Neorealism in International Relations –

Kenneth Waltz
By Jo Jakobsen, NTNU

Neorealism – or structural realism – is the bedrock theory of International Relations.

Starting from a simple set of assumptions, it seeks to explain how states, in particular
the most powerful ones, behave, and how they interact with each other on the
international arena.
Neorealism – or structural realism – is a theory of international politics. The theory is usually
associated with Kenneth Waltz (1924–2013) and his 1979 book bearing the obvious name
Theory of International Politics. That book endeavored to construct a very general
framework for explaining recurring patterns of state behavior and state interaction in the
international system.
As is the case with all theories, there are many things that Neorealism fails to explain. In fact,
most types of state behavior and state interaction cannot usefully be accounted for by Waltz’s
parsimonious theory. Thus it is that neoralism has attracted many adversaries in the academic
world; much – but by no means all – of the criticism Neorealism faces is really of a straw
man character: Neorealism is often faulted for failing to explain or predict events or behavior
that Neorealists have never set out to explain or predict in the first place.

Every theory claims its own domain. Neorealism’s consists of the biggest issues – past,
present, and future – in international relations: war, the avoidance of war, power balancing,
power seeking, the death of states, security competition and arms races, alliance formation,
and the like.
Even then, Neorealism on its own is usually unable accurately to account for the specifics
concerning each case of war, or of the avoidance of war, or of power balancing, or power
seeking, or of the death of states, or security competition and arms races, or alliance
formation. If a student’s objective is, say, to acquire a fairly encompassing grasp of why the
U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, or why the Cold War ended exactly when it did, neoralism on its
own is inadequately suited for such a task.
But Neorealists can easily, and with some justification, claim that their theory is almost
always the natural and necessary starting point – a logical first-cut – when the events or
developments under study represent the “big” issues in international politics, like the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, or the end of the Cold War.

Neorealism is often called “structural realism,” which signifies that the theory primarily
centers on the effects of the structure of the international system when it seeks to explain
outcomes in international politics. In Waltz’s conception of structure, two things are
especially noteworthy about the international system.
Firstly, the international system’s ordering principle is anarchy. This simply means that there
is no such thing as a world government; there is no higher authority above the main units that
exist in the system – the states. Furthermore, this results in an international system that is
essentially a self-help system consisting of states that are autonomous, functionally
undifferentiated actors each of which must always be prepared to fend for itself.
The units of the system closely resemble each other with regard to the functions they
perform, the tasks the face, the primary goals they seek (with survival always being the
fundamental goal on which the attainment of all other objectives rests), and how they go
about accomplishing their objectives. The main point is that, under anarchy, each and every
state by and large operates on its own without having recourse to any higher authority.

The second defining principle of the structure of international politics is the distribution of
capabilities across the units inhabiting the international system. Capabilities, or power, vary
significantly between states; states, though functionally undifferentiated, are differentiated
according to how much power they possess. Variations in power yield variations in the types
and magnitude of structural constraints that states face, thereby effectuating variation in how
states behave (or should behave).
These two simple assumptions – anarchy and the importance of the distribution of power –
result in the famous image of international politics as a “pool table” consisting of balls whose
inherent properties (shape, the material they are made of, etc.) are essentially the same.
However, the sizes of the balls vary greatly. And on the proverbial pool table, the smallest
balls – and indeed the medium-sized balls as well – tend to congregate around the corners
where they more or less stay put. The largest balls, on the other hand, can be found roaming
about the whole table, often interfering with the smaller balls, sometimes knocking them
over, dominating the game and determining how it is being played out.
We can use the Cold War as an example. The Second World War had changed the structure
of international politics. Not in terms of ordering principle (the system was still anarchic) but
in terms of the distribution of world power, which had been fundamentally altered by 1945.
The old multipolar world had gone; two great powers remained – the Soviet Union and the
United States, the superpowers of the new bipolar world.

What this meant for the old great powers of Europe – Germany, Great Britain, and France –
was that their freedom of action, their security relations, and indeed their overall fate, were
suddenly severely constrained by the shifts in the balance of power. They were structurally
constrained inasmuch as they could no longer afford to view Europe as an isolated realm of a
world where security, power, and prosperity were almost exclusively a product of intra-
European interaction.
In light of the perceived threat from communist Soviet Union, neither (West) Germany, nor
the UK or France could act as producers of their own security. They were simply too weak to
follow the strategy of internal balancing; instead they had to rely on external balancing by
soliciting American protection by way of an alliance. Europe had become consumers of
security and had no choice but to accept significant U.S. influence in European affairs as the
price for her friendship.
Neither could the British or the French uphold their respective world-wide empires. On this
score, these two demoted great powers were structurally constrained as regard their global
reach; the power resources necessary to continue dominating far-away places were not any
longer in the possession of Paris or London. Economically, they were both significantly
weakened. Militarily, they were both significantly weakened. In the end, and after the point
was hammered home to them by events such as Dien Bien Phu, the Suez Crisis, and the
Algerian War, retrenchment became accepted as the only sensible option.
On a more positive note, however, the shifts in the balance of power also resulted in
constraints being placed on the European states in terms of the efficacy and rationality of
engaging in security and power competition. Given that America functioned as the
continent’s security provider, it was no longer required of France to view Germany as the
major threat and competitor, and Germany rationally didn’t have to fear France or any other
West European nation.
Neither of these states would gain much from choosing guns over butter; none would be able
to balance the Soviet Union on its own in any case. Engaging in serious security and power
competition against each other would indeed be counterproductive irrespective of perceptions
of national goals or eventual revanchism as long as the overriding question was, and needed
to be, how to relate to the two true consequential states of the time – the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. Peace in Western Europe no more hinged on the relations between Germany, France,
and the UK, but rather on the relations between: (a) the U.S. and the USSR; (b) Western
Europe and the U.S.; (c) Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

