MODULE 5: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND ABSOLUTORY CAUSES

A. Defense of self, relatives, and strangers (Art. 11 (1), (2), and (3), RPC)

1. Manaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150723, 11 July 2006.

FACTS:

Bautista was trying to withdraw money from the ATM so he could buy medicine for his sick daughter. Upon failure of the
ATM to release any money and for having eaten his ATM card, Bautista soon became angry to which the security officer,
herein petitioner Manaban, responded to in order to quell him down. Having failed to do so, Bautista and petitioner got
hostile with each other. Petitioner claimed that when Bautista turned around and acted like he was going to pull a gun on
his waist, he shot Bautista on his back, fearing that the latter might do the same to him. Consequently, Bautista died.
Prosecuted for the crime of homicide, petitioner Manaban claims that he had acted in self-defense.

ISSUE:

Did the lower court err in ruling that petitioner Manaban failed to establish unlawful aggression just because the holster of
the victim was still in a lock position?

HELD:

NO. Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a justifying
circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the accused or the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-
defense. Self-defense is founded on the necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression. Thus, without prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. A mere
threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing,
manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real peril.

In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back as evidenced by
the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked holster and tucked in his
right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban, Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista.
These circumstances clearly belie Manaban’s claim of unlawful aggression on Bautista's part.
2. Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341, 19 October 2004.

FACTS:

Petitioner Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin in a hut when an angry Leon
Lumasac suddenly arrived at the said place, holding a bolo in his right hand and looking for his brother Miguel. Petitioner
and Jose tried to pacify Leon. But when petitioner approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him, so he embraced Leon and
Jose took Leon’s bolo. Then, Leon and petitioner talked things out and later reconciled.

Subsequently, Leon walked out of the hut but he was followed by petitioner. Suddenly, about ten meters from the hut,
petitioner stabbed Leon at the back. When Leon turned around, petitioner continued stabbing him until he fell to the ground.
Petitioner then ran towards the barangay road and threw away the "kolonial" knife he used in stabbing Leon. The latter
died on the spot.

ISSUE:

Was the victim the unlawful aggressor in the instant case, such that, the invocation by petitioner of self-defense excuses
him from culpability for the death of the former?

HELD:

NO. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a
defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor.

We agree with the CA that, as gleaned, even from the testimony of the petitioner, there were two separate but
interrelated incidents that culminated in the petitioner’s stabbing and killing of the victim Leon Lumasac. The first
was the arrival of the victim, who was armed with a bolo, in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal, looking for his brother Miguel
Lumasac, whom he was angry at. The victim hacked the wall of the house in anger. The petitioner, who was armed with a
knife, tried to pacify the victim. The victim attempted to hack the petitioner; nevertheless, the latter embraced and managed
to pacify the victim. Forthwith, Jose Calica took the bolo of the victim and threw it away. For his part, Fidel Senoja took the
petitioner’s knife. As it was, the victim was already pacified. He and the petitioner were already reconciled. Fidel even gave
back the knife to the petitioner.

The second incident took place when the victim demanded that Calica return his bolo as he wanted to go home already.
Because he had thrown away the victim’s bolo, Calica was, thus, impelled to give his own. The victim had already left the
hut and was ten (10) meters away from it. There is no showing that the victim, who was drunk, was aware that appellant
was following him, or that the appellant called out to him so that he (the victim) had to turn around and notice him. It is
clear that at that point in time, the victim was simply walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor.
It was the appellant who, smarting from the earlier incident in the hut where Leon told him, "Hindi ka tatagal, sa loob ng
tatlong araw mayroong mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas," repeated three times, wanted a confrontation.
Appellant stabbed or poked the victim in the left buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound, and when the latter turned
around, successively stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit and chest until he fell. In all, the victim suffered nine (9)
wounds.

While Leon Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was now
the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation.
3. People v. Decena, G.R. No. 107874, 4 August 1994.

FACTS:

It is alleged that while the accused Decena was watching a basketball game, the victim, Jaime Ballesteros, who was drunk
and walking in a wobbly manner, wrapped one arm around Decena’s neck and poked a fork against his neck. Subsequently,
a barangay tanod intervened, took the fork from Jaime and advised Decena to go home. However, Decena claimed that he
was followed by Jaime on the way home and tried to hack him with a balisong. Fortunately, he claims, he was able to parry
the stabbing blow and a struggle ensued between them. Decena overpowered Jaime and succeeded in twisting the wrist of
the victim and thrusting the knife into the latter's body which caused his death.

ISSUE:

Did appellant act in complete self-defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros, as claimed, thus absolving him from criminal liability?

HELD:

NO. When appellant claimed that Jaime suddenly and without any provocation tried to strangle him and poked a fork against
his neck, in front of so many people in the basketball court, then he must necessarily have been deeply offended, if not
insulted, and this fact undoubtedly fired him with a desire to get even with the deceased.

The case at bar calls to mind the scenario and logical view that when a person had inflicted slight physical injuries on
another, without any intention to inflict other injuries, and the latter attacked the former, the one making the
attack was an unlawful aggressor. The attack made was evidently a retaliation. And, we find this an opportune
occasion to emphasize that retaliation is different from an act of self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression was
still existing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making a defense. We find these
observations apropos to the situation presented by the instant case.

It will be recalled that, as claimed by appellant, the unlawful aggression complained of also took place in front of his house,
where Jaime allegedly tried to attack him with a balisong, and not only in the basketball court. To support his theory of
continuing aggression, appellant alleged that whenever the victim was drunk, he would look for trouble. Again, the defense
utterly failed to prove this hypothesis. On the contrary, the wife of the victim testified that the latter has no such record in
their barangay and, significantly, her said testimony was never refuted nor objected to by appellant.

Witnesses for and against the appellant testified that throughout the incident Jaime was inebriated and that he was
staggering or wobbling as he walked. If he had such difficulty even in performing the normal bodily function of
locomotion, it could not be expected that he would muster enough courage to persist in attacking and attempting to
kill appellant, as posited by the defense, considering that the latter was decidedly stronger than him.

After examining and evaluating the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense, we agree with the court a
quo that the prosecution's account is deserving of more credence. On the other hand, we note grave inconsistencies in the
declarations of the defense witnesses.
4. People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 128359, 6 December 2000.

