Kant — Transcendental Idealism
In the wake of Hume, it seemed that philosophy was over ("commit it to the flames")
and science was ultimately unjustified (there is no rational justification for believing that
facts about observed spaces and times entails anything about unobserved spaces/times).
Further, it seems that Reid missed the point of Hume's arguments. OF COURSE we have
to ASSUME that there ARE external objects, and that there IS regularity in the world, etc,,
before we may proceed with our inquiries. Hume's point was only that these starting
assumptions (these “first principles" of “common sense") are ultimately unjustified. But,
“common sense must be shown practically, by well-considered and reasonable
thoughts and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle, when no rational
justification can be advanced.” (Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics)
Kant is going to try to rescue both philosophy and science.
1, Step One: Synthetic A Priori Knowledge: Consider two distinctions:
(@) A priori knowledge — Knowledge gained independent of sensory experience; or
"from the armchair’, so to speak, based on “pure reason’
(b) Empirical (a posteriori) knowledge — knowledge gained by sensory experience.
() Analytic truths - Truths where the predicate is contained in the subject; ie,
truths that are true by definition.
(ii) Synthetic truths - Truths that are NOT true by definition. (The predicate adds
something NEW to the subject)
Hume mistakenly believed that (a)/(i) and (b)/(i) were really just the same categories:
* analytic/a priori. You can know that an analytic truth such as
is true without needing to go out into the world and verify by checking every
triangle to make sure that itis three-sided. Simply put, knowledge of analytic truths
does not seem to require empirical observation, (Kant used: All bodies are extended.)
« empirical/synthetic. When you come to know synthetic truths such as by going out into the world and perceiving things. This fact is not true by
definition, and it required an empirical observation, (Kant used: All bodies have weight)
So, there does seem to be significant overlap. If there is TOTAL overlap, then we have a
problem for philosophy: Hume said, if it's not a priori or empirical, then "commit it to the flames"—for there is no other kind of knowledge. But, if a priori truths are just.
boring “relations between ideas” and empirical knowledge refers to mere contingent
“matters of fact", then there doesn't seem to be any place for “interesting” metaphysical
knowledge; ice, exactly the sort of knowledge philosophers seek. ALL of the claims that
philosophers make—about free will, identity, God, morality, the nature of the mind, of
composite objects, etc.—are supposed to be knowable a priori, but also interesting.
Philosophy isn’t supposed to be just the study of definitions or a bunch of uninteresting
tautologies, like “It is what it is"!
If philosophers are to do any interesting work from the armchair, then there would need
to be synthetic a priori knowledge. But apparently that's just not possible... @
Psych! Kant argued that it IS possible! ©
Consider: <7+5=12> This also seems knowable a priori. Right? Yet, it’s not merely
analytic. The concept of the sum of 7 and 5 isn’t just contained in the concept of 12. So,
it seems that arithmetic is knowable as synthetic, a priori. (though, eg, 7=7 is analytic)
Or this one: The concept of a
triangle doesn’t just contain the concept of 180 degrees. Another example: So, geometry too.
Even some claims in physics seem to be synthetic a priori; e.g, ; ; ; etc. Kant thinks that all of these are synthetic (obviously)
and knowable a priori (do you agree?)
In metaphysics: It seems that, e.g, is true (Recall Descartes and the wax: Through any change, there
must be something that remains the same—otherwise there is just annihilation and
creation!) In ethics: Again, Kant thinks that both
of these philosophical claims are synthetic a priori. (Again, do you agree?)
Conclusion: In short, Kant has at least re-opened the door for philosophy. Perhaps there
IS some interesting knowledge to be had from the armchair. Yay!
For more, watch a video on Kant's view of synthetic a priori knowledge here 2. Step Two: Transcendental Idealism/Empirical Realism: Now, Kant does actually
buy into the veil of perception, strictly speaking, diving the world into two categories
(1) Phenomena: Sensory perception is merely of representations, or appearances. (He
calls the realm of perception the realm of ‘intuition’, or sensibility’) The OBJECTS of
perception (or intuition, or sense) are called ‘phenomena.’ (These are similar to what
Locke and Berkeley mean by ‘ideas’) Like Berkeley, Kant says that phenomena are
dependent on the mind. If we ceased to exist, the phenomena would ALSO cease to
exist. He writes, "they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us."
(2) Noumena: These are the ‘things-in-themselves' (ov, elsewhere, the ‘transcendental
objects). They are the objects of the external world. But, they are not sensible things
(ie, they cannot be perceived). He writes, “we do not apprehend them in any fashion
whatsoever.” Of them, we know "nothing whatsoever." If we COULD know the
noumena, we would know things “as they ARE’—whereas, to know the phenomena
is merely to know things “as they APPEAR.”
‘Skepticism? This appears to entail a radical skepticism, where the things in the external
world are completely unknowable. We might try to INFER that there are external objects
by supposing that our ideas of them (our phenomena) must have a CAUSE. But, the
‘cause MIGHT just be a mind (e.g., God, or even our own minds!). Kant writes,
“For if we regard outer appearances [ie, phenomena, or ideas, of external objects] as
representations produced in us by their objects, and if these objects be things
existing in themselves outside us, itis indeed impossible to see how we can come to
know the existence of the objects otherwise than by inference from the effect to the
cause; and this being so, it must always remain doubtful whether the cause in
question be in us or outside us.” (Critique of the Fourth Paralogism)
The Copernican Shift: Kant does not view himself as an external world skeptic, however.
