Marine Corps Planning Process

Reference Guides

US Marine Corps

Compiled from the Marine Corps Gazette

by Major Paul L. Stokes USMC, Retired
26 December 2018
2i
 MCWP 5-10 Extract
(Formerly MCWP 5-1)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20308-1775
24 August 2010
FOREWORD
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process,
was first published in January 2000. Since that time, the planning process has been used by
Marine Corps forces at all echelons of command to conduct a range of military operations.
The planning associated with these diverse operations has demonstrated the fundamental
soundness of the process. Practical application has also revealed that portions of the plan-
ning process and MCWP 5-1 require clarification or elaboration to enhance comprehen-
sion and utility. Among these, design has emerged as a term requiring further emphasis.
A fundamental responsibility of command, design is present not only in planning, but
also throughout the planning-execution-assessment continuum. This publication empha-
sizes the importance of understanding the problem, the environment, the enemy, and the
purpose of an operation. This awareness is fundamental to the first step in planning—for-
merly named mission analysis—and has, accordingly, been renamed problem framing to
better convey its purpose and importance. Moreover, the publication includes a discus-
sion of battlespace, centers of gravity, commander’s intent, and commander’s critical
information requirements as part of design, versus its former heading of commander’s
battlespace area evaluation.
Marine Corps Planning Process also clarifies the distinction between intent and guid-
ance. Intent describes the purpose of the action being directed and an idea of its end state.
The intent promotes subordinate initiative that is consistent with the higher commander’s
aims when the task assigned is no longer appropriate for the situation. Constructs, such as
“method,” are forms of guidance that may be transitory.
This publication supersedes, MCWP 5-1 w/chg 1, Marine Corps Planning Process, dated
5 Jan 2000.
MCWP 5-1 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization
Agreement (STANAG) 2014, NATO Formats for Orders and Designation of Timing,
Locations, and Boundaries.

ii
iii2
 Table of Contents
BU

Overview
]

Chapter 1, Planning Overview, Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)

- Extract of Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MWCP) 5-10, 2 May 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2B

MCPP Overview
3

- Figure 1-1, MCWP 5-10 .

4B .................................................. 7

The Reference Guides

Step 1: Problem Framing
- Marine Corps Gazette, July 2018
6B .............................................9

Step 2: Course of Action Development

7B

- Marine Corps Gazette, August 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

8B

Step 3: Course of Action Wargaming

9B

10B - Marine Corps Gazette, September 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Step 4: Course of Action Comparison and Decision

1B

12B - Marine Corps Gazette, October 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Step 5: Orders Development

13B

14B - Marine Corps Gazette, November 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Step 6: Transition
15B

16B - Marine Corps Gazette, December 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Thinking outside the box

The Electronic Fire Support Coordinator
16B - Marine Corps Gazette, April 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

iv
v2
 MCWP 5-10 Extract
(Formerly MCWP 5-1)

CHAPTER 1
PLANNING OVERVIEW
Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways
of bringing it about.
—Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning

The Marine Corps doctrinal philosophy of without staffs, comprise six steps—BAMCIS
maneuver warfare describes planning as an essen- [begin planning, arrange for a reconnaissance,
tial part of the broader field of command and con- make the reconnaissance, complete the plan,
trol. The aim of command and control is to issue the order, and supervise].
enhance the commander’s ability to make sound z For units with staffs, the Marine Corps plan-
and timely decisions. Effective decisionmaking ning process (MCPP), described in this publi-
requires both the situational understanding to rec- cation, is most appropriate. It is also a six-step
ognize the essence of a given problem and the process (see fig. 1-1), comprising problem
creative ability to devise a practical solution. framing, course of action (COA) development,
Hence, an essential function of planning is to pro- COA wargaming, COA comparison and deci-
mote understanding of the problem—the differ- sion, orders development, and transition. The
ence between existing and desired conditions— Marine Corps often operates in a joint environ-
and to devise ways to solve it. Planning involves ment, where the MCPP is the vehicle through
elements of both art and science, combining anal- which commanders and their staffs in the oper-
ysis and calculation with intuition, inspiration, ating forces provide input to the joint planning
and creativity. The Marine Corps employs several
process (see app. A).
planning processes:
z If time does not allow use of the full, six-step
z Troopleading steps, used principally as an MCPP, the commander and the planners may
introduction to planning by small unit leaders use the rapid response planning process (R2P2),

Problem
Framing

Course of Action
Transition
Development

Orders Course of Action

Development Wargaming

Course of Action
Comparison and
Decision

Figure 1-1. Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

1
 MCWP 5-10 Extract
(Formerly MCWP 5-1)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1-2 MCWP 5-1

which is a time-constrained version of the in a straightforward manner. For example, infor-

MCPP. The R2P2 enables the Marine expedi- mation gained during COA development or war-
tionary unit (MEU) to plan and begin execution gaming will often require planners to return to the
of certain tasks within six hours and is highly problem framing step of the planning process.
dependent on the use of standing operating pro- Knowledge of the planning hierarchy is essential
cedures (SOPs). to the effective application of the MCPP.
As described in MCDP 5, at the highest level of
Because planning must support the com-
the planning hierarchy is conceptual planning. It
mander’s decisionmaking—especially in a time
establishes aims, objectives, and intentions and
competitive and evolving situation—the MCPP
involves developing broad concepts for action. In
codifies the central role of the commander in
general, conceptual planning is a process of cre-
planning. The process is applicable across the
ative synthesis supported by analysis. It generally
range of military operations and at any echelon
corresponds to the art of war. Developing tactical,
of command. It can be as detailed or abbreviated
operational, or strategic concepts for the overall
as time, staff resources, experience, and the situa-
conduct of military actions is conceptual planning.
tion permit or require.
At the lowest level of the hierarchy is detailed
planning, which is concerned with translating the
Doctrinal Underpinnings broad concept into a complete and realistic plan.
Detailed planning generally corresponds to the
Planning should never be viewed as an isolated science of war and encompasses the specifics of
activity or process; rather, as a part of the plan- implementation. It generally is an analytical pro-
ning-execution-assessment continuum. Because cess of decomposing the concept into executable
situations change continuously, decisions are tasks, although it likely involves some elements
made in the face of relative uncertainty. While it of synthesis as well. Detailed planning works out
is natural to seek additional information to lessen the scheduling, coordination, or technical issues
that uncertainty, it usually comes at the expense of involved with moving, sustaining, administering,
time. Success in such a fluid environment and directing military forces. Examples of
demands that Marines think critically, examine detailed planning include load plans and air task-
the nature of the problem as well as the purpose of ing orders. Unlike conceptual planning, detailed
the operation, and learn and adapt during the planning does not involve the establishment of
entire planning-execution-assessment continuum. objectives. Detailed planning works out actions to
accomplish objectives assigned.
Environmental factors; enemy action; other stake-
holders’ involvement; updated intelligence; Between the highest and lowest levels of the hier-
changing resources; revised guidance from higher archy is functional planning, which involves ele-
headquarters (HHQ); and input provided as a ments of both conceptual and detailed planning.
result of operations and concurrent planning by Functional planning is concerned with developing
subordinate, adjacent, and supporting units all supporting plans for discrete functional activities,
contribute to making planning endeavors highly such as maneuver, fires, logistics, intelligence, and
complex and nonlinear. The problem will evolve force protection.
even while trying to solve it.
Normally, due to the importance of conceptual
While this publication presents the six steps of planning, the commander directs the formulation
the MCPP sequentially, planning seldom occurs of plans at this level. While the commander is

