Description of the Module

Items Description of the Module

Subject Name Sociology

Paper Name Contemporary Social Theory

Module Name/Title Functionalism, neo-functionalism and system analysis : introductory overview

Pre Requisites Classical sociological thinkers like Comte, Durkheim, Weber, conflict sociology and
basic sociological concepts

Objectives This module aims at introducing the readers to critically understand functionalism as
one of the most dominant school of thought and its contemporary relevance and
status in sociology.

Key words Systems, Functions, Processes, Equilibrium, Cybernetics

Module Structure

Functionalism, Neo- Introduction, The Origins of Functionalism, „System‟ and Functionalism(s),

Functionalism And A General Note on Systems Theory and System Analysis, Parsons and The
System Analysis : Social System, Merton: Structures in the System are Not Always Functional,
Introductory Overview Criticisms of Structural Functionalism, The „Neo‟ in Functionalism, A
Glimpse of Luhmann‟s Social System Analysis, Luhmann versus Parsons‟
System Analysis, Conclusion, Summary, References, Learn More.

Role Name Affiliation

Principal Investigator Prof. Sujata Patel Professor, Department of Sociology, University of

Hyderabad

Paper Coordinator Dr. Dev Pathak Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, South
Asian University

Content Writer Deblina Dey & Research Scholar, JNU, Delhi

Dr. Dev Pathak
Content Reviewer Prof. Sujata Patel Professor, Department of Sociology, University of
Hyderabad

Language Editor Prof. Sujata Patel Professor, Department of Sociology, University of

Hyderabad
 FUNCTIONALISM, NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND SYSTEM ANALYSIS

Introductory Overview

1. Introduction

Functionalism as a school of thinking arose as a critique to the utilitarian notion that humans are
economically motivated, rational actors who strive to maximize their „utilities‟ or gains. Utilitarianism
which held sway in the 19th century assumed that there exists „an invisible hand of order‟ through „open
competition in free markets‟ which provided people with the opportunity to satisfy various needs through
the market (Turner 2007: 37). This ultimately fostered social order and organized human behavior
(Turner 2007). Sociologists opposed such utilitarianism, and adopting organicism, according to which
society and social order is understood in terms of perceiving it as a biological being. Sociology as a
discipline arose in response to churning transformations that the European and American society was
going through in the political, economic and cultural domains after the French and American Revolutions.
The quintessential preoccupation of most of the sociological thinkers in the 19th century was – how is
social order possible? And what makes society possible?

In order to understand the societal changes, macro-level studies were conducted to decipher the patterns
of social changes. Society was studied as a total and autonomous system. This chapter takes us through
the trajectory of functionalism (or more commonly structural-functionalism) in its grand attempt to
explain the social system. Celebrating its methodological aspects and critiquing its tendency to discount
several significant aspects of society (like conflict), functionalism was reworked as neofunctionalism. We
will see, in this transition, how system analysis itself was reconfigured.

2. The Origins of Functionalism

To explain the vital question of social order, functionalism as a mode of thinking arose in Europe and
America in the 19th century. Turner (2007) cites the „organicism of Auguste Comte‟, the father of
sociology who approached the question through the scientific lens of looking for social laws. Similar to
natural laws, Comte believed that social phenomena expressed law-like tendencies, studying which
explanation of society was possible. Though Comte himself did not identify himself as a functionalist, his
comparison of elements of society (like families) to cells and tissues whose proper functioning leads to
the maintenance of the „social organism‟- makes him a key associate and one of the founders of
functionalism, according to Turner (2007:40). Herbert Spencer also contributed to the development of
functionalism by comparing societies to an organism and generated „requisite functionalism‟ as Turner
(2007) calls it. This implies that social structures reveal certain „universal requisites that must be fulfilled
in order for them to adapt to an environment‟ (Turner 2007:43). The key idea of functionalism was that -
social processes and structures have certain „requisites‟ or needs that must be met for social order to be
possible. Emile Durkheim‟s functionalism was most explicit in his work „The Division of Labor in
Society‟ in which he illustrates how specialized organs (institutions) of the society (the modern, industrial
or „organic‟ society) work in tandem to bring about social order. Through his concepts of „normal‟ and
„pathological‟ he demonstrated how social order is disrupted when the parts of the social body deviate
from their adaptive roles. „Social systems have needs that must be fulfilled if “abnormal” states are to be
avoided‟ (Turner 2007: 45). In the anthropological tradition, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw
Malinowski‟s names are associated for their contribution to functional school of thought. From
Durkheimian functional analysis of structures, they found answers to the intellectual challenges faced by
anthropology at that time. Turner claims that it was Malinowski who „extended Durkheim and Radcliffe-
Brown‟s limited functional orientation into directions that were to be adopted by the first sociological
functionalists of the 1940s and early 1950s‟ (Turner and Maryanski 1988:114). These anthropologists
were introduced to sociology for the first time by Merton at Harvard University, America. According to
Turner, American sociology was not developed as to deal with questions of total social systems and it was
through these European influences that functionalism „took hold‟ in sociology and a revival of it was seen
in works of Parsons and Merton. Functionalism held great significance in the 1940s to the early 60s.

