9-993-023

DESIGN
MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTE
CASE STUDY
Polaroid Corporation:
Camera Design and
Development 1984
This case study came from the Case
Study Research and Development
Program at the Design Management
Institute’s Center for Research. The
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and design management in business
success. Case studies, the Design
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Acknowledgements:
We are very grateful for the participation and
patience of both current and former Polaroid
employees, including John Pasieka, Milton
Dietz, William O’Neill, and Jon Craine; and
of Henry Dreyfuss Associates, especially Jim
Ryan, Don Genaro and former partner Jim
Conner. Thanks go also to Professor Oscar
Hauptmann, Carleton University, for his close
collaboration and support, and to Earl Powell,
president, DMI, for his vision and insight.

Karen J. Freeze

This case study was partially funded by the

Design Arts Program of the National
Endowment for the Arts.

Institute Staff:
President: Earl N. Powell
Director of Research: Karen J. Freeze
Director of Operations: Melissa J. Comeau
Graphics Specialist: Nancy E. Barry
Office Coordinator: Liza Cluthe

© Copyright 1993
The Design Management Institute
All rights reserved. No part of this
publication may be reproduced without
written permission.

2
 Design Management Institute Case Study

Polaroid Corporation:
Camera Design and
Development 1984

“This project has been going on for over a year and we

aren’t getting anywhere!
■ This case was prepared by Dr.
John Pasieka, project manager for Project 7000, Polaroid Corporation’s Karen J. Freeze, Director of Research,
Design Management Institute, for the
new, high-end instant camera, was frustrated. It was almost spring in purposes of class discussion rather
than to illustrate either effective or
1984, and the crocuses had just begun to peek out in the well-kept ineffective handling of an administra-
tive situation.
grounds at Polaroid’s Technology Square in Cambridge, but John and the

others locked in one of the interminable meetings over Project 7000

couldn’t enjoy them.

“I’ve been telling you that ever since I got involved with this project,”

said Bill O’Neill, who had recently become vice president for consumer

products. “Dreyfuss has been with Polaroid for over 20 years and they

really aren’t with it. They’re stale. And if we don’t do something, they’ll

pull down the next project, the 6000, as well.” Henry Dreyfuss Associates

of New York had been Polaroid’s industrial design consultants for 23

years.

“I’m not so sure,” suggested Milt Dietz, senior vice president for

engineering. “You’ve got to remember that this is no remake. We’re

spending a fortune on new technology, and until it’s ready, we can’t

finalize the design.”

