The War

Against Iraq
 The War
Against Iraq
Other titles in the Lucent Terrorism Library are:
America Under Attack: Primary Sources
America Under Attack: September 11, 2001
The History of Terrorism
Terrorists and Terrorist Groups
PDF Not Available Due to Copyright Terms
PDF Not Available Due to Copyright Terms
 Contents
FOREWORD 8
INTRODUCTION
Winning the Peace 10
CHAPTER 1
Iraq’s History of Aggression and Arms 14
CHAPTER 2
The Axis of Evil and Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq 28
CHAPTER 3
Shock and Awe in Twenty-Six Days 43
CHAPTER 4
The Aftermath of War in Iraq 60
CHAPTER 5
Challenges for the New Iraq 74

Notes 91
Chronology 95
For Further Reading 98
Works Consulted 100
Index 104
Picture Credits 111
About the Author 112
 Foreword

I t was the bloodiest day in American

history since the battle of Antietam
during the Civil War—a day in which
deaths from seventy, eighty, ninety
floors up rather than endure the 1,000-
degree temperatures within the towers.
everything about the nation would New Yorkers who had thought they
change forever. People, when speaking were going to work were caught on film
of the country, would henceforth spec- desperately racing the other way to
ify “before September 11” or “after escape the wall of dust and debris that
September 11.” It was as if, on that rolled down the streets of lower
Tuesday morning, the borders had sud- Manhattan. Photographs showed badly
denly shifted to include Canada and burned Pentagon secretaries and frus-
Mexico, or as if the official language of trated rescue workers. Later pictures
the United States had changed. The dif- would show huge fire engines buried
ference between “before” and “after” under the rubble.
was that pronounced. It was not the first time America
That Tuesday morning, September had been the target of terrorists. The
11, 2001, was the day that Americans same World Trade Center had been tar-
began to learn firsthand about terror- geted in 1993 by Islamic terrorists, but
ism, as first one fuel-heavy commercial the results had been negligible. The
airliner, and then a second, hit New worst of such acts on American soil
York’s World Trade Towers—sending came in 1995 at the hands of a home-
them thundering to the ground in a grown terrorist whose hatred for the
firestorm of smoke and ash.A third air- government led to the bombing of the
liner was flown into a wall of the federal building in Oklahoma City. The
Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a blast killed 168 people—19 of them
fourth was apparently wrestled away children.
from terrorists before it could be steered But the September 11 attacks were
into another building. By the time the far different. It was terror on a frighten-
explosions and collapses had stopped ingly well-planned, larger scale, carried
and the fires had been extinguished, out by nineteen men from the Middle
more than three thousand Americans East whose hatred of the United States
had died. drove them to the most appalling suicide
Film clips and photographs showed mission the world had ever witnessed.
the horror of that day. Trade Center As one U.S. intelligence officer told a
workers could be seen leaping to their CNN reporter,“These guys turned air-

8
 Foreword

planes into weapons of mass destruction,land- success of the September 11 attacks] will
marks familiar to all of us into mass graves.” think: why not do something else?” says
Some observers say that September 11 Richard Murphy, former ambassador to Syria
may always be remembered as the date that and Saudi Arabia.“This is the beginning of
the people of the United States finally came their war. There is a mentality at work here
face to face with terrorism.“You’ve been rela- that the West is not prepared to understand.”
tively sheltered from terrorism,” says an Israeli Because terrorism is abhorrent to the vast
terrorism expert.“You hear about it happen- majority of the nations on the planet,
ing here in the Middle East, in Northern President George W. Bush’s declaration of
Ireland, places far away from you. Now war against terrorism was supported by many
Americans have joined the real world where other world leaders. He reminded citizens
this ugliness is almost a daily occurrence.” that it would be a long war, and one not eas-
This “real world” presents a formidable ily won. However, as many agree, there is no
challenge to the United States and other choice; if terrorism is allowed to continue
nations. It is a world in which there are no unchecked the world will never be safe.
rules, where modern terrorism is war not The volumes of the Lucent Terrorism
waged on soldiers, but on innocent people— Library help to explain the unexplainable
including children. Terrorism is meant to events of September 11, 2001, as well as
shatter people’s hope, to create instability examine the history, personalities, and
in their daily lives, to make them feel vul- issues connected with the ensuing war on
nerable and frightened. People who con- terror. Annotated bibliographies provide
tinue to feel unsafe will demand that their readers with ideas for further research. Fully
leaders make concessions—do something— documented primary and secondary source
so that terrorists will stop the attacks. quotations enliven the text. Each book in
Many experts feel that terrorism against this series provides students with a wealth
the United States is just beginning. “The of information as well as launching points
tragedy is that other groups, having seen [the for further study and discussion.

9
 Introduction

Winning the Peace

A merica’s war in Iraq began on
March 19, 2003, and was an
exercise in overwhelming American
rightness of its actions or win the
peace in Iraq.
Indeed, the United States led the
firepower and force. Incredibly pre- military attack against Saddam Hus-
cise U.S. bombs and missiles struck sein’s regime after a long and frac-
government targets throughout Iraq, tious international debate, against
and a stream of American tanks the will of many of its traditional
raced toward Baghdad. Although allies and amid a storm of demon-
troops faced unexpected resistance strations and protests around the
along the way and strikes appeared world. U.S. president George W. Bush
to have failed to kill Saddam Hussein, said war was necessary to rid Iraq of
the bottom line was a quick U.S. vic- weapons of mass destruction, includ-
tory signaled by the toppling of a ing nuclear, chemical, and biological
huge statue of Saddam Hussein in weapons, and to remove Hussein
the center of Baghdad on April 9, from power. Ousting Hussein, Bush
only weeks after the war began. The argued, would remove a dangerous
war demonstrated to the world that tyrant from the world stage, liberate
the United States had the ability to Iraqis from three decades of Hussein’s
dominate Iraq militarily, sending a terror and brutality, and give Iraq a
warning to other rogue nations that chance to form a free, democratic
might be acting against U.S. inter- government.
ests. Months later, however, America In the months following the war,
had yet to convince the world of the however, Iraqis and many others

10
 Winning the Peace

throughout the world remained skeptical nections with President Bush’s adminis-
that U.S. intentions were based on Iraq’s tration.
best interests. This skepticism was based on Criticism mounted further as U.S.
a widely held suspicion that the United troops failed to provide security in the face
States sought to occupy Iraq for its own of widespread looting and destruction and
purposes, perhaps to control Iraqi oil, to ethnic clashes between Iraq’s three ethnic
profit from doing business with Iraq after groups (Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds). To make
the war, or to install a government in Iraq matters worse, American teams failed to
that would be partial to U.S. control. Even find weapons of mass destruction, the main
before the military operation had ended, justification for going to war. Meanwhile,
some European nations began calling for Iraqi demonstrators called the United States
United Nations (UN) control over the an “occupier” instead of a “liberator” and
rebuilding of Iraq. The United States also demanded that the U.S. forces leave Iraq
was criticized, even in Britain, when initial immediately, even as Iraqi guerrilla fight-
rebuilding contracts were swiftly awarded ers escalated attacks against U.S. troops try-
to big American firms that had close con- ing to stabilize the country.

A soldier watches U.S. troops pull down a statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad just weeks after the
war in Iraq began.

11
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

UKRAINE
MOLDOVA

ROMANIA KAZAKHSTAN
RUSSIA
Aral Sea

BULGARIA
Black Sea
KYRGYZSTAN
UZBEKISTAN

CHINA
GEORGIA

ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN TAJIKISTAN

TURKEY
TURKMENISTAN
Caspian
Sea

Ti
CYPRUS
gris R
SYRIA ive
Mediterranean LEBANON
r

Sea AFGHANISTAN
Eu
p
IRAQ
hr

IRAN
ate
s

ISRAEL
Ri

JORDAN ve
r
PAKISTAN
KUWAIT INDIA

BAHRAIN
OMAN

QATAR Persian
EGYPT Gulf Gulf of Oman
U. A. E.
Red Arabian Sea
Sea SAUDI ARABIA OMAN

SUDAN
Indian Ocean

ERITREA

ETHIOPIA
YEMEN Iraq and the Middle East

The postwar anarchy revealed the short- Similarly, Iraq’s tattered economy and infra-
sighted U.S. focus on war and the stark inad- structure were wholly predictable, given
equacy of U.S. postwar nation-building more than a decade of restrictive UN eco-
plans and expectations. However, history nomic sanctions, the destruction of three
suggests that these problems, and the diffi- wars, and the fallout from almost three
culty of transforming Iraq into a democ- decades of terror and thievery by Saddam
racy, should have been anticipated. Indeed, Hussein and his followers.
Iraq’s history is one marked by political vio- Postwar Iraq, therefore, is a mammoth
lence, ethnic and religious differences, and project and one that will likely require
exploitation by authoritarian rulers. Today’s many U.S. taxpayer dollars and a long-term
postwar disorder is merely the twenty-first commitment of U.S. troops. The challenges
century’s version of this historical pattern. for America are daunting. Encouraging

12
 Winning the Peace

quick economic recovery and creating jobs Finally, the United States must overcome
in a broken country, in addition to pre- the deep distrust of American motives in
venting tribal and ethnic differences from Iraq. Only by first successfully stabilizing and
sabotaging the democratic process, are crit- reconstructing and then by handing over full
ical to American success. Also important democratic control to Iraqis will the United
is a resolution of the fate of Saddam States be seen as Iraq’s “liberator.”And in the
Hussein and his followers; if he is not killed end, the true measure of the success or fail-
or captured, and if Hussein’s followers are ure of the U.S.-led war will be determined
not completely purged from government by what kind of government and society
and army posts, Iraqis will live in fear that emerges in Iraq. As New York Times colum-
Hussein might regroup in a bid to retake nist Thomas L. Friedman states,“America’s
control of Iraq or take revenge against his future, and the future of the Mideast, rides
enemies. on our building a different Iraq.” 1

13
 Chapter One

Iraq’s History of
Aggression and
Arms
I raq is a young nation that has long
suffered from political instability.
the Tigris and the Euphrates. The ear-
liest Arab inhabitants of Mesopotamia
Only during the last twenty-four years were nomadic Arab tribes who wan-
of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship has dered the great deserts of the Arabian
Iraq achieved a measure of national Peninsula with their caravans of
identity and stability. Yet Hussein camels. When a new religion called
failed to use the country’s great nat- Islam emerged with the birth of the
ural and historical resources to forge prophet Mohammad in the year A.D.
a prosperous, free, and peaceful 570, Islam’s followers (known as
nation. Instead, he employed violence Muslims) established alliances between
and terror against the Iraqi people and the various tribes. After the death of
sought to increase his power by build- Mohammad, the Muslim alliances
ing up Iraq’s military and by attacking began to fall apart, but eventually they
Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s recent history, were replaced by a great Arab empire
therefore, became marked by repres- that spread Islam not only through-
sion, war, and struggles with the inter- out Iraq but also to Syria and Egypt.
national community over weapons of This Islamic unity, however, was weak-
mass destruction. ened by, among other things, differ-
ences that developed between two
The British Create Iraq Muslim sects, the Sunnis and the Shias
Iraq is located in an area known in (also called Shiites), creating a divi-
ancient times as Mesopotamia, which sion that continues in Iraq and other
means “the land between two rivers,” places to the present day.

14
 I r a q ’s H i s t o r y o f A g g r e s s i o n a n d A r m s

Ancient Mesopotamia
Although Iraq only re- civilizations such as Egypt, Greece, and
cently emerged as an inde- Rome.
pendent nation, its history dates back The ancient Sumerians used the fertile
more than five thousand years and con- land and the abundant water supply of the
tains the world’s richest known archaeo- area to cultivate and irrigate crops, creating
logical sites. Iraq is situated in the land the first system of agriculture. In addition,
that the ancient Greeks called Meso- Sumerians are credited with such early
potamia, meaning land between the human achievements as the invention of
rivers. The name refers to the Tigris and writing, the plow, and the wheel. The famous
the Euphrates, two large rivers in Iraq. Sumerian city of Ur arose in southern
This location became what many have Mesopotamia and became one of the most
called the “cradle of civilization.” On this prosperous Sumerian cities. In about 2340
site in about 4000 B.C. arose the world’s B.C., however, the Sumerian civilization col-
first civilization, called Sumer, long before lapsed after clashes with other peoples who
the development of other famous ancient migrated to the Arabian Peninsula.

Black Sea The Near East

in Third Millennium B.C.

ASIA
MINOR Caspian
Sea

Haleb Mosul Sumer

Akkad
Ebla Assur Akkadian expansion
under Sargon I
Mari
Eu

Hanat
p

rat
h

PHOENICIA es
CYPRUS Rive
r Tig
Mediterranean Sippar ris
River
Sea Babylon ELAM
PALESTINE
Nippur Susa
Jerusalem Larsa
Uruk
Ur
Memphis Eridu

EGYPT
ARABIAN DESERT Persian
N ile

Gulf
Riv

Red
er

Sea

15
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

The modern country of Iraq was not tions were launched by land and by air
created until the twentieth century, when against the tribes: whole villages were
the outbreak of World War I caused Britain destroyed by British artillery and suspect-
to invade areas around Basra and Baghdad. ed ringleaders were shot without trial.”2 In
The British wanted to ensure that no other 1921 Britain imposed a colonial monarchy
European nation would dominate these on the area headed by a Syrian, King Faisal,
areas because such a development might of the Sunni faith.
threaten their route to India, a country then Due to Britain’s actions, the government
part of Britain’s colonial empire. Arabs in in Iraq became dominated by Sunnis, even
Iraq hoped for independence after the col- though they constituted only a minority of
lapse of Ottoman rule, but these hopes the population in Iraq. This provoked more
were destroyed when Britain brutally sup- tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims.
pressed a united Sunni-Shia revolt against Britain also set the boundaries for the mod-
postwar British rule in 1920. As writer ern state of Iraq artificially, in response to
Geoff Simons describes,“Punitive expedi- Western interests and in order to control

16
 I r a q ’s H i s t o r y o f A g g r e s s i o n a n d A r m s

sites of Iraqi oil reserves. These boundaries become friendly with Egypt, an Arab coun-
included not only Arab-populated areas but try that opposed Communist policies),
also an area near Turkey inhabited by a non- Qasim was unable to hold onto power. He
Arab ethnic group of Indo-European ances- was overthrown in 1963 by the Baath Party,
try called the Kurds, whose culture and a pro-Arab political group that included in
history is separate from both the Sunnis and its membership a young Saddam Hussein.
the Shias. This artificial grouping of three Many believe that the Baath Party was aided
distinct ethnic sects in the same country in the coup by the U.S. Central Intelligence
deepened ethnic differences. Agency (CIA) in order to ensure that a pro-
Indeed, the British policies in Iraq only Western government ruled Iraq.
worsened the historical ethnic divisions and Although the Baath Party was quickly
violence that had plagued the area since overtaken nine months later in another
ancient times. As journalist Said K. Aburish coup by military officers, it regained power
explains, in 1968. This time, the party was more orga-
nized, led by a group of Sunni Arabs from
Just as the long-term history of Iraq con-
the Iraqi town of Tikrit who were united by
tained and nurtured violence, the
tribal and family ties. Saddam Hussein was
British, following short-sighted policies
part of this Sunni tribe from Tikrit. Indeed,
similar to those employed by Iraq’s
his cousin was Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the
ancient conquerors, contributed mea-
respected military leader who became pres-
surably to the ethnic,religious and social
ident of the Baath Party’s new government
divisions which beset the country.3
in Iraq, giving Hussein access to the high-
Iraq became a sovereign state in 1932 est levels of power. Hussein soon became a
but continued to suffer from political unrest key figure in the Baath Party, second in
caused by opposition to British control and power only to President Bakr.
conflict between Iraq’s three ethnic sects— Although the new Baath government
Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. claimed its rule was the will of the Iraqi peo-
ple, in reality its policies created, as author
The Rise of Saddam Hussein Geoff Simons describes, “one-party rule
In 1958 the British monarchy in Iraq was supported by a network of terrorist orga-
overthrown in a coup led by a military offi- nizations used to suppress all political
cer, Abdul Karim Qasim. Qasim’s revolu- opposition . . . [creating] a system of state
tion won the support of most Iraqis and terror to discourage any potential threats
succeeded in ridding Iraq of remnants of to the regime.” 4 For many years Hussein
British repression. However, when the new operated behind the scenes as the ruthless
government adopted Communist social commander of this Baath Party security sys-
and economic reforms that were unpopu- tem, helping the party to establish a repres-
lar with many Sunnis (who wanted Iraq to sive dictatorship throughout Iraq.

17
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Saddam Hussein’s Reign of Terror

Saddam Hussein, after gain- form of torture was to place the vic-
ing power in Iraq, increased tims in solitary confinement for long
the activities of his security force and used periods. Some prisoners were left in
terror and torture against anyone who dared cold cells until their limbs froze, while
criticize or threaten his regime. During on other occasions parts of the pris-
Hussein’s rule, for example, Iraqi law provid- oners’ bodies were set on fire. Another
ed for twenty-four political crimes punish- particular Iraqi specialty was to rape
able by death that fell under the heading of relatives of those detained—male and
treason.Also,as newspaper editor and Middle female—while the accused were forced
East expert Con Coughlin has noted in his to watch. Saddam’s torturers could also
book, Saddam: King of Terror,“The definition make use of a variety of machines that
of these capital offenses was deliberately vague were available for removing human
so that any unauthorized disclosure of infor- limbs, from fingers to legs.
mation could be interpreted as treason.”This Hussein’s government also was charac-
allowed the security forces unlimited power terized by complete government control of
to act for virtually any reason against almost the media, the court system, and every other
anyone, including women and children. Iraqi institution and department. There was
Those who became the victims of this no freedom of expression and all newspa-
regime of terror faced not only beatings and pers, radio, and television were used instead
sometimes execution, but also horrible as instruments for Baath Party propagan-
forms of torture. As Coughlin describes, da. Indeed, Saddam Hussein was glorified
the regime had 107 different methods of by the state-controlled media and used to
torturing its enemies, including: build a cult around him as Iraq’s great
Manual torture took the form of beat- leader. As a group of Iraqis living in exile
ings, hair pulling, bastinado (beating wrote in a memo to the United Nations,
with a stick on the soles of the feet), quoted in Coughlin’s book: “The dictator-
and the twisting of limbs until they ship of Saddam Hussein is one of the harsh-
broke. Electric shocks were common- est, most ruthless and most unscrupulous
ly applied to extract confessions, and regimes in the world. It is a totalitarian, one-
a wide range of psychological torture party system based on the personality cult
was also implemented. The standard of Saddam Hussein.”

His first step in this role was to execute en the power of the party, using tactics of
fourteen men that the Baath Party did not brutality and terror that have become leg-
trust, accusing them of being part of an endary. To give just one example, author
Israeli spy network. Hussein then contin- Geoff Simons recounts a report from some-
ued to purge all others who might threat- one who witnessed Hussein in action:

18
 I r a q ’s H i s t o r y o f A g g r e s s i o n a n d A r m s

Saddam Hussein addresses a crowd after the 1969 hanging of fourteen Iraqis whom the Baath Party
accused of spying for Israel.

“[Saddam] came into the room, picked up focus on security and terror, he increased
[his victim] and dropped him into a bath of membership of the Baath Party and sur-
acid. And then he watched while the body rounded himself with a network of loyal
dissolved.” 5 Other terror tactics used by family members by appointing them to
Hussein against persons he viewed as traitors positions of importance. He also created
included other forms of execution and assas- his own Popular Army in order to lessen the
sination, imprisonment, exile, and torture. regular army’s power. At the same time, he
became involved in social and economic
Saddam’s Power Grows issues such as land reform and health care,
As time progressed, Saddam Hussein’s gaining recognition for his concerns for the
power grew. In addition to continuing his poor. He also used propaganda to increase

19
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

his popularity, publicizing flattering pic- political and manipulative skills. For exam-
tures of himself with his family and using ple, although he generously granted the
radio and television to reach ordinary peo- Kurds substantial concessions and promised
ple with these types of positive images. In them autonomy in 1970, he soon thereafter
addition, Hussein became involved in major began to evict Kurds from their lands and
issues such as Kurdish rebellions, Shia oppo- tried to assassinate their leaders, leading the
sition to the Baath regime, and Iraqi oil. Kurds to seek support from Iran. After years
Indeed, as Geoff Simon notes,“Throughout of fighting between the Kurds and the Iraqi
the 1970s and after, Saddam Hussein was a government, Hussein in 1975 suppressed
principal architect of Iraqi policies.” 6 the Kurdish uprising by negotiating an
Hussein’s handling of some of these agreement with Iran that cut off vital
thorny issues demonstrated his superior Iranian support for the Kurds. Similarly,

Saddam Hussein, right, meets with a Kurdish leader. Throughout the 1970s, Hussein evicted the Kurds
from their land and tried to assassinate their leaders.

20
 I r a q ’s H i s t o r y o f A g g r e s s i o n a n d A r m s

Hussein assumed responsibilities for nego- uniting Iraq’s three disparate groups
tiating with the Iraqi Petroleum Company (Sunnis, Shias, Kurds) more than ever
(IPC), a group of international oil compa- before in Iraq’s history. Despite his brutal-
nies (including Shell, Esso, Mobil, British ity, therefore, Hussein created stability and
Petroleum, and Compagnie Francaise des some measure of national identity for Iraq.
Petroles) that controlled development of
Iraqi oil. He ultimately succeeded in nation- Iraq’s War Against Iran
alizing the IPC in 1972, giving ownership With his regime secure at home, Hussein
of Iraqi oil to Iraq and declaring in popu- next sought to increase his power in the
lar radio messages that “Arab Oil [is]for the Arab world and on the international stage.
Arabs.” 7 His first action in this new direction came
Finally, in 1979, Hussein seized the in 1980, when Iraq attacked Iran.
presidency of Iraq from Bakr, and imme- Although Iran and Iraq had a history
diately carried out a terror purge of the of rivalry, a serious dispute began in 1979,
party to eliminate all opposition and estab- when the Islamic Revolution in Iran stirred
lish his complete control of Iraq. At a closed up anti-Baath sentiments among Iraq’s Shia
session of the Baath Party’s Revolutionary Muslims, who had been long excluded from
Command Council on July 17, 1979, for political or economic power in Iraq despite
example, Hussein slowly and dramatically their majority status. As early as the mid-
read the names of those whom he accused 1970s, Iraqi Shias, united by a Muslim
of plots against Iraq; those named were then group called Al Daawa al Islamiya (mean-
led out of the room to eventually face fir- ing the Islamic Call), began to openly
ing squads formed from the surviving demonstrate against the Baathist regime.
members of the council. At this point, as Saddam Hussein, realizing the threat to his
Geoff Simons notes,“there was no one left rule, responded by banning the Daawa
to challenge Saddam’s authority,” 8 and Iraq Party and executing Daawa leaders.
was fully under his control. However, when the Ayatollah Khomeni,
Both before and after attaining the a powerful Shia, came to power in Iran,
presidency, Hussein used Iraq’s valuable Iraq’s Shia population was reinvigorated,
oil wealth (estimated at $21.3 billion in as Iran provided them with training and
1980) to strengthen his army and imple- encouragement. For example, Khomeni
ment economic development programs openly declared in April 1980, “the people
that improved health, education, agricul- and army of Iraq must turn their backs on
ture, and housing. These economic incen- the Ba’ath regime and overthrow it.” 9 After
tives allowed many Iraqis to rise to numerous border skirmishes between the
middle-class status and created popular two countries, Iraq attacked Iran on
support for Saddam Hussein’s regime. The September 22, 1980, leading to a protract-
economic improvements also succeeded in ed seven-year war.

21
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Casualties of the Iran-Iraq War litter a rocky hillside. The war lasted for seven years and resulted in
the loss of more than 360,000 lives.

The Iraqi army, however, was unable to nations such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
defeat Iran, and by 1982 Iraq was on the lent their support, and the Soviet Union
defensive militarily. Eventually, fears about and European nations such as France and
the revolutionary, fundamentalist Islamic Britain provided arms to Iraq. Although the
government in Iran caused many countries United States initially provided arms to
to come to Iraq’s aid. Neighboring Arab Iran, U.S. policy eventually shifted in favor

22
 I r a q ’s H i s t o r y o f A g g r e s s i o n a n d A r m s

of Iraq. Over the course of the war, the production of oil was depressing oil prices.
United States provided billions of dollars He accused Kuwait of flooding the market
of military support and surveillance infor- in violation of OPEC (Organization of
mation to Iraq, including materials to help Petroleum Exporting Countries) produc-
Iraq develop chemical and biological tion quotas, causing a drop in Iraq’s oil rev-
weapons. enues at a time when Hussein could least
The Iran-Iraq War ended through a afford it. Hussein also nursed long-held
United Nations–sponsored ceasefire and grievances against Kuwait concerning two
resolution accepted in 1988. The war thus areas claimed historically by Iraq—oil fields
produced no victory for either side but cost in Rumeila, an area on the border between
approximately 367,000 lives and resulted the two countries, and two islands over-
in massive economic destruction for both looking one of Iraq’s two ports to the gulf.
countries. Iraq emerged from the war crip- He demanded that Kuwait reduce oil pro-
pled economically but with a strong mili- duction, write off Iraqi debts, and help pay
tary and chemical weapons, which Hussein for Iraq’s reconstruction.
used both against Iran during the war and Other Arab countries sought to medi-
in Iraq against Kurdish civilians in 1987 and ate the dispute, but this failed as Iraq invad-
1988. The war, therefore, strengthened ed Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and quickly
Saddam Hussein’s regime and turned Iraq seized control of the country. However, as
into a formidable military power. As writer and Mideast expert Con Coughlin
Mideast expert Con Coughlin reports,“by explains,“Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait will
1988, Iraq had developed the fourth largest be remembered as one of the great military
army in the world.” 10 miscalculations of modern history,” 11
because the United Nations Security
Iraq’s Attack on Kuwait Council immediately responded with a
After the war with Iran, Saddam Hussein unanimous resolution condemning the
wanted to revive the Iraqi economy. At the invasion and demanding Iraq’s withdraw-
same time, he continued to build up the al. Most Arab nations also condemned Iraq,
country’s military, including chemical, bio- and then-U.S. president George H.W. Bush
logical, and nuclear weapons. He depend- called the invasion an “outrageous and bru-
ed on profits from Iraqi oil to do both, even tal act of aggression.” 12
though much of the oil income had to go
first to repay war debts. As a result, Iraq’s The Gulf War
economy continued to struggle, and in 1990 Saddam Hussein’s refusal to withdraw from
Hussein began to pressure Kuwait and Kuwait had profound consequences for Iraq.
Saudi Arabia to write off Iraqi debts The United States put together a coalition
incurred during the Iran-Iraq War. In May within the UN that included not only tra-
1990 Hussein became concerned that over- ditional European allies but also Turkey,

23
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Saudi Arabia, and other Arab nations. The The attack, as writer Con Coughlin
UN imposed economic sanctions, which describes,“subjected Iraq to one of the most
placed strict limits on the country’s exports intensive aerial bombardments known to
and imports and were aimed at forcing the modern world.” 13 Despite its large air
Hussein to withdraw and disarm. When force and air defenses, Iraq could not match
Hussein did not leave Kuwait, a massive mil- the allied air power, leaving Iraqi targets
itary attack called Operation Desert Storm ripe for allied bombings and a later ground
was authorized by the United Nations and assault. As a result, what became known as
launched by the United States and its allies the Gulf War lasted only a few short months
on January 16, 1991. and accomplished its stated goals of

People celebrate the liberation of Kuwait City in February 1991. The Gulf War ended quickly, as the
allies easily overpowered Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army.

24
 I r a q ’s H i s t o r y o f A g g r e s s i o n a n d A r m s

destroying most of Iraq’s military arsenal Hussein later further restricted inspec-
(including nuclear and chemical facilities) tions, accusing the United States of using
and liberating Kuwait. However, the war UNSCOM as a vehicle for spying on Iraq.
also destroyed much of Iraq’s urban infra- This led to a suspension of weapons inspec-
structure, including irrigation, water, and tions in 1998.
sewage systems, causing lack of clean water, The economic sanctions on Iraq, how-
disease, and food shortages. The effects of ever, were continued by the UN despite
the war would be felt by the Iraqi people their heavy burden on the Iraqi economy
throughout the 1990s. and population. The sanctions created in
1990 prohibited UN member states from
UN Arms Inspections and importing goods made in Iraq and from
Sanctions in the 1990s selling products to Iraq. UN members also
After the war the United Nations voted to were disallowed from investing in any Iraqi
keep sanctions in place until all of Iraq’s economic activities. Exceptions were made
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pro- for humanitarian items such as certain food
grams were destroyed. A weapons inspec- and medial supplies, but these exceptions
tion team, called the United Nations Special were very limited and did not include many
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), was items considered necessary by Iraqis, such
assembled to monitor the disarming, and as clothes, shoes, blankets, spare parts for
in the years that followed, UNSCOM water treatment and sewage disposal, edu-
uncovered and destroyed much of Iraq’s cational materials, and similar items.
WMD arsenal. Saddam Hussein, however, Indeed, many criticized the sanctions
made the disarmament effort as difficult as on humanitarian grounds, arguing that
possible by blocking access, lying about the they caused unjustified suffering for the
extent or existence of weapons programs, Iraqi people, without hurting Saddam
and generally obstructing the UN team. Hussein. No one can deny that sanctions
Indeed, according to a background paper devastated the Iraqi economy, impoverished
produced by the administration of President the middle class, and created severe health
George W. Bush, Hussein during this peri- and food crises. Also, as many as five hun-
od “repeatedly violated sixteen United dred thousand Iraqi children are estimat-
Nations Security Council Resolutions ed to have died as a result of sanctions. The
designed to ensure that Iraq [did] not pose United Nations tried to respond to these
a threat.” 14 humanitarian problems by authorizing an
Slowly, Hussein managed to weaken the oil-for-food program under which Iraq was
weapons inspections. For example, in 1997 allowed to sell oil to purchase food, medi-
he declared several sites to be “presidential” cine, and other necessities. The program
and negotiated with the United Nations to helped a bit to ease the effect of sanctions,
respect Iraq’s sovereignty at those sites. but in many cases Saddam Hussein refused

25
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

to purchase humanitarian items for his peo- on Iraqi targets. The goals of these military
ple, preferring instead to sell oil illegally to efforts varied—to restrict Iraqi military
acquire money to build new palaces and movements and aggression, to respond to
pay for luxuries for supporters of his Iraqi incursions into no-fly zones (areas in
regime. Most agree, however, that the sanc- the north and south where Iraq was not
tions limited to some degree Hussein’s abil- permitted to fly), to repel Iraqi aggression
ity to import items that could be used to against the Kurds (Operation Desert Strike
produce conventional as well as nuclear and in 1996), or in retaliation for Iraq’s defiance
biological weapons. over weapons inspections (Operation Desert
The United States, during the years fol- Fox in 1998). Some argued, however, that,
lowing Iraq’s attack on Kuwait, maintained unlike the initial strike on Iraq in 1991,
a military presence in and around Iraq and which was authorized by the United
repeatedly conducted air and missile strikes Nations, the United States conducted these

UN weapons inspectors oversee the destruction of Iraqi biological weapons in 1996. Throughout the
1990s, Saddam Hussein thwarted the efforts of UN inspectors.

26
 I r a q ’s H i s t o r y o f A g g r e s s i o n a n d A r m s

later military strikes on its own initiative ern Iraq; the United States failed to inter-
and illegally. Indeed, in the years following vene or provide aid, however, and Saddam
the Kuwait invasion, the United States often Hussein crushed the rebellion, killing thou-
found itself alone on issues relating to Iraq, sands.
without the support of allies in Europe or At the beginning of the twenty-first
the Arab states. century, more than ten years after Saddam
To a limited extent the United States Hussein invaded Kuwait, his country lay in
also explored the possibilities of encourag- ruins, his people were starving, his econo-
ing opposition groups within Iraq to over- my was shattered, and his military was
throw Saddam Hussein, with not much almost destroyed. Yet he had managed to
success. Hussein’s tight security within his halt weapons inspections and weaken sanc-
regime and the lack of substantial aid from tions. He had watched the broad coalition
the United States made a coup against the of nations that attacked him in 1991 fall
Iraqi government very unlikely. In addition, apart. No opposition groups had over-
the United States failed to support the most thrown him. His regime had survived, and
promising uprising against Hussein in many feared that he was once again devel-
decades. In 1991, at the end of Desert oping weapons of mass destruction, includ-
Storm, with encouragement from U.S. pres- ing nuclear weapons and the missiles to
ident Bush, Iraqi Shias revolted in south- launch them.

27
 C h a p t e r Tw o

The Axis of Evil and

Diplomatic Efforts
to Disarm Iraq
M any countries believed that Sad-
dam Hussein remained a military
American policies on terrorism.
Shortly after the terrorist attack, on
threat even after more than a decade September 20, 2001, U.S. president
of efforts by the United States and the George Bush declared war on terror-
United Nations to disarm Iraq. Yet as ism in an address to Congress and the
of 2001 UN weapons inspections nation, promising to use every resource
remained indefinitely suspended, and and tool, even war, to disrupt and
there was no clear international plan defeat the global terror network. In
for how to make sure that Iraq was dis- addition, Bush signaled a U.S. inten-
armed. The September 11, 2001, ter- tion to conduct a military strike on
rorist attacks on the United States countries that harbor terrorists or sup-
finally provided the impetus for a U.S. port terrorism:
drive for war against Iraq. This time,
however, unlike the 1991 Gulf War, We will pursue nations that pro-
U.S. goals included not only disarm- vide aid or safe haven to terror-
ing Iraq but also toppling the regime ism. Every nation, in every region,
of Saddam Hussein. now has a decision to make. Either
you are with us, or you are with
September 11, 2001, and the terrorists. From this day for-
the War on Terrorism ward, any nation that continues
The September 11, 2001, terrorist to harbor or support terrorism
attack by the terrorist group al-Qaeda will be regarded by the United
proved to be the turning point for States as a hostile regime.15

28
 The Axis of Evil and Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq

The south tower of the World Trade Center explodes after being struck by an airplane on September
11, 2001. This attack changed the way the American government dealt with terrorism.

29
 do so, and as a result, on
October 7, 2001, the United
States and Britain attacked
Afghanistan. Over the next
few months U.S. and British
forces ousted the Taliban
regime and destroyed al-
Qaeda bases there.

The U.S. Push for

Action Against Iraq
Following the successful
military action against
Afghanistan, U.S. president
George W. Bush praised the
U.S. military victory in his
State of the Union address
to the nation on January 29,
2002. In the same speech
Bush warned of another
facet of terrorism—an “axis
of evil” consisting of three
countries: Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea. He charged
that these states sponsor
terrorism and seek to devel-
op chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons:
President Bush delivers his 2002 State of the Union address in which States like these, and
he labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an “axis of evil.” their terrorist allies,
constitute an axis of
This pledge quickly became a reality. evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
Shortly after Bush’s speech the United States world. By seeking weapons of mass
accused Afghanistan’s Taliban government destruction, these regimes pose a grave
of harboring terrorists and demanded that and growing danger. They could pro-
it turn over al-Qaeda terrorists to the vide these arms to terrorists, giving
United States and close all terrorist bases in them the means to match their hatred.
the country. The Taliban regime refused to They could attack our allies or attempt

30
 The Axis of Evil and Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq

to blackmail the United States. In any August 26, 2002, for example,Vice President
of these cases, the price of indifference Dick Cheney warned,
would be catastrophic.16
Armed with an arsenal of these
Regarding Iraq the president charged that weapons of terror, and seated atop ten
the Iraqi regime had plotted to develop percent of the world’s oil reserves,
anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons Saddam Hussein could then be expect-
for over a decade, had already used chem- ed to seek domination of the entire
ical weapons to murder thousands of its Middle East, take control of a great por-
own citizens, and “is a regime that has tion of the world’s energy supplies,
something to hide from the civilized directly threaten America’s friends
world.” 17 Bush suggested that military throughout the region, and subject the
action might be used by the United States United States or any other nation to
in the near future, stating, nuclear blackmail.19
We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on
our side. I will not wait on events, while Opposition to Bush’s Views of
dangers gather. I will not stand by, as the Iraqi Threat
peril draws closer and closer. The The president, however, faced stiff opposi-
United States of America will not per- tion to his proposal for military action
mit the world’s most dangerous regimes against Iraq. The opposition came from
to threaten us with the world’s most many different quarters, both inside and
destructive weapons.18 outside his administration, and from both
Soon after the speech, members of Democrats and Republicans. His critics
President Bush’s administration began pointed out that there was no evidence that
openly threatening war with Iraq and advo- Hussein possessed nuclear or missile capa-
cating Hussein’s removal from power. bilities that would pose a current or immi-
Defense Department officials Richard Perle nent threat to the United States. Indeed, in
and Paul Wolfowitz, for example, argued testimony before the Senate Foreign
that the only way to prevent Iraq from devel- Relations Committee on July 31, 2002,
oping or using weapons of mass destruc- Richard Butler, the former head of
tion was to use military force to overthrow UNSCOM, the team of weapons inspectors
that searched for weapons in Iraq during
Saddam Hussein and install a pro–U. S. gov-
the 1990s, noted the lack of knowledge
ernment. Others in the Bush administra-
about the status of Iraq’s weapons of mass
tion emphasized that it was important to
destruction, stating:
remove Hussein from power quickly, before
he was able to fully develop his weapons of We do not know and never have known
mass destruction capabilities. In a speech fully the quantity and quality of Iraq’s
given to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on WMD [weapons of mass destruction].

31
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

U.S. Evidence of Iraq’s

Weapons of Mass Destruction
On February 5, 2003, U.S. hibited weapons from UN weapons inspec-
secretary of state Colin Powell spoke at the tors. The evidence Powell presented includ-
United Nations to present information that ed audio tapes of discussions between Iraqi
the United States knew about Iraq’s military officers allegedly discussing how
weapons of mass destruction and to try to to hide prohibited items from UN weapons
persuade UN member countries to sup- inspectors, satellite photos of a weapons
port a military action against Iraq. Powell munition and missile facilities allegedly
reminded UN members that Iraq admit- showing trucks used for decontaminating
ted having vast quantities of biological and moving prohibited materials just prior
weapons in 1995, was known to have used to visits by UN weapons inspectors, and a
chemical weapons against the Kurds in large engine test stand used by Iraq for test-
1988, and in both 1991 and 1995 was dis- ing prohibited long-range ballistic missiles.
covered to have been working on develop- In addition, Powell presented informa-
ing nuclear weapons. He argued that Iraq tion from human sources stating that
had failed to account for many of these Saddam Hussein had warned all Iraqi sci-
weapons as the UN demanded, and had entists of the serious consequences that they
been trying to conceal evidence of pro- and their families would face if they
revealed any sensitive information to the
In a 2003 presentation at the UN, Colin Powell inspectors and that Iraq had been experi-
presented satellite photos like this one as menting on human beings to perfect its
evidence of Iraq’s weapons program. biological or chemical weapons. Further
evidence presented came
from Iraqi defectors stat-
ing that Iraq had mobile
production facilities used
to make biological agents
and that Hussein had
made repeated attempts to
acquire high-specification
aluminum tubes from
eleven different coun-
tries, for use in making
nuclear weapons.

32
 The Axis of Evil and Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq

Its policies of concealment ensured this. between Iraq and terrorists. Indeed, in the
. . .What [Iraq] has been able to further days after the September 11 terrorist attack,
achieve in the four years without even the U.S. secretary of state, Colin
inspection is not clear, in precise terms.20 Powell, admitted that he could find “no
Given the lack of firm information clear link” 21 between Osama bin Laden and
about weapons of mass destruction, critics Saddam Hussein. The CIA continued to
of a war plan suggested that the United maintain this position for many months.
States wanted war with Iraq not to counter However, President Bush and his backers
a threat from such weapons, but instead to eventually began to claim there was such a
remove Hussein and install a U.S.-friendly connection. First, their claims centered
government in Iraq. This, they said, would around an alleged meeting in Prague,
ensure U.S. access to Iraqi oil reserves, Czechoslavakia, in April 2001 between the
which are the second largest in the world leader of the September 11 hijackers,
and constitute a significant portion of U.S. Mohamed Atta, and an Iraqi intelligence
oil imports. agent. After an investigation, however, the
Others questioned what was viewed as a Czechs concluded that the report could not
new Bush policy of “preemption,” referring be substantiated.
to U.S. preventative action against countries Next, the Bush administration pointed
that pose no present threat but may, at some to an al-Qaeda terrorist camp in northern
time in the future, threaten U.S. interests. Iraq that was providing a haven for a terror-
Bush said that the new policy was necessary ist known as Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi,
to remove terrorist threats, but critics argued allegedly a senior al-Qaeda leader who
that it reversed previous U.S. efforts to limit escaped from Afghanistan into Iraq and was
military action to defensive purposes. This, treated at a Baghdad hospital.Although there
critics said, could be very dangerous because was no proof, Bush and his team claimed
it gives the United States license to attack that Hussein’s secret police most certainly
other countries and could lead other coun- knew of al-Zarqawi’s presence, thus estab-
tries to adopt similar aggressive policies lishing that Iraq was harboring terrorists.
against the United States or other nations. Bush himself made this claim in an October
Still others worried that there was no 7, 2002, speech to the nation. However, there
plan to stabilize Iraq after Hussein was were credible reports that al-Zarqawi had
removed from power. The cost of a war and left Iraq, that he was not part of al-Qaeda,
the aftermath, they said, would be astro- and that Iraq had no control over or rela-
nomical for the United States. tionship with him. Bush’s critics claimed that
this evidence, at best, established a very weak
Iraq’s Link to Terror connection between Iraq and terrorism.
Many opponents of Bush’s proposed war In addition opponents of the war plan
on Iraq pointed out that there was no link argued that diverting resources to fight Iraq

33
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

A State Department slide shows the terrorist network headed by al-Qaeda leader Abu Musaab al-
Zarqawi, whom the Bush administration believes sought refuge in Iraq.

could actually detract from America’s war could hurt the broad international cooper-
on terror. In September 2002, for example, ation necessary for the war against terror.
Al Gore, vice president during President Bill
Clinton’s administration and the Demo- U.S. Criticized for Going
cratic nominee for president in 2000, spoke It Alone
out against military action in Iraq, stating, Finally, many of America’s European and
“I am deeply concerned that the policy we Arab allies were not on board with the
are presently following with respect to Iraq United States for any sort of military action
has the potential to seriously damage our against Iraq. Important members of the UN
ability to win the war against terrorism and Security Council, the group of UN mem-
to weaken our ability to lead the world in bers who have the power to obligate the
this new century.”22 Gore explained that U.S. UN, opposed a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Russia,
action against Iraq without broad support Germany, and France, for example, wanted

34
 The Axis of Evil and Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq

to see a diplomatic solution. Only Tony Blair, nations such as France and Britain for
prime minister of Britain, stood squarely diplomacy and cooperation with the UN
behind the U.S. position.“Also, as noted by to contain the Iraqi threat. On September
David Gergen, a special adviser to President 12, 2002, in a much-anticipated address to
Bill Clinton and White House staff mem- the United Nations, Bush asked for UN help
ber in previous administrations, the Arab and for renewed weapons inspections in
world was strongly opposed” to any action Iraq. In the speech Bush set forth his case
against Iraq because of possible anti- against Saddam Hussein, citing Iraq’s fail-
American uprisings:“Closer to Iraq, almost ure to disarm, as required by numerous UN
every country says don’t go; they are more resolutions, and the four-year opportuni-
worried about bedlam on their streets than ty Iraq had to rebuild its weapons arsenals
about threats by Saddam.” 23 since UN inspectors were last allowed into
European leaders made their opposi- Iraq. He concluded,
tion to a U.S. military strike especially clear.
We know that Saddam Hussein pur-
French president Jacques Chirac, for exam-
sued weapons of mass murder even
ple, in a September 9, 2002, interview, urged
when inspectors were in the country.
the United States not to go it alone and to
Are we to assume that he stopped when
consult with the United Nations Security
they left? The history, the logic and the
Council concerning any military action
facts lead to one conclusion. Saddam
against Saddam Hussein:
Hussein’s regime is a grave and gather-
I am totally against unilateralism ing danger.25
[nations taking action alone] in the
The president insisted that Iraq disarm,
modern world. I believe that the mod-
stop its support for terrorism, cease perse-
ern world must be coherent and con-
cution of Iraqi civilians, resolve issues of
sequently, if a military action is to be
unaccounted-for Gulf War personnel, and
undertaken, it must be the responsi-
end illicit trade that violated economic
bility of the international communi-
sanctions. Finally, Bush urged the United
ty, via a decision by the [UN] Security
Nations to develop a resolution to combat
Council.24
the Iraqi threat.
Chirac argued that weapons inspectors Bush’s UN speech was immediately
must be returned to Iraq and that chang- praised by European and some Arab coun-
ing the government of Iraq was not autho- tries, as well as domestically, and U.S. diplo-
rized by the United Nations. mats began working with other countries
to develop the appropriate UN resolution
Bush Tries Diplomacy to renew weapons inspections. Meanwhile,
President Bush initially appeared to res- Bush and his British ally, Tony Blair, con-
pond to the pressure from European tinued to warn about the dangers of Iraq.

35
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Antiwar Protests in America and Abroad

The opposition the United 120 organizations, and Win Without War,
States faced at the UN, in a coalition of religious, business, and civic
large part, reflected antiwar sentiments of leaders. These groups won support from
people around the world. Not only in groups such as labor unions, which donat-
Europe, but also in Asian, South American, ed both money and personnel that helped
and Arab countries, hundreds of peace ral- to organize the marches. Other protesters
lies were held denouncing the U.S. rush to were simply individual citizens fed up with
war. Indeed, even in the United States, anti- the policies of President Bush.
war protests drew some of the largest
crowds in years. Weekend marches in mid-
February, for example, were especially large,
drawing many millions of people to the Demonstrators gather in London, England, in
streets around the globe, particularly in February 2003 to protest the war in Iraq.
Europe. Protesters that weekend
in Britain were estimated at 2
million, in Spain 2 million, in
Italy 1 million, in Germany half
a million, and in France
300,000. In New York City
alone, crowds numbered more
than 375,000, and many more
Americans protested in other
U.S. cities and small towns.
Thousands more protested in
other countries, such as Ireland,
Greece, Russia, and Turkey.
The protests were deemed
historic—the largest antiwar
demonstrations in history.
Antiwar protesters chanted “No
war with Iraq” and carried signs
with slogans such as “Bush only
wants oil” and “No to Bushery.”
Many of the protesters in the
United States were part of orga-
nized antiwar coalitions, includ-
ing United for Peace, an
umbrella group of more than

36
 The Axis of Evil and Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq

A representative delivers Iraq’s weapons declaration to UN officials in December 2002. UNMOVIC

chairman Hans Blix, however, contended that Iraq had not provided a complete declaration of its
weapons program.

They alleged, for example, that Iraq sought to comply with [UN] disarmament oblig-
to acquire uranium in Africa that could be ations” 26 and set up a new inspections
used to make nuclear weapons. The evi- process. The resolution called on Iraq to
dence for this claim, however, was judged provide immediate, unimpeded, uncondi-
by the CIA to be doubtful even at the time tional, and unrestricted access to weapons
Bush and Blair made the charge; later it was inspectors. In addition, the resolution gave
conclusively proved to be a forgery. Iraq thirty days to provide the UN with an
accurate and complete declaration of all
The Return of UN Weapons aspects of its programs to develop chemi-
Inspectors to Iraq cal, biological, and nuclear weapons, bal-
After much behind-the-scenes negotiat- listic missiles, and other delivery systems.
ing, the United States and Britain suc- Finally, the resolution warned Iraq that it
ceeded in getting Resolution 1441 adopted would “face serious consequences as a
by a unanimous vote of the UN Security result of its continued violations of its
Council on November 8, 2002. The reso- obligations.” 27 Iraq agreed to allow weapons
lution provided Iraq “a final opportunity inspectors back into Iraq, and inspections

37
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

by the International Atomic Energy Agency

The United States Says Iraq
(IAEA) and the newly formed UN weapons
Not Cooperating
inspection team, called the UN Monitoring,
Despite the lack of a “smoking gun” show-
Verification and Inspection Commission
ing Iraq in possession of weapons of mass
(UNMOVIC), began in late November
destruction, the United States believed after
2002.
several months of inspections that Saddam
In January 2003 UNMOVIC and IAEA
Hussein, by failing to cooperate and hiding
reported to the UN that they had received
evidence, had demonstrated that he had no
free access to Iraqi facilities and had been
intention of disarming and every intention
able to conduct more than 350 on-site
of continuing to obstruct the UN. On
inspections but that no weapons of mass
February 5, 2003, in an attempt to convince
destruction had been discovered. UNMOVIC
the world to act against Iraq, U.S. secretary
chairman Dr. Hans Blix, for example, told
of state Colin Powell spoke at the UN:
the Security Council on January 9, 2003,
“If we had found any ‘smoking gun’ we Iraq’s behavior demonstrate[s] that
would have reported it to the Council. . . . Saddam Hussein and his regime have
We have not submitted any such made no effort—no effort—to disarm
reports.” 28 IAEA director general Dr. as required by the international com-
Mohamed El Baradei similarly reported munity. Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s
that no evidence of nuclear activities had behavior show that Saddam Hussein
been detected. and his regime are concealing their
Blix, however, told the UN that Iraq efforts to produce more weapons of
had not provided a full and complete dec- mass destruction.29
laration of its weapons programs as In his speech Powell revealed a seem-
required by Resolution 1441. Although ingly impressive list of U.S. intelligence
twelve thousand pages in length, Blix information, including not only informa-
said the Iraqi weapons declaration of tion obtained from Iraqi defectors but also
December 7, 2002, was practically devoid audio tapes of cell phone conversations
of new evidence and failed to resolve between Iraqi military officers (purport-
many of the unanswered questions about edly discussing how to hide evidence from
Iraqi weapons capabilities that remained inspectors) and satellite photos (showing
from the earlier UN weapons inspection that Iraq had recently moved banned
process (1991 to 1998). Subsequent weapons materials from a number of Iraqi
reports by Blix in February and March weapons of mass destruction facilities).
similarly reported that inspectors found Powell also claimed U.S. intelligence showed
no prohibited weapons of mass destruc- that Iraq had mobile laboratories used to
tion and that Iraq was offering only lim- make biological weapons and conceal these
ited cooperation. activities from the UN.

38
 The Axis of Evil and Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq

In addition, Powell cited Iraq’s refusal direct threats by Hussein against scientists
to allow Iraqi scientists who might know who revealed sensitive information, said
about weapons of mass destruction to be Powell, intimidated the scientists and crip-
interviewed by the UN without an Iraqi mil- pled the UN’s best source of information
itary representative present. Iraq’s insistence about Iraqi weapons programs. Finally,
on monitoring its scientists, together with Powell argued there was a direct link

Colin Powell holds up a vial that he described as one that could contain anthrax during a presentation
to the UN Security Council.
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Some European leaders, including French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin (left), French
president Jaques Chirac (center, right), and German foreign minister Joschka Fischer (center, left),
opposed a war with Iraq.

between Saddam Hussein and terrorism, After Powell’s speech, however, much of
referring to the al-Zarqawi evidence previ- Powell’s intelligence information was chal-
ously cited by the administration: lenged as less than persuasive. Indeed, even
some administration and CIA officials
The . . . nexus between Iraq and the Al
admitted that the United States did not know
Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that
what prohibited materials the audio tapes
combines classic terrorist organizations
might be referring to and that the evidence
and modern methods of murder. Iraq
on al-Zarqawi did not clearly establish that
today harbors a deadly terrorist network
Iraq was harboring al-Qaeda terrorists.
headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an
Nevertheless, on February 24 the United
associate and collaborator of Osama bin
States, Britain, and Spain circulated a second
Laden and his Al Qaida lieutenants.30
UN resolution to authorize war against Iraq;
Powell also claimed that Iraqi officials had the proposed resolution concluded that “Iraq
met with al-Qaeda terrorists on several has failed to take the final opportunity afford-
occasions since the early 1990s. ed to it [by] resolution 1441 (2002).”31

40
 The Axis of Evil and Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq

to pass a second resolution; even if the

UN Opposition to Military
United States did get enough votes, a veto
Action Against Iraq
by permanent council members France or
Despite the strong push by the United States Russia looked entirely possible.
and Britain, however, key members of the
UN Security Council, particularly France, “Coalition of the Willing”
Germany, and Russia, refused to authorize When the United States was unable to
military action against Iraq. They believed secure the needed support for a second UN
that continued inspections provided the resolution authorizing military action, U.S.
best way to contain Saddam Hussein’s president Bush moved forward with U.S.
threat. French foreign minister Dominique plans to invade Iraq and remove Saddam
de Villepin, for example, argued that “since Hussein from power, as the leader of a
we can disarm Iraq through peaceful group of nations that he called a “coalition
means, we should not take the risk to of the willing.”
endanger the lives of innocent civilians or In a speech to the nation on March 17,
soldiers, to jeopardize the stability of the 2003, Bush announced U.S. war plans:
region, and further widen the gap between
Today, no nation can possibly claim
our people and our cultures.”32 These oppo-
that Iraq has disarmed, and it will not
nents of U.S. action also feared that war in
disarm so long as Saddam Hussein
Iraq might fuel more terrorism. For exam-
holds power. . . . All the decades of
ple, German foreign minister Joschka
deceit and cruelty have now reached
Fischer warned that a military strike against
an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons
Iraq “would involve considerable and
must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their
unpredictable risks for the global fight
refusal to do so will result in military
against terrorism.” 33
conflict, commenced at a time of our
Citing the fact that no weapons of mass
destruction had been found, these coun- choosing.35
tries circulated a memo at the UN in Saddam Hussein, however, did not
February 2003 urging that war must be a leave Iraq as demanded by the United
last resort. The memo proposed that “rein- States, and so began the march toward war.
forced inspections, a clear timeline and the On March 18, 2003, UNMOVIC and IAEA
military build-up provide[d] a realistic inspectors withdrew from Iraq after the
means . . . to exert maximum pressure on UN secretary-general announced his deci-
Iraq.” 34 In March, China joined the demand sion to withdraw all UN staff. That same
for more time for inspections. As weeks day U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell
passed, it became increasingly clear that the announced that the “coalition of the will-
United States could not muster the nine out ing” included some thirty nations. However,
of fifteen Security Council votes it needed only Britain and Australia provided any

41
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Cars transporting UN weapons inspectors head for Baghdad’s airport. Under the threat of war,
weapons inspectors withdrew from Iraq on March 18, 2003.

significant military assistance. The other European allies except for Britain or any
coalition countries included Afghanistan, Arab nations. This lack of allied or UN
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, support for the action and America’s deci-
the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, sion to essentially “go it alone” created a
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, precedent many countries believed was
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, dangerous for future global relations. If
Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the powerful nations like the United States
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, could act against the will of the interna-
Spain, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. tional community, many argued, the value
Notably, unlike the coalition that sup- of international bodies such as the UN
ported the first Gulf War, this list of sup- could be diminished and the U.S. actions
porting countries did not include traditional could be viewed as illegitimate.

42
Chapter Three

Shock and Awe in

Twenty-Six Days
A s the United States prepared for
military action against Iraq, U.S.
Initial Strike on Saddam
Hussein
officials confidently named the U.S.
battle plan “Shock and Awe” for the The U.S. Pentagon’s Shock and Awe
psychological impact that its over- campaign was supposed to begin
whelming force would have on Iraqis. with warplanes and ships launching
Vice President Dick Cheney predict- between three and four hundred
ed that the United States would easily cruise missiles into Iraq on the first
win victory and that U.S. troops would day, more than the total number of
be greeted as liberators. These positive missiles launched during the whole
forecasts, however, met with a much of the first Gulf War in 1991, followed
different reality, as U.S. troops encoun- by a similar assault the following day.
tered early fierce resistance from the In a surprise move, however, on the
enemy and as crowds of thankful evening of March 19, 2003, President
Iraqis failed to materialize for U.S. and Bush instead ordered a limited mis-
international television cameras. The sile strike on a specific target in
real shock and awe for Iraqis, howev- Baghdad believed to be the command
er, occurred a few weeks later when post for Saddam Hussein and top
U.S. troops regained momentum and leaders of his regime. The United
easily took the capital city of Baghdad, States hoped to kill Saddam Hussein
leading to the sudden collapse of the in one decisive blow and thereby
Saddam Hussein regime after decades decapitate his twenty-four-year-old
of repression and terror. dictatorship.

43
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

A warship launches a missile toward Iraq. The war began with a surprise missile strike against what
the United States believed was Saddam Hussein’s command post.

44
 S h o c k a n d Aw e i n Tw e n t y - S i x D a y s

Kurdish
Territory

Nasiriya
Umm Qasar

The attack was launched using cruise A few hours after the attack, however,
missiles from ships in the Red Sea and the Saddam Hussein appeared in a videotape
Persian Gulf followed by bombs dropped on Iraqi television, raising the possibility
by U.S. F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter that he had survived and that the U.S. mis-
jets. Later, U.S. secretary of defense sion had failed. Analysts later concluded
Donald H. Rumsfeld explained that the that the voice on the videotape was
strike was carried out on the basis of very Hussein’s but said it could have been
good intelligence information and con- recorded earlier. Moreover, military ana-
firmed that the target was a senior Iraqi lysts said that although the Iraqi command
leadership compound. Iraq responded to bunkers were severely damaged and there
the missile attack by firing missiles at was a dramatic drop in communication
allied troops in Kuwait; many of those from the command post, there was no con-
missed and others were intercepted before firmation that Hussein and his aides had
striking their targets. been killed.

45
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Hussein’s most elite troops, and the Special

The Air and Ground War
Begins Republican Guard, an even more elite
group in charge of protecting Hussein and
In addition to the attack on Saddam
thwarting any coup attempts. The air assault
Hussein, the U.S. military began to set the
continued unabated in the following days,
stage for the planned all-out air and land
pounding Baghdad day and night, taking
assault on Iraq, a plan the military called
out government facilities, destroying Iraq’s
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United
air defenses, and hitting Republican Guard
States and its allies positioned ground
positions that guarded the city.
troops to the south of Iraq along the
Also on March 21, U.S. Marine and
Kuwait-Iraq border, and on March 19 allied
Army and British ground forces number-
warplanes attacked Iraqi artillery pieces in
ing about 150,000 began a long march
this southern area because they posed a
toward Baghdad as part of a southern front.
threat to U.S. and British troops stationed
The land assault originally had been
there. Also, the United States began a psy-
planned to occur days later, after air strikes
chological operations campaign that issued
and special operations had prepared Iraq
instructions to Iraqi troops on how to sur-
for invasion. In order to retain the element
render to allied forces once the war began.
of surprise, however, the attack was moved
The messages were delivered by a radio sta-
up after the early strike on Saddam Hussein.
tion near the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border operat-
In addition, Iraq had started fires in six oil
ed by American Special Operations forces,
fields in southern Iraq, and the United
by an airborne radio station, and by leaflets States was anxious to protect Iraqi oil.
dropped by allied aircraft. Iraqis were The campaign got off to a highly suc-
instructed to park their vehicles, put white cessful start, raising high expectations
flags on them, move more than half a mile among the U.S. public that the war could be
away from their vehicles, and wait for fur- won easily and painlessly. Coalition ground
ther instructions. forces advanced quickly through the weak-
On March 21, 2003, the long-awaited ly defended southern desert of Iraq; within
Shock and Awe military campaign against the first day, troops raced to within 200 miles
Iraq began. The first round of air strikes of Baghdad. Television images showed
dropped more than thirteen hundred cruise American bombs striking targets in
missiles and bombs on command and con- Baghdad with great precision and American
trol targets in Baghdad. The strikes were tanks gliding swiftly across the Iraqi deserts.
intended to destroy Saddam Hussein’s abil-
ity to communicate with and control his Unexpected Iraqi Resistance
forces. Targets included headquarters and As the war in Iraq unfolded, contrary to
facilities used by Hussein’s special armed American predictions, Iraqis fighting for
forces, including the Republican Guard, the Hussein regime appeared to be neither

46
 S h o c k a n d Aw e i n Tw e n t y - S i x D a y s

U.S. Marines advance toward Baghdad. Soldiers met with fierce resistance as they fought their way to
the capital.

shocked nor awed by the American mili- tinue to proceed toward Baghdad. However,
tary campaign. Although the first days of firefights broke out as Iraqi troops attacked
fighting appeared successful for the United the U.S. and British forces at those loca-
States and precision air strikes accurately tions. Also, the column of tanks headed for
pounded military targets in Baghdad and Baghdad was repeatedly attacked by small
elsewhere, coalition ground forces quickly bands of Iraqi guerrilla fighters, who were
met fierce resistance from Iraqi fighters. heavily armed and who sought to harass
The first setbacks came over the week- the allied forces’ progress. These fighters,
end of March 23, near the Iraqi cities of known as the Saddam Fedayeen, or
Basra and Nasiriya in southern Iraq, and at “Martyrs of Saddam,” were not part of the
the seaside port of Umm Qasr, near Kuwait. regular Iraqi army but were special forces
Coalition forces surrounded these areas to loyal to Saddam Hussein trained in terror-
allow the main force of allied troops to con- ist and guerrilla tactics.

47
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

In addition, coalition forces began to American soldiers were reported missing.

suffer casualties. An army maintenance Five of the twelve, one of them a woman,
company was captured after it took a wrong were shown on the Arabic television sta-
turn and became separated from the Third tion, Al Jazeera, looking scared and angry.
Infantry Division near Nasiriya. Twelve At the end of the day on March 23, U.S. mil-

Saving Private Jessica Lynch

As U.S. troops gained con- broke down doors and entered with their
fidence in the drive to guns drawn. They used helicopter and
Baghdad, other events also helped bolster armored vehicle backup even though there
American morale. On April 2, in a much- was no Iraqi military presence and no resis-
publicized story, U.S. special operations tance from the hospital staff. Indeed, some
forces rescued army private Jessica Lynch said the raid by the U.S. military was unnec-
from the Saddam Hospital in Nasiriya, Iraq, essary because they were trying to turn
where she had been held captive since Lynch over to U.S. authorities. U.S. military
March 23. Lynch, a nineteen-year-old officials, however, defended the action,
from Palestine, West Virginia, was one of arguing that troops did not know Iraqis
fifteen members of the 507th Ordinance wanted to hand over Lynch, or what they
Maintenance Company, which was attacked might encounter at the hospital, and that
by Iraqi forces early in the war. Her rescue American military doctrine calls for using
became possible after an Iraqi citizen brave- overwhelming force in such situations.
ly reported her location to the U.S. military.
Later, Lynch’s rescue became contro- Jessica Lynch is transported to a military
versial in the United States as evidence hospital after being rescued on April 2, 2003.
surfaced suggesting that it
might have been staged by
the United States to create
positive publicity for the
U.S. war effort among
Americans at home. Inter-
views of Iraqi doctors in
the Iraqi hospital where
Lynch was being treated
claimed that the U.S. rescue
was greatly overdrama-
tized. For example, they
said that U.S. commandos
refused a key and instead

48
 S h o c k a n d Aw e i n Tw e n t y - S i x D a y s

itary officials reported a total of at least Iraqi cities did not rise up against Saddam
twenty American soldiers missing or killed Hussein, oppose the guerrilla attacks on
and up to eighty-two wounded. Americans, or greet coalition troops as lib-
erators.
The March to Baghdad Finally, on March 24 Saddam Hussein
Thereafter, resistance continued as allied appeared on Iraqi television to defiantly
troops moved closer to Baghdad. Fighting urge Iraqis to fight coalition invaders.
continued in southern Iraq, and in a “Strike them until they come to the con-
major setback for the Americans, Iraqis clusion that they are not in a position to
successfully attacked a large group of commit crimes against you and your peo-
American Apache helicopters. A group of ple,” said Hussein.“God has ordered you to
about thirty Apache helicopters was hit cut their throats.” 36 Hussein also demon-
with a hail of antiaircraft fire and rocket- strated that he was aware of recent military
launched grenades while on a night combat events, mentioning for example that sol-
mission targeting units of the Republican diers of Iraq’s Eleventh Brigade had waged
Guard. Two of the Apache helicopters a heroic battle at Umm Qasr and praising
were forced down, and two American individual Iraqi commanders fighting in
crew members were later captured by the southern Iraq. Hussein’s message was clear-
Iraqis. The remaining thirty Apaches were ly recorded earlier, but it clarified for most
forced to return to base, almost all of them observers that he had survived the earlier
damaged. U.S. missile strike.
A bitter fight was also fought around In the United States, the events of the
Najaf, a city about ninety miles from first weeks of the war caused many to crit-
Baghdad and an Islamic holy site, consid- icize the U.S. war plan. The New York Times,
erably slowing the U.S. Army’s march for example, in an editorial charged that the
northward. Again the Iraqi forces fighting U.S. ground force was too small, question-
in Najaf appeared to be not regular army, ing “the American decision to press ahead
but mostly militia fighters from Hussein’s with a relatively small invasion force sup-
Baath Party and two other groups, Saddam ported by overwhelming air and missile
Fedayeen and Al Quds. power.”37 This war plan, the newspaper said,
On top of these troubles the U.S. march created a lack of security for American
to Baghdad was slowed by the weather and troops as well as Iraqi civilians.
hindered by a lack of Iraqi assistance. A Indeed, even Lieutenant General
huge sandstorm disrupted the American William Wallace, the commander of U.S.
convoys, blinded night-vision goggles, and Army forces in the gulf, admitted the
damaged equipment including guns, heli- small bands of guerrillas were a challenge
copters, and computers. Moreover, contrary to American troops. “The enemy we’re
to U.S. hopes, Shia Muslims in southern fighting is a bit different than the one we

49
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

war-gamed against, because of these para- had initially expected. Speaking on the
military forces,” he said. “We knew they White House lawn on March 24, Bush said,
were here, but we did not know how they “It is evident that it’s going to take a while
would fight.” 38 As a result of the unexpect- to achieve our objective.” He added, “I can
ed Iraqi resistance and the limited ground assure the American people we’re making
forces, the U.S. military planners were good progress, and I can also assure them
forced to adapt: They delayed the battle of that this is just the beginning of a tough
Baghdad and focused their efforts on root- fight.” 39
ing out the pro-Hussein guerrilla groups in
southern and central Iraqi cities. The Fall of Baghdad
The early events in Iraq also caused Despite the setbacks, however, U.S. and
President Bush to try to prepare the British troops celebrated a number of suc-
American people for a longer war than they cesses during the first two weeks of the war

“Red Zone” Line

50
 S h o c k a n d Aw e i n Tw e n t y - S i x D a y s

American tanks roll into Baghdad. Despite some heavy fighting, allied forces arrived in Iraq’s capital
less than one month after the war began.

and made steady progress toward the ulti- By April 2, U.S. Army and Marine
mate goal of attacking Baghdad. Iraqi oil ground troops had entered an area that mil-
fields, for example, were quickly secured, itary planners called the “red zone,” a cir-
preventing any widespread sabotage by cle about fifty miles outside of Baghdad
Iraqi loyalists. In addition, although Iraq that was within artillery and missile range
was able to launch missiles into Kuwait, the of Republican Guard forces defending
U.S. antimissile system shot down most of Baghdad. Thereafter, one by one, U.S. forces
them, preventing any damage to Kuwait or easily destroyed Republican Guard units
U.S. command centers there. Most impor- such as the Medina Division, the Baghdad
tant, American forces had traveled deep into Division, and the Nida Division, which were
Iraq to the outskirts of Baghdad. The next expected to put up a much tougher fight.
phase of the campaign required U.S. troops Also, to aid in the Baghdad assault, the
to defeat the Republican Guard divisions American military captured Baghdad’s
that Saddam Hussein had positioned to international airport for use in refueling
defend the Iraqi capital and then to begin allied warplanes. By April 4, U.S. forces had
ground attacks against Baghdad itself. advanced to the Baghdad city limits.

51
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

The following day, in a surprise move, Hussein on the streets of Baghdad the day
a group of sixty American tanks and other before. Iraqi television had shown Hussein
vehicles rolled into Baghdad, killing thou- smiling amongst a cheering crowd of sup-
sands of Iraqi fighters. The U.S. military porters, proving that he had survived
said it wanted to send a message to Iraq that despite all U.S. attempts to destroy him.
it was in control: “We just wanted to let Over the next few days American and
them know that we’re here,” 40 said Major British forces made progressively bolder
General Buford C. Blount III, commander moves into the city, occupying major pres-
of the U.S. Army’s Third Infantry Division. idential palaces and establishing a perma-
In addition, allied forces may have wanted nent presence there. With the success in
to respond to an appearance by Saddam Baghdad the momentum of the war seemed

A U.S. tank helps Iraqi citizens topple a statue of Saddam Hussein on April 9, 2003. Many Iraqis
cheered as the statue crashed to the ground.

52
 S h o c k a n d Aw e i n Tw e n t y - S i x D a y s

to change, leading supporters of President of American special forces, took control of

Bush to claim victory. Vice President Dick the oil town of Kirkuk, followed by efforts
Cheney, for example, said the U.S. advance to stabilize the northern city of Mosul after
into Baghdad was proof that early criticism Iraqi troops stationed there withdrew.
of the war plan was wrong; instead, he said, Finally, U.S. troops made an assault on
the war was “one of the most extraordinary Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown, con-
military campaigns ever conducted.” 41 sidered to be the last holdout for remnants
of forces loyal to his regime. Tikrit was
The Collapse of Saddam expected to pose a significant obstacle to
Hussein’s Regime coalition forces, but instead it was taken on
On April 9 the world witnessed the most April 14 with little opposition. Finally, on
striking image of the war: In the center of April 15, 2003, military officials at the U.S.
Baghdad, in a scene reminiscent of the fall Pentagon said the main fighting in Iraq was
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (the wall that had finished, and President Bush declared that
separated East and West Germany since the “the regime of Saddam Hussein is no
end of World War II), Iraqi citizens with more.” 43
help from U.S. Marines toppled a tower-
ing bronze statue of Saddam Hussein. As Finding Saddam and Baath
the statue came crashing to the ground, a Officials
crowd of jubilant Iraqis cheered loudly, It was clear, unfortunately, that Saddam
danced for joy, and hit the statue with their Hussein had likely survived the attack on
shoes, a gesture of contempt in Iraq. At this his country. U.S. forces, however, had no
moment, psychologically at least, the idea where Hussein was hiding. Rumors
regime of Saddam Hussein collapsed. abounded, suggesting that he had fled to
Brigadeer General Vincent K. Brooks Syria, that he was hiding in Tikrit, or that
summarized the victory at a briefing at U.S. he was still in Baghdad. Wherever he and
command headquarters, stating, “Today his supporters were, the United States badly
the regime is in disarray. The capital city wanted to find and destroy them, to ease
has been added to those places where the the minds of still-frightened Iraqis who had
regime has lost control.” 42 lived under his brutal regime for decades
The scene in Baghdad signaled that the and to ensure that he could not make an
war would soon be over. American officials, effort to return to power.
however, cautioned that much remained to The U.S. military, therefore, acting on
be done before victory could be declared. tips and intelligence information, made
As U.S. and British forces continued to con- additional attempts to attack locations
solidate their hold on Baghdad, the U.S. where Hussein and other members of the
focus shifted to northern Iraq. Soon Iraqi leadership were believed to be meet-
Kurdish fighters there, under the command ing. On April 7, for example, American

53
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Recovering from Saddam’s Evils

The end of the war and the Thomas explained in an April 2003
removal of Saddam Hussein Newsweek article entitled “The Saddam
from power reminded Iraqis of the horri- Files”:
ble terror of Hussein’s regime and the many
America wants to bring liberty and
gruesome ways that the regime punished
democracy to Iraq. But first the Iraqis
those accused of political crimes or threats
will have to come to terms with the
against the government. As American sol-
legacy of fear Saddam created, and
diers gained control of Iraqi prisons and
regain the humanity that was fright-
palaces, for example, they uncovered clear
ened and beaten out of them by three
evidence of the regime’s brutality, includ-
decades of grotesque misrule.
ing torture equipment used to deliver elec-
tric shocks to ears and genitals and cages The turning point for Iraqis may be the
used to hold human prisoners. Evidence killing or capture of Saddam Hussein; many
of this brutality also was revealed in the Iraqis fear that as long as Saddam Hussein
numbers of Iraqi citizens who have been remains uncaptured, he may at some time
mutilated by surgeons on Hussein’s orders; in the future try to regain power in Iraq.
the cutting off of ears appears to have been
a favorite punishment. In addition, thou-
sands of Iraqi families whose relatives were
arrested or disappeared
during Hussein’s rule Iraqis walk among plastic bags containing bodies exhumed from a
mass grave south of Baghdad.
began learning for the
first time about the fates
of their family members.
The bodies of these polit-
ical prisoners were dis-
covered in graveyards
throughout Iraq, largely
because the Hussein gov-
ernment kept highly
accurate records of peo-
ple it killed.
It may take a long time
for Iraqis to recover psy-
chologically from twenty-
four years of terror.
Reporters Melinda Liu,
Rod Nordland, and Evan

54
 S h o c k a n d Aw e i n Tw e n t y - S i x D a y s

bombers dropped four bunker-busting served as deputy head of tribal affairs and
two-thousand-pound bombs on a com- was involved in the special security orga-
pound in the Mansur area of Baghdad, nization headed by Saddam’s son Qusay.
where military officials believed Hussein As time passed, others were taken into cus-
was meeting with his sons and top leaders. tody, including Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s deputy
The bomb created a huge crater sixty feet prime minister and public spokesman for
deep and killed as many as fourteen Iraqis. the regime; General Abid Hamid Mah-
Afterward U.S. officials said they were not moud al-Tikriti, Hussein’s top aide; and
sure whether Hussein survived, but troops many other high-level government offi-
did not secure the site, suggesting to some cials and prominent scientists.
that Hussein had not been hit. Much later, U.S. troops acting on a tip
Later that week, on April 10, American from an Iraqi even located and killed
forces attacked and later bombed a mosque Saddam’s two sons, Qusay and Odai.
in Baghdad where Hussein was reported to Saddam Hussein, however, remained
have been seen. Some claimed that Hussein unaccounted for. Finally, on April 30 a
or one of his aides had been hit in the ear- London-based Arabic newspaper, Al Quds
lier bombing and had been taken to the al Arabi, printed an ominous handwritten
mosque, suffering from wounds. Neighbors letter said to be written and signed by
claimed Hussein had visited the mosque Saddam Hussein. The letter urged Iraqis to
the day before: “Saddam was here, and I rebel against the “infidel, criminal, mur-
kissed him,” one man said, “People were derous and cowardly occupier,” promised
kissing his feet. They were cheering. There that those who collaborated with the
were 200 people there.” 44 However, by the Americans would be punished, and pre-
time marines attacked, members of dicted that “the day of liberation and vic-
Hussein’s group had already escaped. tory will come.” 45 The letter was dated April
In an effort to encourage the capture 28, Hussein’s sixty-sixth birthday. It con-
of Hussein and his top aides, the U.S. mil- firmed many Iraqis’ worst fears—that
itary in April announced rewards and Hussein was still hiding in Iraq and wait-
issued troops a deck of fifty-five playing ing to stage a comeback.
cards showing pictures and names of the
most-wanted Iraqi leaders. On April 17 The Search for Weapons of
troops captured Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Mass Destruction
al-Tikriti, Hussein’s half-brother and a Throughout the war, coalition military
former chief of Iraqi intelligence, who is planners and troops were fearful that Iraq
believed to have helped Hussein hide bil- would use chemical weapons against them.
lions of dollars in other countries. A few These fears, however, were never realized.
days later, Hussein’s son-in-law Jamal Although American soldiers approaching
Mustafa Abdallah Sultan surrendered; he Baghdad repeatedly found indicators of

55
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

U.S. weapons experts search for chemical weapons near the city of Basra. As the war ended, the
military focused on uncovering Saddam Hussein’s suspected cache of chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons.

chemical weapons, such as gas masks, pro- ing and destroying illegal weapons was the
tective suits, nerve gas antidotes, training main justification given by President Bush
manuals, and barrels of suspicious chemi- in his push for war against Iraq.
cals, chemical weapons were never used by Despite expectations that troops would
Iraqi troops. As the war ended, the focus of quickly stumble upon illegal weapons left
the military turned to searching for Iraq’s behind by Iraqi forces, however, initial coali-
supposedly hidden cache of weapons of tion efforts to search for such weapons
mass destruction. This goal became a high proved unsuccessful. On April 20 news
priority for the United States, because find- reports suggested a possible explanation for

56
 S h o c k a n d Aw e i n Tw e n t y - S i x D a y s

why neither UN weapons inspectors nor U.S. labs, however, was challenged by other U.S.
forces had yet found any weapons of mass and British intelligence experts. Meanwhile,
destruction. A scientist who claimed to have U.S. teams continued to search a list of more
worked in Iraq’s chemical weapons program than one thousand sites that American offi-
told an American military team hunting ille- cials have identified as possible hiding spots
gal weapons that Iraq had destroyed chem- for weapons.
ical weapons and biological warfare As a result of the lack of success in find-
equipment a few days before the war began. ing prohibited weapons, President Bush
The scientist led U.S. troops to buried mate- came under growing international pres-
rial used as the building block for a toxic sure. An editorial in the New York Times, for
agent used in illegal chemical weapons. example, said, “with every passing day,
In addition, the scientist, whose iden- American credibility is called into question.
tity was kept secret by the military, claimed . . . The chief justification for invading Iraq
that, beginning in the mid-1990s, Iraq had was to get rid of Baghdad’s stores of chem-
destroyed some stockpiles of unconven- ical and biological agents and dismantle its
tional weapons, sent some to Syria, and effort to produce a nuclear bomb.” 46 Also,
recently had burned some warehouses of the CIA was ordered to begin a review to
chemical agents. Hussein had supposedly determine whether it may have erred in its
focused on projects that would be almost prewar assessments of Iraq’s weapons pro-
impossible for weapons inspectors to grams. Otherwise, President Bush stead-
detect—for example, hiding chemical fastly insisted that the United States would
ingredients that were not prohibited as find the hidden weapons, cautioning that
weapons but that could be quickly made it would just take time.
into chemical weapons.
As weeks passed, American military The War’s Message to the
units found parts of three mobile labs that World
they claimed might be mobile biological The U.S. war in Iraq was the first action
weapons laboratories. The labs appeared taken under a new national security strat-
to have been cleaned by the Iraqis, and U.S. egy created by President Bush, called “pre-
experts who tested the labs reported on emption.” This policy calls for the United
May 19 that they had failed to find bio- States to intervene before a potential enemy
logical agents. Nevertheless, these experts can attack America. As President Bush
concluded that the only plausible use for the explained in a radio address in early April,
units was to produce germs for weapons, a his decision to attack Iraq was part of his
finding that bolstered U.S. prewar assertions plan to “not sit and wait, leaving enemies
that such mobile labs were being used by the free to plot another September 11—this
Iraqis to hide illicit biological and chemical time, perhaps, with chemical, biological or
weapons. This U.S. conclusion about the nuclear terror.” 47

57
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

The war thus demonstrated to the rest action in Iraq.After insisting for months that
of the world that America is capable and it would only negotiate with the United States
willing to take action to change a regime that about its nuclear weapons program, North
poses a potential future threat to U.S. inter- Korean negotiators agreed to multicountry
ests. This message was not lost on other talks with both China and the United States
countries, such North Korea, Iran, and Syria, in late April 2003. However, at the talks North
which were also believed to be developing Korea announced that it had already devel-
weapons of mass destruction and have con- oped nuclear weapons and might even
nections to terrorists. Although the Bush choose to sell them to other countries. North
administration insisted that it had no plans Korea’s threat, for many, showed the other
to conduct other preventative wars against possible outcome of the example of the Iraq
countries such as these, U.S. officials hoped war—that small countries, instead of halt-
the threat of U.S. action would cause other ing weapons development out of fear, might
rogue nations to modify their behavior. instead speed up their nuclear weapons devel-
North Korea, for example, appeared to opment to deter possible U.S. strikes similar
change its bargaining posture after the U.S. to the one against Iraq.

South Korean and North Korean leaders discuss North Korea’s nuclear program in 2003. North
Korea announced that it had developed nuclear weapons and might sell them to other countries.

58
 S h o c k a n d Aw e i n Tw e n t y - S i x D a y s

Indeed, critics of the war in Iraq claim America. A June 2003 report by the non-
that the war will not make the United States partisan Pew Research Center for the People
or the world safer but instead will increase and the Press, according to its director,
the spread of nuclear weapons and inspire Andrew Kohut, found that
more terrorism. The failure of the United
the war has widened the rift be-
States to secure nuclear waste sites in Iraq
tween Americans and Western Euro-
led to looting of nuclear materials, and
peans, further inflamed the Muslim
experts warn that, because of the war, this
world, softened support for the war
nuclear material might end up more quick-
on terrorism, and significantly
ly in the hands of terrorists, creating an even
weakened global public support for
more dangerous terrorist threat. Also, the
the pillars of the post–World War II
images of the U.S. invasion of an Arab
era—the U.N. and the North At-
country, critics say, are bound to inspire
lantic alliance.48
more anti-American terrorist attacks. This
prediction appeared to come true quick- Whether these seemingly negative
ly—in May 2003, suicide bombers believed interpretations of the war will be recorded
to be connected to al-Qaeda hit American by history as the war’s legacy, however, may
targets in Saudi Arabia. depend at least partly on the success of post-
At the very least the war appears to have war nation-building and peacemaking
created more, not less, animosity toward efforts.

59
 Chapter Four

The Aftermath
of War in Iraq
T he Bush administration claimed
that the war was a great military
victory for America because it result-
much less prepared for postwar chal-
lenges than it was for war.

ed in the quick removal of Saddam Civilian Deaths and Injuries

Hussein’s regime and freedom for the Much was made throughout the war
Iraqi people. For Iraq, however, the of the precision of America’s bombs
reality of the war’s aftermath was and their ability to strike military tar-
death and destruction, a power vacu- gets in Baghdad and other areas with-
um, and chaos in the streets. out causing “collateral damage,” the
Thousands of Iraqis were killed or military’s term for civilian deaths.
injured by American bombs, and the American forces also took great care
cutoff of essential services such as in selecting targets to limit civilian
water, food, and electricity created casualties. In addition, U.S. military
humanitarian disasters in the making. officials touted the low casualty rate
Without a police force to maintain for U.S. and British soldiers—a total
order, looting and crime became wide- of 162 were killed during the war.
spread, depriving communities of However, either because hard
many items essential for recovery and numbers were unavailable or because
rebuilding. Slowly the United States they wanted to downplay the infor-
began to restore order, restart essen- mation, U.S. reports did not mention
tial services, and lay the groundwork that unknown thousands of Iraqi
for creation of an interim Iraqi gov- troops were killed and wounded,
ernment. America, however, appeared many of them forced to fight against

60
 T h e A f t e r m a t h o f Wa r i n I r a q

their will. As for civilians, reports varied but These civilian casualties, though per-
a survey by the Associated Press, based on haps low in number given the amount of
records from 60 of Iraq’s 124 hospitals and firepower directed at Iraq, rival the num-
reported in June 2003, said that “at least bers killed and wounded in the September
3,240 civilians died . . . between March 20, 11 attack on the United States and repre-
when the war began, and April 20, when the sent untold suffering for many families
fighting was dying down.” 49 Thousands across Iraq. These casualties also were the
more were injured by the attacks. main focus of sensational Arab television

Iraqis carry the body of a man killed by a U.S. air strike. Despite the great care American forces took
to limit strikes to military targets, many civilians were killed or injured during the war.

61
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

reporting throughout the war, stirring Arab years of UN-imposed economic sanctions.
anger at the American invasion of an Arab These events destroyed Iraq’s middle class
country. and produced deaths, chronic malnutri-
tion, and disease among Iraq’s population.
Humanitarian Concerns— For example, at the time the war started,
Water and Food Iraqis barely had enough food; as the
As the war raged, it disrupted supplies of British periodical the Economist notes,
water, food, and electricity, raising fears of “Before the first bomb was dropped, 16m
humanitarian disasters. Indeed, even [million] people—six Iraqis in ten—
before the war Iraqis were already suffer- depended entirely on the OFFP [the UN’s
ing from Iraq’s previous wars and twelve oil-for-food program] for food.” 50 Iraq’s

U.S. soldiers hand out food to Iraqi citizens. Food shortages in Iraq before and during the war were
widespread and led to chronic malnutrition and disease.

62
 T h e A f t e r m a t h o f Wa r i n I r a q

water supply also was already contami- unprecedented challenge to feed Iraq’s pop-
nated from the leakage of sewage into fresh ulation. On March 28 the WFP appealed to
water supplies. Another war only made donors to provide $2.2 billion in food aid
things worse. for Iraq, the amount it estimated would be
Among the first concerns was restor- necessary to cover humanitarian assistance
ing an adequate water supply. When the for Iraq for a mere six months.
fighting knocked out electrical power for Fortunately, the world began respond-
water treatment plants, people’s only source ing to the need for humanitarian aid in Iraq.
of safe drinking water was destroyed, leav- On March 28, for example, the British deliv-
ing them to drink water from sources that ered emergency food, blankets, and medi-
may have been contaminated by sewage or cine to the port of Umm Qasr after the
other sources. In Basra the problem became waterway was cleared of mines, and short-
acute quickly. As soon as British troops were ly thereafter the WFP was able to truck sup-
able to gain control of the city, they began plies of dry milk into northern Iraq. Also
to ship in clean water. However, this was not in March the UN temporarily resumed dis-
enough, and by May 12 the World Health tribution of OFFP food but voted to phase
Organization began warning that Basra out the oil-for-food program after six
might experience an epidemic of cholera, months. When the war ended, the OFFP
a disease caused by germs from fecal con- had assets of about $13 billion, but much
tamination of water supplies that results in of it was earmarked to pay contracts for
severe diarrhea and sometimes death from food, medicine, and industrial goods that
dehydration. The International Committee had been approved earlier. By early April,
of the Red Cross (ICRC) managed to according to the Economist,“about $10 bil-
restore water to half the population in lion worth of supplies [were] in the
Basra, but many continued to rely on water pipeline, and the UN [had] designated
from polluted estuaries. more than 450 contracts for medicines,
Food became the next essential to pre- health supplies, food, water and sanitation,
vent humanitarian crises in Iraq. The UN worth over $1 billion, as priorities for ship-
oil-for-food program was suspended on ment.” 51 Countries also began donating aid.
March 17, just before the war began, The United States was the largest contrib-
although extra food was distributed before utor: On March 25, President Bush asked
that time to allow people to stock up. The Congress for $2.4 billion for relief and
UN at that time estimated, however, that reconstruction, bringing the U.S. total con-
food supplies would soon run out. The tribution to $3.5 billion at that time.
UN’s World Food Programme (WFP), for- Iraqis, however, remain concerned
tunately, positioned enough food in near- about the long-term food situation. For
by areas to feed 2 million people for one example, Iraq relies on an area called Mosul
month, but after that it expected to face an to produce half of its wheat and barley, but

63
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Iraqi medical personnel work in a dark hospital during a blackout. Even after the war ended, power
outages remained a problem in areas outside Baghdad.

the harvest there is in serious jeopardy. well into the summer of 2003. Authorities
Under Hussein’s rule, the government established priorities for who would get
would set a price for the grain and pay the power: Hospitals were first, then water
farmers; Iraq had no government, its banks treatment plants, sewage treatment plants,
had been looted, fuel was in short supply, and homes, with industry last on the list.
and land disputes were increasing, creating
formidable difficulties for farmers and Health Care Needs
threatening Iraq’s food supply. Health care also became an early concern
Electrical power was restored by late during the war, as hundreds of injured
April to many parts of Baghdad, but other Iraqis swarmed medical facilities in need
parts were left without power or were expe- of care. However, the fighting damaged
riencing frequent blackouts. Officials pre- many hospitals and other facilities, and
dicted that the power shortage would last those that remained after the U.S. victory

64
 T h e A f t e r m a t h o f Wa r i n I r a q

were virtually destroyed by looters, who noting that under the Geneva Conventions,
stole essential medical supplies and equip- treaties that set out the rules of war, an
ment. Also some facilities did not have elec- occupying power is responsible for main-
trical power, and medical staff often failed taining order. Outlying areas in Iraq faced
to report to work because of fears for their similar health crises: In Kurdish-controlled
safety, as law and order evaporated with the northern Iraq, for example, international
fall of the regime. Although Baghdad hos- humanitarian agencies reported a massive
pitals coped initially, on April 11 the Red increase in acute respiratory infection and
Cross claimed that “the medical system in diarrhea.
Baghdad ha[d] virtually collapsed” 52 On May 20 the World Health Or-
because of war damage and looting. The ganization (WHO) began a program to
Red Cross urged U.S. forces to take control, bring basic health services in Iraq back to

An Iraqi man tends to his brother who lost a leg during the U.S. assault. The fighting damaged many
hospitals and left the injured with no place to receive medical care.

65
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

their prewar level, an effort that WHO esti- unprecedented wave of crime and looting
mated would cost up to $180 million. The that destroyed much of what the war left
United States, Britain, Spain, and Italy standing. Iraqis who suffered under
quickly pledged $12 million toward this Saddam Hussein’s regime sought revenge
program. WHO said that it would cost $6.5 by destroying government sites; poor Iraqis
million just to make basic structural repairs saw a chance to steal items they desperate-
to correct damage caused by looting; addi- ly needed or could sell for cash; and crim-
tional funds were needed for medicines, inals let loose from Iraqi jails took
equipment, and paying hospital workers. advantage of the absence of police to com-
President Bush promised to quickly mit crimes. As one Iraqi, Mahmoud Ahmed
provide necessary humanitarian aid to Iraq. Uthman, described it, “We used to have a
On March 25, as he submitted a request to brutal dictatorship that controlled every-
Congress for funding for the war effort, he thing. . . . When the government collapsed,
said, “This nation and our coalition part- there was nothing left except a great empti-
ners are committed to making sure that the ness. And that emptiness has been filled
Iraqi citizens who have suffered under a with chaos.” 54
brutal tyrant have got the food and medi- The looting decimated government
cine needed as soon as possible.” 53 buildings, hospitals, museums, universities,
Humanitarian efforts, however, quickly banks, businesses, and power and water
bogged down as the security situation wors- facilities, gutting them of virtually every-
ened in Iraq. In order to deliver food, repair thing and anything that could be carried
and restart water treatment facilities, and off. Critical medical supplies were looted
rebuild health services in Iraq, humanitar- from hospitals, and essential parts were
ian workers need to be able to travel and removed from utility facilities. After the ini-
work within Iraq’s borders. This required tial round of looting, the crime wave con-
that they be protected from looters and tinued; armed bands patrolled highways,
criminals, a task that U.S. troops were strug- hijacking private cars and trucks carrying
gling to accomplish during the months fol- humanitarian supplies, and criminals
lowing the war’s end. mugged citizens and burglarized their
homes.
Looting and Chaos Perhaps the worst example of looting
During the war American commanders was the theft of precious heirlooms and
took great pains to avoid damaging the artifacts from Iraq’s National Museum in
institutions and infrastructure of Iraq so Baghdad. The museum housed some of the
that Iraq could quickly recover from the world’s oldest pieces from ancient
war. The sudden defeat of the regime of Mesopotamia, and experts claimed that
Saddam Hussein, however, left a gaping major, irreplaceable treasures were stolen,
power vacuum in the country leading to an including items such as a lyre from the

66
 T h e A f t e r m a t h o f Wa r i n I r a q

Looters flee a government building in Baghdad. The quick collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government
led to widespread looting in the Iraqi capital.

Sumerian city of Ur dated 2400 B.C. United States. U.S. officials were well aware
However, museum officials and American of the importance of the museum. Experts
investigators later said that although impor- met with Pentagon officials in January, and
tant antiquities were lost, the losses were the Pentagon provided a memo to military
less serious than originally believed: More commanders listing the Baghdad museum
than seven hundred artifacts and tens of as the number two priority for protection.
thousands of ancient manuscripts thought The fact that the United States moved
to have been stolen actually had been stored quickly to protect the Iraqi Oil Ministry but
in underground vaults to protect them from did not station troops to protect the muse-
the war’s damage. um sent a message that the United States
Nevertheless, the loss of many impor- valued oil more than Iraq’s cultural her-
tant cultural objects was blamed on the itage. As Frank Rich, a columnist for the

67
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

An Iraqi man sifts through heirlooms at Baghdad’s National Museum. In April 2003, looters
ransacked the museum, and many irreplaceable works of art were stolen or destroyed.

New York Times, said,“By protecting Iraq’s sion of humanitarian aid and slowed the
oil but not its cultural motherlode, we echo efforts to get Iraq’s electricity and other util-
the values of no one more than Saddam, ities up and running after the war. Karim
who in 1995 cut off funds to the Baghdad W. Hassan, director general of Iraq’s elec-
museum, pleading the impact of sanctions, tricity commission, pleaded,“Give me secu-
yet nonetheless found plenty of money to rity and I’ll give you electricity.” 56 The delays
pour into his own palaces.” 55 in restoring electricity and telecommuni-
One cost of the looting crisis was grow- cations, in turn, have kept businesses and
ing Iraqi anger at the United States and banks closed and, with armed robbers on
problems for the reconstruction of Iraq. the highway, trade and commerce virtual-
The instability prevented the quick infu- ly stopped. Once order is restored, the full

68
 T h e A f t e r m a t h o f Wa r i n I r a q

damage from the looting will be revealed ing the U.S. presence in their country and
and will result in significantly higher recon- an easy transition to democracy, using
struction costs. Iraqi police to retain order and Iraqi sol-
diers to help with rebuilding projects.
U.S. Unprepared for Chaos Perhaps because there was no pay, howev-
The U.S. military appeared unprepared to er, policemen did not return to work and
stop the postwar chaos. The American pre- soldiers disappeared, allowing many Iraqis
war expectations envisioned Iraqis cheer- to take advantage of the lack of authority.

Saddam’s Mass Graves

After the war ended in Iraq, was discovered in Habbaniya, fifty miles
Iraqis began to discover and west of Baghdad, where six hundred
dig up mass graves throughout Iraq that corpses were found; these are believed to
contained the bodies of political prisoners be the six hundred Kuwaiti prisoners taken
who were arrested or disappeared during by Hussein’s security forces when Iraq
Saddam Hussein’s rule. In many cases, these invaded Kuwait in 1990. The process of
discoveries are the first information rela- digging up and identifying all the victims
tives have received about the fates of their of Hussein’s evil is expected to take a very
missing loved ones. long time.
For example, in Mahawil, a farming area
in central Iraq, Iraqis have discovered mass An Iraqi woman carries the body of a family
graves containing perhaps eleven thousand member found in one of Iraq’s many mass
bodies. The area is believed to be an execu- graves.
tion and gravesite for Shias
killed by the government
when they rebelled against
Hussein’s rule in February and
March 1991. As Patrick E.
Tyler reported on May 15,
2003, in the New York Times,
“There are signs of blindfolds
binding many skulls, which
are marked with execution
wounds, and some bundles
seem to contain the mingled
bones of more than one per-
son, perhaps of a mother and
child.” A similar mass grave

69
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

In addition, the U.S. military force in Iraq al leaders and religious leaders tried to take
was limited in size, and the U.S. plan was control.
to move troops out of the country as
quickly as possible after the war to avoid U.S. Efforts to Restore Order
being seen as an occupier of Arab lands. Soon, however, it became clear that securi-
For example, only about twenty thousand ty was the first and most important prior-
American troops were stationed at the end ity for U.S. forces. In April, U.S. troops
of the war in Baghdad, a city of about 4.5 began joint patrols with Iraqis, including
million people. Many of those troops had several hundred Iraqi police officers who
other important responsibilities, such as reported to duty without pay. Later in the
rooting out remaining pockets of Iraqi month the United States announced that
fighters, preventing them from patrolling four thousand more troops would be sent
for looters. Also, the troops, equipped only to Iraq to help restore order. In perhaps the
with heavy tanks, were ineffective because most significant change, the United States
they could not maneuver around the city. replaced Jay Garner, an American army gen-
Making matters worse, initially the U.S. eral charged with overseeing reconstruc-
and British response was to minimize the tion, with a civilian administrator—L. Paul
security problem and avoid using force Bremer III. His appointment marked a
against looters because of fear that this turning point in the postwar administra-
image would further antagonize the Arab tion of Iraq.
world. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld spoke Bremer vowed to restore order and
of the hands-off attitude that characterized emphasized the need for greater numbers
the initial U.S. attitude in a Pentagon brief- of American troops. As a first step he
ing: “We’ve seen looting in this country immediately arrested about three hundred
[referring to the United States]. . . . We’ve violent criminals who had been released by
seen riots at soccer games in various coun- Saddam Hussein, in an effort to demon-
tries around the world. . . . To the extent it strate U.S. resolve. As part of the new, tough
happens in a war zone, it’s difficult to stop.”57 security policy, Bremer also authorized U.S.
Instead, Americans sought out Iraqi military forces to shoot looters, increased
civic leaders and asked them to take on the patrols, announced he would hire more
task of providing the necessary security. In police officers, and banned ranking mem-
some areas, as a result of the vacuum of bers of the Baath Party from public service.
authority, Iraqis began turning to self- Next he disbanded Iraq’s military and the
appointed authorities. In Baghdad, for security organizations that supported
example, a man called Muhammad Mohsen Saddam Hussein’s regime and announced
Zobeidi openly declared himself mayor and a ban on assault weapons.
began dispensing decisions until he was Bremer, however, insisted that things
arrested by U.S. troops. In other areas trib- in Iraq were not quite as bad as they were

70
 T h e A f t e r m a t h o f Wa r i n I r a q

Iraq’s new civilian administrator L. Paul Bremer III talks with the press after arriving in Baghdad in
May 2003. Bremer vowed to restore order to postwar Iraq.

being portrayed. He stated, “Let’s put this Nevertheless, months after U.S. troops
in perspective. . . . First of all, this is not a first entered Baghdad, America was still try-
country in anarchy. People are going about ing to develop a plan to secure Iraq with far
their business. They are going about their too few troops and a local police force of
lives.” 58 He said that the U.S. military had seven thousand that was just beginning to
started aggressive patrols and that two be reestablished. American soldiers from
courts were operating to deal with crimi- the Third Infantry Division, which helped
nals who are caught, and added: “We have to capture Baghdad in the war, were tiring
made progress. We are making progress and expecting to go home; instead, howev-
every day, and we [will] continue to make er, their mission was extended in Iraq. The
progress in the days ahead.” 59 United States made plans for a much larger

71
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

War Costs and Profits

After months of hedging months. The total cost of rebuilding is
before the war began, the expected to cost some $20 billion a year for
Bush administration finally revealed the cost the next three years, according to some
of the war to the American people on March experts. Bechtel is connected to former
25, after the war had begun. Congress Secretary of State George Shultz, who serves
awarded the president approximately $63 on its board of directors and is also on the
billion to cover the cost of war in Iraq and board of the Committee for the Liberation
some initial funds for relief and recon- of Iraq, a group with close ties to the White
struction. The administration will have to House that had lobbied in favor of the war.
return to Congress to request more money These contract awards to Washington
to pay for reconstructing Iraq, and the total insiders were heavily criticized because they
cost to American taxpayers is expected to suggest favoritism for Bush friends. As an
reach at least $100 billion, if not more. April 14, 2003, editorial in the New York
If ordinary taxpayers lost money on the Times put it, “This looks like naked
war, however, certain other Americans favoritism and undermines the Bush
stood to make large profits. Indeed, corpo- administration’s portrayal of the war as a
rations connected with the Bush adminis- campaign for disarmament and democra-
tration and the U.S. military were awarded cy, not [monetary gain].” In fact, the
big contracts for rebuilding Iraq even before Halliburton contract was awarded without
the war started. For example, before the war, allowing any other competing companies
the Army Corps of Engineers awarded a $7 to bid, bypassing federal contracting regu-
billion, two-year contract to fight oil fires lations. Similarly, the Bechtel contract was
to a subsidiary of Halliburton, the compa- awarded without offering coalition allies,
ny Vice President Dick Cheney ran from such as Britain, or other countries the
1995 to 2000. As soon as the war ended, on opportunity to bid for the vast reconstruc-
April 17, the Bush administration award- tion work. U.S. officials, however, have
ed the Bechtel Group of San Francisco a promised to allow companies from other
major contract for reconstructing Iraq. This countries to submit bids for subcontract-
contract will initially pay Bechtel $34.6 mil- ing work. This was not enough for the U.S.
lion and could eventually be worth as much Congress, which began an investigation of
as $680 million over a period of eighteen the matter.

force in Iraq than originally anticipated; the postwar effort, and as of July 2003,
about 150,000 U.S. troops were commit- twenty-four had committed to do so.
ted to Iraq as of June, and many believed Countries sending troops included
that number was likely to increase. The Hungary, Bulgaria, Honduras, El Salvador,
United States also has asked about seven- Ukraine, Slovakia, Denmark, and Spain,
ty other countries to contribute troops to with some countries sending only a few

72
 T h e A f t e r m a t h o f Wa r i n I r a q

hundred troops and others sending one . . . The planning for peace was much less
to two thousand. developed than the planning for war.” 60
As months passed, the United States Similarly, political columnist Thomas
came under growing criticism for not antic- Friedman, in an editorial in the New York
ipating the need for security in postwar Iraq. Times, wrote that the United States is “not
U.S. senators, for example, assailed Deputy only underestimating how hard nation
Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz with building will be with this brutalized people,
criticisms in a meeting of the Senate Foreign but how much the looting and power vac-
Relations Committee on May 22. Senator uum have put us into an even deeper hole.”61
Richard G. Lugar, a Republican who heads Friedman, among with many others hop-
the committee, said, “I am concerned that ing for a positive outcome to the situation,
the administration’s initial stabilization and urged that America’s attention must not be
reconstruction efforts have been inadequate. diverted from the postwar needs of Iraq.

73
 Chapter Five

Challenges for
the New Iraq
A merica’s vision for a new Iraq is a
prosperous economy fueled in
Friends, whether you like or hate
how and why we got into this war,
the fact is America . . . has assumed
large part by Iraq’s vast oil wealth, a sec-
ular democratic government in which responsibility for rebuilding Iraq.
ethnic and religious groups share We are talking about one of the
power, and a modern, educated, and biggest nation-building projects
free society that creates a shining the U.S. has ever undertaken, the
example for other Arab nations in the mother of all long hauls. We now
Middle East. The Iraq that emerged as have a 51st state of 23 million peo-
of June 2003, however, was a country ple.We just adopted a baby called
very much in transition, still in disor- Baghdad . . . [and] raising that
der, angry about its occupation by for- baby, in the neighborhood it lives
eigners, and only beginning a long in, is going to be a mammoth
struggle toward democracy and pros- task.62
perity. As a result, the United States had
to shelve its early, optimistic plans for The Delay of Iraqi Self-Rule
a rapid reconstruction, power transi- The United States, in keeping with its
tion, and troop pullout to accept that goal of avoiding the “occupier” label
the birthing of a new Iraq would be a in Iraq and turning over power to
much longer, harder, and more dan- Iraqis as quickly as possible, initially
gerous job, for both Americans and projected that a transitional Iraqi gov-
Iraqis. As New York Times columnist ernment would be formed shortly
Thomas L. Friedman put it, after the war’s end.

74
 Challenges for the New Iraq

The first meeting with various Iraqi fac- among other things, that the new Iraq must
tions to discuss forming a provisional gov- be democratic and that Saddam’s Baath
ernment for Iraq was held on April 15 in Party must be dissolved.
the southern city of Ur. It included all three A second general meeting was held on
ethnic groups (Kurds, Sunnis, and Shias) April 28, Saddam Hussein’s sixty-sixth birth-
from inside Iraq as well as Iraqis who had day. Like the first meeting, it attracted dele-
spent years in exile. Thousands of Shia gates from inside and outside Iraq, including
Muslims, however, boycotted the gathering Shiite and Sunni Muslim clerics, Kurds from
as a protest against the American military the north, Arab tribal chiefs, and Iraqi exiles.
occupation of Iraq. The meeting produced The group, with U.S. encouragement, decid-
a thirteen-point communique declaring, ed at this time to hold a national conference

A man speaks at the April 28, 2003, general meeting during which representatives from Iraq’s many
political and ethnic groups voted to hold a national conference to select a transitional government.

75
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

in May 2003 to select a “transitional gov- for quickly turning over control to an Iraqi
ernment” for Iraq, a term referring to an transitional government. Instead, L. Paul
Iraq-led interim governing body. Under this Bremer, the new American administrator,
plan, fully approved by the United States, announced on May 16 that the coalition
Iraqis were to be quickly granted governing would remain in charge of Iraq for an indef-
power over Iraq. Former U.S. administrator inite period. In making the announcement,
Jay Garner promised,“Next week, or by the Bremer explained that a U.S.-led “interim
second week in May [2003], you’ll see the authority” could assist Iraq in creating a
beginning of a nucleus of a temporary Iraqi constitution and developing democratic
government, a government with an Iraqi face elections and that the delay would allow
on it that is totally dealing with the coali- time to broaden participation in the Iraqi
tion.” 63 leadership. John Sawers, a British diplomat
In mid-May, however, the United States representing British prime minister Tony
and Britain abruptly reversed their plans Blair, however, suggested that the allies

Demonstrators take to the streets of Baghdad in May 2003 to protest the prolonged American
occupation of Iraq after the war.

76
 Challenges for the New Iraq

delayed the hand-over of power to Iraqis Iraqi government. They also planned to
because of fear that that a divided or weak send delegations to Washington and
interim government, given the continuing London to lobby for quick elections. The
disorder, could not control Iraq. He said, leadership council comprises groups such
“It’s quite clear that you cannot transfer all the two main Kurdish factions in northern
powers onto some interim body, because it Iraq, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad
will not have the strength or the resources Chalabi, the Iraqi National Accord of Iyad
to carry those responsibilities out.” 64 Alawi, the Shiite Muslim movement of
Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, the
Iraqi Anger over the Delay Shiite Dawa Party, and the democratic
For their part, Iraqis were greatly disap- movement of Nasir al-Chadirchy.
pointed with the decision. “I don’t think Following the Iraqi complaints, as part
they trust this group [referring to the ini- of an effort to involve Iraqis in decision-
tial group of Iraqi political factions that making, Bremer met with Iraqi political
emerged in Iraq] to function as a political groups and promised to hold a national
leadership,” 65 said one Iraqi political figure. conference in July to create an interim Iraqi
Others expressed stronger anger over the political council of twenty-five to thirty
decision. Adel Abdel Mahdi, political advis- Iraqis to help administer the country.
er to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Bremer also agreed to hold a national con-
Revolution, one of Iraq’s largest Shia polit- ference to appoint an all-Iraqi commission
ical groups, for example, openly accused that would be charged with drafting a new
the United States of reneging on promises constitution for Iraq. These Iraqi bodies,
to support the rapid creation of an Iraqi- however, would not be independent but
led interim government. His comments would operate under U.S. authority.
reflected the disappointment felt by many However, the Iraqi leadership council
other groups, including Kurdish political continued to criticize Bremer’s plans. In
groups and the Iraqi National Congress. On response to the leadership council’s
May 25, in one of the strongest shows of demands, Bremer modified his original
dissatisfaction, an estimated ten thousand plan for an interim Iraqi political council
Shia Muslims protested in Baghdad, by agreeing to give the council more power
demanding that the United States turn over in naming ministers to an interim admin-
power to an Iraqi government and with- istration and in making recommendations
draw its troops from the country. for a new currency, oil production, eco-
That same day, several of the main Iraqi nomic strategy, and education reform.
political groups, who call themselves the Nevertheless, one of the leadership coun-
“leadership council,” decided to submit a cil’s main political factions and a leading
formal protest to U.S. authorities com- Shia Muslim party, the Supreme Council for
plaining about the delay in setting up an the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, announced

77
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Shiite Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (left), Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi (third from left), former
foreign minister Adnan Pachichi (facing page, left), and Kurdish leader Jalal Talibani (facing page, right)
from Iraq’s main political groups formed the Leadership Council in an effort to restore self-rule in Iraq.

that it would not join Bremer’s Iraqi polit- tions on Iraq. On May 22 the UN Security
ical council if its members were appointed Council voted unanimously to allow the
by Americans. United States and Britain to occupy and
Bremer also encountered trouble for rebuild Iraq and to end nearly thirteen years
his plan for a constitutional commission. of sanctions. The resolution also gave a lim-
On June 30, Iraq’s leading moderate Shia ited role to a United Nations special repre-
cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued sentative to help create a new Iraqi
a fatwa, or religious ruling, rejecting the government; Sergio Vieira de Mello, a long-
idea of an American-controlled constitu- time UN executive, was chosen for this posi-
tional commission, arguing that Iraqis tion.
should elect the drafters of their constitu- The UN vote was a significant diplo-
tion. Despite the difficulties Bremer was matic victory for the Bush administration,
encountering, however, it seemed clear that because France, Germany, and Russia, who
Iraqi political groups, at least temporarily, strongly opposed the war in Iraq, agreed to
had lost the chance to take full control of support the resolution and to accept almost
postwar Iraq. complete U.S. control of postwar Iraq.
Indeed, the effect of the vote was to give the
UN Approval of the American United States and Britain control, not only
Occupation over Iraq’s political development, but also
The United States, simultaneously, was over its billions of dollars in annual oil rev-
seeking UN support for a resolution that enues. U.S. officials had been anxious to get
would both legitimize U.S. authority over Iraq’s oil flowing and have promised that
postwar Iraq and lift UN economic sanc- these oil revenues will be used to finance

78
 Challenges for the New Iraq

was awarded the first main

reconstruction contract, im-
mediately began working to
repair electrical and other ser-
vices. It quickly had potential
subcontractors from all over
the world lining up to bid for
the various subcontracts nec-
essary for other reconstruc-
tion efforts. Some of these
early reconstruction efforts
were frustrated, however, by
reconstruction in Iraq. The U.S. power over looters who stole necessary repair items
Iraq, according to the terms of the resolu- such as copper cable used for electrical
tion, will expire when an internationally wiring in high-tension power lines. In addi-
recognized representative government takes tion, because the problems in Iraq were
power in Iraq, a goal that may take several more serious than first anticipated, the
years to reach. United States decided to focus on emer-
gency repairs rather than on major recon-
Reconstruction and Rebuilding struction of Iraq’s crumbling electricity and
the Iraqi Oil Industry water and sanitation systems. Later, Bechtel
In addition to the political challenges that hopes to persuade U.S. officials and legis-
come with the deposing of a twenty-four- lators to undertake more comprehensive
year-long authoritarian regime and the cre- water, sewage, and electricity rebuilding
ation of a democracy where none has ever projects.
existed before, U.S. administrators also face Another step important to reviving
the huge job of rebuilding Iraq’s economy. Iraq’s economy was acquiring financing to
The Baath Party’s pillage of Iraq’s wealth, pay for reconstruction and rebuilding. In
combined with years of economic sanctions late May, U.S. administrator Bremer
and several wars, left the country’s econo- announced the opening of bank credit
my shattered. Fixing it will require not only lines to allow Iraq to pay for goods and ser-
restoration of basic services and infra- vices essential to its reconstruction. In
structure (such as roads, bridges, and build- addition, U.S. administrators expect some
ings) but also the rebuilding of important Iraqi cash to help pay for reconstruction
Iraqi industries, especially its oil industry. costs. Fortunately American troops have
Reconstruction began early after the recovered close to $1 billion believed to
war ended but was expected to take some have been stolen from Iraq’s Central Bank
time. Bechtel, the American company that just before the war by Saddam Hussein’s

79
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

son, Qusay. U.S. forces later discovered restoring the country’s oil production. The
another $250 million in American cur- end of sanctions will allow Iraq to export
rency in the flooded basement vault of the oil more freely than under Hussein’s regime
Central Bank. and should eventually bring in a sizable
Yet another important economic pri- income for Iraq. Thanks to U.S. efforts and
ority to help pay for reconstruction was the work of talented Iraqi oil engineers and

Iraq’s Oil
Iraq’s southern fields are officials and a former American oil execu-
among the largest of Iraq’s tive to this team. This advisory group will
oil reserves and were among the first areas likely make important decisions such as
secured by U.S. forces when the war began. whether Iraq’s oil industry will be owned
Experts predicted the southern Rumeila oil by private companies or the government
field, for example, could produce up to 1.1 and whether foreign companies will be per-
million barrels a day within weeks after the mitted such ownership rights.
end of the war. Total oil production in Iraq, The issue of who will control and own
according to the Iraqi Oil Ministry, could Iraqi oil is highly controversial and very
reach the country’s prewar output of 2 to 3 important to both Iraqis and U.S. officials,
million barrels a day in about eighteen because there is a widespread belief in Iraq
months. and throughout the Arab world that one of
As of the end of May 2003, however, the the main motives behind the U.S. war was
postwar Iraqi oil production was still only a for America to get control of Iraq’s vast oil
fraction of its prewar level due to damage to reserves. As columnist and TV commenta-
refineries and pipelines. Indeed, production tor Rami G. Khouri explained in a May 19,
was so low that, in a country awash in oil, 2003, article in Maclean’s, “Most analysts
the U.S. military was forced to truck in more and ordinary citizens believe the U.S. wants
than a million gallons of gasoline a day just to control Iraq’s oil, secure a permanent
to meet the country’s domestic needs. Mideast military foothold from which to
Meanwhile, the issue of who will control dominate and pacify the region, and reduce
Iraqi oil has yet to be resolved. Under a May the incidence of terror emanating from the
22, 2003, United Nations resolution, the area.” The failure to turn up weapons of
United States was given broad authority mass destruction, which was President
over Iraq’s economy, including its oil indus- Bush’s main justification for going to war,
try. However, prior to the vote on the reso- has made critics of America even more sus-
lution, the U.S. administration set up an oil picious about whether the United States
advisory team, comprised of both Iraqis will try to take over Iraq’s oil. Nevertheless,
and Americans, that was to be responsible U.S. officials promised that Iraqi oil belongs
for running the country’s oil industry. On to Iraqis. Whether that promise will be kept
May 3, U.S. officials named two Iraqi oil has yet to be shown.

80
 Challenges for the New Iraq

On June 22, 2003, these two oil tankers became the first to export Iraqi oil since the war began.
Here, the tankers wait at a terminal in Turkey to unload 2 million barrels of oil.

technicians, oil began flowing, both from

Iraq’s southern fields and from oil fields in
Restoring Jobs
northern Iraq in May. On June 22, Iraq Another critical challenge for U.S. officials
exported its first oil since the end of the war. in Iraq was providing jobs and getting the
However, steady oil exports were delayed economy moving. The war and postwar
because of severe looting and sabotage of chaos all but destroyed business activity
oil facilities during the months following in Iraq, and U.S. administrators disband-
the war. As a result, production as of early ed the country’s largest employer—the
July 2003 leveled off at roughly eight hun- government—leaving thousands of work-
dred thousand barrels a day, significantly ers unemployed. For example, about
less than the prewar goal of 2 to 3 million 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and civilians lost their
barrels a day. jobs when American officials dissolved the

81
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Ministries of Defense and Information, promised to recruit ex-soldiers for a new Iraqi
approximately 250,000 people used to work army, as long as they were not Baath Party
for government ministries that no longer officers. In addition, the Iraqi government,
are functioning, as many as 96,000 work- with U.S. permission, began making pay-
ers were idled from Iraq’s state-owned busi- ments to about two hundred thousand mil-
nesses, and an additional 60,000 people are itary officers and paying full salaries to
now unemployed who worked for Iraq’s approximately 1.3 million employees of gov-
military and weapons companies. ernment ministries and Iraq’s government-
In the face of protests and threats of sui- owned companies, even though there was no
cide bombings from unemployed army and work for them to do. As for business activi-
government workers, U.S. administrator ty, many stores and small businesses in
Bremer announced a $70 million temporary Baghdad reopened in May, although many
jobs program that would pay Iraqis low wages closed early because of fears that they would
to collect trash and rebuild schools. He also be robbed after dark by looters and thieves.

U.S. soldiers hand out application forms for the new Iraqi army. Offering Iraqis jobs in the new army
was part of Bremer’s efforts to rebuild Iraq’s stalled economy.

82
 Challenges for the New Iraq

agement, outdated equipment, and a lack

Encouraging Business
of marketing skills. In the new Iraq the
Investment
relaxation of import restrictions will add a
Ultimately, rebuilding Iraq’s economy will new challenge—a veritable landslide of
require individuals and businesses to invest international companies who will want to
in Iraqi companies. U.S. administrator sell their products to Iraqis and compete
Bremer indicated that America’s priority is with Iraqi companies. As of July 2003, how-
to shift Iraq’s economy from the state indus- ever, these concerns were not an issue
tries to the private sector. Closing state because investors considered Iraq to be still
industries that are losing money will be dif- too unstable for them to make major finan-
ficult because of the hardships that would cial commitments.
be created for their employees who would
lose their jobs, but the U.S. officials believe Preventing a Baath Party
such actions will be necessary to attract Resurgence
investment and make industry in Iraq com- As American forces fought to restore order,
petitive in the world economy. they began to face two new threats to securi-
Experts expect that small entrepreneurs ty in postwar Iraq—a spate of increasingly
are likely to be the first to invest in Iraq’s serious sniper and hit-and-run guerrilla
economy. Eventually, however, as security attacks on U.S. and British soldiers and inci-
improves, experts predict that bigger com- dents of sabotage on oil pipelines, the
panies and foreign investors will see the Baghdad electrical system, a liquid natural
advantage of investing in business oppor- gas plant, and other important infrastructure
tunities in the new Iraq. Some of these sites. Most of the attacks on soldiers occurred
investors may come from a small group of in central Iraq, considered to be a stronghold
Iraqi merchant families who existed even of former members of the Baath Party.
before Saddam Hussein’s rule and who The guerrilla attacks and sabotage,
remain very wealthy today. although not a serious threat to military
Experts warn, however, that investors forces, greatly increased the insecurity of
in the new Iraq should be prepared to investors about Iraq, made life more diffi-
weather many challenges, not only imme- cult for Iraqis, and caused military casual-
diate ones such as lack of power, difficulties ties at a time when Americans at home
with communication and transportation, believed the war was over. Indeed, the num-
and the updating of equipment, but also bers of U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq since May
longer-range problems such as an expect- 1, the day President Bush declared major
ed increase in imports. Iraq’s businesses combat over, eventually exceeded the num-
have been weakened by many disadvantages ber killed during the war.
over a long period of time, including UN U.S. officials attributed the attacks on
economic sanctions, Hussein’s bad man- soldiers to remnants of the Baath Party of

83
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Saddam Hussein and members of the that Hussein was still alive and in hiding in
Saddam Fedayeen paramilitary force. The Iraq, waiting to stage a coup if the U.S. effort
sabotage incidents also appeared to be the to govern the country faltered. Experts admit
work of pro-Saddam loyalists. These that Hussein’s party has a long history of sur-
attacks were believed to be part of a plan vival and self-preservation, as well as expe-
prepared by Hussein’s government before rience in working underground and in
the war, based on a document found in secret. As Saad Obeidi, a psychological war-
the southern Iraqi city of Basra dated fare specialist assisting the American mili-
January 23 and purportedly prepared by tary, explains,
the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The docu-
Time has always been the backbone
ment called for a sabotage campaign in
of Saddam’s strategy. He is a man who
case Hussein’s regime was overthrown and
knows the psychology and sociology
outlined various types of sabotage, such
of Iraq. The looting and disorder we
as looting and burning government
see now fall in his favor. Americans
offices, sabotaging power plants, cutting
have to act fast. People will forget all
communication lines, and attacking water
about the Baath Party if order and
purification plants.
prosperity return.67
The American administrator of Iraq,
L. Paul Bremer III, vowed that the attacks In an effort to help prevent a resurgence
would not deter U.S. efforts to reconstruct of Hussein and his Baath Party, the U.S.
Iraq:“We’re certainly not panicked,” he said, administrator in Iraq banned between fif-
“We’re not going to get deflected from our teen and thirty thousand Baath Party offi-
direction by an attack now and then, trag- cials from participation in any future Iraqi
ic as it may be.” 66 In response to the guer- government. In addition, the United States
rilla attacks, the United States stepped up disbanded the armed forces, the Republican
patrols, conducted more house-to-house Guard, the Defense Ministry, and the
searches, and in late June carried out an Information Ministry, all of which sup-
aggressive series of raids, seeking to root ported the most repressive activities of
out and intimidate the troublemakers. Hussein’s regime. However, it is not prov-
Troops arrested numerous Iraqis and seized ing easy to get rid of Baath Party officials.
some weapons and documents but as of Often, these people are the only ones with
July 2003 had not uncovered any major expertise, and as a result senior party offi-
pockets of resistance. This heightened mil- cials were often hired by U.S. authorities in
itary response, unfortunately, only increased their efforts to stabilize Iraq.
resentment among ordinary Iraqis toward As might be expected, these appoint-
the American occupation. ments drew protests from local Iraqis. For
Also, as of fall 2003, although U.S. forces example, in early May hundreds of Iraqi
located and killed his two sons, most believed doctors, nurses, and health workers de-

84
 Challenges for the New Iraq

An Iraqi child heaves a rock at a burning U.S. army vehicle that was destroyed by a guerrilla attack in
Baghdad.

monstrated against the U.S. appointment of the country’s most able administra-
of Ali al-Janabi, a senior Baath Party mem- tors.
ber, to be minister of health for Iraq. Similar
protests occurred at other Iraqi min- Bridging Iraq’s Ethnic and
istries. The cost of “de-Baathification,” it Religious Differences
seemed, would be not only the loss of In addition to uprooting Baath Party loy-
American lives fighting former Baath alists, American administrators worry that
Party members but also the loss of some the overthrow of Saddam Hussein will lead

85
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

An American soldier passes an army truck ambushed by guerrillas. U.S. officials attribute most of the
guerrilla attacks to Baath Party loyalists and the Saddam Fedayeen paramilitary force.

to renewed religious and ethnic strife Since the war’s end, for example, the
among Iraq’s other ethnic groups. Dis- Kurds have been returning to the cities and
agreements between the three groups—the towns where they grew up, leading to eth-
Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis—were controlled nic clashes with Arab residents that were
during Hussein’s rule largely because Sunnis located into Kurdish areas by Saddam
held complete power and brutally repressed Hussein. Hussein’s brutal ethnic cleansing
the two other sects. Since the end of the war, campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s threw
however, the absence of a government or many Kurdish citizens out of their homes
other strong authority has led not only and brought in Arabs to replace them; in
Hussein’s Sunni loyalists but also the two this way Hussein acquired control over the
other ethnic groups to defend their ethnic rich oil resources of northern Iraq. In the
identities and compete for power in post- first months after the war, Kurds reclaimed
war Iraq. the major northern cities of Kirkuk and

86
 Challenges for the New Iraq

Mosul and hundreds of other towns and who have long been persecuted by
villages. Kurds even felt safe enough to Hussein’s Sunni government, have also
return to Halabja, a town that Hussein had been jousting for power since the war
attacked with chemical weapons in 1988. ended. The Shias share the Islamic religion
The returning Kurds, however, have been but, in the postwar period, divisions
confronting Arabs, leading to ethnic clash- between different Shia religious leaders
es and gunfights. In May, for example, have resulted in confrontations and vio-
fighting in Kirkuk left nine people dead. lence. In April, for example, Sheik Abdel
In addition, Kurdish leaders announced Majid al-Khoei, a well-known Shia cleric,
that they would force Arabs who came to was murdered by a mob just days after he
northern cities during Saddam Hussein’s returned to Iraq from exile.
rule to leave those areas. Confrontations also have taken place
The Shias (or Shiites), who make up between the followers of other rival clerics
almost two-thirds of Iraq’s population but who are competing for political power.

A Kurdish man in Kirkunarab (left) is forced from his home ny the Kurdish man on the right. Displaced
Kurds have reclaimed Kirkuk and other towns Saddam Husseim forced them to abandon.

87
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Until he was killed by a bomb blast in ment. The fear of many, however, is that
August 2003 Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr the majority of Shias might try to create an
al-Hakim lead the Supreme Council of the Islamic government that imposes funda-
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, one of the most mentalist Muslim religious values as state
popular Shia groups in Iraq. Another pop- policy. This could upset U.S. support and
ular cleric whose followers often protested alienate other powerful tribal and ethnic
Hakim’s appearances was Moktada al-Sadr, leaders that will be important for a stable
a thirty-year-old who emerged shortly after and united Iraq.
the fall of Baghdad. Both Ayatollah Hakim
and Sadr are opposed to the American pres- The Future of Iraq
ence in Iraq and seek to create an Islamic Around the world and in Iraq, reaction to
government in Iraq. Other more moderate the U.S.-led war and the overthrow of
Shia leaders, although less prominent, are Saddam Hussein’s regime varied, but the
believed to favor a separation of religion one point most seemed to agree on was that
and government. the United States should leave Iraq as soon
The U.S. hope is that a democratic gov- as possible, leaving Iraqis the freedom to
ernment can be created in Iraq that allows govern themselves. The United States
all three main ethnic groups to share power appeared to share this vision and initially
and that separates religion from govern- planned for a quick turnover of power to

Kurdish Hopes for Independence

Because of historic perse- No Kurd can dissuade himself of the
cution at the hands of right to self-determination, but . . . we
Hussein and others, the Kurds have long know the possibility of a Kurdish state
strived for an independent Kurdish state. in Iraq is a very distant one. The tan-
With American protection, they have suc- gible thing for us is to work for a fed-
cessfully governed their own independent eral democracy and be a full-fledged
region in northern Iraq since the time of Iraqi citizen.
the first Persian Gulf war in 1991. Kurdish leaders, therefore, have been
For practical and political reasons, working with American forces and can be
Kurdish political leaders have agreed to expected to be an influential voice in any new
become part of the new Iraq, but most Iraqi government. There is a fear, however,
Kurdish people would prefer a separate that they could seek to break away from Iraq
Kurdish nation. Barham Salih, governor of if Iraq’s new government does not provide
the eastern Kurdish enclave, in a 2003 New them with security and some measure of self-
York Times article explained, rule.

88
 Challenges for the New Iraq

an Iraqi interim authority and a quick pull- Therefore, it appeared that Iraq’s future
out of U.S. troops. However, the reality of would be a period of difficult transition and
postwar Iraq soon changed U.S. plans. that the United States would be responsi-
Disorder continued and obstacles to recon- ble for Iraq for some time to come. For
struction mounted, making it clear that the Iraqis already chafing under the U.S. and
United States would have to stay in Iraq British occupation, this was not welcome
longer than expected. To do otherwise news. If, however, the United States can
would risk anarchy, which could result in withstand the pressure from critics, actu-
either the return of Saddam Hussein or the ally improve the lives of Iraqis, and help
rise to power of yet another strongman like them create a government that promises
him. Such a result would negate the strug- real freedom, the United States may yet
gle to liberate Iraq and condemn it to even claim the mantle of “liberator,” and Iraq’s
more suffering. future may, indeed, turn bright.

89
Notes
Introduction: Winning the Peace Session of Congress and the Nation,
1. Thomas L. Friedman, “Because We Washington, DC, September 20, 2001.
Could,” New York Times, June 4, 2003. www.white house. gov.
16. George W. Bush, President’s State of the
Chapter One: Union Address, Washington, DC, January
Iraq’s History of Aggression and Arms 29, 2002. www.whitehouse. gov.
2. Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam. 17. Bush, President’s State of the Union
New York: St. Martin’s, 1994, p. 178. Address.
3. Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein, The 18. Bush, President’s State of the Union
Politics of Revenge. New York: Bloomsbury, Address.
2000, p. 2. 19. Dick Cheney, speech to the Veterans of
4. Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention,
p. 231. August 26, 2002. www.whitehouse. gov.
5. Quoted in Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to 20. Richard Butler, Statement at the Senate
Saddam, p. 246. Foreign Relations Committee,Washington,
6. Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, DC, July 31, 2002. www.iraqwatch.org.
p. 233. 21. Quoted in William Safire, “Clear Ties of
7. Quoted in Aburish, Saddam Hussein, The Terror,” New York Times, January 27, 2003.
Politics of Revenge, p. 100. 22. Al Gore, speech to the Commonwealth
8. Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, Club, San Fransisco, September 9, 2002.
p. 249. www.gore2004us.com.
9. Quoted in Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: 23. David R. Gergen, “It’s Time to Speak
The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. New York: Loudly,”U.S. News & World Report, August
Routledge Chapman & Hall, 1991, p. 35. 19, 2002.
10. Con Coughlin, Saddam: King of Terror. 24. Quoted in New York Times, “Interview
New York: HarperCollins, 2002, p. 238. with Jacques Chirac,” September 9, 2002.
11. Coughlin, Saddam: King of Terror, 25. George W. Bush, speech to the United
p. 255. Nations, New York, September 12, 2002.
12. Quoted in Coughlin, Saddam: King of
www.whitehouse. gov.
Terror, p. 256.
26. Resolution 1441, adopted by the United
13. Coughlin, Saddam: King of Terror, p. 263.
Nations at Security Council meeting
14. The White House, “A Decade of
4644, November 8, 2002. www.cnn.com.
Deception and Defiance,” September 12,
27. Resolution 1441.
2002. http://usinfo.state.gov.
28. Quoted in United Nations, United Nations
Chapter Two: The Axis of Evil and Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Diplomatic Efforts to Disarm Iraq Commission,Notes for Briefing the Security
15. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Council, January 9, 2003. www.un.org.

91
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

29. Colin Powell, speech to the United Regime Is in Disarray,’ U.S. Commander
Nations, New York, February 5, 2003. Says,” New York Times, April 9, 2003.
www.state.gov. 43. Quoted in David E. Sanger and Thom
30. Powell, speech to the United Nations. Shanker,“Bush Says Regime in Iraq Is No
31. Draft Resolution on Iraq by the United More; Syria Is Penalized,” New York Times,
States, Great Britain, and Spain, circulat- April 15, 2003.
ed to the UN Security Council on 44. Quoted in Dexter Filkins, “Hunting
February 23, 2003. www.cnn.com. Hussein, U.S. Attacks Mosque,” New York
32. Quoted in Associated Press,“Bush Warns Times, April 11, 2003.
Allies Against Inaction in Confronting 45. Quoted in Warren Hoge, “A Letter Said
Baghdad,” January 21, 2003. to Be from Saddam Hussein Urges Iraqis
33. Quoted in Associated Press,“Bush Warns to Rebel,” New York Times, April 30, 2003.
Allies Against Inaction in Confronting 46. New York Times, “The Quest for Illicit
Baghdad.” Weapons,” April 18, 2003.
34. Memo submitted to United Nations 47. Quoted in David E. Sanger,“Viewing the
Security Council by France, Germany, War as a Lesson to the World,” New York
and Russia on February 24, 2003. www. Times, April 5, 2003.
cnn.com. 48. Quoted in Christopher Marquis,
35. George W. Bush, speech to the nation, “World’s View of U.S. Sours After Iraq
March 17, 2003. www.whitehouse.gov. War, Poll Finds,” New York Times, June
4, 2003.
Chapter Three:
Shock and Awe in Twenty-Six Days Chapter Four:
36. Quoted in Marc Santora,“From Hussein, The Aftermath of War in Iraq
Defiance and Praise for His Troops,” New 49. Associated Press, “Partial Count Finds
York Times, March 24, 2003. Many Civilians Killed,” San Diego Union-
37. New York Times,“A New War,” March 24, Tribune, June 11, 2003.
2003. 50. Economist (US), “The Other Battle;
38. Quoted in Jim Dwyer, “A Gulf Com- Humanitarian Assistance,” April 5, 2003.
mander Sees a Longer Road,” New York 51. Economist (US), “The Other Battle.”
Times, March 28, 2003. 52. Quoted in Reuters,“Red Cross Urges U.S.
39. Quoted in R.W. Apple Jr., “Bush Moves to Secure Baghdad’s Hospitals,”April 11,
to Prepare Public for a Harder War,” New 2003.
York Times, March 24, 2003. 53. George W. Bush, remarks at the Pentagon,
40. Quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Tanks Washington, DC, March 25, 2003. www.
Make Quick Strike into Baghdad,” New whitehouse. gov.
York Times, April 6, 2003. 54. Quoted in Edmund L. Andrews and
41. Dick Cheney, speech at the American Susan Sachs,“Iraq’s Slide into Lawlessness
Society of Newspaper Editors, New Squanders Good Will for U.S.,” New York
Orleans, April 9, 2003. www.command- Times, May 17, 2003.
post.org. 55. Frank Rich, “And Now: ‘Operation Iraqi
42. Quoted in John M. Broder, “‘Today the Looting,’” New York Times, April 28, 2003.

92
 Notes

56. Quoted in Andrews and Sachs, “Iraq’s Chapter Five:

Slide into Lawlessness Squanders Good Challenges for the New Iraq
Will for U.S.” 62. Thomas L. Friedman, “Our New Baby,”
57. Quoted in Maureen Dowd, “History up New York Times, May 12, 2003.
in Smoke,” New York Times, April 16, 63. Quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, “Opposition
2003. Groups to Help to Create Assembly in
58. Terence Neilan, “Bremer Says U.S. Is Iraq,” New York Times, May 5, 2003.
Tackling Security Problem in Baghdad,” 64. Quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, “In Reversal,
New York Times, May 15, 2003. Plan for Iraq Self-Rule Has Been Put Off,”
New York Times, May 15, 2003.
59. Terence Neilan, “Bremer Says U.S. is
65. Tyler,“In Reversal, Plan for Iraq Self-Rule
Tackling Security Problem in Baghdad.”
Has Been Put Off.”
60. Quoted in Eric Schmitt, “Senators 66. Neela Banerjee, “Marching in Baghdad,
Sharply Criticize Iraq Rebuilding Efforts,” Thousands of Shiites Protest Against the
New York Time, May 22, 2003. U.S.,” New York Times, May 20, 2003.
61. Thomas L. Friedman,“Iraq Fast Becoming 67. Quoted in Amy Waldman,“Bremer Says
Yesterday’s Story,” New York Times, May More Attacks Won’t Deter the Allies,” New
22, 2003. York Times, June 29, 2003.

93
Chronology
3100 B.C. 1984
The ancient civilization of Sumer is founded United Nations (UN) investigators report that
and develops systems of irrigation, trade, and Iraq uses mustard gas and the nerve gas Tabun
writing. against Iranians in Iran-Iraq War.

A.D. 1533–1534 1987

Iraq is conquered by the Ottoman Empire. August 20 A UN ceasefire goes into effect to
end the Iran-Iraq War.
1920
Iraq is created in its current boundaries as a 1988
British colonial monarchy. Saddam Hussein uses chemical weapons against
civilian Kurds in the town of Halabja, leaving
1932 five thousand dead and ten thousand wound-
Iraq becomes a sovereign state. ed, and destroying thousands of villages.

1958 1990
Iraq becomes a republic. The monarchy is over- August 2 Iraq invades Kuwait. The UN Security
thrown in a military coup led by General Karim Council unanimously passes Resolution 660,
Qasim. condemning the invasion and demanding
unconditional and immediate withdrawal.
1968 August 6 The UN Security Council passes
The Baath Party seizes power in Iraq; Resolution 661, imposing economic sanctions.
Saddam Hussein’s cousin Bakr becomes
November 29 The Security Council passes
president; Hussein arises as a key leader in
Resolution 678, authorizing member states to
the Party.
use force unless Iraq leaves Kuwait by January
1974–1975 15, 1991.
Kurds rebel, with the backing of the shah of
1991
Iran. Saddam Hussein instrumental in sup- April 4 The UN Security Council passes
pressing a Kurdish rebellion by negotiating an Resolution 687, creating the United Nations
end to Iranian support for the Kurds. In Special Committee on Iraq (UNSCOM) to
exchange Iraq agrees to share sovereignty of the monitor and verify Iraqi compliance with UN
Shatt al-Arab waterway, which provides access disarmament requirements, and requiring the
to the Persian Gulf. certified destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction as a condition for ending economic
1979
sanctions.
Saddam Hussein becomes president, purges all
opposition through terror. 1995
September 22 Iraq attacks Iran, Iran-Iraq War Hussein Kamel al-Majid, who headed Iraq’s
begins. weapons of mass destruction program, defects,

95
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

and the world learns that Iraq had a large bio- November 8 The UN passes Resolution 1441,
logical weapons program and had weaponized giving Hussein one last chance to disarm and
some biological agents. authorizing a new team of weapons inspec-
tors to search for weapons in Iraq. The team,
1997 called the UN Monitoring, Verification and
Saddam Hussein declares several weapons Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), begins
inspections sites to be “presidential”and there- inspections in late November 2002.
fore off-limits to UNSCOM.
October 31 Saddam Hussein announces his 2003
refusal to allow any further UN weapons January UNMOVIC and the International
inspections; UNSCOM reports that it has made Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report to the
“significant progress” in disarming Iraq. UN that they had received access to Iraqi facil-
ities but that no weapons of mass destruction
1999 had been discovered. Subsequent reports by
Throughout 1999 and 2000, the United States Blix in February and March make similar
and Britain pursue an aggressive bombing cam- reports.
paign against Iraq under leadership of President February 24 The United States, Britain, and
Clinton. Spain circulate a second UN resolution to
authorize war against Iraq, but it did not pass
2001 due to opposition from countries such as
September 11 U.S.World Trade Center attacked France, Germany, Russia, and China.
by terrorists belonging to Arab terrorist group March 17 Bush announces the U.S. war plans
al-Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden. Later, in a speech to the nation.
reports surface of a meeting in Prague earlier
in 2001 between suicide hijacker Mohammed March 19 The war begins with a missile strike
Atta and an Iraqi intelligence agent, but this is on targets in Baghdad believed to be the com-
not confirmed.No other evidence of Iraqi com- mand post for Saddam Hussein.
plicity in September 11 attack emerges. March 21 The air and land campaign against
Iraq begins.
2002 March 24 Saddam Hussein appears on Iraqi
January 29 U.S. president Bush announces in television and defiantly urges Iraqis to fight.
State of the Union speech that Iraq is one of April 2 U.S. special operations forces rescue
three countries forming an “axis of evil,” threat- army private Jessica Lynch.
ening the world by supporting terrorists and
developing weapons of mass destruction. April 5 A group of American tanks rolls
Thereafter, U.S. president Bush and adminis- through Baghdad.
tration officials repeatedly make comments April 7 American bombers drop bombs on a
indicating support for regime change in Iraq, compound in Baghdad, seeking to kill Hussein
while European allies and Arab states indicate and his top leadership.
strong opposition to any attack on Iraq. April 9 Iraqi citizens and U.S. Marines topple
September 12 U.S. president Bush addresses a statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.
the United Nations, outlining Hussein’s disre- April 15 The U.S. Pentagon says the main
gard for multiple UN resolutions, and asking fighting in Iraq is finished and President Bush
for UN help with Iraqi threat of weapons of declares that “the regime of Saddam Hussein
mass destruction. is no more.” Thereafter, looting erupts through-

96
 Chronology

out Iraq. U.S. forces hold a meeting with vari- Britain to occupy and rebuild Iraq and to end
ous Iraqi political groups to discuss forming a economic sanctions.
provisional government for Iraq. June 2 Bremer meets with Iraqi political
April 28 On Saddam Hussein’s sixty-sixth groups and promises to hold a national con-
birthday, a second meeting of Iraqi political ference in July to create an interim Iraqi polit-
groups decides to hold a national conference ical council, which would be under U.S.
in May to select a “transitional government” authority.
for Iraq. May–June U.S. officials and American recon-
April 30 A newspaper prints a handwritten struction contractors work to restore order,
letter said to be written and signed by Saddam repair electrical and other utilities, and get
Hussein, urging Iraqis to rebel against the Iraqi oil flowing.
invaders. July 22 Acting on a tip, U.S. troops locate and
May 12 Garner is fired and is replaced by a kill Saddam Hussein’s two sons, Qusai and
civilian administrator, L. Paul Bremer III, who Odai.
initiates a tougher security policy to crack August 19 A bomb attack destroys UN head-
down on looting and policies to prevent quarters in Baghdad, kills the UN’s special
Baath Party officials from holding govern- representative in Iraq (Segio Vieira de Mello)
ment jobs. and seventeen others, and wounds one hun-
May 16 Bremer reverses U.S. plans and dred more.
announces that the coalition would remain August 29 A bomb blast outside an Islamic
in charge of Iraq for an indefinite period. shrine kills Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir al-
May 22 The UN Security Council votes Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for
unanimously to allow the United States and Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

97
 For Further Reading
Books Based Largely on Intelligence About
Fred Bratman, War in the Persian Gulf. Banned Arms That Still Haven’t Been
Brookfield, CT: Millbrook, 1991. This is Found. Was America’s Spy Craft
a young adult selection that discusses Wrong—or Manipulated?” Time, June
the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf crisis, from 9, 2003.
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to Earth Island Journal, “The Cost of War,”
the allied victory in 1991. Summer 2003.
Joseph Braude, The New Iraq: Rebuilding Adnan R. Khan, “Killing Was Just a Game:
the Country for Its People, the Middle Hundreds of Iraqis Are Digging
East, and the World. New York: Basic Through Mass Graves in Search of
Books, 2003. This book describes the Relatives,” Maclean’s, June 2, 2003.
effects of wars, sanctions, and Saddam Max Singer, “The Chalabi Factor,” National
Hussein’s rule on Iraq’s economy and Review, April 14, 2003.
the challenges that lie ahead for the Kevin Whitelaw and Mark Mazzetti, “Law
postwar reconstruction of the coun- and Disorder,” U.S. News & World
try. Report, May 26, 2003.
Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat. New Websites
York: PublicAffairs, 2000. This book is Iraq Action Coalition (http://leb.net/IAC).
written by the head of the United An online media and activists’ resource
Nations weapons inspection team that center for groups and activists who
searched Iraq for weapons of mass opposed the war in Iraq.
destruction during the 1990s. It dis- The Iraq Foundation (www.iraqfounda-
cusses that effort and the team’s find- tion. org). A nonprofit, nongovern-
ings. mental organization working for
Paul J. Deegan, Saddam Hussein. Edina, democracy and human rights in Iraq.
MN: Abdo & Daughters, 1990. This is a The Nonviolence Web, Iraq Crisis Anti-
young adult book that examines the life War Homepage (www.nonviolence.
of Saddam Hussein. org). Home to dozens of major U.S.
Leila Merrell Foster, Iraq. New York: peace groups, with articles and infor-
Childrens Press, 1998. This is a book mation about postwar Iraq.
written for young readers describing
United Nations, Office of the Iraq
the geography, history, culture, indus-
Programme Oil-for-Food (www.
try, and people of Iraq.
un.org/Depts/oip). A UN website pro-
Periodicals viding information about the oil-for-
Michael Duffy, “Weapons of Mass food program established by Security
Disappearance: The War in Iraq Was Council Resolution 986 in 1995.

98
 For Further Reading

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) U.S. Department of State, International

(www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact Information Programs (http://usinfo.
book). A government website provid- state.gov/regional/nea/iraq). A govern-
ing geographical, political, economic, ment website providing information
and other information on the country about current political issues and
of Iraq. human rights involving Iraq.

99
 Works Consulted
Books Edmund L. Andrews and Susan Sachs,
Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein, The “Iraq’s Slide into Lawlessness
Politics of Revenge. New York: Squanders Good Will for U.S.,” New
Bloomsbury, 2000. This is a biography York Times, May 17, 2003.
of Saddam Hussein covering his rise to R.W. Apple Jr., “Bush Moves to Prepare
power and his reign as president of Iraq. Public for a Harder War,” New York
Con Coughlin, Saddam: King of Terror. New Times, March 24, 2003.
York: HarperCollins, 2002. This book Associated Press, “Bush Warns Allies Against
traces the life of Saddam Hussein from Inaction in Confronting Baghdad,”
his humble origins to his actions as leader January 21, 2003.
of Iraq on the world stage, based on ———, “Parial Count Finds Many
information from Western intelligence Civilians Killed,” San Diego Union-
and interviews with Iraqi defectors. Tribune, June 11, 2003.
Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Brian Bennett, “Sorting the Bad from the
Military Conflict. New York: Routledge Not So Bad: To Get Iraq Back on Its
Chapman & Hall, 1991. This is an easily Feet, the U.S. Needs Help from Officials
readable account of the war between of the Former Regime. But Which Ones
Iraq and Iran during the years between Are Tolerable?” Time, May 19, 2003.
1980 and 1988. John M. Broder, “‘Today the Regime Is in
Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Iraq, A Country Disarray,’ U.S. Commander Says,” New
Study. Washington, DC: Library of York Times, April 9, 2003.
Business Week, “Whose Fuel Is in U.S. Cars?
Congressj 1988. http://memory.loc.gov.
Increasingly, It’s from Iraq,” June 2002.
This is a Library of Congress study and
Lynette Clemetson, “Thousands in D.C.
report on Iraq, providing a good
Protest Iraq War Plans,” New York
overview of its history, society, economy,
Times, January 20, 2003.
government, military, and foreign policy.
Maureen Dowd, “History up in Smoke,”
Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to
New York Times, April 16, 2003.
Saddam. New York: St. Martin’s, 1994.
Jim Dwyer, “A Gulf Commander Sees a
This book provides a broad history of
Longer Road,” New York Times, March
Iraq from ancient times to the present,
28, 2003.
with a particular focus on twentieth-
Economist (US), “The Other Battle;
century events.
Humanitarian Assistance,” April 5,
Periodicals 2003.
Edmund L. Andrews, “Iraq Sanctions Dexter Filkins, “Hunting Hussein, U.S.
Lifted; Little Relief Expected,” New York Attacks Mosque.” New York Times, April
Times, May 23, 2003. 11, 2003.

100
 Wo r k s C o n s u l t e d

Thomas L. Friedman, “Because We Could,” Tackling Security Problem in

New York Times, June 4, 2003. Baghdad,” New York Times, May 15,
———, “Iraq Fast Becoming Yesterday’s 2003.
Story,” New York Times, May 22, 2003. New York Times, “A New War,” March 24,
———, “Our New Baby,” New York Times, 2003.
May 12, 2003. ———, “Interview with Jacques Chirac,”
David R. Gergen, “It’s Time to Speak September 9, 2002.
Loudly,” U.S. News & World Report, ———, “The Iraq Money Tree,” April 14,
August 19, 2002. 2003.
Joshua Hammer and Colin Soloway, ———, “The Quest for Illicit Weapons,”
“Who’s in Charge Here? The First April 18, 2003.
American Team Leading Iraq Was Stanley Reed, “How to Get Iraq’s Economy
Plagued by Inexperience, Bureaucratic on the Mend,” Business Week, May 26,
Infighting and Inertia,” Newsweek, May 2003.
26, 2003. Reuters, “Red Cross Urges U.S. to Secure
Warren Hoge, “A Letter Said to Be from Baghdad’s Hospitals,” April 11, 2003.
Saddam Hussein Urges Iraqis to Rebel,” Frank Rich, “And Now: ‘Operation Iraqi
New York Times, April 30, 2003. Looting,’” New York Times, April 28,
John B. Judis, “Below the Beltway: Between 2003.
Iraq and a Hard Place,” American William Safire, “Clear Ties of Terror,” New
Prospect, March 25, 2002. York Times, January 27, 2003.
Adnan R. Khan, “The Edge of Anarchy: To David E. Sanger, “Viewing the War as a
Slow Iraq’s Drift into Total Chaos, the Lesson to the World,” New York Times,
U.S. Changes Its Administration in the April 5, 2003.
Country,” Maclean’s, May 26, 2003. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Bush
Rami G. Khouri, “Getting It Right in Iraq: Says Regime in Iraq Is No More; Syria
Young Arabs Want Democratic Is Penalized,” New York Times, April 15,
Governments of Their Own Making,” 2003.
Maclean’s, May 19, 2003. Marc Santora, “From Hussein, Defiance
Charlie LeDuff and David Rohde, “Turkey and Praise for His Troops,” New York
Says It Won’t Send More Troops into Times, March 24, 2003.
Iraq,” New York Times, March 26, 2003. Eric Schmitt, “Senators Sharply Criticize
Melinda Liu, Rod Nordland, and Evan Iraq Rebuilding Efforts,” New York
Thomas, “The Saddam Files,” Times, May 22, 2003.
Newsweek, April 28, 2003. Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Saddam,”
Christopher Marquis, “World’s View of U.S. Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002.
Sours After Iraq War, Poll Finds,” New Marlise Simons, “In the Street, Across
York Times, June 4, 2003. Europe, a Weekend of Antiwar Rallies,”
Judith Miller, “Iraqi Tells of Renovations at New York Times, January 20, 2003.
Sites for Chemical and Nuclear Arms,” David Stout, “U.S. Uncertain Whether Air
New York Times, December 20, 2001. Strike on Baghdad Got Hussein,” New
Terence Neilan, “Bremer Says U.S. Is York Times, March 20, 2003.

101
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

Sabrina Tavernise, “Returning to Iraq, Few ———, speech to the United Nations, New
Kurds Want to Be Part of It,” New York York, September 12, 2002. www.white
Times, May 24, 2003. house.gov.
Patrick E. Tyler, “An Open Secret Is Laid Osama bin Laden, speech made in a video-
Bare at Mass Grave in Iraqi Marsh,” tape aired on Arabic television news
New York Times, May 15, 2003. network Al-Jazeera, October 7, 2001,
———, “In Reversal, Plan for Iraq Self- September 11. News.com.
Rule Has Been Put Off,” New York Richard Butler, Statement at the Senate
Times, May 15, 2003. Foreign Relations Committee,
———, “Opposition Groups to Help to Washington, DC, July 31, 2002.
Create Assembly in Iraq,” New York www.iraqwatch.org.
Times, May 5, 2003. Dick Cheney, speech at the American
———,“U.S. Tanks Make Quick Strike into Society of Newspaper Editors, New
Baghdad,” New York Times, April 6, 2003. Orleans, April 9, 2003. www.com-
Douglas Waller, “Did the U.S. Betray Iraqis mand-post. org.
in 1991?” Time, April 14, 2003. ———, speech to the Veterans of Foreign
Andrew West, “800 Missiles to Hit Iraq in Wars 103rd National Convention,
First 48 Hours,” Sun-Herald, January August 26, 2002. www.whitehouse.
26, 2003. gov.
Stephen Zunes, “Foreign Policy by CNN, “Cheney: ‘Time Is Not on Our Side,’”
Catharsis: The Failure of U.S. Policy March 16, 2003. www.cnn.com.
Toward Iraq,” Arab Studies Quarterly, ———, “European Protesters Fill Cities,”
Fall 2001. February 15, 2003. www.cnn.com.
Draft Resolution on Iraq by the United
Internet Sources States, Great Britain, and Spain, circu-
George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session lated to the UN Security Council on
of Congress and the Nation, February 23, 2003. www.cnn.com.
Washington, DC, September 20, 2001. Al Gore, speech to the Commonwealth
www.whitehouse.gov. Club, San Francisco, September 9,
———, President’s State of the Union 2002. www.gore2004us.com.
Address, Washington, DC, January 29, International Atomic Energy Agency,
2002. www.whitehouse.gov. World Atom, Status of the Agency’s
———, radio address to the nation, April Verification Activities in Iraq as of 8
5, 2003. www.cbsnews. com. January 2003, January 9, 2003. www.
———, remarks at MacDill Air Force Base iaea.org.
Florida, March 26, 2003. www.white Memo submitted to United Nations
house.gov. Security Council by France, Germany,
———, remarks at the Pentagon, and Russia on February 24, 2003. www.
Washington, DC, March 25, 2003. cnn.com.
www.whitehouse.gov. Colin Powell, speech to the United Nations,
———, speech to the nation, January 3, New York, February 5, 2003. www.state.
2003. www.whitehouse.gov. gov.

102
 Wo r k s C o n s u l t e d

Resolution 1441, adopted by the United http://usinfo.state.gov.United Nations,

Nations at Security Council meeting United Nations Monitoring,
4644, November 8, 2002. www.cnn. Verification and Inspection
com. Commission, Notes for Briefing the
The White House, “A Decade of Deception Security Council, January 9, 2003.
and Defiance,” September 12, 2002. www.un.org.

103
 Index
Aburish, Said K., 17 Baghdad, 33
Afghanistan, 30 air strikes on, 46
“coalition of the willing” and, 42 British invasion of, 16
terrorism and, 33 employment and, 82
Albania, 42 falls to U.S., 43, 49–53
allies hospitals in, 65
air power of, 25 National Museum looting and, 66–67
“coalition of willing” and, 42 protests in, 77
criticize U.S., 34–35 red zone around, 51
Gulf War and, 24–25 Baghdad Division, 51
Operation Iraqi Freedom and, 46 Baradei, Mohamed El, 38
troop support from, 72–73 Basra, 16, 47, 63, 84
America. See United States Bechtel, 79
anthrax, 31 bin Laden, Osama, 33, 40
Apache helicopters, 49 Blair, Tony, 35
Arabs, 14, 16–17 Blix, Hans, 37, 38
antiwar protests and, 36 Blount, Buford C., III, 52
“coalition of willing” and, 42 bombs, 10, 45, 55, 60
criticize U.S., 34–35 suicide bombers and, 59, 82
Gulf War and, 24–25 Bremer, L. Paul, III
Kurdish property and, 86–87 appointment of, 70
provisional government and, 75–76 assessment of Iraq, 71
Associated Press, 61 Baath Party and, 84
Atta, Mohamed, 33 economic rebuilding and, 82–83
Australia, 42 interim government issues and, 76–79
axis of evil, 28–34 Britain, 11, 23, 41, 89
Azerbaijan, 42 Afghanistan attack and, 30
Aziz, Tariq, 55 antiwar protests and, 36
Baghdad attack and, 46
Baath Party, 17 “coalition of the willing” and, 42
banned from public office, 70 humanitarian aid and, 66
Command Council of, 21 Iraq creation and, 14, 16–17
economic effects of, 79 Operation Iraqi Freedom and, 46
employment and, 82 provisional government and, 76–77
increased membership of, 20 Resolution 1441 and, 37–38
Khomeini and, 22 supports U.S., 35
militia of, 49 British Petroleum, 21
preventing resurgence of, 83–85 Brooks, Vincent K., 53
search for members of, 53, 55 Bulgaria, 42, 72
violence of, 18–19 Bush, George H.W., 24

104
 Index

Bush, George W., 10 Central Bank and, 79–80

arms inspections and, 25 employment restoration and, 81–82
axis of evil and, 30–31 food and, 62–64
“coalition of the willing” and, 41–42 health care and, 65–66
criticism of, 31, 33, 58 industry rebuilding and, 79–81
declares war, 41–42 Iran-Iraq war and, 23
diplomatic approach of, 35, 37 middle class and, 62
humanitarian aid and, 66 oil and, 21
preemption and, 33, 58 postwar Iraq and, 11–13, 60–73
reports on length of war, 50 UN sanctions and, 25–27
“Shock and Awe” program and, 43–59 war cost and, 12–13
UN occupation approval and, 78–79 Economist (magazine), 62–63
war on terrorism and, 28–35 education, 74, 82
Butler, Richard, 31, 33 Egypt, 14–15, 17
El Salvador, 42, 72
al-Chadrichy, Nasir, 77 employment, 81–82
Chalabi, Ahmad, 77–78 Eritrea, 42
Chemical Ali, 55 Esso, 21
Cheney, Dick, 31, 43, 53 Estonia, 42
China, 41, 58 Ethiopia, 42
Chirac, Jacques, 35 ethnic issues, 74–75, 86–88
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 17 Euphrates River, 14–15
Hussein/bin Laden and, 33
information challenged, 40–41 F-117 Nighthawks, 45
weapons of mass destruction and, 37, 58 Faisal (king of Iraq), 16
civilian casualties, 60–62 fatwa (religious ruling), 78
Clinton, Bill, 34 Fischer, Joschka, 40–41
“coalition of the willing,” 41–42 food, 26, 52–54, 62–64
collateral damage, 60 France, 21, 23
Colombia, 42 approves U.S. occupation, 78–79
communism, 17 opposes war, 35, 41
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, 21 Friedman, Thomas L., 13, 73–74
Coughlin, Con, 18, 23, 25
courts, 18 Garner, Jay, 70, 76
Czech Republic, 33, 42 Geneva Conventions, 65
Georgia, 42
Gergen, David, 35
Al Daawa al Islamiya, 21 Germany
Daawa Party, 77 approves U.S. occupation, 78–79
de-Baathification, 85 opposes war, 35, 41
democracy, 69, 75–77 Gore, Al, 34
Democrats, 31 Greece, 15, 36
Denmark, 42, 72 guerrillas, 47, 83–85
Gulf War, 24–25, 42–43, 88
economic issues
business investment and, 83 Habbaniya, 69

105
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

al-Hakim, Abdul, 78 Kurds and, 21

al-Hakim, Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr, 77, 88 war with Iraq and, 21–23
Halabja, 87 Iraq
Hassan, Karim W., 68 accused of noncooperation, 38–41
health care, 64–66 ancient, 15
Honduras, 72 as axis of evil, 30–31
humanitarian aid, 52–54, 62–66, 68 British creation of, 14, 16–17
Hungary, 42, 72 democracy and, 75–77
Hussein, Qusay, 55, 79–80 employment restoration and, 81–82
Hussein, Saddam ethnic issues in, 74–75, 86–88
attempts to kill, 43–45 future of, 88–89
Baath Party and, 17 Gulf War and, 24–25
business skills of, 83 health care and, 64–66
Daawa Party and, 21 humanitarian aid to, 52–54, 62–66, 68
ethnic cleansing by, 86–87 inspectors removed from, 41–42
Gulf War and, 24–25 Iran war and, 21–23
Kuwait and, 23–24 Kuwait attack and, 23–24
loyal fighters for, 46–53 looting in, 65–70, 79, 82
nepotism of, 20 postwar conditions in, 11–13, 60–73
oil and, 21, 68 power vacuum in, 64, 66, 69–70
refuses to leave, 41 provisional government for, 74–78, 88–89
regime collapse of, 53 religion in, 14, 21, 36, 77–78, 86–88
regrouping of, 13 Resolution 1441 and, 37–38
removal of, 10, 28, 31, 33 “Shock and Awe” program and, 43–59
Republican Guard of, 46 “smoking gun” and, 38–39
return of, 89 terrorism links of, 33–34
rise of, 17–21 UN sanctions and, 25–27
Saddam Fedayeen and, 47 utility restoration and, 63–65, 68–69, 79, 83
search for, 53, 55 see also oil; weapons of mass destruction
seizes presidency, 21 Iraqi Intelligence Service, 84
survival of, 84 Iraqi National Accord, 77
television appearances of, 45, 49, 52 Iraqi National Congress, 77–78
threatens scientists, 39–40 Iraqi Oil Ministry, 67
toppled statue of, 10–11, 52–53 Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), 21
violence of, 14, 18–19, 54, 69, 86–87 Iraq War. See Operation Iraqi Freedom
weapons of mass destruction and, 32 Islam, 14, 21
Islamic Call, 21
India, 16 Islamic Revolution, 21, 77–78, 88
interim government, 76–77 Israel, 19
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Italy, 42, 66
38, 41–42
International Committee of the Red Cross al-Janabi, Ali, 85
(ICRC), 63 Japan, 42
Iran, 58
as axis of evil, 30–31 al-Khoei, Abdel Majid, 88
Khomeini and, 22 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 22

106
 Index

Khouri, Rami G., 80 mobile labs, 57–58

Kirkuk, 53, 87 Mohammad (prophet), 14
Kohut, Andrew, 59 moral issues
Kurds, 17, 27, 53 criticism of U.S., 10–12
ethnic violence and, 86–88 UN sanctions and, 25–26
independence for, 88 Mosul, 53
property reclamation by, 86–87 Muslims. See Islam
provisional government and, 75, 77
Saddam Hussein’s treatment of, 20–21, 23, 32 Najaf, 49
Kuwait Nasiriya, 47
Gulf War and, 23–25 National Museum, 66–67
mass graves and, 69 nerve gas, 31
U.S. antimissile system and, 51 Netherlands, 42
Newsweek (magazine), 54
Latvia, 42 New York Times (newpaper), 13, 49, 58, 68,
leadership council, 77–78 73–74, 88
liberator role, 11, 13 Nicaragua, 42
Lithuania, 42 Nida Division, 51
Liu, Melinda, 54 no-fly zones, 27
looting, 65–70, 79, 82 nomads, 14
Lugar, Richard G., 73 Nordland, Rod, 54
Lynch, Jessica, 48 North Korea
as axis of evil, 30–31
Macedonia, 42 changed position of, 58
Maclean’s, (magazine) 80
Mahawil, 69 Obeidi, Saad, 84
Mahdi, Adel Abdel, 77 oil, 11, 21, 74, 77
al-Majid, Ali Hassan, 55 antiwar protests and, 36
Mansur, 55 destruction of, 46
mass graves, 69 for food, 26, 62–63
media, 18, 46 industry reconstruction and, 79–81
medicine, 63–66 production rate of, 81
Medina Division, 51 protection of, 51, 67–68
Mello, Sérgio Vieira de, 78 Rumeila field and, 80
Mesopotamia, 14–15 weapons and, 23
military Operation Desert Fox, 27
collateral damage and, 60–62 Operation Desert Storm, 24–25, 27
guerrilla attacks and, 83–85 Operation Desert Strike, 27
increased troop numbers and, 70, 72–73 Operation Iraqi Freedom
long-term commitment of, 12–13 air strikes and, 46
Saddam Hussein and, 21 casualties and, 48–49, 60–62
“Shock and Awe” program, 43–59 cost of, 65–66, 72
see also war fall of Baghdad and, 43, 49–53
mines, 63 ground maneuvers and, 46
missiles, 10, 45 guerrillas and, 47
Mobil, 21 health care and, 64–66

107
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

humanitarian efforts and, 62–64 unilateralism and, 34–35, 42

initial strike, 43–45 UN occupation approval and, 78–79
Iraqi resistance and, 43, 46–53 UN sanctions and, 25–27
looting and, 65–70, 79, 82 war on terrorism and, 28–35
Lynch and, 48 war profits and, 72, 79
postwar chaos and, 66–72 weapons of mass destruction and, 55–58
profits from, 72, 79 see also specific political parties
psychological warfare and, 46 Popular Army, 20
Saddam Hussein’s fall and, 53, 55 Powell, Colin, 33
search for Baath Party members and, 53, 55 “coalition of the willing” and, 42
unexpected length of, 50 criticizes Iraq, 38–40
U.S. reputation and, 58–59 “smoking gun” and, 38–39
U.S. troop size and, 49–50 preemption, 33, 58
victory declaration and, 53 propaganda, 20, 48, 72
weather obstacles, 49 psychological warfare, 46, 53
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), 23 al-Qaeda, 28, 30, 33–34, 40
Ottoman rule, 16 Qasim, Abdul Karim, 17
Al Quds al Arabi (newspaper), 55
peace
Iraq War’s effect on, 58–59 Red Cross, 63, 65
postwar chaos and, 66–73 red zone, 51
Perle, Richard, 31 religion, 14, 74
Pew Research Center for the People and the antiwar protests and, 36
Press, 59 Daawa Party and, 21
Philippines, 42 ethnic violence and, 86–88
playing cards (wanted posters), 55 fatwa and, 78
Poland, 42 Islamic Revolution and, 21, 77–78, 88
politics toleration and, 86–88
axis of evil label and, 28–34 see also Shiites; Sunnis
British occupation and, 14, 16–17 Republican Guard, 46, 51, 84
civilian casualties and, 60–62 Republicans, 31
“coalition of the willing” and, 41–42 Resolution 1441, 37–38, 41
democracy and, 69, 75–77 Rich, Frank, 67–68
employment restoration and, 81–82 Romania, 42
Islamic Revolution and, 21, 77–78, 88 Rome, 15
leadership council and, 77 Rumeila oil field, 23, 80
liberator role and, 11–13 Rumsfeld, Donald H., 45, 70
no-fly zones and, 27 Russia, 23
opposition to Iraqi policy and, 31, 33 approves U.S. occupation, 78–79
preemption and, 33, 58 criticizes U.S., 35
provisional government and, 74–78 opposes war, 36, 41
Saddam Hussein and, 14, 18–21
“Shock and Awe” program and, 43–59 Saddam Fedayeen (Martyrs of Saddam), 47, 49,
Sunnis and, 16–17 84
transitional government and, 76 “Saddam Files, The” (Newsweek), 54

108
 Index

Saddam: King of Terror (Coughlin), 18 provisional government and, 75

al-Sadr, Moktada, 88 revolt of, 16
Salih, Barham, 88 Syria, 14, 16, 53, 57–58
Saudi Arabia, 23–24, 59
Sawers, John, 76–77 Taliban, 30
scientists, 39–40 terrorism
security axis of evil and, 30–31
Bremer and, 70–71 Baath Party and, 83–86
postwar chaos and, 66–73 Iraqi links to, 33–34
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 73 Iraq War’s effect on, 58–59
September 11, 2001, 28–30 al-Qaeda and, 28, 33
Shell, 21 Saddam Hussein and, 18
Shiites, 14 September 11, 2001, 28–30
British occupation and, 16–17 suicide bombers and, 59, 82
Daawa Party and, 77 Third Infantry Division, 52, 71
ethnic violence and, 86–88 Thomas, Evan, 54
Islamic Revolution and, 21, 77–78 Tigris River, 14–15
Khomeini and, 22 Tikrit, 17, 53
mass graves of, 69 al-Tikriti, Abid Hamid Mahmoud, 55
neutrality of, 49 al-Tikriti, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan, 55
provisional government and, 75 torture, 18–19, 54, 69, 86–87
revolt of, 16 Turkey, 17, 24, 36, 42
United States and, 27 Tyler, Patrick E., 69
“Shock and Awe” program
air strikes, 46 Ukraine, 72
Baghdad and, 49–53 Umm Qasr, 47, 49, 63
ground strikes, 46 unilateralism, 34–35, 42
initial strike, 43–45 United Nations, 11–12, 59
Iraqi resistance and, 46–50 approves U.S. occupation, 78–79
results of, 58–59 arms inspections by, 25–27, 37–42
Simons, Geoff, 16–17, 19, 21 criticizes U.S., 34–35
al-Sistani, Ayatollah Ali, 78 Gulf War and, 24–25
Slovakia, 42, 72 Iran-Iraq war and, 23
“smoking gun,” 38–39 Iraqi noncooperation with, 38–41
South Korea, 42 Kuwait attack and, 23–24
Soviet Union, 23 Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Spain, 41–42, 66, 72 Commission (UNMOVIC), 37–38, 41–42
Special Republican Guard, 46 oil and, 26, 62–63, 80
suicide bombings, 59, 82 opposes war, 41
Sultan, Jamal Mustafa Abdallah, 55 Powell’s address to, 32
Sumer, 15, 67 removes inspectors, 41–42
Sunnis, 14 Resolution 1441 and, 37–38, 41
Baath Party and, 17 sanctions by, 25–27, 62, 78
British occupation and, 16–17 “smoking gun” and, 38–39
ethnic violence and, 86–88 Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM),
political domination by, 16–17 25, 31

109
T h e Wa r A g a i n s t I r a q

World Food Programme (WFP), 63 cost of, 12–13

United States declaration of, 41–42
Afghanistan attack and, 30 Geneva Conventions and, 65
air strikes of, 25–27 Gulf War, 24–25, 42–43, 88
antiwar protests and, 36 Iran-Iraq, 21–23
blamed for looting, 67–68 preeemption and, 33, 58
Central Intelligence Agency, 17, 33, 37, profiting from, 72, 79
40–41, 58 psychological, 46, 53
“coalition of the willing” and, 41–42 religion and, 21, 77–78, 88
criticism of, 10–13, 27, 34–35, 58, 73 Resolution 1441 and, 37–38, 41
declares victory, 53 “Shock and Awe” program, 43–59
declares war, 41–42 World War I, 16
Gulf War and, 24–25, 42–43, 88 see also specific operations
humanitarian aid and, 63, 66 water, 52–54
Iran-Iraq war and, 23 weapons
as liberator, 11–13 anthrax, 31
military strength of, 10 Baath Party and, 83–84
nation-building policy of, 12–13 ban on assault, 70
postwar chaos and, 69–73 biological, 23, 26, 57–58
preemption and, 33, 58 bombs, 10, 45, 55, 59–60, 82
provisional government and, 74–78, 88–89 chemical, 23, 25, 55–58
Resolution 1441 and, 37–38, 41 increase of, 59
September 11, 2001 and, 28–30 mines, 63
“Shock and Awe” program, 43–59 missiles, 45, 51
“smoking gun” and, 38–39 nerve gas, 31
Third Infantry Division, 52, 71 nuclear, 23, 25, 31–32
transitional government and, 76 Resolution 1441 and, 37–38
unilateralism of, 34–35, 42 seizure of, 83–85
UN occupation approval and, 78–79 “smoking gun” and, 38–39
Ur (Sumerian city), 15, 67 UN inspections and, 25–27, 37–41
Uthman, Mahmoud Ahmed, 66 weapons of mass destruction, 11
utilities, 63–65, 68–69, 79, 83 Bush policy and, 31, 33
Uzbekistan, 42 evidence for, 32
failure to find, 38–39, 41, 80
Villepin, Dominique de, 40–41 mobile labs and, 57–58
violence search for, 25–27, 37–41, 55–58
ethnic, 86–88 secret disposal of, 56–57
mass graves and, 69 “smoking gun” and, 38–39
Saddam Hussein and, 14, 18–19, 54 Win Without War (coalition), 36
torture, 18–19, 54 Wolfowitz, Paul D., 31, 73
see also war World Health Organization, 63, 65–66
World Trade Center, 29
Wallace, William, 49–50 World War I, 16
war
antiwar protests and, 36 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musaab, 33, 40
civilian casualties and, 60–62 Zobeidi, Muhammad Mohsen, 70

110
Picture Credits
Cover: Hulton Archive by GettyImages © Ed Kashi/CORBIS, 95
Associated Press/Wide World Photo,107, © Francoise de Mulder, 11, 50
109 © Roger Wood/CORBIS70
AFP/CORBIS,32, 101 © Getty Images, 16, 34, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48,
© Bettmann/CORBIS, 19, 20, 26, 28, 30, 37, 57, 59, 62, 73, 81, 91, 103, 105
79, 88 Steve Zmina, 23, 35, 51, 53, 56, 65, 74, 82,
© CORBIS, 90 84

111
 About the Author
Debra Miller is a writer and lawyer with an interest in current events and history. She began
her law career in Washington, D.C., where she worked on legislative, policy, and legal mat-
ters in government, public interest, and private law firm positions. She now lives with her
husband in Encinitas, California. She has written and edited numerous publications for
legal publishers, as well as books and anthologies on historical and political topics.

112