FACTS:

One evening, accused Dela Cruz and his live-in partner were resting in his bedroom when they heard a car stop in front of
their house and later, knocks on their door. When San Antonio opened the door, she was confronted by the herein victim
Macapagal who then made his way inside the house holding a gun in his hand. Macapagal went to the closed bedroom where
Dela Cruz was and banged at the door with his gun while yelling “Come out. Come out.” When Dela Cruz opened the door,
he was greeted by Macapagal’s gun which was pointed at him. Dela Cruz immediately closed the door and Macapagal
continued banging at it. When he opened the door once more, Dela Cruz was now armed with a .38 caliber revolver.
Thereafter, the two grappled at each other’s firearm. A few moments later, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead on
the floor. It is claimed by Dela Cruz that he had acted in self-defense.

ISSUE:

Do the benefits of self-defense apply to the accused in this case?

HELD:

NO. Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack
or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude – but most
importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. True, the victim barged into the house of
accused-appellant and his live-in partner and, banging at the master bedroom door with his firearm, he yelled, "come out."
Accused-appellant, however, upon opening the door and seeing the victim pointing a gun at him, was able to
prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, accused-
appellant, taking his .38 caliber revolver, again opened the bedroom door and, brandishing his own firearm,
forthwith confronted the victim. At this encounter, accused-appellant would be quite hard put to still claim self-defense.

The second element of self-defense would demand that the means employed to quell the unlawful aggression were
reasonable and necessary. The number of the wounds sustained by the deceased in this case would negate the existence
of this indispensable component of self-defense. The autopsy report would show that the victim sustained four gunshot
wounds.

It would be essential, finally, for self-defense to be aptly invoked that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. When accused-appellant, opening the bedroom door the second time confronted, instead
of merely taking precautionary measures against, the victim with his own gun he had taken from the cabinet, accused-
appellant could no longer correctly argue that there utterly was no provocation on his part.
5. People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946.

FACTS:

Herein deceased Amado Capina was in love with accused Avelina Jaurigue whom she flatly refused. On a previous occasion,
Amado suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts, on account of which Avelina slapped Amado, gave him
fist blows and kicked him. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife whenever she went out, evidently for self-
protection.

One day while accused was in a chapel for the purpose of attending religious services, she sat on the bench next to the last
one nearest the door. Thereafter, Amado sat beside her and placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. Avelina
Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which she had in a pocket
of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly
grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a
wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Accused Avelina invoked the justifying circumstance of self-
defense.

ISSUE:

Can the accused-appellant claim exemption from criminal liability claiming to have acted in self-defense of her honor?

HELD:

NO. The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense,
inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is
evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal
liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect
her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504).

In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her house late at night
on September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated
by his previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him,
as shown by the authorities cited above.

However, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio
chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with
electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the
barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no
possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting
upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the
defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally
declared completely exempt from criminal liability.
6. People v. Narvaez, G.R. No. L-33466-67, 20 April 1983.

FACTS:

In this case, accused Mamerto Narvaez was taking his rest when he suddenly heard that the walls of his house were being
chiseled and being fenced by the herein victims David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. The two were fencing what is claimed
to be the land of George Fleischer, father of David Fleischer. Narvaez tried to talk it out with the group, but Fleischer refused
and answered “No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.” This was when the accused lost his equilibrium, got his gun, and shot both
Fleischer and Rubia from the window his house and killing them. It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with
the long drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer
and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was the
accused.

ISSUE:

Was the aggression in the instant case unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested property,
destroy appellant's house, and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?

HELD:

NO. In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to resist, pursuant
to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's
rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window,
killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.

We find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was
asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased
and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at all.

Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are
present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression on persons, not property Plana, J., in the
result.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in part. It is true that Art. 429, Civil Code
of the Philippines, provides that the owner or legal possessor of a thing may use such force as may be reasonably necessary
to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. It seems to me,
however, that an attack on the person defending his property is an indispensable element where an accused pleads self-
defense but what is basically defended is only property.

Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of property can only be invoked when it is
coupled with some form of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether
complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide must be coupled with an attack by the one
getting the property on the person defending it.

In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted, much less made upon the person
of appellant. The mere utterance "No, gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant
to the pela of self-defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is homicide but without any privileged mitigating
circumstance.
7. Sabang v. People, G.R. No. 168818, 9 March 2007.

FACTS:

In the midst of a drinking spree, herein victim Nicanor Butad, while intoxicated, uttered the ominous words “I will shoot
you” to Randy Sabang while pointing a revolver at him. Thereafter, Nilo Sabang, herein accused and father of Randy, claimed
to have grabbed the arm of Butad, attempting to twist it toward his body and away from his son. As they were grappling
and the revolver was pointed towards the body of Butad, petitioner claimed he heard gunshots, and only after the shots
were fired was he able to "take the gun" from Butad.

However, the evidence for the prosecution claims that Butad was not holding any gun but a glass when he uttered those
words. Petitioner then reacted to Butad’s statement saying, "Just try to shoot my child because I’ll never fight for him
because he is a spoiled brat."

Petitioner claims that Butad’s act of aiming a gun at his son while uttering the words "I will shoot you" was an aggression
of the most imminent kind which prompted him to try to wrestle the gun from Butad leading to the accidental firing of the
fatal shots.

ISSUE:

Did petitioner sense an imminent threat to his son’s life such that the justifying circumstance of self-defense of a relative
may be invoked to exculpate him from criminal liability?

HELD:

NO. In order to successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in
provoking the assailant, should any provocation been given by the relative attacked. Unlawful aggression is a primary and
indispensable requisite without which defense of relative, whether complete or otherwise, cannot be validly invoked.

Unlawful aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this case, there is a divergence in the testimonies of the
prosecution and defense witnesses as to whether Butad aimed a gun at petitioner’s son as he uttered the words "I will shoot
you." With this conflict emerges the question of whether petitioner sensed an imminent threat to his son’s life. Payud
unequivocally testified that petitioner even dismissed Butad’s utterance saying, "Just try to shoot my child because
I’ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat."

This indicates to us that petitioner did not consider Butad’s words a threat at all.