3
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

“We can’t wait any longer. Benes has and personal magnetism brought some of
hired a Boston design firm to come up the most talented and brilliant people in
with a new proposal for the 7000 within an array of fields to Polaroid, where many
the next two months,” O’Neill responded. of them spent their entire careers. They
Michael Benes was head of corporate de- stayed not only because of the opportunity
sign services, which handled mainly cor- to create new things at the frontier of their
porate communications and packaging. fields and be rewarded for doing so, but
“I know,” returned Dietz. “Jim Ryan also because the company was a progres-
has insisted on being allowed to do the sive employer. Its employee benefits and
same, away from our committee meetings, its contributions to the surrounding com-
and I told him he could do so.” Ryan was a munity reflected a corporate ethic that was
Dreyfuss designer and senior partner who pioneering in its day.
had worked with Polaroid projects for sev- Land’s aphorisms defined him and per-
eral years. meated the company’s spirit as well.
“Well, whatever happens with the 7000, “Anything worth doing is worth doing to
“If you it will be just a short-term fix,” O’Neill excess.” “Don’t do anything that anyone
stated. “Just look at the 6000. People who else can do.” “If you can define a problem,
can define have seen the first proposal for the 6000 you can solve it.” Land never considered
say they can’t see the difference between it anything impossible, and was inevitably
a problem, and the Pronto. It’s going to be a mass- able to look at any problem with fresh
market product like the 600s, so it has to eyes—he simply didn’t see things in the
you can be new. International is pressing for Euro- same way as other people.
pean input. I think that’s a good idea.” Land’s gifts—including that of hiring
solve it.” the right people—brought the company to
THE LAND CAMERA COMPANY its heights in the sixties and early seven-
At his retirement from Polaroid in 1982 at ties, with only a few slumps in between.
age 73, Edwin H. Land had 537 patents to Dozens of useful products that most
his name, second only to Thomas Edison people outside of the stockholders hadn’t
and a record unthreatened in the foresee- heard of made Polaroid an essential player
able future. Except perhaps by Land him- in business and industry as well as an ex-
self, who was working full-time at the citing figure in the amateur photography
Rowland Institute for Science, a basic re- field.
search laboratory he had founded some Land began to reduce his involvement
years earlier. One of his most significant in 1975, when he appointed Bill McCune
inventions, however, was not patentable: president. McCune had joined Polaroid in
Polaroid Corporation itself. 1939 and had been vice president for engi-
By 1983 Polaroid had experienced both neering. He subsequently became CEO in
the heights and the depths of corporate life 1980 and chairman of the board in 1982
in the U.S. Founded in 1937 by Land and when Land retired from those positions. I.
George Wheelwright, who had worked to- MacAllister Booth, a mechanical engineer
gether for five years in the Land-Wheel- and MBA who had worked in the film di-
wright Laboratories on devices for polariz- vision since 1958, became chief operating
ing light, Polaroid had enjoyed modest officer in 1981 and president in 1983.
commercial success before the war, and
had solidified its reputation as a creative, THE CAMERA BUSINESS: MARKETS AND
science-based company through its work COMPETITION
for the military during the war. Land gave The ability to freeze and preserve a mo-
birth to instant photography in 1947, the ment in time was at first the domain of
invention with which Polaroid would the professional photographer, with his
henceforth be identified. huge, mysterious array of equipment
Like many inventor-entrepreneurs, perched at the roadside in a Wild West
Land ran his company single-handedly, town, or cloistered in his portrait studio.
delegating functions only when they be- It took George Eastman, a photographic
came massive, but nevertheless retaining a pioneer, to dream about average people
hand in all decision-making. His intuition taking pictures of their own.

4
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

One of Eastman’s first successful cam- the desert with his family, Land had been
eras (called a “Kodak” like his company, a taking pictures when his daughter Jennifer
name Eastman invented for its memorabil- asked, “Why can’t I see them now?” That
ity) was a user-friendly system—easy-to- question catapulted Land into one of his “Push the
use and very conveniently preloaded with creative sprees of the mind, and within a
film for 100 pictures. All the customer had few hours he had asked “why not?” and button
to do was “push the button and leave the had answered the question with a concep-
rest to us.” After taking the pictures, the tual solution, complete from start to finish. and leave
photographer sent the whole camera back Slowed only by extensive commitments to
to Kodak, which returned the developed the military during World War II, the in- the rest
pictures along with the reloaded camera. stant photography project commanded the
The system created a profitable depen- attention of some of the best scientists in to us.”
dency on film manufacturers and photo- the U.S., who devoted their lives to it as
graphic developers. For years Eastman soon as fighting ceased. The “Model 95,”
Kodak was the only company that did all named for its expected price of $95, was
three: cameras, film, and developing. They introduced at the American Optical
could price cameras within reach of most Society’s meeting in February, 1947. The
anybody, because what they might lose in first production models were sold at Jor-
minimal margins, they would gain in the dan Marsh in Boston in 1948. It was an
sale of film—specific to each camera—and overnight success, and launched Polaroid
developing services. Thus the camera on its upward trajectory of the next several
business was a proverbial “blades” busi- decades. (See Exhibit 1.)
ness: the money was in the film, that yel- During the 1950s Polaroid made sev-
low box found in every corner of the eral improvements in the original instant
globe, sold by pushcart vendor and profes- camera, and incorporated different fea-
sional photographic supply stores alike. In tures in a variety of models. Color film
this way Kodak developed the amateur was introduced in 1963, and inexpensive,
photography market Polaroid would even- simpler cameras were devised for various
tually target. markets. The Swinger, for example, was a
In the mid-twentieth century, when simple, inexpensive, fixed-focus, black
Kodak held a virtual monopoly in the and white snapshot camera that debuted
U.S., challenged only by home darkrooms in 1965. The Big Shot, designed for close-
using Kodak developing equipment, other up portraits, became a favorite in police
companies begin arriving on the U.S. departments.
shores. By the beginning of the second
world war, the elite cameras were German,
the mass-market cameras were Kodak. A Exhibit 1
color film project was underway at Kodak Model 95
that would keep Kodak on top of the film
industry, despite inroads by Japanese and
German film companies. The emergence
of German and Japanese 35mm single lens
reflex cameras in the early fifties, however,
fundamentally changed the consumer
photography industry. These cameras
were expensive and complicated, but pro-
duced excellent pictures. Inexpensive,
simple cameras were easy to use, but pro-
duced only adequate pictures.