One of Waltz’s main points is that such structural constraints that arise from the distribution
of power force or induce states to act in certain ways and avoid acting in others. As rational
actors – or at least we should assume that they are rational actors – states tend, over the long
haul at least, to choose the means that best help to realize their objectives. The fundamental
objective for any state is to survive – for if survival is not ensured, all other goals the state
may have will be rendered unachievable. A more elusive version of the term survival is the
slightly broader notion of “security.” As a matter of assumption, Neorealists highlight
security as a key objective of states. Waltz tells us that states generally aim to maximize
security.
According to Neorealism, if states are to be secure in an anarchic world, they need to pay
heed to the structural constraints under which they operate. Simplistically stated, powerful
states can and indeed should or must “do more” than less powerful states. Interests expand as
relative power increases. Still, even the most powerful states shouldn’t get too excited about
the power-projection opportunities that arise simply from having great capabilities.
Nazi Germany lost the Second World War because it gaped over more than it could chew;
faced with (self-inflicted) opposition from and constraints provided by the United States and
the Soviet Union, it could scarcely have won the war following the strategy it did trying to
maximize power and expand the Reich ever more. Knowing where and when to stop – i.e.
acknowledging and abiding by the structural constraints of the system – is vital for any state
that seeks successfully to fulfil its objectives, key among which is security.

The United States – a post-WWII superpower – expanded greatly after 1945 in the sense that,
starting with Western Europe, it assumed global responsibilities of an unprecedented
magnitude. It did so because: (a) it could (i.e. it had the capabilities to do so); and (b) it was
perceived to be in the interests of national security to do so. As relative power increases,
interests expand – and they also expand geographically.
The U.S. increased its influence in and over Western Europe quite rapidly in the late 1940s
and early 1950s. That was in a sense terra nullius for Washington: they had to fill the vacuum
in the wake of the World War lest communism do so instead. Soviet communist control over
Western Europe or, alternatively, good old security competition within Western Europe,
would clearly work to the detriment of the United States with regard to its security,
economic, and ideological interests. The U.S. were commanded to expand. Big nations have
big goals.
However, the U.S. was also structurally constrained during the Cold War. Whereas goals can
be pretty much unlimited, the actual achievement of these goals critically depends upon –
again – the distribution of capabilities across the international system. The U.S. could not,
even if it wished to (which it surely did), achieve complete world dominance; they could not
shape the world completely according to its own image. They could not do this because of the
existence of a countervailing power, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union balanced the power of the United States, whereas the United States
balanced the power of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could not expand (militarily,
economically, or ideologically) into Western Europe for the simple reason that the United
States acted as a check on such expansion. Likewise, the United States could not expand
(militarily, economically, or ideologically) into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence for the
equally simple reason that the Soviet Union acted as a check on such expansion.
Such a check – such balancing – represents a structural constraint on expansion, a structural
constraint on the achievement of hegemony. The concept of the balance of power plays a key
role in Neorealism. Considering the ultimate objective of survival/security, hegemonic
aspirations by others constitute the key threat to the units of the system. As states arise that
have the means or capabilities to expand, others need to react lest they face the risk of
extinction or, in any case, a loss of sovereignty, autonomy, or control over their own fate.
Hegemonic threats, in other words, need to be balanced in an anarchic world.
The peculiar thing about bipolarity, Waltz has famously and rightly stated, is that, on a global
scale at least, only the two superpowers possess the means required to balance each other
(having allies helps, but for purposes of balancing, they are all disposable under bipolarity).
Hence, if the U.S. had failed to abandon its isolationist grand strategy of earlier times, the
Soviet Union’s influence would quite likely have expanded. And vice versa: If the Soviet
Union had failed to assume responsibility of checking the expansion of the United States in
Europe and, eventually, across the globe, the United States would quite likely have expanded
even further.