Furthermore, the presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad’s body negates the claim that the killing was
justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. Even assuming that it was Butad who initiated the attack,
the fact that petitioner was able to wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression which Butad had started
already ceased. Petitioner became the unlawful aggressor when he continued to shoot Butad even as he already lay
defenseless on the ground.
8. People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006.

FACTS:

One afternoon, a group were drinking inside the compound of the Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto
Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden, appellants Santiano and Dagani, who were security officers of the PNR, entered the
canteen upon order by their desk officer and approached the group. Appellants claim that Javier began striking a bottle of
beer on the table and pulled out a .22 caliber revolver in an attempt to fire at appellant Dagani, but the gun failed to go off.
Thereafter, Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun
which belonged to Javier. During the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a warning shot. He
heard Javier’s gun fire again, so he decided to rush into the canteen. Santiano then shot Javier from a distance of less than
four meters.

Appellants argue that the courts a quo erred in finding that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. They
insist that the victim, Javier, had been armed with a revolver at the time he was struggling with appellant Dagani; that the
former "could have easily killed the latter;" that, given the fact that Javier had been drinking, "it is quite probable for Javier
to act harshly and aggressively towards peace officers such as the accused;" and that Javier actually fired three shots from
his .22 caliber gun. They invoke the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of official duty as PNR
security officers.

ISSUE:

I. Was there a valid invocation of the justifying circumstance of self-defense in this case?

II. Were the accused-appellants acting in the lawful performance of their duties?

HELD:

I. NO. The assertions that it was "quite probable" that Javier, during the course of the struggle for the firearm, "could
have easily killed" the appellants are uncertain and speculative. There is aggression in contemplation of the law
only when the one attacked faces a real and immediate threat to one’s life. The peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not just speculative.

Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger to their lives had
already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter. After the victim had
been thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression that would have necessitated the act of
killing. When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to
kill or even to wound the former aggressor. When Javier had been caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun
with appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim,
had then ceased to a reasonable extent, and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when
he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had
already ceased.

The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful aggression are reasonable
and necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence. The
circumstances in their entirety which surround the grappling of the firearm by Dagani and Javier, such as the nature and
number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim which amounted to two fatal wounds, that Dagani was able to
restrain the hands of Javier and push them away from his body, that Dagani was larger than Javier and had finished
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) hand-to-hand combat training, and Javier, as admitted by the appellants, was
inebriated at the time of the incident, do not justify appellant Santiano’s act of fatally shooting the victim twice.
II. Appellants set up the defense that they were in the lawful performance of their official duties. Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not
incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted
in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense
committed should have been the necessary consequence of such lawful exercise. These requisites are absent in the
instant case.

However, as found by the Court of Appeals, the defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on duty
at the time they were at the canteen. Appellants were unable to submit their daily time records to show that they were
on duty at the time. Their assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied by PNR Security Investigator
Rolando Marinay’s testimony that PNR security officers work in two 12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from
7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.

Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as
a necessary consequence of appellants’ due performance of an official duty.
9. Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 165483, 12 September 2006.

FACTS:

One evening, the Ferrer brothers decided to go to Tidbits Videoke bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing.
Thereafter, herein petitioner Jaime Palaganas arrived, together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. When
petitioner was singing, Melton Ferrer sang along with him as he was familiar with the song My Way. Petitioner got insulted
and struck Servillano Ferrer with the microphone, hitting the back of his head. A rumble then ensued between the two
groups.

It is claimed by the defense that the death and injuries committed against the Ferrer brothers by shooting them were merely
the result of self-defense when they tried to pursue the Palaganas and pelting them with stones.

ISSUE:

May the justifying circumstance of self-defense be invoked in this case?

HELD:

NO. In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified
the act of petitioner in shooting them. There were no actual or imminent danger to the lives of petitioner and Ferdinand
when they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw thereat the Ferrer brothers. It appears that the Ferrer brothers
then were merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not carrying any weapon when the petitioner arrived with his
brother Ferdinand and started firing his gun.

Assuming, arguendo, that the Ferrer brothers had provoked the petitioner to shoot them by pelting the latter with stones,
the shooting of the Ferrer brothers is still unjustified. When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner
was not in a state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from the location
of the former. Petitioner was not cornered nor trapped in a specific area such that he had no way out, nor was his back
against the wall. He was still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have also called
or proceeded to the proper authorities for help. Indeed, petitioner had several options in avoiding dangers to his life
other than confronting the Ferrer brothers with a gun.

It is significant to note that the shooting resulted in the death of Melton, and wounding of Servillano and Michael. With
regard to Melton, a bullet hit his right thigh, and another bullet hit his head which caused his instant death. As regards
Servillano, a bullet penetrated two of his vital organs, namely, the large intestine and urinary bladder. He underwent two
(2) surgeries in order to survive and fully recover. Michael, on the other hand, sustained a gunshot wound on the right
shoulder. It must also be noted that the Ferrer brothers were shot near the videoke bar, which contradict petitioner's
claim he was chased by the Ferrer brothers. Given the foregoing circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the Ferrer
brothers were the unlawful aggressors. As correctly observed by the prosecution, if the petitioner shot the Ferrer brothers
just to defend himself, it defies reason why he had to shoot the victims at the vital portions of their body, which even led to
the death of Melton who was shot at his head. It is an oft-repeated rule that the nature and number of wounds inflicted
by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.

There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers which justified the act of petitioner in shooting them.
Even if the Ferrer brothers provoked the petitioner to shoot them, the latter's use of a gun was not a reasonable means
of repelling the act of the Ferrer brothers in throwing stones. It must also be emphasized that both the trial court and
the appellate court found that petitioner failed to established by clear and convincing evidence his plea of self-defense.
22. Velasquez v. People, G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017.

FACTS:

It is claimed by the prosecution that the without provocation, the group of petitioners beat up the victim Jesus with a stone,
punching him, and hitting him with a bamboo, leaving Jesus on the ground, bloodied. Jesus then crawled and hid behind
blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He then got up and staggered his way back to their house.

On the other hand, the defense claims that petitioner Nicolas was roused in his sleep by his wife, Mercedes Velasquez, as
the nearby house of co-petitioner Victor was being stoned. Nicolas made his way to Victor's place, where he saw Jesus
hacking Victor's door. Jesus, who was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon Nicolas and the other accused, as well as
on Mercedes. The accused thus responded and countered Jesus' attacks, leading to his injuries.