2
 MCWP 5-10 Extract
(Formerly MCWP 5-1)
_______________________________________________________________________________
Marine Corps Planning Process 1-3

also engaged in both functional and detailed plan- of the problem in order to identify an appropriate
ning, the specific aspects of these are often left to conceptual solution. While not prescriptive or a
the staff. checklist, design is based on—
Conceptual planning provides the basis for all z Critical thinking.
subsequent planning and should progress from z Conceptual planning.
the general to the specific. For example, the over- z Visualization.
all intent and concept of operations (CONOPS) z Emergence of a hypothesis.
lead to subordinate intents and CONOPS as well z Continuous activity.
as to supporting functional concepts; these intents
and concepts lead to the specifics of execution.
Critical thinking is purposeful and reflective
The planning dynamic does not operate in only judgment about what to believe or what to do in
one direction. Conceptual planning must be response to observations, experience, verbal or
responsive to functional constraints. For example, written expressions, or arguments. Critical think-
the realities of deployment schedules (a func- ing involves the high-order cognitive skills of
tional concern) can dictate employment schemes analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Analysis
(a conceptual concern). Functional planning in allows planners to see the parts and to recognize
turn must be responsive to more detailed require- and explain patterns and meanings. Synthesis
ments of execution. In this way, the levels of allows planners to predict and draw conclusions,
planning mutually influence one another. Con- create new ideas, and discuss “what if ” situa-
ceptual, functional, and detailed planning are sel- tions. Evaluation allows planners to critique
dom conducted sequentially because the situation ideas, make recommendations, assess value, and
and available information are continually evolv- make choices. All three high-order thinking skills
ing. While conceptual, functional, and detailed are required in design.
planning are described in sequence, in practice
they are conducted in a more interactive manner Conceptual planning allows commanders, mem-
due to uncertainty and time. bers of their staffs, and others to develop an
understanding of the environment and problem as
well as develop a broad approach to solve the
Introduction to Design problem. As the conceptual element of the plan-
ning hierarchy, design shapes the functional and
detailed planning that follows. As the examples
Design is the conception and articulation of a on page 1-4 show, at the campaign level, design
framework for solving a problem. It is appropri- may take the form of a campaign concept.
ate to problem solving at the strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical levels of war. As commanders In both instances, the commander had a deep
conceptualize their operation, their periodic guid- appreciation for the wholeness of the problem,
ance is in the form of visualization, description, including the adversary and environment. His
and direction and guides the staff throughout resulting visualization concisely expressed how he
planning. Design provides a means to learn and intended to achieve success. The same is true at
adapt and requires intellectually versatile leaders the tactical level where design may take the form
with high-order thinking skills who actively of a commanders vision of actions. See app. J for
engage in continuous dialogue and collaboration another example of design.
to enhance decisionmaking at all levels.
Visualization is the commander’s “mental snap-
The purpose of design is to achieve a greater shot in time” that represents his current under-
understanding of the environment and the nature standing of the environment, the problem, or how

3
 MCWP 5-10 Extract
(Formerly MCWP 5-1)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1-4 MCWP 5-1

During the Korean War, General MacArthur succinctly restated his campaign concept in
his Far East Message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Operation planned mid-September is
amphibious landing of a two-division corps in rear of enemy lines for purpose of envelop-
ing and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from south by Eighth Army.”
Guided by this design, his staff planned multiple COAs. This planning revealed that the
most strategically advantageous COA—an amphibious assault at Inchon—also involved
the greatest operational risks. General MacArthur accepted the risks of landing at Inchon
and subsequent staff actions focused on the functional and detailed planning necessary to
both flesh out the COA and minimize the attendant risks. The latter included using a dis-
carded COA, a landing at Kunsan, as the basis for a deception effort.
In 1864 and 1865, General Grant’s strategic concept called for coordinated military actions
in Virginia, Georgia, and Tennessee. These actions were complemented by a naval block-
ade and put overwhelming, simultaneous pressure on all the Confederate armies, thereby
removing their ability to shift resources to reinforce any one army.

he sees solving the problem. Human beings con- z Are other constructs, such as leverage points,
stantly form and reform mental images as their fault lines, lines of operations (LOOs), or criti-
environments change or new information be- cal variables, more appropriate to the situation?
comes known. Early in the planning process the (More information on warfighting functions
commander shares his mental image with his and LOOs can be found in app. B.)
staff, using his visualization to focus and guide
their efforts. As planning progresses, the com- Design is a continuous activity and must never be
mander continues to update and provide a refined viewed as an isolated event occurring only during
visualization through his guidance. problem framing. It occurs throughout the plan-
ning-execution-assessment continuum. Design is a
Understanding the environment and the nature of
way of organizing conceptual work within an
the problem will eventually lead to the emergence
organization to assist commanders in understand-
of a hypothesis on how the problem might be
ing, visualizing, and describing the operational
solved. The commander may visualize the
environment and to develop approaches to solv-
hypothesis by describing how to move from an
ing problems. Because the environment is
existing set of conditions to a desired set of con-
dynamic, problems also evolve. As a result,
ditions. This visualization requires the com-
design must occur throughout planning, execu-
mander to understand the current situation,
tion, and assessment.
broadly define the future situation, and deter-
mine the necessary actions to bring about the
desired future state. It is expressed using opera-
tional terms of reference and concepts that shape
Synopsis of the
the language governing the conduct (planning, Marine Corps Planning Process
execution, and assessment) of operations. It
addresses questions, such as— A commander may begin planning on his own
initiative, based on indications and warnings, or
z Will planning, execution, and assessment in response to specific guidance and direction
activities use traditional constructs, such as from HHQ. The planning process is designed to
center of gravity (COG), decisive points, and promote understanding among the commander,
warfighting functions? his staff, and subordinate commanders regarding

