Reference: https://www.studocu.

com/ph/document/central-philippine-university/constitutional-law/doctrine-of-
state-immunity/10146978
Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:

On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots was not
signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R.
Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A
– E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338
of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and
his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to
the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the
Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following
provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of
RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon
25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.

NOTE: Article 1491 par. 5 of the new civil code : Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from
acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in
which they intervene by virtue of their profession.

Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce: Paragraph 1 (The following cannot engage in the commercial
profession, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any direct administrative or economic position in
commercial or industrial associations within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge
their duties: Associate justices, judges, and officials of the department of public prosecution (ministerio fiscal) in
active service.)

Sec.3 par H of RA 3019: (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited
by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest

Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules: "Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That his prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will
not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary
in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he
shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of directors",

Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: 25. Personal investments and relations: A Judge should abstain from
making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after accession
to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him
to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or
prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.

It is highly improper for a judge to utilize information coming to him in a juridical capacity for purposes of speculation
and it detracts from the public confidence in his integrity and the soundness of judicial judgment for him at any time
to become a speculative investor upon the hazard of a margin.

Issue:

Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:

No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon
who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr.
Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders
dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this
Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because
whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated,
unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed
this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.

This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself
and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated.

Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru
his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon
ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free
election, hence null and void. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and
any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and
therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:

First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution.

It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the
provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of
the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935
Constitution) shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and
having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.

Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications
prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is
no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of
the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by
raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites.

This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot
System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government
and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into
the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.

The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC
and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No.
73.

The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the
returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935
Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure
the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s
Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC
the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results
of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102.

Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the
Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over
the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial
knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in
other parts of the Philippines.

Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in
line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not
constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is
a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers.

The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions,
some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification,
adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the
people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a
document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures
approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive
department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due
course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the
people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution
is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the
people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution
and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force
by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando
and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of
the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in
force.
Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
270 SCRA 106
MARCH 19, 1997

FACTS:

Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a ―Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People ‘s amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. XVII
of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist
of the submission of this proposition to the people—―Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of all
elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI, Section 4 of Art. VII and Section 8 of
Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?
The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the notice of hearing and
thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as
intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents COMELEC and Delfin‘s Petition to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments:

 The constitutional provision on people ‘s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
 R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative. It only provides for the effectivity of the law after the publication in print media indicating
that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter takes effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.
 COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the ―conduct of initiative on
the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as
initiative or amendments to the Constitution are concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.
Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
 The people ‘s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, to the revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of
the santiagpeople ‘s initiative.
  Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people ‘s initiative, neither the COMELEC nor
any other department, agency or office of the government has realigned funds for the purpose.
The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and granted the Motions for Intervention filed by
Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.

ISSUES:
Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said constitutional provision?
Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials as proposed would constitute a
revision, or an amendment to the Constitution?

HELD:
NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still
dependent on congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power and duty of the Congress to
enact the statutory implementation of sec.2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Although said Act intended to
include the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover that
system and accordingly provide for a local initiative required for proposing Constitutional changes.

NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is void, as expressed in the Latin maxim ―Potestas delegate non delegari
potest. In every case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the delegation itself is valid.

The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not academic, as the proposal to lift the term limits
of elective local and national officials is an amendment to the Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the
petition was granted, and the COMELEC is permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficiently law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.
RAUL L. LAMBINO v. COMELEC, GR NO. 174153, 2006-10-25
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 174153
OCTOBER 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
(“Lambino Group”), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7
of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (“RA 6735”).
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article
XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the
voters’ ratification.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
HELD:
NO. The court declared that Lambino Group’s initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails
to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on his
or her behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.