G.R. No.

L-43346 March 20, 1991

MARIO C. RONQUILLO, petitioner

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ROSENDO DEL ROSARIO, AMPARO DEL ROSARIO and FLORENCIA DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.*

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:

This petition seeks the review of the decision1 rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on
September 25, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 32479-R, entitled "Rosendo del Rosario, et al., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, versus Mario Ronquillo, Defendant-Appellant," affirming in toto the judgment of the trial
court, and its amendatory resolution2 dated January 28, 1976 the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of this Court dated September 25, 1975 is
hereby amended in the sense that the first part of the appealed decision is set aside, except
the last portion "declaring the plaintiffs to be the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of
Estero Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs' property," which we affirm, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

The following facts are culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:

It appears that plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc, Manila and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila (Exhibit "A").
The other plaintiffs Florencia and Amparo del Rosario were daughters of said Rosendo del
Rosario. Adjoining said lot is a dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied by the
defendant since 1945 which is the subject matter of the present action.

Plaintiffs claim that long before the year 1930, when T.C.T. No. 34797 over Lot No. 34 was
issued in the name of Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been in possession of said lot
including the adjoining dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub having bought the same
from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, said titled lot was occupied by Isabel Roldan with
the tolerance and consent of the plaintiff on condition that the former will make improvements
on the adjoining dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant
occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion of the old Estero
Calubcub which abuts plaintiffs' titled lot. After a relocation survey of the land in question
sometime in 1960, plaintiffs learned that defendant was occupying a portion of their land and
thus demanded defendant to vacate said land when the latter refused to pay the reasonable
rent for its occupancy. However, despite said demand defendant refused to vacate.

Defendant on the other hand claims that sometime before 1945 he was living with his sister
who was then residing or renting plaintiffs' titled lot. In 1945 he built his house on the
disputed dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub with a small portion thereof on the titled lot
of plaintiffs. Later in 1961, said house was destroyed by a fire which prompted him to rebuild
the same. However, this time it was built only on the called up portion of the old Estero
Calubcub without touching any part of plaintiffs titled land. He further claims that said dried-
up portion is a land of public domain.3

Private respondents Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia, all surnamed del Rosario (Del Rosarios),
lodged a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila praying, among others, that they be
declared the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. Petitioner Mario Ronquillo
(Ronquillo) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case since the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land and, thus,
subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands. The Del Rosarios opposed the motion arguing that
since they are claiming title to the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as riparian owners, the trial
court has jurisdiction. The resolution of the motion to dismiss was deferred until after trial on the
merits.

Before trial, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

1. That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797;
 2. That said property of the plaintiffs abuts and is adjacent to the dried-up river bed of Estero
Calubcub Sampaloc, Manila;

3. That defendant Mario Ronquillo has no property around the premises in question and is
only claiming the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub, whereon before October 23,
1961, the larger portion of his house was constructed;

4. That before October 23, 1961, a portion of defendant's house stands (sic) on the above-
mentioned lot belonging to the plaintiffs;

5. That the plaintiffs and defendant have both filed with the Bureau of Lands miscellaneous
sales application for the purchase of the abandoned river bed known as Estero Calubcub
and their sales applications, dated August 5, 1958 and October 13, 1959, respectively, are
still pending action before the Bureau of Lands;

6. That the parties hereby reserve their right to prove such facts as are necessary to support
their case but not covered by this stipulation of facts.4

On December 26, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment the decretal portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to deliver to the

plaintiffs the portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of title No. 34797 which is
occupied by him and to pay for the use and occupation of said portion of land at the rate of P
5.00 a month from the date of the filing of the complaint until such time as he surrenders the
same to the plaintiffs and declaring plaintiffs to be the owners of the dried-up portion of
estero Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs' property.

With costs to the defendant.

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal, respondent court, in affirming the aforequoted decision of the trial court, declared that
since Estero Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change in the
course of the waters, under Article 370 of the old Civil Code which it considers applicable to the
present case, the abandoned river bed belongs to the Del Rosarios as riparian owners.
Consequently, respondent court opines, the dried-up river bed is private land and does not form part
of the land of the public domain. It stated further that "(e)ven assuming for the sake of argument that
said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or disappeared, said dried-up estero would
still belong to the riparian owner," citing its ruling in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama.6

Upon motion of Ronquillo, respondent court modified its decision by setting aside the first portion of
the trial court's decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender to the Del Rosarios that portion of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 occupied by the former, based on the former's
representation that he had already vacated the same prior to the commencement of this case.
However, respondent court upheld its declaration that the Del Rosarios are the rightful owners of the
dried-up river bed. Hence, this petition.

