IX.

DIVORCE

A. Brief History of Divorce

● Around 2000 BCE- Earliest known divorce laws were written on clay
tablets in ancient Mesopotamia. Formally or informally, human societies
across place and time have made rules to bind and dissolve couples.
Inca couples, for example, started with a trial partnership, during which
a man could send his partner home.

● 7th Century AD- Religious authorities have often regulated marriage and
divorce. Muslims in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia began using the Quran’s
rules. Generally, a husband can divorce his wife without cause or agreement,
while a wife must secure her husband’s agreement to divorce him.

● 11th Century- In Europe, Christian churches controlled divorce, with the

Catholic Church banning it entirely and Protestant churches allowing it in
restricted circumstances, particularly adultery.

● 18th Century- A series of changes took place that would eventually

shape divorce laws around the world. Following centuries of religious
conflict, Europeans pushed for state governance separate from religious
control. Secular courts gradually took over education, welfare, health,
marriage— and divorce. The French Revolution ushered in the first of the new
divorce laws, allowing men and women to divorce for a number of grounds,
including adultery, violence, and desertion, or simply mutual consent.

● The 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act- allowed ordinary people to

divorce. Before then, divorce was largely open only to men, and had to
be granted by an Act of Parliament, which was hugely expensive, and
therefore was also open only to the rich. (Long before then, of course,
Henry VIII was granted a divorce by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and
church courts retained the power to dissolve marriages.)

○ Under the new law, women divorcing on the grounds of adultery

not only had to prove their husbands had been unfaithful but also
had to prove additional faults, which included cruelty, rape and
incest.

● 1923- A private members' bill made it easier for women to petition for
divorce for adultery, but it still had to be proved.

● 1937- the law was changed and divorce was allowed on other grounds
including drunkenness, insanity and desertion.

● 1969- The big change came when the Divorce Reform Act was passed,
allowing couples to divorce after they had been separated for two years
IX. DIVORCE

(or five years if only one of them wanted a divorce). A marriage could be
ended if it had irretrievably broken down, and neither partner no longer
had to prove "fault".

However, divorces continued to favour men, with the award and

maintenance for the less-wealthy spouse – usually the woman – being
calculated based on needs.

● 1996- The Landmark case, White v White case, Martin White and his
wife Pamela had run a farming business, worth about £4.5m during their
33-year marriage. At first Pamela White was awarded £800,000, but
she took the case to the court of appeal, then the House of Lords in
2000, and was finally awarded £1.5m.

○ It was a landmark case because it was decided the assets should

be split more fairly, and recognised the contribution of a
“homemaker.”

https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/sep/19/divorce-law-history

https://www.ted.com/talks/rod_phillips_a_brief_history_of_divorce/transcript?
language=en
IX. DIVORCE

B. Absolute Divorce distinguished from other remedies

➢ What is the difference between an absolute divorce from others?

It actually ends the marriage. Once a decree of absolute divorce is entered, the
parties are free to remarry. The decree of absolute divorce is a formal order
issued by the court to end the divorce proceeding. After an absolute divorce,
one party can no longer inherit property from the other.

➢ What is the difference between limited and absolute divorce?

➔ Limited divorce
❖ A limited divorce, sometimes referred to as a legal separation, does not
actually end a marriage. Instead, it gives a couple a court-mandated
separation. A judge may dictate who lives in the marital home, gets
custody of children and pays alimony, but the agreements are all
temporary.
❖ Because this legal action does not terminate a marriage, couples are not
allowed to remarry. Furthermore, if one of the spouses starts a new
relationship or has sexual relations with someone else, it could be
considered adultery.
❖ Even though qualifying for a legal separation is easier than qualifying for
an absolute divorce, couples must still meet certain requirements, such
as the following:
➢ Either the husband or wife deserted the other.
➢ The couple stopped living together or having sexual relations for
less than 12 months.
➢ One of the spouses abused a child.
➢ One of the partners abused the other party.
➢ When these criteria are met, a couple may qualify for limited
divorce.

➔ Absolute divorce
❖ An absolute divorce, which is the most common type of divorce, is a
termination of a marriage. In other words, after this legal process is
complete, a couple will be completely separated and able to remarry or
participate in new romantic relationships.