But Waltz also says that states are normally and gradually socialized into accepting the view
that power needs to be balanced. You never know when a revisionist state appears on the
international stage. A lack of proper socialization – a lack of acknowledgment of the risks out
there and of the appropriate means of facing the risks – can have catastrophic consequences
for national security. This is not to say that states are automatically socialized into behaving
sensibly; it does not mean that they automatically learn from their own or others’ mistakes.
States indeed falter from time to time. In the 1930s, a series of key “mistakes” were made by
France and Great Britain vis-à-vis the threat posed by Adolf Hitler. The common
denominator of these mistakes was that they, overall, represented relative ignorance toward
the salience of power balancing. Nazi Germany was not properly balanced. The result was
World War II and, with it, the end of France and Great Britain as great powers.
Above I have stated that the Soviet Union acted as a check on U.S. power. The United States
could not expand its influence too much, lest it would find itself fighting a war (an actual
war, not only a “Cold” one) with the USSR. That was something the United States was not
interested in, to put it mildly. In general, states do not wish to fight wars; indeed, they tend to
fear war more than anything else, and that fear generally works as a significant constraint on
state behavior, instilling some degree of prudence into leaders.

Contrary to what some people seemingly believe, Neorealism is not a theory that goes around
predicting war here, there, and everywhere. Wars happen, Neorealists will say, and they will
continue to plague the international system from time to time. The basic sources of war and
peace – the permissive causes of war and peace – are exactly the two fundamental elements
of the structure of the international system: anarchy and the distribution of power.
The assumption about anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system leads to
the simple but inherently correct contention that wars will occur because there’s nothing there
to stop them from occurring. States will always have conflicting interests; sometimes these
conflicting interests center on vital issues, sometimes adversaries make mistakes when they
are trying to gauge relative power, and sometimes states make mistakes when they try to
estimate the resolve of adversaries.
Thus, sometimes a conflict of interest simply escalates into war proper. Moreover, sometimes
wars occur because power is insufficiently balanced, making war of conquest a potentially
fruitful endeavor. In all such cases, the basic cause of armed conflict is the lack of a global
sovereign – the lack of a world government complete with a “police” force – to stop them
from occurring.
That wars are often down to mistakes, miscalculations, and accidents is perhaps an
unsatisfactory conclusion when one attempts to obtain a grasp of the general forces and
patterns in international politics. And it is true that Neorealism fails to account for many of
the specific causal mechanisms at play in most cases of interstate armed conflict. For that,
additional theoretical knowledge – the assistance of other theories about causes of war and
peace – are required.
Yet Neorealism can still usefully inform us about the permissive causes of war and peace;
that is, under what general circumstances are war likely, and under what circumstances are
they not? And, given certain circumstances (structures/constraints): What types of wars are
likely? What types of wars are less likely? Who will fight these wars (big states, small
states)? Who won’t fight these wars?
Anarchy is in this instant a constant. Wars occur because of anarchy, but wars also fail to
occur despite that the international system is anarchic. The key variable is the distribution of
power. Waltz has indeed much to say about this issue, on which I will not dwell too much.
Suffice it to say that, according to Waltz, great-power wars are much more likely to occur
under multipolarity than under bipolarity. This is so not least because bipolarity diminishes
uncertainties among the adversaries and eases estimations of relative power and relative
resolve, making crises and conflicts of interest less likely to spill over into war proper.
But perhaps an equally interesting question revolves around an issue that Waltz does not
specifically address in his 1979 book, namely, what happens in an anarchic world where
neither bipolarity nor multipolarity characterizes the distribution of power. In other words:
What happens under unipolarity?

I will round up my discussion of Neorealism by saying just a few words about exactly this.
To be sure, Waltz has later and elsewhere written on the subject of the relationship between
unipolarity and international-political behavior and outcomes. In addition, much of what he
does write in Theory of International Politics is inherently of great value to analysts of the
current international system as well.
In brief, the end of the Cold War (1989/91) and the collapse of the Soviet Union also spelled
the immediate end of bipolarity. One superpower faced its sudden demise, one was left
standing. And standing completely and utterly alone to boot. Thus the world suddenly
became distinctly unipolar. And it still is unipolar, especially considering how Waltz and
others define relative power in terms of the possession of material resources – as opposed to
the use of such resources. In other words: The world is unipolar because the United States
commands aggregate material resources (especially but not exclusively military capabilities)
of a magnitude that no other state in the world is remotely close to matching.
In terms of power resources, the U.S. stands alone. In terms of the capacity to act, the U.S.
stands alone. In theory, the U.S. does not have to act globally even if its absolute and relative
power allows it to. To what extent Washington seeks to exert its influence around the world
critically depends on its grand strategy, the outline of means and ends in U.S. foreign policy;
a specification of what is America’s mission, what are the threats to its mission, and how
America should deal with these threats.
If America’s leaders, acting on behalf of the people of America, conclude that America’s
security and prosperity are best served by America staying at home, then America will
choose an isolationist grand strategy that pretty much leaves the rest of the world alone. The
U.S. would still, though, be the unipole of the international system given the actual
distribution of material resources throughout the globe. A sudden reversal to isolationism
would spell the end of American hegemony but not of unipolarity.

Waltz, however, teaches us that such a move by Washington would be extremely unlikely.
Power shapes interests: the more power, the more extensive the interests. The United States
behaves like a hegemon because it has the power to behave like a hegemon. If power is
present, it will be used. At the very least, a state having no peer competitors, with a military
machine that gobbles up around 40 percent of world military spending (with its allies
accounting for an additional 25 percent), with an economy twice as large as the next one on
the list, with unmatched technological and academic prowess, with a prestige second-to-none
in an international system whose institutions are largely the embodiment of that very state’s
core values – well, such a state is not likely to retrench any time soon.
Neorealists and Kenneth Waltz himself would make two major points about such a situation,
both of which have to do with the dangers of unchecked power. Firstly, it matters what the
United States actually does in such unprecedented circumstances. The temptation to do a lot
is obviously there once the Soviet Union disappears – once Moscow cannot any longer
function as a countervailing power that balances the power of the mighty United States. And
to do a lot means to expand. And expansion, for its part, does not (necessarily) mean
territorial expansion. It means increasing the influence of the United States in key areas
around the globe.
The United States has expanded its influence and activities following the end of the Cold
War, despite the fact that the level of its influence and activities was already unparalleled at
the moment the Soviet Union collapsed. One would indeed think that the marginal utility of
expanding even further would be fairly limited after the shift from bi- to unipolarity. The
exceptions are to be found, of course, in the areas left behind by the Soviet Empire. And
indeed, most of East and Central Europe – including the Baltic States bordering Russia – are
now firmly entrenched within the U.S. sphere of influence, contravening alleged promises
made by the U.S. to Russian authorities in the early 1990s to be magnanimous in victory and
to pay heed to Moscow’s security objectives.
But apart from that, arguably important, region, U.S. exploitation of the “unipolar moment”
has perhaps first and foremost consisted of attempts to institutionalize (and, where possible,
expand) the world order of which the U.S. itself has been the key shaper. The list of
examples is long and includes the enlargement and further strengthening of NATO; the
bolstering of key security alliances around the world; enhancing the institutions underpinning
economic globalization and capitalism; ostracizing (and sometimes attacking) recalcitrant
regimes; and, more generally, entrenching its ideological hegemony and agenda-setting
powers in the world.
Many Neorealists – Kenneth Waltz included – would argue that the United States have gone
a bit too far; facing no serious countervailing force, it has set out to expand its influence
around the globe in too hasty a fashion – with the years 2001–2009, under George W. Bush,
representing the high-water mark of what some would call slightly counterproductive
unilateralism and hegemonic endeavors that effectively risk(ed) overstretching even the
impressive resources of the American unipole. Personally, I’m not so sure. Institutionalizing
the spoils of the victor is not necessarily unwise – and the mistakes of Afghanistan and Iraq
are not irredeemable; eventually Washington wisely chose to cut its losses in both these
cases. And, despite the current financial predicament, there is as yet little evidence to suggest
that unipolarity is anywhere close to eroding due to overextension, as Waltz has readily
admitted as well.
Nevertheless, in terms of major-power contests, power balancing, and security competition,
the era into which we are about to enter will undoubtedly be far more interesting than the
previous two decades. This brings me to the second danger that follows from the existence of
unchecked power, according to Neorealism, namely the response of other major states in the
system, the brief discussion of which will also conclude this article.
One of the big – if not the biggest – debates among International Relations scholars in the last
twenty years have been exactly this: How will the other major powers respond to U.S.
unipolarity and U.S. hegemony? (Under unipolarity, Waltz refers to secondary states as
“major powers” rather than “great powers,” the U.S. being the only state entitled to the latter
label.) Specifically, will the other major powers attempt to balance the mighty American
power?
That is the expectation of Neorealists. Indeed, in the early 1990s Waltz himself anticipated
that balancing would soon occur on a major scale. He was wrong, however; the overall
evidence points to the absence of balancing throughout the first 10–15 years of that period:
Unipolarity and American hegemony have as yet not been seriously challenged. The most
convincing (among several) explanation of why this non-balancing has characterized the
unipolar moment so far centers, inter alia, on the argument that U.S. power has been – and
still is – so overwhelming that balancing is largely rendered impossible, ineffective, and
indeed also quite risky considering that it might lead to serious confrontations with the
superpower at a time where no other state can confidently expect to pose a real military
challenge against it.
Waltz and Neorealists should nonetheless be exonerated. They got the timing slightly wrong;
real balancing did not occur on any significant scale in the 1990s and early 2000s. However,
history sometimes moves with the pace of a glacier, and moreover, the picture has changed
somewhat in the last few years – partly in the form of the resurgence and assertiveness of
Russia, but in particular with the rise of China and its conscious translation of speedy
economic growth into military capacity specifically aimed at countering U.S. military power
in East Asia.
At present, real balancing is occurring. It will also very likely continue to occur. And for an
explanation of why this will happen, we need not go much further than to Waltz’s Theory of
International Politics. In an anarchic world, where interests collide, where survival and
security constitute the basic goals of states, where the distribution of power largely shapes
what states can and cannot do and whom they have reasons to fear and not fear, the biggest
gamble one takes is to remain oblivious to the risk posed by unchecked power. America’s
power is as yet unchecked and unbalanced. Waltz tells us that this will eventually change,
though perhaps only slowly. We should in any case listen to him, because he is in all
likelihood in the right.

Rethinking Neorealist Theory: Order Within Anarchy

By Dr. Bruce Bordner

University of Virginia
December 1997

It has been more than eighteen years since Kenneth Waltz first introduced his structural based
"Neorealist" theory of international relations. The purpose of this article is to assess how well this theory
holds up nearly twenty years later. Three specific areas of neorealist theory will be examined: the issue of
anarchy, the role of international organizations, and the growing international economic interdependence.
The discussion will proceed as follows. First, this paper will summarize Waltz's theory of international
relations. This will include a discussion of states being security seeking, but not power maximizing.
Second, it will examine the issue of anarchy. Specifically, the role played by hierarchies within anarchy.
Third, it will analyze the role played by cooperation and international organizations in neorealism. Fourth,
this paper will examine the growing economic interdependence among the world's nations. Lastly, it will
reach several conclusions. First, that international anarchy does not prevent an ordering of nations within
the international community. Nations can balance against other nations, or they can form hierarchies and
balance one hierarchy against one or more rival hierarchies. Second, that there is a role for international
organizations in international relations. These conclusions will be proposed in a modified version of
Waltz's theory of international relations. This modified theory will be based upon the existence of order
within the anarchic international system.

Waltz's Theory of International Relations

Structural realism attempts to explain the nature of international relations by separating the state level,
which Waltz defines as composed of units, from the systems level, which is composed of structure. Waltz
believes that "[a]t the systems level, we find results; at the subsystems level, causes." (Waltz: 43). Waltz
assumes that states are security seekers. He finds that anarchy exists on the international level. Anarchy
exists on the first dimension of what Waltz terms structure. Furthermore, Waltz describes power on the
state level as being distributed hierarchically, while in the international community it is distributed
horizontally. Next, he assumes that security seeking states are composed of units. States as units are the
second dimension of structure. As states are security seeking, states tend to replicate each other on the unit
level, thus leading to a balancing behavior. Assuming states tend to replicate due to balancing, Waltz
concludes that the second dimension structure drops out. The third dimension of structure in Waltz's
theory finds that the distribution of capabilities is largely determined by the number of great powers in the
international community. Utilizing his simple elegant theory, Waltz finds that there is a substantial
connection between the number of great powers and how states in the international community act and re-
act, such as why states build arms, form alliances, trade, imitate each other, as well as estimate the
probability of war among nations.

Waltz's theory assumes that states by their nature are security seeking. That is to say that states are
rational actors who seek to assure their own survival. By this assumption, one takes Waltz to mean that
states will do anything to assure their survival, but this is not Waltz's point. Waltz clearly states in his
book, Theory of International Relations, that states are not assumed to be power maximizers. How can a
state be security seeking and not a power maximizer? How can a state guarantee its own security if it can
never actually know the true intentions and capabilities of another state? Because states can only have
perceptions of another states intentions and capabilities, a state cannot be security seeking and not be a
power maximizer. If a state is assumed to be security seeking and international regimes are assumed not to
exist, then that same state must logically also be a power maximizer. The truth is that states seek only
relative security in comparison to other states. This can be accomplished on one's own and through
alliances formed against a common enemy.

Anarchy: From Chaos Can Come Order

Waltz's definition of anarchy is the absence of an international government possessing the legitimate use
of force. It is this lack of an international government that forces states to be security seeking. According
to Waltz, the major powers balance against each other in order provide this security. In a bipolar world two
great powers compete for control and security; whereas, in a multipolar world, multiple great powers
compete. But, what happens when a hegemon orders the world or a region of the world? The answer is
that balancing will still occur. Did the Soviet Union and the United States not dominate the security and
economic interests of their respective spheres of influence during the bipolar cold war world? Did the two
states undertake balancing with regard to one another? In truth, neorealism, does allow for the formation
of security arrangements in the face of a common enemy, but does this not suggest that some structural
order can be imposed on international actors? The conclusion here is that the creation of some order and
cooperation among states is possible within an anarchic system. Further, the creation of this ordering
among anarchy does not preclude balancing among spheres of influence.

Neorealism, Cooperation, and International Organizations

The security seeking nature of states forces them to be wary of international cooperation and
international organizations. For the neorealist, a state will cooperate if state security is not placed at risk.
The problem is that it is difficult to guarantee that state security is, in fact, secure; as a result, security
seeking states will be concerned about the relative gains made by other states through military and
economic cooperation. This concern extends to one's enemies, as well as one's friends. The argument is
that today's friends may be tomorrow's enemies. Leaders change and the natures of the relations between
governments can also change. This situation can be seen in Russia today: What might have happened if
Yeltsin had died as a result of complications from his recent heart surgery or was too weak to resume his
full duties. The resulting power vacuum might have brought a hard-liner to power in Russia. While the
United States government may have had cordial relations with Yeltsin, the future direction of the Russian
government remains in question, as does its relations with the United States.

I mentioned above that cooperation among states was rational in the face of a common enemy. This
represents one of the two instances in which a neorealist will cooperate. The second is when concessions
or side payments are made to compensate a government when it enters into an agreement in which one
government achieves a relative gain. In these two instances, rational security seeking states can enter into
cooperative arrangements with other states.

There has been a great debate between neorealists and neoliberal Institutionalists about the role to be
played by international organizations. Neorealists argue that little is to be achieved via international
organizations. Neoliberals make the point that international organizations and regimes provide structures
and mechanisms for eliminating the problem of states cheating or defecting from an agreement. The belief
is that international organizations will foster improved communication between actors. Additionally, the
organizational or regime's framework of rules and norms are believed to lock states into the regime.
Because of the regime, states become concerned with their reputations. Defecting from a regime might
hurt a state's reputation, thus providing states with a disincentive to defect or cheat. The problem for the
neorealist is that leaders of security seeking states should be unwilling to have their role as the sovereign
dictated or restricted by international organizations and regimes. For this reason, neorealists generally
oppose collective security and other forms of international cooperation. This can be seen with the failure
of the League of Nations. The United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty because of national
sovereignty issues. National sovereignty is also the reason the United States has been unwilling to
recognize the World Court.

I find that states will act in their self interests. If this means utilizing an international organization for a
state purpose, then so be it. This appears to have been the case of the Gulf War. The United States sought
the moral approval of the United Nations to protect Kuwait, thus assuring access to oil. Further, the United
States utilized side payments in order to create a coalition force. These side payments took the form of
forgiving debt owed by Egypt and other countries. The reason was that the United States needed a number
of Arab nations on its side. Additionally, Japan made side payments to the United States to compensate us
for the cost of the operation. The reason being that Japan needed access to middle eastern oil. Thus, it can
be seen that the United States utilized an international forum and formed international security alliances
when it was deemed in its national self-interest.

Economic Interdependence
Neorealism fails to account for much of the economic interdependence among nations. Why should
nations trade if relative gains are being achieved? The answer to this question appears to be beyond
Waltz's theory of neorealism because it does not focus on power, as defined as capabilities. Waltz seems
to indicate that nations should seek to be self sufficient, thus providing for their own security and other
national needs. In this manner, a nation would not risk having food, arms, or other resources cut off by an
enemy. Additionally, neorealists tend to assign economic interdependence to the unit level. In truth,
economic interdependence can affect the intentions and actions of international actors. It seems likely that
the United States would go to war if China were to close off Japan's access to the South China Sea. The
reason is that the Japanese economy is heavily dependent on middle eastern oil. The United States,
meanwhile, is greatly reliant on a strong Japanese economy to purchase United States securities and goods.
A shock to the Japanese economy would reap havoc on the United States economy. Therefore, I find that
the United States would probably go to war over the South China Sea for the same reason it went to war in
the Persian Gulf - economic self interest. It seems that individual hierarchies or spheres of influence
should build up trade within their individual blocks. This trade should, in turn, result in a greater
independence among states in the block. This increased independence should allow the members of the
block to benefit together, such that they can balance as one hierarchy against other hierarchies. This
hierarchic benefit from economic interdependence can be seen among the western allies in both Europe
and Asia since World War II.

Beyond Waltz
 Waltz's Theory of International Relations provides the reader with a consistent theory for the study of
the discipline. What Waltz argues is logically reasoned from the premises he assumes. Waltz, in his
attempt to develop a parsimonious theory of international relations, assumes away the real world. He acts
like the economist who assumes perfect competition. In the real world, while a state of international
anarchy does exist, order within anarchy is also possible. States act in an international context. The
actions of one state may or may not affect another state.

It is true that Waltz's theory explains a lot based upon the independent variable he utilizes to explain his
dependent variable. As a discipline, however, theorists need to move beyond Waltz. It seems that many an
international relations theorist has attempted to improve upon Waltz's theory in one way or another. In
truth, Waltz's theory needs to be altered and expanded to explain the real world as it truly appears. What I
propose is a modified version of Waltz's structural realism. I propose the following. First, I find that the
international system exists in a state of anarchy as Waltz asserts. I find, however, that a number of spheres
of influence and hierarchies can exist in an anarchic international system. Order in the international
community does not have to be distributed horizontally. Additionally, the number of spheres of influence
and hierarchies existing within the international system can vary. A bipolar world could be defined as
consisting of two hierarchies or spheres of influence ordered by a hegemon or dominant power. In the case
of the post World War II period, the United States and the Soviet Union represented two hegemons or
dominant powers heading two different hierarchies or spheres of influence. Therefore, I adopt the
independent variable consisting of degree of hierarchy or spheres of influence. This variable consists of
low (more nations in each hierarchy) and high (fewer nations in each hierarchy) degrees of hierarchy or
spheres of influence. In a bipolar world, a world consisting of two hierarchies or spheres of influence, the
number of nations in each hierarchy would tend to be higher than in a multiple hierarchy world in which
fewer nations, on average, would belong to each hierarchy or sphere of influence. This assumes a fixed
number of nations in the world in which to place into spheres of influence.

Similar to Waltz, I am willing to let the second level of structure, that of domestic factors, to be dropped
from the international structure. This is premised on international regimes, alliances, and security
arrangements being treated as an organizational dynamic of the hierarchy or hierarchies within the anarchic
system. This allows for the balancing behavior of states and of one sphere of influence or hierarchy
against another.