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE HAVE TO WAIT: THE

EVOLUTION OF INSTANT PHOTOGRAPHY
Land was spending Christmas 1943 with
his family in Santa Fe, New Mexico, when
his life changed forever. Sight-seeing in Source: Company archives

5
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

In the mid-sixties Land began to think “Pronto” in 1975, it became the platform
about a new color film that would be all in for a series of products—the One Step
one piece, eliminating the trash trail left by (with fixed focus) in 1978, and the Sun
previous Polaroid prints. Such a film pack 600 series (so named after their faster 600
would be smaller than earlier film rolls or ASA film). (See Exhibits 3a, 3b, and 4.)
peel-apart film, and thus the camera could The One-Step hit a manufacturing peak of
be smaller. By the late sixties, the new SX- 30,000 per day in the late 1970s and en-
70 project was well underway, the most joyed a 40% penetration of U.S. house-
intense in Polaroid’s history. The com- holds.
pany invested $750 million in the new Despite this success, innovation never
camera, making technological advances in slowed at Polaroid. The company devel-
every element of the product that would oped a sonar autofocus (AF) system,
stun both scientists and consumers when which they added to both the SX-70 and
it was introduced in 1972. (See Exhibits the One Step. (See Exhibit 5.) Then they
2a-2d.) added a built-in strobe to a model called
In the meantime, work was underway the Super Autofocus 660. (See Exhibit 6.)
on a simple, non-folding camera for the But when they added the strobe to the SX-
low-end market. Introduced as the 70 (see Exhibit 7), it was no longer the
sleek, elegant device it had been at its birth
in 1972. Besides, the SX-70 was too ex-
Exhibit 2a pensive to manufacture and was losing
The SX-70 folded (1972) ground in the market. In 1982, with Land
gone, Polaroid decided to discontinue the
SX-70. This left the consumer product
group with various models built on the
Pronto platform, but no high-end camera.
By this time, the competitive environ-
ment in consumer photography had
changed. Polaroid had had essentially no
competitors for most of its existence; now
Source: Dreyfuss archives competition for instant photography came
from a number of sources. The 35mm
Exhibit 2b cameras, ever more compact and easy to
The SX-70 (1972) use, had become less expensive and in-
creasingly popular. Because of the ubiqui-
tous Polaroid Sun series, a low-end camera
whose picture quality did not match that
of 35mm prints, at least not routinely, “in-
stant photography” was associated with
“fuzzy” pictures. To combat this threat,
Polaroid had embarked on Project 7000.

Source: Polaroid archives

POLAROID’S CONSUMER BUSINESS
Exhibit 2c Polaroid’s business was basically one: in-
The SX-70’s SLR viewfinder optics stant imaging. But this business covered a
wide range of markets; indeed, 40 percent
of them were in technical and industrial
imaging, for dozens of applications from
medicine to quality control. It was, how-
ever, the amateur, or consumer, photogra-
phy business that had made Polaroid a
household name.
Not until the early 1980s, however, did
Source: Dreyfuss archives Polaroid recognize this part of its business