❖ The custody, alimony and property division decisions made during these
proceedings are often permanent. In some cases, a court may decide to
revisit custody, child support and alimony after some time has passed or
a lifestyle change has been made.

❖ Qualifications for an absolute divorce: couples must have legal grounds

for separation as defined by their state.
➢ Most commonly, the partners have lived apart continuously for at
least 12 months. Other reasons include adultery, abuse, criminal
convictions, insanity, desertion and unreasonably malicious
conduct. Without these criteria, a couple may have to first go
through a limited divorce, but a legal separation is not a
prerequisite for an absolute divorce.
IX. DIVORCE

C. Foreign Divorces

Art. 15, NCC

ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)

Art. 26, Family Code

ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; dumrrI

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F.

ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19671, July 26, 1966
FACTS:
Pastor and Vicenta entered into a secret marriage before a Catholic chaplain. Upon
discovery of their daughter’s marriage, spouses Mamerto and Mena sought priestly
advice where it was suggested that the marriage be recelebrated. However, the
recelebration did not take place and the newlyweds eventually became estranged.
Later, unknown to Pastor, Vicenta left for the United States. There, she filed a
complaint for divorce on the ground of extreme mental cruelty, and an absolute divorce
was granted by the Court of Nevada. She later sought for the annulment of her
marriage from the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta eventually married an American in
Nevada and acquired American citizenship.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta and
her parents whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged their daughter
from joining him and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church
for having decreed the annulment of the marriage. He asked for legal separation and
one million pesos in damages.

Vicenta claims a valid divorce from Tenchavez and an equally valid marriage to her
American husband; while her parents filed a counterclaim for moral damages, denying
that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts.

The trial court did not decree a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from supporting
his wife and to acquire property to her exclusion. It granted the counterclaim of the
IX. DIVORCE

Españo spouses for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against
Tenchavez, to the extent of P45,000.00. Thus, he filed a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the
Philippines;

2.) Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation and to moral damages.

RULING:

1.) No. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between
Tenchavez and Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding the
decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines which was already in force at the time expressly
provided that “Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.” Here, at the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then still subject to Philippine law, which
does not admit absolute divorce. Thus, under Philippine law, the divorce was invalid.

2.) Yes. The Court ruled that it can be gleaned from the facts and considerations that
Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal separation on the basis of adultery as
provided under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code. Since our jurisdiction does not
recognize Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage as valid, her marriage and
cohabitation with the American is technically “intercourse with a person not her
husband” from the standpoint of Philippine Law. Her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband also constitute
in law a wrong for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity. Thus,
the latter is entitled to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law.

As to moral damages the Court assessed Tenchavez’s claim for a million pesos as
unreasonable, taking into account some considerations. First, the marriage was
celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
humiliation on his part. Second, the parties never lived together. Third, there is
evidence that Tenchavez had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage,
although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy. Fourth, the
fact that Tenchavez is unable to remarry under our law is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that he entered into voluntarily and with open eyes.
Therefore, he should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s
fees.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs.

HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.,
respondents.
139 SCRA 139 (1985)

FACTS:

1972- Alice Reyes, a Filipino, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong Kong.
Following their marriage, they moved to the Philippines where they had two children.
IX. DIVORCE

1982- the spouses were divorced in Nevada, US. Subsequently, Alice remarried to
Theodore Van Dorn.

1983- Richard filed a case against Alice before RTC Pasay, claiming that Alice's
business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property of the parties. In
other words, he wanted the RTC to declare that he has a right to manage the conjugal
property.

Alice filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that Richard's cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings in Nevada, where Richard
acknowledged that he and Alice had "no community property" as of 1982.

RTC Pasay: Denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved
(Galeon Shop) is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing
in the case.

ISSUE:

Whether a divorce decree validly issued by a competent court overseas is also valid in
the Philippines?

HELD:
1. YES. Divorce valid overseas is also valid in PH. His claim that the divorce
decree applies only in the US and not in the Philippines due to the standing
policy in the Philippines that divorce is not allowed, creates an absurd situation
where Alice is validly divorced from Richard in the US but remains married to
him in the Philippines. This cannot be countenanced as this would result in Alice
being discriminated against in her own country.

