.98) due to purchasing
the discounted ADA, and on exchange A it will be cheaper due to selling it (e.g.,
$2.98). As long as there is a price difference between exchanges, so that when these
trades are executed they are more profitable than the execution cost, arbitrage
is possible. Arbitrage leads to all included exchanges converging on the central
limit value (true market sentiment from the aggregated exchanges) of the asset
price. The arbitrageur earns profits by buying at a discount from exchange B and
selling at a premium on exchange A. Hence both exchange B sellers and exchange
A are the source of income for the arbitrage bot and are ”victim” of the market
inefficiency (in reality, they are not victims but simply prone to be scalped this way).
Finally, the mentioned example is the most basic case of arbitrage (pure arbitrage).
There are a multitude of arbitrage styles, including statistical, where arbitrage is
based on the market movement predictions and the average expectation of reward
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrage#Types. Arbitrage leads to efficient
price discovery, but at the cost of market participants (both takers and makers)..
20, 60, 74
black swan event The black swan theory or theory of black swan events is a metaphor
that describes an event that comes as a surprise, has a major effect, and is often
inappropriately rationalized after the fact with the benefit of hindsight.. 42, 47
capital efficiency Each task has many ways of being performed, one way will consume
more resources (energy, time, etc.) than the other, hence the way which consumes
less resources and achieves the same result is more efficient. The more efficient use
of capital the better generated returns, the better user experience, and the better
the actual state of the market is reflected.. 1, 15, 18, 40, 49, 50, 68
concurrency The act of progressing on the same task by multiple agents at the same
time, which implies communication between agents. Concurrency speed improve-
ment is limited to the bottlenecks in agent communication and defined by Amdahl’s
law.. 73
Decentralized Exchange (DEX) Non-custodial exchange model, where trades are ex-
ecuted directly on the smart contract blockchain. DEX does not have intermediary,
responsible for providing the service for exchanging assets, but rather it is performed
in automated manner by participants providing assets for the code to access (gov-
erned by code rather than company).. 72
Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) A form of attack on the Internet in-
frastructure, where the attacker aims to exhaust the available resources of the target
by the shere volume of the traffic created. DDoS usually results in the targeted ser-
vice being unavailable for the duration of the attack.. 72
(e.g., ADA), at equal interval (e.g., every day), for the same amount of the source
currency/asset (e.g., USD). There are more sophisticated forms of DCA available,
for instant, weighted DCA in which the amount bought at the equal interval (e.g.,
every day / week) is adjusted by the weight parameter w computed from the mar-
ket indicators (e.g., divergence indicator indicating local maxima and minima). In
the case, of divergence indicator, the weight w would be higher near local minima
and lower at the local maxima, resulting on average in better performance of the
trading system.. 72
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) A hypothesis stating that the prices in the
market reflect all of the information available, in practice it is rarely true. A
straightforward example is Dogecoin rising to the top 10 and firmly remaining there
based on a series of tweets with no substance behind them. Even a rebuttal from
the Dogecoin development team did nothing to stem the rise. The market ignored
this information and irrationally valuated Dogecoin at a higher price. This does not
reflect the fundamental information available in the market and is an extreme case
of market inefficiency. In traditional finance, research would be published showing
its shortcomings, people would evaluate the study’s validity, and would short such
an overvalued company. If an asset were to be severely undervalued, a leverage or
long option would be bought, significantly magnifying the potential returns from the
efficient use of information. Under the Efficient Market Hypothesis, assets would be
priced at what they are truly worth, and there would be very little difference in the
asset prices between exchanges. On the contrary, market inefficiency is such a com-
monly occurring phenomenon that a whole field of study is dedicated to measuring
it and adjusting trading strategies based on it. Inefficiencies take root from lack
of information flow between exchanges (e.g., via arbitrage) and irrational decision-
making (modeled well by behavioral investing). This is not a problem without a
solution, it is merely the result of the environment emerging from inefficiencies of
the exchanges and the irrationality of the actors in the market.. 72
special and often changing cases, prohibitively expensive (e.g., in HFT where the
algos are constantly updated and improved).. 72
front-running Process of using the existing knowledge of submitted orders (e.g., by
scanning mempool) to tip the exchange / protocol, with the aim to insert your
order (based on existing information) ahead of other orders, in order to capitalize
on this knowledge. For instance, spot a whale swap, tip the protocol to insert
transactions before in the block, buy at the cheaper price, allow the whale order to
move the market (whale pays more for the order), tip for 2nd order to be placed
after the whale order, sell immediately for higher price.. 73, 77
impermanent loss Loss of capital when compared to HODLing due to inherent flaws of
liquidity pool formula. The worst offenders are ironically the most popular family
of constant-product pools such as Uniswap’s v1/v2 x ∗ y = const[5, 6]. It occurs
when providing a pair of assets into a liquidity pool, as the rations of x and y
change in the pool and the more the prices diverge, the bigger the impermanent
loss. At some point, around the 20-50% threshold (the range is large due to inherent
typical crypto volatility), actually holding the 2 separate assets outside of the pool
would have been a better investment. It is made even worse by the incentivization
of yield farming to create the most negatively correlated pools there are possible
(completely deflationary crypto such as ADA and completely inflationary fiat such
as USD). Those two assets will naturally diverge and create the impermanent loss.
In a sense, there’s a sizeable hole in the bucket through which the total value of
your deposited funds will leak. This is made even worse by many DEXs being either
only concerned with increasing the amount of transactions (in order to obtain more
fees from transactions) or being completely oblivious to this obvious mathematical
fact (DEX are generally built without regard to quantitative modelling). . 1, 10,
15, 16, 18, 40–43, 50, 68, 74
Initial Stake Pool Offering (ISPO) A novel project cost development financing model
utilising Cardano SPO. A project wanting to receive funds via Initial Stake Pool
Offering (ISPO) will raise variable fee to 100%, collecting all rewards from the block
production. In return, delegators receive airdrops of the project utility tokens, to
be used when platform launches to access its features.. 72
limit order A limit order is an order to buy or sell stock at a specific price or better.
A limit order ensures execution at the specified price (or better), but does not
guarantee how quickly the order will be executed, or if at all. Limit orders are ideal
when the primary goal is to execute at specific price, once that price is available..
20, 26, 30, 34–36, 38
liquidity Ease of exchanging one asset for the other without affecting the asset price,
at the perceived current market value. Naturally the most liquid asset category
are fiat currencies, and the most liquid among them USD, which can be exchanged
for many assets around the world; it is used in international settlements, and the
payments performed by individual organisations, regardless how large, do not affect
the price of USD.. 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 27, 32, 40, 41, 44, 47, 48, 64, 77
liquidity pool A method of providing liquidity to the market via crowdsourcing it from
among many participants into one shared pool, usually in the form of AMM.. 14,
16, 26, 29, 31, 34, 38, 40–45, 47, 48, 60, 64
market maker A party providing liquidity to the market (e.g., via liquidity pool), either
by depositing assets into liquidity pool, usually constant formula pricing assets, in
the case of DeFi, or via sophisticated market making tools and algos in the case
of TradFi. Market makers create efficient market to transact in, ensuring good
experience of market takers.. 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 30, 32, 35, 42, 43, 46, 47, 62, 63, 77
market order A market order is an order to buy or sell a stock at the market’s current
best available price. A market order typically ensures an execution, but it does not
guarantee a specified price. Market orders are optimal when the primary goal is to
execute the trade immediately.. 26, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 38
market taker Any party exchanging assets on the market, and hence taking the liq-
uidity from the market, or in other words taking the service provided by market
makers. They expect the exchange prices to reflect the true prices of assets, low
slippage (price change during trade execution), and ability to exchange assets on
demand.. 9, 10, 30, 32, 35, 47, 77, 80
money ≡ energy When modelling financial systems you can think of money as a unit
of energy, same as in physics, we can think of kinetic, potential, and other energies,
energy is potential to perform a certain amount of work; we can think of money
in the same way. Money has potential to be applied in the market, from lending
to businesses developing novel ideas, increasing market efficiency by providing liq-
uidity to exchanges, creating information flow via arbitrage, financial analysis and
research, to utilising available information to maximise returns given a specified risk
appetite. Energy can be applied in many ways. If we choose a very inefficient way
to do something e.g., growing tomatoes in a completely dark underground bunker,
we will expend a lot of energy. In contrast, we can put them in a greenhouse or
even on a balcony and make much more efficient energy use. Same in the capi-
tal markets, efficient models lead to high money utility (energy well spent towards
productive work), and productive work is the work that is usually associated with
rewards (e.g., business borrowing money will pay it with interest). Therefore, an
efficiently allocated liquidity will work very well even with low total value locked
and respond quickly to the changing market dynamics, bringing higher rewards per
unit of capital.. 40
off-chain Everything that is not on-chain, most often implies off-chain code of dApp
smart contracts.. 7, 15, 19, 24, 25, 27, 38, 79
off-chain code Cardano introduces the concept of Turing-complete off-chain code, that
computes the necessary state update for the user taken action, and provides it to
Cardano wallet for submission onto the ledger.