4
 MCWP 5-10 Extract
(Formerly MCWP 5-1)
_______________________________________________________________________________
Marine Corps Planning Process 1-5

the nature of a given problem and the options for operating environment, such as weather, terrain,
solving it. The plans which result may be consid- culture, and non-Department of Defense (DOD)
ered hypotheses that will be tested and refined as entities or stakeholders. This detailed examina-
a result of execution and assessment. The six tion of the operational environment and possi-
steps of the planning process are— ble adversary reactions should forge a greater
understanding of the environment, the problem,
z Problem Framing. Problem framing enhances and possible solutions.
understanding of the environment and the z COA Comparison and Decision. During
nature of the problem. It identifies what the COA comparison and decision, the commander
command must accomplish, when and where it reviews the pros and cons of the option(s) and
must be done and, most importantly, why—the decides how he will accomplish the mission,
purpose of the operation. The purpose is articu- either by approving a COA as formulated or by
lated in the mission statement (task and pur- assimilating what has been learned into a new
pose). The purpose of the operation, which is COA that may need to be further developed
enduring, is restated and amplified as desired and wargamed.
in the commander’s intent. Since no amount of
z Orders Development. The orders develop-
subsequent planning can solve a problem
ment step translates the commander’s decision
insufficiently understood, problem framing is
into oral/written/graphic direction sufficient to
the most important step in planning. This
guide implementation and initiative by subor-
understanding allows the commander to visual-
dinates.
ize and describe how the operation may unfold,
z Transition. The transition step may involve a
which he articulates as his commander’s con-
wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals neces-
cept—his overall picture of the operation. The
sary to ensure a successful shift from planning
commander’s concept is also known as the
to execution. A number of factors can influence
CONOPS, operational concept, or method. As how the transition step is conducted, such as
planning continues, the commander’s concept echelon of command, mission complexity, and,
becomes more detailed, providing additional most importantly, available time.
clarity and operational context. Design does
not end with problem framing, because the sit-
uation constantly evolves and requires the Tenets of the Marine
commander to continually review and possibly Corps Planning Process
modify his design.
z COA Development. The COA development
step produces options for accomplishing the The tenets of the MCPP—top-down planning,
mission in accordance with commander’s single-battle concept, and integrated planning—
intent. It provides options for the commander; derive from the doctrine of maneuver warfare.
These tenets guide the commander’s use of his
refines the design; and promotes understanding
staff to plan and execute military operations.
of the environment, problem, and the approach
to solving the problem. z Top-Down Planning. Planning is a fundamen-
z COA Wargaming. The COA war game exam- tal responsibility of command. The commander
ines and refines the option(s) in light of adver- must not merely participate in planning, he
sary capabilities and potential actions/reactions must drive the process. His personal involve-
as well as the characteristics peculiar to the ment and guidance are keys to planning. The

5
 MCWP 5-10 Extract
(Formerly MCWP 5-1)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1-6 MCWP 5-1

commander uses planning to increase under- planning process as early as possible to consider
standing of the environment and the problem to all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share
support his decisionmaking. information as broadly as possible. (See app. C
z Single-Battle Concept. Operations or events in for information on organization for planning.)
one part of the battlespace often have profound
and consequent effects on other areas and Planning is a complex process of interacting
events; therefore, a commander must always activities with feedback loops. The six steps of
view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. the MCPP aid in understanding and generally fol-
Commanders prepare for a single battle effort low a sequence; however, it is important to
during planning primarily through their intent, remember that planning is not a simple sequence
which provides the larger context for subordi- of steps. Any one step of the process may involve
nate units so they can exercise judgment and multiple phases (see app. D for planning process
initiative when the unforeseen occurs while diagrams). Any step in the process may feed back
remaining consistent with larger aims. into a previous one. For example, conceptualizing
z Integrated Planning. Integrated planning is a COA generally follows establishing goals and
conducted to coordinate action toward a com- objectives, but it is difficult to establish meaning-
mon purpose by all elements of the force. Inte- ful goals and objectives without some idea of
grated planning is facilitated by the assignment how to accomplish them. Likewise, new informa-
of personnel with an appropriate level of knowl- tion received during orders development may
edge of their respective organization or activity reveal a weakness in the CONOPS, which would
to the operational planning team (OPT). The require the development of new COAs or a
key to integrated planning is to involve the right branch plan.
personnel from the right organizations in the

6
 MCWP 5-10 Extract (Formerly MCWP 5-1)
Step 1

Problem
Framing
Step 6 Step 2
Transition Course of Action
Development

DESIGN

Orders Course of Action

Development Wargaming
Step 5 Step 3
Course of Action
Comparison and
Decision

Step 4

Figure 1-1. Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

7
82
 MCPP REFERENCE GUIDES
“We should think of planning as a learning
process—as mental preparation which improves our
understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms,
planning is thinking before doing.”
-MCDP 5 Planning

The Gazette, in collaboration with the MAGTF Staff Training Program, will
present a series of six Reference Guides covering insights and best practices for
employing the steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). The Guides
are for the use of our readers and members of the MCA&F and will be available
for members to download at

www.mca-marines.org/gazette/MCPP_guides

Step One Step Two

Problem Framing Course of Action Development

The purpose of problem framing is to gain an enhanced August Issue
understanding of the environment and the nature of the
problem. This greater understanding allows a commander
to visualize the operation and describe his conceptual
approach, providing context for the examination of what
the command must accomplish, when and where it must
be done, and most importantly, why—the purpose of the
operation.

Since no amount of subsequent planning can solve a

problem insufficiently understood, framing the problem is
critical. To achieve this understanding, problem framing
requires both the judgment of synthesis and the systematic
study of analysis. Accordingly, problem framing consists of a
commander-driven design effort supported by staff actions.

MCWP 5-10 Marine Corps Planning Process

17MCPP Tip In_N_0718.indd 1 6/7/18 7:21 AM

 THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS
STEP ONE: PROBLEM FRAMING

DESIGN
- Describe the Current and
KEY INPUTS Desired States
- Define the Problem Set
KEY RESULTS
Higher Headquarters - Develop the Broad Graphic & narrative describing the
- Guidance & Intent Operational Approach current and desired state
- Mission Statement
- WARNO/OPORD Broad Operational Approach
- Intelligence/IPB Products
- Confirmation Briefs Initial estimates of supportability
(MSC)
Situational Information
Initial staff estimates (Staff)
Commander and Staff
Approved Mission Statement
- Experience
- Expertise STAFF ACTIONS
- Judgement Commander’s Intent
- Task Analysis
- Center of Gravity Analysis COA Development guidance
- Relative Combat Power
Analysis
- Assumption/Limitations
- CCIRs/RFIs
- Draft Mission Statement
- Resource Shortfalls
- Estimates (Staff & MSC)
- Update IPB products
- Red Cell/Green Cell/Red
Team

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20180531_MCPP_Final_7.625x5.indd 1 6/5/18 1:56 PM
 Problem Framing
Purpose: To gain an understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem set.

DESIGN
Goal is to achieve understanding
STAFF ACTIONS through critical thinking and dialogue
Concurrent and Complementary
1. Commander’s Orientation
2. Describe the current and
1. Analyze Tasks
-Specified: Anything specified
5. Develop Mission Statement
desired states of the operating PRESENT PROBLEM
-Who, What, Where, When, Why
environment
(OPORD, Mission Statement,
verbal, etc)
- Must address the problem set
3. Define the problem set FRAMING BRIEF
-Implied: Necessary to accomplish
a specified task 6. Propose Initial CCIRs -As they exist within the
-Essential: Specified or implied environment
tasks that MUST be performed to -Planning CCIRs -Preventing the environment from
accomplish mission -Operational CCIRs progressing toward the desired
state
2. Analyze Center of Gravity 7. Perform Ongoing Activities 4. Develop the Broad
-Enemy and friendly (COG, CC, -IPB product refinement Operational Approach COMMANDER’S COURSE
CR, CV) -Red Cell activities/Green Cell
activities
-Refinement of staff estimates
- Input and Synthesis of both
design and staff actions OF ACTION GUIDANCE
3. Develop Assumptions - Graphic and Narrative
and estimates of supportability
-Battlespace refinement - Commander’s initial intent and Broad Operational Approach
-Logical
-Realistic -Resource shortfalls identification guidance
-Essential for Planning -Commander’s Critical Information
-Doesn’t assume away an Requirement review/update
adversary capability -Requests for information