ISSUE:

Can the petitioners be held criminally liable for the physical harm inflicted on Jesus Del Mundo?

HELD:

YES. We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, to be sorely wanting.

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: "(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires
the same first two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third "in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein."

Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by barging into the premises of
petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and threatening physical harm upon petitioners and their companions. That
is, that unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.

The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim that Jesus launched an assault despite the
presence of at least seven (7) antagonists: petitioners, Mercedes, and the four (4) other accused. They further assert that
Jesus persisted on his assault despite being outnumbered, and also despite their and their co-accused's bodily efforts to
restrain Jesus. His persistence was supposedly so likely to harm them that, to neutralize him, they had no other recourse
but to hit him on the head with stones for at least three (3) times, and to hit him on the back with a bamboo rod, aside from
dealing him with less severe blows.

As the Regional Trial Court noted, however:

The Court takes judicial notice of (the) big difference in the physical built of the private complainant and accused
Victor Velasquez, Sonny Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo del Mundo, private complainant is shorter in
height and of smaller built than all the accused.

The said accused could have had easily held the private complainant, who was heavily drunk as they claim, and
disarmed him without the need of hitting him.

Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by petitioners and their
co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably
necessary means to repel his supposed aggression. Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of
self-defense and of defense of a relative.
23. People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, March 31 2009.

FACTS:

The prosecution contends that the five appellants caught the victim Rolando and, armed with their nightsticks, took turns
in hitting the victim until he slumped to the ground face down. In that position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw.
After a while, when Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano first ordered the others to kill the victim and to tie him up. Upon
hearing the order, Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope used by
farmers for tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching. This caused the death of Rolando Sevilla.

However, the defense contends that one night, a public dance and singing contest was being held when the accused as
barangay officials, were at the place of the celebration, discharging their peace-keeping duties. As claimed by the defense,
when a fire broke out in the toilet of the Day Care Center, accused Ramon Regalario responded to the said area. It was
contended that the victim Rolando Sevilla, without warning, emerged from the group, thrust and fired his gun at him, hitting
him in the left shoulder. To disable Rolando from firing more shots, Ramon struck the victim’s head at the back with his
nightstick (bahi), causing the victim to reel backward and lean on the bamboo fence. They grappled with the gun until
Bienvenido Regalario, the barangay tanod, arrived at the scene after the fact. He was instructed by Marciano, the barangay
captain to effect the arrest of Rolando Sevilla for the crime of shooting Ramon. According to Bienvenido, they were taught
in their training seminar to just use a rope in lieu of handcuffs because they could not be supplied with it. So, he tied the
hands and feet of Rolando Sevilla for fear that he might be able to escape. The next morning, policemen found the dead body
of Rolando Sevilla.

ISSUE:

Is the accused’s claim of self-defense legally justified in the instant case?

HELD:

NO. By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head and he continued hitting
the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There
was clearly no longer any danger, but still Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People v. Cajurao, we held:

…The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has
the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon the
cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for the person
invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in attacking his adversary, he can no
longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary
killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray.

Ramon’s claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on the neck, four (4)
lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions on different parts of the victim’s body,
as shown in the Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Mario Cerillo who conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim
revealed that the victim’s lacerated wounds could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or an
iron bar; his stab wounds by a sharp-edged instrument or knife; his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or through
contact with a blunt instrument. He also declared that the sharp object which caused the victim’s stab wounds could have
been a knife 2 centimeters (cms.) wide and 6 cms. long because they were clean-cut wounds. Indeed, even if it were true
that the victim fired a gun at Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated
that the force used against him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to disarm the victim or prevent him from
doing harm to others.

The four (4) other accused-appellants, namely, Sotero, Marciano, Bienvenido and Noel, to exonerate themselves, denied
their involvement in inflicting wounds on Rolando. We are not convinced.

Accused-appellants’ denials cannot overcome the positive identification by the prosecution’s witnesses. Elementary is the
rule that positive identification, where categorical and consistent, prevails over unsubstantiated denials because the latter
are negative and self-serving, and thus, cannot be given any weight on the scales of justice. The participation of each of the
accused-appellants can be fully ascertained from the clear, categorical and spontaneous testimony given by prosecution
witness, Ronnie Siglos, who was at the scene of the crime.

Q What kind of weapons (was) used?

A Sotero was armed with bahi wood, and also Ramon. Bienvenido was also armed with bahi, as well as Cecilio Lunas, Jose
Quinno were also armed with ‘malo-palo.’

Q What kind of weapon was being held by Noel Regalario?

A A knife. (7 inches in length)

Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the attack against Rolando was carried out, and the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying the accused-appellants as the assailants, we concur in the rulings of the
CA, affirming those of the trial court, in (a) disregarding Ramon Regalario’s declaration that he attacked the victim in self-
defense and (b) holding that all the accused-appellants acted in concert and killed Rolando.
24. People v. Dulin, G.R. No. 171284, July 29, 2015.

FACTS:

In his defense, Dulin testified that in the evening of August 22, 1990, he was in his house in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan with Doming Narag, Imelda Danao, Jun Danao, Carolina Dulin and Caridad Narag; that Nicanor Annariao and
Raymund Soriano arrived at his house to see the fighting cocks being sold by Alberto Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto was
not yet around, arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening to talk with Raymund and Nicanor about the price of the
fighting cocks; that after their transaction, Alberto served Nicanor and Raymund food, and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao
thereafter accompanied Raymund and Nicanor to the highway to get a tricycle ride, but on their way, they passed Angel
Bancud who called out to him: that he (Dulin) asked the others to go ahead, and he would just catch up with them; that as
he (Dulin) approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother, stabbed him on the right side of his body and in
the left hand; that he complained to Batulan: Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill
you; that he (Dulin) ran to the upper level of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again several
times; that they grappled for the weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan
with the weapon, and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that he (Dulin) regained
consciousness only the next day at the hospital.

ISSUE:

Is self-defense in the instant case legally justified?

HELD:

NO. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful
aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal
safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical
or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or
assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening
attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression
must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to be the
aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the
latter going inside the house of Danao, where they again grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the
weapon did not amount to aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of the weapon at that
point. Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation against
Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim
started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing
when the accused injured the aggressor. As such, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify
his fatal stabbing by Dulin.