On May 17, 1976, this Court issued a resolution7 requiring the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition in behalf of the Director of Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the Republic
of the Philippines, and who, not having been impleaded, was subsequently considered impleaded as
such in our resolution of September 10, 1976.8 In his Motion to Admit Comment,9 the Solicitor
General manifested that pursuant to a request made by this office with the Bureau of Lands to
conduct an investigation, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau sent a communication
informing him that the records of his office "do not show that Mario Ronquillo, Rosendo del Rosario,
Amparo del Rosario or Florencia del Rosario has filed any public land application covering parcels of
land situated at Estero Calubcub Manila as verified by our Records Division.

The position taken by the Director of Lands in his Comment10 filed on September 3, 1978, which was
reiterated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 and again in the Comment dated August 17, 1989,
explicates:

5. We do not see our way clear to subscribe to the ruling of the Honorable Court of Appeals
on this point for Article 370 of the Old Civil Code, insofar as ownership of abandoned river
beds by the owners of riparian lands are concerned, speaks only of a situation where such
river beds were abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters.
Conversely, we submit that if the abandonment was for some cause other than the natural
change in the course of the waters, Article 370 is not applicable and the abandoned bed
does not lose its character as a property of public dominion not susceptible to private
ownership in accordance with Article 502 (No. 1) of the New Civil Code. In the present case,
 the drying up of the bed, as contended by the petitioner, is clearly caused by human activity
and undeniably not because of the natural change of the course of the waters (Emphasis in
the original text).

In his Comment11 dated August 17, 1989, the Director of Lands further adds:

8. Petitioner herein and the private respondents, the del Rosarios, claim to have pending
sales application(s) over the portion of the dried up Estero Calubcub, as stated in pages 4-5,
of the Amended Petition.

9. However, as stated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 of the Director of Lands, all sales
application(s) have been rejected by that office because of the objection interposed by the
Manila City Engineer's Office that they need the dried portion of the estero for drainage
purposes.

10. Furthermore, petitioner and private respondents, the del Rosarios having filed said sales
application(s) are now estopped from claiming title to the Estero Calubcub (by possession for
petitioner and by accretion for respondents del Rosarios) because for (sic) they have
acknowledged that they do not own the land and that the same is a public land under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands (Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186, 194).

In a letter dated June 29, 197912 Florencia del Rosario manifested to this Court that Rosendo,
Amparo and Casiano del Rosario have all died, and that she is the only one still alive among the
private respondents in this case.

In a resolution dated January 20, 1988,13 the Court required petitioner Ronquillo to implead one
Benjamin Diaz pursuant to the former's manifestation14 that the land adjacent to the dried up river
bed has already been sold to the latter, and the Solicitor General was also required to inquire into
the status of the investigation being conducted by the Bureau of Lands. In compliance therewith, the
Solicitor General presented a letter from the Director of Lands to the effect that neither of the parties
involved in the present case has filed any public land application. 15

On April 3, 1989, petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari,16 this time impleading the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which subsequently bought the property adjacent to the
dried-up river bed from Benjamin Diaz. In its resolution dated January 10, 1990,17 the Court ordered
that DBP be impleaded as a party respondent.

In a Comment18 filed on May 9, 1990, DBP averred that "[c]onsidering the fact that the petitioner in
this case claims/asserts no right over the property sold to Diaz/DBP by the del Rosarios; and
considering, on the contrary, that Diaz and DBP claims/asserts (sic) no right (direct or indirect) over
the property being claimed by Ronquillo (the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub), it follows,
therefore, that the petitioner Ronquillo has no cause of action against Diaz or DBP. A fortiori from the
viewpoint of the classical definition of a cause of action, there is no legal justification to implead DBP
as one of the respondents in this petition." DBP thereafter prayed that it be dropped in the case as
party respondent.

On September 13, 1990, respondent DBP filed a Manifestation/Compliance19 stating that DBP's
interest over Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139215 issued in its name (formerly Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 34797 of the Del Rosarios and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135170 of Benjamin Diaz)
has been transferred to Spouses Victoriano and Pacita A. Tolentino pursuant to a Deed of Sale
dated September 11, 1990.

Petitioner Ronquillo avers that respondent Court of Appeals committed an error of law and gross
abuse of discretion, acted arbitrarily and denied petitioner due process of law (a) when it declared
private respondents Del Rosarios the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub by
unduly relying upon decisional law in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama, ante, which case was decided
entirely on a set of facts different from that obtaining in this case; and (b) when it ignored the
undisputed facts in the present case and declared the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as a
private property.

The main issue posed for resolution in this petition is whether the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub being claimed by herein petitioner was caused by a natural change in the course of the
waters; and, corollary thereto, is the issue of the applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil Code.