4. Determine Limitations
-Restraints: what can’t be done
-Constraints: something you must
do
ISSUE WARNO

11
20180531_MCPP_Final_7.625x5.indd 2 6/5/18 1:56 PM
12
2
 MCPP REFERENCE GUIDES
“We should think of planning as a learning
process—as mental preparation which improves our
understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms,
planning is thinking before doing.”
—MCDP 5, Planning

The Gazette, in collaboration with the MAGTF Staff Training Program, will
present a series of six Reference Guides covering insights and best practices for
employing the steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). The Guides
are for the use of our readers and members of the MCA&F and will be available
for members to download at

www.mca-marines.org/gazette/MCPP_guides

Step Two Step Three

Course of Action Development Course of Action Wargaming

Course of action (COA) development leads to one or September Issue
more options for how the mission and commander’s
intent might be accomplished in accordance with the
commander’s understanding as a result of the design
effort that began during problem framing.
Planners develop broad COAs considering a number of
factors, including mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available-time available (METT-T);
adversary versus friendly capabilities assessment; civilian
and cultural considerations; and possible employment
options.
Planners should not judge or eliminate initial or “rough-
cut” COAs; all possibilities are recorded for consideration
in order to provide the commander with a variety of
options.
—MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process

13

17 MCPP Planning #2_N0818.indd 1 7/3/18 9:36 AM

 THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS
STEP TWO: Course of Action Development

Activities
KEY INPUTS Establish battlespace framework KEY RESULTS
Design and Staff Actions Array forces (friendly, adversary, population) COA graphic & narrative
Operational Approach Assign purpose and then tasks for each Refined IPB and intelligence
subordinate element products
Approved Mission
Statement Task organize Planning support tools
-DST/DSM/Synch Matrix
Commander’s Intent Sequence actions to achieve the mission
Estimates of Supportability
Commander’s COA Divide operation into phases
Development Guidance Staff estimates
Integrate activities across time and space
Commander’s Wargaming
Establish control measures Guidance and Evaluation Criteria
Present COA Development brief to Updated WARNO
Commander

14
20180626_MCPP_7.625x5.indd 1 6/26/18 4:42 PM
 COA DEVELOPMENT
Purpose: Develop one or more options for accomplishing the mission
in accordance with the commander’s operational approach

Operational Approach Activities

-Commander’s Intent 1. Establish Battlespace Framework 6. Sequencing
-Commander’s COA Guidance -Organize the battlespace -Arrangement of actions to
•Types of Operations •spatial/functional achieve the mission
•Forms of Maneuver •deep, close, rear
•COG* Analysis •decisive, shaping, sustaining 7. Phasing
•Battlespace Framework -Organize the force
•Influence & Deception Activities •Main effort, supporting effort, -Divide operations into phases
•Risk Guidance reserve, security
8. Develop COA Graphic and
2. Array Initial Forces Narrative and Synch Matrix
-Determine RCPA* required to
accomplish task 9. Establish Control Measures
COA Criteria -Array forces starting with decisive
operations and continuing with 10. Rough Cut COA Brief
shaping and sustaining operations
1. Feasible: Accomplishes -Rough Task Organization
3. Assign Purpose and Then Tasks -Rough COA Graphic and
mission with the available time, Narrative
space, and resources -What is necessary to accomplish
2. Acceptable: Worth the cost mission? 11. COA Refinement
3. Suitable: Accomplishes the 4. Convert Generic Units to -Develop supporting concepts
task and purpose Specific Units
4. Distinguishable: COAs differ 12. Conduct COA Development
from each other 5. Task Organize
5. Complete: Addresses all the -Structure and resource the force 13. Commander’s Wargaming
tasks to conduct operations Guidance Evaluation Criteria
-Establish command and support
relationships
*COG: Center Of Gravity
**RCPA: Relative Combat Power Analysis
15
20180626_MCPP_7.625x5.indd 2 6/26/18 4:42 PM
16
2
 MCPP REFERENCE GUIDES
“We should think of planning as a learning
process—as mental preparation which improves our
understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms,
planning is thinking before doing.”
—MCDP 5, Planning

The Gazette, in collaboration with the MAGTF Staff Training Program, will
present a series of six Reference Guides covering insights and best practices for
employing the steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). The Guides
are for the use of our readers and members of the MCA&F and will be available
for members to download at

www.mca-marines.org/gazette/MCPP_guides

Step Three Step Four

Course of Action Wargaming Course of Action

The purpose of COA wargaming … is to improve the plan. Comparison and Decision
It examines and refines the option(s) in light of adversary October Issue
capabilities and potential actions/reactions as well as
other factors peculiar to the operational environment,
such as the local population and how it may respond to
friendly and adversary interactions … Whether conducted
formally as a disciplined, interactive process or informally
through a simple “what if” conversation between the
commander and staff, wargaming relies heavily on the
operational judgment and experience of the participants
… A continuation of design, the process of COA
wargaming contributes to a better understanding of the
environment and the problem.

—MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process

17

17_MCPP_N_0918.indd 1 8/7/18 8:06 AM

 THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS
STEP THREE: Course of Action War Game

KEY INPUTS KEY RESULTS

COA graphic & narrative Identified branches and sequels
Planning support tools Activities Refined IPB and intelligence
products
Estimates of Assign War Game billets
supportability Refined staff estimates
Collect documents and tools
Staff estimates Refined estimates of
Select War Game technique supportability
Commander’s
wargaming guidance Conduct COA War Game Approved COAs for comparison
and evaluation criteria and decision
Record COA War Game results
Comparison criteria/guidance
Refine staff estimates, estimates
of supportability, and supporting
concepts
Present War Game brief

18
PocketGuide_3.indd 1 7/27/18 8:52 AM
 COA War Games
Purpose Activities
To Improve the Plan
1. Organize for Wargaming Civilian Reaction
1. Validate COAs by testing each COA l Describe actions of other actors
2. Gather documents and tools in the OE*
against a thinking adversary Counteraction
2. Improve each COA 3. Select a War Game technique l Identify additional actions and

3. Evaluate strengths and weaknesses 4. Conduct a War Game resources required

l Modify COA as necessary
of each COA
4. Better understand the problem -Roll call
-Orientation to the War Game board 5. Record and display War
and environment -Commander’s War Game guidance
-Confirm task organization two
Game results
levels down -War Game worksheet
-Review CCIRs and assumptions -Synchronization Matrix
Inputs -Review critical events to be war
gamed
6. Assess the War Game results
-Identify war game method to be
utilized
lCommander’s Wargaming guidance -Red/Green cells brief their COAs to
l Commander’s evaluation criteria be war gamed
l IPB products -Review rules of War Game
l Planning support tools -Execution of turns
Action
l Describe operations to all friendly

units
l Describe the mission/tasks

War Game Techniques l Describe the desired outcome

Reaction
l Describe operations of all friendly

l Key Events or Sequence of Critical units

l Describe probable outcome of
Tasks contact
l Avenue in Depth

l Belt

l Box *OE: Operating Environment

19
PocketGuide_3.indd 2 7/27/18 8:52 AM
20
2
 MCPP REFERENCE GUIDES
“We should think of planning as a learning
process—as mental preparation which improves our
understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms,
planning is thinking before doing.”
—MCDP 5, Planning

