1

THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND

CORPORATE SOCIA RESPONSIBILITY ON CORPORATRE
PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF THE BANKING SECTOR OF
PAKISTAN
Affan Khan, Usama Tahir, Hassan Jilani, M. Asad, Waqar Haider

Abstract
Purpose:
The main purpose of this paper is to study the influence of Corporate Governance, Corporate Social
Responsibility, and Corporate-specific characteristics on the performance of Banking sector of
Pakistan.

Methods:
Results:

1. Introduction
Companies influence and are influenced by their external environment, so the company’s objectives
exceed profit-making and turn to value creation (Berman et al., 1999; Cremers, 2017). Thus, the
Corporate Governance (CG) characteristics, which dictate the relationship that the company maintains
with its stakeholders, are considered essential tools for the success of companies. Simultaneously, the
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) characteristics comprise the behaviors and actions that the
company takes voluntarily, promoting its stakeholders’ well-being. In this sense, corporate governance
protects shareholder interests and plays a key role in preserving and sustainable development of a
company (Srivastava et al., 2018).
Recent literature has shown that adopting corporate governance principles and practices is considered
an important determinant of the assessment of companies and, consequently, their performance levels
(Ting et al., 2019). There is a growing concern regarding social and corporate initiatives, providing
companies with a natural progression, focusing on improving the human dimension, preserving the
environment, and social awareness. In addition, currently, companies are increasingly involved in
plans whose objectives involve environmental, social, or governmental issues (Zhao et al., 2018). This
process benefits companies, allowing them to improve their performance (Rodriguez-Fernandez,
2016). There is still a long way to go in performance analysis considering societies’ social challenges.
Thus, this study arises from the need to expand the literature on the subject, namely The Banking
Sector of Pakistan, and aims to demonstrate how corporate governance, corporate social
responsibility, and company-specific characteristics influence performance. This analysis is made
from two different perspectives, analyzing both the view of managers and the view of potential
investors. This study contributes in different ways to the literature. First, the Banking Sector as a
whole is analyzed, given its geographic proximity and commercial and cultural relations; then, each
country is analyzed individually to better understand the differentiating characteristics in terms of
business performance.
Secondly, and to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the different
characteristics of corporate governance and social responsibility for the Banking Sector, allowing us
to investigate the effect of these determinants in comparative terms for the country.
Thirdly, our study allows us to analyze the results from the different perspectives of managers and
potential investors, results that can be quite different, according to Vieira et al. (2019).
 2

1.1 Background of Study:

There is a growing concern regarding social and corporate initiatives, providing companies (Banks)
with a natural progression, focusing on improving the human dimension, preserving the environment,
and social awareness. In addition, currently, companies (Banks) are increasingly involved in plans
whose objectives involve environmental, social, or governmental issues (Zhao et al., 2018). This
process benefits companies (Banks), allowing them to improve their performance (Rodriguez-
Fernandez, 2016).
There is still a long way to go in performance analysis considering societies’ social challenges. Thus,
this study arises from the need to expand the literature on the subject, namely the aims to demonstrate
how corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and (Bank’s) company-specific
characteristics influence performance.

1.2 Problem Statement:

The banking sector plays a pivotal role in Pakistan’s economy, and its performance and stability have
significant implications for financial systems and broader economic well-being.
Corporate governance practices and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives are increasingly
recognized as essential components of responsible banking in Pakistan. However, there remains a
need to empirically investigate the interrelationship between corporate governance, CSR, and
corporate performance in the banking sector of Pakistan. This study seeks to address this critical
knowledge gap by assessing how corporate governance mechanisms and CSR practices influence the
financial performance, stability, and reputation of Banking Sector of Pakistan.
The study aims to provide empirical evidence to guide effective corporate governance and CSR
strategies within the banking sector, promoting sustainable and responsible banking practices that
benefit all stakeholders.

1.3 Research Objectives:

 To find the relation between Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance.
 To study the effects of Corporate social responsibility on Corporate Governance.
 To investigate the combined effect of Corporate Governance and Corporate social
responsibility on Corporate performance.
 To evaluate the mediating effect of Ethical behavior on Corporate Performance.
 To identify Moderating role of Industry Characteristics on Corporate Performance.

1.4 Research Questions:

 What is the relation between Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance.
 How the Corporate social responsibility influence on Corporate Governance.
 How do the strong Corporate Governance and effective Corporate social responsibility impact
on Corporate overall performance.
 How does Ethical behavior influences on Corporate Performance as a mediator.
 How do Industry Characteristics moderately impact on Corporate Performance.

1.5 Significance of Study:

2. Literature Review
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2.1. Corporate Governance Factors

2.1.1. Board Size:
The "board size" in the banking sector refers to the number of individuals who serve on a
bank's board of directors. The size of a bank's board can have significant implications for its
governance, decision-making processes, and overall effectiveness.
In the banking sector, the optimal board size can vary based on several factors, including the bank's
size, complexity, and specific regulatory requirements. Smaller community banks may have smaller
boards, typically composed of a handful of directors, while larger, more complex financial institutions
may have larger boards with a greater number of directors.
The board of directors of companies is an essential internal control mechanism, as it represents the
link between shareholders and the company’s management. In addition, this board monitors the
quality of financial information to ensure transparency in the disclosure of information and allow for
the reduction of agency costs (Dias et al., 2017; García-Sánchez et al., 2019; Kalsie and Shrivastav,
2016; Merendino and Melville, 2019). In Pakistan, there is no recommendation about the ideal board
size. Literature shows controversial results concerning board size and performance. On the one hand,
some studies support a positive effect on performance, justified by the fact that larger boards promote
more effective controls and encompass a broad set of competencies and skills to meet the
organization's diverse needs. Furthermore, a larger number of board members can dilute power
decisions (e.g., Kalsie and Shrivastav, 2016; Pekovic and Vogt, 2021; Pucheta-Martínez and Gallego-
Álvarez, 2020; Tulung and Ramdani, 2018). On the other hand, according to agency theory, more
managers negatively influence company performance (e.g., Merendino and Melville, 2019; Orozco et
al., 2018; Palaniappan, 2017; Terjesen et al., 2016). Vieira et al. (2019), who studied Portuguese listed
companies, concluded that there is no significant relationship between the size of the board of
directors and ROA.

2.1.2. Board Independence:

"Board independence" in the banking sector refers to the extent to which the members of a
bank's board of directors are free from conflicts of interest and are able to make impartial and
objective decisions that are in the best interests of the bank and its stakeholders. Board
independence is a critical component of corporate governance, as it helps to ensure
transparency, accountability, and responsible decision-making within financial institutions.
A board member is independent if external to the organization, having arbitrary capacity in situations
of divergence between managers, seeking to mitigate agency problems between managers and
shareholders, and promoting the interests of different stakeholders (Fama, 1980; Sá et al., 2017).
Thus, there are studies that identify a positive relationship, using ROA and Tobin's Q as performance
proxy (e.g., Alqatan et al., 2019; Ben Barka and Legendre, 2017; Handriani and Robiyanto, 2018;
Manna et al., 2016; Pucheta-Martínez and Gallego-Álvarez, 2020; Tulung and Ramdani, 2018). This
positive relationship is justified because more independent administrators increase supervision and
control in organizations, leading to better performances (Fernández-Temprano and Tejerina-Gaite,
2020). However, other studies show a negative relationship between the independent elements and the
company’s performance, such as Cavaco et al. (2016) or Rashid (2018). Singh et al. (2018) conclude
that the negative relationship is due to the close association between internal and external managers of
the company, which leads to worse performance. Moreover, for the market, more independent
members can affect the company’s credibility.

2.1.3. Audit Committee:

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The Audit Committee in the banking sector is a subcommittee of the bank's board of directors
comprised of independent directors who are not involved in the bank's day-to-day operations.
This committee is responsible for providing independent oversight and monitoring of the bank's
financial reporting and auditing processes, risk management, and compliance with applicable
laws and regulations.
The audit committee, quite common in the Anglo-Saxon model, is ended of a part of the board of
directors, who are non-executive directors. This committee acts as a supervisory body. Its functions
include obtaining internal information, reporting, and supervising so that information disclosed to
stakeholders is presented fairly and truthfully (Dakhlallh et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2018. Concerning
studies that analyze the impact of the audit committee on the companies performance, there are
uncertain results. Some studies verify a positive effect on performance measured by ROA or Tobin’s
Q since the audit committee will promote greater internal control, reduce risks and fraud in
organizations, increasing the performance of companies (e.g., Dakhlallh et al., 2020; Fauzi et al.,
2017; Hussein Mohammed et al., 2019). However, some authors report a negative relationship
between these variables, such as Hassan et al. (2016) and Puni and Anlesinya (2020), justifying this
relationship with a possible lack of independence and specialized knowledge of its members, or by the
fact that companies only fulfill the requirement of having an audit committee (Zhou et al., 2018).

2.1.4. Ownership concentration:

"Ownership concentration" in the banking sector refers to the distribution of ownership or
control over a bank's shares or equity among its shareholders. It describes the extent to which a
bank's ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few large shareholders or is more dispersed
among a broader group of shareholders. Ownership concentration is a critical aspect of
corporate governance and can significantly impact the decision-making and control of a bank.
Ownership concentration is an internal corporate governance mechanism that determines the power
and control assigned to the management body and the owner, whose determination is the ownership
structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) concluded that the separation of ownership and control will
lead to potential agency conflicts, affecting corporate performance. This situation is observed when
managers act for their own benefit, rather than meeting the interests of shareholders (Belghitar et al.,
2011; Elbadry et al., 2015). Concerning the literature that studies the effect of property concentration
on performance, the results are inconsistent. Some studies find a positive impact between
concentration and performance, as there will be greater control and supervision in the organization’s
management (e.g., Al Farooque et al., 2020; Gaur et al., 2015; Iwasaki and Mizobata, 2020; Mandacı
and Gumus, 2010; Neves, 2014). In addition, the high concentration of ownership allows overcoming
the agency problems present in the organization, leading to better business performance results
(Waheed and Malik, 2019). In contrast, Altaf and Shah (2018) and Pekovic and Vogt (2021) find a
negative impact of concentration on performance on performance, suggesting that concentration of
ownership tends to increase information asymmetry, opportunistic behaviors, thus reducing
performance.

2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility Determinants:

The recognition of the direct relationship between CSR and companies’ performance has attracted the
interest of several authors. It can be measured through different proxies such as CEO remuneration,
the Social and Corporate Responsibility Committee, and Social expenses.

2.2.1. CEO’s Remuneration:

The remuneration of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in the banking sector with respect to
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) refers to the compensation structure that includes
components and incentives related to the bank's CSR initiatives and performance. This means
 5

that a portion of the CEO's remuneration is directly tied to the bank's efforts and achievements
in social and environmental responsibility. This approach is designed to align the CEO's
financial incentives with the bank's commitment to CSR, promoting ethical and sustainable
business practices.
The CEO’s compensation is the total amounts earned in the quality of salary, bonuses, compensation
through shares, and other personal benefits (Hoi et al., 2019). This remuneration can positively or
negatively affect the performance of companies. Thus, higher CEO compensation can lead to more
ethical conduct, improving organizations’ performance (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003). In addition, Edmans et al. (2017) and Elsayed and Elbardan (2018) argue that a
way to align managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests involves associating remuneration with
performance, in line with agency theory. Also, Manna et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2021) find a
positive effect between remuneration and company performance, as the highest-paid CEO may be
more motivated to achieve corporate results. However, high remunerations can mean agency problems
that cause a decrease in business performance or CEO do not satisfy their duties (Carter et al., 2016).
Furthermore, executive members with high salaries may not be sufficiently motivated to increase
market performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q (Smirnova and Zavertiaeva, 2017). These authors also
verify that only bonuses earned by the CEO increase ROA.

2.2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility Committee:

A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Committee in the banking sector is a specialized
committee within a bank's governance structure that is responsible for overseeing and guiding
the bank's CSR initiatives and activities. Its primary role is to ensure that the bank fulfills its
ethical, social, and environmental responsibilities in a manner that aligns with its business
values and contributes positively to society. The establishment of a CSR Committee underscores
the bank's commitment to responsible and sustainable banking practices.
The existence of a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee shows the direction and commitment
of the board of directors to sustainable development (Hussain et al., 2018) and environmental issues
(García Martín and Herrero, 2020). The presence of the CSR committee is considered a good
governance practice, capable of avoiding corruption and exposing the company to possible failures in
the scope of social responsibility, and, therefore, it must include at least one specialist in
environmental and social issues in its constitution (García-Sánchez et al., 2019; Gennari and Salvioni,
2019). The literature that analyzes the effect of the social and corporate responsibility commission on
performance shows an ambiguous relationship between the variables. Some studies show a positive
impact, as this committee allows the creation of mechanisms that ensure more outstanding
commitment to the company’s social and economic responsibility, providing greater corporate
performance (Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2021; Spitzeck, 2009). However, this commission can also have
a negative effect on performance (Sekhon and Kathuria, 2019) or have a non-existent effect (Cancela
et al., 2020), justified by the fact that managers or future shareholders do not consider this
commission useful for corporate performance.

2.2.3. Social Expenses:

"Social expenses" in the banking sector refer to the costs associated with various social and
community-related initiatives and obligations undertaken by banks as part of their corporate
social responsibility (CSR) and community engagement efforts. These expenses represent the
financial resources allocated by banks to support and contribute to social and community well-
being beyond their core financial services.
Employee remuneration is essential for organizational functioning, as employers depend on their
human resources skills and professional performance to maintain their activity and respective
 6

competitiveness in the market (Gupta and Shaw, 2014) Thus, social expenses can have a positive or
negative effect on business performance. On the one hand, higher remuneration can translate into
greater employee motivation and effort, greater productivity, lower agency costs, greater business
innovation, consequently leading to greater corporate performance (e.g., Cao and Rees, 2020; Edmans
et al., 2017; Iverson and Zatzick, 2011; Neves et al., 2021; Wei et al., 2020). However, employees
may behave contrary to the organization’s interests, acting according to their own interests to obtain
higher remuneration, which can lead to lower performances (Gupta and Shaw, 2014). Also, Kim and
Jang (2020) show that in the short term, the effect of personnel expenses and performance is negative,
but, in the long term, this relationship could be positive.

2.3. Specific Corporate Determinants

Following the traditional literature, the specific characteristics of the companies can be considered as
control variables. Two widely used variables are firm size and leverage.

2.3.1. Company (Bank) size :

Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2014), for a sample consisting of Portuguese companies, conclude that the
company size positively influences corporate performance. Makridou et al., (2019); Neves,
Henriques, et al. (2021), and Zeitun and Saleh (2015) also found a positive effect. According to these
authors, large companies have a greater capacity to diversify their investment, a greater possibility of
reducing their default risk, greater ease of access to capital markets, and greater ease in reducing
financing costs, leading to better performance. Contrary to previous studies, Bikker and Vervliet
(2018) or Proença et al. (2020) conclude that size is negatively related to business performance,
adding that a high amount of assets does not necessarily guarantee more significant investments in
development or greater stability. Similar to this result, Alqatan et al. (2019) demonstrated that the
company’s total assets significantly negatively impact the performance. Finally, Vieira et al. (2019)
found no relationship between the Portuguese companies' size and their level of performance.

2.3.2. Leverage:
In the banking sector, "leverage" refers to the use of borrowed funds or debt to increase the
potential return on investment. It represents the ratio of a bank's total debt or liabilities to its
equity capital. Leverage is a common financial practice that banks employ to amplify their
profits, but it also increases the level of risk and potential losses.
Leverage provides evidence about a company’s dependence on third parties and may reveal its
capacity to generate additional returns and maximize business performance. According to Alshatti
(2016), leverage positively affects the banks performance, suggesting that banks that can manage their
debt efficiently can have better performances in the future, mainly for tax reasons. In agreement with
previous results, Bărbută-Misu et al. (2019) and Neves, Henriques, et al. (2021) confirm the existence
of a positive relationship between leverage and performance. On the other hand, Zeitun and Saleh
(2015) show that leverage has a negative effect on business performance. Similarly, Pais and Gama
(2015), using a sample of Portuguese non-financial companies, attested to a significantly negative
relationship between the level of financial debt and performance, measured through ROA. Miralles-
Marcelo et al. (2014.

3. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development

3.1. Definition and Concept of Variables
Independent Variables
3.1.1. Corporate Governance:
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"In the context of the banking sector in Pakistan, corporate governance is defined as, 'the
comprehensive system of principles, structures, and practices that govern the operations,
decision-making, and accountability of financial institutions' (Khan, 2023)."
Corporate governance in the Pakistan banking sector is designed to protect the interests of
stakeholders, maintain financial stability, and foster public confidence in the banking system. It
includes the composition and role of the board of directors, risk management practices, regulatory
compliance, ethical behavior, and accountability mechanisms, all of which collectively contribute to
responsible and sound banking operations within the Pakistan.

3.1.2. Corporate Social Responsibility:

"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the banking sector of Pakistan refers to a set of
voluntary, ethical, and sustainable business practices and initiatives undertaken by banks to
contribute positively to society, the environment, and the economy while also fulfilling their
financial objectives. (Khan,2023)
These initiatives encompass a range of activities, including philanthropic efforts, environmental
stewardship, ethical and transparent business operations, financial inclusion, and community
development, with the goal of enhancing the well-being and quality of life of all stakeholders,
including customers, employees, communities, and the nation as a whole.

Dependent Variables
3.1.3 Corporate Performance:
“The assessment of an organization's overall effectiveness, efficiency, and success in
achieving its strategic objectives and fulfilling its mission”. (Khan,2023)
It is measured through a combination of key performance indicators (KPIs) and metrics in
various dimensions.
Corporate performance refers to the overall effectiveness and efficiency of a corporation or
organization in achieving its goals, objectives, and mission. It encompasses a wide range of
activities, measures, and outcomes that determine how well a company or entity is
functioning. Corporate performance is often assessed in multiple dimensions, including
financial, operational, strategic, and social aspects.
Mediating Variables
3.1.4 Ethical Behaviour:
Ethical behavior in the banking sector is the consistent adherence to a well-defined set of moral
and professional principles, values, and standards that guide the actions, decisions, and
practices of banking professionals and institutions. (Khan,2023)
Operationally, ethical behaviour in this sector can be evaluated through the following specific and
measurable criteria:

 Honesty and Truthfulness:

 Integrity and Professionalism:
 Customer Fairness and Protection:
 Confidentiality and Data Security:
 Transparency and Disclosure:
 Regulatory Compliance:
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 Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF)

Compliance:
 Environmental and Social Responsibility:
 Ethical Decision-Making:
 Professional Development and Ethical Training:

Moderating Variables
3.1.5 Industry Characteristics:
Industry characteristics in the banking sector refer to the specific attributes and traits that
define the environment, structure, and operations of the banking industry as a whole.
(Khan,2023)
These characteristics help differentiate the banking sector from other sectors and provide insights into
its unique features and dynamics.

 Market Concentration
 Regulatory Environment
 Banking Products and Services
 Financial Inclusion
 Technology and Innovation
 Credit Risk and Asset Quality
 Efficiency and Productivity
 Risk Management
 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
 Profitability and Financial Performance
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3.2 Conceptual model:

Corporate Ethical
Governance Behaviour
Corporate
Performance
Corporate Social
Responsibility

Industry
Characteristics
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3.3 Hypothetical Model:

CG EB

CSR CP

IC

3.3.1 Hypothesis
Ho Corporate Governance has no impact on Corporate Performance.
H1: Corporate Governance has significant impact on Corporate Performance.
HO: Corporate social responsibility has no effect on Corporate Governance
H2: Corporate social responsibility has remarkable effect on Corporate Governance.
Ho: Corporate Governance and Corporate social responsibility has no effect on Corporate
performance.

H3: Corporate Governance and Corporate social responsibility has notable effect on Corporate
performance.
Ho: Ethical behavior has no mediating effect on Corporate Performance.

H4: Ethical behavior has serious mediating effect on Corporate Performance.

Ho: Industry Characteristics has no moderating affect on Corporate Performance .
H5: Industry Characteristics has outstanding moderating affect on Corporate Performance.
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