on-chain Action executed by the validator nodes or an asset stored on the ledger.. 1,
14, 17, 19, 24, 27, 46, 48, 60, 65, 79
on-chain validator A part of smart contract code stored on Cardano ledger and used
to validate submitted transactions. In contrast to other blockchains where all smart
contract actions are performed on-chain, in the case of Cardano, a transaction is
prepared by off-chain code and validated if it is spendable and meets all spending
conditions, by block producing nodes, on layer 1.. 15, 17, 24, 27
parallelism The act of splitting a task into smaller, independent, subtasks, all of which
can be executed independently of each other, implying that there is no communi-
cation required between agents executing the subtasks.. 22, 25, 73
Plutus Application Backend (PAB) An off-chain dev tool allowing for the interac-
tion with smart contracts. PAB allows for interaction with external clients, such
as wallet front-ends, and acts as the intermediary between Plutus application, the
node, the wallet back-end, and end users. The purpose of PAB is to provide a
standardised environment to run Plutus applications, with disciplined state man-
agement, discoverable interfaces by external clients (primarily wallets), track on-
chain information that smart contract uses, and deal with requests such as running
contract instances, forwarding user input to those instances, and notifying these
instances of ledger state change events.
. 72
Portfolio Manager (PM) An experienced professional responsible for making and car-
rying out investment decisions on behalf of vested individuals or institutions. Clients
either invest directly into portfolio manager’s investment strategies[27, 26, 29], or
vest their funds with the investment institutions, that has multiple portfolio man-
agers working for it, and managing investors’ money.. 72
Profit & Loss (P&L, PnL) A financial statement summarising the revenues, costs,
expenses, and losses of a given period. In trading realized and unrealized P&L is
distinguished, realized P&L refers to closed positions, where unrealized P&L refers
to the current profits and losses on the open positions (e.g., not matured options)..
72
Sharpe ratio Reward to risk (variability) ratio measuring the performance of an in-
vestment as compared to a risk-free asset, after adjusting for the risk (defined as
standard deviation of the investment, i.e. volatility). The formula is named after
William Sharpe, its inventor, and defined as Sa = E[Rσaa−Rb ] ., where Ra is the asset
return, Rb is risk-free return, E[Ra − Rb ] is the expected excess return, and σa is
the standard deviation of the asset excess return. 16, 62, 76
slippage The difference between the expected price of a trade and the price at which the
trade is executed. Slippage occurs most frequently in TradFi during the periods of
high volatility and in DeFi due to inefficiency of liquidity providing formulas. To
decrease slippage, DEXs often rely on TVL.. 12, 38, 39, 77, 80
Stake Pool Operation (SPO) Running PoS (proof of stake) blockchain validator nodes.
In the case of Cardano, it implies running block producing node connected to P2P
(peer to peer) network of Cardano nodes (at the time of writing P2P feature is
still under the development and relies on the central registry of relays) via SPO
operated relays.
SPO upon correct registration on the ledger and depending on its total delega-
tion and pledge, is going to be assigned the role of slot leader during each epoch.
Each validated slot and block produced results in SPO rewards that are then dis-
tributed between delegators and the stake pool operator according to the pool’s
fixed fee (usually 340 ADA) and variable fee. Out of the profits from producing
blocks, fixed fee + variable fee · total rewards is allocated to SPO, and the rest is
distributed among delegators, in direct proportion to delegation (e.g., if delegator
provides 1% of all delegation in the pool, she will receive 1% of all remaining re-
wards after SPO receive its share).
SPOs receive rewards, in accordance to fixed fee and variable fee to cover the op-
eration costs (including the human labor), and in the case of ISPOs and mission
driven pools is a form of delegators to support specific cause and project.
Also frequently abbreviation of Stake Pool Operator, both terms basically having
the same meaning (the entity / activity of operating stake pool).. 72
Total Value Locked (TVL) Total capital amount locked into specific contract (liquid-
ity pool). For inefficient liquidity curves such as CFMM TVL is important as it
reduces the effect of slippage and volatility. However, high TVL is not only a good
metric, in the case of TVL that’s too high, the price will be resistant to update and
present a loss for market takers and opportunity for arbitrage.. 72
trading system A trading methodology, based on market data, trader’s experience, re-
search, etc., that defines a systematic approach to take as the reaction to different
market conditions. Trading systems are great in detaching emotions (which of-
ten lead to bad trades) from decision making process. System usually defines the
position that the trader should take given the current market scenario, but can
be much more precise and implemented as automated trading algorithm. Trading
using defined systems usually leads to better trader’s performance (P&L.. 74, 75
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