Respondent court, in affirming the findings of the trial court that there was a natural change in the
course of Estero Calubcub declared that:

The defendant claims that Article 370 of the old Civil Code is not applicable to the instant
case because said Estero Calubcub did not actually change its course but simply dried up,
 hence, the land in dispute is a land of public domain and subject to the disposition of the
Director of Land(s). The contention of defendant is without merit. As mentioned earlier, said
estero as shown by the relocation plan (Exhibit "D") did not disappear but merely changed its
course by a more southeasternly (sic) direction. As such, "the abandoned river bed belongs
to the plaintiffs-appellees and said land is private and not public in nature. Hence, further, it
is not subject to a Homestead Application by the appellant." (Fabian vs. Paculan CA-G.R.
Nos. 21062-63-64-R, Jan. 25 1962). Even assuming for the sake of argument that said
estero did not change its course but merely dried up or disappeared, said dried-up estero
would still belong to the riparian owner as held by this Court in the case of Pinzon vs.
Rama (CA-G.R. No. 8389, Jan. 8, 1943; 2 O.G. 307).20

Elementary is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court
of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the review of
errors of law, and that said appellate court's finding of fact is conclusive upon this Court. However,
there are certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
and (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee.21

A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal that the
change in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces, but due to the dumping
of garbage therein by the people of the surrounding neighborhood. Under the circumstances, a
review of the findings of fact of respondent court thus becomes imperative.

Private respondent Florencia del Rosario, in her testimony, made a categorical statement which in
effect admitted that Estero Calubcub changed its course because of the garbage dumped therein, by
the inhabitants of the locality, thus:

Q When more or less what (sic) the estero fully dried up?

A By 1960 it is (sic) already dried up except for a little rain that accumulates on the lot when
it rains.

Q How or why did the Estero Calubcub dried (sic) up?

A It has been the dumping place of the whole neighborhood. There is no street, they dumped
all the garbage there. It is the dumping place of the whole community, sir.22

In addition, the relocation plan (Exhibit "D") which also formed the basis of respondent court's ruling,
merely reflects the change in the course of Estero Calubcub but it is not clear therefrom as to what
actually brought about such change. There is nothing in the testimony of lone witness Florencia del
Rosario nor in said relocation plan which would indicate that the change in the course of the estero
was due to the ebb and flow of the waters. On the contrary, the aforequoted testimony of the witness
belies such fact, while the relocation plan is absolutely silent on the matter. The inescapable
conclusion is that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was occasioned, not by a natural change
in the course of the waters, but through the active intervention of man.

The foregoing facts and circumstances remove the instant case from the applicability of Article 370
of the old Civil Code which provides:

Art. 370. The beds of rivers, which are abandoned because of a natural change in the course
of the waters, belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout the respective length of
each. If the abandoned bed divided tenements belonging to different owners the new dividing
line shall be equidistant from one and the other.

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if
1âwp hi1

there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-
made or artificial accretions23 nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial
drainage systems.24 Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was
actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the
case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the
public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. That such is the case is
made more evident in the letter, dated April 28, 1989, of the Chief, Legal Division of the Bureau of
Lands25 as reported in the Reply of respondent Director of Lands stating that "the alleged application
filed by Ronquillo no longer exists in its records as it must have already been disposed of as a
rejected application for the reason that other applications "covering Estero Calubcub Sampaloc,
Manila for areas other than that contested in the instant case, were all rejected by our office because
of the objection interposed by the City Engineer's office that they need the same land for drainage
purposes". Consequently, since the land is to be used for drainage purposes the same cannot be the
subject of a miscellaneous sales application.

Lastly, the fact that petitioner and herein private respondents filed their sales applications with the
Bureau of Lands covering the subject dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub cannot but be deemed as
outright admissions by them that the same is public land. They are now estopped from claiming
otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, the remaining effective portion of which declares private
respondents Del Rosarios as riparian owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 77294 December 12, 1988

ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P. LADRIDO, LOURDES LADRIDO IGNACIO, EUGENIO P.
LADRIDO and L P. LADRIDO, defendants-appellees.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

Miraflores Law Offices for respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1986, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69942
entitled, "ANGELICA VIAJAR, et. al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus LEONOR LADRIDO, et. al., Defendants-Appellees," affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo dated December 10, 1981.

The antecedent facts in the instant case are as follows: The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor
P. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay
Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo. This lot contained an area of 154,267 square meters and was registered in
the names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo.

Spouses Rosendo H. Te and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described
in their title as Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan.

On September 6, 1973, Rosendo H. Te, with the conformity of Ana Te, sold this lot to Angelica F.
Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in the names of Angelica F.
Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.

Later, Angelica F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the
possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused.

On February 15, 1974, Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of
possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. This case was docketed as Civil Case No.
9660 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Summoned to plead, defendant Ladrido filed his answer
with a counterclaim. Plaintiffs filed their reply to the answer.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo H. Te as another defendant.

Plaintiffs sought the annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the purchase price with
interest in the event the possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Defendant Te filed his answer
to the amended complaint and he counter claimed for damages. Plaintiffs answered the
counterclaim.

During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 7340 to his
mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this reason, plaintiff Angelica F. Viajar now appears to
be the sole registered owner of this lot.
On May 25, 1978, defendant Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil action by his wife, Leonor
P. Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P.
Ladrido, as parties defendants.