Third, I find that Waltz's distribution of capabilities (Waltz's number of great powers) defines my first
assertion. I find that Waltz's distribution of capabilities among nations affect whether the international
community is fully anarchic or if one or more hierarchies exist in the international arena.

I also make the same assumption as Waltz as to the nature of rational states necessarily being security
seeking. I find with Waltz that states are not necessarily power maximizers, but rather hierarchies or
spheres of influence seeking to maximize power, while individual states, I would argue, seek relative
security. Relative security can exist because, while states do exist in Waltz's anarchic system, this anarchic
system can consist of interdependent spheres of influence or hierarchy. While I agree with Waltz's
assessment that states are concerned for relative power, I add the caveat that this assumes that relative
power assures relative security. It is this combination of relative state security that great powers bring
together in the creation and ordering of their hierarchies. The great power will seek to add nations in order
to increase power. The power of these nations will tend to be sufficiently less than that of the dominant
power of that sphere. As a result, the majority of balancing will be undertaken by the dominant power.
This helps the dominant power to assure their own security, while maintaining dominance of the hierarchy
for as long as is possible. Additionally, the adding of nations to the hierarchy will continue until the
adding of nations no longer acts to increase the hierarchy's power, but instead act as a drain on power
capabilities of the hierarchy. The adding of nations can also cease when no more states sharing the
common interest are found to exist. The only exception to the adding of nations beyond the point of
diminishing returns occurs when the dominant power is willing to bear the cost of adding the additional
state to the hierarchy by increasing its own security requirements. When a hegemon or the dominant
power of the hierarchy declines, the likelihood of conflict and war within and between hierarchies may
increase. The reason is that actors within that hierarchy may challenge the dominant power for control
over the hierarchy or may attempt to split off and organize their own rival hierarchy. This challenge can
result in the reordering of the hierarchy and the military and economic arrangements within it. The
existing order of the hierarchy will generally linger beyond the hegemons or dominant power's decline
because the benefits accrued from the present ordering will continue to exceed the cost of the challenge.

What this modified theory accomplishes is the following. When there are fewer hierarchies in the
international system and more nations in each hierarchy, then there is more likely a higher degree of
economic cooperation and interdependence among the nations. When there are more hierarchies in the
international system and fewer nations in each hierarchy, then there will be a lower degree of economic
cooperation among nations. With regard to the tendency of nations to balance, I reach the following
conclusions. First, the fewer the number of hierarchies, the higher the degree of balancing behavior
exhibited. Bluntly put, more security alliances are formed. A gain by one side is seen as a loss to the other
side. With regard to predicting the probability of war, I reach the following conclusion. I find that with
fewer hierarchies comes greater stability through the creation of international regimes, security
arrangements, and alliances. With more hierarchies comes greater instability because more great powers
seek to influence more states in the international system. This conclusion is consistent with that of Waltz.

When one modifies the assumption of anarchy to include some hierarchic order, or spheres of influence,
it then becomes possible to explain the existence and importance of international regimes. This is because
the international order can only be fully anarchic, unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. In each instance, with
the sole exception of the fully anarchic system, an individual great power or multiple great powers will
seek to dominate the international system. These actors then will order their portion of the international
system. Based upon this, I find that states exist in a complex system of interdependence. This
interdependence takes the form of a complex web of international regimes, security arrangements, and
trade agreements, organized by the dominant power. By building complex security relationships, great
powers can enhance their own security and that of the states in their hierarchy. The United States
undertook the Marshall Plan in an effort to build-up its European Allies following World War II. The
belief was that having stronger allies would assist the United States in its containment efforts against
communism within Europe. The building up of our allies in Europe allowed them to acquire the necessary
resources to balance against the Soviet Union. This resulted in the hierarchy dominated by the United
States having increased power which helped lead to peace during the Cold War. As a result, states do not
necessarily need to be power maximizers in order to be security seekers. The great powers will still
provide for their own security, but they will expand their sphere of influence to cover other states in their
hierarchy. Further, states can have military protectors. Since World War II, Japan is become a world
economic power, but it still lacks the military power to provide for its own security; rather, the United
States and its Asian allies are committed to defending Japan from common threats. Clearly, relative
security among states may be acceptable when a state is part of a hierarchy that exists in order to deter or
fend off another hierarchic order or enemy.

What I am arguing is that it is possible for states in both bipolar and multipolar worlds to exist in a
hierarchic state in which security is increased through international trade and security regimes. This does
not preclude states from being security seeking or performing balancing functions. Balancing can take
place either internally or in combination with one's allies. This is consistent with the record of history
through the late part of the 19th and 20th Centuries. In each major war, a state has sought to change the
international order by challenging the dominant power. In each instance the dominant power has formed
alliances and defeated the challenger. This can be seen in Hapsburg Germany in World War I and Japan
and Germany during World War II. The creation of security arrangements in order to defeat the
challenging nation does not appear to be contrary to Waltz's theory. States existing in an anarchic
international system can be organized into multiple hierarchies by a hegemon or dominant power. When
faced with a rival hierarchy or sphere of influence in the international anarchic system, it is then possible
for states to form security alliances, enter into international regimes, and trade. The possibility of anarchy
consisting of hierarchic spheres adds a new and dynamic dimension to understanding order in the
international system within the neorealist way of thinking.