It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have sustained twelve stab
wounds confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by the accused
reflected his determination to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not defending himself.
25. People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012.

FACTS:

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near
his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had
then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a
karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone
with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had
then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.

ISSUE:

Is self-defense in the instant case legally justified?

HELD:

NO. By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is
basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on
the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim,
Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be
held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden
by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved
in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the
State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful
aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a stone, causing the mortal
injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the aggression. It remains,
however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the
hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication
applied to him. In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head
more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack
from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to
kill his victim, not just to defend himself.
26. Josue v. People, G.R. No. 199579, December 10, 2012.

FACTS:

On May 1, 2004, at around 11:15 in the evening, Macario, a barangay tanod, was buying medicine from a store near the
petitioner’s residence in Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila when he saw the petitioner going towards him, while shouting to
ask him why he had painted the petitioner’s vehicle. Macario denied the petitioner’s accusation, but petitioner still pointed
and shot his gun at Macario. The gunshots fired by the petitioner hit Macario’s elbow and fingers. As the unarmed Macario
tried to flee from his assailant, the petitioner still fired his gun at him, causing him to sustain a gunshot wound at his back.
Macario was then rushed to the Chinese General Hospital for medical treatment.

ISSUE:

May the justifying circumstance of self-defense be invoked in this case?

HELD:

In the present case, particularly significant to this element of "unlawful aggression" is the trial court’s finding that Macario
was unarmed at the time of the shooting, while the petitioner then carried with him a .45 caliber pistol. According
to prosecution witness Villanueva, it was even the petitioner who confronted the victim, who was then only buying
medicine from a sari-sari store. Granting that the victim tried to steal the petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to
a danger in his life or personal safety. At one point during the fight, Macario even tried to run away from his assailant, yet
the petitioner continued to chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the mortal wound on
his chest. Contrary to the petitioner’s defense, there then appeared to be no "real danger to his life or personal safety," for
no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise justified him in inflicting the gunshot wounds for his defense,
emanated from Macario’s end.

The weapon used and the number of gunshots fired by the petitioner, in relation to the nature and location of the victim’s
wounds, further negate the claim of self-defense. For a claim of self-defense to prosper, the means employed by the person
claiming the defense must be commensurate to the nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. Considering the petitioner’s use of a deadly weapon when
his victim was unarmed, and his clear intention to cause a fatal wound by still firing his gun at the victim who had attempted
to flee after already sustaining two gunshot wounds, it is evident that the petitioner did not act merely in self-defense, but
was an aggressor who actually intended to kill his victim.
27. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004.

FACTS:

The petitioner adduced evidence that at around 5:00 p.m. on September 16, 1995, he was on his way home at Tuburan,
Odiongan, Romblon. He saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte, and the latter’s friends, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez, and Lani Famero,
about five meters away from his house, having a drinking spree. He ordered them not to make loud noises, and they obliged.
He then went to his house, locked the door with a nail, and went to sleep. However, he was awakened at around 9:30 p.m.
by loud noises coming from Ricky and his three companions. He peeped through the window grills of his house and
admonished them not to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was then already inebriated, was incensed; he pulled out a
balisong, pushed the door, and threatened to stab the petitioner. The petitioner pushed their sala set against the door to
block the entry of Ricky, but the latter continued to push the door open with his hands and body. The petitioner ran to the
upper portion of their house and got his bolo.5 He returned to the door and pushed it with all his might using his left hand.
He then pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand, towards Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and
the latter lost his balance and fell to the floor. The petitioner, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain.

ISSUE:

Does the petitioner’s insistence that he accidentally hit the victim on the stomach compatible with the claim of self-defense
under the law?

HELD:

NO. The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in the trial court and
foisted in the CA – by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article
12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories
– (1) that he killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal
liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically
antithetical There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate and positive
overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means.
The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on
necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity,
and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it
ends.12 Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that
the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities.13 On the other
hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.14 The basis of the
exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does
not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because
of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. 15 An accident is a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.

The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While it was established
that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which would give a semblance of verity to appellant’s
version of the incident, such view, however, is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed
and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no
weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Ricky’s arrival at
appellant’s doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any aggressive act
that may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s want of any weapon when he arrived at appellant’s
doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo
belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky. Thus, appellant’s version of the events does not support a
finding of unlawful aggression.

Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life necessitating his assault on
Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely
a threatening or intimidating attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail.
28. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 189405, November 19, 2014.

FACTS:

According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia
Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner was already inside
the building, he went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the
configuration of the eye witness Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back
towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back
of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle
for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun.
Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the
bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.

ISSUE:

Do the elements of self-defense exist in this case to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide?

HELD:

NO. First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was employed by the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to his life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. In the
case at bar, other than petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey
condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident;
that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused
petitioner to fear for his life.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore, danger
may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey
by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful
aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had
every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so.

Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means
employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he
sought to avert.

Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:

The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the
discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of
fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates
a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).
29. Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.

FACTS:

Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together with
their companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound and threw stones at his house and tricycle. Through
the back door of his house, Rodolfo went down to the basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw
him, threatened to kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the palm of his left hand. Rodolfo responded
by reaching for the bolo tucked in the "so/era" of his house and hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two brothers
fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to
the hospital. He stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.

As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking. Erwin narrated
that he, his brother David, and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound. Suddenly,
Philip ran up to him saying that David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. Erwin was then met by Rodolfo who hacked
him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners' compound and kept on
hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.

Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged Rodolfo's tricycle. They did not likewise
destroy the petitioners' gate, which was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by
Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually
rained on them and people outside the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come out."
After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died in the hospital while being
treated for his wounds.

ISSUE:

Is self-defense in the instant case legally justified?

HELD:

By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which they were charged,
albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to
the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the
following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-
defense.

Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful
aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. The element of
unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to
self-defense.