The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which used
to be Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan
Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in
1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819
square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the defendants; that the area
of 14,036 square meters, which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey
of 1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and that the plaintiffs have never been
in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.

After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which included damages was admitted.

The plaintiffs raised the following issues to be resolved:

1. Whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden
as claimed by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the
defendants;

2. Assuming arguendo it was gradual, whether or not the plaintiffs are

still entitled to Lot "B' appearing in Exhibit "4" and to one-half (½) of
Lot "A," also indicated in Exhibit "4;" and

3. Damages (pp. 12-13, Rollo).

On December 10, 1981, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against

the plaintiffs:

1. Dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs Angelica F. Viajar and Celso

F. Viajar with costs against them;

2. Declaring defendants Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio,

Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel of
land indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan (Exhs. 'C' as well as
'4,' '4-B' and '4-C') situated in barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan
Pototan, Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 square meters, more
or less; and

3. Pronouncing that as owners of the land described in the preceding

paragraph, the defendants are entitled to the possession thereof.

Defendants' claim for moral damages and attorney's fees are dismissed.

SO ORDERED (p. 36, Rollo).

Not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned the
following errors:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE

ENTITLED TO LOT B APPEARING IN EXHIBIT "4" AND TO ONE-HALF (½) OF
LOT A IN THE SAID EXHIBIT "4."

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS (p.

42, Rollo).

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo. Plaintiffs (the
petitioners herein) now come to Us claiming that the Court of Appeals palpably erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court on the ground that the change in the course of the Suague River was
gradual and not sudden.
In the decision appealed from, the Court of Appeals held:

This appeal is not impressed with merit.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.

The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and
caused by accretion and erosion (Martinez Canas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas
Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil.
133). In the case at bar, the lower court correctly found that the evidence introduced
by the plaintiff to show that the change in the course of the Suague River was
sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear and convincing.

Contrariwise, the lower court found that:

... the defendants have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a
gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot No. 7511 took place by action of the
current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 square
meters (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been added to Lot No. 7511. (Exhs. '1'
as well as Exhs. 'C' and '4'). Apropos it should be observed that the accretion
consisted of Lot A with an area of 14,036 square meters; Lot B, 11,819 square
meters; and Lot C, 4,057 square meters. (Exhs. '4-B,' '4-C' and '4-D'). Only Lot C is
not involved in this litigation. (See Pre-trial Order, supra)

The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot No. 7511 was the
Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years
(before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property
of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of
the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot No. 7511 due to alluvion or
accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the
same with coin and tobacco.

The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The land is
already plain and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed.
The river bed is definitely no longer discernible now.

What used to be the old river bed (Lot A) is in level with Lot No. 7511. So are the two
other areas to the East. (Lots B and C) Lots A, B and C are still being cultivated.

Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands
adjoining the banks. (Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took
effect on August 30, 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the
accretion to Lot No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and B (see Exhs. 'C' and '4')
belongs to the defendants (pp. 34-35, Record on Appeal).

We find no cogent reason to disturb the foregoing finding and conclusion of the lower
court.

The second assignment of error is a mere offshoot of the first assignment of error
and does not warrant further discussion (pp. 4244, Rollo).

The petition is without merit.

The petitioners contend that the first issue raised during the trial of the case on the merits in the
Court of First Instance, that is, "whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden
as claimed by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the defendants," was abandoned and never
raised by them in their appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals, in holding that
the appeal is without merit, because of the change of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden,
disposed of the appeal on an issue that was never raised and, accordingly, its decision is void. In
support of its contention, petitioners cite the following authorities:

It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice have no jurisdiction or

power to decide a question not in issue (Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
 A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon
which the parties were not heard, is not merely irregular, but extra-judicial and invalid
( Salvante vs. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236-244; Lazo vs. Republic Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc., 31 SCRA 329, 334).

The pivotal issue in the petitioners' appeal was whether the change in the course of the Suague
River was gradual or sudden because the trial court below resolved the same in its decision thus
subjecting the same to review by respondent appellate court. By simply abandoning this issue, the
petitioners cannot hope that the affirmance of the decision wherein this issue was resolved makes
the decision of the Court of Appeals void. In effect, the petitioners are expounding a new procedural
theory that to render a questioned decision void, all that has to be done is to simply abandon on
appeal the pivotal issue as resolved by the lower court and when its decision is affirmed on appeal,
attack the decision of the appellate court as void on the principle that a court of justice has no
jurisdiction or power to decide the question not in issue. This is not correct. Even the authorities cited
by the petitioners, more specifically the Salvante and Lazo cases, supra, do not support their
contention. They were heard in the trial court and they cannot complain that the proceeding below
was irregular and hence, invalid.

The trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual and this finding
was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. We do not find any valid reason to disturb this
finding of fact.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code (reproduced from Article 366 of the Old), the law applied by the
courts a quo provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

Petitioners contend that this article must be read together with Sections 45 an 46 of Act No. 496
which provides:

SEC. 45. 1 The obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of
title shall be regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the
applicant and all successors in title that the land shall be and always remain
registered land, and subject to the provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory
thereof.

SEC. 46. 2 No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

As a result, petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the
accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should not
extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in question having remained the registered land of the
petitioners, then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of the
petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.

The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining
stream is well settled. In Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55, We ruled:

The controversy in the present cases seems to be due to the erroneous conception
that Art. 366 of the Civil Code does not apply to Torrens registered land. That article
provides that "any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from
the effects of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon."
Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that registration does
not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.

In C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, We also ruled:

It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate
as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the
accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is covered by a Torrens
Certificate of Title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof.
Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of
his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions
which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become
the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of
 the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams
and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the
Registration Act.

We find no valid reason to review and abandon the aforecited rulings.

As the private respondents are the owners of the premises in question, no damages are recoverable
from them.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES,
MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: ñé+.£ ªw ph !1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth
Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their registration in the names of
the private respondents.

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco
Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three lots
adjacent to their fishpond property and particularly described as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ £

Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of

Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE.,
along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by
Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the
NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW.,
along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877). ...
containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY
SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of

Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E., along
line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by Meycauayan
River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along
line 4-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). ... containing an area
of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE METERS.
...
 Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of

Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE.,
along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along line
2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan River, on
the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property
of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and on the NW., along line 6-1, by
property of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...

On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of
Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.

On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration
with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner
appointed by the Court.

On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with
respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that
the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: t êñ.£ îhqw â£

WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are

accretions to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of said property. The Court,
therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2 situated in the barrio of Ubihan,
municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and more particularly described in
plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying technical descriptions (Exhs. E,
E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662
Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex
Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial,
married to Juan Imperial, residing at Pasay Road, Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal;
and Mario C. Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St.,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.

On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.

On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the
lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: tê ñ.£î hqwâ £

DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang

kabuuan nang walang bayad.

The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this
Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage,
Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact
of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where
there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further
down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is
man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the
waters of the river.

On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acuña to the effect
that:t êñ. £îhqw â£
 xxx xxx xxx

... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry almost
at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the boundaries
of the lots, for about two (2) arms length the land was still dry up to the edge of the
river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of Lots
1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil and this was
done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were then converted into fishpond, and
water in this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the
fishpond ... .

The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of accretion without
human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.

We agree with the petitioner.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: têñ.£ îhqw â£

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered
by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of
the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being
because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private
respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father
noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents
claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness was
incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.
However, the witness testified that in that year, she observed an increase in the area of the original
fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden.
However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not
the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial
deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of
the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is
not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it.
It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the
fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep
on the side of the pilapil facing the river

The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a
river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If
estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force
of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners
thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works
expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred
their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect
their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river.

We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private respondents'
lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such alleged alluvial deposits,
deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question were not included in the survey of their
adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality
of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for
taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently formed. The only
valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed
only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in
1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph
1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration
Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to
their original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñ ët

G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES,

GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO
MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.

FELICIANO, J.:

The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an
estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan
River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road.
Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River
as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-
appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of the
year, that is, from September to December during the rainy season.

The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959,
respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of
Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale1 as follows:

. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500

hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National
Road; on South by Julian Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation
under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P
750.00. . . .

Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had
earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total
acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was more
particularly described as follows:

. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000
square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by
Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the
West, by Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. . . . 2

During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2)
parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot,
designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole
of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65
hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a portion
of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included
in Lot 307.

The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent
Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form
two (2) branches—the western and the eastern branches—and then unites at the other end, further
north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of
respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern
branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For
about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River
forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition
persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation.

Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral
survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches
of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12
December 1969.4

It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822.
The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is
located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed,
being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821
also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is
adjacent.

Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821.
They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they
plant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed
portion during summer.5 This situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry
against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini,
Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a
case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.

On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6 before the then Court of First Instance of
Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged
ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio
Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the
western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be
entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.

Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was then
set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of
facts.7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive
portion:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the
defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:

1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot
No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in
paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot
No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in
paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly
described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and

4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court.
They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.

While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the
Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the
finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since
the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the year such that
when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up bed
owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that
the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the
year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.

It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that
they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.9 This is in recognition of the
peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of
the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final
arbiter of questions of fact.10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is
a question of law cognizable by this Court.11

In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their
findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the
eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held:

The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion
(Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same
land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff
purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and
is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip
(Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court that "the
owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to
make an express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by
the current of the water becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12

The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:

As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the
word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the
Cagayan River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which
comes during rainy season especially from September to November which increases the
water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower
portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be inundated with
water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water
level is high the whole strip of land would be under water.