The Gazette, in collaboration with the MAGTF Staff Training Program, will
present a series of six Reference Guides covering insights and best practices for
employing the steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). The Guides
are for the use of our readers and members of the MCA&F and will be available
for members to download at

www.mca-marines.org/gazette/MCPP_guides

Step Four Step Five

Course of Action Comparison and Decision Orders Development

During COA comparison and decision ... the commander November Issue
evaluates each friendly COA against established criteria,
compares them with each other, and selects the COA he
believes will best accomplish the mission. ... Using his
evaluation criteria, the commander leads ... a discussion Problem
Framing
about the relative merits of each COA. The staff records
the advantages and disadvantages for each. ... The Transition
Course of Action
COA comparison provides the commander with an Development

understanding of the relative merit of each COA. ... The

commander compares the COAs against one another
Design
using the results of the COA evaluation. ... This step Orders
Development
Course of Action
Wargaming
requires the involvement of the commander, subordinate
commanders, and their staffs from start to finish. Course of Action
Comparison &
Decision

—MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process

21

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 THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS
STEP FOUR: COA Comparison and Decision

KEY INPUTS
•Updated IPB products
•Updated, complete COAs
•COA war game worksheet
•COA evaluation worksheet
•Resource shortfalls
KEY RESULTS
•Updated CCIRs Approved COA
•Decision Support
Template & Decision Guidance for branches and
Support Matrix sequels
•Branches and sequels
identified for further Activities Updated WARNO
planning
Evaluate COAs against
Commander’s Evaluation Criteria
Compare COAs
Commander’s Decision

22
PocketGuide_4.indd 1 9/5/18 10:33 AM
 COA Comparison And Decision
Purpose
For the Commander to evaluate all friendly COAs against established criteria, then compare each COA
against each other, and decide which COA best accomplishes the mission.

1 2 3
Evaluate Course of Action Compare Courses of Action Commander’s Decision
The separate evaluation of each to each other The Commander selects the course
COA against the Cmdr’s Evaluation of action that best accomplishes the
The comparison of each COA to mission. There are four options:
Criteria with special consideration to each other using the advantages,
advantages, disadvantages, and risk. •Select
disadvantages, and risks developed •Modify
in the evaluation step. •New
•Discard

4 5
Potential Evaluation Criteria
Refine the Concept of Operations Update the Warning Order Principles of war
The concept of operations is a Limitation of casualties
The Warning Order allows Exploitation of the adversary’s
general description of actions to be subordinates to continue concurrent weaknesses/friendly strengths
taken and a generic organization for planning. Population considerations
combat that serves as the basis for Opportunity for maneuver
supporting concepts, functional or Concentration on combat power
detailed Planning, and branch and Speed
Sequel planning. Supportability
Political considerations
Force protection
23 Risk assessment

PocketGuide_4.indd 2 9/5/18 10:33 AM

24
2
 MCPP REFERENCE GUIDES
“We should think of planning as a learning
process—as mental preparation which improves our
understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms,
planning is thinking before doing.”
—MCDP 5, Planning

The Gazette, in collaboration with the MAGTF Staff Training Program, will
present a series of six Reference Guides covering insights and best practices for
employing the steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). The Guides
are for the use of our readers and members of the MCA&F and will be available
for members to download at

www.mca-marines.org/gazette/MCPP_guides

Step Five Step Six

Orders Development Transition

The purpose of orders development is to translate the December Issue
commander’s decision into oral, written, and/or graphic
communication sufficient to guide implementation and
promote initiative by subordinates ... Orders appear
in a variety of forms, ranging from detailed, written
documents with numerous annexes to simple verbal
commands ... When writing plans or orders, words matter
... A good order is judged on its usefulness—not its size ...
The orders development step in the MCPP communicates
the commander’s decision in a clear useful form that can
be understood by those executing the order.

—MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process

25

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 THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS
STEP FIVE: ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

PURPOSE
The Orders Development Step translates the commander’s decision into
oral, written, and graphic direction sufficient to guide subordinate planning,
execution, and initiative.

KEY INPUTS KEY RESULTS

Approved COA Approved order or plan
CONOPS ACTIVITIES Planning support tools
-Refine the Concept of Operations
-Prepare the order or plan
-Orders reconciliation
-Orders crosswalk
-Approve the order or plan

26
PocketGuide_5.indd 1 10/11/18 9:27 AM
 ORDERS DEVELOPMENT
Activities
-Refine the Concept of Operations: Types of Combat Orders
Refined staff estimates and IPB products
from the approved COA allow planners Operations Order (OPORD)
and supporting staff sections to proceed A directive issued by a commander to subordinate
with functional and detailed planning. commanders for the purpose of effecting the
coordinated execution of an operation.
-Prepare the order or plan: The CoS or
XO dictates the format for the order, Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)
sets and enforces the time limits and
development sequence, and assigns An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as
responsibility for annex development to needed after an operation order to change or modify
the appropriate staff sections. that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.

Warning Order (WARNO)

-Orders reconciliation: An internal
process during which the staff conducts A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to
a detailed review of the entire order follow.

-Orders crosswalk: An external process Execute Order

in which the staff compares its order An order to subordinates that directs them to execute
with the order of higher, adjacent, and existing orders or plans and conveys guidance not
subordinate commanders to achieve provided in earlier instructions.
unity of effort and ensure the superior
commander’s intent is met.

-Approve the order or plan:

Commander’s signature

27

PocketGuide_5.indd 2 10/11/18 9:27 AM

28
2
 MCPP REFERENCE GUIDES
“We should think of planning as a learning
process—as mental preparation which improves our
understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms,
planning is thinking before doing.”
—MCDP 5, Planning

In 2019 the Gazette, in collaboration with the MAGTF Staff Training Program, will be
presenting additional Reference Guides covering various aspects of planning, execution,
Joint Operations, and Warfighting Functions.

Step Six
Transition
Transition may involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or
rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful shift from
The complete set of 6 MCPP
planning to execution... At a minimum, this step includes
CONOPS brief along with the handover and explanation Reference Guides is available
of any execution tools developed during planning, such for our readers and members to
as a decision support matrix or an execution checklist... download at
Transition is a continuous process that requires a free
flow of information between commanders and staffs www.mca-marines.org/gazette/
by all available means... Transition occurs at all levels MCPP_guides
of command. A formal transition normally occurs on
staffs with separate planning and execution teams.
For transition to occur, an approved order or plan
must exist... Regardless of the level of command, a
successful transition ensures those who execute the order
understand the commander’s intent, the CONOPS, and
any planning tools.

—MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process

29

17_MCPP_6_N1218.indd 1 11/8/18 9:11 AM

 THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS
STEP SIX: TRANSITION

KEY INPUTS
Approved order or plan
Planning support tools
IPB and intelligence products

Successful
transition enhances
ACTIVITIES the situational
understanding of
-Transition brief those who will execute
-Transition events (rehearsals, drills exercises, briefs) the order, reinforces
-Confirmation briefs the intent of the
commander, promotes
unity of effort, and
generates tempo.

KEY RESULTS
Subordinate commanders and
staff ready to execute the order
Ongoing development of plan for
branches and sequels
30
PocketGuide_6.indd 1 11/6/18 10:41 AM
 TRANSITION
Transition Briefs
(Future to Current Ops, HHQ to lower)
-Internal transition is when the planning staff moves its plan
to execution (Future Operations to Current Operations)
-External transition occurs between the commander and
subordinate commanders

Transition Events

Confirmation Brief
(Subordinate to HQ)

Transition Event Options

-Map brief
-Terrain model brief
-Communications exercise
-Rehearsal of concept drill
-Combined Arms rehearsal
-Key leader rehearsal
-Reduced force rehearsal
-Full dress rehearsal

31
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IDEAS & ISSUES (C2)

The Electronic Fire

Support Coordinator
Thinking outside the box
by Maj Paul L. Stokes, USMC(Ret)

Southeast Asia, 2015 >Maj Stokes retired in August 2006 after 31 years of active duty service. A former

T
he regimental landing gunnery sergeant and chief warrant officer 3, he has served in a variety of lead-
team (RLT) commanding ership and communications billets from the team to theater levels. He has served
officer (CO) sat in his chair as the Deputy Director for Operations, Marine Corps Communications-Electronics
in the landing force opera- School, since January 2007.
tions center (LFOC) and viewed his
battle display as his battalions and sup-
porting elements began to execute the The S–3 immediately calls the pri- ploying our communications gear in
coordinated amphibious/air/ground at- mary staff together for a hip pocket op- the same manner as weapons systems,
tack. At first things were going well. 1st erational planning team (OPT). He we can do better. For example, when
Battalion seized its objectives quickly via knows that unless command and con- that RLT S–6 arrives at that OPT in
a combined tank/infantry assault trol (C2) connectivity is reestablished the LFOC, he must embrace the fact
launched from the beachhead supported he’s going to lose almost 25 percent of that he isn’t just a communicator.
by a 155 battery and a Burke-class de- his combat power and hundreds of Rather, he is an expert in employing a
stroyer. 3d Battalion disembarked Marines. The staff includes leaders who supporting arm, just like artillery, mor-
smoothly from the LSDs and LPDs via are responsible for all of the elements tars, and close air support; the only dif-
assault amphibious vehicles and LCACs of the RLT, but at this particular mo- ference is that his weapons fire
and quickly seized the port complex that ment, the one man who understands electrons vice steel. Or to put it another
would facilitate the offloading of the fol- how to employ the RLT C2 systems in way, many of the same planning con-
low-on echelon in near record time. But the most effective manner possible, the siderations that would be applied to
what concerned the CO was 2d Battal- fire support planning (e.g., mission,
ion. Its forward command element enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
(FCE) and lead companies were airlifted support available-time available; petro-
off the LHD as planned. Even though . . . the CommO . . . leum, oil, lubricants; supply; mainte-
they lost one CH–53 en route due to a will soon find himself nance personnel; priority of fires) also
hidden antiaircraft position, the flight apply to communications. Ergo, the S–
leader reported that they landed in being respected as a 6 needs to ingrain himself into the
Landing Zone (LZ) Dodo (next to a tactician. . . . planning process by serving in the same
major airport 40 miles inland) without manner as the artillery/air officers by
taking any additional fire, and the FCE advising the CO/S–3 on how he can
signaled that they were good to go. But effectively support the scheme of ma-
that was over 30 minutes ago, and the one man who knows how “to make it neuver with his “electronic artillery.”1
FCE has yet to check in on any of the happen” regardless of what the book With this approach, the CommO
regiment’s radio nets. Suddenly, the air says, the one man who can snatch vic- (i.e., the shooter) will soon find himself
officer tells him the forward air con- tory from imminent defeat is the elec- being respected as a tactician vice a tech-
troller (airborne) (FAC(A)) reports ob- tronic fire support coordinator, aka the nician, which is a key point. All too often
serving heavy artillery and small arms RLT S–6 communications officer we (the Marine Corps communications
fire in/around LZ Dodo, and the second (CommO). That’s right, Marines, the community) focus on the technical as-
wave has lost two Ospreys to enemy fire. electronic fire support coordinator. pects of communications and forget the
Clearly something has to happen fast, so For decades the Marine Corps has fact that our mission is to support the
he tells his S–3 (operations officer) to trained its CommOs/chiefs to be tech- frontline rifleman. This means that we,
get the staff together to find out what’s nically proficient. But when it comes as communicators, need to dust off our
going on. to thinking outside the box and em- old combat arms manuals from The

38 www.mca-marines.org/gazette M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A p r i l 2 011
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Basic School/Expeditionary Warfare

School/Command and Staff College and 1. Be a leader, first and foremost.
begin to think like electronic fire support
coordinators. There are a number of 2. Electronic fire support systems (e.g., communications gear)
documents that could help prepare the are employed in the same manner as artillery, crew-served
shooter for this “shift in mindset,” but weapons, and close air support—the only difference is that
the first one he should get his hands on they fire electrons not steel.
is the 1976 version of the old Fleet Ma-
rine Force Manual 10–1 (FMFM 10–1), 3. Become an expert in terrain appreciation from the tactical to
Communications, because this manual strategic levels.
is based on over 35 years of combat ex-
perience and is designed to pass on those 4. Understand the command’s mission, capabilities, and
time-tested lessons. Granted, finding limitations.
that document could take a little time,
but it’s worth the effort.2 The shooter 5. Create a “toolbox” of reference material, and don’t be afraid
should also read the Chairman, Joint to bring it to an OPT.
Chiefs of Staff Manual 6231 (CJCSM
6231) series of publications, because 6. When reporting to an OPT, bring a good sense of humor,
they are the standard when it comes to patience, and the discipline “to stick to your guns” when
joint command, control, communica- discussing why a particular course of action is
tions, and computer (C4) systems. And unsupportable.
he shouldn’t be afraid to bring them to
an OPT. After all, the artillery/air guys 7. Read as much as you can about battle leadership, tactics,
have to use reference pubs in these meet- and C2 from the tactical to strategic levels.
ings, so why can’t he bring his? The next
thing he needs are copies of the initiating 8. Learn to think, talk, and brief like an “operator.”
directive, operations order, task organi-
zation, force laydown, and concept of 9. Write and publish electronic fire support plans that are clear,
operations, since these products will help concise, and easily adaptable to changes on the battlefield
him understand the command relation- and/or scheme of maneuver.
ships/force structure. With that knowl-
edge, the shooter can create the com- 10. Become an integral part of your respective staff and focus
munications control (CommCon) rela- not only on the immediate missions but also prepare for
tionships (i.e., the electronic fire support those that always seem to “pop up” when you least
control structure) that will furnish, in- expect them.
stall, operate, and maintain the C2 sys-
tem/network(s) that supports the
evolution that is being OPT’d. The re- The electronic fire support coordinator’s basic tenets.
maining things the shooter needs to
bring with him are a good sense of
humor, patience, and the discipline to but if the shooter makes the conscious Warfighting Publication 6–11 (MCWP
stick to his guns. Face it, artillery and air decision to embark upon a journey of 6–11), Leading Marines, and read it,
can only do so much, and the CO/G– lifelong self-study, he’ll find that the study it, and implement it in all of his
3/S–3 will usually accept those limita- challenges of C4 are nothing new. The daily activities. After all, it’s his primary
tions without question. Communica- hard part is figuring out how to best duty as a leader to “take care of Marines
tions (i.e., electronic fire support) should employ the available electronic fire sup- and support operations.”
be looked at in the same manner since it port systems/personnel. Where does The second step would be learning
can’t be fairy dusted. It either does or the shooter start? how the operators think. This is a cul-
doesn’t work. That may be hard for some The first step would be embracing tivated skill, but if the shooter studies
folks to swallow, but if the shooter can the fact that he is a leader first and fore- Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1
speak in the G/S–3’s terms, then he will most. Technicians are, quite frankly, a (MCDP 1), Warfighting; MCDP 1–0,
soon find himself inside the circle vice dime a dozen. Ergo, the shooter can’t Marine Corps Operations; MCDP 1–
out of it. allow himself to get sucked into the vor- 1, Strategy; MCDP 1–2, Campaigning;
As one can quickly surmise, devel- tex of minutia. Therefore, he should MCDP 1–3, Tactics; MCDP 2, Intelli-
oping these “battle skills” takes time, pull out his copy of Marine Corps gence; MCDP 3, Expeditionary Oper-