6
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

Exhibit 2d
The SX-70: An inside view

Source: Polaroid archives

organizationally, giving Consumer Pho- camera designers was, as senior engineer

tography its own vice president. Bill Bruce Johnson put it, “to make a camera
O’Neill, formerly corporate controller that will produce the smallest picture a
and financial analyst with Polaroid since consumer will accept in the largest camera
1969, had just been given that job in Au- they will accept.” Unlike standard photog-
gust 1983. raphy, where negative film of any size can
be blown up to any size, Polaroid equip-
DESIGNING CAMERAS FOR AMATEURS ment had to fit around a given size film,
Traditionally Polaroid’s recipe for product which was determined by the optical re-
success had been: unlimited funds + un- quirements—i.e. the focal plane, or the
limited brains + whatever time you need distance between the lens and the film. As
= something impossible that didn’t exist Bill O’Neill put it, “the sheet pod and
before. Within this framework, the funda- negative is a great wonder—when you
mental challenge to Polaroid’s consumer press the film through the rollers, the pod

Exhibit 3a
Pronto

Exhibit 3b
One Step, 1977

Source: Dreyfuss archives

7
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

Exhibit 4
Two models from the 600-series
(Pronto platform)

Source: Polaroid archives

is broken and the chemicals spread over A House Full of Scientists and Engineers
the film. But it is a great constraint as In its forty-sixth year Polaroid Corpora-
well.” tion employed numerous scientists en-
Only slightly more flexibility was al- gaged more or less in basic research, and
lowed by the viewfinder and lens systems. many engineers of every sort who worked
This limitation demanded attention not on product-related projects. Because Land
only to actual size, but apparent size as inspired the best in people and accepted
well: “One of our goals is that a camera nothing less, dozens of these employees
‘look smaller’ so we start with a shrink-fit were among the best in their professions.
case,” Johnson explained. “Anything dif- For nearly twenty years, Polaroid had had
ferent is inevitably bigger.” a critical mass of talent necessary for inno-
vation in all the key fields in photography.

Exhibit 5
Sonar AF systems on the SX-70
(left) and the Pronto, 1978

Source: Dreyfuss archives

8
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

Whole groups could be set to work on the Exhibit 6

smallest part, or parallel teams might work The Sun Super AF 660, 1981
on the same part. When the basic configu-
ration for the new product had been de-
termined by the engineers, many of
whom were called camera designers, in-
dustrial design consultants would begin
working on the final design. The two
groups would work together on the prod-
uct, and then turn it over to Polaroid’s
manufacturing group.
Creative Services: Polaroid’s Corporate
Design Department
Polaroid’s in-house design group, called
Creative Services, was headed by Michael Source: Dreyfuss archives
Benes, who had come to Polaroid early in
the fall of 1982. Although Creative Ser- and had been working on the side with the
vices was situated directly under senior 7000’s engineering manager Ed Coughlan
vice president for worldwide marketing, on yet another proposal for the new cam-
Joe McLaughlin (see organization chart in era, and had engaged a Boston firm, Gre-
Exhibit 8), Benes also reported directly gory Fossella, to work with them on it.
to Booth.
The department’s traditional sphere
Henry Dreyfuss Associates
had been communications and package de- Henry Dreyfuss Associates (HDA) were
sign; Benes sought to develop a compre- industrial design consultants based in New
hensive corporate identity program. In York who had worked with Polaroid since
1983 he organized a packaging study that 1960.1 In the mid-1940s, while he was de- 1. See “Design Management
demonstrated the value of the company veloping the first instant camera, Land had Lessons from Henry
name and current packaging, but also asked Henry Dreyfuss, HDA’s founder Dreyfuss” by Karen J.
Freeze,Ph.D., with Earl N.
showed that the image of the product was and a father of industrial design in Powell, Innovation, Spring
“cheap.” Benes was in the midst of a new America, to work on its “styling.” Henry 1991.
corporate identity program that would give was working for Ansco on some cameras
the company a consistent image in all so—following his own company policy—
forms of communication, and would he had to turn Land down, recommending
counteract the cameras’ poor image. Walter Dorwin Teague, another industrial
Occasionally the internal design depart- design pioneer, instead. Teague worked on
ment called in other outside consultants to the Model 95, and continued to work for
work on projects initiated by marketing or Polaroid until the late 1950s. By then
other functions, rather than engineering.
The Big Shot, a simple black & white por-
trait camera favored by police depart-
ments, was designed by a Boston firm and Exhibit 7
introduced in 1971. These forays into The SLR 680, 1981
product design were not appreciated by
engineering, who felt that the graphic de-
signers did not understand Polaroid tech-
nology. “When Peter Wensburg was here
they’d take drawings to him and then he’d
tell McCune that’s what he wanted,” ex-
plained Pasieka. “The problem was that
they just didn’t understand the technology
and the constraints it generates.”
Benes felt strongly about the need for
new input into Polaroid’s camera design

