WinVent Handbook Overview
WinVent Handbook Overview
HANDBOOK
by Richard Siwek and Christoph Cesana
Fifth Edition
April 2021
2
The information contained in this Handbook is essentially based on the European Standards
EN 14491-2012 “Dust explosion venting protective systems”, EN 14994-2007 “Gas
explosion venting protective systems”, Guideline VDI-3673, Part 1-2002 “Pressure release of
dust explosions” and the book of Wolfgang Bartknecht “Explosionsschutz, Grundlagen und
Anwendungen (Explosion Protection, basics and application, only in German)”, 1993 and is
subject to change without prior notice. Cesana AG and FireEx Consultant GmbH hereby state
that they will accept no liability whatsoever for consequences arising from such changes.
Despite the most careful editing, the handbook may be incomplete and may contain errors.
The authors and contributors disclaim any liability arising out of your use of this handbook.
Content
WINVENT ................................................................................................................................................. 1
1 Preliminary Remarks
The present Handbook describes explosion venting as one of the possible measures to miti-
gate the effects of explosions. The Handbook aids in the selection and the design of pressure
venting devices. The specified method for the selection and the design of such devices is
generally applicable. Additional explosion isolation systems must be incorporated because
European Standards mandate them. "Explosion pressure venting" is a protective measure for
equipment in which combustible dusts, flammable gases or hybrid mixtures is processed.
Special regulations apply for explosives, which are covered by an "Explosives Act".
Explosion venting should not be used if products or compounds are released which are classi-
fied as very poisonous, poisonous, corrosive, irritant, teratogenic as per "CLP/GHS" /7/.
For environmental and production related reasons it is very important to avoid ignition
sources, irrespective of the applied explosion venting. Thus, the probability of the existence of
one of the prerequisites for an explosion can be reduced.
The Handbook is meant to be a tool for the engineer who is faced with the task of venting the
equipment within his plant. The information contained in this Handbook is based on interna-
tionally accepted standards, guidelines and literatures e.g., European Standards EN 14491-
2012 “Dust explosion venting protective systems”/1/, EN 14994-2007 “Gas explosion venting
protective systems”/2/, EN 14797-2006 “Explosion venting devices /3/, VDI-3673, Part 1-
2002 “Pressure release of dust explosions” /4/, the book of Wolfgang Bartknecht
“Explosionsschutz, Grundlagen und Anwendungen (Explosion Protection, basics and
application, only in German)”, 1993 /5/ and EN 14460-2006: Explosion resistant equipment /6/.
Due to the great variety of conditions in industry, it is impossible to cover all applications.
However, the thorough treatment of the topic should allow the design engineer to arrive at a
favorable solution for all cases.
It is permissible to deviate from the vent areas given in this Handbook provided the same
level of safety could be guaranteed and documented through actual tests.
Equipment cannot be protected through explosion venting from the hazardous consequences
of a detonation.
In order to get a clear and simple representation in the WinVent program and the Handbook
the abbreviations and symbols may deviate from those given in the different European Stand-
ards. The selection of the abbreviations and symbols is such that they best conform to the
international standards or are optimum for the program representations.
The following Table 1-1 shows the abbreviations and symbols used in this Handbook.
All pressure data in connection with the protective measure "explosion venting" are given in
gauge pressure with the unit bar or mbar.
Examples are:
Resistance of vessel P in bar
Explosion overpressure Pmax in bar
Activation overpressure Pstat in bar
Vacuum resistance of vessel VRes in mbar
External pressure max PAmax in mbar
External pressure PAr in mbar.
Exception:
To avoid confusion with the explosion pressure data, the unit bar abs. was deliberately used
for the Operating Pressure OP.
Table 1-2. summarizes all check parameters that are specially marked with an *. They are
listed separately, because on the one hand these parameters can influence the calculations
significantly or on the other hand, they are not directly included in the calculations but require
an entry to check whether the calculations are within the validity range.
* Operating pressure OP
* Conveying speed vF
* Air flow Q
* Diameter (equivalent) DF
* Amount of product discharge MP
* Portion of solvent LM
* Weight of venting device GE
* Angle between axis of vent and duct WAr
When considering the propagation of a flame front and the rise in pressure during an explo-
sion, one has to differentiate between:
Generally, the velocity of flame propagation during explosions in vessels L/De = 1 remains
small relative to the sonic velocity so that no local pressure differences occur in closed
vessels. The maximum explosion overpressure may reach ten times the initial starting
pressure. Such a value may be markedly exceeded with some dusts /1/. Obstructions may
increase the violence of the explosion.
In pipelines, the flame propagation accelerates as a function of pipe length. Gases and dusts,
especially the ones with medium or high gas specific or dust specific characteristics /1, 2/,
may behave in a detonation-like fashion, e.g., if the explosion is transmitted out of a closed
vessel and into a closed pipeline. In such a case, the flame front propagates at supersonic
speed. The pressure exerted locally on the pipe wall may reach a multiple of the explosion
overpressure for a short time. Even higher pressures may occur at end flanges and pipe bends
due to pressure piling of the explosive mixture ahead of the flame front.
In such a combination, where the dust explosion propagates from one vessel to another
through a pipeline, the reaction may be more violent and result in a higher pressure than in a
single vessel (Fig. 2-1). The propagation of an explosion can be prevented or the effect can be
limited through the measure "explosion isolation/decoupling" /9/.
Figure 2-1. Propagation of a dust explosion through a pipeline into a dust filter
above: test arrangement, below: dust explosion in dust filter
Pm [bar]
Vent system
activated
Pred,max
vented
Pstat
1 time s [s]
Explosion venting devices limit the explosion overpressure by releasing unburned mixture
and products of combustion (Fig. 3-2). The resulting maximum reduced explosion
overpressure may not exceed the design pressure of the equipment. Applying the venting
technique as such does not prevent the explosion; only the dangerous consequences are
mitigated.
However, outside the vented vessels, near the vent area, considerable pressure and flame
spreading must be expected. The latter is very pronounced in case of combustible dusts
(Fig. 3-2). Subsequent fires must be expected as well (Fig. 3-3).
Pressure venting devices may be designed for one incident only e.g., rupture disks (explosion
panels), or for multiple use e.g., explosion doors. The prerequisite for the use of pressure
venting devices is the selection of the proper design pressure of the vessel or equipment. It has
to withstand a certain venting pressure (maximum reduced explosion overpressure Pred,max).
All parts of the equipment, which are exposed to the explosion pressure, must meet the design
strength e.g., valves, sight glasses, manholes, cleaning ports as well as ducts.
In case the explosion pressure is not released directly but through a vent duct (Fig. 3-4), into
the open, there will be an increase in the maximum reduced explosion overpressure Pred,max
in the vessel being protected which calls for an increase of the design strength of the vessel.
Figure 3-4. Vent duct, installed after a vent opening of a filter housing
The intensified effect of the explosion is not only dependent upon the length of the pipe but
also upon whether gas or dust-air-mixtures are anticipated (see Section 9). The design of the
vessels and equipment exposed to a fuel explosion has to be in accordance with applicable
codes /8, 9/. Explosion venting devices have to be installed in such a way that nobody will be
endangered. Figure 3-5 shows a poor example where the danger area (effects of pressure and
flames) is not signposting and cordoning off!
In addition, the operation of any equipment, which is important with regard to safety, shall not
be restricted (Fig. 3-6).
Figure 3-6. Endangerment of the filter unit and restricting the vent efficiency by poorly
placed vent areas including vent pipes
Rooms or parts of a building may also be protected by means of explosion venting, but not
personnel, which stay in these areas. In this case, explosion venting serves the purpose of pro-
tecting the integrity of the building. Venting may be accomplished e.g., by using the
windows, the outside walls or the roof of the room (Fig. 4-1) to be protected.
In case of side venting, a solid railing has to be provided. This is necessary to prevent
employees from falling into the lightly supported facade covering which serves as a venting
device (Fig. 4-2).
An ample safety zone has to be provided near the venting system outside the room so that
humans are not affected by the hazards and the operation of safety and major equipment is not
affected.
Window glass (Fig. 4-3) or similar material, which has a tendency to fragment, shall not be
used as the material of construction for vent devices.
Materials are preferred, which will not form large sharp-edged fragments. The effects of
flying fragments have to be considered when using e.g. safety glass (Fig. 4-4).
Sandwich type facade walls or light metal facade elements are preferred for the venting of
buildings (Fig. 4-5) /4/.
Fore venting of enclosures through the roof, a roof construction consisting of a great number
of aluminum fins (Fig. 4-6) has proven to be successful /10/.
5 Venting Devices
Rupture disks, explosion panels or explosion doors may be used as venting devices. With re-
spect to the activation overpressure, these devices shall be the weakest part of the equipment.
All basic investigations on explosion venting where carried out with nearly inertia-free
rupture disks/bursting foils made of polyethylene or aluminum membranes (with a specific
mass GE ≤ 0.5 kg·m-2). This corresponds to a venting efficiency of EF = 1. These venting
devices do not obstruct venting. Explosion venting devices with an inertia greater than
0.5 kg·m-2 and smaller or equal to 10 kg·m-2 can be considered as inertia-free provided that
the specific vent area A/V0.753 is smaller than 0.07 /3/. Other sorts of venting devices
containing venting elements with a specific mass greater than 10 kg·m-2 may effect venting.
This effect shall be tested with regard to the determination of the venting efficiency (see
Section 5.3). All pressure-venting devices are protection systems according to the Directive
94/9/EC and have to be subject to an EC suitability test from July 2003 on /11/. An increase
in the static activation overpressure due to dirt, snow load, excessive friction, or a decrease
due to corrosion or material fatigue may jeopardize the efficient performance of the venting
device and affects the venting efficiency. Therefore, a sufficient preventive maintenance of
the venting device is necessary.
Popular are triple rupture discs (Fig. 5-2) and segmented-rupture disks (Fig. 5-3).
The rupture disk shown in Fig. 5-3 is a round domed disk of composite construction laser cut
in a stitch pattern in the done area. An FEP/PTFE liner covers the slits providing a seal. The
vent burst pressure is controlled by the arrangement of the stitch pattern. This rupture disk is
fitted with a vacuum support to resist high vacuum.
Figure 5-3. Domed and segmented metal rupture disk round style /13/
Vents with their domed constructions are designed to resist high vacuum under cycling condi-
tions without the need for vacuum support bars attached to the inner safety Frame. The
vacuum rating of a vent is dependent on the type of rupture disk. The rupture disk shown in
Figure 5-3 has been tested to over 1 million pressure cycles from vacuum to light positive
pressure while retaining its burst accuracy. The vent exhibits superior performance compared
to conventional composite vents that fatigue after less than 40'000 pressure cycles under
equivalent test conditions.