In conclusion, the world as we know it is not always chaotic and unorganized; rather, the anarchic world
can be hierarchic in nature. Anarchy does not rule the day in the international world, it only seems that
way. Once one understands the possibilities inherent with interpreting the anarchic world in a hierarchic
manner, through an examination of spheres of influence, one gains a greater understanding of the
international system and the existence of international cooperation, the formation of alliances, and how
states can seek relative security without being power maximizers.

What are the basic concepts of neorealism?

The basic tenets of neorealism enable the systematic approach to studying shifts in state
behaviour. Six fundamental neorealist concepts are respectively introduced in this section;
anarchy, structure, capability, the distribution of power, polarity and national interest. These
concepts are evoked by many realist scholars of international relations (Buzan 1993; Herz
1950; Hanami 2003; Jervis 1997; Keohane 1986; Mearsheimer 2001; Oye 1986; Snyder
2002; Waltz 1979; Zakaria 1998), albeit with variations in their precise definitions.
The first two concepts; ‘anarchy’ and ‘structure’; are intertwined. The ‘structure’ of the international
system is said to be ‘anarchic’. ‘Anarchy’ does not imply the presence of chaos and disorder. It
simply refers to the absence of a world government (Waltz 1979, 88). With no overarching global
authority that provides security and stability in international relations, world politics is not formally
and hierarchically organized . International politics is structured by ‘anarchy’, in contrast to domestic
politics that is structured by ‘hierarchy’. The international system is thus defined in terms of an
anarchic international structure.

An ‘anarchic structure’ has two main implications. Firstly, every actor in the international system is
responsible for looking after itself, rendering the international system a “self-help system”. This
system is thus composed of self-regarding units, who primarily seek to survive . National states are
the only entities in international relations that have the centralized legitimate authority to use force
to look after themselves. Sovereign states are thus the constitutive units of the international system,
and the primary actors in world politics. Therefore, the organizing principle of the international
structure is ‘anarchy’, and this ‘structure’ is defined in terms of states. Secondly, states perpetually
feel threatened by a potential attack from others. Where no one commands by virtue of authority,
no one is obliged to obey (Waltz 1979, 88-93).
As each state constantly feels insecure, each needs to be capable of fending for itself. This leads to
the third concept of ‘capability’. Capabilities are instrumental for states to ensure their survival. The
survival aim encourages relative gains. A neorealist assessment of the ‘capability’ of a state is
determined by five main criteria; its natural resource endowment, its demographic, economic,
military and technological capacity. As each state achieves a different level of capability (which
primarily serves its survival goal), states within the international system are differentiated via their
level of capability. Neorealist scholars thus strive to paint a relational picture of the capabilities each
state possesses at any given time. This is referred to as ‘relative capability’.

Because states are perpetually insecure, they perpetually wish to acquire capabilities. The grand
paradox of international politics is thus born; the “security dilemma”. In striving to attain security
from a potential attack, states are driven to acquire more and more capabilities in order to escape
the impact of the capabilities of others. This renders the others more insecure and compels them to
prepare for the worst. Since no one can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units,
competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and capability accumulation is on (Herz 1950,
36).
In the competition for security, states will achieve varying levels of capability. Thus, capabilities are
distributed differently across the constitutive units of the system. Such an assessment of the
‘distribution of capabilities’ constitutes the fourth concept of neorealism. Countries’ ranking
depends on how they score on all the aforementioned components of ‘relative capability’.

The notion of ‘polarity’ can be explained in light of the preceding concepts. The ‘polarity’ of the
international system is determined by examining the ‘distribution of capabilities’ across units, at any
given time. This approach enables the distinct typification of the nature of the international system.
It is generally possible to distinguish between three types of polarity; unipolarity, bipolarity and
multipolarity. Unipolarity prevails when a single state in the system is markedly superior, relative to
all other states in terms of demographic, economic, military and technological capabilities. The
current state of the international system can be described as unipolar; the United States maintains
military, economic and technological primacy in the world. Bipolarity exists when these capabilities
are mainly distributed amongst two prominent actors, much like the Cold War era when the US and
the Soviet Union represented the two ‘poles’ of power . Multipolarity occurs when more than two
actors possess nearly equal amounts of relative capability. Examples of multipolar structures can be
seen in the periods following up to and lasting throughout the First and Second World Wars.
‘National interest’ is an elusive concept. In striving for security, states seek to expand their
capabilities vis-à-vis rival states. Thus ensuring territorial, economic and military security constitutes
the national interest calculus of a state. At the same time, the level of capability a state possesses
vis-à-vis others, constrains or equips states to pursue such interests. In turn, the scope and ambition
of a country’s interests are driven by its level of capability (Telhami 2003, 109). Therefore within a
neorealist conceptual framework, national interests of states are best understood with reference to
their relative capability ranking.