9
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

Dreyfuss was no longer working with a marketing person, and we have to do mis-
camera company, so Land invited him to sionary work all over again.”
work with Polaroid on a new camera, the
Model 100, the first to use the new color
Marketing and Market Research
pack film. Delighted, Henry asked one of Classic market research—focus groups,
his partners, Jim Conner, to work on it be- questionnaires—was anathema to Land,
cause of his technical background and in- who believed that he, in consultation, per-
terest in photography. Conner’s first major haps, with a few friends and colleagues,
project was the renowned SX-70, but could determine what products would sell;
“styling” was not his job. As would any in- after all, hadn’t he been right in the past?
dustrial designer, Conner took product Thus any market research undertaken was
design seriously, from the inside out, fit- done so in utmost secrecy, and, should
ting form to function, paying attention to Land discover it, its results were sum-
the user interface. “Styling” denoted atten- marily ignored. After Land retired, how-
tion only to superficial characteristics like ever, voices both in marketing and outside
color and “looking nice.” of it were protesting: “Our CEO isn’t like
Explaining the relationship between the the customer, nor is anyone else on our ex-
industrial design consultants and ecutive staff. The whole executive commit-
“We often Polaroid’s engineers, Conner noted that it tee put together doesn’t represent the cus-
takes “months or even years to develop a tomer!” voiced engineering project
don’t even relationship. We didn’t understand cam- manager Ed Coughlan.
eras from day one, but now we’re on an
have to talk, equal basis with them.” Indeed, from PROJECT 7000: HIGH TECH AND PRE-
Conner’s perspective it appeared that CIOUS
because we “communication between engineering and By mid-1982, Polaroid’s consumer camera
Dreyfuss was better than between various line lacked a high-end product to replace
know what engineers. We were often the glue—the fa- the history-making SX-70. The marketing
cilitators, coordinators—that held people people were pressing for a no-compro-
the other is together.” As Jim Ryan, who followed mises camera with a built-in flash,
Conner to the Polaroid account, put it, re- autofocus with manual override, and auto-
thinking.” ferring to his understanding of Polaroid’s matic exposure, which would nevertheless
technology as it relates to design limits, be compact. "We had tried during the 600
“We often don’t even have to talk, because program to fold the camera, but it didn't
we know what the other is thinking.” work because the drive system and shutter
Bruce Johnson, described the partner- were connected mechanically," Pasieka ex-
ship this way: “They understand enough plained. "One of my engineers, more or
about manufacturing processes, such as in- less on his own time, finally figured out
jection molding, painting versus plating, how to do it and developed a crude model.
etc. And they are open enough to listen to When Bill McCune saw that it was fea-
our requirements, and so they are reason- sible, he challenged us to try to do a fold-
able, and creative. They design so the ap- ing camera economically—which would
pearance doesn’t violate the inside require- mean going with as much of the existing
ments. But once in a while they don’t get 600 platform as possible."
the user interface right, as in the place- Polaroid’s engineers were used to this
ment and operation of the shutter or the kind of challenging mandate, but by the
opening mechanism.” time they figured out how to fold the cam-
It was difficult, in such a large com- era, they had to change two-thirds of its
pany, to be close to everyone, however. parts, so they decided instead to develop an
The Dreyfuss people knew the product entirely new camera. (See concept sketch
engineers best, and had to work at educat- in Exhibit 9.)
ing other functions. “What happens is that At this point, in late 1982, McCune gave
the people we work with know us,” engineering the go-ahead to “go wild,” as
Conner explained, “and we understand John Pasieka put it. Some of them started
them. Then some new guy comes in, like a looking at ways to reduce part size. They
new internal design director, or a new shrunk the sonar autofocus transducer