M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A p r i l 2 011 34 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 39
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IDEAS & ISSUES (C2)

toon/squad level, which magnifies the

planning and engineering challenges
faced by the shooter. The ConExPlan
provides the guidance, points of con-
tact, and techniques and procedures for
accessing/troubleshooting these serv-
ices via a DoD teleport/standard tacti-
cal entry point, making it a valued
addition to any S–6’s toolbox.
U.S. Army Field Manual 6–02.71
(FM 6–02.71), Network Operations,
dated 15 January 2009. This FM ex-
plains how the Army conducts network
operations (CommCon) from the the-
ater to battalion level, to include a set
of corps-level network operations tech-
niques and procedures that directly
correlate to the ones that are used by a
MAGTF G–6/S–6.
The fourth step is to read as much
as one can on leadership, operations,
fire support, planning, and how to
It’s time to think outside the box. (Photo courtesy of author.) cope with great adversity. In addition
to the Marine Corps Professional
ations; MCDP 4, Logistics; MCDP 5, tical C4 systems operations in all three Reading Program, the shooter should
Planning; MCDP 5–1, Marine Corps MEFs and serves as a source of MCS seek out and read the following books
Planning Process; and MCDP 6, Com- technical information.4 and reports.
mand and Control, he’ll become an op- Joint Publication 6–0, Joint Com- Battle Leadership.5 This book has
erator in his own right, especially when munications Systems, dated 20 March been a favorite of Marine officers since
he finds himself being assigned as the 2006. This is an overview of how joint the 1930s, and its lessons are timeless
leader of the next OPT. C4 works at the Department of De- (e.g., “We must kill institutionalized
The third step would be to become fense (DoD), combatant command, training otherwise it will kill us!”).
tactically and technically proficient in and joint task force (JTF) levels and in- Leaders and Battles: The Art of Mil-
the employment of electronic fire sup- cludes a comprehensive JTF J–6 plan- itary Leadership.6 When it comes to
port systems. The schoolhouse does a ning checklist that can be readily military history, the trend is to over-
good job teaching technical skills, but adapted by a MAGTF G–6/S–6. look the human factors that ultimately
to be truly effective, the shooter needs led to success or defeat. This study
to create a publications “toolbox” (see “brings to life” these elements and gives
Table 1) that would contain the tools, the shooter a clear understanding of
techniques, procedures, and technical . . . read as much as one why the best-laid plans go “haywire”
data that he can use when furnishing, can on leadership, oper- once the first round goes downrange.
installing, operating, and maintaining Edson’s Raiders.7 You’re a senior
C4 systems in support of an operation. ations, fire support, plan- colonel tasked to create a brand new
Besides the publications we’ve just men- ning, and how to cope unit that’s designed to strike the enemy
tioned, this toolbox would include: quickly and deeply, and you don’t have
MCWP 3–40.3, MAGTF Commu- with great adversity. the luxury of time to put it all together.
nications Systems, dated 8 January That’s the challenge that “Red Mike”
2010. This MCWP outlines how the Edson faced back in 1941 when he
MAGTF communications systems found himself in command of the 1st
(MCS) provide effective C2 support.3 The Defense Information Systems Marine Raider Battalion—and that’s
Headquarters Marine Corps Agency (DISA) Global Contingency the same challenge that every electronic
(HQMC) C4 Tri-MEF Communica- and Exercise Plan (ConExPlan). DISA fire support coordinator faces when
tions Standing Operating Procedures Network C2 services (secure voice, he’s told to throw together a task-orga-
(SOP), Version 3, dated 21 October data, and video) are now being ex- nized communications team. So why
2009. This SOP “sets the bar” for tac- tended down to the company/pla- not learn from the best?

40 www.mca-marines.org/gazette M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A p r i l 2 011
35
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Easter Offensive.8 It is 1972 in

