AMMONIA
Ammonia is a material of special importance in hazard control, because of its toxicity and its very widespread use.
An additional factor is its ability to form denser than-air mixtures on release to the atmosphere, in spite of
its low molecular weight relative to that of air.
The threshold limit value (TLV) for ammonia is 25 PPM (TWA), short term exposure limit (STEL) 35 PPM and
IDLH 300 PPM . Ammonia gas is extremely corrosive and irritating to the skin, eyes, nose, and respiratory tract.
Exposure by inhalation causes irritation of the nose, throat, and mucous membranes. In case of low concentration
(<TLV) no relationships between level or length of ammonia exposure and lung function results were demonstrated.
At 400-700 PPM severe eye and respiratory irritation can occur, with the potential for permanent damage.
CASE 1
There have also been a number of non-fatal releases of ammonia. A large spill of 600 tonnes of ammonia from a
burst pipe in Floral, Arkansas, USA in 1971 did not result in any human fatalities. However, the released ammonia
reached a watercourse and killed thousands of fish. Due to an error warm ammonia transferred to the tank from
bottom where it formed a layer on the bottom. In due course this layer rose suddenly to the surface like ‘rollover’.
The higher vapour pressure of the warmer liquid caused a sudden rise in pressure in the tank, which the pressure
relief valves were unable to handle, and the tank burst.
(Chemical Engineering (1971) News Report on Floral incident. Chemical Engineering, July 1971, p334. In Marshall, V.C. (1987) Major
Chemical Hazards. Ellis Horwood Ltd, ISBN 085312969X)
CASE 2
Brittle fracture is catastrophic, since the fracture can propagate at a velocity close to that of sound. In 1973 at
Potchefstroom, South Africa, an ammonia tank suffered brittle fracture, which resulted in the total release of some
38 ton of ammonia which resulted 18 deaths. It appears to be the worst accident involving ammonia. There were no
overpressure or over temperature of the tank contents and no other triggering event was determined. The fracture
occurred in a dished end which was fabricated in carbon steel and which had not been stress relieved after
manufacture. Subsequent tests were conducted and found the minimum transition temperatures 200C for the
fragment and 1150C for the remaining part of the dished end. Thus, the metal was below its transition temperature
under normal operating conditions. The failure resulted in rise of a gas cloud of approximately 150 m diameter and
20 m deep. At the time of the accident the air was apparently still, but within a few minutes a slight breeze arose
which caused the cloud to move towards a township. It had prompted the South African authorities to lay down
guidelines that all vessels containing dangerous substances shall be given appropriate heat treatment irrespective of
the (construction) code requirements.
Commenting on this Lonsdale (1975) states “Stress-relieving does not overcome fully the damage done by
progressive cold-forming of a dished end. This is particularly so where seam welds has had to be made in the dished
end.” Lewis D. J.(1993) In Lee’s Loss Prevention in Process Industries,3rd ed. Vol. 3, Appendix 1: Case Histories, A65 (Potchefstroom, South
Africa, 1973)
(Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH, 1979) Second Report, HMSO. in Marshall, V.C. (1987) Major Chemical Hazards. Ellis
Horwood Ltd, ISBN 085312969X)
(Lonsdale H., Ammonia tank failure – South Africa. CEP Technical Manual Vol. 17. A.I.Chem.E, New York, 1975, p335. In Marshall, V.C.
(1987) Major Chemical Hazards. Ellis Horwood Ltd, ISBN 085312969X)
CASE 3
There are large numbers of recorded ammonia releases in excess of 100 tonne but much lower casualties. In 1989 a
refrigerated atmospheric ammonia storage tank containing some 7,000 te of liquid ammonia failed at Jonova,
Lithuania . The ammonia ignited and due to domino effect ammonium nitrate storage caught fire. It was estimated
that some 1400 te of ammonia evaporated and further 700 te of ammonia and nitrous fumes participated in the toxic
fire plume. The plume had affected an area of some 400 km2. Seven people were killed 57 injured. The tank with 29
m dia and 20 m high with single wall construction and perlite insulation held in place by an outer steel shell and
with a surrounding 14 m high reinforced concrete wall. The pool of ammoni had taken 12 h to evaporate completely
whereas fertilizer continued to burn for 3 days. The occurrence of stress corrosion cracking in ammonia storage
tanks/spheres has created a considerable problem in the maintenance of such storages. Accounts are given by Brown
(1982) and Guth and Clark (1985) . They illustrate both the procedures for isolation, emptying, purging and entry,
and for bringing back on stream for such storages and the procedures for inspection and repair.
(Kletz T. A. (1991a) In Lee’s Loss Prevention in Proces Industries, 3rd ed. Vol. 3, Appendix 1: Case Histories, A124 Jonova, Lithuania, 1989).
(Brown Robert S., Damage Detection, Repair, and Prevention in an
Ammonia Storage Sphere, Plant/Operations Progress, Volume 1,
Issue 2, pages 97–101, April 1982.)
(Guth David C., Clark Don A., Inspection and Repair of Two
Ammonia Spheres, Plant/Operations Progress, Volume 4, Issue 1,
pages 16–19, January 1985)