Figure 5-4. Domed single section metal explosion vent rectangular style /13/
Figure 5-5. Domed single section metal rupture disk round style /13/
Rupture disks may be combined with signaling devices e.g., a wire runs across the device and
a holding current flow through this wire. When the device is destroyed the current is
interrupted and this signal is used to trigger an alarm (Fig. 5-6) or a magnetic burst sensor
(magnetically activated sensor), which will trigger a shut down or a controlling mode and
immediately warns of a ruptured or exploded disk. The magnetic burst sensor is combined
with a burst disk monitor to provide continuous monitoring of rupture or explosion disk
integrity (Fig.5-7).
For special applications, buckling pin devices (Fig. 5-12) are available.
Explosion doors with a specific mass of up to 10 kg·m-2 will respond almost without inertia if
the specific vent area A/V0.753 is smaller than 0.07 /3/.
Depending upon the application explosion doors may be selected which remain either open or
close automatically after releasing the explosion. In case of an explosion, they will free the
vent opening. A horizontal or vertical arrangement will also affect its effectiveness.
In addition to the venting efficiency (see Section 5.3) of an explosion door, its mechanical
strength is also of utmost importance. A suitability test shall document that the device will
function at the anticipated explosion conditions and that there will be no hazard from flying
parts.
The forces arising due to the impact of the opening venting device have to be taken into
account in the design of the vented vessel (e.g., groove).
Corrosion, unprofessionally applied coats of paint on the movable parts to the explosion door
as well as icing or snow load may result in an increase of the activation overpressure. The
movability of such venting devices and the static activation overpressure has to be checked in
predetermined conditions.
Icing or snow loads can be prevented by installing e.g., an effective electrical heating system
for the explosion device (Fig. 5-15).
5.3.2 Specific Mass Greater than 0.5 kg m-2 to Smaller or Equal to 10 kg m-2
Explosion venting devices with venting elements with a specific mass greater than 0.5 kg m-2
can influence the venting process by their opening and release behavior. Experiments have
shown that explosion venting devices with a specific mass greater than 0.5 kg m-2 and smaller
or equal to 10 kg m-2 can be considered as inertia-free, that means having a venting efficiency
EF = 1 provided for /3/:
For all other conditions, the venting efficiency has to be determined by tests (Fig. 5-16 and 5 -
17). The venting efficiency EF and therefore the effective vent area Aw of a non-inertia-free
explosion device is smaller than the venting efficiency of an inertia-free vent device made of
polyethylene or aluminum membranes (specific GE < 0.5 kg m-2) with the same vent area.
2
Test results:
vent device with
GE < 0.5 kg/m²
1.6
Venting Efficiency:
EF = Ae / Ag
Pred,max [bar]
1.2
0.4
Ae Ag
0
0 0.6 1.2 1.8
A [m²]
Investigation /16/ have shown, that the venting efficiency EF generally increases with
increased maximum reduced explosion overpressure Pred,max and decreases with increased
mass of the explosion device. This shall be considered for practical use. The venting
efficiency of a vent device has to be known for a given application (vessel size, dust explosion
class) and the restrictive venting behavior offset either by increasing the design strength of the
vessel or enlargement of the vent area. Obviously, the mechanical strength of the explosion
door has to be consistent with the design pressure of the vessel.
In order to prevent this from happening, vacuum breakers (Fig. 5-21) have to be provided /1,
4/ and are either built strongly enough to withstand the Pred,max during venting, or provided
they break away like rupture diaphragms to leave a clear opening.
Figure 5-22 shows the roof of a silo, which is correct protected with an explosion door and
integrated vacuum breakers.
Generally, they are independent of the vessel size and are determined in accordance with an
agreed standardized method /17, 18/.
The Handbook does not make a distinction between KG-values for flammable gases and KSt-
values for combustible dusts. Generally, a maximum product specific constant Kmax is given
without reference to the type fuel.
The equations given below represent the optimum mathematical expression of a multitude of
experimental test results obtained by varying the single parameters within the stated limited
range. The combination of the single parameters within the equations is not based on their
physical-chemical dependency.
The experimental investigations, which are the bases of the equations, were carried out under
conditions, which reflect actual practice and, from experience, cover the unfavorable condi-
tions, too. For deviating conditions, it has to be proven that the same level of safety will be
maintained (Safety analyses or experimental proof) /1, 2/.
The areas calculated from the equations, which are valid for the stated range only, can be di-
rectly incorporated into practical applications.
In the following no distinction is made between the design using the European Standards /1,
2/ and the VDI-3673, Part 1 /4/, because they are in principle identical.
Figure 6-1 shows the consequences of poor design. The calculated vent area was insufficient
and the installed vent device did not have a test certificate. The material of the explosion vent
was a thick acrylic glass piece. The static activation overpressure of this device was not
known. Furthermore, it is most probable that this isolating vent device was also the ignition
source.
If explosion venting is used as a protective measure in more than 50 % of the cases the
isolation measures e.g., extinguishing barriers, diverters are missing, even it is mentioned in
all actual standards and guidelines.
In a protected vessel, an explosion propagates from this vessel to others through pipelines and
creates more damages in the pipelines and other vessel. This propagation of an explosion most
also be prevented.
Figure 6-2 shows the consequences when the application of EXPLOSION ISOLATION IS
NOT APPLIED. The explosion was properly controlled by the applied constructional measure
in the vessel, but the pipeline carrying the product to other equipment was destroyed.
Figure 6-3 shows the consequences of the secondary equipment (bag-filter) protected by
explosion venting. The dust explosion propagates from the first vessel also protected by
explosion venting WITHOUT ISOLATION through a pipeline into the secondary vessel.
Because the reaction is more violent and results in a higher pressure than in the first vessel,
the second vessel (bag-filter) was destroyed.
Under « standard dust dispersion » it is understood a dust-air-mixture where the dust con-
centration is independent on the location. They are generated by rapid discharge of
combustible dust from pressurized storage vessels (20 barg) via dispersion arrangements
(Fig. 6-4) following the standard procedure (VDI-/ISO-Method) /5/.
If the filling of vessels or silos in practice is done through pneumatic transport (Fig. 6-6 and
6-7), the course of explosion differs from the one using the standard dust dispersion, because
they are generated by e.g., the introduction of combustible dust in vessels and silos through
pneumatic transport in the form of pneumatic conveying or in the filling of vessels or silo by
gravity /1, 4, 5/.
Within the applicable range, the vent areas obtained from the equations can be used directly in
practice. The numerical values of the parameters defined in Section 16.1 are entered into the
equations.
The static activation overpressure Pstat of the venting device has to be equal to or smaller than
the strength of the vessel P (corresponding to the excepted maximum reduced explosion over-
pressure Pred,max).
• area requirement for vessels having a length/diameter ratio of L/De = 1 (Fig. 6-8) and
• area requirement for elongated vessels/silos having a length/diameter ratio of L/De > 1
(Fig. 6-9 and Fig. 6-10).
Elongated vessels are characterized by their length being larger than diameter respectively
equivalent diameter
A*
De = 2 ·
π
De is the diameter of a circle which has the same area as the reference area A* of any shape. Such
geometry accelerates the flame propagation as a function of increased length. Investigations
/5/ in a closed and vented vessels with different L/De ratios have shown, that the influence of
the flame acceleration effect is valid already if the ratio of length to diameter is L/De > 1.
In the European Standards or Guidelines /1, 2, 4/ the following was therefore defined:
The following is applicable for dusts belonging to the dust explosion classes St 1 and St 2
having a maximum explosion overpressure Pmax ≤ 10 bar and a dust explosion class St 3 with
a maximum explosion overpressure Pmax ≤ 12 bar and for operating overpressures for up to
0.2 bar.
In sizing the vent area for a vessel without obstructions, generally the completely empty
volume has to be considered. With obstructions present (e.g., filter bags on cages or filter
elements (Fig. 6-11) the exterior volume of the filter elements can be deducted from the
vessel volume. However, one must ensure that the venting process is not hindered by the
obstructions /1, 5/.
The following empirical equation allows the calculation of the size of a vent area A (in m2).
One has to know the explosion strength P (in bar) of the vessel /1, 4/ (i.e., the anticipated
maximum reduced explosion overpressure Pred,max), the static activation overpressure Pstat (in
bar) of the venting device, the vessel volume V (in m3), the length/diameter ratio L/De of the
vessel to be protected, the explosion characteristics (maximum explosion overpressure Pmax,
maximum product specific constant Kmax) and the reference area A* (in m2). If necessary, the
calculated area may be subdivided into several single areas.
A = B (1 + C ⋅ log (L/De)) in m2
A is the vent area that shall be fitted to the enclosure assuming the venting efficiency factor of
the venting device is EF = 1 and thus the effective vent area is equal to the geometric venting
area (see Section 5.3.2). Some explosion venting devices have a venting efficiency less than
1, and the effective vent area is thus less than the geometric vent area. It is this effective vent
area that shall be used in marking up the vent area A in practice.
If the maximum explosion overpressure, the maximum product specific constant or the static
activation overpressure are smaller than the ones stated in the parameters, then the above
equations may be used with the minimum value given above.
It is necessary to limit the upper maximum reduced explosion overpressure in the vessel or
silos. Extensive testing has shown that the spread of results increases markedly with very
small vent areas.
The required area for pressure venting increases with increased length (height) to diameter
ratio, in comparison with the area requirement for L/De = 1 vessels (Fig. 6-13).
5
4.5 L/DE = 6
4 L/DE = 4
L/DE = 2
3.5
L/DE = 1.5
3 L/DE = 1
A [m²]
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5
Pred,max [bar]
Figure 6-13. Influence of the ratio L/De on the relationship between the vent area A and
maximum reduced explosion overpressure Pred,max (V = 20 m³, Pstat = 0.1 bar, St 1)
For low reduced maximum explosion overpressures, the required effective vent area will be
markedly influenced by the ratio L/De. Such influence diminishes with increasing reduced ex-
plosion overpressure and cease at Pred,max = 1.5 bar as per experimental results.
However, with a maximum reduced explosion overpressure ≥ 1.5 bar no influence of the
height / diameter ratio can be noticed.
less violent explosion behavior and lower reduced explosion overpressure respectively
requires a smaller venting area.
The following empirical equations may be used to calculate the required vent area A for cases
using the outlined mode of filling.