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. As
the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of
November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack
actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate
was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's testimony that his
brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These
circumstances, coupled with the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the
petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real
aggressors.
B. Avoidance of greater evil (Art. 11 (4), RPC)

10. People v. Ricohermoso, G.R. No. L-30527-28, 29 March 1974.

FACTS:

Geminiano owned a parcel of land in that barrio which accused Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin. Geminiano asked
Ricohermoso about his share of the palay harvest. He added that he should at least be allowed to taste the palay harvested
from his land. Ricohermoso answered that Geminiano could go to his house anytime and he would give the latter palay.
However, when Geminiano arrived at the house of Ricohermoso, the latter refused. Thereafter, Ricohermoso unsheathed
his bolo and stabbed Geminiano on the neck and fell face downward on the neck, while Severo Padernal, Ricohermoso’s
father-in-law, hacked Geminiano on the back with an axe.

At that same place and time, while Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso were assaulting Geminiano de Leon, another episode
was taking place. Juan Padernal (Ricohermoso's brother-in-law and the son of Severo) suddenly embraced Marianito de
Leon from behind, with his right arm locked around Marianito's neck and his left hand pressing Marianito's left forearm.
Juan tried to stop Marianito from firing his gun and they grappled and rolled downhill towards a camote patch. Marianito
passed out. When he regained consciousness, his rifle was gone. He walked uphill and found his father Geminiano dead.

It is contended by the defense that while Geminiano was being assaulted, his son Marianito tried to shoot with his rifle but
Juan Padernal disabled him and wrested the gun.

ISSUE:

Can the act of self-defense be admitted in this case?

HELD:

NO. The act of Juan Padernal in preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, who were
the aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to his assailants.

Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to disable Marianito. Padernal's malicious intention was to
forestall any interference in the felonious assault made by his father and brother-in-law on Geminiano. That
situation is unarguably not the case envisaged in paragraph 4 of article 11.
11. People v. Norma Hernandez, CA-G.R. No. 22553-R, 14 April 1959.

FACTS:

Vivencio Lascano and Maria Norma Hernandez wanted to get married. Vivencio’s parents went to the house of Norma for
“pamamanhikan”. They brought chickens and goats and agreed to buy a wedding dress, two vestidas, shoes, P20 for the
sponsors and to repair the uncle’s roof. Norma already counselled them not to bring the chickens and that they should not
regret whatever may happen later. On the day of the wedding, Norma did not show up, causing Vivencio and his family great
shame and humiliation. Norma confessed that she was not really in love with him, that she merely accepted the proposal
because she was convinced by her parents, and that she decided to leave home as last recourse to prevent the marriage.
The lower court convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent the
celebration of the marriage.

ISSUE:

Should the appellant be acquitted pursuant to Article 11 (4) of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower court and held that a party to an agreement to marry who backs
out cannot be held liable for the crime of slander by deed by for then, that would be an inherent way of compelling said
party to enter a marriage without his or her consent, and this would contravene the principle of law that what could not be
done directly could not be done indirectly. Said party has the right to avoid to himself or herself the evil of going
through a loveless marriage, pursuant to Article 11 (4) of the Revised Penal Code.
C. Fulfillment of duty (Art. 11 (5), RPC)

12. People v. Delima, G.R. No. L-18660, 22 December 1922.

FACTS:

Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence. Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe
Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the
shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged, it,
and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with
his weapon. These peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him. The policeman
was tried and convicted for homicide to which he appealed.

ISSUE:

Is the accused’s act of shooting the victim justified?

HELD:

YES. That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had no
right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which
compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified
by the circumstances.

Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby acquitted with
the costs de oficio.
13. People v. Lagata, G.R. No. L-1940-42, 24 March 1949.

FACTS:

Herein accused-appellant Ignacio Lagata was a provincial guard charged with murder, serious physical injuries, and evasion
through negligence in three separate cases. The facts provide that six prisoners from the provincial jail were assigned to
work in the capitol's plaza who then headed to the nursery to pick up gabi accompanied by Lagata. When the prisoners
were called to assemble, Lagata contends that one of the prisoners, Epifanio Labong, took advantage of the grassy place and
escaped. Lagata then ordered the five prisoners to look for the escapee. However, when the prisoners followed the trail
through which one of the prisoners claimed Labong had passed through, Lagata told them to stop because the prisoners
were already far away from him. Lagata claimed that they did not heed his order to stop, causing him to fire a shot in the
air and the prisoners subsequently scattered.

Lagata fired at the other escapees, namely, Eusebio Abria when he was running towards the mountain, at Ibañez who was
running towards him and then around him, and Tipace who was running side-wise towards Lagata. Lagata claims that he
fired at the prisoners due to his fear that if a prisoner escaped under his custody, he would be the one to be put in jail and
get discharged from his duty, as what had happened before with the other guards whose prisoners under their guard had
escaped.

ISSUE:

Can the justifying circumstance of acting in the fulfillment of a duty be invoked in this case?

HELD:

NO. As regards the shooting of Abria and Tipace we are convinced that the facts were as narrated by the witnesses for the
prosecution. Abria was shot when by the witnesses for then prosecution. Abria was shot when he was only three meters
away from appellant and the latter has not even shown that Abria attempted to escape. Tipace was also shot when he was
about four or five meter away from appellant. The latter's allegation that Tipace was running — conveying the idea that
said prisoner was in the act of escaping — appears to be inconsistent with his own testimony to the effect that Tipace was
running sidewise with his face looking towards appellant and with the undisputed fact that Tipace was hit near one axilla,
the bullet coming out from the opposite shoulder. If Tipace's purpose was to escape, the natural thing for him to do would
have to give his back to appellant.

It is clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. Lagata could have fired at him in self defense or if absolutely
necessary to avoid his escape. The record does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any act of aggression
"he was running towards and then around me". How could anyone in his senses imagine that Tipace intended to
escape by running towards and around the very guard he was supposed to escape from?

There is no question that the escape of Labong scared appellant according to him because of the experience of other guards
who were dismissed from office or even prosecuted because of prisoners who had escaped under their custody and that it
was his duty to fire against the prisoner if he wanted to be exempt from any responsibility. Even if appellant sincerely
believed, although erroneously, that in firing the shots he acted in the performance of his official duty, the
circumstances of the case show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners so as
seriously wound one of them and kill instantaneously another. While custodians of prisoners should necessity would
authorize them to fire against them. Theirs is the burden of proof as to such necessity. The summary liquidation of Prisoner
under flimsy pretexts of attempts of escape, which has been and is being practiced in dictatorial system of government has
always been and is shocking to the universal conscience of humanity.

Consequently, appellant should be sentenced for homicide.

FACTS:

Three policemen, including herein petitioner and accused Mamangun responded to a call claiming that a robbery-holdup
was in progress who entered the yard of one Antonio Abacan and proceeded to the rooftop of his house. When they searched
the rooftop, they saw a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner, who was walking
ahead of the group, fired his handgun once and hit the man who turned out to be Gener Contreras who was likewise chasing
after the robbery suspect.

The defense claims that Contreras allegedly raised a stainless steel pipe toward petitioner’s head but he was able to evade
the attack. This prompted petitioner to shoot the person on the left arm. All three claimed that it was only at this point that
PO2 Cruz and Diaz approached Contreras who then told them, "Hindi ako. Hindi ako." One of the prosecution witnesses who
went with the policemen contends that Mamangun replied back, "Anong hindi ako?", but before he could say anything to
confirm that it was some other person, Mamangun fired his gun, hitting the man who turned out to be Contreras.

Charged with homicide, petitioner thus came to the Supreme Court arguing that the shooting in question was done in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. Petitioner insists that the shooting was justified because
he was repelling Contreras’ unlawful attack on his person as he was about to strike him on the head with a steel pipe.

ISSUE:

Was petitioner acting in the performance of a duty justifying him from criminal liability over the death of Contreras?

HELD:

NO. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised Penal Code may be
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and (2) the
injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.

Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police officer, was responding to a robbery-holdup
incident. His presence at the situs of the crime was in accordance with the performance of his duty. However, proof that the
shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a policeman
is essential to exempt him from criminal liability.

Petitioner’s posturing that he shot Contreras because the latter tried to strike him with a steel pipe was a mere afterthought
to exempt him from criminal liability. We see no plausible basis to depart from the Sandiganbayan’s findings that
there was no reason for the petitioner to shoot Contreras. The latter was unarmed and had already uttered, "Hindi
po ako, Hindi po ako" before the petitioner fatally shot him on the left arm. Prosecution witness Ayson, who was
then behind the petitioner when the latter shot Contreras, testified that to the victim’s utterances, the petitioner
even responded, "Anong hindi ako," and immediately shot Contreras.

There was no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot before
pulling the trigger against Contreras who was one of the residents chasing the suspected robber.
16. People v. Beronilla, G.R. No. L-4445, 28 February 1955.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Manuel Beronilla was the Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra. He received copy of a memorandum issued by
Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons
accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting of the enemy", received a list of all puppet government officials of
the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), and another memorandum instructing all
Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of the municipality for
collaboration with the enemy. When charges were filed against Arsenio Borjal, he was subsequently ordered by appellant
Beronilla to be executed under the instructions of Lt. Col. Arnold that whatever disposition he makes of the case is approved.

The state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram from Col. Volckmann, overall area
commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which
the prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. The prosecution contends that if the Volckmann message was
known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal cannot be justified.

ISSUE:

Was the execution of Arsenio Borjal given by appellant Beronilla as Military Mayor lawful?

HELD:

YES. There is no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram or any copy thereof. Upon Beronilla's
conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior orders, he would not
have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, half an hour after the execution. And what is even
more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on write in reply "I can only
compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla and
ordering his court martial for disobedience?

Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that cannot now be ascertained, failed to transmit the
Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be
rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.

It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders of
a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being
aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been
established. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Accused is acquitted.
17. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103501- 03, 17 February 1997.

FACTS:

Petitioner Tabuena and Peralta were the General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) who were convicted of the crime of malversation of public funds by the Sandiganbayan. The facts
provide that they allowed the release and withdrawals of a total of P55 Million funds from the MIAA as payment of its
liability to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). However, it is claimed by petitioner that they were
merely acting under the MARCOS Memorandum issued by President Marcos which ordered him to forward immediately to
the Office of the President P55 Million in cash as partial payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC, and that he was of the belief
that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC.

ISSUE:

Are the petitioners guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds?

HELD:

NO. In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum, we are swayed
to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of such memorandum.
From this premise flows the following reasons and/or considerations that would buttress his innocence of the crime of
malversation.

First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum
required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive,
and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior — the
former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies
such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and
transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it
should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less,
good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS
Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to
an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and
Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose
partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).

However, the unlawfulness of the MARCOS Memorandum was being argued, on the observation, for instance, that the
Ongpin Memo referred to in the presidential directive reveals a liability of only about P34.5 Million.

Granting this to be true, it will not nevertheless affect Tabuena's goad faith so as to make him criminally liable. What is more
significant to consider is that the MARCOS Memorandum is patently legal (for on its face it directs payment of an
outstanding liability) and that Tabuena acted under the honest belief that the P55 million was a due and demandable debt
and that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC. Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the
subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact
committed in good faith.
E. Absolutory Causes

a. Art. 6 (3), RPC

ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.

Xxx There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.

b. Art. 20, RPC

ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. – The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed
upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers
and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.

*1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.

c. Art. 247, RPC

ART. 247. Death or Physical Injuries under Exceptional Circumstances. – Any legally married person who, having surprised
his spouse in the act of thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment."

These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen
years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to
the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this Article.

d. Art. 280, RPC

ART. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. — Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's
will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).

If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another's dwelling for the purpose of
preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicable to any
person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall
enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are open.

e. Art. 332, RPC

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of
the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line.

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.

The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime.

f. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002", is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

"(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

"(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic laboratory examiner,
shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification;

(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall
within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the
guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the
offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled
for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which,
together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction
over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above
proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or
fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours
before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the
public attorney's office to represent the former;

(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as
evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request
the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein
which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the
presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused/and or his/her counsel, and,
b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered
dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.
18. Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 181409, 11 February 2010.

FACTS:

Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased
mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William
Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the said accused feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate
and herein deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of attorney (in the pretense of presenting a document
pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and disposition of the latter’s properties. In relation to
this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the case.

As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art 332 of the Revised Penal Code. He cites that he
falls under the enumeration of those relatives who shall be exempt from criminal prosecution. Being a relative by affinity,
he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the law. He further counters that the same law makes no
distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly
committed. Thus, the death of his spouse Zenaida Carungcong Sato though dissolved the marriage with the accused, did not
on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and son-law relationship between Sato and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He
then cannot be removed from the protective mantle of Art 332.