In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that —

According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest
depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the
highest depth they attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the
one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the
year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure, and
goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article 74
of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground
covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry
season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.

We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the
waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the
west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of
water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in existence when the whole of
the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and uneroded. 13

The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Colegio de San Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay;
since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and
use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the
disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes
found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in
the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.

We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to
the case at bar:

Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters
during the highest floods. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered
by its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the
entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the most part of the year
(i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the waters ( i.e., from
September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river waters.

The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of
record. Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from
1âwphi 1

Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307.15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba
was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of
Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale
signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern
branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case,
Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which
includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River.

Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July
1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible.16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to
respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west
both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821.
It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward
and very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water
passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano
Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the
land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban,
has a height of eight (8) meters.17

The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface
of the earth. However, Exhibit "E"18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property
standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before
the sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses—perhaps written to
make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged portion—is an implied admission
of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo,
the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like
slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of
time.

Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private
ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of
absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could
not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code
states:

The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1)
the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed
the public ownership of river beds:

La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario
considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo
rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora
bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?

Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el
Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio
publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos
o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num 1, donde dice: son de dominion publico . .
. los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34 de
 la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los
arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de
los rios en la extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas
ordinarias.20 (Emphasis supplied)

The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it
were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the
purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply
divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed. The
intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding obviously prejudiced
respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed
to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated
by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened
that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a
channel on it.

We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers
that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the
eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast).22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which
respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed
accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307
across the river.

Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring
ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of
Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by
respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the aver in a slow and gradual manner. On
the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several floods that caused the land to
reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is
hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern
portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that
such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The
total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina
Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even
smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot
821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's contention were
accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his
landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already
noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot
821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable
conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant
action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.

We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests
on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought
separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad
who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was
transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property and had it declared
for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice
instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against
respondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing
in their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since
1955.

If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the
depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for
Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for
forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307
and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax declarations
presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the
real property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less
than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and
possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly
submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of
public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be
instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95907 April 8, 1992

JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch VIII, and the HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS and
DOLORES A. CARLOS, and HEIRS OF GORGONIO CARLOS and CONCEPCION
CARLOS, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal of: a) decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated February 28, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. 1917 entitled "JOSE REYNANTE versus HON.
VALENTIN CRUZ, Judge, RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, and HEIRS OF LEONCIO AND DOLORES
CARLOS, et al.", affirming the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 8, Third Judicial Region which reversed the decision 3 of the Municipal
Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch 1, Third Judicial Region in Civil Case No. 1526 entitled
"HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS & DOLORES A. CARLOS and HEIRS OF GORGONIO A. CARLOS
& CONCEPCION CARLOS versus JOSE REYNANTE: and b) the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.

The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows:

More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme
Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein private respondents, over a fishpond located at Barrio
Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of 188.711 square meters, more or less and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618, Land Registry of Bulacan.

During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his family lived
and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5,096
square meters and 6,011 square meters respectively. These lots are located between the fishpond
covered by TCT No. 25618 and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Petitioner harvested and
sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the late Don
Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and
appropriate them as his own.

After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs (private respondents' predecessors-in-interest)
entered into a written agreement denominated as "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NG PAGSASAULI
NG KARAPATAN" dated November 29, 1984 with petitioner Jose Reynante whereby the latter for
and in consideration of the sum of P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the
heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or "bantay-kasama at
tagapamahala" (Rollo, p. 77).

Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the two huts located
therein to private respondents. Private respondents thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos
de la Cruz. Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take
care of the nipa palms he had planted therein.

On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded that the petitioner vacate said
portion since according to them petitioner had already been indemnified for the surrender of his
rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner refused and failed to relinquish possession of
lots 1 and 2.
Hence, on April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary
mandatory injunction against petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took
over the physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubos or
huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent
thereto.

On January 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and finding that
petitioner had been in prior possession of lots 1
and 2.

Private respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court and on August 8, 1989 it rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
defendant and hereby reverses the decision of the Court a quo. Accordingly, the
defendant is ordered to restore possession of that piece of land particularly described
and defined as Lots 1 & 2 of the land survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer
Restituto Buan on March 2, 1983, together with the sasa or nipa palms planted
thereon. No pronouncement as to attorney's fees. Each party shall bear their
respective costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 55; Decision, p. 4).

From said decision, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, p. 30;
Annex "A"). On February 28, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo, being consistent with law and
jurisprudence, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. The instant petition seeking to issue a
restraining order is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30; Decision, p. 3).

On November 5, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
(Rollo, p. 35; Annex "B").

Hence, this petition.

In its resolution dated May 6, 1991, the Second Division of this court gave due course to the petition
and required both parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 93).