A = X (1 + Y log (L/De)) in m2
With
X = [ 1/Dz (8.6 ⋅ log P - 6) - 5.5 log⋅P + 3.7 ] · 0.011 · Kmax · DF
Y = 1.0715 ⋅·P-1.27
The equations independent of the load in the conveying stream are valid for:
• Axial and central discharge from above through one pipe with a diameter DF in m into a
vessel/silo without obstructions (measurement devices are not taken into account),
• vessel volumes 10 m³ ≤ V ≤ 250 m³,according to /1/ and up to 10’000 m³ according to /4, 5/,
• air conveying velocities of vF = 30 m·s-1 according to /1/ and up to 40 m·s-1 according to /4, 5/,
• air flow Q ≤ 2'500 m³·h-1,
• diameter of the conveying tube DF ≤ 0.3 m,
• static activation overpressure of venting device Pstat ≤ 0.1 bar,
• vessel strength (= Pred,max) 0.1 bar < P ≤ 2 bar; and Pred,max shall be at least Pstat + 2 times the
tolerance range of Pstat,
• maximum explosion overpressure Pmax ≤ 9 bar,
• maximum product specific constant 50 bar·m·s-1 ≤ Kmax ≤ 300 bar·s-1,
• venting efficiency EF = 1.
The size of the volume V which needs protection is to be equivalent to a cylinder which a
length/diameter ratio = 1. The diameter Dz is calculated as follows:
4⋅ V
Dz = 3
π
A is the vent area that shall be fitted to the enclosure assuming the venting efficiency factor of
the venting device is EF = 1 and thus the effective vent area is equal to the geometric venting
area (see Section 5.3.2). Some explosion venting devices have a venting efficiency less than
1, and the effective vent area is thus less than the geometric vent area. It is this effective vent
area that shall be used in marking up the vent area A in practice.
If the maximum explosion overpressure, the maximum product specific constant or the static
activation overpressure are smaller than the ones stated in the parameters, then the above
equations may be used with the minimum value given above.
Silos and bunkers may be placed or erected as single units (Fig. 6-14) or in clusters in open
areas (Fig. 6-15) or as an integral part of a building.
As a rule, silos and bunkers are part of materials handling systems. The formation of the dust
dispersion during filling depends upon the type of conveying system. When discharging the
formation of the dust dispersion depends upon the product characteristic (e.g., tendency for
bridging), the geometry and the condition of the wall surface (dust buildup).
Scrutinize building constraints, which in many cases limit the explosion venting to the silo
top. Generally, not even this whole area is available due to the space requirements of the
conveying system (Fig. 6-16).
Figure 6-16. Roof of a silo, approximately 2/3 of roof used as vent area
The larger the height/diameter ratio is, the higher the required pressure resistance of the silo
will be.
If silos must be vented on the side (Fig. 6-17) recoil forces must be considered according Sec-
tion 11.
In cases where silo clusters have to be vented into a space, which is enclosed for weather pro-
tection (not an operating floor), e.g., silo floors (Fig. 6-18), such a space needs explosion
venting (Fig. 6-19). Otherwise, the explosion must be prevented from propagating through
other means (Fig. 6-20).
Figure 6-20. Extinguishing barrier inside the silo floor close to the vented silo top
A = X (1 + Y log (L/De)) in m2
with
X = [1/Dz (8.6/k⋅log P – Kmax/44 - 0.513) - 5.5/k log⋅P + Kmax/69+0.191] 0.011·Kmax·DF
Y = 0.166 ⋅·eKmax/129 P-1.27/k
with
k = 1 for 0.1 bar ≤ Pred,max ≤ 1 bar
k = 2 for 1 bar < Pred,max ≤ 1.7 bar
The equations are valid independent from the product load of the conveying stream in case of
tangential pneumatic filling for:
• tangential product release through one conveying tube with a diameter DF ≤ 0.2 m,
• round vessels/silos without obstructions (measurement devices are not taken into account),
• vessel volumes 10 m³ ≤ V ≤ 120 m³,
• air conveying velocities of vF = 30 m·s-1,
• air flow Q ≤ 2'500 m³·h-1,
• length/diameter ratio 1 ≤ L/De ≤ 5,
• static activation overpressure of venting device Pstat ≤ 0.1 bar,
• vessel strength (= Pred,max) 0.1 bar < P ≤ 1.7 bar and Pred,max shall be at least Pstat + 2 times the
tolerance range of Pstat,
• maximum explosion overpressure Pmax ≤ 9 bar,
• maximum product specific constant 100 bar·m·s-1 ≤ Kmax ≤ 220 bar·m·s-1,
• venting efficiency EF = 1.
A is the vent area that shall be fitted to the enclosure assuming the venting efficiency factor of the
venting device is EF = 1 and thus the effective vent area is equal to the geometric venting area (see
Section 5.3.2). Some explosion venting devices have a venting efficiency less than 1, and the effective
vent area is thus less than the geometric vent area. It is this effective vent area that shall be used in
marking up the vent area A in practice.
If the maximum explosion overpressure, the maximum product specific constant or the static acti-
vation overpressure are smaller than the ones stated in the parameters, then the above
equations may be used with the minimum value given above.
The equations independent of the load in the conveying stream are valid for:
A is the vent area that shall be fitted to the enclosure assuming the venting efficiency factor of
the venting device is EF = 1 and thus the effective vent area is equal to the geometric venting
area (see Section 5.3.2). Some explosion venting devices have a venting efficiency less than
1, and the effective vent area is thus less than the geometric vent area. It is this effective vent
area that shall be used in marking up the vent area A in practice.
If the maximum explosion overpressure, the maximum product specific constant or the static
activation overpressure are smaller than the ones stated in the parameters, then the above
equations may be used with the minimum value given above.
A = [(0.1265 · log· Kmax - 0.0567) · P-0.5817 + 0.1754 · P-0.5722 · (Pstat - 0.1)] V2/3
A is the vent area that shall be fitted to the enclosure assuming the venting efficiency factor of the
venting device is EF = 1 and thus the effective vent area is equal to the geometric venting area (see
Section 5.3.2). Some explosion venting devices have a venting efficiency less than 1, and the effective
vent area is thus less than the geometric vent area. It is this effective vent area that shall be used in
marking up the vent area A in practice.
If the maximum explosion overpressure, the maximum product specific constant or the static
activation overpressure are smaller than the ones stated in the parameters, then the above
equations may be used with the minimum value given above.
Based on today’s knowledge it is necessary to limit the upper maximum reduced explosion
overpressure in the cubic vessel. Extensive testing has shown that the spread of results in-
creases markedly with very small vent areas.
Vent areas on buildings shall be distributed uniformly over the wall and roof areas. In estimat-
ing P, (Pred,max) care shall be taken to ensure that the weakest structural element, as well as
any equipment or other devices that can be supported by structural elements, is identified. All
structural elements and supports shall be considered.
For example, floors and roofs are not usually designed to be loaded from beneath. However, a
lightweight roof can be considered sacrificial, provided its movement can be tolerated and
provided ice or snow does not hinder its movement.
Ae = Cv × AS × P-0.5 in m2
where
Ae is the effective vent area, in m²,
Ag is the geometric vent area Ag = Ae/EF, in m²,
EF is the venting efficiency,
Cv is the venting equation constant:
0 < Kmax ≤ 100 : Cv = 0.018 bar0.5,
100 < Kmax ≤ 200 : Cv = 0.026 bar0.5,
200 < Kmax ≤ 300 : Cv = 0.030 bar0.5,
AS is the internal surface area of enclosure, in m²,
P is the maximum explosion overpressure (Pred,max) developed in a vented enclosure during a
vented deflagration. P in this application is not to exceed an overpressure of 0.1 bar.
Note 1:
For the calculation of the length-to-diameter ration of the room, (L/De) WinVent calculates
the effective diameter as follows:
Deff = De = 4 (Ac/Lp),
where
Ac is the cross-sectional area normal to the longest dimension, in square-meters (m2);
Lp is the perimeter of cross-section, in meters (m).
Note 2:
The form of the venting formula is such that there are no dimensional constraints on the shape
of the room, provided the vent area is not applied solely to one end of an elongated room. The
vent area should be applied as evenly as possible over the available wall area; but if it is re-
stricted to the end of an elongated room, the ratio of length-to-diameter of the room should
not exceed 3.
For rooms with venting restricted to one end, the application of the venting formula is con-
strained as follows:
L < 12 × Ac × Lp-1 in m
where
L is the longest dimension of the building, in meters (m);
Ac is the cross-sectional area normal to the longest dimension, in square-meters (m2);
Lp is the perimeter of cross-section, in meters (m).
Vent areas on buildings shall be distributed uniformly over the wall and roof areas. In estimat-
ing P (Pred,max) care shall be taken to ensure that the weakest structural element, as well as
any equipment or other devices that can be supported by structural elements, is identified. All
structural elements and supports shall be considered.
For example, floors and roofs are not usually designed to be loaded from beneath. However, a
lightweight roof can be considered sacrificial, provided its movement can be tolerated and
provided ice or snow does not hinder its movement.
Ae = C × AS × P-0.5 in m2
where
Ae is the effective vent area, in m²,
Ag is the geometric vent area Ag = Ae/EF, in m²,
EF is the venting efficiency,
The internal surface area, AS, is the total area that constitutes the perimeter surfaces of the
enclosure that is being protected. Non-structural internal partitions that cannot withstand the
expected overpressure are not considered to be part of the enclosure surface area.
The enclosure internal surface area AS includes the roof or ceiling, walls, floor, and vent area
and can be based on simple geometric figures. Surface corrugations are neglected, as well as
minor deviations from the simplest shapes. Regular geometric deviations such as saw-toothed
roofs can be "averaged" by adding the contributed volume to that of the major structure. The
internal surface of any adjoining rooms should be included. Such rooms include adjoining
rooms separated by a partition incapable of withstanding the expected overpressure.
Note: 1
For the calculation of the length-to-diameter ration of the room, WinVent calculates the effec-
tive diameter Deff = De as follows:
Deff = De = 4 (Ac/Lp) in m
where
Ac is the cross-sectional area normal to the longest dimension, in square-meters (m2);
Lp is the perimeter of cross-section, in meters (m).
Note: 2
The form of the venting formula is such that there are no dimensional constraints on the shape
of the room, provided the vent area is not applied solely to one end of an elongated room. The
vent area should be applied as evenly as possible over the available wall area; but if it is re-
stricted to the end of an elongated room, the ratio of length-to-diameter of the room should
not exceed 3.
For rooms with venting restricted to one end, the application of the venting formula is con-
strained as follows:
L < 12 × Ac × Lp-1 in m
where
L is the longest dimension of the building, in meters (m),
Ac is the cross-sectional area normal to the longest dimension, in square-meters (m2),
Lp is the perimeter of cross-section, in meters (m).
If an enclosure contain a highly turbulent gas mixture and the vent area is restricted to one
end, or
if the enclosure has any internal obstructions and the vent area is restricted to one end, then
the L/De of the enclosure should not exceed 2, or the following formula should be used:
L < 8 × Ac × Lp-1 in m
where
L is the longest dimension of the building, in meters (m),
Ac is the cross-sectional area normal to the longest dimension, in square-meters (m2),
Lp is the perimeter of cross-section, in meters (m).
An unacceptably high vacuum is prevented if the vacuum breaker is sized in with the
following equation, which describes the correlation of the minimum required suction area
with the size of the protected vessel or silo and its vacuum resistance:
With
Asuc = effective suction area in m2,
Pvac = vacuum resistance of vessel in mbar,
V = vessel volume in m3.
Figure 7-2 shows the roof of a coal silo fitted with several explosion doors with integrated
vacuum breakers.
Figure 7-2. Explosion doors with integral vacuum breakers to avoid an inadmissibly
Explosion venting is always accompanied by flame propagation (Figs. 8-1 and 8-2) plus pres-
sure consequences in the surrounding areas.
Figure 8-1. Dust explosion in a vented 7.5-m³-filter with homogeneous dust dispersion
The reason for this is the unburned product, which is pushed outside once the vent system ac-
tuates. The fuel-air-mixture generated externally is then ignited by a flame jet exiting the vent
area. The flame length will be larger with a lesser static activation overpressure and smaller
vent area.
Dependent on the volume of the equipment it can reach up to 60 m (Fig. 8-3). Longer ranges
of flame than 60 m even in case of greater volumes are not to be expected.
The venting process should not endanger personnel. In addition, the operation of any equip-
ment, which is important with regard to safety, should not be restricted. This shall be consid-
ered when designing the plant and may be accomplished by releasing the pressure upwards
(Fig. 8-3).
If a pressure venting upwards is not feasible, then the vent openings should be placed as high
as possible at the side of the vessel. For this, the recoil forces with respect to the overturning
moment have to be taken into account, see Section 12.
Large fireballs were observed during vented dust explosion in cases where additional dust de-
posits accumulated near the vent opening (Fig. 8-4). The lower edge of the vent has to be
sufficiently higher than the maximum dust pile in order to limit the danger of dust discharge.
Figure 8-4. Dust explosion in a filter housing with additional deposits of loose dust near
the venting area by homogeneous dust dispersion
Longer ranges of the flames than 60 m even in case of greater volumes are not to be expected.
The maximum external width of a flame WF shall be determined for horizontal and vertical
venting according to the following empirical equation:
WF = 2.8⋅V1/3 in m
Figure 8-5 shows clearly that with increasingly venting vessel volume the maximum flame
length external LF increases.
100
Horizontal
Vertical
LF [m]
10
1
1 10 V [m³] 100 1000
Figure 8-5. Maximum external flame length LF of homogeneous dust cloud explosions
into the outside area of vented vessels V without vent duct
Tests have shown that if the vent area is subdivided into several single areas the maximum
flame range will not be reduced.
Figure 8-6 shows clearly that with increasingly venting vessel volume the maximum external
flame width WF of dust explosions increases.
100
WF [m]
10
Figure 8-6. Maximum external flame width WF of homogeneous dust cloud explosions
into the outside area of vented vessels V without vent duct
At present no information are available on the maximum external flame range for
elongated vessels and silos. Longer ranges of the flames will be expected for elongated
vessels with a height/diameter ratio H/D ≥ 2.
8.1.1.2 Deflectors
The extent of the flame produced by a vented explosion external to the enclosure can be
limited by deflectors. These can be designed and installed to reduce flame length. A possible
design of defector plate, and its installation, is shown in Figure 8.7.
The area of the plate should be at least three times the area of the vent, and its dimensions
should be at least 1.6 x the dimensions of the vent. The plate should be inclined at least 45° -
60° to the horizontal to deflect the ejected flame upwards. The plate should be installed at a
sufficient distance from the vent to ensure that it does not act as an obstacle to the venting
process and so cause an increase in the reduced explosion pressure inside the enclosure.
Neither should the plate be installed at too great a distance from the vent; the distance of
1.5 DN given in Figure 8.7, where DN is the nominal diameter of the vent, has been shown to
be satisfactory in explosion trials, but may need to be modified in practice, depending on
circumstances. The plate should be mounted so that it can withstand the force exerted by the
vented explosion, which can be calculated by multiplying the reduced explosion pressure by
the area of the plate.
The length of the flame along the axis of the vent is limited by the plate. Explosion trials
show that, a deflector plate positioned as in Figure 8.7 approximately halves the length of the
flame compared to when the plate is absent. A safe distance beyond the deflector should be
specified from which personnel are excluded while the plant is operating. The plate deflects
flame sideways and the lateral extent of the safe area should be sufficient to avoid harm from
this sideways deflection.
Deflectors should not be installed when the enclosure volume is greater than 40 m3 because
test were only performed with vessel volumes up to 35 m3 /20/ (Fig. 8.8).
The maximum external overpressure PAmax for homogeneous dust cloud explosions ignited
in a cubic vessel vented by rupture discs arising at outside the vented enclosure can either be
due to one of these two above-mentioned effects. Therefore, both shall be calculated and the
worst (Highest) value shall be used.
8.1.1.3.1 Overpressure due to the explosion of the dust cloud in the area outside the vent
(secondary explosion)
Figure 8.9 demonstrate the meaning of secondary explosion.
Figure 8-9. Explanation of the secondary explosion outside the vented vessel
The maximum external overpressure PAmax can be estimated using the following formula:
This estimated external overpressure can be expected at a distance Rs = 0.25 ·LF in axial dis-
charge direction from the vent area A.
For larger distances, r (r > Rs), from the vent, the external overpressure PAr decreases as fol-
lows:
Which effect such peak pressures may have on parts of constructions can be taken from annex
21.3.
At present no information are available on the pressure behavior outside elongated vessels and
silos near the vent area.
The maximum external overpressure PAr at a certain location can be estimated using the fol-
lowing formula (see also Fig 8-10):
Where
r is the distance from the vent area, in m with r > RS,
DH is the hydraulic diameter of the vent area, in m².
NOTE: For a round duct DH = D and for a square duct, where L=W, then DH = L
α defines the direction towards the vent
with
α = 0° means in front of the vent area,
α = 90° means sideways from the vent area.
Figure 8-11 shows the definition of hydraulic diameter DH of vent devices with different
shapes.
Figure 8-11. Definition of hydraulic diameter DH of vent devices with different shapes
DH = 4A/Perimeter
Which effect such peak pressures may have on parts of constructions can be taken from annex
21.3.
The EN 14491 recommends that both effects of primary and secondary explosion shall be cal-
culated and the worst (highest) value shall be used.
The following Table 8-12 compares the two calculation methods using 2 different vessel sizes
and 3 different pressure resistance of the vessel.
Table 8-12. Comparison of the horizontal calculation methods for secondary and
primary explosion in front of the vent area (without vent duct)
V = 10 m³; L/D = 1; Pmax = 9 bar; Kmax = 100 m bar/s; P = 0.3 bar; A = 0.4 m², Pstat = 0.1 bar
PA,max = 83 mbar at R = 5.4 m
Secondary Explosion Primary Explosion
Equation
Cloud outside α = 0° Cloud outside α = 0°
External Pressure PAr at r = 10 m 33 mbar 11 mbar
External Pressure PAr at r = 20 m 12 mbar 4 mbar
V = 10 m³; L/D = 1; Pmax = 9 bar; Kmax = 200 m bar/s; P = 0.3 bar; A = 0.8 m², Pstat = 0.1 bar
PA,max = 89 mbar at R = 5.4 m
Secondary Explosion Primary Explosion
Equation
Cloud outside α = 0° Cloud outside α = 0°
External Pressure PAr at r = 10 m 35 mbar 17 mbar
External Pressure PAr at r = 20 m 12 mbar 7 mbar
V = 10 m³; L/D = 1; Pmax = 9 bar; Kmax = 200 m bar/s; P = 0.5 bar; A = 0.6 m², Pstat = 0.1 bar
PA,max = 144 mbar at R = 5.4 m
Secondary Explosion Primary Explosion
Equation
Cloud outside α = 0° Cloud outside α = 0°
External Pressure PAr at r = 10 m 57 mbar 23 mbar
External Pressure PAr at r = 20 m 20 mbar 9 mbar
V = 10 m³; L/D = 1; Pmax = 9 bar; Kmax = 200 m bar/s; P = 1 bar; A = 0.4 m², Pstat = 0.1 bar
PA,max = 276 mbar at R = 5.4 m
Secondary Explosion Primary Explosion
Equation
Cloud outside α = 0° Cloud outside α = 0°
External Pressure PAr at r = 10 m 109 mbar 35 mbar
External Pressure PAr at r = 20 m 39 mbar 14 mbar
V = 30 m³; L/D = 1; Pmax = 9 bar; Kmax = 200 m bar/s; P = 0.5 bar; A = 1.3 m², Pstat = 0.1 bar
PA,max = 189 mbar at R = 7.8 m
Secondary Explosion Primary Explosion
Equation
Cloud outside α = 0° Cloud outside α = 0°
External Pressure PAr at r = 10 m 130 mbar 39 mbar
External Pressure PAr at r = 20 m 46 mbar 15 mbar
V = 30 m³; L/D = 1; Pmax = 9 bar; Kmax = 200 m bar/s; P = 1 bar; A = 0.9 m², Pstat = 0.1 bar
PA,max = 365 mbar at R = 7.8 m
Secondary Explosion Primary Explosion
Equation
Cloud outside α = 0° Cloud outside α = 0°
External Pressure PAr at r = 10 m 250 mbar 61 mbar
External Pressure PAr at r = 20 m 88 mbar 24 mbar
One can clearly see that a secondary explosion in front of the vent area always lead to
higher pressures outside the vented vessel.
LF = 30 · V-1/3 in m
Figure 8-13 shows that the maximum external flame length LF changes - as in the case of
homogeneous dust cloud explosions - with the third root of the vented vessel volume V. In
contrast to the homogeneous dust cloud explosions, the maximum external flame length LF
for the inhomogeneous dust cloud explosions decreases with increasing vented vessel volume
V.
Tests have shown that if the vent area is subdivided into several single areas the maximum
flame range will not be reduced.
At present, no guidance can be given for flame ranges from elongated vessels and silos.
It is expected that the length of the flame will be longer for elongated vessels with a
height/diameter ratio H/D ≥ 2.
For larger distances, r (r > Rs), from the vent, the external overpressure PAr decreases as
follows:
At present no information are available on the pressure behavior outside elongated vessels and
silos near the vent area.
LF = 5 · V1/3 in m
Hybrid dust-propane-air-mixtures have the same range of the flame as homogeneous dust-
air-mixtures.
Figure 8-14 documents that the range of the flame from a vented propane-air-mixture ignited
in its quiescent (zero turbulence) state in a cubic vessel increases with increased vessel size.
With the markedly shorter flame ranges the vessel size dependency is much more pronounced
than which homogenous dust-air-mixtures.
Exploratory tests indicate that the maximum range of the flame is not shortened in cases
where the vent area is spread over multiple segments.
At present, no guidance can be given for flame ranges from elongated vessels and silos.
It is expected that the length of the flame will be longer for elongated vessels with a
height/diameter ratio H/D ≥ 2.
The following estimate can be made for the maximum peak pressure for gas/air mixtures
ignited in a compact enclosure:
Where
R is the distance to vent opening, in m,
A is the vent area, in m²,
α defines the direction towards the vent (see also Fig. 8-10)
with
α = 0° means in front of the vent area,
α = 90° means sideways from the vent area.
• L/De < 2
• only valid for vessels without vent duct.
Which effect such peak pressures may have on parts of constructions can be taken from annex
21.3.
Newer developments indicate that flame propagation from explosion vented equipment can be
stopped, under certain conditions, by using approved diverters /4, 5/, e.g., mechanical flame
barriers (flame arresters, quenching devices with dust retainers). Compare Section 10.
Figure 9-1 demonstrates what can happen if the design of vent duct is not correct.
Where
LAS is the length of vent duct were velocity of sound is reached
Vent ducts with a length of LA > LAS have no additional effect upon the pressure increase.
Therefore, the length of vent duct were velocity of sound is reached (LAS) will be the
maximum length that has to be considered.
The presence of the vent duct has no effect on the Pred,max, if the ratio length of the vent duct
to diameter of a single vent duct is LA/LD ≤ 0.5: provide that the volume of the vent duct is
less than the volume of the protected vessel (Fig. 9.2).
Independent of the location of the vent duct (longitudinal or transversal arrangement Fig. 9-3),
the maximum reduced explosion overpressure P’red,max (the design pressure P of the vessel to
be protected) caused by the downstream duct can be calculated for vessels having L/De ration
of 1 with the following equation:
Where
P’red,max maximum explosion overpressure with vent duct (= P) in bar;
Pred,max maximum explosion overpressure without vent duct (= Po) in bar;
A required vent area in m2 without vent duct;
V volume of protected vessel in m3;
LA length of vent duct in m.
If the maximum explosion overpressure, the product specific constant or the static activation
overpressure are smaller than the ones stated in the parameters than the above equation may
be used with the minimum values given above.
Experimental studies have proven that the influence of vent duct with longitudinal
arrangement - located on the roof - decreases markedly with increased length diameter ratio
(Fig. 9-3, left and Fig. 9-4). The increase of the maximum explosion overpressure is at its
maximum if L/De = 1.
For a length diameter ratio L/De = 6 the elevated "maximum reduced explosion overpressure"
P’red,max (the design pressure P of the vessel to be protected) caused by the downstream pipe
can be calculated from the simple equation:
With a given
• maximum explosion overpressure without vent pipe of 0.1 bar < Pred,max ≤ 2 bar,
• vessel length diameter ratio 1 < L/De < 6 and
• length of vent pipe LA ≤ LAS
the reduced maximum explosion overpressure between vessel L/De 1 and 6 with vent duct be-
comes for:
1 < L/De < 6 (only longitudinal):
Where C1 = P’red,max from the equation for vessel L/De = 1 and C2 = P’red,max from the equa-
tion for vessel L/De = 6.
For a vessel ratio L/De > 6 the maximum reduced explosion overpressure will not increase
anymore /4, 5/. Figure 9-4 depicts a horizontal silo with a 2 m long vent duct. As mentioned
before there will be no influence of the duct upon the maximum reduced explosion
overpressure because the vessel ratio L/De is larger than 6.
Figure 9-4. Horizontal arranged silo (L/De = 6.25), which will be vented trough
the roof via a 2 m long vent pipe (longitudinal arrangement)
If the location of the vent duct is installed on the side (transversal arrangement Fig. 9-3, right),
the influence of the downstream vent duct on the maximum reduced explosion overpressure
P’red,max (the design pressure P of the vessel to be protected) can only be calculated by the
equation for vessels having a L/De ratio of 1 which is - for the transversal arrangement - also
valid up to a L/De ratio of 20.
The above-mentioned information regarding design of vent ducts are valid for all dust
injection methods, such as standard, pneumatic conveying with axial and tangential inlet
and free fall filling.
In accordance with the expected increase of the maximum reduced explosion overpressure
Pred,max the design pressure P of the vessel to be protected has to be augmented as follows in
which P correspond to the design pressure with vent pipe and Po without vent pipe:
In case the design pressure is given as P then the vent area A has to be increased so that the
following maximum reduced explosion overpressure Po results during free (unobstructed)
venting:
Test with dust-air-mixtures and rectangular explosion doors of low efficiency have shown that
in certain cases the influence of vent ducts can be reduced. This is true for explosion doors
with substantial specific mass GE > 45 kg·m-2 /16/. The following performance is related to
the efficacy of rectangular explosion doors in presence of homogeneous dust-air-mixtures and
vent pipes having a special construction (Fig. 9-5).
Vent pipe
c = a · 0.55
Explosion door
Figure 9-5. Special construction of vent pipe attached to rectangular explosion doors
c = a · 0.55 in m
there is no augmentation of the pressure inside the vessel because of the vent duct. The reason
for this is that the cross section of the vent duct is markedly larger than the effective area of
the vent door. In contrast to a rupture disk as the venting device the flow of unburned dust-air-
mixture is “metered” into the duct therefore maintaining a low dust concentration. The full
development of the secondary explosion in the duct is hindered provided dust deposits near
the venting device are preventable. In such a case the design strength P of the protected vessel
may be lower than for rupture disks or low specific mass explosion doors (generally specific
GE < 10 kg·m-2) with regular ducts.
Only longer vent ducts (LA > 8 m) have a small influence upon the course of the explosion
inside the protected vessel /5/.
For a heavier specific mass of the explosion door (GE > 10 kg·m-2) and without special design
of the vent duct (see Fig. 9-3 and Fig. 9-4) the equations for rupture disks can be used to
determine the augmented pressure. It will be referenced to the Pred,max, which results from an
explosion door without vent duct (Po). When in doubt special tests may be needed.
For a specific mass of the vent door in excess of GE = 10 kg·m-2 the influence of the vent duct
upon the augmented pressure in the protected vessel may be smaller -similarly to the behavior
with combustible dusts (see Section 9.2.1). A deviation from the usual calculation method
given in Section 9.1.2 is permitted if documented with actual explosion tests.
If an inspection hatch is located in the vicinity of the venting device for servicing purposes,
cover and closing device must have the same strength as the vent duct /1, 2, 4, 22/.
Vent duct shapes with a gradual bend (Fig. 9-7) is also acceptable if the ratio of the radius r of
the curvature to the duct diameter DN is greater than 2.
On the other hand, if the vent duct has a bend of 90° after the area of the vent (Fig. 9-8, left),
the explosion venting process shows particularly severe inhibition and the maximum reduced
explosion overpressure can be raised by this arrangement up to 400%.
9.4.3 Cross-Sections
The cross-section of vent ducts must be at least that of the vent opening of the vessel under
protection. An increase in the vent duct cross-section compared with that of the vent area
(Fig. 9-9, left) does not promote the venting process /1, 4, 22/.
Constriction of the cross-section (Fig. 9-9, right), on the other hand, can have a considerably
greater effect on the increase in the maximum reduced explosion overpressure than, e.g.,
straight (Fig. 9-6) or slightly bent vent ducts (Fig. 9-7).
Constriction of the cross-section (Fig. 9-9, right), on the other hand, can have a considerably
greater effect on the increase in the maximum reduced explosion overpressure than, e.g.,
straight (Fig. 9-6) or slightly bent vent ducts (Fig. 9-7).
9.4.4 Conclusions
The vent duct design shown in Figures 9.8 and 9.9 are not forbidden; rather the equation
shown in chapter 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 do not apply to them.
These and other designs can be used as long as the predictions of the effects of the vent duct
on the maximum reduced explosion overpressure in the protected vessel are based on either
published or experimental data that has been obtained from representative explosion venting
trials,
Figure 9-10. Vent pipes ends cut away at an angle with additional mesh
A vent duct angled downward slightly also prevents the ingress of rain or snow (Fig. 9-11).
Figure 9-11. Vent duct angled downward slightly with additional mesh
With regard to how the length of the vent duct with angled cutaway end should be measured,
the length LA of the median axis always applies (Fig 9-12).
LA LA
Figure 9-12. Determination of the length of the vent duct with angled cutaway end
To prevent the ingress of rain and snow into the vent ducts, light covers, e.g., foils/films or
disks in clamping profiles are admissible (weight < 0.5 kg/m²) if these covers free the vent
duct cross-section at very low overpressures (less than 50% of Pstat, to be proven by tests).
The covers shall not affect the venting process or endanger people or things (Fig. 9-13).
Foil/Film
Disk in
clamping profile
Other vent duct covers such as those shown in Figure 9-14 can also be used if the required
low activation overpressure (less than 50% of Pstat) has been proven by tests and flying off,
e.g., of metal covers can be reliably prevented by retaining wires.
Figure 9-15 shows a heavy metal cover installed at the end of a vent duct. The corresponding
static activation overpressure does not fulfill the requirements of very low static activation
overpressures < 50-% of Pstat) and a low weight of less than 0.5 kg/m². The flying off the
metal cover is not reliably prevented.
Explosion tests with a similar type of metal cover shows that this type of hinged cover was
torn off and hurled away even at rather low-pressure loads. This is creating an additional
hazard in the vicinity.
The connection between the protected vessel and the vent duct frequently requires elastic
rubber compensators (Fig. 9-16). They often comprise fiber-reinforced rubber with an
explosion strength, which is virtually impossible to prove by calculation.
The use of such compensators is possible when explosion tests have provided proof of the re-
quired strength.
Rubber compensator
Special care must be exercised in the installation of the rubber compensators and, if
applicable, the clamping rings of sleeve connections.
Figure 9-17 shows the missing rubber compensator for the connection between the protected
vessel and the vent duct. In this case, the missing rubber compensator is creating an additional
hazard in the vicinity.
10.1 Basics
Flameless explosion venting devices consist of an explosion-venting device and a flame-
quenching element as a minimum. Flame quenching elements shall be suitable for the
intended use (e.g. temperature range, mechanical strength, fuel type). Explosion venting
devices shall be designed according to /3, 23/. Material used for the parts of explosion venting
devices shall be selected based on their suitability with regard to the chemical and physical
conditions to which they will be subjected in service.
All parts of the flame-quenching element shall resist the expected mechanical, thermal and
chemical loads of the intended use. During or after the venting process, deformations of the
flameless explosion-venting device may occur. This shall not lead to gaps in the housing that
could lead to flame transmission into the surrounding. The flame quenching capability of the
device shall be demonstrated by tests.
In a thermo graphical investigation of a dust explosion, it has been recorded that when using a
Q-Tube System there is a huge reduction in temperatures generated (Fig 10-2).
In a thermo graphical investigation of a dust explosion, it has been recorded that when using a
Q-Box System there is a huge reduction in temperatures generated (Fig 10-5).
Figure 10-7. Schematic representation of an explosion relief valve system; left: closed;
right: open during explosion /19/
Figure 10-8 shows an example of such an explosion relief valve system, which is normally,
installed in dust extraction systems.
Figure 10-8. Example of an explosion relief valve system; EVN 2.0 /19/
Vo = α (Po/∆P) V
The pressure effect should be determined based on estimating the exhaust gas volume
and temperature.
Considering the typical design strength of standard industrial building is 0.01 bar, reinforcing
or venting of the surrounding area (building/room) should be considered when this room or
building is smaller than 300 times the vented volume, or a ratio which is determined by
testing and/or calculation as per above.
Local overpressure shall be avoided. The flameless venting device shall not be placed close to
a wall.
In the case of filter elements which have a certain rigidity and strength, the volume of all filter
elements or, under certain conditions, the entire enveloping volume of the filter elements can
be subtracted from the dirty air volume.
If the distance a between the circular filter elements is ≤ 0.5 d of the filter elements, then the
entire enveloping volume of the filter elements can be subtracted from the dirty volume. The
same is valid if a ≤ w with w being the width of the enveloped or pocket filters (Fig. 11-1.)
Figure 11-1. Left-hand side: bag, candle or cartridge filter elements; right-hand side:
pocket, flat bag, cassette filter elements or disk filters /EN 14491, VDI 2263 Part 6.1/
(a = distance between filter elements; w = width of flat bag or pocket filters; d = diameter of filter elements)
If no information regarding the distance a between the filter elements is given, WinVent auto-
matically calculates only the total volume of all filter elements, i.e. bag total or pocket total.
After entering all necessary data specifically for the bags or pockets, WinVent checks if the
necessary conditions for the calculation of the envelope volume are given.
If the conditions for the calculation of the envelope volume are fulfilled WinVent
automatically calculates the envelope volume otherwise only the total volume of the
bag/pocket filter elements is calculated.
The distance a must not fall below a minimum distance, as otherwise too many dust particles
are released onto the surrounding hoses during cleaning and will then stick to them. For jet
filters, during cleaning in operation, the distance should be at least 50 mm.
Because often, apart from the distance of circular filter elements a, the exact arrangement of
the circular filter elements is not known, WinVent calculates the entire enveloping volume of
the circular filter elements as follows if the distance between to circular filter elements is be-
tween a ≥ d/3 up to a ≤ d/2.
VE = [d + a] ∙ le ∙ No
2
where
Support body for pocket filter, cassette filter, disk filters or sinter plate filter ele-
ments
In the following “pocket” represents all filter elements for which the envelope volume can be
calculated. If the distance a between the pocket filter elements is equal to or smaller than the
width w (a ≤ w) of the pocket filter elements, then the entire enveloping volume of the filter
elements can be subtracted from the entire dirty air volume.
The distance a must not fall below a minimum distance, as otherwise too many dust particles
are released onto the surrounding hoses during cleaning and will then stick to them. For
pockets, during cleaning in operation, the distance should be at least 40 mm.
The entire enveloping volume of the pocket filter elements is calculated as follows if the dis-
tance between to pockets filter elements is between a ≥ w/3 up to a ≤ w.
VE = [No ∙ w + (No-1) ∙ a] ∙ x ∙ le
where
clean air volume from the dirty volume (tube sheet and filter elements) is maintained during
the initial explosion event.
If the clean air contains fuel then an additional separate vent on the clean airside should be
calculated based on the clean airside volume.
The preferred location of the vent is below the filter elements (Fig. 11-2). It must be ensured,
however, that the built-in components neither will entirely nor partially impede the venting
process. Therefore, the filter bags, for instance, must not cover the explosion vents.
Figure 11-2. Arrangement of the vents on the dirty side of the filter
(left: in the cone below the filter elements; center: in the dirty air volume by shortening the filter
elements; right: increasing the cylindrical part of the dirty air volume of the filter housing)
Where the vents can only be arranged near the filter elements rather than underneath them
(see Fig. 11-2), the required number of filter elements in front of the vent system shall be
removed or shortened so as to ensure an undisturbed venting process.
The distance X between the first arrays of the filter elements and the vents (as per Fig. 11-3.
Left-hand side or center), shall be so dimensioned that the passage area directly in front of the
vent at least equals that of the vent. The resultant passage area shall be confined to the width
of the explosion vent.
The right-hand side of Fig. 11-3 shows a vent arranged in front of the first array of the filter
elements, which have been halved in length. To ensure favorable flow conditions for
unimpeded explosion venting, the distance Y between the installation plane of the explosion
vent and the array of filter elements that has not been shortened shall be determined in the
same manner as the distance X; however, the clear passage area must be at least twice that of
the vent device in this case. Suitable retaining devices (no plates) shall be provided to prevent
the filter elements from obstructing the vents in the event of an explosion.
Figure 11-4. Arrangement of passage area in front of one vent near the filter elements
Figure 11-5. Arrangement of passage area in front of two vents near the filter elements
Figure 11-6. Rectangular filter evenly vented at both longer sides of the body
(1: clean air side; 2: dirty air side with rigid bag filters; 3: vent devices)
The next Figure 11.7 shows a rectangular vented bag filter where the vents are evenly
installed only at one longer side of the body of the filter housing.
Figure 11-7. Rectangular filter evenly vented only at one longer side of the body
(1: clean air side; 2: dirty air side with rigid bag filters; 3: vent devices)
Figure 11.8 shows a rectangular vented bag filter. The vents are evenly installed at both
shorter sides of the body of the filter housing.
Figure 11-8. Rectangular filter evenly vented at both shorter sides of the body
(1: clean air side; 2: dirty air side with rigid bag filters; 3: vent devices)
The next Figure 11.9 shows a rectangular vented bag filter where the vents are evenly
installed only at one shorter side of the body of the filter housing.
Figure 11-9. Rectangular filter evenly vented only at one shorter side of the body
(1: clean air side; 2: dirty air side with rigid bag filters; 3: vent devices)
For calculating the explosion-venting device of a cyclone (Fig. 12-1), take into account the
entire cylindrical volume, V1 (without subtracting the air outlet pipe), the conical volume, V2,
as well as the volume of the settling chamber, V3.
Typically, the explosion vent is located on top of the air pipe implying that the vent area
equals the total cross-sectional area, A, of the air outlet pipe. For the venting design, the
immersion pipe (air outlet pipe) should be considered as a vent duct with length, LA. Should
the immersion pipe be tapered inside, use the smaller cross-sectional area X for the
calculation of Pred,max which witch corresponds to the cyclone strength P.
Figure 12-1. Cyclone with settling chamber, left: normal immersion pipe (A), right:
tapered immersion pipe (X) /1, 24/
In comparison with vessel explosions, dust explosions in pipelines can show appreciably
more vehement development. With increasing pipe length, detonations with a high flame
velocity up to 2000 m⋅s-1 and brief local pressure spots of more than 20 bar must be
anticipated. The occurrence of detonations is dependent on the pipe diameter and the dust
concentration and increases in probability with an increase in the Kmax value of the dust. At
end flanges, constrictions and bends, pre-compression can lead to even higher pressures in the
short term. However, pipelines constructed to PN 10 withstand the above stresses /5/.
In dust explosions, owing to the directional effect of the explosion effective explosion venting
of pipe systems is possible only when venting devices (bursting disks) of sufficient size are
arranged a short distance apart (1-2 m) on the pipe wall (Fig. 11-1).
This is possible only with open-air installations owing to the escape of flame (Fig. 13-2).
Figure 13-3. Venting device at end: Counter-balanced, hinged explosion door /5/
However, it must be borne in mind that the response of such a venting device in the event of
an explosion leads to an increase in the explosion velocity and hence to the explosion pressure
by explosion force effects caused by release of the vent opening. The lower the static
activation overpressure, the quicker this happens. A correspondingly high static activation
overpressure must thus be selected - Pstat = 0.5 to 2 bar - to avoid promoting the formation of
processes similar to detonations or actual detonations because of the venting process /5/.
For venting devices at the end of pipe systems, according to /5/ it is necessary to place more
demands that are exacting on their mechanical strength than in the case of explosion doors of
vessels.
• selection of a relatively high static response pressure (corresponding to the strength of the
pipeline) to avoid promoting increases in velocity and pressure,
• venting in the longitudinal direction of the pipeline over the entire cross section and
• proof of the operability by explosion or detonation tests.
The end venting devices shown in Figs. 11-3 and 11-4 also fulfill the requirement regarding a
gas-tight pipe closure following an explosion.
During pressure venting, recoil is generated by the unburned mixtures and products of
combustion flowing through the vent opening. The force bearing on the protected equipment
depends upon the reduced explosion pressure and the vent area. The maximum recoil force
FRmax can be calculated /1, 4/ as a function of the maximum reduced explosion overpressure
Pred,max and the vent area A as per the following equation:
Not only the calculated recoil force but also its variation over time is decisive for the practical
design of the structure, which supports the explosion vented vessel.
The duration of the recoil force can be estimated with the following equation /1, 4/:
Kmax ⋅ V Kmax ⋅ V
td = 10-4 · = 10-4 ·
A ⋅ Pred, max A ⋅ Po
In order to determine the total transferred impulse I, a rectangular load with the same area can
replace the real load-time course. In practice the height of this rectangular impulse may be
chosen as 0.52 · FRmax. This results into an impulse of
IR = 0.52 · FRmax · td
The effect of the recoil forces on the structure of the vented vessel need further detailed con-
sideration.
The influence of the recoil force can be in general compensated for by arranging vent areas of
equal size opposite each other. It is always possible for one vent to open before another. Such
imbalance should be considered when designing vessel or enclosure restrains for resisting
thrust forces.
Figure 14-1 shows schematically the effect of the recoil forces on the vent areas installed dif-
ferent on the vessel during a vented explosion.
Figure 14-1. Effect of the recoil force on vent areas installed different on the vessel dur-
ing a vented explosion; recoil forces effective (left), recoil forces will
be compensated, if both vent open simultaneously (right)
If a vessel is vented through a vent pipe the maximum reduced explosion overpressure
Pred,max will be increased compared to a vented vessel without vent pipe. Therefore, signifi-
cant higher maximum recoil forces must be considered.
Not only the calculated recoil force but also its variation over time is decisive for the practical
design of the structure, which supports the explosion vented vessel.
The duration of the recoil force can be estimated with the following equation:
Kmax ⋅ V Kmax ⋅ V
td = 10-4 · = 10-4 ·
A ⋅ Pred, max A ⋅ Po
In order to determine the total transferred impulse IR, a rectangular load with the same area
can replace the real load-time course. In practice the height of this rectangular impulse may be
chosen as 0.52 · FRmax. This results into an impulse of
IR = 0.52 · FRmax · td
The effect of the recoil forces on the structure of the vented vessel need further detailed con-
sideration.
The influence of the recoil force can be in general compensated for by arranging vent areas of
equal size opposite each other. It is always possible for one vent to open before another. Such
imbalance should be considered when designing vessel or enclosure restrains for resisting
thrust forces.
Figure 14-2 shows schematically the effect of the recoil forces on the vent areas installed dif-
ferent on the vessel during a vented explosion.
Figure 14-2. Effect of the recoil force on vent areas installed different on the vessel dur-
ing a vented explosion: recoil forces effective (left), recoil forces will
be compensated, if both vent open simultaneously (right)
Vent areas determined by the equations shown in Section 6 are too small if a dust explosion
propagates from one vessel into another through a pipeline. Increased turbulence, pressure pil-
ing and broad flame jet ignition may result in increased explosion violence especially with
duct length > 6 m. This results in an elevated maximum reduced explosion overpressure.
Measures to disengage the explosion in the connecting pipeline are therefore needed /1, 2, 4/.
In accordance with the present technology the protective measure explosion venting can be
used for pipelines having a nominal diameter up to DN 300, a connecting length ≤ 6 m, for
dusts with Kmax values not exceeding 200 m·bar·s-1 and the venting device is to be designed
for a low static activation overpressure (Pstat < 0.2 bar)., in accordance with the following
criteria:
1. Vessels of the same size (∆V ± 10%) are to be vented as per basic equations (Fig. 15-1).
Figure 15-1. Vessels of the same size (∆V ± 10 %) connected with a pipeline ≤ 6 m
with a maximum diameter of DN = 300 (Pstat < 0.2 bar), Kmax ≤ 200 m·bar·s-1
2. The vent areas of different maximum sized vessels (∆V > 10 %) have to be brought in rela-
tion to a maximum reduced explosion overpressure Pred,max ≤ 1.0 bar. The design
overpressure should not fall short of P = 2 bar (Fig. 15-2).
Figure 15-2. Vessels of different size (∆V > 10%) connected with a pipeline ≤ 6 m
with a maximum diameter of DN = 300 (Pstat < 0.2 bar)
3. If it is not possible to vent the smaller vessel, then this vessel has to be designed for the
maximum explosion overpressure (Fig. 15-3) and the vent area of the larger vessel has to
be doubled. Through this doubling, the maximum explosion overpressure (is equal to the
vessel strength) will be reduced of about 70 %. The use of explosion venting is impossible
if the larger vessel cannot be vented.
Figure 15-3. Vessels of different size (∆V > 10 %) partially vented connected with a
pipeline ≤ 6 m with a maximum diameter of DN = 300 (Pstat < 0.2 bar)
Explosion venting may be used without explosion isolation for vessels ≤ 20 m³ interconnected
with pipes with a nominal diameter up to 500 mm, a connecting length up to 15 m and Pstat ≤
0.1 bar, in accordance with the following criteria:
a) For Kmax ≤ 150 m·bar·s-1, dimensionless vent areas (A/V2/3) of each vessel of greater
than 0.25 will limit the maximum reduced explosion overpressure to 0.5 bar (Fig. 15-
4).
b) For Kmax values more than 150 m·bar·s-1 up to 250 m·bar·s-1, dimensionless vent
areas (A/V2/3) of each vessel greater than 0.4 will limit the maximum reduced
explosion overpressure to 0.5 bar (Fig. 15-5).
The dimensionless vent area is defined as A/V2/3 where A is the required vent area and V is
the vessel volume.
The total vent area shall be divided between the vessels so that the dimensionless vent area
has the same value on each enclosure.
Explosion venting of bucket elevators is designed to prevent internal explosion pressures ex-
ceeding the strength of the bucket elevator construction. The maximum explosion pressure al-
lowed inside the bucket elevator is the reduced explosion pressure, Pred,max.
The following conditions are necessary for application of this part of the standard.
Explosion venting devices shall be positioned so that the effectiveness of the venting process
is not impeded. Personnel and nearby plant shall not be at risk from the venting action.
Vent openings shall have an area equal to or greater than the internal cross-sectional area of
the bucket elevator leg(s).
The minimum vent area for the head and the boot shall be equal to the internal cross-sectional
area of the leg.
Venting devices shall comply with EN 14797 /3/. The static activation overpressure of the ex-
plosion-venting device, Pstat, shall not exceed 0.1 bar.
Guidance for the design of explosion venting is given for dusts with Pmax < 10 bar and Kmax
up to 200 bar m s-1 /25, 26/.
These rules apply to vents positioned on one side of the bucket elevator leg. It may be
necessary to position vents on two sides of the leg. The total effective area of these two vents
should equal at least the area of the single vent they replace; that is, the cross-sectional area of
the leg.
Where there is a requirement to put a vent on the boot and it is not possible to install it on the
boot, the vent shall be put on both legs as close as possible to the boot. The distance between
the lower edge of the vent and the top of the boot must not exceed 0.5 times the vent spacing
or within 3 m of the boot whichever is the smaller value. The same criterion applies to the
head, when it is not practical to vent the head.
Ensure that the venting process is not impeded by the belt. This can e.g., be achieved by posi-
tioning the vents in a face normal to the belt. Figure 16-1 shows the vent locations permitted
in the legs relative to the belt or chain.
Figure 16-1. Definition of bucket spacing and vent locations on bucket elevator legs
The bucket elevator should be designed for the reduced explosion pressure, taking into
account the weakening due to the vents and the reaction forces arising during the venting
process. The reaction forces can be calculated using the formula in EN14491. The length of
the vented flame can be calculated from the formula in EN14491 taking the volume as the
volume between two subsequent vents. The external pressure effects close to the vent can be
calculated from the formula in EN14491 taking the volume as the volume between two
subsequent vents. On larger distances from the vent, the effects of multiple vents need to be
taken into account. As a conservative approximation, the external overpressure from the
various vents at a certain location the pressures can be added together.
Figure 16-2 shows the required pressure resistance for various Kmax values and vent configu-
rations /25, 26/.
c
Pred,max = exp(a ∙ Kmax + b)
Figure 16.3 shows an example using a Kmax = 150 m·bar·s-1 and metal buckets.
6m
12 m
6m
alle 6 m 6 m 6 m
12 m
alle
12 m
max.
max.
Berstscheibe
Bursting disc
Figure 16-3. Examples of the necessary explosion protection resistance of bucket eleva-
tors, left: Vent spacing every 12 m, Pmin = 1.7 bar;
right: Vent spacing every 6 m, Pmin = 0.7 bar
If instead of metal bucket plastic buckets are used, then plastic buckets will enhance
explosion pressures. Increased bucket elevator strength is required to withstand the higher
pressures, as given in next table.
Kmax Increase of
[bar·m·s-1] bucket elevator strength
< 100 20 %
100 to 150 35 %
> 150 to 200 50 %
Plastic buckets will enhance explosion pressures. Increased bucket elevator strength is
required to withstand the higher pressures, as given in next table.
max Increase of
[bar·m·s-1] bucket elevator strength
< 100 20 %
100 to 150 35 %
> 150 to 200 50 %
17 Hybrid Mixtures
Hybrid mixtures imply the coexistence of dispersed combustible dust with gaseous fuel (e.g.,
solvent vapor and flammable mist).
The individual dust concentration and the individual flammable gas-air-mixtures may not be
explosive but together they may form an explosive hybrid mixture /1, 4/ (Fig. 17-1).
In hybrid mixtures with a given dust concentration which is below the lower explosive limit
LEL, the required amount of flammable gas or vapor to reach an explosive mixture becomes
smaller the lower the explosive limit.
200
160
PVC
Pea Flour
LEL [Vol.-%]
120 Cellulose
80
40
0
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25
C3H8 [Vol-%]
Figure 17-1. Lover explosion limit LEL of hybrid mixtures consisting of combustible
dusts and propane (C3H8)
If the concentration of the gas and vapor portion remains at every location below 20 % of
the lower explosion limit LELgas,vapor, then the safety data of the pure dust air mixture can
be used to evaluate the total mixture. On can expect that products with a flammable solvent
content of no more than 0.5 wt-% will have a vapor concentration of less than 20 % LEL-
gas,vapor at every location.
Dried dusts or dusty products than contain a maximum 0.5 wt.-% of flammable solvents
and which are handled at temperatures below their drying temperature can be considered
free of solvents within the frame work of this Handbook [VDI 3673, Part 1].
Figure 17-2 depicts for closed vessels the correlation of the explosion characteristics of com-
bustible dusts with e.g. increasing propane content in the combustible atmosphere. The
addition of gaseous fuel affects the maximum explosion overpressure Pmax only slightly. The
product specific constant Kmax, however, is markedly influenced. It increases with increased
content of gaseous fuel and the classification into a higher dust explosion class possible. With
increasing fuel content, Kmax reaches a peak and decreases again above the stoichiometric gas
concentration.
10
8
Pmax [bar]
6
Dyestuff
Pea flour
4
Corn starch
Anti-oxidant
2
C3H8
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
C3H8 [Vol-%]
500
400
Kmax [m·bar/s]
300
Dyestuff
100 Anti-oxidant
C3H8
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
C3H8 [Vol-%]
Figure 17-2. Influence of the propane (C3H8) concentration in the combustion air upon
the explosion characteristic of combustible dusts in a closed vessel (V = 1 m³)
Equations for standard mixtures (see Section 6.1.1.1) may be used for sizing the vent areas
for hybrid mixtures. The combustible dust should belong to the dust explosion class St 1 or
St 2 and the explosion behavior of the flammable vapor should be similar to that of propane.
The following values are to be entered into the equation /1/:
Possibly the explosion characteristics of the given hybrid mixture may have to be determined.
For hybrid mixtures made up with combustible dusts of the explosion class St 3
(Kmax > 300 m·bar·s-1) in the presence of flammable gases advice should be sought from the
experts.
Explosion venting should not be used as a protective measure if products or compounds are
released which are classified as
• very poisonous,
• poisonous,
• corrosive,
• irritant,
• carcinogenic,
• teratogenic or
• mutagenic
Equipment cannot be protected from the hazardous consequences of a detonation through ex-
plosion pressure venting.
If pressure release cannot be applied e.g., where pressure and flame effects must be avoided in
the vicinity of the equipment to be protected, other protective measures are required, e.g.:
- inertisation,
19 Maintenance
Venting devices are subject to a number of influences, which may restrict their performance.
The protective function may be completely lost or an unintentional activation may result.
Therefore, they have to be adequately inspected and periodically maintained and repaired if
necessary.
Rupture disks may be weakened by corrosion, pressure fluctuations, mechanical abrasion and
aging.