ISSUE:

I. Is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the
wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created
such relationship by affinity?

II. Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?

HELD:

I. Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling), and malicious mischief. It limits
the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the
offended party. In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the
exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.

In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. The first view (the
terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either
by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. Under this view, the relationship by
affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and
necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that
the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood
relatives.

The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when
there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in
whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse
and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether
the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of
the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that,
where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these
people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married
parties.

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second view is more
consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created between
the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s
relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in
favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

II. The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable
language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief.
It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as
theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.
19. People v. Lua Chu, G.R. No. 34917, 7 September 1931.

FACTS:

Herein defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from their judgment convicting them of illegal importation of opium.
The facts of the case provide that Uy Se Tieng was a consignee of the shipments of opium coming from Hong Kong, being
agents of the real owners of said opium containing 3,252 tins. He collaborated with Juan Samson, the Chief of the Customs
Secret Service of Cebu and Joaquin Natividad of the Customs by paying them an amount of P6,000 for the opium to be
released safely from the Customs.

Upon arrival of the shipment in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng then informed Juan Samson that he will consult the real
owners of the shipment on how to proceed with the payment of P6,000, and that he will come over to Samson’s house to
relay the decision of the owners regarding such matter.

On the same day, Samson informed the Constabulary represented by Captain Buenconsejo requesting a stenographer to
take down the conversation between Samson and Uy Se Tieng. They hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of
Samson to witness the conversation between them. It was noted that Lua Chu was one of the owners of the opium, that Lua
Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from the warehouse of Uy Se Tieng, and he had a conversation
with a Customs Collector before when Samson was on vacation in Europe agreeing on the business of shipping the opium.
The following day, Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu were caught in the act of presenting papers to Samson and were subsequently
arrested.

The defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question. Juan Samson
denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out.
A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to seize the
instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in mind.

ISSUE:

Did Juan Samson induce the defendants to import the opium?

HELD:

NO. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the
accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country
through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful
issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the
purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere
entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable,
the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed
in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence
of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free
from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a
thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such
agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and,
being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is
generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter,"
detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.
There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the Government from
prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely
to prosecute him but is simply a trap set to catch a criminal.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret service pretended to
agree to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the
seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
20. People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, 22 January 1999.

FACTS:

Herein accused-appellants Florencio Doria (Alias Jun) and Violeta Gaddao (Alias Neneth) were convicted with a violation
of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The facts provide that when the members of the
PNP Narcotics Command (NARCOM) received information from two civilian informants that Doria was engaged in illegal
drugs activities, the latter decided to entrap and arrest him through a buy-bust operation.

During the buy-bust operation Doria took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3
Manlangit forthwith arrested him as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked Doria but did not find the marked
bills on him. Upon inquiry, Doria revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate, Gaddado and led the police
team to the latter’s house.

Upon arrival, SPO1 Badua asked Gaddao about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house. Standing by the door,
PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and inside the box
was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier “sold” to
him by Doria. His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered Gaddao’s house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the
box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants. Gaddao testified that inside her house were her co-accused
Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box.
The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said
she did not know anything about the box and its contents. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation
that marked bills were found in her person. The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.

ISSUE:

Was the buy-bust operation and apprehension of accused-appellant Doria valid?

Was the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and her house, and the pieces of evidence
obtained therefrom valid?

HELD:

1. YES. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria was found guilty.

2. NO. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao was acquitted.

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as
provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he “has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When
an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but
duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana
and marked bills are different matters.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:(1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the
box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the
warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in “hot pursuit” and the search was an incident to her lawful
arrest.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion
at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her
daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. “Personal knowledge” of
facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon “probable cause” which means an
“actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3
Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3
Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate
in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the
money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria’s
word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing
that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested
to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.

2. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home
and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This
brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.

The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make
an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and
hand and its discovery inadvertent.

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is
inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items
that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao’s house because they were led there by appellant Doria. The
Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to
her. Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao’s house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a
half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed
something wrapped in plastic.

He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not
immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view
and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the
poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.

The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does
not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place
between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in
court. The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-
appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer.
The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in
the sale of said drug.
21. People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 231989, 4 September 2018.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda was found guilty of violating R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 for the illegal sale of shabu. The facts provide that Orellan and his teammates were at Regional Office X of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a Confidential Informant (CI) that a certain “Romy” has
been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs.

They instituted the buy bust operation, CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and ordered Gorres to give
the drugs, in return, carin gave the buy bust money. After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to
IO1 Orellan, which was the pre-arranged signal They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan
declared that they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their arrest for selling
dangerous drug.

When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his pocket. IOl Orellan ordered him to
pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3×4 inches in size.
They could see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white substance.

Orellan seized the items, the buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office

The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory
Office 10.

On the other hand, the version of the defense contends that accused Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres was
watching the television. When the latter heard that somebody jumped over their gate, he stood up to verify. Before he could
reach the door, however, it was already forced opened by the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian clothing. They
entered the house, pointed their firearms at him, instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and
handcuffed him. They inquired on where the shabu was, but he invoked his innocence. When they asked the whereabouts
of “Romy,” he answered that he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there and kicked the door open. Lim was
then surprised as a gun was pointed at his head. He questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet.
The men let him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were brought to the
PDEA Regional Office and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the assistance
of a counsel, ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison him. Like Gorres,
he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest. Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents
but was acquitted in the case.

ISSUE:

Was the procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Art II of R.A. No. 9165 followed by the apprehending team?

HELD:

NO. The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
 (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of arrest may be
excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the
items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the resources
and capability to mount a counterassault. The present case is not one of those.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a
disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1
Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the marking and physical
inventory of the two sachets of shabu. To ensure that .they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by
Lim to I01 Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-
19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.

Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the media to
witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. In fact, their signatures do not appear in the
Inventory Receipt.

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible.
However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required
witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must
show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere
statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified
grounds for noncompliance.

In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene because it
was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house. IO2 Orcales similarly declared that
the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no available media
representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them. He admitted that there are times when they do
not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they might leak the confidential information. We are of the view
that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law.