2. The divorce decree issued in Nevada released Richard from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband
of Alice. Therefore, he would have no standing to sue in the instant case and
claim that he is still the husband.

3. The SC held that the RTC's denial of the Motion to Dismiss is overturned. As
such, the Supreme Court ordered RTC Pasay to dismiss the case filed by
Richard against Alice.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner vs. HON. CORONA

IBAY-SOMERA,respondents.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to private

respondent Erich Geiling (Geiling), a German national, in Germany. Geiling obtained a
divorce in a German court on the grounds of failure of marriage.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery against petitioner alleging that she had an affair with two
IX. DIVORCE

different men while their marriage subsisted.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as
an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree prior to the filing of the
criminal complaint. However, the said motion was denied by the respondent judge.

Hence, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after
obtaining a divorce decree

HELD:

No, an alien spouse has no legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after
obtaining a divorce decree.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code:

“the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse”

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.

Hence, after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
to institute proceedings against the offenders. Where, however, proceedings have
been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect
on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings.

In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Therefore, Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case.

Republic of the PH vs. Cipriano Obrecido III

472 SCRA 114 (2005), G.R. No. 154380,
October 5, 2005

Facts:
May 24, 1981- Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Related imageThey were
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
IX. DIVORCE

Kimberly V. Orbecido.

1986- Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer . After a
few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.

2000- Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a
petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine
law.
Under article 26 (2):
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under PH law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove his wife’s naturalization, he was still
barred from remarrying.

Fe D. Quita vs CA and Blandina Dandan,

GR. No. 124862, December 22, 1998 / 300 SCRA 406 (1998)

Facts:
May 18, 1941- Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines . No children were born out of their marriage.

July 23, 1954- petitioner obtained a final judgement of divorce in San Francisco,
IX. DIVORCE

California, U.S.A.

April 16, 1972- Arturo died leaving no will.

August 31, 1972- Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favour of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan,
opposed the petition.

The RTC- expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until
the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage between private respondent and
Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.

Issue:
1. WON the case be remanded to the lower court.
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent?

Ruling:
YES. The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is
affirmed
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their
respective hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being
a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of
the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.

Paula T. Llorente vs. Court of Appeals and Alicia F. LLorente

GR. No. 124371, November 23, 2000 / 345 SCRA 592 (2000)

FACTS:

1937- Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in the Philippines.
Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US
where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife,
he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was
registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a
divorce in California, which later on became final.

He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his
IX. DIVORCE

last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second
marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special
administrator of his estate.

Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of
administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion
for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and
modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever
properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of
cohabitation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:

Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was
also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15
of the civil code,
“aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in
their National Law.”

Thus, the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not
Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became
an American citizen.

Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.

The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity
of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing
proof of foreign law.

Grace J. Garcia vs. Rhederic A. Recio

GR. No. 138322, Oct. 2, 2001 / 366 SCRA 437 (2001)

Facts:
March 1, 1987- Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia.

May 18, 1989- a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by
an Austrian family court.

June 26, 1992- respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a “Certificate of

Australian Citizenship” issued by the Australian government.

January 12, 1994- Petitioner( a Filipina) and respondent were married in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

October 22, 1995- petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured
in Australia.
IX. DIVORCE

March 3, 1998- petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy—respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she
learned of respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

❖ In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that
his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to many
petitioner in 1994.

July 7, 1998—or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down.”

Issue: Whether a divorce decree ipso facto clothes a divorcee with the legal capacity
to remarry.

Principles:

1. A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal
capacity to remarry. He must still adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign
State’s personal law governing his status, or at the very least, he should still prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

HELD:
The SC ruled that it cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
➢ It agreed with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.

➢ However, the Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null and
void on the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that, under the foreign
law, the divorcee was really capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce
decree—the most judicious course is to remand the case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal capacity to remarry.
Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage
on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce, hence, our courts cannot
grant it, and a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad.

➢ A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce

obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
IX. DIVORCE

➢ In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the

Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.”

➢ A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be

recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.

➢ A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law.”
➢ Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.

Before a foreign judgement is given presumptive evidentiary value, the

document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.

➢ Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a
public document—a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
➢ Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence.
➢ A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO.