10
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

Exhibit 8
Polaroid’s Marketing Organiza-
tion, 1984
J. McLaughlin
Group VP, Marketing

Operations Services

WW Consumer
NA Creative Market Marketing
Industrial International Export Product Mgt. Controller Advertising Publicity Personnel
Marketing Services Research Systems
Marketing & Services
M. Benes

from 1 1/2 inches in diameter to one inch. MARKET RESEARCH: INTERVIEWS AND
The optical people started working on a FOCUS GROUPS
new type of lens, which would reduce the In the meantime, the marketing depart-
overall length of body by one inch. The ment was conducting research on the cur-
viewfinder remained six inches long. rent state of consumer wants and expecta-
Other engineers played with mechani- tions. They found that most people
cal configurations. “It was a lot of fun,” perceived instant cameras as:
Pasieka said. “We started off with perfor- • a toy
mance and features, but what we really • of limited use
wanted was a different look from the • old-fashioned
Pronto - smaller and ‘precious.’” Milt • expensive
Dietz felt it was still unclear whether their • poor quality.
product positioning goal was “high tech”
or “easy to use.” “We are really aiming for Marketing then embarked, for the first
the higher-income people, such as those time, on a series of focus group studies
who had bought the SX-70. That’s why that attempted to identify what consumers
Joe McLaughlin, head of marketing, gave really wanted. They used the models
us the word ‘precious.’” Ryan’s and Pasieka’s people were produc-
During the “wild exploration” of 1982, ing “We made our models to be handled,
Polaroid engineers and Dreyfuss industrial specifically so they could be used in focus
designers came up with all sorts of models, groups,” Ryan explained. (See examples in
trying out various configurations, most of Exhibit 13.) Because they viewed the
which turned out to be impractical. (See 35mm camera as their prime competitor,
Exhibit 10a and 10b for two of these they wanted to know if the rectangular
models.) Both Polaroid and Dreyfuss built print of the 35mm camera was a “must”
the models, and they often went back and
forth, adding to and improving on the
other’s work. “They’d give us compo-
nents, and we’d draw housing sketches. Exhibit 9
They’d make models, and we’d finish Folding the 600: Concept sketch
them,” Ryan explained. They even put
graphics on the foam models “so people
will respond to something that looks real.”
After two months, they settled on a “clam
shell” configuration (see Exhibit 11 for an
early concept sketch). At this point the
Dreyfuss people began working on “how
to make the thing look smaller—like mak-
ing the bottom a little smaller than the
top.” (See Exhibit 12.)

Source: Dreyfuss archives

11
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

Exhibit 10a
Model with the flash in a folding
handle

Exhibit 10b
Radical “A-frame” model

Source: Dreyfuss archives

for Project 7000. They considered both an

Source: Dreyfuss archives
SLR design and a zoom lens, but they
were too big for a Polaroid camera with
the designated large film format: “Physics
was in conflict with consumer wants,” skepticism. “But they forget that when you
O’Neill quipped. smooth over those bumps, you make the
camera bigger!” The new vice president of
Cars and Curves consumer photography, O’Neill, dis-
At this point, engineering and marketing agreed: “We’re having a big battle with
had somewhat different views of how the Dreyfuss. The world is going to curves, as
new camera should look. “Marketing in the Audi, one of the first cars to go
thinks that all cameras should look like curved. I maintain that car design drives a
Bill O’Neill’s Audi, with smooth rounded lot of people’s feelings about what they
forms,” said John Pasieka, not hiding his want in design.”

Exhibit 11
Early concept sketch of the 7000

Source: Dreyfuss archives

12
 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

Exhibit 12
Fostering illusions: making the
7000 look smaller

Source: Dreyfuss archives

Dietz exclaimed. “It takes time, and it

Lifestyle Consultant makes the product bigger!”
To bolster marketing’s input, O’Neill
brought in a “lifestyle consultant,” Irene
Quintic autofocus lens
Khrone from New York. Her remarks In order to justify the higher cost of the
were vivid in Bruce Johnson’s mind: “She new camera, Polaroid needed a better fo-
said, in effect, ‘You old men, you don’t cus system—automatic and good for close-
know how to make a camera for the ups, but without exorbitant cost. The cam-
younger generation.’” Johnson found that eras based on the Pronto platform had a
rather “abrasive,” as did Dietz; Ryan was rotating lens disk, but that wouldn’t fit in a
dismayed at her lack of technical knowl- smaller space, nor was it very precise. And,
edge. But all agreed that eventually, “once as Bruce Johnson explained, “We didn’t
she started to understand the limits of the want a linear motion, because that would
technology,” she did make positive contri- involve a motor. So we made an arc with
butions to the project. ten positions that permitted continuous
Over a year into the project, the prod- focusing.” With the help of Dr. James
uct was still undefined, or somewhat de- Baker of Harvard University, who had
fined but constantly changing. “We usually made camera lenses for NASA, Polaroid
operate with a clear, specific design brief,” made significant advances in the technol-
Ryan explained, “but here all we’ve been ogy of what was called the "Quintec lens."
given is vague words like ‘precious’ and in- Employing super-scientists to work on
decision about everything.” Management amateur cameras was not without its prob-
was trying to determine why it was pro- lems, however, as Johnson recalled: “Dr.
ceeding so slowly, and what could be done Baker had to learn about the difference be-
about it. tween tolerances for military products and
those for consumer products. His com-
NEW PARTS FOR A NEW WHOLE puter goes to 10 decimal points. He has
While the high-level management group done a lot for the Air Force—he made
was worrying about slow development and lenses used during WWII, and the tracking
styling issues, the insides of the camera cameras for the first 15 years of satellites.
had yet to be completed, which meant that He wasn’t used to cost constraints!”
the final form of the camera could not yet
be fixed. Project 7000 embraced a number
Viewfinder
of parallel projects that were typical of Another feature that had to be superior to
Polaroid, each staffed by first-rate people, that in Polaroid’s current products was the
all enjoying the opportunity to work on viewfinder. As Johnson described it, “the
sophisticated—and time-consuming—so- viewfinder on the Sun had fuzzy edges and
lutions. “The amount of stuff we’re pack- included borders that the lens doesn’t see.
ing in is typically our Achilles heel,” Milt To do better, we needed a telescope. So

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 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