Explosion doors may also lose their effectiveness through corrosion and mechanical abrasion.
Generally, more serious are the detrimental effects of incompetent maintenance (e.g.,
gumming up with paint). A regular inspection is necessary. Whenever an explosion has
activated a door, it must be checked for suitability for future use.
The following maintenance and servicing should be carried out periodically and are
considered as a minimum:
Rupture disks:
• Check on the rupture disks for perfect condition
• Check on hold-back-devices for rupture disks
• Electrical check on the trip circuits of signal device
Explosion disks:
• Check on the explosion disks for perfect condition
• Check on hold-back-devices for explosion disks
• Check on the retaining-cables for perfect condition
• Electrical check on the trip circuits of signal device
Vent pipe:
• Check on the vent pipes for free cross-section
• Check on the light cover for perfect condition
• Check on hold-back-devices for light covers
• Check on the lattice cover at the end of vent pipe
Figure 19-1 shows that particular immediately attention should be paid to maintenance and
checking of the explosion door to avoid severe consequences in case of an explosion.
Figure 19-1. This explosion door needs immediately maintenance to avoid severe conse-
quences in case of an explosion
The worst-case condition, to which equations in Section 6 can be applied, is a vessel with a
vent at the roof, because the flame can travel the entire length of the vessel/silo before it
vents. If, in such a case, the vessel is cylindrical or rectangular, then the value of L/De ratio
can be calculated directly from the physical dimensions (length and diameter of vessel or
width and depth of vessel).
If the vessel/silo consists of a cylindrical and conical part, however, or the venting device is at
the side, the appropriate value of L/De can only be obtained by estimating, based on the ves-
sel/silo design, the maximum distance the flame (Leff) can travel inside the vessel before
venting and the volume (Veff) through which the flame travels.
Note 1: The effective length of the flame travel Leff is measured vertically including the pres-
sure-venting device. In the case of lying vessels, it is measured horizontally.
Note 2: The effective volume of the flame Veff, which is necessary for the calculation of the
ratio (L/De), is not to be confused with the vessel volume V. Vessel volume V is the volume
to be protected and is the base for the calculation of the vent area.
vent area
Veff
Leff
1/3 Hcon
vent
area
Veff
Leff
1/3 Hcon
21 Annex
21.1 Definitions
Activation overpressure in bar
Static activation pressure Pstat:
Pressure, which activates a pressure-venting device while the pressure rises slowly /11/.
Cubic law
The correlation of the maximum rate of pressure rise (dP/dt)max with the vessel volume
assuming complete geometrical similarity and volume independent burning velocities is:
-1
Dust explosion class Kmax in m·bar·s Pmax in bar
Equivalent diameter De in m
Diameter of a circle, which has the same area as the reference area A* of any shape:
A*
De = 2 . π
Explosion characteristics
All explosion characteristics are determined in accordance with a standardized procedure /17,
18/ and are defined as follows:
Kmax-value in m·bar·s-1
Product specific characteristic (constant), which is calculated with the help of the cubic law.
Note: The numeric value of the Kmax-value is equivalent to the maximum rate of pressure rise (dP/dt)max in a
1-m³-vessel /1, 4/.
Gas-air-mixtures
Non-turbulent mixtures
Gas-air-mixtures, which are in a non-turbulent state at the moment when the ignition source is
activated /5/.
Turbulent mixtures
Gas-air-mixtures, which are in a turbulent state at the moment when the ignition source is
activated. They can be obtained in vessels (or silos) by the rapid release of air from
pressurized containers through distribution devices with a standardized procedure /5/.
Hybrid mixtures
Mixtures of combustible compounds in different aggregate conditions.
Note: Mixtures of methane, coal and air or mixtures of solvent vapors and combustible dusts are example for
hybrid mixtures.
Note: The mixture may be explosible even if the concentration of one or more components are below their mini-
mum explosible concentration.
Pneumatic transport
Transport of product through ducting with a transport velocity of vF = 15 to 40 m·s-1.
Explosion door
Pressure venting device, which will open the vent area at a defined activation overpressure
and generally re-close after discharge.
Venting element
Part of a vent system, which covers the vent area and opens under explosion conditions. It
may be reusable or consumable.
Distance Rs in m
Distance from the vent opening in direction of the vent discharge, which will show the maxi-
mum peak of the external overpressure PAmax.
Recoil duration td in ms
Time interval between opening of the pressure-venting device and reaching ambient air pres-
sure.
Vent area A in m²
Geometric vent area of an explosion pressure-venting device.
Venting efficiency EF
Relation of the effective pressure vent area Aw and vent area A /3/.
Vent duct
Duct work (pipeline) downstream from a venting device for the safe discharge of the pressure
wave, flame and products of combustion.
21.2 Abbreviations
A : vent area (equivalent) in m²
A* : reference area of any shape in m²
AS : internal surface area of enclosure in m²
Ac : cross-sectional area in m²
Ae : vent area (effective) in m²
Ag : vent area (geometric) in m²
Asuc : effective suction area in m²
a : width of explosion door in m
α : defines the direction towards the vent
E : energy in J
EF : venting efficiency
FR : recoil force in kN
FRmax : recoil force, maximum in kN
H : height of fall in m
IE : ignition energy in J
IR : transferred impulse in kN·s
Kmax : maximum product-specific constant in m·bar·s-1
k : kilo
kN : kilo Newton
M : median
MESG : maximum experimental safe gap
MIE : minimum ignition energy
MIT : minimum ignition temperature
MP : amount of product discharged kg·h-1
m : meter
max : maximum
N : Newton
NFPA : National Fire Protection Association
T : temperature in °C
Tb : operating temperature in °C
t : time in s
td : recoil duration in ms
tv : ignition delay time in s
V : vessel volume in m³
Veff : effective volume traveled by the explosion flame in m³
VDI : Verein Deutscher Ingenieure
v : speed in m·s-1
vF : air conveying velocity in m·s-1
VRes : vacuum resistance of vessel in mbar
W : vessel width in m
WAr : angle between axis of vent area and duct in °
WE : vent area width in m
WF : maximum flame width in m
WO : width of opening in m
w : gap width in mm
Z : cylinder
The effects of fuel explosions upon buildings can be approximated from experience as a static
load equivalent to the maximum explosion pressure /28/.
0.02 Safe limit: 95% probability for no serious damage for pressure less than
0.02 bar. Small damage to house roofs (roof tiles and gutters) 1-10% of window
glass broken
0.03 Limited minor structural damage
0.035 - 0.07 Generally large and small windows break, occasional damage to window frames
0.05 Small damage to house structure
0.06 1% structural damage, 99% of window glass shattered
0.07 Partial destruction of houses, made uninhabitable (danger of collapsing)
0.07 - 0.14 Corrugated asbestos panels shattered, failure of fasteners for corrugated steel
and aluminum panels
0.09 Minor damage to steel frames of buildings (distortion)
0.10 Light structures collapse, pressure vessels intact
0.14 - 0.21 Not reinforced concrete or cinder block walls destroyed
0.16 Lower limit for serious structural damage
0.17 50% destruction of brickwork of houses
0.21 Heavy machinery (1.5 ton) within buildings suffer little damage; Steel frames of
building distorted and separated from foundation; 50% structural damage
0.21 - 0.28 Light structures made out of self-supporting steel panels (without frame) demol-
ished; Rupture of empty oil storage tanks
0.28 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured
0.30 Major building damage (collapse)
0.34 Wooden utility poles snapped; Minor damage to machinery (20 ton) inside build-
ings
0.34 - 0.41 Total destruction of houses; Reinforced walls break; 99% structural damage to
buildings
0.48 Loaded freight cars overturned
0.48 - 0.55 Failure of not reinforced 20-30 cm thick brick walls due to shearing or flexure;
Failure of pipe trestles (pipe rupture)
0.62 Complete destruction of loaded freight cars
0.7 Destruction of industrial buildings; Machinery (3.5 ton) within building heavily
damaged due to dislodging)
0.8 - 1.5 Destruction of earth quake proof concrete and steel framed concrete buildings
21.4 Reference
/1/ EN 14491-2012: Dust explosion venting protective systems.
/2/ EN 14994-2007: Gas explosion venting protective systems.
/3/ EN 14797-2006: Explosion venting devices.
/4/ VDI-3673, Part1-2002: Pressure venting of dust explosions, Part 1, Beuth Verlag GmbH, 10772
Berlin.
/5/ Bartknecht, W.: Explosionsschutz: Grundlagen und Anwendung, Berlin, Heidelberg, New
York: Springer 1993.
/6/ EN 14460-2006: Explosion resistant equipment.
/7/ CLP/GHS - Classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, 2008
/8/ EN-13445- Unfired pressure vessels.
/9/ EN 15089-2009: Explosion isolation systems.
/10/ Siegenthaler, F., Siwek, R.: Zerkleinerung von Sperrmüll -Kombination von Explosionsunter-
drückung und -entlastung (Crushing of bulky-refuse: combination of explosion suppression and
explosion venting) VDI-Berichte Nr. 975, VDI-Verlag GmbH, Düsseldorf, Germany, 1992.
/11/ Directive 94/9/EC (ATEX 114): DIRECTICE 94/9/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLEMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 March 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive at-
mospheres.
/12/ Rembe Brochure: Premium Explosion Protection, Rembe GmbH, SAFETY+CONTROL,
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/13/ BS&B: Catalog: Pressure relief and explosion venting technology, 2000; BS&B Safety
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/14/ Bühler: Prospektblatt: Explosion Control, BUHLER Ltd. CH-9240 Uzwil.
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/17/ EN 14034-1-2004: Determination of explosion characteristics of dust clouds – Part 1: Determi-
nation of the maximum explosion pressure Pmax.
/18/ EN 14034-2-2006: Determination of explosion characteristics of dust clouds – Part 2: Determi-
nation of the maximum rate of explosion pressure rise (dP/dt)max.
/19/ Hoerbiger Prospektblatt: Hoerbiger Ventilwerke GmbH & Co KG, A-1110 Vienna, Austria.
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/22/ Siwek, R.: Einfluss von Ausblasrohren auf die Druckentlastung von Staubexplosionen. Staub,
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/23/ EN 16009-2011: Flameless explosion venting devices.
/24/ VDI-2263, Part 6.1-2009: Dust fires and explosion protection in dust extraction installations -
Examples, Beuth Verlag GmbH, 10772 Berlin.
/25/ VDI-2263, Part 8.1-2011: Fire and explosion protection in elevators - Examples, Beuth Verlag
GmbH, 10772 Berlin.
/26/ CEN/TR 16829-2016: Fire and explosion prevention and protection for bucket elevators.
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of workers potentially at risk from chemical substances at work.
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Richtwerte zur Beurteilung der Einwirkung von Druckwellen auf Bauten und Anlageteile.