Vietnam. You’re an advisor on your
The Electronic Fire Support Coordinator’s Toolbox first inspection tour visiting the 3d
Division Headquarters, Army of the
1. MCWP 6–11, Leading Marines Republic of Vietnam, just south of
the demilitarized zone, which just
2. MCDP 1, Warfighting happens to be the same day that the
North Vietnamese Army launches its
3. MCDP 1–0, Marine Corps Operations Easter offense. The next thing you
know you’re coordinating the defense
4. MCDP 1–1, Strategy of the Northern Provinces of an en-
tire nation. LtCol G.H. Turley en-
5. MCDP 1–2, Campaigning tered this crucible, succeeded, and left
behind a story that will teach any
6. MCDP 1–3, Tactics leader how to cope with events that
would crush a lesser man. As any suc-
7. MCDP 2, Intelligence cessful MAGTF G–6/S–6 will tell
you, overcoming adversity is a daily
8. MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations occurrence when it comes to elec-
tronic fire support.
9. MCDP 4, Logistics Guadalcanal: The Definitive Land-
mark Account.9 Guadalcanal was the
10. MCDP 5, Planning last time the United States fought a
determined enemy in an expedi-
11. MCDP 5–1, Marine Corps Planning Process tionary environment, without the lux-
ury of air/sea/ground superiority, thus
12. MCDP 6, Command and Control forcing our Marines, sailors, soldiers,
and airman to think “out of the box,”
13. FMFM 10–1, Communications, 24 June 1976 Edition lead from the front, and employ tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures that
14. Director C4, Communications Control, Strategy, dated ultimately led to victory. This opera-
4 February 2010, HQMC, Washington, DC tional history is exactly what its title
implies. It is the definitive account.
15. MCWP 3–40.3, MAGTF Communications System, dated Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of
8 January 2010 Unity in Command and Control,
1942–1991.10 If there is no commu-
16. HQMC C4 Tri-MEF Communications Standard Operating nications, there is no aviation C2,
Procedures (SOP), Version 3, dated 21 October 2009 which means that the shooter must
immerse himself in the nuances of
17. Joint Publication 6–0, Joint Communications System, joint air operations. This RAND study
dated 20 March 2006 is the best analysis I’ve read on how
Marine aviation is affected by national
18. The CJCSM 6231 Series of Publications policy, technology, and resources.
A Bias for Action: The 7th Panzer
19. DISA Global ConExPlan Division in France and Russia, 1940–
1941.11 The German Army was so
20. FM 6–02.71, Network Operations, dated 15 January 2009 successful in World War II because its
commanders/staffs used a common
21. Joint Forces Command JTF Communications Officer (J6) doctrine that stressed initiative, criti-
Handbook, dated 7 August 2002 cal thinking, and the willingness to
make decisions at the lowest practical
level. One can learn much from this
treatise since it explains how leaders
interact as they successfully execute
Table 1. The toolbox. mobile combat operations.

M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A p r i l 2 011 36 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 41
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IDEAS & ISSUES (C2)

Under the Red Sea Sun.12 It’s mid- a level of success that may have evaded 3. MCWP 3–40.3, MAGTF Communications
December 1941. You’ve been sent to him in the past. Because quite frankly, System, dated 8 January 2010, p. 1–1, para-
British-occupied Italian East Africa to re- learning the technical skills of C4 is the phrased. The MCDPs cited in this article were
published by the Department of the Navy,
build the port of Massawa—one of the easy part. The real challenge lies in ef-
HQMC, Washington, DC.
hottest places on the planet—with noth- fectively leading Marines.
ing much more than the verbal order “to 4. HQMC C4 Tri-MEF Communications
make the port operational ASAP.” That Southeast Asia, 2015 SOP, Version 3, dated 21 October 2009, p. 3,
is the challenge that CDR Edward Ells- The OPT started rough and after paraphrased.
berg faced, and this is the best memoir several tirades from his fellow staff
I’ve ever read on how to do the impossi- members the electronic fire support co- 5. Von Schell, Capt Adolf, Battle Leadership,
Staff Corps, German Army, The Benning Her-
ble with little to no resources. The ordinator (aka RLT S–6) checked the
ald, Fort Benning-Columbus, GA, 1933,
shooter may find himself in similar cir- RLT’s radio plan then recommended reprinted by The Marine Corps Association,
cumstances, and knowing that aggressive that the RLT air officer call the FAC(A) Quantico, 1982.
leadership can overcome any obstacle to see if he still had contact with the 2d
will make him that much more effective. Battalion FCE’s tactical air control 6. Wood, W.J., Leaders and Battles: The Art of
Military Leadership, Presidio Press, New York,
1984.

Because quite frankly, learning the technical skills of 7. Alexander, Col Joseph H., USMC(Ret),
Edson’s Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battal-
C4 is the easy part. ion in World War II, Naval Institute Press, An-
napolis, MD, 2001.

8. Turley, Col G.H., USMCR(Ret), The Easter

Offensive: The Last American Advisors, Viet-
Operation Stabilise: Australian East party (TACP). Five minutes went by nam, 1972, Presidio Press, 1985, reprinted by
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1995.
Timor Operations: September 1999– and the air officer confirmed that he
December 1999.13 You’re a Marine did; immediately the RLT S–6 recom- 9. Frank, Richard B., Guadalcanal: The Defin-
captain 0602 on your way to Australia. mended that they set up a voice radio itive Account of the Landmark Battle, Random
The next thing you know you’re or- relay between the TACP, the FAC(A), House, New York, 1990.
dered to report for duty as the J6 fu- and the LFOC. The RLT S–3 nodded
ture operations officer to the U.S. in agreement. C2 was reestablished 10. Winnefeld, James A., and Dana J. Johnson,
component of an Australian-led, with the remnants of the 2d Battalion Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Com-
mand and Control, Naval Institute Press, An-
United Nations-sanctioned combined FCE, and a potential disaster was ad- napolis, MD, 1993.
task force. Does that sound like a chal- verted. Was the solution a throwback
lenge for any leader, let alone the back to days of Higgins boats and 11. Stolfi, Dr. Russell H.S., “A Bias for Action:
shooter? You bet it does, and these re- LVT–1 alligators? Maybe so, but that’s The German 7th Panzer Division in France and
ports provide a firsthand view of just why you have an electronic fire support Russian, 1940–1941,” Marine Corps Univer-
how complicated C2 becomes in a coordinator—to think outside the box sity Perspectives on Warfighting, Number One,
Command and Staff College Foundation,
coalition operation. when the plan goes out the window!
Quantico, 1991.
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting
Small Wars in the Midst of a Big 12. Ellsberg, CDR Edward, USNR, Under the
One.14 To defeat the enemy one must Notes Red Sea Sun, Dodd, Mead & Company, New
first understand him. This modern clas- 1. Electronic artillery: long-range—ground mo- York, 1946.
bile forces satellite communications systems
sic on global insurgencies is absolutely (i.e., Phoenix, secure mobile antijam reliable
invaluable to learning how to be suc- 13. Operation Stabilise: Australian East Timor
tactical-terminal, secure wide area network, and Operations: September 1999–December1999,
cessful in this era of “violent peace.” lightweight multiband satellite terminal); DISA-PAC PC32 Combined Reports, dated 14
The fifth step is to become an inte- medium range—TRC–170 super high-fre- January 2000, Marine Corps Lessons Learned
gral part of your respective staff and quency troposcatter radio transmission systems; System Reference Number 4562.
focus not only on the immediate mis- short range—MRC–142 mircrowave radio
sions but also on preparing for the ones transmission systems, mobile and manpacked 14. Kilcullen, David, The Accidental Guerrilla:
single-channel radio systems, and tactical tele- Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,
that always seem to “pop up” when you phone and computer systems.
least expect them. This is the essence of Oxford University Press, 2009.
electronic fire support, and if the 2. The Gen Alfred M. Gray Research Center at
shooter makes the determined effort to Marine Corps Base Quantico has this docu-
become a combat leader he will realize ment on file.

42 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 37 M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A p r i l 2 011
• .”,, “

“. . . [A] good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week”

- George S. Patton, Jr.

"The Senior Commander of a force plans the battle in its broader sense and is responsible
for ultimate success or failure. However, once a subordinate unit has been committed to
action, he must, for the time being, limit his activities to providing the necessary support
and insuring the coordination of all components. Regardless of how well conceived the
Senior Commander's plan may be, it can be nullified if his front line platoons are incapable
of carrying out the mission assigned.”

- 3d Marine Division during World War II