Exhibit 13
Models for Market Research

Source: Dreyfuss archives

the 7000’s viewfinder has 7 lenses, 4 mir- larger camera with larger, rectangular
rors, and a couple of other parts.” prints.
The placement of the viewfinder was
driven by its technology. It was six inches PATIENCE 7000: WAITING UNTIL THEY
long, and therefore its placement deter- GET WHAT THEY WANT
mined key parameters of the design. As Project 7000 was characterized by a multi-
they looked for ways to make the apparent tude of meetings with all disciplines,
size of the camera smaller, the designers though perhaps not all at the same time.
explored the “outrigger” option, in which As project manager, John Pasieka held
the viewfinder becomes the handle when half-hour meetings at 7:00 a.m. every
the camera is closed. (See Exhibit 11.) Al- morning, and many groups—part (e.g. the
though they made several models attempt- shutter) teams, functional groups, cross-
ing to make this work, they eventually dis- functional teams—held weekly meetings.
carded the idea. Pasieka also organized monthly review
meetings for management, at which 50 to
Film 60 people followed a structured agenda,
At the very beginning of Project 7000, the reviewing every aspect of the program.
media development organization was chal- The weekly review meetings were a
lenged to make a film that would rival source of frustration. “We have weekly,
35mm film in quality. It was to have two-hour luncheon meetings on Wednes-
higher resolution and a broader tempera- days, with 12 or so people, mostly vice
ture latitude than any Polaroid film hith- presidents,” explained Ed Coughlan, engi-
erto. But the challenges proved formidable neering manager for Project 7000. “The
even for the Polaroid film people, and the agenda is directed at the availability of
new film was taking much longer than ex- who’s there, and that varies a lot. But at
pected to be ready. this point it’s mostly styling issues. You get
Midway through the project, McCune a free lunch and a vote on everything.”
decided that the film should be rectangu- Conner and/or Ryan came up from
lar, in order to compete with 35mm New York once a week for design meet-
prints. Since the clamshell configuration ings. “The pressures are unbelievable,”
made the camera almost large enough to Pasieka said. “We tend to have too many
accommodate wider film anyway, they people involved, and that makes it hard to
thought that a bit of stretching wouldn’t close on issues. We haven’t brought manu-
make much difference. Market research, facturing people in yet for that reason.”
done twice in August, 1983, showed that Ryan was frustrated over these big meet-
57% preferred a smaller camera with ings, which were “always with different
smaller, square prints over 41% for a people. You have to explain things over

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 Polaroid Corporation: Camera Design and Development 1984

and over again, because there’s always 300 people, who were involved in many
someone new. They can’t seem to make other projects, to manage.
decisions.” His mentor, Jim Conner, was a Maybe it is the industrial designers who
little more tolerant: “At least people aren’t should be able to speed things up, Pasieka was
isolated like they were in previous pro- beginning to wonder. Aren’t they supposed to
grams. Marketing, production, and design be able to facilitate communication? After all, it’s
are all talking. There’s lots of conflict, but styling issues that are occupying all our time.
it’ll probably be better in the end.” Milt thinks maybe Dreyfuss is too appreciative
Pasieka linked the slow decision-mak- of Polaroid’s technical problems, and that per-
ing with this change in modus operandi: “In haps that’s what’s inhibiting them from taking a
the old days, during the SX-70 and the fresh look. Maybe Fosella will come up with
Pronto, these decisions were made with something different for the 7000 that will satisfy
three or four people. Now we have too marketing. With that Pasieka started to ex-
many people involved. We should have amine his own attitude towards Dreyfuss,
closed earlier on some things, but it’s in which he’d always respected. Maybe Milt
our management’s culture to wait until and I should be open-minded and respond more
they get what they want.” Pasieka under- positively to the pressure of International Mar-
stood that “you have to agree to be crazy” keting for a new design thrust. Maybe Dreyfuss
in order to nurture creativity in an organi- really is just too conservative, especially for a new
zation. “Sometimes, though, you have to low-end camera. Maybe a trip to Europe to re-
crank out a product,” he noted wryly. cruit a new designer would be just the thing to
Jim Ryan tried to ameliorate the prob- inspire us. But what if there’s something else go-
lem by simplifying the discussions: “In ing on here?l
these meetings we show only a sampling
of our sketches. When you have too many
alternatives and too many people making
decisions, it’s unbelievably difficult.”

PRESSURE TO MOVE FORWARD

As project manager for the 7000, Pasieka
was feeling the pressure from marketing to
complete the project. Some aspects of the
project he could control: “My style is to do
what’s possible, so I am trying to make
sure to push on things, like the spread sys-
tem, drive system, and exposure system,
that are not affected by styling decisions.
It’s hard to keep the engineers interested
when a project drags on like this, because
they wonder if what they do will ever be
used. It’s really bad for morale.”
Much was out of Pasieka’s control,
however. He knew it would be at least a
year before the new film would be ready.
Besides, the weekly meetings were proving
dysfunction in terms of coming to closure
on anything. “You never know who will
show up, and anyone who does has a vote,
even if they haven’t been in on earlier dis-
cussions. Every vice president feels he has
the right to veto anything, and no one is
really making decisions.” Pasieka didn’t see
how he could change the system. Besides,
as the head of product engineering, he had

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