TOMAS Respondent 628 SCRA 266 (2010)
Facts:
1. Gerbert Corpuz, who acquired Canadian citizenship, married a Filipina, Daisylyn
Sto. Tomas. He left for Canada soon after the wedding and when he came back to the
Philippines after three months, he discovered that his wife was having an affair with
another man.

2. Corpuz returned to Canada and filed for a divorce. His petition was granted and the
said divorce took effect a month after it was granted.

3. Two years after the divorce, he found another Filipina to love. He wanted to marry
his new fiancée so he went to the Pasig City Civil Registry to register the divorce
decree on his and Sto. Tomas’ marriage certification.

4. As told by an NSO official, Corpuz filed for a judicial recognition of foreign divorce
but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied his petition, citing that he was not the proper
IX. DIVORCE

party to institute the action for a judicial recognition and that only the Filipino spouse
can avail of the remedy under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

5. Corpuz then filed a petition for review on certiorari from the RTC’s ruling.

Issues:

1. Is the foreign decree sufficient to declare that there is a divorce?

2. WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

3. Can the Filipino spouse remarry under Philippine law should a divorce be validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse, thereby capacitating him or her to remarry?

Decision:

(1)No. The decree has to be recognized first in a competent Philippine court.

Rule 108 of the Court sets the jurisdictional procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
made and annotated in the civil registry.

(2) The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code states that:
“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law”.

The said provision bestows no rights in favour of aliens. However, this does not
necessarily strip Mr. Corpuz of his legal interest to petition for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. In fact, he can be considered as a proper party to the petition
because his direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of foreign judgement. Although Corpuz failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce as a supporting document to the validity of the decree, the
Court granted to remand the case and granted the petition for review on
certiorari.

(3)As to the third question, YES, the Filipino spouse can remarry under Philippine law
should a divorce be validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse (second paragraph,
Article 26, Family Code).

“When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under the PH law. ”
IX. DIVORCE

MINORU FUJIKI, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,

RESPONDENTS.
G.R. 196049, June 26, 2013

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent

Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well
with the petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

2. Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in Quezon City. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

3. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship.
Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan declaring
her marriage in Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial court dismissed the petition, maintaining
that Fujiki lacked the personality to file the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

RULING:

Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the said rule provides
for who may file such petition, to wit:

Sec. 1: Who may file a petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
IX. DIVORCE

In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. Thus, he has the legal personality to file
the petition. PETITION GRANTED.

➢ The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARELYN TAN

EDO MANALO, respondent

FACTS

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national. She later filed for divorce against
her husband, and a divorce decree was issued by a Japanese court.

In 2012, she sought the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila by virtue of the said divorce decree. She later amended her petition for the
judicial recognition of the divorce decree.

RTC denied Marelyn's petition, arguing that the divorce obtained by Marelyn in Japan should
not be recognized. The RTC held that based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine
law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos'
family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity
to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."

Upon appeal, the CA overturned RTC's ruling. CA held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. As such, it would be height of injustice to consider
Manelyn as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her and
can legally have another wife.

OSG's motion for recommendation was denied by CA. Hence, the instant petition.

RULING

Does a Filipino citizen have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry? -- YES.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of
the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of
the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
IX. DIVORCE

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended
as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed
by operation on the latter's national law.

In fact, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or
her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike.

Finally, a prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We
disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms"
under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.

Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded
as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV
of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized
by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous customs.

Although the SC held that a Filipino may initiate divorce against a foreign spouse, Marelyn's
case was still remanded to the RTC to allow Marelyn to present evidence as proof of the
relevant Japanese law on divorce

divorce abroad is validly RECOGNZED here in PH. SC affirmed the petition for the cancellation
of the entry to the local civil registrar, to effectually recognized the divorce decree here in
PH.

oHOWEVER: Petition did not properly prove the existence of the Japanese law validly
divorcing them

o CONSEQUENCE: It is not Final! divorce obtained in Japan needs further proof. The
court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe
that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. To Determine whether which
of the two types of divorce:
IX. DIVORCE

■ (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage,

■ (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

o EVIDENCE NEEDED: Divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.

■ Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:

• (1) an official publication or

• (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

o (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

o (b) authenticated by the seal of his office

Republic vs. Helen Bayog-Saito

IX. DIVORCE

D. Muslim Divorces

Code of Muslim Personal Laws

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1083

A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZING THE

SYSTEM OF FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS,
AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)

Section 1. Nature and Form

IX. DIVORCE

Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond
in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible
means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be affected by:

(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

(b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila);

(c) Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);

(d) Acts of imprecation (li'an);

(e) Redemption by the wife (khul');

(f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwld); or

(g) Judicial decree (faskh).

Article 46. Divorce by talaq.

(1) A divorce by talaq may be affected by the husband in a single repudiation of his
wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from
carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tuhr shall
constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the
prescribed 'idda.

(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have
the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed 'idda by resumption of
cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the
repudiation shall become irrevocable (Talaq bain sugra).

Article 47. Divorce by Ila. Where a husband makes a vow to abstain from any carnal
relations (ila) with his wife and keeps such ila for a period of not less than four months,
she may be granted a decree of divorce by the court after due notice and hearing.

Article 48. Divorce by zihar. Where the husband has injuriously assimilated (zihar)
his wife to any of his relatives within the prohibited degrees of marriage, they shall
mutually refrain from having carnal relation until he shall have performed the
prescribed expiation. The wife may ask the court to require her husband to perform the
expiationor to pronounce a regular talaq should he fail or refuse to do so, without
prejudice to her right of seeking other appropriate remedies.

Article 49. Divorce by li'an. Where the husband accuses his wife in court of adultery,
a decree of perpetual divorce may be granted by the court after due hearing and after
the parties shall have performed the prescribed acts of imprecation (li'an).

Article 50. Divorce by khul'. The wife may, after having offered to return or renounce
her dower or to pay any other lawful consideration for her release (khul') from the
marriage bond, petition the court for divorce. The court shall, in meritorious cases and
after fixing the consideration, issue the corresponding decree.

Article 51. Divorce by tafwid. If the husband has delegated (tafwid) to the wife the
right to effect a talaq at the time of the celebration of the marriage or thereafter, she
IX. DIVORCE

may repudiate the marriage and the repudiation would have the same effect as if it
were pronounced by the husband himself.

Article 52. Divorce by faskh. The court may, upon petition of the wife, decree a
divorce by faskh on any of the following grounds :

(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at least
six consecutive months;

(b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment

for at least one year;

(c) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without reasonable cause
his marital obligation in accordance with this code;

(d) Impotency of the husband;

(e) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable disease which would
make the continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family;

(f) Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next succeeding article;
or

(g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the dissolution of marriage
by faskh either at the instance of the wife or the proper wali.

Article 53. Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. A decree of faskh on the ground of
unusual cruelty may be granted by the court upon petition of the wife if the husband:

(a)Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruel conduct even if
this does not result in physical injury;

(b) Associates with persons of ill-repute or leads an infamous life or attempts to

force the wife to live an immoral life;

(c) Compels her to dispose of her exclusive property or prevents her from
exercising her legal rights over it;

(d) Obstructs her in the observance of her religious practices; or

(e) Does not treat her justly and equitably as enjoined by Islamic law.

Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it

becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:

(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another
marriage in accordance with this Code;

(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;

(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of

this code;
IX. DIVORCE

(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in
case the talaq has been affected after the consummation of the marriage, or
one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;

(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in
accordance with Article 67; and

(f) The conjugal partnership, if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be

dissolved and liquidated.

Article 55. Effects of other kinds of divorce. The provisions of the article immediately
preceding shall apply to the dissolution of marriage by ila, zihar, li'an and khul', subject
to the effects of compliance with the requirements of the Islamic law relative to such
divorces.

Section 2. 'Idda

Article 56. 'Idda defined. 'Idda is the period of waiting prescribed for a woman whose
marriage has been dissolved by death or by divorce the completion of which shall
enable her to contract a new marriage.

Article 57. Period.

(1) Every wife shall be obliged to observe 'idda as follows:

(a) In case of dissolution of marriage by death, four months and ten days
counted from the death of her husband;

(b) In case of termination of marriage by divorce, for three monthly

courses; or

(c) In case of a pregnant women, for a period extending until her delivery.

