SIKHS AND THE PARTITION OF THE PUNJAB

Author(s): Shiv Kumar Gupta

Source: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 58 (1997), pp. 591-598
Published by: Indian History Congress
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 SIKHS AND THE PARTITION OF THE
PUNJAB
Sbiv Kumar Gupta*

1947 - the year of partition and freedom, has gone down in the pages
of history as a year when the largest ever migration in human history
took place, the magnitude of the massacre was unparalleled, morality
had turned into brutality. Punjab experienced the worst of all that hap-
pened during this trauma of Partition. It played a crucial role in the
scheme of partition, owing to its religious composition and its geo-
graphical location. 57% of its population being Muslim, the commu-
nity enjoyed a narrow majority over the Sikhs and Hindus. It was this
narrow majority which made all the difference - a strong plea for the
partition of the country by the Muslim League. Of course, the British
played a game of parleys with the effected parties viz., the Congress,
Muslim League and the Sikhs . For carrying on any such negotiations
with the Sikh, the persons to get hold were Master Tara Singh, S.
Baldev Singh and Giani Kartar Singh.
No doubt, the seed of the creation of Pakistan lay much deeper,
the historic significance of the famous 'Lahore Resolution* lay in the
fact that it determined the destiny of Indian Muslims. The slogan of
Pakistan at the Muslim League session in March infused a new spirit
among the Muslims. The Sikhs were most hard hit by this resolution.
Obviously, they came out boldly against it. Master Tara Singh, Presi-
dent of the Shiromani Akali Dal said, "The League demand might
mean a declaration of the civil war. To realise it, Muslims would have
to cross an ocean of Sikh blood.'" Baba Kharak Singh of the Central
Akali Dal said that "the Sikhs shall not allow India to be vivisected."2

Where Pakistan scheme was being fervently discussed on all In-

dia level, Master Tara Singh presented the famous 'Azad Punjab
Scheme' - which was to consist of 40% Muslims, 40% Hindus and
20% Sikhs. The river Chenab was proposed to be the dividing line.
But this 'scheme' evoked strong reaction from various quarters. Of
course, Master Tara Singh made amply clear that "it was intended to
be an alternative to the division of the country - a move to cripple
Pakistan scheme, a counter-blast to Pakistan". At an anti-Pakistan
conference, Giani Kartar Singh explicitly said, "we want neither Hindu
Raj nor even Sikh Raj what we advocate is joint rule of all parties and
communities guaranteeing safeguards and religious freedom to all the

• LM- II 32. Pattala, Punjab

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592 ÍHC : Proceedings, 58th Session, 1997
inhabitants of the country."3
The Draft Declaration of Stafford Cripps amounted to the first
formal acceptance by the British Government of the principle of Paki-
stan. The Sikhs turned down this scheme. Master Tara Singh declared
that "Pakistan would be formed only over their dead bodies."4 Sikhs
also turned down Rajaji's formula involving the principle not only of
the partition of the country but also of the possible partition of Bengal
and the Punjab. In this Scheme, they found "a death-blow to the Sikhs".
When the Cabinet Mission conceded Pakistan indirectly through its
scheme of grouping of provinces, Giani Kartar Singh strongly criti-
cised it and suggested that the minorities should have full and weighty
representation so that the constituent Assembly must concede, to the
Sikhs right that in all communal questions affecting them their con-
sent will be essential."

A Sikh delegation consisting of Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar

Singh and G. Harnam Singh met the cabinet delegation on 5th April
1946. They reiterated their demand that "the Sikhs favoured a United
India and some sort of a coalition Government of all communities.
But in case of the division of the country, they would insist on a sepa-
rate independent state of Sikh, with the right to federate with Hindustan
or Pakistan".6 When asked by Sir Stafford Cripps, as to what would
be the area of the proposed Sikh State, Giani Kartar Singh said that it
should be the whole of the Jullundur and Lahore divisions together
with the Hissar, Karnal, Ambala and Shimla districts of the Ambala
division and the Montgomery and Lyallpur districts". At this Giani
Kartar Singh prepared a strong "case for the new Sikh Hindu Prov-
ince in the Punjab and said that "the proposed Sikh Hindu province
will be a bulwark of struggle to them" In this pamphlet grouping of
whole Punjab in group 'B' was alleged by him as unjust, unfair and
preposterous. Giani Kartar Singh also warned that if the formation of
proposed "Sikh-Hindu province was not conceded, it will mean the
ruin of the Hindu martial as well as commercial classes under the per-
manent domination of those who believe in their being a separate na-
tion. Similarly the Sikhs, 95% of whose world population resides in
the Punjab will become politically extinct".9
The Cabinet Mission proposals gave a serious jolt to the Sikhs'.
So a largely attended Diwan was held at Guru Ka Bagh under the
auspices of the Naujawan Panthic Federation. Here Giani Kartar Singh
exhorted that "the Mission proposals had doomed to the aspirations of
the Sikhs. They were faced with life and death struggle". On 3rd
June, 1946, an Akali Conference was held in Minto Park, Lahore,
under the auspices of Shiromani Akali Dal. A resolution was adopted

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 Modem India 593

condemning the British Cabine

Singh, in his Presidential Address,
these proposals if they wanted
Punjab".12
In the wake of challenges ahead an organisation, called the Panthic
Pratinidhi Board was formed which represented almost all Sikh or-
ganisations. It resolved to fight against the dreaded domination of
Pakistan as also to accept no constitution that did not meet their just
demands"13 This Board even decided against Baldev Singh joining
the interim Government. But now the Congress Working Committee
assured the Sikhs of all possible support in removing their grievances
as also for the protection of their just interests in the Punjab. At this
the Panthic Pratinidhi Board decided to accept the statement of 16
May, 1 946 and to send their representatives to the Constituent Assem-
bly. Baldev Singh also joined the interim Government as Defence
Minister on 2nd September, 1946.
By now the British authorities were convinced that the issue of
partition of the Punjab mostly rested with the attitude of the Sikhs.
The Secretary of State, Lord Penthic Lawrence, observed that "Parti-
tion would become necessary if Sikhs could not otherwise be satis-
fied".14 In fact, they had consistently tried to woo the Sikhs to come to
an understanding with the Muslim League.
Penderai Moon pleaded that "the Sikhs should now definitely
decide to throw in their lot with their Muslim bretheren i the Punjab
and take their place in the new dominion of Pakistan".15 Francis Tucker,
Commander of British-Indian forces in the East said, "we wished to
see Sikhs put wholly under Pakistan".16 Lord Ismay tried to bring a
rapproachment between the Sikhs and the Muslims, "through Major
Short, who was considered an expert on Sikh affairs and was a friend
of both. It was he who believed that, "settle the Sikhs and you settle
India",17 but all in vain.
But perhaps, it was under these circumstances that the Sikhs leader
Giani Kartar Singh tried to evoke a response from the Muslim League
circles about the Sikh position in the Constitutional set-up of their
thinking but all such efforts failed.
In July, 1946 Giani Kartar Singh and his close associate Gopal
Singh met Jinnah who told them, "the better way would be first to
break the Khizar ministry and for the Akalis to join the Muslim League
Government in Punjab".18 According to Gopal Singh, "He [Jinnah]
was not prepared to commit himself anything else, before this hap-
pened. It was however a clever move on his part to commit the Sikhs

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594 IHC: Proceedings, 58th Session, 1997
to the Muslim League, and Pakistan without the League committing
anything to the Sikhs in defence".19 Gopal Singh strongly felt that
"such a move would have jeopardised the future of the Sikhs com-
pletely, closing the other options to them which they later exercised to
their advantage and got the Punjab partitioned to save as many of them
from communal domination as possible, with the help of the Con-
gress" 20
It was under these circumstances that the Shiromany Akali Dal in
a meeting on April 16, 1947, "not only demanded the Partition of the
Punjab but also demanded the exchange of population and Property".21
On April 16, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and Baldev Singh
met the Governor and put forward the Sikh point of view that the
division of the province had become inevitable and demanded that the
boundary line defining the proposals of the division should be fixed at
Chenab".22

On his arrival in India, Mountbatten watched the prevailing situa-

tion, met representatives of various communities and parties and came
to the conclusion that partition was inevitable. Accordingly, he pre-
pared his partition plan and left for England for final approval. It was
announced on 3rd June, 1947. The All-India Congress met on June
14, 1947 and passed a resolution accepting it. The important position
that Punjab enjoyed in Pakistan scheme, turned it into the central arena
of struggle among various interests and parties concerned".23 On the
fate of the Sikhs, The Tribune succinctly commented in an editorial.
To Sikh solidarity, the Mountbatten scheme will be what a knife is to
a cheese Piece - it will cut through it easily and definitely".24
The fate of the Punjab and the Sikhs was settled on 23rd June
when the Sikh members of the Punjab Assembly voted with the Hindu
members in opposition to the Muslim members. The voting resulted
in the partition of the Punjab".25
On 30th June, Giani Kartar Singh accompanied by Baldev Singh
met Mountbatten and handed over a note in which it was stated that
the Sikhs would be satisfied only when the boundary is so demarcated
that at least 80% of them are in East Punjab. It was also demanded
that Nankana Sahib and the adjoining non-Muslim majority belt which
spread into Lyallpur, Sheikhupura and Gujranwala districts as well as
"just share of the Colony areas should be included in East Punjab
where the Sikh population of West Punjab could be shifted".26 Alive
to the Sikh sentiments on the issue of Nankana Sahib, V.P. Menon
also suggested that Jinnah should be approached and persuaded, to
declare Nankana Sahib a sort of "Vatican". It was a gesture- which

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 Modem India 595

might have had a calming effect

one which it would have cost Jinnah little to concede".27 But that was
not to be. No wonder the Government received an intelligence report
that "If Nankana Sahib is not included in the Boundary award to East
Punjab, the Sikhs intend to start trouble on a big scale".28
Sir Evan Jenkins, the then Goverr r of the Punjab, felt concerned
about the fate of Sikhs in case of partition. He was very clear that
"the decision of Sir Cyril Redcliffe and his boundary commission could
not help, if realistic lines were drawn through the Punjab assigning
the west to Pakistan and the East to India. The Great Sikh communi-
ties in the western Punjab would be left stranded, puddled of anti-
Muslim life in a Muslim country".29 Jenkins categorically told the Vice-
roy that the Sikhs were "extraordinarily important".30 "He doubted if
India could be peaceful if the Punjab were in a state of chaos and the
Punjab could hardly be peaceful if the Sikhs were, not reasonably
satisfied with their political condition".31 No wonder, on 10th July,
1947, Giani Kartar Singh warned Sir Evan Jenkins that if the Sikhs
were not satisfied by the Boundary Commission award, they would
take "violent action and would sabotage communications and canal
works".32 Punjab Government, in its report for the second half of July,
1 947 explicity conveyed that "the attitude of the Sikhs is one which
continues to cause grave anxiety".33
In view of the threats and ultimatum served by the Sikhs, the Brit-
ish had to resort to a careful dual policy - one to start a dialogue with
the Sikh leaders and another to make elaborate military preparations
to meet the challenge.
Despite all what had happened during all these days Sikh leaders
were always prepared to open dialogue with the British Government
on the issue of Boundary Commission Award and the fate of the Sikhs.
According to Giani Kartar Singh, the Sikh spokesmen, solution of the
Sikh, problem lay in "If at least a million of the Sikhs or so are brought
to the Eastern Punjab and similar number of Muslims from Eastern
Punjab is sent to Pakistan, after demarcating suitable boundary line,
and the Hindi-speaking Population of this Eastern Province is sepa-
rated from the non-Hindi speaking population of this Eastern prov-
ince".34

Convinced by Giani Kartar Singh's stand, Sir E. Jenkins wrote to

Mountbatten, "I believe that there is quite a lot in the claim of the
Sikhs".35

On the announcement of the Boundary Commission Award Giani

Kartar Singh termed it as "wholly unsatisfactory and disgusting".36

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596 IHC : Proceedings , 58th Session, 1997
Worst was yet to come "The Punjab which was crucial to any scheme
of partition of the country, became the worst victim of violence subse-
quent to the acceptance of the divisions of India and the Province
itself'.37 Punjab Boundary Force created to maintain law and order
achieved little success. Contrary to it "some of the most gruesome
tragedies were enacted in the area entrusted to it by its own units be-
cause, the military force under General Rees was injected with com-
munalismV* Hundreds of Hindus and Sikhs were massacred in
Sheikhupura in the West Punjab. Mudie's letter proves that Sikhs of
Lyallpur were loath to go, but West Punjab Government was deter-
mined to drive them out. Under these circumstances Giani Karter Singh
met Sir Francis Mudie and "requested him to give necessary facilities
to the Sikhs for going to India as they had decided to leave Pakistan".39
He made this request only after he had definite information that Jinnah
had, instructed the Governor of the west Punjab to expeli all the Sikhs
from Pakistan".40

Subsequently this was confirmed , by a letter of Sir Francis ad-

dressed to Mr. Jinnah and intercepted by the East Punjab police in
which Sir Francis Mudie frankly declared: "I am telling everyone that
I do not care how the Sikhs get accross the border, the great thing is
to get rid of them as soon as possible. There is little sign of 3 Lakh
Sikhs in Lyallpur maving, but in the end they too will have to go".41
The result was that a large number of non-Muslims deserted their
homes and migrated towards East. One cannot describe the hardships
to which the refugees men, women and children with practically noth-
ing to live upon, had to suffer, but instinct for life was so strong that
they all bore it with resignation. "Over 6,63,000 Hindu and Sikh and a
million Muslim refugees were moved during the week ending Octo-
ber, 1947".42
Thus Punjab stood partitioned much against, the wishes of the
people. Lahore Resolution of 1940 by the Muslim League raising the
slogan of Pakistan alarmed the Sikhs. Their leadership that included
Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and Baba Kharak Singh were
out to fight against any attempt at partition. Master Tara Singh's Azad
Punjab Scheme was intended only to be an alternative to the division
of the country, a move to cripple Pakistan scheme, a counter-blast to
Pakistan. The Sikhs turned down Stafford Cripps's proposals which
amounted to the first formal acceptance by the British Government of
the principie of Pakistan. Sikhs also turned down Rajaji's formula.
On meeting the Cabinet Mission the Sikh delegation reiterated
their demand that "The Sikhs favoured United India". It was only in
case of the division of the country, that the Sikhs would insist on a

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 Modem India 597

separate independent state of Sik

Hindustan or Pakistan". Here it is v
when British were all out to woo
were insisting on a new Sikh-Hin

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 . The Tribune , 1 8 April, 1 1940.

2. Ibid., 11 April, 1940.
3. Ibid., 15 Apiri, 1943.
4. J. S. Grewal, The New Cambridge History of India - The Sikhs of the Pu
Delhi 1994), p. 173.
5. The Liberator , 29 December, 1946.
6. Ibid.

7. V P. Menon, The Transfer of Power (Pinceton, 1957), p. 242.

8. Ibid.

9. Giani Kartar Singh, The Case for a New Sikh-Hindu Province in the P
1946), p.9.
10. The Tribune , 29 May, 1 1946.
11. Ibid., 9 June, 11946.
12. Ibid.

13. J.S. Grewal, Ibid , p. 176.

14. S.L. Malhotra, Gandhi , Punjab and the Partition (Chandigarh, 1973), p. 172.
15. Penderai Moon, Divide and Quit (London, 1962), p. 30.
16. Francis Tucker, India 's Partition and Debasement, Vol.1, Reprint (Delhi, 1988),
p. 277.

17. Penderai Moon to Ismay, 27 June, 1947, in Kirpal Singh, op. cit., p. 122-123.
1 8. Gopal Singh, A History of the Sikh People (New Delhi, 1993), p. 700.
19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Resolution of the Shiromany Akali Dal, (16 April, 1947). See Kirpal Singh (ed
Select Documents on Partition of the Punjab (New Delhi, 1991), p.42.
22. The Hindustan Times , 3 June, 1947.
23. Satya M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab (New Delhi, 1965), p. 45.
24. The Tribune , 5 June, 1947.
25. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Partition of India and Moutbatten (New Delhi, 1989), p. 1 1
26. Ibid.

27. Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of British Raj (London, 1962), p. 21 1.
28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

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598 I HC: Proceedings , 58th Session, 1997
30. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, op. cit., p.39.
3 1 . Mountbatten Papers , File No. 139. See Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Ibid., p. 1 06.
32. H.V. Hudson, The Great Divide (London, 1969), pp.238-39.
33. Home Political Dept. (9) File No. 18/147, pp. 87-101). Report on the situation in
the Punjab for the Second half of July, 1947. See Kirpal Singh (ed.), op. cit., p. 30.
34. A Note by Giani Kartar Singh to the Viceroy 26.6.1947 See Kirpal Singh (ed.),
Ibid., p. 164.
35. K. Jenkins to Lord Mountbatten, 10 July, 1947, No.694 Kirpal Singh (ed.), Ibid.,
p. 164.
36. The Liberator , 24 August, 1947. Also see Kirpal Singh, (ed.), Ibid., p. 468.
37. The Liberator , Ibid.
38. Kirpal Singh, Partition of the Punjab (Patiala, 1972), p. 1 18.
39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. The Tribune , 18 Oct., 1947.

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