Now, Locke gave us a system where external objects were inferred from experience, but
remained doubtable. Berkeley denied their existence altogether. Kant thought he could
do better—by proving the existence of external objects a priori, with certainty!
Here's how: Before Kant, the assumption had been that we KNOW things only when the
appearances or impressions in our mind accurately represented the things out in the
external world; ie, we gain knowledge when our minds conform to reality. A
“Copernican shift” occurred when Kant suggested that we gain knowledge when reality
conforms to our minds. (‘Vote that this is also believed by the Berkeleyan idealist) Itis
only once we approach from THIS direction that we can do (a priori) metaphysics. “if our intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, | don't see how we
can know anything about them @ priori; but | can easily conceive of having a priori
knowledge of objects if they (as objects of the senses) have to conform to the
constitution of our faculty of intuition.” (Preface to the second edition)
Eh... What? We can have a priori knowledge of objects if they conform to what now?
Well, for starters, Kant thought that space and time were innate, hard-wired necessary
pre-conditions of experience. Simply put, we CANNOT experience the world as anything
other than being “out there” in space and time. So, these are synthetic a priori concepts.
(You might think that you acquire the concepts a posteriori; e.g., by observing one thing
here and another over there, and then inferring that there is space between them. But,
note that you've already inserted the concept of space into your perception the moment
you abserved one thing as being THERE and another as being HERE.)
Descartes showed us that we can know (a priori, with certainty) that WE exist (via what
Kant calls our ‘inner sense’). But, we also learned that we know with certainty facts about
our sensations and experiences. Yet, our experiences NECESSARILY represent
material objects as being “out there” in space and time (via what Kant calls our
‘outer sense’). So, there REALLY ARE external objects, in space and time.
This was the whole Copernican shift: Our mind shapes reality. Reality conforms to our
minds, not vice versa. It conforms to our stamps of space and time, for instance. This is
transcendental idealism.’ From here, Kant is able to adopt an empirical realism (i, a
realism about the perception of external objects). He writes,
“The transcendental idealist ..may be an empirical realist .; that is, he may admit the
existence of matter without going outside his mere self-consciousness, or assuming
anything more than the certainty of his representations, that is, the cogito, ergo sum.
For he considers this matter and even its inner possibility to be appearance merely;
and appearance, if separated from our sensibility, is nothing. Matter is ... therefore,
only a species of representations (intuition), which are called external, not as
standing in relation to objects in themselves external, but because they relate
perceptions to the space in which all things are external to one another, while yet the
space itself is in us. ... [Olur doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of
accepting the existence of matter on the unaided testimony of our mere self-
consciousness, or of declaring it to be thereby proved in the same manner as the
existence of myself as a thinking being is proved. .
7 As Bilis notes: “Kant uses the term ‘transcendental’ to refer to innate cognitive structures (or the norms of thought)
that make our knowledge possible. Thus, Kant's idealism isa transcendental idealism, since the world-to-mind
conformity relation is due to these transcendental structures.” Thus external things exist as well as | myself, and both indeed, upon the immediate
witness of my self-consciousness. The only difference is that the representation of
myself, as the thinking subject, belongs to inner sense only, while the representations
which mark extended beings belong also to outer sense. .. . [But] in both cases alike
the objects are nothing but representations, the immediate perception
(consciousness) of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality. The
transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical realist, and allows to matter, as
appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately
perceived.” (Critique of the Fourth Paralogism)
So, rather than the existence of external objects needing to be INFERRED, Kant's view is
that external objects are immediately PERCEIVED, and so are known with certainty to
really exist externally. Yay! Now we can do science!
..Sort of... This only follows because Kant is using ‘real’ and ‘external’ as follows:
* The “real” world - Kant clarifies that “The reality of outer appearances is therefore
real in perception only, and can be real in no other way." So, these so-called external
objects are REAL... asin, really in our minds,
© The “external” world ~ Kant clat
fies:
“The expression ‘outside us’ is thus unavoidably ambiguous in meaning, sometimes
signifying what as thing in itself exists apart from us, and sometimes what belongs
solely to outer appearance.” He then clarifies that ‘empirically external’ refers only to
the latter meaning, For, “If we treat outer objects as things in themselves, it is quite
impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside
Us, since we have to rely merely on the representation which is in us.”
Simply put, ‘external’ objects are really OUTSIDE of us... or, at least, they APPEAR to
us in that way; appearances are unavoidably REPRESENTED to us in that way.
Keep in mind, however, that Kant does not think that we can know anything about the
NOUMENAL external objects, if there even are such things. [But, isn’t that what we mean
when we say ‘external objects’? Is Kant achieving certainty about “external” objects merely
by endorsing idealism and then CALLING the ideas ‘external objects’? What do you think?
A further worry: If empirical reality is entirely INSIDE of my head (in the phenomenal
realm), and reality conforms to each person's mind, then how do we know that each
person's reality is the same? Worse stil, isn't the reality that | am living in, BY DEFINITION
DIFFERENT than the reality YOU are living in? This worry would in fact lead to many later
philosophers admitting that, yes, we DO each have different ways of carving up the world,
Reality is entirely subjective, and each and every person's reality is entirely different)