(2) Should the husband die while the wife is observing 'idda for divorce, another
'idda for death shall be observed in accordance with paragraph 1(a).

Hatima C. Yasin v. Sharia District

Court
GR. No. 94986, Feb. 23, 1995 241
SCRA 606 (1995)
Facts:

After the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of the
Philippines, petitioner Yasin filed a petition to resume the use of maiden name before
the Shari'a District Court. The respondent court denied the petition on the ground that
the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions
of Rule 103 Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the position is to be
granted.

➢ Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
IX. DIVORCE

Philippines, as follows:

Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage
bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all
possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be affected by:

(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

Issue:

1. Does the petitioner seek to change her registered name?

2. In case the marriage ties no longer exist (as in the case of death, divorce,
annulment), does women need to seek judicial confirmation of the change in their civil
status in order to revert to their maiden name?

Held:

1. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil
register. While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may
be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. In the instant
petition, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead,
prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the
dissolution of her marriage, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with
Muslim law.

2. No. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial
authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's
full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law
grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or
vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as
the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When the
petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status.
Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her
husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname
during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the
husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before
the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires
her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws. (Yasin vs.
Judge Shari'a District Court, G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995)

Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. v. Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos,

G.R No. 193719 (March 21, 2017)
IX. DIVORCE

Facts:

Dec. 28, 1992- Pacasum and Zamoranos were married However, Pacasum
discovered that Zamoranos was previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982.

Pacasum filed an administrative complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct

against Zamoranos on the ground that she had contracted a bigamous marriage.
Zamoranos raised as a defense the dissolution of her previous marriage under
the Muslim Code. Prior to her marriage with De Guzman, she had converted to Islam.

In 1983- She and De Guzman divorced in the Shari'a Circuit Court of Isabela.The
CSC dismissed the complaint because Pacasum failed to assail the existence,
much less validity, of the Decree of Divorce. The CSC ruled that since
Zamoranos' supposedly subsisting marriage with De Guzman is the sole basis for
Pacasum's charge of immorality, the existence of the Decree of Divorce is fatal
to Pacasum's complaint.Pacasum moved for reconsideration, but this was denied
by the CSC.On appeal, the CA initially granted the petition. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Zamoranos alleged complaint for bigamy has a legal basis

Ruling:

NO. Pacasum's complaint for immorality based on Zamoranos' alleged bigamy

has no leg to stand on.
The Muslim Code recognizes divorce in marriages between Muslims, and mixed
marriages wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or the Muslim Code in any part of
the Philippines.At present, this is the only law in the Philippines that allows domestic
divorce.P2: The divorce between Zamoranos and De Guzman was issued by
Judge Kaudri L. Jainul of the Shari 'a Circuit Court.

It states that both Zamoranos and De Guzman appeared when the case was
called for hearing. It further recites that both parties converted to the faith of Islam
prior to their Muslim wedding, and that it was Zamoranos who sought divorce by
tafwid, with De Guzman having previously delegated his authority to exercise
talaq.Thus, on its face, the divorce appears valid, having been issued for a
cause recognized under the applicable law by a competent court having
jurisdiction over the parties. And, as neither party interposed an appeal, the divorce
has attained finality. P3: Here, Pacasum's administrative complaint is wholly
dependent on the continuing validity of the marriage between Zamoranos and De
Guzman.

However, we have already recognized that this marriage was dissolved in

accordance with the Muslim Code in the case of Zamoranos v. People, which also
involved the herein parties.Conclusion:Following the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, the parties are already bound by our previous ruling on that specific issue,
that is, Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman was valid which enabled her to contract
the subsequent marriage with Pacasum.

As a result, Pacasum's complaint for immorality based on Zamoranos' alleged

bigamy has no leg to stand on.Analysis: The court used a deductive to inductive
reasoning. By first establishing the validity of Muslim Codes in accordance with the
IX. DIVORCE

Family Code, the court thereafter went to the basis of their previous ruling in
Zamoranos and De Guzman’s validity of marriage

Here, Pacasum's administrative complaint is wholly dependent on the continuing

validity of the marriage between Zamoranos and De Guzman. However, we have
already recognized that this marriage was dissolved in accordance with the Muslim
Code in the case of Zamoranos v. People, which also involved the herein parties.
Following the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgement,