Contents

Unit 1- Interpretation of Statutes Introduction: .............................................................................. 4

Interpretation/Interpret v. Construction/ Construe ....................................................................... 5
Theories of Statutory Interpretation ............................................................................................ 6
Purposivism............................................................................................................................. 6
Textualism............................................................................................................................... 6
Classification of Statutes ............................................................................................................ 6
1. Classification by object ................................................................................................. 6
2. Classification by duration .............................................................................................. 8
Structure of an Act/ Parts of a Statute......................................................................................... 9
Basic Rules of Interpretation .................................................................................................... 11
1. Sententia legis ................................................................................................................ 11
2. Ex viscerbis actus ........................................................................................................... 11
3. Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat ................................................................................. 14
Fundamental Rules of Interpretation: ....................................................................................... 17
1. Literal Rule ................................................................................................................. 17
2. Literal/Grammatical Rule ................................................................................................. 20
3. Golden Rule of Interpretation ..................................................................................... 23
4. Heydon’s Rule / Mischief or Purposive Rule ................................................................... 27
SUBSIDIARY RULES OF INTERPRETATION .................................................................... 32
1. Noscitur a sociis.......................................................................................................... 32
2. Ejusdem generis .......................................................................................................... 34
3. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius ....................................................................... 36
4. Reddendo Singular Singulis ....................................................................................... 38
5. Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege .................................... 39
UNIT – 2 – Internal Aids .............................................................................................................. 42
Long Title v Short Title ............................................................................................................ 42
Preamble ................................................................................................................................... 42
Headings ................................................................................................................................... 42
Marginal Notes.......................................................................................................................... 43
Punctuation ............................................................................................................................... 43
 Illustrations ............................................................................................................................... 44
Schedules .................................................................................................................................. 44
Definitions/Interpretation Clauses ............................................................................................ 45
Proviso ...................................................................................................................................... 45
Explanation ............................................................................................................................... 47
Non Obstante Clause................................................................................................................. 47
UNIT -3 - External Aids ............................................................................................................... 49
Historical Facts & Surrounding Circumstances ........................................................................ 49
Surrounding Circumstances, State of the Law & Parliamentary History ................................. 50
Legislative History in India ...................................................................................................... 51
Posterior Political, Social & Economic Developments and Scientific Inventions ................... 54
General words ........................................................................................................................... 54
Scientific Inventions ................................................................................................................. 55
Reference to Other Statutes ...................................................................................................... 56
1. Statutes in Pari Materia............................................................................................... 56
2. Assistance of Later Statutes ........................................................................................ 57
3. Reference of Earlier Statute into later statute ............................................................. 58
Textbooks.................................................................................................................................. 60
Dictionaries ............................................................................................................................... 60
Foreign Decisions ..................................................................................................................... 63
UNIT – 4 - Presumptions .............................................................................................................. 65
General Presumptions ............................................................................................................... 65
Legislation is Generally Prospective ........................................................................................ 66
Statutes dealing with Substantive Rights .............................................................................. 66
Statutes dealing with procedure ............................................................................................ 66
Statutes of Limitation ............................................................................................................ 66
Fiscal Statutes ....................................................................................................................... 67
Penal Statutes ........................................................................................................................ 67
Statutes relating to Sucession................................................................................................ 67
Unit – 5- Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... 70
Exclusion of Superior Court’s Jurisdiction ............................................................................... 70
UNIT – 6 – Repeal and Expiry of Statutes ................................................................................... 72
Effect of Expiry of Statutes....................................................................................................... 72
Repeal by a temporary statute ................................................................................................... 73
Repeal ....................................................................................................................................... 74
Repeal by Implication ............................................................................................................... 75
UNIT 7 – Fiscal Statutes ............................................................................................................... 78
Strict Construction .................................................................................................................... 78
Double Taxation........................................................................................................................ 79
Role of Notification & Circulars............................................................................................... 82
UNIT – 8 – Remedial & Penal Statutes ........................................................................................ 84
Remedial v Penal Statutes ......................................................................................................... 84
General Rule ............................................................................................................................. 84
Mens Rea in Statutory Offences ............................................................................................... 86
UNIT – 9 SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION............................................................................... 88
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION ........................................................................................... 88
NATURE .................................................................................................................................. 88
NECESSITY OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION ............................................................... 88
KINDS OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION ....................................................................... 89
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION ................................................. 89
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS - Sec. 23 of General Clauses Act, 1897 ......................... 91
Mimansa principles of interpretation ........................................................................................ 94
Unit 1- Interpretation of Statutes Introduction:
- AStatute is the expression of the will of the legislature
- The Court’s function is to interpret the document according to the intent of the makers/
Parliament.
- The function of the court is Jus Dicer, non Jus dare i.e. to declarelaw and not make law
- The Constitution of India does not define the term Statute
- Law is defined by Article 13(3)(a) as including any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule,
regulation, notification, custom/usage having the force of law.
- Duty of the court is to ascertain intention of the Legislature
1. Basic rules of interpretation
a. Sententia legis
b. Ex visceribus actus
c. Ut res magis valeat quam pareat
2. Fundamental Rules of Interpretation
a. Literal
b. Golden
c. Mischief
d. Harmonious
3. Subsidiary Rules of Interpretation
a. Expresso Unius est exclusion
b. Ejusdem generis
c. Contemporanea exposito
d. Nositur a sociis
Attorney General and Another v. Antigua Times Limited (1976) A.C. 16
 Section 3(2) of the Newspaper Surety Ordinance (Amendment) Act, 1971 made it
unlawful to print /publish a newspaper unless, in addition to a bond, $10000 had been
deposited with the Accountant General tosatisfy any judgment of the SC for libel.
 Provided that the Minister responsible for newspaper, on being satisfied with the
newspaper’s security in the form of a policy of insurance /a bank guarantee, may waive
the requirement for the deposit.
  The Privy Council took the view that may in the proviso was mandatoryand the Minister
if satisfied with the sufficiency of security offered, had to waive the requirement of
deposit of $10,000.
 If Minister is satisfied with the sufficiency of security, then the Minister’s failure to
waive the requirement of a deposit would be an improper exercise of discretion
Interpretation/Interpret v. Construction/ Construe
 According to Webster’s Third New International dictionary to interpret means to explain
the meaning of; to conceive in the light of individual belief, judgment or circumstance
 Construe means to interpret, explain, clarify
 Pedantic difference is sometimes drawn between interpretation and construction of a
statute
 From the point of view of court, they can be taken as synonymous/ used interchangeably.
- Salmond
- By interpretation or construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to
ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in
which it is expressed.
- Cooley
- Construction is wide term embracing a number of senses including the sense in which
the author is intended to convey while interpretation is the art of finding out the true
sense of any form of words; that is the sense in which author intended to convey. The
word Interpretation has, therefore a restricted sense.
 Interpretation is art of finding true sense of words expressed in a statute
 Construction is drawing conclusions that is beyond the direct expression of words
 Drawing conclusion which are in the spirit, but not within the letter of law
 When the meaning is not plain, the courts have to decide whether the wording was meant to
cover the situation before the court. Here the court would be resorting to what is called
construction.
 When the court adheres to the plain meaning of the language used by the legislature, it
would be interpretation.
Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Purposivism
 Purposivists argue that court should prioritise interpretation that advance the legislative
purpose of the statute
 They believe that the judges can best observe legislative supremacyby paying attention
to the legislative process
 They are more willing to consider legislative history than proponentsof textualism
 Purposivist judge said, It promotes comity with the first branch of theGovernment
Critics
 Allows to ignore the text and “achieve what he believes to be the provision’s
purpose.”
Textualism
 Textualists maintain that judges focus should be confined primarily totexts
 They focus on the words of a statute, emphasising text over any unstated
purpose, these texts have survived those political processes
 They care about the statutory purpose to the extent that is evidentfrom the text
 They consider the whole statute, general purpose of the statute
 Focussing on unexpressed legislative intention invites the danger of judges encroaching
into the legislative function by making law rather than interpreting it
Critics
 They ignore legislative intent, decline legislative history.
 In India, no judges are identified as pure Purposivists/textualists- in practice they
employ some elements from each theory
Classification of Statutes
Statutes can be classified by object, by reference toduration

1. Classification by object
a. Codifying Statute
 The purpose of a codifying Act is to declare the law on a particular subject matter
 In codification the various areas of the law, such as equity, the common law, orders
of the executive and judicial decisions are examined and then condensed in the form
 of a code.
 E.g. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Succession Act, 1956

b. Consolidating Statute
 It collects statutory provisions on a particular subject & embodies them into a
single Act of Parliament
 It does not contain case law
 E.g. Companies Act, 1956, Companies Act, 2013

c. Declaratory /Curative/ Validity statutes

 An Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of
any Statute
 Existing law is misunderstood/ wrongly applied
 Used to correct what is considered to be judicial error
 E.g. The Hindu Marriage Validation Act, 1949Arya Marriage Validation Act, 1937

d. Remedial Statutes/ Labour and Welfare/Social Welfare legislations

 They are directed towards extending a certain benefit to theparticular class of society
 E.g. Workmen compensation Act 1923, Consumer Protection Act 1986
 They declare certain acts as invalid/prohibit them & provide redress/compensation to
the aggrieved party.

e. Penal Statutes
 The penalty for disobedience may be in the form of fine, forfeiture of property,
imprisonment, death sentence etc.
 E.g. Indian Penal Code

f. Enabling Statute
 The purpose of this statute is to make something lawful which was previously
forbidden/ creates new power
 Empowers agencies/ Corporations/persons to do what they could not do before the
enactment of the Act
 E.g. Land Acquisition Act enabled the Government to acquire privateproperty
 for public purposes which was otherwise not permissible

g. Disabling statute
 The purpose of the statute is to make something unlawful which is otherwise
lawful or It limits/curbs certain rights
 E.g. The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978

h. Taxing statutes
 Article 265 of the Constitution of India provides that "no tax shall be levied or
collected except by the authority of law". Therefore, no tax can be levied or collected
in India, unless it is explicitly and clearly authorized by way of legislation

i. Amending Statutes
 Brings changes in the existing statute whether by addition, omission/ substitution of
provisions
 E.g. Article 21A inserted vide The Constitution ( Eighty Sixth Amendment) Act,
2002
 The Consumer Protection ( Amendment) Act, 2002

j. Repealing Statutes
 A statute which either expressly or necessary implication repeals orrevokes an earlier
statute
 E.g. The Competition Act, 2002 repealed the MRTP Act, 1969

2. Classification by duration
a. Temporary Statutes
• The period of operation is fixed by the statute itself
• It expires on the lapse of period so specified unless repealed earliere.g.- Ordinance

b. Permanent Statutes
• No period specified in the statute in regard to time limit for the life ofthe enactment
• It expires on either express/implied repeal by the legislature
• E.g. Competition Act 2002 repealed the MRTP Act,1969
Structure of an Act/ Parts of a Statute
a. Short title
 e.g. The Consumer Protection Act, 2019

b. Long title
 The long title to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) states simply that it is "An
Act to amend the law relating to transfer of property by act of parties"
 The long title to The Tea Act, 1953 (29 of 1953) is in the following terms
 "An Act to provide for the control by the Union of the tea industry, including the
control, in pursuance of the Inter- national Agreement now in force, of the cultivation
of tea in, and the export of tea from, India and for that purpose to establish a Tea
Board and levy a duty of excise on tea produced in India".
c. Preamble
 The Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925). "An Act to consolidate the law
applicable to intestate and testamentary succession" (long title)
 "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate the law applicable to intestate and
testamentary succession" (preamble)
 The Reformatory Schools Act,(8 of 1897)
“An Act to amend the law relating to Reformatory Schools and to make further
provisions for dealing with youthful offenders (long title)
"Whereas it is expedient to amend the law relating to Reformatory Schools and to make
further provisions for dealing with youthful offenders" (preamble).
d. Enacting clause
 The form adopted in India since the 26th day of January, 1950, whenIndia became
a Republic is as follows-
"Be it enacted by Parliament in the........year of the Republic of India
e. First Section
 The first section in all Indian enactments usually states (1) the short title (2) the extent
of operation of the enactment and (3) its commencement.
1. The short title clause
  The short title clause generally runs as follows-"This Act may be called the Transfer
of Property Act, I882”.
2. Extent clause
 The extent clause deals generally with the territorial extent of operation of the Act.
Different forms-
"This Act extends to the whole of India" or
"This Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and
Kashmir“
 Extra-territorial operation

3. Commencement Clause
 An Act shall commence (unless otherwise stated) on the day the Act receives the
assent of the President/on the day on which such assent is first published in the
official gazette.
 If the Act has to give a retrospective effect, the commencement clause is in the
form: ‘This Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the...
f. Definition Section
g. The operative or substantive part of the Act
h. Miscellaneous Part
 Includes provisions relating to matters like protection of action in good faith by
authorities,power to delegate functions or to make rules etc.

i. Repealing and Savings clause

 A clause in a statute repealing a previous enactment.
 A saving clause is a clause in a statute limiting the scope of repeal of prior statutes. They
protect vested rights, as they existed on the date of repeal.
j. Schedule
Basic Rules of Interpretation
1. Sententia legis- the true intention of the legislature
2. Ex viscerbis actus- the statue must be read as a whole & words in a statute often take
their meaning from thecontext of the statute
 Context means- the statute as a whole, the previous legislations, other statutes in pari
materia, general scope of the statute, mischief that it was intended to remedy
 Meaning is plain & clear indicating one meaning – court must give effect to their
meaning
 Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration AIR 1965 SC 871
 Members of a raiding party led by licensing inspector of Delhi
Municipal Corporation having taken into custody 25-30 stray cattle
 At the time of taking to cattle pound- the accused persons assaulted
theraiding party members- got the cattle released by force

Defence of the appellants

 No proper delegation of authority to impound cattle
 The cattle was not abandoned in the sense being ownerless &
therefore could not be legally impounded
 Injuries inflicted in the lawful exercise of their right to private defence
of property
 The power to impound stray cattle is contained in s. 418(1) of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 which allows impounding of animals “found
abandoned and roaming or tethered on any street or public place”
 The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1.- To abandon -to let go, give up, renounce,
leave off ; to cease to hold, use or practice.“ (The meanings relied on by the
appellants)

Held:-
 Meaning to be attached to the word 'abandoned' would depend upon the context
in which it is used.
 It is the duty of the court in construing a statute to give effect to the intention of
the legislature.
  In the Act before us when the legislature used the word "abandoned" it did not
intend to say that the cattle must be ownerless.
“This is implicit in the proviso to sub- s. (1) of S. 418 which says that any one
'claiming' an animal which has been impounded under that sub-section can,
within 7 days of seizure, get it released on fulfilling certain conditions. Such a
claim could only be made by a person who is the owner of the animal
impounded or who has at least the custody of the animal.

 Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar AIR 1967 SC 773

 Attar Singh a tenant- certain land-rented for the purpose of firewood stall
 The respondents filed application for the eviction of the tenant from the land to
build residential house- entitled to the order of eviction under Sec 13(3)(a) of
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949

 Section 13(3)- East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949

(a)A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing thetenant to
put the landlord in possession
(i) in the case of rented land, if-
(a) he requires it for his own use
(b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose
of hisbusiness any other such rented land, and
(c) he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause
after thecommencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned."
 The contention on behalf of the appellant-tenant is that the words "for his own
use" must be read along with sub-clauses (b) and (c) along with sub- cl. (a);
 The provision really means that a landlord can ask for eviction of rented land
only in those cases where he requires the rented land for his own use for carrying
on a trade or business principally.
 The appeal is hereby allowed
  Ajay Maken v. Adesh Kumar Gupta (2013) 3 SCC 489
 Appellant declared elected to 15th LS from New Delhi LS constituency in 2009
elections
 Challenging the election- voter of said constituency filed election petition in HC
Delhi-corrupt practices falling under section 123(1),(2),(5),(6),(7) read with
section 127(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
 Election petitioner has annexed a complaint- made by Youth for equality- CEC
– alleging irregularities both by BJP and Congress candidates- Vijay Goel and
Ajay Maken respectively
 Chose to implead only the returning officer and the appellant in the suit
 82. Parties to the petition.—A petitioner shall join as respondents to his
petition—
a) returned candidate
b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice
aremade in the petition
 Section 83(1)(b) and (c) in The Representation of the People Act, 1951
 An election petition shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that
the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of
the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and
place of the commission of each such practice; and shall be signed by the
petitioner
 Whether such allegation is made against Vijay Goel in the election petition & if
made, is Vijay Goel required to be made a respondentto the election petition.

Senior Counsel- K Parasaran – appearing for Ajay Maken

 If an election petition contains annexure or schedules attached to it, whose
content is not elaborately described in the body of the election petition, but only
referred to as containing the factual basis for seeking declaration of nullity of the
election of the returned candidate, such annexure or schedules become an integral
part of the election petition and, therefore, all the allegations contained in such
schedules or annexures become allegations in the election petition.
Shri Ranjit Kumar appearing for the respondent-election petitioner
 An annexure or schedule to the election petition becomes an integral part of the
election petition only in certain circumstances
 They are evidence of the allegation contained in the election petition, but not an
integral part of the petition
 The purpose of this annexure was only to derive support to his allegation of the
commission of corrupt practice by the appellant herein by demonstrating that
such allegation against the appellant isnot only made by the election petitioner but
also by others during the course of the election.
 The election petitioner does not make any such allegation in the body of the
election petition, but such allegations are found in some document annexed to the
election petition – of which the election petitioner is not the author - can it be
said that the allegations are MADE in the petition ?
Held-
The answer is negative
 Annexure not authored by election petitioner
 In the entire body of petition no reference to any corrupt practice by
VijayGoel has been made
 Section 82 and 83 (1) (b) read together
 Vijay Goel cannot be made party to the petition

3. Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat

 A statute must be so construed to make it effective and workable
 It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it
 Construction of a rule should give effect to the rule rather than destroying it.
 A provision capable of two interpretations of which one gives effect to the provision &
other renders the provision ineffective – the former which gives effect to the provision
is adopted and the latter is discarded.
 Courts would always lean in favour of the constitutionality of the statutory provisions
  Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228
 Gita Hariharan, married to Dr. Mohan applied to RBI for bonds to be held in
the name of her minor son & signed off as guardian
 RBI sent back the application- advising her to produce
a. application signed by the father/
b. certificate of guardianship from competent authority in her favour

 Section 6- Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956

 Natural guardians of a Hindu minor- in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl-
the father, and after him, the mother, provided that the custody of a minor who
has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother
 RBI was of the opinion-that Dr. Mohan was the natural guardian
 Ms. Hariharan challenged the constitutionality of the provision –
violated Article 14 & 15 of the Constitution
 Section 4(b) wherein guardian is said to mean a person having the care of
the person of a minor or his property and includes: (i) natural guardian……
 Section 4(c) “natural guardian” means any of the guardians mentioned in S. .6
Held
 Both father and mother are natural guardians of a minor child (in terms of the
 Provisions of Section 6 read with Section 4(c)
 The word after has to be read and interpreted in a manner so as to not to defeat
the intention of the legislature
 Ascribing literal meaning to the word after does not arise in the light of object of
the statute ( welfare of the child), Constitutional provisions and to give full effect
to the legislative intent
 Any other interpretation would render the statute void and “which in our
view ought to be avoided”
 It is to be noted that in the matter of interpretation of statute the same meaning
ought to be attributed to the same word used by the statute as per the definition
section.
  Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab 1965 AIR 666
 Appellant was prosecuted and convicted for theft of electric energy under
S. 39 of Indian Electricity Act, 1910
 He challenged prosecution- as it was not instituted against him at the instance of
persons mentioned in section 50 of the Act
 Section 39 of the Act - “Whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any
energy shall be deemed to have committed theft within the meaning of the Indian
Penal Code“
 Section 50 of the Act - No prosecution shall be instituted against any person for
any offence against the Act.... except at the instance of the Government or an
Electrical Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the same."
Held
 Section 378 of IPC read by itself does not include a theft of electricity for
electricity is not considered movable property
 S.39 of Indian Electricity Act, 1910 created an offence (offence is created by
fiction). Thus section 50 of the Act would apply
 Since the abstraction is by S. 39 to be deemed to be an offence under the Code,
the fiction must be followed to the end and the offence so created would entail
the punishment mentioned in the Code for that offence.
 Conviction set aside
 As the offence is created by raising a fiction, the section which raises the fiction,
namely s. 39 of the Act, must be said to create the offence.

 Rt. Rev. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala (1979) 1 SCC 23

 St. Vincent's High school opened for the benefit of Christian students in 1947
 Until 1971-72, only boy students were admitted in the school
 The Manager applied to Regional Deputy Director for permission to admit girl
students in the school
Rejected on 2 grounds-
1. School was not opened as a mixed school- running purely as boys’ school for
the last 25 years
 2. There was facility for girls’ education in a nearby girls school within a
radius of one mile
 Appellant filed writ petition in the High Court. The respondent justified orders
under Rule 12 (iii) of Chapter 6, Kerala Education Rules 1959. The HC
dismissed the writ petition.
 Appeal before the Supreme Court
 Rule 12 in Chapter VI reads as follows:-
"Admission of Boys into Girls' Schools:-
(i) All Primary Schools (Lower and Upper) shall be deemed to be mixed
Schools and admission thereto shall be open to boys and girls alike. But
under special circumstances the Director may exempt particular institutions
from this rule so that admission thereto might be restricted to boys or girls
and in the absence of such special circumstances the Director may withdraw
such exemption.
(ii) Girls may be admitted into Secondary Schools for boys in areas and in
towns where there are no Girls' Schools and in such cases adequate
arrangements should be made for the necessary convenience. Theadmissions
will be subject to general permission of the Director in particular Boys'
Schools which will be specified by him."
Appeal allowed
 Self-imposed restriction does not justify legal ban
 The rule violates Art 30 (1)
 It is not necessary or advisable to strike down the Rule as a whole but do restrict
its operation and make it inapplicable to a minority educational institution in a
situation like the one which arose in this case.

Fundamental Rules of Interpretation:

1. Literal Rule
 Tej Kiran Jain & others v. N Sanjiva Reddy 1970 SCR (1 ) 612
 The appellants claim to be admirers & followers of Jagadguru Shankaracharya of
 Govardhan peeth, Puri
 March, 1969-World Hindu Religious conference was held at Patna- Shankaracharya took
part in it and is reported to have observed that untouchability was in harmony with the
tenets of Hinduism
 April 2, 1969, Shri Narendra Kumar Salve, MP- moved a calling attention motion & gave
particulars of the happening – discussion followed
 The respondents execrated the Shankaracharya. According to the appellants, the
respondents used unparliamentarily language & his holiness was made to appear as
leprous dog
 The appellants brought an action against the respondents
 Article 105(2) - No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in
respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof,
and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of
either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings

Plain Meaning Rule

 If the words in a statute bear one meaning they are plain and the courtmust give effect to
their meaning
 To decide whether certain words in a statute are plain and clear, the court has to
study them in their context
Article 212
1. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature. The validity of any proceedings
in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged
irregularity of procedure
2. No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under
this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining
order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the
exercise by him of those powers
Mr. Lekhi appearing for the appellant
 The provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution pointed out that the immunity under that
Article was against an alleged irregularity of procedurebut not against an illegality
  According to him the immunity granted by Art 105(2) was to what was relevant to the
business of Parliament and not to something which was utterly irrelevant.
Held
 Art 105(2) confers immunity inter alia in respect of 'anything said… in
Parliament". The word 'anything' is of the widest import and is equivalent to
'everything’.
 The only limitation arises from the words 'in Parliament' which means during the sitting of
Parliament and in the course of the business of Parliament.
 Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted,
anything said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any
court. Appeal Fails

 P V Narsimha Rao v. State ( CBI)(1998) 4 SCC 626

 Whether by virtue of Article 105 of the Constitution a Member of Parliament can claim
immunity from prosecution on a charge of bribery in a criminal court.
 General Election for the 10th Lok Sabha held in 1991 the Congress (I) party formed the
Government with Shri P.V. Narsimha Rao as the PM
 July 1993, no confidence motion moved against the Government by CPI ( M) Ajay
Mukhopdhyay- The motion was thereafter put to vote. The motionwas defeated .
 On February 28, 1996, on Shri Ravindra Kumar of Rashtriya Mukti Morcha filed a
complaint -CBI-a criminal conspiracy-to prove a majority of the Government on the floor
of the House by bribing Members of Parliament of different political parties, individuals
and groups of an amount of over Rs.3 crores
 105. Powers, Privileges, etc. of the House of Parliament and of the members and
committees thereof- No Member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any
courtin respect of anything said or any vote given by him in parliament or anycommittee
thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the
authority of either House of Parliament of anyreport paper, votes or proceedings
Shri Kapil Sibal appearing for the appellants
 Art 105 (2) secures full freedom for a Member of Parliament while participating in the
proceedings in the House or its committees by way of speech or by casting his vote
  Immunity extends to prosecution of member on a charge of bribery in making a speech or
giving his vote in the House or any committee
 They used Tej Kiran Jain & Ors v. N. Sanjiva Reedy & Ors., 1971 (1) SCR 612-
construed in widest sense- ‘anything’ equivalent to ‘everything’
Held ( 3:2)
 Settled law- interpretation of constitution- strengthens the foundational features and
basic structure of constitution
 The immunity would not be available to give protection against liability for an act that
precedes the making of speech/giving of vote
 Liability for which immunity can be claimed under Sec105 (2) is the liability
that has arisen as a consequence of the speech that has been made or the vote that has
been given in Parliament. ( Minority opinion)
 “Broadly interpreted, as we think it should be, Article 105(2) protects a member of
Parliament against proceedings in court that relate to, or concern, or have a connection or
nexus with anything said, or a vote given by him in Parliament”. ( Majority opinion)
 A member who is alleged to have accepted bribe but has not voted cannot enjoy
immunity under Article 105(2)

2. Literal/Grammatical Rule
 In interpreting/construing a statute, the obvious method is to start with the literal
interpretation/ primary rule/plain rule of interpretation
 If the words are clear and unambiguous – effect must be given to the provision- they must
be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense unless that leads to some
absurdity/inconsistency/unconstitutional result/ or unless there is something in the context
or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary
 Literal meaning of a word is also affected by its context, give effect to the intent and
purpose of the legislation
a. Denotation
b. Connotation
 Commissioner of Sales tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Jaswant Singh AIR 1967 SC 1454
 Respondent, a dealer in firewood and charcoal
  The question - assessment of sales tax
 Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958
Entry I of Part III of Schedule II
1.Coal including coke in all its forms
8. Firewood………………………………………………taxable at 2%
Entry I of Part IV of Schedule II
• All other goods not included in Schedule II or any other part of this Schedule is taxable at
4%
• Charcoal whether coal within the meaning of Entry I Part III of Schedule II (Madhya
Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958)
• Whether charcoal be assessed at the rate of 2% or 4%.
Counsel for the State, however, raised three contentions-
(1) That coal and charcoal are different products, one being a mineral product and the other
prepared from wood and other articles by human agency, and, therefore, the term 'coal'
would not cover charcoal;
(2) That the Legislative policy in reference to the term 'coal' shows that it is not used by the
Legislature in India so as to include charcoal.
(3) Colliery Control Order, 1945- the Legislature there had dealt with coal in its strict and
technical meaning- mineral product only
Contention of the Respondent
 The object of legislature was to tax coal and firewood as articles used as fuel- it didn't
make a separate entry in regard to charcoal- as coal in ordinary & commercial sense
would include charcoal.
Held
 The SC agreed with the meaning of coal given by High Court – held charcoal taxable at
2%
 The natural, ordinary/popular meaning of the term coal would be used as fuel in the
context of Sales Tax Act
 The Colliery Control Order deals with collieries ( coal mines) and therefore term coal is
used as a mineral product in the context of Colliery Control Order, 1945
 B N Mutto v. T K Nandi (1979) 1 SCC 361
 Appellant – Mutto ( IGP) leased his property ( New Delhi) to respondent from 15th Sept,
1972- lease for residential purpose/professional purpose only and not for commercial
purpose
 18th July, 1974- the landlord filed a petition for eviction of the respondent on the grounds
of misuse, subletting
 B. N. Mutto, retired as IGP on 30th November, 1975
 While in office he was occupying the premises in New Delhi, allotted to him by the
Government.
 9th September, 1975- Govt. took a decision- Govt servants who own the houses in the
locality shall vacate the accommodation allotted to them within three months from 1st
Oct, 1975
 9th December 1975- notice served on IGP to vacate the house failing which necessary
action to evict him shall be taken
 On the same day, the appellant filed the present suit for eviction of the respondent under
Sec 14(A) (1)
 Where a landlord who, being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted
to him by the Central Government or any local authority is required, by, or in pursuance
of, any general or special order made by that Government or authority, to vacate such
residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that
he owns, in the Union territory of Delhi a residential accommodation either in his own
name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, there shall accrue, on and from the
date of such order, to such landlord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in
this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether
express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary, a right to recover immediately
possession of any premises let out by him.
 (Section 14 A (1) Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act 1976)- It was deemed to have
come into force on 1st December, 1975
Contention of tenant/respondent
 On 9th Dec 1975- landlord cannot invoke the provisions because he is not a Government
 servant on the date of petition
 The landlord had already filed a petition for eviction which was registered as O.S. No.
182 of 1974 and was pending before the Additional Rent Controller
 Whether the landlord who retired from service on 30th November, 1975 can invoke the
provisions of section 14A(1).
 Read the section- Does it require a person to be a Government servant?
 The general order no doubt relates only to government servants.
 It may be noted that the section does not require that the person who is in occupation of
the premises allotted by the Government should be a Government servant.

Held
 S. 14 A does not restrict the right to recover immediate possession to Govt servants
 Taking into object of the Act, the meaning of the word- person can’t be confined to
Government servants but to others as well
 There could be no difficulty in giving the plain meaning to the word "person" as not being
confined to Government servants for it is seen that accommodation has been provided by
the Government not only to Government servants but to others also
 The Court will not be justified in presuming that when the legislature used the word
"persons" it meant only Government servants.

3. Golden Rule of Interpretation

a. It is the modification of the literal rule of interpretation
b. The golden rule tries to avoid absurdity/repugnancy/inconsistency arising from literal
interpretation
c. In view of the same, the grammatical meaning of such words is usually modified to avoid
such absurdity/inconsistency but not further
d. No objective criterion- discretion of the judge
e. Judges are able to add or change the meaning of statutes and thereby become law makers
infringing the separation of powers.
 S R Batra & Anr. v. Taruna Batra 2007 3 SCC 169
 Taruna Batra (Respondent) married to Amit Batra the s/o the appellants on 14/4/2000.
 After marriage, the Respondent resided in the house belonging to the appellant
 Amit Batra filed a divorce petition.
 Counter to divorce petition, the respondent filed a FIR under Sec 498- A & Sec 506 of
IPC. Consequently, the appellants were arrested and granted bail after 3 days.
 The respondent had shifted to her parent’s residence following the dispute with her
husband
 She alleged that later when she tried to enter the house of the appellant, she found the
main entrance locked
 Respondent filed a suit for mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house
 It is stated by the appellants that their son Amit Batra, husband of the respondent, had
shifted to his own flat before the above litigation between the parties had started
 The senior civil judge held that if the Husband was not residing / living in the suit
property, a matrimonial home could not be said to be a place where only wife resides.
 Therefore, Taruna Batra has no right to the properties other than that of her husband.
 Hence no injunction granted
 In the appeal to HC, it was held that the property was in fact the matrimonial home
because Mere change of the residence by the husband would not shift the matrimonial
home, particularly when the husband had filed a divorce petition against his wife.
 The SC on appeal, the respondent cited the case of B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi and Ors.,to
determine the law to be applied. It was contended that since there was no legislation
governing matrimonial homes in India, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 was applied.
 Under this act, section 17 stated that “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the
right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or
beneficial interest in the same.”
 Section 2(s) defined “shared household” as
 a household where the person aggrieved lives or
 at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship
 either singly or along with the respondent and
  includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved
person and the respondent,
 or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person
or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and
 includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the
respondent is person has any right, title or interest in the shared household"
 It was contended that since the appellant had lived in the property in suit, it shall be
considered as the shared household.
 The SC rejected this submission and stated that if such a definition was to be followed, it
would mean that any property where a married couple lived would be considered as a
shared household.
 It was well accepted that absurdity in interpretation was not accepted.
 The court ruled that as regards Section 17(1) of the Act, “in our opinion the wife is only
entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a `shared household'
would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house
which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member”.
 Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja overruled its earlier judgment
in SR Batra v. Taruna Batra due to the different approaches adopted in statutory
interpretation.
 State Of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum And Anr
 The respondents, who were evacuees. were owners of land in two villages in the district
of Gurgaon
 Their lands in the aforesaid two villages along with lands of other persons in other
villages were acquired by the appellant for use as a field Firing and Bombing Range
 The respondents were not notified about the acquisition and were not present at the time
of the award.
 October 25, 1953 - The Collector made an award by which he allowed compensation
at the rate of Rs. 96/- per acre in respect of the lands of the respondents.
 December 24, 1954 - The respondents made an application for interim payment (but
without prejudice to the claim of the respondents for enhancement of the amount of
compensation.)
  July 22, 1955 – the amount of compensation paid.

 September 30, 1955 - The respondents made an application to the Collector for a
reference under s.18 of the Act.
 Stated that they knew about the award on July 22, 1955 when they received the
compensation amount and therefore the petition was within time.
 Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1984:
1. Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application
to the Collector regarding his objection.
2. The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken.
Provided that every such application shall be made-
a. if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the
time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's
award;
b. in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector
under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the
Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.”
 The ratio of the decision in Raja Harish Chandra's case is that:
 the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively and
 the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge
 In this case, appellant contested that the date of knowledge was December 24 – the date
of application for interim payment.
 It was held that:
 Knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award
has been made.
 The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may
be known either actually or constructively.
 Thus, the date of knowledge in this case was July 22, 1955. The application for a
reference was clearly made within six months from that date.
  It was stated that literal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the
date of the Collector's award" occurring in the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso would
not be appropriate.

4. Heydon’s Rule / Mischief or Purposive Rule

 Orthodox rules of interpretation:
 The interpretation of legislation must be sought within four walls of the statute.
Mischief Rule:
 The following questions must be answered to interpret any legislation:
1. What was the common law before making the Act?
2. What were the mischief and the defect which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy the Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the defect? (the
mischief the statute in question is trying to correct)
4. The reasons for the remedy.
 That is all judges should make such a construction which shall suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy and object of the Act.
 Smith v. Huges
 Facts: A prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon Street, London and used the premises for
the purposes of prostitution
 The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was-
1. To attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal
object and
2. By hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and
3. Having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the
premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little while?’ at the
same time as she indicated the correct door of the premises.
 Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, ‘It shall be an offence for a common
prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution’.
  The defendant contended that the balcony was not ‘in a Street’ within the meaning of
section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no offence had been
committed.
 Lord parker CJ, stated as follows:
 I approach the matter by considering what the mischief is aimed at by this Act.
 Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people
to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.
 Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the
street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony
 In such case, her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the
street.
 For my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.
 Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Shri Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co.
 In this case, the respondent business consisted of
1. Manufacturing of Copper sheets and the preparation of utensils
2. Milling paddy
3. Flour mill
4. Saw mill
 These works were suited in the same compound.
 The respondent company employs different workers in each section of its activities
engaged either on a permanent or on a temporary basis.
 Some workers, such as clerks and watchmen were common for them.
 The Provident Fund Act, 1952 was enacted and the Co. was required to comply its
provisions.
 The Central Government framed a scheme under S.5 of the Act where, an employer is
required to contribute 6-1/4% of the-total wage bill every year as his contribution towards
the Fund and 3% as the administrative charges on the total contribution of the employer
and his employees.
 The respondent company contended that it was not a factory under s. 1(3)(a) of the Act
and so, it could not be called upon to comply with its provisions.
 Regional Provident Fund Commr. Stated that Co. fell within the meaning of the word
"factory" as defined under S.1 (3)(a).
 Section 1(3)(a): “Subject to the provisions contained in section 16, it (i.e., the Act)
applies to every establishment which is factory engaged in any industry specified in
Schedule I in which fifty or more persons are employed, but the Central Government
may, after giving not less than two months' notice of its intention so to do, by notification
in the Official Gazette,- apply the provisions of this Act to all factories employing such
number of persons less than fifty as may be specified in the notification and engaged in
any such industry."
 The first issue was whether 1(3) (a) excludes composite factories from its scope.
 The respondent contended that it is only factories which are exclusively engaged in any
industry specified in Schedule I to which the Act applies, provided, of course, they satisfy
the other test that there are 50 or more persons employed in them.
 It was submitted that section 1(3) was amended in 1956 to include 1(3)(a). Prior to 1956,
it read as follows:
 “applies in the first instance to all factories engaged in any industry specified in Schedule
I in which fifty or more persons are employed,”.
 It was held that he amendment included the term “establishment” which clearly showed
that it may consist of different factories dealing with different industries and yet
considered as one establishment, it may fall under section 1(3)(a).
 The second issue was whether the requirement that the workmen employed should be 50
or more, governs the word "Industry" or the word “establishment" is under s. 1 (3)(a)?
 It was held that as the provision stands, the word 'factories’/establishment is qualified by
two clauses:
1. The first adjectival clause is 'engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I'
2. and the second clause is "in which 50 or more persons are employed”
 The requirement as to the prescribed number qualifies the word "factories” /
“establishment” and does not qualify the word "industry”
 The same can be derived from the intentions of the amendment.
 It was also stated that rules of grammar are not considered in the context of a statute.
 R.M.D. CHAMARBAUGWALLA V. UNION OF INDIA
 The petitioners in this case were promoting and conducting a prize competition in
different States of India, challenged the validity of Sec 4, 5 of the Act & Rule 11 & 12
framed under the Prize Competition Act, 1955.
 The objective of the legislation was to provide control and regulation of prize
competitions.
 Section 2(d) ) of the Act defines "prize competition" as meaning "any competition
(whether called a cross-word prize competition, a missing-word prize competition, a
picture prize competition or by any other name), in which prizes are offered for the
solution of any puzzle based upon the building up, arrangement, combination or
permutation of letters, words or figures ".
 Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are as follows:
4 "No person shall promote or conduct any prize competition or competitions in which
the total value of the prize or prizes (whether in cash or otherwise) to be offered in any
month exceeds one thousand rupees; and in every prize competition, the number of
entries shall not exceed two thousand.
5 “Subject to the provisions of section 4, no person shall promote any prize competition
or competitions in which the total value of the prize or prizes (whether in cash or
otherwise) to be offered in any month does not exceed one thousand rupees unless he
has obtained in this behalf a license granted in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and the rules made thereunder.”
 The petitioner, Nani Palkhiwala, had contended that Prize Competition as defined in Sec 2
(d) – included not merely competitions of gambling nature but also those in which success
depended on skill which was a violation of Article 19 as in effect, it is a prohibition and
not merely a regulation of the business.
 The respondent, represented by Seervai, had contended that 'prize competition' as defined
in the Act- properly construed, means and includes only competitions which are
essentially gambling in their character; that gambling activities are not trade or business
within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(g).
 Further, it was stated that even if the definition of 'prize competition' in s. 2(d) is wide
enough to include competitions depending on skill, the provisions of the Act does not
 affect the validity of the enactment as regards the competitions which are in the nature of
gambling, the Act being severable in its application to such competitions, i.e., based on
the doctrine of severability, even if the definition includes games of skill, that does not
mean the entire act shall be held unconstitutional. Only the provisions placing a restriction
on the constitution may be altered/ amended or removed.
 The issue was raised whether the definition of prize competition in Sec 2(d) of the Act
applies to competitions which involve substantial skill and are not in the nature of
gambling.
 Secondly, If it does, whether the provisions of ss. 4 and 5 and r. 12 which are, ex concessi
void, as regards such competitions, can on the principle of severability be enforced
against competitions which are in the nature of gambling.
 The court considered the history of the Prize Competition Act , 1955 and recognized that
the genesis of the act may be found in the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions
Control and Tax Act , 1948 which was enacted in Bombay.
 Section 7 of the 1948 Act provided that "a prize competition shall be deemed to be an
unlawful prize competition unless a licence in respect of such competition has been
obtained by the promoter thereof.
 It was noted that the 1955 act established a license regime on the price competitions.
 It was later extended to activities conducted outside the state but operating within Bombay
to prevent tax evasion.
 The court recognized that in pursuance to this act, the Parliament had passed the Prize
competition Act, 1955 under Article 252(1) of the constitution which allowed the
parliament to enact a legislature on a matter in the state list.
 Thus the prize competition was enacted to regulate prize competitions of a gambling
nature under Entry 34 of the State list.
 In this case, the court applied the Heydon's rule, also known as the Mischief rule and
stated that So State legislatures moved Parliament to enact under Art. 252(1) was one to
control and regulate prize competitions of a gambling character.
 Competitions in which success depended substantially on skill could not have been in the
minds of the legislatures which passed those resolutions.
  It was held that assuming that they apply by virtue of the definition in s. 2(d) to all kinds
of competitions, are severable in their application to competitions in which success does
not depend on any substantial skill.
 The petition was dismissed

SUBSIDIARY RULES OF INTERPRETATION
1. Noscitur a sociis
 As per this, the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word (as in a statute or contract)
should be determined by considering the words with which it is associated in the
context,
 I.e. a doubtful word can be understood and defined by its association with surrounding
words and its context.
 State of Assam v. Ranga Mohammed
 Article 233(1), Constitution of India - Appointments of persons to be, and the posting
and promotion of, district judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the
State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such
State
 ISSUE: Whether the word posting includes transfer?
 As per Webster, the word 'to post' may denote either
(a) To station someone at a place, or
(b) To assign someone to a post, i.e., a position or a job, especially one to which a
person is appointed.
 The SC held that the word posting took its colour from the surrounding
words/associated words ('appointment' and 'promotion’) - the assignment of a
appointee/ promotee to a position in the cadre of District Judges & not his transfer
from one station to another.
 Therefore, transfer of already appointed/ promoted district judge does not come under
the purview of Article 233(1)
 It was stated that the Governor is only concerned with appointment and promotion and
posting to the cadre of District judges but not with the transfers of District judges
already appointed/promoted.
  Pradeep Agarbatti, Ludhiana vs. State of Punjab
 Entry No.16 of Schedule A to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948
 "Cosmetics, perfumery and toilet goods, excluding tooth-paste, tooth-powder,
Kumkum and soap”
 The question was whether "dhoop" or "dhoopbatti" fell within the description of
"perfume" thereunder.
 The word "perfumery" in the said Entry No.16 draws colour from the words 'cosmetics'
and 'toilet goods’ - the word 'perfumery' in the said Entry No.16 can only refer to such
articles of perfumery as are used, as cosmetics and toilet goods – therefore no
application to 'dhoop' and 'aggarbatti'.

 Oswal Agro Mills. Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise & Ors.

 The question relates to classification of "toilet soap" in Excise item 15 of the First
Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act of 1954 as amended in 1964
 (1954) - 15(A) 'Soap' all varieties of the product known commercially as soap-
 1.Soap, in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried
on with the aid of power or of steam for heating:-
1. Soap, household and laundry
a. Plain bars not less than one pound in weight Rs. 5 per cwt
b. Other sorts Rs. 6 per cwt
2. Soap toilet Rs. 14 per cwt
3. Soap, other than household and laundry or toilet Rs. 14 per cwt

This entry as amended in 1964 reads as follows

15- 'Soap' means all varieties of product known commercially as soap
1. Soap, household and laundry- 15% ad valorem
2. Other sorts- 20% ad valorem

Contention of the Counsel for the CCE

 Statute always kept distinction between soap "household and laundry" and "other
sorts”.
  Toilet soap was kept in the packet of other sorts.
 Household and laundry soaps are being used for cleaning household articles and
utensils and washing the clothes while toilet soaps are for bathing purpose.
 The latter are commercially known as other sorts but not household soaps

Contention of the Counsel for the Appellant

 In 1954 toilet soap was treated as an independent tariff sub-item and household and
laundry soaps were treated as separate category
 In 1964 toilet soap was omitted as a separate category and brought toilet soap as part of
genus, namely, soap "household", as a toilet soap is always a household soap.

 The question, therefore, emerges whether "toilet soap" would be household soap within
the meaning of Tariff item 15(1) of the Schedule.
 Held that the meaning of the word soap- "household” signifies a family living together.
 "Toilet soap" being of everyday household use for the purpose of the bath and having
removed its separate identity which it enjoyed preceding amendment and having been
not specifically included in "other sorts", it took its shelter in commercial parlance
under "household".

2. Ejusdem generis
 When a particular word belong to a class/category/genre are followed by a general word-
general word is construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified.
 Example - Automobiles, trucks, buses, motorcycles and other motor powered vehicles
 Requirements -
1. When a statute contains an enumeration of specific words
2. The subjects of enumeration constitute a class/category
3. The class/category is not exhausted by the enumeration
4. The general word follow the enumeration
5. There is no indication of a different legislative intention
 Siddheshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. V. UOI
 The appellant manufactures cotton fabrics- power loom
  Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, exempts from the whole of the duty of
Excise, 'unprocessed' cotton fabric- which is manufactured on power looms
 The question in the appeal is whether such cotton- fabric ceases to be "unprocessed"
cotton-fabric if it is subjected to calendering.
 Sec. 2(f)(v') reads:(The definition of "manufacture”) - "in relation to goods comprised
in Item No. 19-I of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1944, includes
bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberizing, shrink-proofing,
organdie processing or any other process or any one or more of these processes;”
 The contention of the appellant is calendering to which the cotton fabric was subjected,
though might be a process in the larger and general sense of that term and thus would
not fall under "any other process' within the meaning of Sec. 2(f)(v) the Act.
 In the present case the expressions bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing which precede the
expression 'or any other process' contemplate processes which impart a change of a
lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or
otherwise.
 'Any other process' in the section therefore will not include ‘calendering’.

 Hamdard Dawakhana ( Wakf) Delhi v. UOI

 Appellant manufactured medicated syrups Sharbat Rooh Afza- containing fruit juices
 Fruits Product Order, 1955- amendment – min. percentage of fruit juice in the final
product of fruit syrup- raised from 10% to 25%
 On inspection of the factory- stopped further manufacture and sale- ground of non-
compliance
 Appellants prayed for quashing of impugned order on the grounds that Sharbat is not a
food stuff/ fruit product but a medicinal product- cannot be regulated by the impugned
order.
 Respondents-stated that the appellants has been holding a license as manufacturer of
fruit products since 1955.
 Further, the Sharbat bottles- do not bear labels with words- for medicinal use only and
therefore falls under the purview of fruit order.
 Fruit Product Order, 1955- Clause 2(d)
  Fruit Product means any of the following articles-
 Synthetic beverages, syrups and sharbats
 Squashes, crusher, cordials, barley water, barrelled juice and ready to serve
beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices/ fruit pulp
 Any other items unspecified relating to vegetables and fruits

 The issue was raised if clause 2(d)(v) can be read ejusdem generis?
It was held that
 The provision refers to several beverages and the residuary part takes in any beverages
containing fruit juice /fruit pulp
 Rule of ejusdem generis cannot be invoked as an examination of the said beverages do
not constitute a genus.
 The context of clause clearly suggests that it is intended to take in all beverages other
than those earlier specified provided they contain fruit juices/fruit pulp.
 Therefore, Sharbat falls under the purview of the Fruit Product Order.

 Casher v. Holm
 A duty was imposed on copper, brass, tin and all other metals not enumerated
 Issue - Can the words all other metals can be construed ejusdem generis to cover gold
and silver?
 It was held that Silver and gold not covered, these being of a superior kind to the
particular metals enumerated.
 It was stated that as an outcome of the rule of ejusdem generis – there is another rule
that states that the statutes which deal with person/ things of inferior rank-are not
extended to those superior degree by introduction of general words ( words of rank).

3. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

 Latin maxim- express mention of one thing excludes all others
 Indicates that the items included in the list leads to the presumption that the items not
included in the list are excluded.
 Khemka and Co. v. State of Maharashtra
 Whether the assessee under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 hereinafter referred to as the
Central Act could be made liable for penalty under the provisions of the State Sales Tax
Act 1953 hereinafter referred to as the State Act.
 The penalty imposed under the State Act is for default in payment of taxes within the
prescribed time.

 Section 9(1) Central Act- that the tax payable by any dealer under the Central Act on
sales of goods effected by him in the course of inter-state trade or commerce shall be
levied by the Government of India
And the tax so levied shall be collected by that Government in accordance with the
provisions of sub-section (2) in the State from which the movement of goods, commenced
 Section 9(2) of the Central Act is as follows
 Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder,
 the authorities for the time being empowered to assess, re- assess, collect and enforce
payment of any tax under the general sales tax law of the appropriate State shall,
 on behalf of the Government of India, assess, re-assess, collect and enforce payment of
tax, including any penalty, payable by a dealer under this Act
 as if the tax or penalty payable by such a dealer under this Act is a tax or penalty
payable, under the general sales tax law of the State;
 and for this purpose they may exercise all or any of the powers they have under the
general sales tax law of the State;
 Section 16 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 - states that if the tax is not paid by any
dealer within the prescribed time, the dealer shall pay, a penalty in addition to the
amount of tax
 The assessee unsuccessfully contended before various sales tax authorities as well as
before the High Court that levy of penalty under s. 16(4) of the Bombay Sales-tax Act for
delay or default in payment of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act was without
jurisdiction as it was not warranted by the provisions of s. 9(2) of the Central Sales-tax.
Act, 1956.
 It was contended before this Court that there was no provision in the Central Sales-tax Act
for imposition of penalty for delay or default in payment of tax and, therefore, imposition
 of penalty under the provisions of the State Act for delay or default in payment of tax was
illegal.
Contention of the Revenue:
 Words ‘enforce payment’-include penalties under the State Act.
 Therefore, they may exercise all or any of the powers they have under the general sales
tax law of the State
 Since State Sales Tax authorities are thus created agents of the Government of India, the
section sets out the scope of work of the State agencies.

It was held that

 Imposition of pecuniary liabilities- can be created by clear, unambiguous and express
enactment
 The maxim of interpretation to apply here is "Expresso Unius exclusio alterius”- express
mention of one/more thing excluding all other members of the class.
 Tax and penalty payable under this Act mean payable under Central act only.
 Further, There is no lack of sanction for non- payment of tax under the Central Act. Any
dealer, who would not comply with the provisions for payment of tax, would be subjected
to recovery proceedings under the Public Demands Recovery Act.
 Thus the maxim rule was applicable.

4. Reddendo Singular Singulis

 Latin maxim- referring each phrase/expression to a corresponding object
 If anyone shall draw/load any sword /gun – the word draw applied to sword and load to gun
 Where multiple subjects and multiple objects are set out in a provision, the maxim
reddendo singula singulis, or “referring each to each”, is a grammar based rule that helps
the reader sort out which subjects correspond to which objects.
 Bishop v. Deakin
 Sec 59(1) Local Government Act, 1933
 A person shall be disqualified for being elected /being a member of local authority
 if he was within 5 years before the day of election
  Or since his election, has been convicted of any offence and ordered to be imprisoned
for a period of not less than three months without the option of fine.
 The section may be categorized into two matters:
1. Disqualification for election if conviction was within five years before the day of
election.
2. Disqualification for a member after election in case of conviction since election.

 Koteshwar V Kamath v. Rangappa Baliga & Co.

 Proviso to article 304 of the Constitution reads: ‘Provided that no Bill or amendment for
the purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State
without the previous of the president.
 It was held by the SC that the word ‘introduced’ referred to ‘Bill’ and the word ‘moved’
to ‘Amendment’.

5. Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege

 This means that old statutes should be interpreted as they would have been at the date when
they were passed.
 Prior usuage & interpretation by the contemporary authorities must be considered.
Presumptive evidence to be used when the meaning is doubtful.
 Also known as historical interpretation
 In India:
 It is applicable/relevant in executive construction;
 Not applicable to modern statutes
 This principle is not decisive in controlling the question of construction but only has
persuasive value.
 If the occasion arises, such interpretation may be even disregarded by the court in a clear
case of error.
 Suresh Nathan and Anr. v. UOI
 The Recruitment Rules for the post of Assistant Engineer in the PWD, Pondicherry,
prescribed the educational and other qualifications for appointment by direct recruitment
and promotion.
  For direct recruits,
 the qualification prescribed is a Degree in Civil Engineering of a recognized University
or
 Diploma in Civil Engineering from a recognized institution with three years'
professional experience.

 For appointment by promotion of Section Officers now called Junior Engineers, the
qualification prescribed is as under:-
 Section Officers possessing a recognized Degree in Civil Engineering or equivalent
with three years' service in the grade
 Section Officers possessing a recognized Diploma in Civil Engineering with six years'
service in the grade
 The dispute in the present case is whether a Diploma-holder Junior Engineer who obtains
a Degree while in service becomes eligible for appointment as Assistant Engineer by
promotion on completion of three years' service (including therein the period of service
prior to obtaining the Degree.)

The Diploma-holders contend –

 They would be eligible for promotion in this category on obtaining the Degree if the total
period of service is three years inclusive of the earlier period.

According to the Degree-holders, these are two distinct categories

1. Degree-holders with three years' service in the grade-the period of three years being
subsequent to the date of obtaining the Degree
2. Diploma-holders with six years' experience.

Held that:
 The practice that was followed in the Department for a long time was that the period of
three years' service for promotion as Degree-holders commenced from the date of
obtaining the Degree.
 The earlier period of service of Diploma holders was not counted for this purpose.
 The question is, whether deviation from past practice is allowed.
 It was stated that if the past practice is based on one of the possible constructions which
can be made of the rules then upsetting the same now would not be appropriate.
UNIT – 2 – Internal Aids
- Internal Aids - Long title, Preamble, Definition, Exceptions, Explanation, headings,
marginal notes, preamble, proviso, saving clauses, Non-obstante clause

Long Title v Short Title

 Long title-Good guide regarding object, scope or purpose of the Act, part of the statute
admissible as an aid to its construction
 Cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment
Preamble
 Is expected to describe scope, object and purpose of Act more comprehensively than
long title
 May recite ground and cause of making the statute
 Jurists across the globe-preamble safe means of collecting the intention of legislature
 Key to open the mind of the makers of the Act, and mischief’s which they intended
to redress
 Preamble in itself is not an enacting provision-not of same weight as an aid to
construction of a section
 The utility of Preamble diminishes on a conclusion as to clarity of enacting
provisions [ A.G v. HRH Prince (1957) 1 All ER 49]
 GullipilliSowriaRajv.BandaruPavani(2009)1SCC714
 S. 5 of HMA – based on preamble can be concluded that both parties to marriage must
be Hindus
 Preamble provides that act relates to marriage among Hindus
Headings
- Short headings – prefixed to a section
- Long Headings – prefixed to a group of sections
- “Headings like side notes and punctuation -inserted by the draftsmen -it is seldom that
any attention is paid to them in the Legislature, therefore it should bedisregarded”
- It is more realistic to accept the Act as printed as being the product of whole legislative
process and give due weight to everything found in thestatute
 Frick India Ltd v UOI
  Headings cannot be referred when words are clear and unambiguous
 Headings cannot be used in a manner that would cut down the plain meaning of
the words
 Must only be used if ambiguity exists in the provision
 Prabhakar v R Dugar
 In case of conflict between plain meaning of words and headings, the plain
meaning of the provision would prevail over the heading
Marginal Notes

- Headings/notes –inserted at one side of a section and express the effect of the
sections/ a brief precis of the section
- Bengal Immunit Co v State of Bihar
 The marginal note to article 286 is "Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the
sale or purchase of goods", which, unlike the marginal notes in Acts of the
British Parliament, is part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent
Assembly
 It prima facie, furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the article.
Apart from the marginal note, the very language of that article makes it
abundantly clear that its object is to place restrictions on the legislative power of
the States with respect to the imposition of taxes on the -sales or purchases of
goods.
- Marginal notes in other enactments – added by drafters-occasionally inaccurate-( the
weight of authority –in favour- that a Marginal note can’t be used for construing a
section)
Punctuation

- Weightage should be given to Punctuation, but cannot be allowed to control the plain
meaning of the statute ( Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arbinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369)

- When a statute is carefully punctuated- it may be resorted to for the purpose of

construction
 Mohd. Shabbir v.State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 564
  S. 27 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act
 Whether Stocking of drugs is offence
 No comma after stocking means only stocking for purpose of sale is prohibited
Illustrations
- Examples/instances appended to a section- explains the provision
- Cant modify/ curtail the ambit of the section
- Conflict b/w the text of section & illustrations – the text of the sections shall prevail
 Mahomed Syedol Ariffin vs Yeoh Ooi Gark
 Whether Diary of deceased father can be admitted under S. 32(5) of IEA to show
proof of age of son
 Held statement as to DOB relates to commencement of relationship under S. 32(5)
 Support taken from illustration under S. 35
 Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v State of Punjab
 S. 133 of IEA allows conviction based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony
while S. 114 of IEA in illustrations provides that uncorroborated accomplice
testimony is unworthy of credit
 Deviation from normal rules of construction
 Thus the rule of law enacted in the later part of section 133 has, from practical
point of view, been reduced to a dead letter on the basis of a rule of practice
developed under a mere Illustration and that too appended to a different section.
 Such a result, which is exceptional from the point of view of principles of
construction, is the outcome of the anxiety of courts to safeguard the liberty of the
subject and to make sure that a conviction is not obtained merely on tainted
evidence.

Schedules
- Attached /added towards the end of a statute to avoid excessive detail in the sections
- Contains forms for the working of the section/ rules etc
- Read together with the connected section
- In case of conflict between the body of the Act and the schedule, the former prevails
Definitions/Interpretation Clauses
- Word defined to ‘mean’ such and such- definition is restrictive /exhaustive
- Word defined to ‘include’ such and such- definition is extensive
- A definition may be in the form of ‘means and includes’ the definition is exhaustive
(Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1976 SC 997)
 Indra Sarma v VKV Sharma (2013)
 Definition of ”domestic relationship” has 5 categories and uses the word means
 Therefore it is exclusive
 Carter v Bradbeer (House of Lords)
 S. 201(1) of Licensing Act, 1964 defines bar with the word include – therefore
does not exclude what is considered a bar in ordinary and common parlance
 South Gujarat Roofing Tile Manufacturers Association v State of Gujurat
 Entry 22, Part 1 to the Schedule of Minimum Wages Act, 1948
 Definition of Potteries industry gives a list of 9 industries that are included and
uses the term includes
 Question was whether mangalore pattern roofing tiles is part of schedule
 If it had been the legislature's intention to bring within the entry all possible
articles of pottery, it was quite unnecessary to add an Explanation
 The word 'includes' has been used here in the sense of 'means’- definition
exhaustive the manufacture of Mangalore pattern roofing tiles is outside the
purview of entry 22
- Ambiguous definition
 Definition should not be read in isolation- read and construed in thecontext
- Definitions subject to a contrary context
 Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject/context
 Unless the context otherwise requires
Proviso
- It is added to an enactment (main provision) to qualify /create an exception to what is in the
main provision
- 'Proviso’ - is used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for
themspecially
- Beginning with“ provided that”
- Example – S. 376(1) of IPC – Proviso for punishment of rape less than 7 years for special
reasons
- Main Roles of Proviso
a) Exclusionary- excludes something which would otherwise fall within the
principal provision
b) Qualifying – attaches conditions to the provision laid in the main enactment
c) Clarificatory- further provides clarity to some
- 'Exception' is added to an enactment for exempting something which would otherwise fall in
the ambit of main provision
- Applies in all circumstances Eg. - IPC s. 76 to 105
- Proviso is construed in relation to the section /sections to which it is appended ( does not
travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso)
- Proviso to be construed in relation to section/sections to which it is appended/ read with
main provision
- It is not separate /independent provision
- Proviso cannot be inconsistent with main provisions- if so its ultra vires the main provision-
struck down / construed harmoniously
- A proviso-strictly construed- because it is an exception to general rule
- Example – Section 27 of IEA applied to group of sections of 24-26 where principal matter is
confession by accused person
 T.M. Kanniyan vs Income-Tax Officer, Pondicherry
 By Article 240(1) of the Constitution, power is conferred on the President "to make
Regulations for the peace, progress and good Government" of the Union territories.
 There is a proviso appended to Article 240(1) which directs that the President shall not
make any regulation after the Constitution of a Legislature of a Union territory for that
Union territory.
 It was contended on the basis of the proviso that the power of the President is co-
extensive with the power of the Legislature which may be constituted for a Union
territory and hence the President's power to make regulations is limited to subjects
falling within the Concurrent and State List.
  This argument was negated on the reasoning that the enacting part of Article 240(1) in
plain terms confers plenary powers of making regulations which are not curtailed by
the proviso

Explanation
- Explanation appended to a section ( explain the meaning of words contained the
section)
- Read together with the provision connected
- Not a substantiveprovision
Non Obstante Clause
- A clause beginning with notwithstanding anything contained
 In this Act
 In some particular provision in the Act
 In some particular Act
 In any law for the time being in force
The enacting part of the section, in case of conflict is given an overriding effect over the
provision/ Act mentioned in the non obstante clause
- Non Obstante Clause used in contradistinction with to the phrase Subject to
- Yielding place to another provision/provisions to which it is made subject
- A provision enacted without prejudice to.........(another section)
- Enacting provision does not have the effect of affecting other provisions and any action
taken must not be inconsistent with such other provision
- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law - Any other law will refer to any law
other than the Act in which the section occurs
- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act - May be construed to take away the effect
of any provision of the Act in which the section occurs but it cannot take away the effect of
any other law
- Even though the notwithstanding clause is very widely worded, its scope may be restricted
by construction having regard to the intention of the Legislature gathered from the enacting
clause or other related provisions in the Act. This may be particularly so when the
notwithstanding clause "does not refer to any particular provision which it intends to
override but refers to the provisions of the statute generally
 Vishin N Khanchandani v Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani
 Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 by which a nominee of
the certificate on the death of the holder becomes entitled to the certificate and to be
paid the sum due thereon "notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the
time being in force", or in any disposing testamentary or otherwise in respect of any
saving certificate, does not make the nominee owner of the sum so received to the
exclusion of the legal heirs
 This is clear from section 8 and other provisions of the Act, the object of permitting
nomination being essentially to prevent delay in collection of the money due under
the certificate after the death of the holder.
UNIT -3 - External Aids
- Interpretation is determination of a writing, i.e the art of finding out the true sense of any
form of words. It is the process of ascertaining the meaning of any given text
- When no clue is found from the language of the text about the intention of the legislature,
the aids of interpretation are employed.

Historical Facts & Surrounding Circumstances

- If language of statute is unambiguous and clear there is no need to use any external aid
- However, in construction of statutes the state of things at the time is a relevant factor.
This includes the time when the statute was passed, the evils it sought to remedy etc
- Historical facts and circumstances are quite useful in order to understand the subject
matter of the statute and arrive at the legislative intent
- Shrimant Suryavanshi v Bhairoba Suryavanshi (2002 3 SCC 676)
- Historical facts and documents preceding the legislation can be take into consideration
while construing its provisions
- Section 53-A of TP Act inserted based on recommendations of special committee set up
by GoI
- Held that reference to the committee report/recommendations can be taken into
consideration while construing the provisions.
- In Auckland Jute Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Chandra Goswami it was held that the interpreter
should place himself, as far as possible, in the position of those whose words he is
interpreting and the meaning of certain words and terms used in an ancient document or a
statute can be properly explained only by reference to the circumstances existing at the
time when the statute was enacted or the document was written.
- To sustain the presumption of common of constitutionality, the consideration maybe
had to even matters of common knowledge; the history of the times
and every conceivable state of facts existing at the time of legislation which be the
assumed.
- It is permissible to look into the historical facts and surrounding circumstances for
ascertaining the evil sought to be remedied. Value of "historical evolution" of a provision
or "reference to what preceded the enactment" as an external aid to understand and
 appreciate the meaning of a provision, its ambit or expanse has been judicially recognised
and textually recommended.
- But this aid to construe any provision which is "extremely hazardous" should be resorted
to, only, if any doubt arises about the scope of the section or it is found to be "sufficiently
difficult and ambiguous to justify the construction of its evaluation in the statute book as
a proper and logical course and secondly the object of the instant enquiry" should be "to
ascertain the true meaning of that part of the section which remains as it was and which
there is no ground for thinking the substitution of a new proviso was intended to alter".
- But "considerations stemming from legislative history must not, however, override
the plain words of a statute". This rule of interpretation, if applied to a limited extent,
may give good results but if it is unduly extended, it may lead to absurdity.
- Summing up, it is of no doubt that historical facts and surrounding circumstances are so
important that they have been described as two footsteps required for walking on the
road. But on each side, there are some dangers to be avoided.

Surrounding Circumstances, State of the Law & Parliamentary History

1. In order to arrive at the intention of the legislature, the state of the law and judicial
decisions antecedent to and being handed down at the time the statute was being passed
are material matters to be considered.
2. Evidence of matters relating to such surrounding circumstances and historical
investigation of which judicial notice can be taken by the court, including reports of
Select Committees and statements of objects and reasons, can be resorted to for
ascertaining such antecedent law and for determining the intention of the legislature.
3. But the Bill and reports of Select Committees are not legitimate material to be called in
aid for arriving at a construction of a statute, i.e. for finding the meaning of words.
4. Parliamentary debates on the floor of the legislature are also inadmissible because the
court is concerned only with what the legislature actually said in the statute.
5. Moreover, plain words in the statute cannot be limited by any considerations of policy.
6. An erroneous assumption by the legislature as to the state of the law has no effect and
does not become a substantive enactment.
7. In the construction of a statute, the worst person to construe it is the person who was
responsible for its drafting.
 8. Courts sometimes make a distinction between legislative debates and reports of
committees’ and treat the latter as a more reliable or satisfactory source of assistance
Legislative History in India
- It has properly been held that legislative history may be consulted by the courts with
proper understanding & circumspection.
- Similarly, historical evolution of a provision can also be relied on as an external aid to
construction.
- In Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, earlier Acts, dictionaries, history of
legislation, parliamentary history, parliamentary proceedings, state of law, as it existed
when the Act was passed, the mischief sought to be suppressed and the remedy sought to
be advanced by the Act were recognised as external aids.
a) White Papers- Likewise, the white paper issued by the government, giving details of the
facts leading to enactment of a statute, is admissible for understanding the background,
when the court is called upon to interpret and decide the validity of the statute. It must be
noted that extensive reference was made to the white paper by the Supreme Court for the
purpose of understanding the background of the Rama Janmabhumi Babri Masjid Dispute
and the constitutionality of the acquisition of certain areas of Ayodhya Act, 1993.
b) Constituent Assembly Debates - It was held in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab that the
historical background and, perhaps, what was accepted or what was rejected by the
Constituent Assembly while the Constitution was being framed may be taken into
account in finding out the scope and extent of Article 368.
c) Reports - Reports of the Law Commission can be looked into to understand the history
of the legislation, the object with which certain legal provisions are enacted and what
advantages may be derived by adopting a particular policy. As observed in S.P. Gupta v.
Union of India (1981), the report of the committees of the Law Commission are entitled
to great respect as they are prepared by experienced persons after taking into
consideration, all relevant aspects and sometimes the evidence collected by them from
several sources. If they are to be excluded, many opinions expressed in many of the
books have to be excluded.
However, in Maharani Kusumkumari v. Smt Kusumkumari Jadeja where the question
was about protection of legitimacy of children born of void marriage, the court did not
 rely upon the Law Commission's report as the relevant sections of Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 were amended and it could safely be deduced that Parliament did not held identical
view, as expressed by the Law Commission's report.
d) Parliamentary History - In Consumer Education and Research Society v. Union of
India, the court, while dealing with the constitutionality of Parliament (Prevention of
Disqualification) Amendment Act, 2006, observed that the expression "office of profit" is
not defined in the Constitution. The view that certain offices or positions held by a
Member of Parliament may be either incompatible with his or her duty as an elected
representative of the people, or affect his or her independence, and thus weaken the
loyalty to his or her constituency and, therefore, should disqualify the holder thereof, had
its origin in the parliamentary history of the UK.
e) Speeches & Debates - Speeches of Members of Parliament are external aids and are in a
similar position as Constituent Assembly debates. The reports of commissions and
enquiry committees, which precede the introduction of a Bill at times, have been used or
referred for interpreting the Act.
In Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, it was observed that Constituent Assembly debates
are external aids. They are not conclusive for interpretation of any expression. The court
cannot ignore the present by going into the past.
f) Amendments to a Bill - It is not correct to contend that acceptance or rejection of
amendments to a Bill, in the course of parliamentary proceedings, forms part of the pre-
enactment history of a statute and, as such, might throw valuable light on the intention of
the legislature when the language used in the statute admitted of more than one
construction. The reason why a particular amendment was proposed, or accepted, or
rejected is often a matter of controversy, and without the speeches bearing upon the
motion, it cannot be ascertained with any reasonable degree of certainty. And where the
legislature happens to be bicameral, the Second Chamber may or may not have known of
such reason when it dealt with the measure. (Ashwini Kumar Ghose v Arabinda Bose
1952)

This principle was again referred to by the Supreme Court and substantially modified in
Express Newspapers Pvt Ltd v UOI (1958). Bhagwati J, speaking for the court observed
 that there is a consensus of opinion that the circumstances under which a particular word
came to be deleted from the original Bill as introduced in the Parliament and the fact of
such deletion when the Act came to be passed in the final shape are not aids to the
construction of the terms of the statute. He, however, added a rider: "It is only when the
terms of the statute are ambiguous or vague that resort may be had to them for the
purpose of arriving at the true intention of the Legislature", and although asserting that it
was not necessary in that case to refer to the circumstance of deletion of the word
"minimum" from the bill, he proceeded in the next paragraph to consider that very
circumstance and to hold that it had the effect of widening the enquiry before the wage-
Board

For instance in CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. the court relied on the Minister's
speech, the notes on clauses of the Bill and the memorandum for explaining the
expression "financial non-viability" which was not defined in the Act.

g) Statement of Objects - Bills and the statement of objects and reasons of a Bill are not
material for taking into account to construe provisions where they are absolutely clear.
Thus, the courts have to be careful before making use of this device of interpretation. .
(Ashwini Kumar Ghose v Arabinda Bose 1952)

In State of W.B v UOI Justice Sinha reiterated the same in the following words –
“It is however well- settled that the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a
bill, when introduced in Parliament, cannot be used to determine the true meaning and
effect of the substantive provisions of the statute. They cannot be used except for the
limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs
leading up to the legislation. But we cannot use this statement as an aid to the
construction of the enactment or to show that the legislature did not intend to acquire the
proprietary rights vested in the State or in any way to affect the State Governments' rights
as owners of minerals”
 In the said case a clear declaration in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that "the
Central Government does not intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the States"
was held to be ineffective to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute
which was construed as conferring power upon the Union to acquire the rights of States
in coal bearing lands.

Posterior Political, Social & Economic Developments and Scientific Inventions

- When a change in social condition produces a novel situation which was not in
contemplation at the time when the statute was first enacted, there can be no a priori
assumption that the enactment does not apply to the new circumstances.
- If the language of the enactment is wide enough to extend to those circumstances, there
is no reason why it should not apply.
- Social expectations and attitudes are also important and have to be considered to upkeep
the law. In Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India an interesting constitutional situation
arose. Under Section 30, Punjab Excise Act, 1914, the Act prohibited the employment of
any man under the age of 25 years or any woman to be employed in any part of premises
wherein intoxicating drugs were consumed by public. This was a good law in 20th
century but having regard to the present social conditions and equality of man and
woman under the Constitution, the same was declared invalid.
- However, the judges should not substitute their own views in order to fill the gaps.

General words
- It must be remembered that words are not static vehicles of ideas or concept, their content
will always expand. Global changes and outlook in trade and commerce could be a
relevant factor to consider while interpreting a word, what was not considered a necessity
a century back, may be held to be so now.
- Utilizing the above principle, general words are interpreted to include in their widened
and extended meaning to include new inventions and technological advances.
- Following the same principle, the Supreme Court has held that a "telephone line" in
Telegraph Act, 1885 is wide enough to include electric lines used for the purposes of
wireless telegraph. (Senior Electric Inspector v Laxminarayan Chopra)
 - Similarly, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the word textiles, held that it includes
cotton, woollen dry felts, because, it said that the "concept" of textiles is not a static
concept. Having regard to newly developed methods, materials, processes and techniques,
this word gets a continually expanding meaning and consequently new kinds of fabrics
that may be invented can be, without doing any violence to the language, legitimately
regarded as textiles. (Porritts & Spencer v State of Harayana)
- On the same principles, general words are construed to include new inventions and
technological advances not known at the time when the Act was enacted.
- As the content of the ideas or concepts conveyed by respective words expand, so does the
content of the words keep pace with the same expanding content and naturally tend to
widen the field of public interest which the section wants to protect.

Scientific Inventions
- Where in some cases when a statute is to be historically interpreted, it looks as if one
were interpreting it the day after it was passed. However, the courts are free to apply the
current meaning of the statute to the present-day conditions.
- It has been observed in State v. S.J. Choudhary, that the legislature is presumed to
anticipate the temporal development and to intend the Act to be applied in such a way as
to give effect to the tone intention. The statute should be so construed as to continuously
update the wordings in accordance with the changes in social conditions, science and
technology.
- The question in this case was expert opinion about the typewriter on which the
questioned document was typed. The question at hand was whether the term handwriting
within the scope of S. 45 of the IEA would include a typewriting expert.
- This was so because what was understood by handwriting in 1872, must now in the
present times after more than a century of the enactment of that provision, be necessarily
understood to include typewriting as well, since typing has become more common than
handwriting and this change is on account of the availability of typewriters and their
common use much after the statute was enacted in 1872. This was an additional reason
for holding that the opinion of the typewriter expert in this context is admissible under
Section 45, Evidence Act, 1872.
 - In the same case, it was observed that reading of the word "telegraph" to include
"telephone" within the meaning of the word in Act, 1863 and 1869 was a long accepted
practice of judicial construction when telephone was not invented. The same was, thus,
applied to read "typewriting" within the meaning of the word "handwriting" in the Act of
1872.
Reference to Other Statutes

1. Statutes in Pari Materia

- The statute has to be read as a whole and the words therein are to be understood in their
context. This is the main rule and as an extension of this rule of context, it is permitted to
refer to other statutes in pari materia. Statutes in pari materia mean statutes dealing with
the same subject-matter or forming part of the same system.
- The rule of reading the statute as a whole, when extended in its application, permits
reference to other statutes in pari materia.
- According to Sutherland Statutes are considered to be in pari materia-to pertain to the
same subject-matter-when they relate to the same persons or thing or have the same
purpose or object.
- A statute must be read as a whole because its words are to be understood in their context.
This rule of context can be extended to refer to other statutes in pari materia, i.e. statutes
dealing with the same subject matter. The word context has a wide meaning which means
including other statutes in pari materia.
- Meaning of the phrase in pari materia is explained in case of United Society v. Eagle
Bank of New Haven, when the two pieces of legislation are of different scopes, they
cannot be said at in pari materia. However, it is not necessary that the entire subject
matter in both the statutes should be identical.
- It is a rule of construction that courts may follow decisions about similar provisions
contained in enactments in pari materia.
- The object behind this rule is to avoid contradiction between two statutes dealing with the
same subject. But where two statutes are not in pari materia, the rule does not apply.
- In Babu Khan v. Nazim Khan it has been held that the court, while construing a provision
of an enactment, often follows the decisions by the courts construing similar provision of
an enactment in pari materia.
- But in the Babu Khan case, it is clear that the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy
Act, 1950contains one integrated scheme providing for remedy to a pucca tenant claiming
restoration of possession under Sections 91 and 93 of the Act. The Madhya Bharat Land
Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 was repealed by M.P. Land Revenue Code. In repealing
Act, i.e. M.P. Land Revenue Code, there is no provision like Section 93 of the Act.
Therefore, it must be concluded that Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Act are not in pari
materia with the provisions of Section 250, M.P. Land Revenue Code.
- It is not a sound principle of construction to interpret a provision of an enactment
following the decisions rendered on a similar provision of an enactment when two
statutes are not in pari materia.
- This in pari materia rule has in its favour, the following points:
1. Use of later statute - The rule facilitates the use of a later statute as exposition of
the meaning of an ambiguous expression.
2. Use of earlier statute- By this rule, it is allowed to make use of an earlier statute
to throw light on the meaning of a phrase used in a later statute in the same
context.
3. Contradiction avoided- The rule avoids contradiction between a series of
statutes dealing with the same subject.
4. Presumption- It permits to raise a presumption, in the absence of any context
showing a contrary intention, that the same meaning attaches to the same words in
a later statute, as in an earlier statute, if the words are used in similar connection
in two statutes. However, this presumption is rebuttable because it does not
necessarily follow that the same words used in the two provisions carry the same
meaning.

2. Assistance of Later Statutes

- A later statute is normally not, therefore, made use of as an aid to construction of an
earlier one. This principle was referred to and was approved in Peddinti Venkata Murali
Ranganatha Desika Iyengar v. Govt. of A.P.
- Trusts and Societies - validity of provision - Section 76 of A.P. Charitable and Hindu
Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 and A.P. (Andhra Area) Inams
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 - whether Section 76 valid piece of
 legislation - Section 76 attempts to destroy effect of law in Inams Abolition Act without
amending law under latter - Section 76 founded on erroneous assumption that Inams
Abolition Act did not bind religious or charitable institutions or endowments or holder of
patta granted to him and land was still with institution and treated occupant as encroacher
- legislation founded on erroneous assumption does not have effect of depriving holder of
land or their vested right acquired under Inams Abolition Act - held, Section 76 is invalid
to extent it effects right acquired under Inams Abolition Act. (Peddinti Venkata Murali
Ranganatha Desika Iyengar v. Govt. of A.P.)
- A legislation declaring certain facts, which are nonexistent as existing and thereafter
proceeding on that assumption, may also be held to be ineffective.
- It is clearly established now that the subsequent legislation on the same subject may be
looked into, in order to see what the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act
where the earlier Act is ambiguous.
- If the subsequent legislation proceeds upon an erroneous construction of previous
legislation, it cannot alter that previous legislation, but if there is any ambiguity in the
earlier legislation, then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which
is to be put upon the earlier. This passage was approved by Lord Buckmaster in Ormond
Investment Co. Ltd. v. Betts.
- Thus, a subsequent Act of Parliament affords no useful guide to the meaning of another
Act which came into existence before the later one was ever framed. Under special
circumstances, the law does, however, admit of a subsequent Act to be resorted to for this
purpose but the conditions under which the later Act may be resorted for the
interpretation of the earlier Act are strict; both must be laws on the same subject, and the
part of the earlier Act which is sought to be construed must be ambiguous and capable of
different meanings.

3. Reference of Earlier Statute into later statute

- Incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the sake
of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier
Act into the later. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by
reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the
later Act as if they had been "bodily transposed into it.
- A distinction has also been drawn between a mere reference or citation of one statute into
another and incorporation. In the former case a modification, repeal or reenactment of the
statute that is referred will also have effect for the statute in which it is referred; but in the
latter case any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal has no
repercussion on the incorporating statute. It is a question of construction whether a
particular former statute is merely referred to or cited in a later statute or is wholly or
partially incorporated therein.
- The distinction between incorporation by reference and adoption of provisions by mere
reference or citation is not too easy to highlight. The distinction is one of difference in
degree and is often blurred. The fact that no clear-cut guidelines or distinguishing features
have been spelt out to ascertain whether it belongs to one or the other category makes the
task of identification difficult. The semantics associated with interpretation play their role
to a limited extent. Ultimately, it is a matter of probe into legislative intention and/or
taking an insight into the working of the enactment if one or the other view is adopted
- The Punjab Pre-emption Act (Punjab Act 1 of 1913) defined "Agricultural land" by
reference to the definition of this expression contained in the Punjab Alienation of Land
Act, 1900, which Act was repealed by the Adaptation of Laws (Third Amendment)
Order, 1951, but the Supreme Court held that the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land
Act, 1900 had no effect on the continued operation of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and the
definition of "Agricultural land" incorporated in it. (Ramsarup v Munshi)
- Section 23 of the Mysore Improvement Act, 1903 provided that the acquisition under the
Act "shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894".
- Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 sets out the matters to be considered in
determining compensation. One of the matters so set out is the market value of the land.
Till 1923, the market value required to be taken into account was the value at the date of
publication of the declaration under section 6. By Act 38 of 1923, section 23 of the Land
Acquisition Act was amended and the market value became relatable to the date of the
notification under section 4.
- In the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust, Mysore v P
Govindan, the question was whether section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended
 in 1923 will apply to the acquisitions under the Mysore Act or whether such acquisition
even after 1923 will be governed by section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act as it
originally stood.
- In holding that the Land Acquisition Act as amended would apply, the Supreme Court
held that a fair interpretation of section 23 of the Mysore Act, 1903 was that it applied
whatever procedure may be for the time being in force regarding matters regulating
compensation under the Land Acquisition Act.
- In reaching this conclusion the court said that section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1923 lays down the procedure for award of compensation and it has to be followed as it
exists on the date of acquisition for no one has a vested right in a particular procedure
Textbooks
- Privy Council observed in Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga
Sethupathi,
“according to the established rules in our courts, it is not open to the court to go back to
the old text in order to see whether the interpretations placed on them by the recognised
commentators are correct or not.”
- However, for arriving at a true meaning of an enactment, the courts may refer to text
books. It lies within the discretion of the courts to accept or reject the meaning given in
the textbook.
- The courts have often quoted from Manu, Jimutvahana, Kautilya, Vigyaneshwar and
Yajnavalkya with approval. In the well-known case of Kesavananda Bharati, a large
number of textbooks were looked into.
Dictionaries
- When a word is not defined in the Act itself, as was the case in Nagulapati
Lakshmamma v. Mupparaju Subbaia, it is permissible to look into a dictionary to find
out the general sense of the word. i.e. the sense in which the word is understood in
common usage.
- A word may bear various shades of meaning. Out of these meanings, a suitable meaning
in regard to the context in which the word is used has to be selected or found out. This is
because it is a fundamental rule of construction that the meanings of words and
expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear.
- It has been rightly observed, therefore, by the Supreme Court that contextual construction
has its own importance and significance. Color and content emanating from context may
permit sense being preferred to mere meaning. Words lose their thrust when read in
vacuum.
- Quite often in interpreting a statutory provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to
the subject-matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve.
- It has been observed in Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa that the use of a dictionary ad
lib without an analysis of the entire Act, its purpose and its intent, for ascertaining the
meaning in which the legislature could have used the word or expression, may not lead us
to the right conclusion.
- "Dictionaries", as observed by Krishna Aiyar in SBI v. N. Sundara Money. "are not
dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law, more emphatically
the definition clause, furnishes a different denotation".
- When a plain meaning of the provision brings out what was intended, dictionary meaning
is not to be considered
- Where an expression has been defined in an Act, it will carry the same meaning. In such a
case, it is an unnecessary exercise to find out what is the general meaning of the
expression because the definition given in the statute is the determinative factor. In the
Nagulapati case, it has been held that judicial dictionary meaning cannot be relied upon
where there is an express statutory provision in regard to that matter.
- As observed in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd, the dictionary meaning
of a word cannot be looked at where that word has been statutorily defined or judicially
interpreted but where there is no such definition or interpretation, the court may take the
aid of dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of a word in common parlance, bearing in
mind that a word is used in different sense according to its content and a dictionary gives
all the meanings of a word, and the court has, therefore, to select the particular meaning,
which is relevant to the context in which it has to interpret that word.
- Dictionary meaning is ruled out when word has a definite prevalent meaning. Also when
legislature uses certain words which have acquired a definite meaning over a period of
time, it must be assumed that those words have been used by the legislature in the same
sense.
- Furniture- When the word is not defined in the Act, dictionaries may be helpful. In one
case, where meaning of the word "furniture" was not given, dictionary was permitted to
be referred and the meaning given therein was relied upon. (New Chelur Manufacturers
v CCE)
- Timber- Similarly, in the Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. case, it was held that the
dictionary meaning of a word cannot be looked at where the word has been statutorily
defined or judicially interpreted. But in absence of such interpretation or definition, the
court may obtain the aid of dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of a word in common
par. lance. Here, the court has got to select the proper and suitable meaning out of
equivalent meanings given in dictionary. In this case, it was held that "timber" and sized
timber or dressed logs are one and the same commercial commodity. Moreover, beams,
rafters, planks, etc. are also included in the word "timber".
- Apprentice- The similar was the case in ESI Corpn. v. TELCO where, in case of
interpretation of the word "apprentice", dictionary was permitted to be referred and its
meaning accepted. However, one thing is to be remembered here and, i.e. judicial
interpretation given to the word defined in one statute does not afford a guide to
construction of the same words in another statute, unless the statutes are in pari materia
legislation.
- In Sarin Chemical Laboratory v. CST, according to the dictionary meaning, tooth
powder is regarded both as an item of cosmetic and toilet requisite but the names of
articles, the sales and purchases of which are liable to be taxed given in a statute unless
defined in the statute, must be construed not in a technical sense but as understood in
common parlance meaning "that sense which people conversant, with the subject-matter
with which statute is dealing would attribute to it". In common parlance, a tooth powder
is considered as a toilet requisite. That meaning accords with the dictionary meaning as
well.
Technical meaning- If an expression acquires a special connotation in law, it must be
assumed that the legislature had used it in its legal sense and not with reference to
common parlance or dictionary meaning.
Foreign Decisions
- The Supreme Court is not bound by decisions of foreign courts. Foreign decisions and
textbooks have only persuasive value. However, there are countries which follow the
same system of jurisprudence as the Indian jurisprudence and these countries have
statutes in pari materia to our statutes.
- The Indian courts have, therefore, permitted the use of such foreign decisions. However,
the use must be with restraint and sobriety.
- Our statutes are couched in English language and they (statutes in English language) are
considered as authoritative.
- The country is in touch with English jurisprudence and English common law for the last
150 years. Similarity, in political thought. But because of these reasons the Indian courts
never accepted the assistance of foreign decisions with closed eyes.
- As held in STO v. Kanhaiya Lal Mukund Lal Saraf, while seeking assistance of such
decisions, prime importance must be given to the language of the Indian statute, the
circumstances, the setting in which the statute is enacted and the Indian conditions
wherein it is to be applied. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that there is always an
element of risk in grabbing ready-made and hasty assistance from foreign decisions.
- Before independence, i.e. pre-Constitution, Indian courts profusely referred to English
decisions, and that was a common practice. A caution was, therefore, given by the Privy
Council to discontinue this practice, but it was not given up. But it must be confessed that
where the language of our Indian statute is not clear, knowledge of English Law and
precedents have proved to be of valuable assistance.
- As observed in CCE v. Sitaram Agarwala, where an Indian Act is modeled on a prior
English Act, decisions construing the provisions of the English Act are referred to as
helpful guide for construing corresponding provisions of Indian Act. Similarly, the courts
get considerable assistance from foreign decisions while interpreting certain provisions of
the Constitution. However, this assistance is again to be obtained and used with care and
caution.
- The Supreme Court, unlike the English court, interpreted and construed the words
"damage caused by a ship" in Section 443, Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 widely, so as to
include therein, not only physical damage to ship but also damage to cargo carried in the
 ship. For interpreting these words widely, there were justifiable reasons, and they were,
that there was no other Act in India covering claims for damage to cargo carried into a
ship. In England, this point is covered expressly by a separate Act. (M.V Elizabeth v
Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt Ltd)
- In certain areas, the Supreme Court may strive to be more progressive in interpretation. A
good example is afforded by Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar. In this case, a statutory
tenant (i.e. a tenant whose tenancy is determined and who continues in possession
because of statutory protection in Rent Acts) was recognised to hold a heritable interest
unless there be a contrary provision in the statute. Under English Law, a statutory tenant
is not recognised to hold a heritable interest unless it is conferred by the statute. As
observed by Bhagwati J, this contrary view under the English Law proceeds because of
reluctance to the idea that the law is moving forward from contract to status.
UNIT – 4 - Presumptions
- In the interpretation of statutes, certain so-called presumptions exist, which are not truly
concerned with evidence at all, but are cannons of interpretation.
- A presumption should be allowed to fill in the gaps disclosed in the evidence. In Bhojraj v.
Sita Ram, it was held that the presumption, not to supplement but to contradict the evidence,
would be out of place.
- Commencement- date on which the Act comes into force/operation
- Unless otherwise provided, the Act comes into force on the day it receives the Presidential
assent
- Commencement of an Act is postponed to a specified future date- appropriate govt. may by
notification in the official gazette may appoint

General Presumptions
1. The words in a statute are used precisely and not loosely.
2. Vested rights are not taken away without express words or necessary implication or
without compensation.
3. Mens rea is generally required for a criminal act.
4. Government is affected by a statute.
5. The jurisdiction of courts is neither enlarged nor decreased
6. Statutes are not intended to be inconsistent with international law.
7. The legislature does not intend what is inconvenient and unreasonable.
8. The legislature knows the existing law and does not intend to alter it except by express
enactment.
9. The legislature does not commit mistakes or make omissions.
10. Different words in the same statute have different meanings.
11. Words are to be understood according to the subject-matter they refer to and the object
of the legislature.
12. An interpretation clause is an aid to the interpretation of the statute in which it occurs
and has no effect on other statutes.
Legislation is Generally Prospective
- Every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly/by necessary implication
made to have retrospective operation ( presumption of prospectively)
- Articulated in the legal maxim-Nova Constitutio Futuris Formam Imponere Debet, Non
Praeteritis- new law is to regulate what is to follow, not the past

Statutes dealing with Substantive Rights

 When the object of the statute- affect vested rights/impose new burdens/ impair
existing obligations- general rule- presumption of prospectivity/ presumption against
retrospectivity- must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect
 i.e. unless the words are sufficient- show the intention of legislature to give
retrospective effect

Statutes dealing with procedure

 Statutes merely dealing with matters of procedure- are presumed to be retrospective
unless such construction is textually inadmissible
 No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of
prosecution/defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by /for the Court in
which the case is pending & if by an Act of Parliament, the mode of procedure is
altered- he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode (
Maxwell
 Law Relating to forum is procedural
- A statute which changes procedure as well as creates new rights/ obligations – construed
to be prospective unless expressly provided/by necessary implication
- Law relating to right of action/right of appeal- substantive

Statutes of Limitation
- Procedural – no new right – only prescribes the time limit – may be prospective or
retrospective
- If a particular right of action – time barred under an earlier Limitation Act- later
limitation Act provides a larger period of limitation- right is not revived by a later
limitation Act – new Act has prospective effect
 - When a later limitation Act provides for shorter period of limitation than the earlier
limitation Act- a right of suit which is subsisting according to earlier Act will not be
extinguished- prospective effect

Fiscal Statutes
-Impose Liability - Not retrospective – generally prospective

Penal Statutes
- Cannot be presumed to have retrospective effect – Prospective -Supported by constitutional
restriction- Article 20(1)
 State v Gian Singh
 Operation Blue Star – Gian Singh TADA- sentenced to death
 TADA 1985 had higher punishment than TADA 1987
 They were sentenced under 1985 Act
 Held not retrospective but SC gave benefit of S. 3(2) of TADA 1987 and
converted death to Life Imprisonment
 If the position was just in the reverse order i.e. the later Act contained harsher
sentence and the former Act contained a lesser sentence the prohibition embodied
in Article 20(1) of the Constitution -would have come to the rescue of the
offender.
 But if any subsequent legislation would downgrade the harshness of the sentence
for the same offence, it would be a salutary principle for administration of
criminal justice to suggest that the said legislative benevolence can be extended to
the accused who awaits judicial verdict regarding sentence

Statutes relating to Sucession

- Operate and apply from the date when the succession opens thereafter, i.e. after the date
of coming into force of the statute
 Eramma v Verrupanna & Ors
 Sucession dispute
 Hindu Sucession Act –enacted during the course of dispute - As per S. 8 it would
got to appellants as they were step mother but S. 6 clearly states that it would be
applicable only if a male Hindu dies after commencement of the Act
  Therefore S. 8 of the Act is not retrospective
 Sukhdev Singh v State of Haryana
 Section 42(2) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, prior
to its amendment, provided that where an officer takes down any information in
writing under section 42(1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso
thereto, he shall "forthwith" send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.
 The word "forthwith" was substituted for "within seventy-two hours" by Act 9 of
2001 with effect from 2 October 2001, thereby bringing more certainty to the
requirement.
 The Supreme Court observed that amendments to criminal law would not intend
that there should be undue delay in disposal of criminal trials or that there should
be a retrial just because the law has changed. In the present case, information
regarding the alleged commission of an offence was received by the officer on 4
February 1994, and the trial had already been concluded on 4 July 1998, prior to
the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 2001.
 Since the law, as it existed at the time of commission of the offence, would govern
the rights and obligations of the parties, the unamended section 42(2) was held to
apply in the said case.
 Zile Singh v State of Harayana
 Haryana Municipal Act – Disqualification for membership – first amendment had
a mistake/typo
 Was corrected in second amendment 6 months later
 Held that the time period prescribed under S. 13-A would be considered from the
date of first amendment and that that the text modified in second amendment
would have retrospective effect
 The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to
declaratory/curative statutes
 It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous
law, retrospective operation is generally intended
 No express words of retrospective operation in second amendment- intention of
legislature- necessary implication
 ESI Corpm v Dwaraka Nath Bhargava
 Section 45B the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, which enables the
Employees' State Insurance Corporation to recover arrears of contribution from
the employers as arrears of land revenue, has been held to be procedural and
applicable to arrears falling due before coming into force of the section on 28
January 1968.
 The reason is that statutes providing for new remedies for enforcement of an
existing right are treated as procedural and apply to future as well past causes of
action.
Unit – 5- Jurisdiction
- Statutes should not be construed so as to take away jurisdiction of superior courts/extend
that jurisdiction.
- Statutes giving jurisdiction to subordinate courts, tribunals - must be strictly complied
with
- Provisions excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts- do not affect either the jurisdiction
of either the HC under Art 226/ of the SC under Art 32/136- to interfere when grounds
are established
- Civil courts- disputes of civil nature- exclusion of jurisdiction therefore not to be readily
inferred- either expressly/clearly implied
- The burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is excluded is on the party raising such
contention
- Applies to all courts of general jurisdiction including criminal courts
- Exclusion of their jurisdiction can be brought about by setting up courts of limited
jurisdiction in limited field

Exclusion of Superior Court’s Jurisdiction

- The question of curtailing the jurisdiction of the SC/HC does not arise in India except by
the Constitution
- Jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution – can be taken away by amending the
Constitution- not by statutory enactments
- Egs.-1. Kihoto Hollohan case ( AIR 1993 SC 412)
2. Inter- State water Disputes Act 1956- Sec 11
- The powers of SC under Articles 32 & 136 & the High Court’s under Articles 226 &
227- parts of basic structure- Constitution cannot be amended to create a tribunal making
its orders immune from challenge under aforesaid provisions( L Chandra Kumar v. UOI
AIR 1997 SC 1125)
- Legislative enactment states- order of a court/tribunal is final- remedies available under
the Constitution remains unfettered( R. Krushna Bose v. Kanungo AIR 1954 SC 202)
- S. 115 of CPC - Special Act- conferring power on a sub-ordinate court – enacts that the
decision rendered by such court is final- it will only take away the remedy of appeal- but
not a remedy by way of revision under S. 115
- ( exclusion of revision cannot be inferred except by express provision to that effect)
 Akbar Khan v UoI
 The question of acquisition of citizenship was under consideration. The plaintiffs
in this case filed a suit in the civil court claiming that they were Indian citizens on
26 January 1950. They went to Pakistan in 1953 on a temporary visit and had not
acquired Pakistani citizenship. They continued to be Indian citizens.
 As per Section 9(2), Citizenship Act, 1955, if any question arises as to whether,
when and how any person has acquired citizenship of another country, it shall be
decided by such authority as may be prescribed, i.e. as per Rule 30 by the Central
Government. The State contended that the plaintiffs had never been Indian
citizens. They had acquired Pakistani citizenship voluntarily. The suit was
dismissed as it was barred by Section 9(2) of the Act.
 The Supreme Court held that the question whether the plaintiffs were Indian
citizens on 26 January 1950, could be decided by civil courts and the suit was not
barred by Section 9(2). However, the question, whether the plaintiffs had acquired
Pakistani citizenship thereafter, could only be decided by the Central Government.
 The Supreme Court directed that if the civil court found that the plaintiffs were
never Indian citizens, the suit should be dismissed. But if they are found to be
Indian citizens on 26 January 1950, the question regarding their foreign
citizenship shall be decided by the Central Government.
UNIT – 6 – Repeal and Expiry of Statutes
- Repeal means to cancel, revoke/abrogate particularly a statute Repeal of the statute in
whole/part-expressly
- Repeal may be done impliedly by enacting matter contrary to/inconsistent with the prior
legislation i.e. the court will treat matter as repealed by implication- if the earlier statute
and later statute are clearly inconsistent
- Every legislature has power to repeal laws as it has power to enact
- Repeal may be by express provision/by necessary implication
- Repeal of a repealing provision does not revive the initially repealed provisions unless
the intent to revive it is apparent. It may however allow common law principles to apply
- Repeal Simpliciter/ accompanied with a fresh legislation
- Perpetual Statute – duration not fixed – remains in force until repealed

Effect of Expiry of Statutes

- When a temporary Act expires, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which in
terms is limited to repeals, has no application. The effect of expiry, therefore, depends
upon the construction of the Act itself
- The section is regarding effect of repeal- applies to all kinds of repeal- also applies when
temporary statute is repealed before its expiry
- The effect of expiry depends upon the construction of the Act itself
- The normal rule is that the proceedings taken against a person under a temporary statute
terminate, ipso facto, as soon as the statute expires. This shows that a person cannot be
prosecuted and convicted for an offence against the Act after its expiry, in absence of a
saving provision.
- If the prosecution has not ended before the date of expiry of the Act, it will terminate of
its own, automatically, as a result of the termination of the Act. Penal provisions creating
legal fiction must receive strict construction.
- In short, after an Act is expired, a person cannot be prosecuted and convicted for an
offence against the Act unless there is a saving provision. If the prosecution has not
ended before the date of expiry of the Act, it will automatically come to an end as the Act
is expired.
 - On expiration or repeal of a temporary Act, normally, any appointment, rules, orders,
notifications, schemes, forms or bye-laws made or issued will come to an end. Even if the
expired Act is re-enacted, these will not be continued. In this regard, Section 24, General
Clauses Act, 1897 makes the position clear.
- As observed in S. Krishnan v. State of Madras, a person's detention under a temporary
statute relating to preventive detention will automatically come to an end on the expiry of
the statute.
- Expiry of a statute does not make the statute dead for all purposes. It is a question of
construction. A person, who has been prosecuted for violating the provisions of the
temporary Act and sentenced while the temporary Act was in force, cannot be released
before he serves out his sentence. This is so, even if the temporary Act expires before the
expiry of the full period of the sentence.
- However, offences which are punishable under the ordinary laws but were being tried by
special courts, being connected with the offences under the expired Act, could still be
tried by ordinary courts without the necessity of a de novo trial
- A person's detention under a temporary statute relating to preventive detention will
automatically come to an end on the expiry of the statute.

Repeal by a temporary statute

- Whether a statute which is repealed by a temporary statute will, on the expiry of the
repealing statute, revive or not, is a question, answer to which must be found in the
construction of the repealing statute.
- If the repealing section in a temporary statute expires with the expiry of the Act, the
repeal will be construed only as a temporary repeal. As observed by Gajendragadkar J in
State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, "the intention of the temporary Act in
repealing the earlier Act will have to be considered and no general or flexible rule in that
behalf can be laid down."
- The Privy Council observed to the same effect in Gooderham and Worts Ltd. v.
Canadian Brodcasting Corpn, when it said that the repeal effected by the temporary
legislation was only a temporary repeal. When by the fiat of Parliament, the temporary
repeal expired; the original legislation automatically resumed its full force. No enactment
of it was required.
Repeal
- After an Act is expired, a person cannot be prosecuted & convicted for an offence against
the Act, in the absence of a saving provision
- In the absence of a saving clause no prosecution for infringement of its provisions could
be commenced after the expiry of the life of the Act ( State of UP v. Jagamanderdas
AIR 1954 SC 683)
- Example – JJ Act 2015, repeals JJ Act 2000 – S. 111(1) but S. 111(2) has a savings
clause that allows action taken under JJ Act 2000 to be considered to have been done
under the corresponding sections of JJ Act, 2015
- A legislature which has power to enact a law on a particular subject matter has also
power to repeal the same
- Repeal may be by express provision / necessary implication
- Express Repeal
 No special words necessary to bring about an express appeal.
 The words must show an intention to abrogate the provisions /Act
a) is or are hereby repealed
b) Shall cease to have effect
c) Shall be omitted
d) All provisions inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed
e) Shall to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Act be
deemed to have been repealed/ modified
 When the object is to repeal only a portion of an Act words shall be omitted used
 The legislative practice in India- omission of a provision is treated as amendment –
which signifies deletion of provision & is not different from repeal ( Sec 6A of the
General Clauses Act, 1897)
 No real distinction between repeal and amendment ( Attorney General v. Margaret
(2003) 78 ALJR 105)
 Where a provision of an Act is omitted by an Act- said Act simultaneously re-enacts
a new provision ( repealed provision with modification)- modification /changes are
treated as amendment coming into force from the date of enforcement of re-enacted
provisions
Repeal by Implication
 Is not favoured by courts.
 There is always a presumption against implied repeal
 The rule – based on the theory- the Legislature while enacting law has complete
knowledge of the existing laws on the subject matter
 When a new Act contains a repealing section ( mentioning the Act which it expressly
repeals)- the presumption is against implied repeal strengthened on the principle
expression unius est exclusion alterius
 May be inferred when
a. Where there is direct conflict between two provisions
b. When the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code replacing the earlier law
c. When two laws occupy the same field
1. Later law prevails earlier law
2. Special law prevails over General law
- Prior Particular/Special Law & Later general law
 Intention of later general law is clear to repeal/modify a prior particular law – the general
law will prevail over the particular law
 If the general law by its own terms recognises the existence or continuance of special law
on the subject, no question of inconsistency with or repeal of the special law can arise.
 Thus, section 5 of the CrPC, 1973, recognises the continuance of special form of
procedure under any law for the time being in force and hence it was held that the
Haryana Childrens Act, 1974, which came into force on 1 March 1974, was not repealed
by the Code which came into force on 1 April 1974 ( Rohtasv.Stateof Harayana)
 A later general law may abrogate a prior special law by express repeal/ making provisions
inconsistent with it- later general law will prevail over the earlier special law (Ajay
Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India 1984 3 SCC 126)
- Prior General Law and Later Particular/Special Law
 A prior general law may be affected by a subsequent particular/special Act
 May repeal the general Act/ curtailing its operation
 A general Acts operation may be curtailed by a later special Act even if the general Act
contains a non-obstante clause ( Damji V Shah v. LIC AIR 1966 SC 135)
 Ratan Lal Adukia v UOI
 Whether new Section 80, Indian Railways Act 1890 constituted a complete and self-
contained special law as to the place of suing respecting suits envisaged by that Section
derogating from the generality of the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil
Procedure or Whether there is an implied repeal of Section 20 of CPC.
 Section 80 of the Railways Act, 1890, substituted in 1961, provides for the forum where
a suit for compensation for the loss of life of, or personal injury to, a passenger or for
loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods against a
railway administration may be brought.
 It was held that the said section was a special provision and a self contained code and
that it impliedly repealed in respect of suits covered by it the general provisions of
section 20 of the CPC, 1908.
 Ajay Kumar Banerjee & Others etc. v. Union of India & Others etc
 The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later
abrogates the earlier one.
 A prior special law, would yield to a later general law, if either of the two following
conditions is satisfied:
(i) The two are inconsistent with each other
(ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment
 If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law, even though general, would
prevail
- If a later statute describes an offence created by an earlier one & provides for different
punishment /varies procedure- earlier statute is repealed by implication( Zaverbai v. State
of Bombay AIR 1954 Cri LJ 1822)
- The principle cannot be applied when the offence in the later Act is not the same as the
one in the earlier Act i.e. when their ingredients are not the same ( Om Prakash v. State
of UP AIR 1957 SC 458)
 Delhi Municipal Corporation v Shiv Shankar
 Whether the respondent is liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 for selling adulterated vinegar when the vinegar is being sold
 under a licence granted under the Fruit Products Order, 1955 made by the Central
Government under s. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act.
 But, if the two may be read together and some application may be made of the words in
the earlier Act, repeal will not be inferred.
 Thus the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and Rules, 1955 made thereunder
relating to vinegar were not held to be impliedly repealed by the Essential Commodities
Act, 1955 and the Fruit order made thereunder although both contained regulatory
provisions and laid down certain standards of quality and composition for vinegar for it
was not possible to say that the two could not stand together.
 In the words of the court: "If the Adulteration Act or rules impose some restrictions on
the manufacturer, dealer or seller of vinegar then they have to comply with them
irrespective of the fact that the fruit order imposes lesser number of restrictions in
respect of these matters. The former do not render compliance with the latter
impossible, nor does compliance with the former necessarily and automatically involve
violation of the latter."
 S. 26 of GC Act prevents Double Jeopardy
UNIT 7 – Fiscal Statutes
- Article 265 of the Constitution of India provides that "no tax shall be levied or collected
except by the authority of law".
- Therefore, no tax can be levied or collected in India, unless it is explicitly and clearly
authorized by way of legislation.
- A tax is imposed for
i. Public purpose
ii. For raising revenue for the State

 Every taxing Statute

i. Charging Section
ii. Procedure for assessment of tax
iii. Collection and Recovery of tax
iv. Penalties

Strict Construction
 An act of fiscal nature – imposes liability- strictly construed
 Subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose ( A P Board for Water
Pollution Control v. A P Rayons Ltd. (1989) 1 SCC 44)
 A taxing statute must be interpreted as it reads, with no additions and no subtractions, on
the ground of legislative intendment /otherwise
 In cases of ambiguity in regard to the charging section, the benefit of doubt is given to
the assessee
 Literal interpretation is the general rule- cannot be adopted if it leads to incongruous
results- effect to be given to the object of enactment
 Ambiguity /doubt in exemption clause in a fiscal statute- can be resolved in favor of the
revenue & not in favor of assessee
 The burden of proving the applicability is on the assessee [Commissioner of Customs
(Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar]
  Procedural Provisions- can be liberally construed as long the substantive provision is
satisfied
 Taxing statutes read prospective unless retrospective operation is clearly set out therein
 Charging provisions including penalty provision should be strictly construed
 In taxing statute- commercial parlance meaning/ trade meaning is preferred to dictionary
meaning

Double Taxation
 Double taxation Avoidance Agreement
 One construction result in double taxation of the same income- such result must be
avoided
 But, an express provision cannot be held invalid on the ground that it results in double
taxation
 Jain Bros & others v. UOI
 But as the rule of avoidance of double taxation is merely a rule of construction it
ceases to have any application when the Legislature expressly enacts a law which
results in double taxation of the same income.
 The law so made cannot be held invalid merely on the ground that it results in double
taxation. It was, therefore, held that section 23(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, which
made provision for assessment and payment of tax by a registered firm and also for
inclusion of the share of income of a partner in his total income was not invalid.
 After the amendment a registered firm was liable to pay income tax independently of
the tax payable by the individual partners of the firm on their share of profits
 It is not disputed that there can be double taxation if the legislature has distinctly
enacted
 It is only when there are general words of taxation and they cannot be so interpreted as
to tax the subject twice over the same income
 The Constitution does not contain any prohibition against double taxation
 Appellant had argued that same income cannot be taxed in hands of firm and partners
 Further that there must be a passage of the money in another form of income for it to
be taxed again
 Tata Sky Ltd. v. State of MP
 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether DTH (direct to home) broadcasters
could be taxed under the Madhya Pradesh Entertainments Duty and Advertisements
Tax Act, 1936. On an examination of the Act as a whole, particularly a conjoint
reading of sections 2(a) (admission to an entertainment), 2(b) (definition of
entertainment), 2(d) (payment of admission), 3 (entertainment duty payable by the
proprietor of an entertainment) and 4 (method of levy)
 The court held that the charge of tax under the Act would be attracted only if an
entertainment takes place in a specified physical location to which persons are
admitted on payment of some charge to the proprietor of the entertainment. Since
DTH operation is not a place-related entertainment, it is not covered under the
charging provision i.e. section 3, and therefore, the State cannot impose any tax on
DTH operators under the said Act
 State of Gujarat v Essar Oil Ltd
 It was held that the principle that in case of ambiguity, a taxing statute should be
construed in favour of the assessee, does not apply to the construction of an exception
or an exempting provision, which must be construed strictly, and in case of any doubt
or ambiguity, the benefit must go to the State.
 Member-secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water
Pollution vs. Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. and Ors.
 Whether the Respondent-manufacturing Rayon Grade Pulp, a base material for
manufacturing of synthetics is an industry as mentioned in Schedule I of the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 for the purposes of levy of Water
Cess under the Act
 Act- Section 3 levy and collection of cess on water consumed by persons carrying on
certain industries with a view to augment the resources of the Central Board and the
State Boards
 Schedule 1 specifies the industries that have to pay cess
 HC held that the said industry was not a textile industry or any specified industry
under Schedule 1
  Act imposing liability for cess-is fiscal in nature-be strictly interpreted- to find out
whether a liability is fastened on a particular industry.
 The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose;
 There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no
presumption to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied
 Whether a particular industry falls within the realm of taxation, must be judged by the
predominant purpose and process and not by any ancillary or incidental process
carried on by a particular industry in running its business
 Chemical process would be involved to a certain extent, more or less in all industries,
but an industry would be known as a chemical industry if it carries out predominantly
chemical activities
 Neither chemical, textile nor paper Industry
 The purpose of the Act is to realize money from those whose activities lead to
pollution and who must bear the expenses of the maintenance and running of the State
Board.
 It is a fiscal provision and must, therefore, not only be literally construed but also be
strictly construed
 The question as to what is covered must be found out from the language according to
its natural meaning, fairly and squarely read
 CIT v Vatika Township Private Limited
 Whether the surcharge levied by way of insertion of the proviso to section 113 of the
Income Tax Act 1961, by the Finance Act, 2002 was to operate prospectively or was
clarificatory and curative in nature, to be applied retrospectively.
 A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court relied on the understanding of the Central
Board of Direct Taxes, as expressed in CBDT Circular No. 8 of 2002, dated 27 August
2002, titled "Finance Act, 2002 - Explanatory Notes on Provision Relating to Direct
Taxes", to hold that the amendment which inserted the proviso to section 113 of the
Income Tax Act, 1961, would be prospective and not retrospective in its application
 Legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or
impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective
unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect;
 unless the legislation is for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former
legislation or to explain a former legislation.
 Where a benefit is conferred by legislation, the rule against a retrospective
construction is different. If legislation confers a benefit on some persons but without
inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public generally
and where to confer such benefit appears to have been the legislators object, then the
presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would
warrant it to be given a retrospective effect.
 In the instant case, the proviso added to section 113 is not beneficial to the assessee.
On the contrary, it is a provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case
like this, court has to proceed with the normal rule of presumption against
retrospective operation.
 Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no
statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction
appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct
implication.
 Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be
displaced by out weighing factors.

Role of Notification & Circulars

- A notification is issued by a Government (Central/ State) to exercise the power of a
legislative enactment – take care procedural aspects of the enactment
- Part of the statute itself and has the force equal to the statutory provisions
- Circulars are issued by the chief executive in charge of the taxation hierarchy- normally
explanatory/ clarificatory or the strict application of the law or its procedures can be
reduced by the issuance
- Binding upon the department / office falling under the jurisdiction of issuing authority
- A circular which is beneficial to the assessee -can avail the benefit of circular
- If against the interest of assessee, it cannot restrict options of the assessee.- challenge the
correctness
- Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs / the Central Board of Direct Taxes (
CBDT)
- Board cannot issue circulars which impose on the assessee a burden greater than that
contemplated by the statute- the strict application of the law or its procedures can be
reduced by the issuance of a circular
- The Court held that since the circular was conferring a benefit upon assessee and diluting
the stringent requirements of the Act, the Board was required to comply with its own
instructions, and could not itself contend that the circular could not be enforced (
Navnitlal Javeri v. K K Sen 1965 (1) SCR 909)
- Circulars are not binding on the assessee, Tribunals (CCE v. Minwool Rock Fibres Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 518)
- In case of conflict between interpretation taken by the SC & circular- decision of the
Supreme Court will be binding (CCE v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries 2005 3 SCC
57)
UNIT – 8 – Remedial & Penal Statutes
Remedial v Penal Statutes
- Legislations enacted with the purpose of bringing into effect- social reform- improving
conditions of certain class of persons-who might have not been fairly treated in the past-
remedial statutes
- These statues prohibit certain acts – provide redress/ compensation to the person
aggrieved by such acts
- Do not make the offender liable for any penalty, but merely provides compensation to
the injured party-remedial statute
- Also known as welfare, beneficial /social justice oriented legislations
- Penal statutes- penalties for disobedience of the law
- Penalties are directed against the offender-in relation to the State- by making him liable
to imprisonment, fine, forfeiture/other penalty

General Rule
- A penal statute should be strictly construed; It is for the legislature and not for the court to
define a crime and provide for its punishment in case of ambiguity
- The court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather
than the one which imposes a penalty or in favour of the alleged offender/accused
- Remedial statutes construed liberally- 'the widest operation which its language will permit.
- The doubt is resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is
enacted
 J & F Stone Lighting & Radio Ltd. V. Haygarth
 Factories Act, 1961 should be regarded as a beneficial rather than a penal statute. Its
object is to secure proper working conditions & penalties for failure to provide such
conditions are merely incidental to the object.
 There is no need to construe the Act restrictively, though equally there is no need to
extend it beyond its natural meaning
 B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court
 The court applied the beneficent rule of construction in construing section 5 of the
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, which makes the employer liable for the payment of
 maternity benefit to a woman worker at the rate of the average daily wage for "the
period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her
delivery and for the six weeks immediately following that day.
 Maternity benefit- an amount equivalent to daily wage -72 working days falling within
twelve weeks of the maternity period
 The question was whether in calculating the maternity benefit for the period covered by
section 5, Sundays' being wageless holiday should be excluded.
 In holding that Sundays must also be included the court applied the beneficial rule of
construction in favour of the woman worker and observed that the benefit conferred by
the Act read in the light of Article 42 of the Constitution was intended to enable the
woman worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her
child, preserve her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous
efficiency and output
 M V Joshi v. M U Shimpi & Anr
 In construing the word "Butter" in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, the
Supreme Court gave effect to the plain meaning and held that the word included butter
prepared from curd; rejecting the contention based on the rule of strict construction and
on the rule that that construction should be adopted which is more favourable to the
subject, Subbarao J said:
“But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental principle of
interpretation, namely, that the primary test is—the language employed
in the Act and when the words are clear and plain the court is bound to
accept the expressed intention of the Legislature.”
 Appeal before the SC-Butter prepared from curds is not butter within the meaning of the
Rules-appellant contends that the rule being a part of a penal statute, it should be
construed strictly & in favor of the accused.
 In the case of butter, curd was not shown as one of the products from which it could be
prepared, while in the case of ghee, it was shown as a separate produce from which ghee
could be prepared.
  The interpretation suggested by learned counsel for the appellant, if accepted, would
make the rule a dead- letter, for all practical purposes, and the object of the Legislature (
to prevent adulteration of food )would be defeated
 Only 'the processes adopted for making it are different
 State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh
 The presumption related to dowry death in section 304-B of the IPC, which covers not
only the husband of the deceased woman but also "any relative of her husband", was
construed strictly to hold that the brother of the aunt of the husband cannot be
prosecuted thereunder.
 Since the term "relative" is not defined in the IPC, the same has to be understood in its
natural, ordinary or popular sense, and would therefore mean only a person related to
the husband by blood, marriage or adoption

Mens Rea in Statutory Offences

- Wrongful Act/Actus Reus
- Guilty Intention/ Mens Rea
- Generally IPC- mens rea is indicated- use of words- intentionally, voluntarily, dishonestly,
knowingly etc
- Legislature –may- create an offence of strict liability- where mens rea is not necessary
 Sarjoo Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
 The SC held that any person, whether employer or employee contravening the provisions
of section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, is liable to punishment
under section 16, and it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the person
concerned had guilty knowledge or intention or that he knew that the article was
adulterated.
 It was pointed out that the Legislature enacted the Act in the larger interest of
maintenance of public health, and the language was wide enough to cover every person
selling adulterated food whether he had the guilty knowledge or not
 Some statutory offences- Prevention of food adulteration Act, Weights and Measures
Act- liable even without proof of mens rea/guilty knowledge
 Western India Plywood Ltd vs Shri. P. Ashokan
 Whether the respondent, who is an employee of the appellant, can claim damages from
the appellant -the injury suffered by him during the course of employment when he was
already received the benefit under the provision of the Employees State Insurance Act
1948.
 SC held that Section 53 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, which provides that
an insured person or his dependents will not be entitled to "any compensation or damages
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 or any other law for the time being in
force or otherwise in respect of an employment injury", was held to bar even claim for
compensation or damages in Torts although the Act is a beneficial legislation.
UNIT – 9 SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
-Subordinate legislation is the legislation made by an authority subordinate to the
legislature.
- According to Sir John Salmond, “Subordinate legislation is that which proceeds from any
authority other than the sovereign power and is, therefore, dependent for its continued
existence and validity on some superior or supreme authority.”
- Most of the enactments provide for the powers for making rules, regulations, bye-laws or
other statutory instruments which are exercised by the specified subordinate authorities.
- Such legislation is to be made within the framework of the powers so delegated by the
legislature and is, therefore, known as delegated or subordinate legislation.
NATURE
- ‘Subordinateness’, in subordinate legislation is not merely suggestive of the level of the
authority making it but also of the nature of the legislation itself.
- Delegated legislation under such delegated powers is ancillary and cannot, by its very
nature, replace or modify the parent law nor can it lay down details akin to substantive
law.
- There are instances where pieces of subordinate legislation which tended to replace or
modify the provisions of the basic law or attempted to lay down new law by themselves
had been struck down as ultra vires.
- It must be noted that legislation is an inherent and inalienable right of Parliament and it
has to be seen that this power is not usurped nor transgressed under the guise of what is
called subordinate legislation.

NECESSITY OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

 Gwalior Rayon Mills Mfg. (Wing.) Co. Ltd. V. Asstt. Commissioner of Sales Tax and
Others
- In this case, the SC highlighted the need for subordinate legislations.
- It was stated that most of the modern socio-economic legislations passed by the
legislature lay down the guiding principles and the legislative policy.
- The legislatures because of limitation imposed upon by the time factor hardly go into
matters of detail.
- This provision is, therefore, made for delegated legislation to obtain flexibility,
elasticity, expedition and opportunity for experimentation.
- The practice of empowering the executive to make subordinate legislation within a
prescribed sphere has evolved out of practical necessity and pragmatic needs of a modern
welfare State.
 - In view of newer areas emerging, law-making today has become not only time
consuming but also an increasingly complicated and technical affair. What a legislature
can possibly do and actually does is that it lays down the policy and purpose of the
legislation and leaves it to the executive, experts and technocrats to provide for working
details within the framework of the enactment by way of rules, regulations, bye-laws or
other statutory instruments.
- That is why, delegated legislation is increasingly assuming an important role in the
process of law-making, comprising an important component of legislation.
- Powers have also been conferred under various provisions of the Constitution of India on
the different functionaries to frame rules, regulations or schemes dealing with various
aspects.

KINDS OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

There are five Kinds of Subordinate Legislation which are as follows -

1. Colonial Legislation - Colonial Legislation is the outcome of colony or colonies.

2. Executive Legislation - These powers are expressly delegated to the executive by the
parliament.
3. Judicial Legislation - The Superior courts especially Supreme Court and High Courts of
the State have the power of Making rules for the regulation of their own procedure.
4. Municipal Legislation - Municipal authorities are empowered and entrusted with the
power of establishing special laws for the Districts under their Control.
5. Autonomous Legislation - These are the bodies of Private Persons, they make rules for
the regulation and functioning of their offices.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

- Under Indian Law, the delegated legislation does not go beyond the reach of the judicial
review of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts. Judiciary exercises effective control
over delegated legislation in India.
- The validity of delegated legislation can be examined by the courts on several grounds.
These grounds are far wider than the grounds available in England.
o All laws made in this country shall have to conform to the provisions of the
Constitution including Chapter III thereof.
o Whenever a law made by the Executive is found to be inconsistent with the
Constitution or ultra vires the parent Act, from which the law-making power has
been derived, it is declared null and void by the Court.
- The power of examining the validity of delegated legislation in India has been vested in
the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
 - In the control-mechanism, judicial control has emerged as the most outstanding
controlling measure.
- Judicial control over delegated legislation is exercised by applying two tests:
o Substantive ultra vires; and
o Procedural ultra vires

In India the invalidity of delegated legislation may arise from any of the following reasons:

(1) The enabling Act or delegating statute being unconstitutional.

- Where the enabling Act or some of its provisions, under which delegated legislation is
provided, are in contravention of the Constitution, the court would declare the Act or its
provisions, as the case may be, ultra vires.

- The unconstitutionality of an Act may arise under the following three conditions:
o A law will be ultra vires if it violates a constitutional provision.
 In re Delhi Laws Act case
3 the majority of the Judges held the exercise of delegated law-making
power invalid because the enabling Act exceeded the constitutional limits
in permitting the executive to repeal a law existing in the area.

o Express limitation
According to this, no Legislature has the power to transgress the scheme of
distribution of powers embodied in the Constitution. The Legislative powers are
divided between the Parliament and the State Legislature. The ambit of their
power has been clearly spelt out in the Constitution. Any provision of delegated
legislation contained in an Act which is in violation of the constitutional scheme
of distribution of legislative powers would be ultra vires.

o Where the Legislature has the power, subjected to certain restrictions which are
not observed by it.
 Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P.,
The C.P. Regulation of Manufacturer of Biris Act, 1948, in order to ensure
adequate agricultural labour in biri-making areas, empowered a Deputy
Commissioner to fix the apicultural seasons and to prohibit manufacture of
biri in the notified villages during the season.
By a notification, the Deputy Commissioner forbade all persons from
manufacturing the biri.
The Supreme Court held that the Act in permitting the imposition of a
total prohibition upon those carrying on business of manufacture of biris
during the agricultural seasons interfered with private business and
 violated Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution, hence the notification under
the Act was void.

(2) The subordinate legislation violating the Constitution.

- In the countries where the powers of the Legislature are limited and defined by a written
Constitution, the position of subordinate legislation is different.
- The tests which have been applied to subordinate legislation by the courts:
o whether or not the enabling Act or the enabling provision thereunder is valid.
o whether or not subordinate legislation violates any provision of the Constitution.
- M/s. Dwarka Pd. v. State of U.P,
This is an instance of subordinate legislation being in conflict with Constitution and
hence was ultra vires.
In this case clause 3(1) of U.P. Coal Control Order, 1953 was held ultra vires because it
gave unrestricted power to the State Controller to make exceptions and even if he acted
arbitrarily there was no check over him and no redress was available against it.
The Court held that it is violative of Article 19(1 )(g) and could not be justified as a
reasonable restriction under clause (6) of the same Article.

(3) The subordinate legislation being ultra vires the delegating Act.
- In all circumstances the power of delegated legislations should be exercised within the
scope of the rulemaking power provided in the statute.
- Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co.
The court laid down that:
o notwithstanding the subordinate legislation being laid on the Table of the House
of Parliament or the State Legislature
o and being subject to such modification, annulment or amendment as they may
make,
o the subordinate legislation cannot be said to be valid unless it is within the scope
of the rule-making power provided in the statute.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS - Sec. 23 of General Clauses Act, 1897

23. Provisions applicable to making of rules or bye-laws after previous publication.—
- Where, by any Central Act or Regulation,
- a power to make rules or bye-laws is expressed to be given
- subject to the condition of the rules or bye-laws being made after previous publication,
- then the following provisions shall apply, namely:—
(1) the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws shall,
 - before making them,
- publish a draft of the proposed rules or bye-laws
- for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby;
(2) the publication shall be made in such manner as that
- authority deems to be sufficient, or,
- if the condition with respect to previous publication so requires, in such manner as the
Government concerned prescribes;
(3) there shall be published with the draft a notice specifying a date on or after which the
draft will be taken into consideration;
(4) the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws,
- and, where the rules or bye-laws are to be made with the sanction, approval or
concurrence of another authority, that authority also,
- shall consider any objection or suggestion
- which may be received by the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws
- from any person with respect to the draft before the date so specified;
(5) the publication in the Official Gazette of a rule or bye-law purporting to have been made
in exercise of a power to make rules or bye-laws after previous publication shall be
conclusive proof that the rule or bye-law has been duly made.

Landmark case in Concept of Delegated Legislation in India-

 In Re, Delhi Laws Act Case
- This is s a landmark judgment of the 7 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court wherein each
judge had a difference of opinion.
- In this, there were some pre-existing Acts, which contained some delegation:

1. The Delhi Laws Act,1912: Section 7 says that the provincial government may, by
notification in the official gazette, extend with such restriction and modification as it thinks
fit to the province of Delhi or any part hereof, any enactment which is in force in any part of
British India at the date of such notification.

2. The Ajmer- Marwar (extension of laws) Act, 1947: Section 2, the Central Government may,
by notification in the official gazette, extend to the province of Ajmer-Marwar with such
restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other
province at the date of such notification.

3. Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950: Section 2 runs as follows, authority was delicate to the
Central Govt. for two purposes & two provisions were made:
 i. To Extend & apply with restriction and modification recruitment in force in part A
state to part C state.
ii. There’s an ability where a delegation of powers to Central Govt. can be done to
repeal or amend any corresponding law.

Before Independence, during the formation of this Act, the states were divided into three kind’s
i.e the Part A States/ Part B States/ Part C States.

These Acts were sent to the President and they entertained the doubt regarding a delegation
power i.e whether such delegation was proper and permissible.

So, the President of India referred to the SC under art. 123 of Constitution for seeking the
opinion on delegated power given to the Executive/ Administration in the mentioned Acts.

The issue arose whether these legislations were ultra vires?

Judgement:

- In the first Issue, the Act delegated the authority to the provincial government to the
Delhi area with some restrictions and modifications in any parts of the British India laws.
The Supreme Court held section 7 as valid by the majority of opinion.
- In the second issue, the Act delegated the power to the Central Government to the extent
to the provinces with some modification and restriction as much as it fits in the Act, and
again the Supreme Court held this section 2 to be Valid.
- Regarding the third issue, Part C states automatically come under the Central
Government without having their legislature. So, the Parliament has to legislate them
somehow or other. The delegated power was given to the Central Government to the
extent of the Part C states with some modification and restriction as much as it can be in
force to any Part A states.

ANALYSIS

Based on the opinion of the seven judges, Supreme Court decided their Judgment:

1. “Separation of Power” is not presented as something related to the Indian Constitution

from its inception.
2. Indian Parliament was never a representative of anyone. Hence, the doctrine of
“delegatus non potest delegare” (no transfer of power can be anymore transferred) cannot
be held to be applying here.
3. Parliament cannot relinquish itself by making a parallel authority.
4. Only auxiliary capacities or non-essential tasks can be given.
 5. There's a restriction on the giving of authority. The Legislative powers should not
transfer its vital processes to determine the legislation's policy and to enforce it into
definitive standards of behaviours.
Overall, the judgment legitimized the delegation of the legislative power by the legislature to the
administrative organ.

Mimansa principles of interpretation

- The principles of interpretation of statutes mainly relied on in our law courts are those
dealt with in the works of Western jurists like Maxwell and Craies. However, in our
country we had developed from very early times a scientific system of interpretation
known as the Mimansa Principles.
- Purva Mimansa is one of the classical Hindu philosophy schools, and according to it one
can achieve Moksha by performing Yagya (sacrifice) in accordance with the Shastras.
- These were regularly followed by our renowned jurists like Vijnaneshwara (author of
Mitakshara), Jimutvahana (author of Dayabhag), Nanda Pandit (author of Dattak
Mimansa) etc.
- Most of these principles are rational and scientific, and in some respects superior to the
principles obtaining in Western Law.
 The Mimansa principles are in two respects superior to Maxwell's principles of
interpretation, viz.:
(1) They can be utilised not only for interpreting statutes but also judgments, whereas Maxwell's
principles can only be used for interpreting statutory law,

(2) They are more detailed and systematic.

 Following are the four well-known general principles of interpretation in Mimansa,:

1. The Shruti Principle, or the literal rule
The correct interpretation, according to the Shruti principle, is the first interpretation.
2. The Linga principle (also called Lakshana artha)
This is the suggestive power of words or expressions.
 U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore6,
where the words "landless person" were held to refer to landless peasants only and not to
landless businessmen.
3. The Vakya Principle, or syntactical arrangement.
Syntax is the order or arrangement of words and phrases to form proper sentences.

4. Prakarana
This permits construction by referring to some other text in order to make the meaning
clear.
CASE LAWS:
 Tribhuwannath v. D.I.O.S.
 - Case decided in 1992.
- One of the Mimansa principles was applied
In this case the petitioner, who was the senior most teacher in an Intermediate College, had filed
a writ petition claiming that he should have been appointed ad hoc Principal on the retirement of
the previous Principal, but the management had superseded him.

In the course of hearing two Division Bench decisions apparently conflicting with each other,
were cited.

- While the Division Bench ruling written by Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. had held that the
seniormost teacher should be appointed ad hoc Principal
- The Division Bench ruling delivered by Hon'ble V.N. Khare, J. had held that it is the
discretion of the Management as to who is to be appointed.
By way of employing the Samanjasya principle of Mimansa it was easy to reconcile the
conflicting decisions by holding that:

- the former decision should be interpreted to mean that ordinarily the senior most
teacher should be appointed Principal,
- while the latter decision should be interpreted to mean that in exceptional cases, viz., if
there are grave charges against him, he can be superseded by a reasoned order, though
only after giving him a show-cause notice
 Vijay Narayan Thatte & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors
- The Supreme Court has called for liberal use of Mimansa Principles of Interpretation
(MPI) in interpreting and understanding the statutes and provisions of law.

A Bench of Justice Markandey Katju and Justice A.K. Ganguly in its order said:

- “MIP which were our traditional principles of interpretation which are unfortunately
ignored in our Courts of law today.
- Today our so-called educated people are largely ignorant about the great intellectual
achievements of our ancestors and the intellectual treasury which they have bequeathed
us.”
- “The MPI is part of that great intellectual treasury, but it is distressing to note that apart
from the reference to these principles in the judgment of Sir John Edge, the then Chief
Justice of Allahabad High Court in Beni Prasad vs. Hardai Bibi, a hundred years ago
and in some judgments, there has been almost no utilisation of these principles even in
our own country.”

UNIVERSAL APPLICABILITY:

It was stated that the Mimansa Principles were our traditional system of interpretation of legal
texts.
Although originally they were created for interpreting religious, gradually they came to be
utilised for interpreting legal texts and also for interpreting texts on philosophy, grammar, etc.
i.e. they became of universal application.

RULING
- The Bench in the instant case used MPI to interpret Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act.
- The Maharashtra government issued a notification under Section 6 of the LAA and the
question arose whether it was barred by limitation or not.
- The present appeal was allowed against a Bombay High Court judgment rejecting a writ
petition against the notification.
It was held that:
- when the language of the Statute is plain and clear then the literal rule of interpretation
has to be applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration of equity, public
interest or seeking the intention of the legislature.
- It is only when the language of the Statute is not clear or ambiguous or there is some
conflict etc. or the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can depart from the
literal rule of interpretation.
- In our opinion, the said Notification was clearly barred by limitation.

 Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan v. State of U.P

- The controversy was as to which of two clerks appointed on the same day in an
Intermediate College would be senior, and hence entitled to promotion as Head Clerk.
- Now there is no rule to cater to this situation.
- However, Chapter 2, Regulation 3 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Regulations states
that where 2 teachers are appointed on the same day, the senior in age will be senior.
- Using the atidesh Principle of mimansa it was held that the same principle which applies
to teachers should be also applied to clerks, and hence the senior in age would be
senior.
 Vinay Khare v. State of U.P.
- The controversy in this case was that if in a competitive examination two candidates got
equal marks whether the candidate who got more marks in the oral interview should be
placed higher in the select list or the candidate who got more marks in the written test.
- It was held in this case that, as per the Laghava Principle, the candidate who got more
marks in the written test should be placed higher because to interpret general suitability
on the basis of marks in the written test is a short and simple interpretation and provides
a clear objective test, whereas the criteria in the oral interview involves consideration of
the candidate's personality, dress, physique, etc. which is complicated and in which there
are more chances of favouritism and arbitrariness.
- (Laghava principle - which states that that construction which makes the meaning
simpler and shorter is to be preferred. )