The main issues to be resolved in this case are: a) who between the petitioner and private
respondents has prior physical possession of lots 1 and 2; and b) whether or not the disputed lots
belong to private respondents as a result of accretion.

An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title to the property is never
determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority
in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria (German Management &
Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 498, 499).
On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action for
forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73
Phil. 469 [1942]).

Hence, the Court of Appeals could not legally restore private respondents' possession over lots 1
and 2 simply because petitioner has clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.

The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of the questioned lots for more than
50 years. It is undisputed that he was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don Cosme
Carlos for more than 50 years and that he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and
planted nipa palms therein. This fact is bolstered by the "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY" executed by
Epifanio Lucero (Records, p. 66), Apolonio D. Morte (Records, p. 101) and Carling Dumalay
(Records, p. 103), all of whom are disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that can be
attributed to them, except their desire to tell the truth.

Moreover, an ocular inspection was conducted by the trial court dated December 2, 1988 which was
attended by the parties and their respective counsels and the court observed the following:
 The Court viewed the location and the distance of the constructed nipa hut and the
subject "sasahan" which appears exists (sic) long ago, planted and stands (sic)
adjacent to the fishpond and the dikes which serves (sic) as passage way of water
river of lot 1 and lot 2. During the course of the hearing, both counsel observed
muniment of title embedded on the ground which is located at the inner side of the
"pilapil" separating the fishpond from the subject "sasa" plant with a height of 20 to
25 feet from water level and during the ocular inspection it was judicially observed
that the controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs but
situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part of the public domain.
(Rollo, p. 51; Decision, p. 12).

On the other hand, private respondents based their claim of possession over lots 1 and 2 simply on
the written agreement signed by petitioner whereby the latter surrendered his rights over the
fishpond.

Evidently, the trial court did not err when it ruled that:

An examination of the document signed by the defendant (Exhibit "B"), shows that
what was surrendered to the plaintiffs was the fishpond and not the "sasahan" or the
land on which he constructed his hut where he now lives. That is a completely
different agreement in which a tenant would return a farm or a fishpond to his
landlord in return for the amount that the landlord would pay to him as a disturbance
compensation. There is nothing that indicates that the tenant was giving other
matters not mentioned in a document like Exhibit "B". Moreover, when the plaintiffs
leased the fishpond to Mr. Carlos de La Cruz there was no mention that the lease
included the hut constructed by the defendant and the nipa palms planted by him
(Exhibit "1"), a circumstance that gives the impression that the nipa hut and the nipa
palms were not included in the lease to Mr. de la Cruz, which may not belong to the
plaintiffs. (Rollo, p. 49; Decision, p. 9).

With regard to the second issue, it must be noted that the disputed lots involved in this case
are not included in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618 as per verification made by the Forest
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources. That tract of land situated
at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in the
plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for Jose Reynante falls within
Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond development) under Project No. 15 per B.F.L.C. Map
No. 3122 dated May 8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 31; Decision, p. 2).

The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and
hence the property of private respondents pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (c) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 514, cited in Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218).

Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and while it is true
that accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become
the property of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription.

This Court ruled in the case of Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-
17652, June 30, 1962, 115 Phil. 521 that:

An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of
land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by
the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title
to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed
by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain
this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws,
wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by accretion,
still their failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.

It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than fifty (50)
years and unless private respondents can show a better title over the subject lots, petitioner's
possession over the property must be respected.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated February 28,
1990 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch I, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

(G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ADMINISTRATOR
OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF
THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY
CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAÑAQUE
CITY, TERESITA A. GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR.,
MANUEL M. ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L.
GONZALES, ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P. ROSALES, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V. EBIO,
RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V.
EBIO, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision1 and June 8, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The
CA had reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 196,
issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.

Below are the facts.

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406 square
meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Parañaque City and
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said
land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and
possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930,
Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively
occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and
occupancy,4 Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name. 5 Since
then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property. 6

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro’s
advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario
Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house
within the said compound.7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights 8 ceding
his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations
under Pedro’s name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio’s name. 9

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08,
series of 199910 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of
an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to
be eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of
Vitalez Compound11 traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city government
advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their
opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended. 12
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and
the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents
filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of
Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor.13 On June 29, 2003,
the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the construction of the proposed
road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed project and their
claim of ownership over the affected property.14 On November 14, 2003, respondents attended
another meeting with officials from the city government, but no definite agreement was reached by
and among the parties.15

On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said
property.16 Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their
claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. 17 The request remained
unheeded. 1av vphi1

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.18 In the course of the proceedings,
respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a
sales patent before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 19

On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 20 denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court
reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to
the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for
sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic of the
Philippines, which is an indispensable party.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.21

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court
of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents. According to the Court of Appeals--

The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands adjoining Cutcut Creek
particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion beside RL 8.

The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of 291 square
meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears
to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City Government of Parañaque on 22 March
1966 and which was accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is
no evidence however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot.

On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the accreted
property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of declaring the said
property for taxation purposes. The property then became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134
beginning the year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966,
1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of
Appellant MARIO EBIO for the subject property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his
rights in the accreted property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.

Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary evidence, it could be
concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the accreted property considering its ownership
of the adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant
case.

xxxx

The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was] duly
proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants together with their predecessor-in-
interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of the subject property and starting
1964 had introduced improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction permits. Thus, even
by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have acquired ownership of the property in
question since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of
Guaranteed Homes. x x x.

xxxx
Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8 registered in its name,
which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property
in 1930. x x x.

xxxx

We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants which bolster their
right over the subject property. x x x.

xxxx

In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply proven their right over
the property in question.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Order
of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.22

On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition raising the following assignment of errors:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;]

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT …

FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT.23

The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State is an indispensable
party to respondents’ action for prohibitory injunction; and substantively, whether the character of
respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of
prohibitory injunction.

The petition is without merit.

An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act.24 It
is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part
or as an incident to an independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction may issue. 25

In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of
Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through a
parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of
the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be
considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is an
indispensable party to the action.

We do not agree.

It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs
ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
remains in effect,26 in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits
along the banks of a creek. It reads:

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and
lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. 27

Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek
do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the
alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 28

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the
possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain.29 Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as
against the State.30

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, 31 the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the
public domain by clear provision of law.

Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree
would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence.32 In
contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the
whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their
absence without affecting them.33

In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Parañaque from
proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary
nor an indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no
obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable
party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.

We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested
land entitles them to the avails of the action.

A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right.34 A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief
must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. 35 It should not
be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.36

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied
and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit
from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot.
In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the
property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes,
Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the
respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Parañaque.

From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can
be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion.
Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to
register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not
the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over
the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. 37 A decree of
registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. 38

Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before the
DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?

We answer in the negative.

Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through judicial
proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted that they
opted to confirm their title over the property administratively by filing an application for sales patent.

Respondents’ application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate
what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales patent application
should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which
they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a
grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land.39

Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally
applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007 Decision, as well as
the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of
the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying
up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of
public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A.
Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square
meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in
the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the
Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest
by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr.
as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property
had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous
and adverse possession for more than 30 years.2

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed
the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20
meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal
easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that
the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and
ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE
OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of
Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered
by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque
Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following
technical description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of
the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5 to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED
IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE
ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT
FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF
THE RIVER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION
DESPITE APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED
THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003. 7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8

RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR

ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF

THE PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE
REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL
TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY,

OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE
THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether
or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A.
Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which
was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos,
Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now
deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9

The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New
Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the
land which was previously part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up
and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was
obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil
Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion,
but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.

The Republic’s submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the
merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is
of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it. 11 They would be held
entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system
only if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12 The deposit of soil,
to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of
the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant
the grant of their application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual
and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot
4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the
land which was previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried
up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of
Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as
the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be
that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque
River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the
effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank.
There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river
bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did
not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit
of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of
soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited
in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years
– the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their
deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which
respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied
Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was
the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own
testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried
up and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687
confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the
drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the
consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW
along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was
described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent
Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water
level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual
and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In
accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as
the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear
and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to
accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it
is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to
apply the law.17

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article
502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the
State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-
up river beds should belong to some other person.19

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because
they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than
30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along
the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they
took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than
thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the subject
parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it
surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys Division Land
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque
River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the
foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants
have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and is,
therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to
prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), which pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following,
namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945.21

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years." 22

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with
such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court, 23 the Court has consistently recognized
exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings
the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.24

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible.
Hence, the Court should now review the findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land
for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty
years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land
along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed
per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management
Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC – Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration
Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty
years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel
of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their
possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The
decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to
be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment
of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were paid
for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly,
the causing of surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and
adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need
to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance
because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time
that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein.
This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the
land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to
possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of
Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents
themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes
only from 199928 signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the
filing of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more
than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription
or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and
disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of
its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion,
namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code
declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question
that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero, 29 a case involving the
registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the
Court held:

As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the
Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her
predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased
the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the
ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect,
the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their
value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only
when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is
uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional
Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by
the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if
there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-
made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial
drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was
actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the
case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the
public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a
river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the
dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there
is a showing of a title from the State.31 Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots
the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land
affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds
remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B
was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be
deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable
by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following
notation found on the survey plan, to wit:33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director
issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the
property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we
said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap34 that:

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the

issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability
and disposability of public land, to wit:

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to
be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating
that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a
positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere
surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the
Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the
effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by

respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the
1 âwphi 1

trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable
and disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot
10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such
government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such
government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-
000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau
of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more
or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot
4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque
River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.