3. ‘System’ and Functionalism(s)

When we refer to functionalism, we do not refer to a single theorist or one branch of thinking only. Let us
now look at the various types of functionalisms that exists in the sociological literature. For instance,
Parson‟s functionalist approach is labeled as „analytical functionalism‟, Merton‟s as „empirical
functionalism‟ and Luhmann‟s as „systems functionalism‟ by Turner (2007). The detailed contribution of
each of the three thinkers will be taken up in separate chapters. Each of them had different focal issues
and methodological variations. However, one common element among all of them is the „systems
perspective‟ (Moore 1979:322). A system according to Collins (1997) is „anything that has parts
connected by processes or relationships. A system may be open or closed, stable or unstable.
Functionalism is a particular type of system theory which attempts to explain the existence of parts of
society by their contribution to maintaining the whole society‟ (Collins 1997:75). Hence, social order was
contingent upon the processes of „differentiation‟ and „interdependence‟ of parts as was evident in
Durkheim‟s idea of „organic solidarity‟ (Moore 1979:324).

Wells (1978) explains that culture was the primary preoccupation of functionalism. By culture is meant
the „organized values, norms and beliefs that pattern all of social life‟ (Wells 1978:7). Culture according
to Wells, is understood by functionalists as intrinsically stable and permanent in nature. Culture brings
social order. Hence, functionalism has been interested all the while in „how parts of culture (for example
norms regulating kinship) function for total culture- that is, what their purpose (function) is in the overall
culture (child socialization, regulation of fertility and so on)‟ (Wells 1978:7). Functionalists deal with
questions of regulation or „the problem of integration‟ in society (Moore 1979:329). Moore (1979)
exclaims that „nonconformity or deviance has remained a theoretical problem with respect to integration‟
(1979:329).

Functionalism as a theory enables to answer why a certain system or a social pattern exists? According to
it, the existence of something should be explained by virtue of the function that it serves in society. The
existence of „system requisites‟ or „needs‟ highlights that structures in the society have functions, which
must be fulfilled for social order to prevail. This is the basis of „structural-functionalism‟. Structural-
functionalism views social systems as possessing the „tendency to perform certain tasks that are necessary
for their survival, and sociological analysis therefore, involves a search for the social structures that
perform these tasks or meet the “needs” of the social system‟ (Wallace and Wolf 1995:17). According to
Ritzer (2011) there need not be a concern for both, „structure‟ and „function‟ at the same time. For
instance he argues that, one may study the structures of the society without asking questions about the
functions of those structures. He says that structural-functionalism has different approaches; however, it is
the „societal functionalism‟ which remains predominant in sociological structural-functionalists (Ritzer
2011:238). This branch of functionalism concerns itself with large-scale organizations, institutions and
organizations of society with a focus on their interrelationship and how they constrain the actions of
people in society. Besides Durkheim, Parsons and Merton, Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore are also
associated with structural-functionalism. The latter two are known for their functional theories of
stratification.

Wallace and Wolf (1995:18) note the following central arguments or commonalities among different
functionalists:

1. The general interrelatedness or interdependence, of the system‟s parts;

2. The existence of a “normal” state of affairs, or state of equilibrium, comparable to the normal or
healthy state of an organism; and
3. The way that all the parts of the system reorganize to bring things back to normal.

Functionalism has been heavily criticized for providing the most simplistic and „favorable‟ interpretation
to anything (Collins 1997:54) and its aim of preserving the status quo (Turner 2007). Moore (1979) points
out that „the integration model‟ of functionalism often sidelines issues of conflict and contradictions
within systems. Collins (1997) opines that it provides ideological justification for interests of dominant
groups, Teleology, wholism which neglects social diversity as well as political conservatism are some of
the critiques discussed by Wells (1978). According to Wells, the Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka (1974)
can be credited with the most outstanding scrutiny of functionalism. According to Sztompka, there are
many strands of functional theorizing. When we speak of functionalism the two most important theorists
whose name comes to the forefront is that of Talcott Parsons and Robert K Merton, to whom we will turn
shortly.

Before understanding Parson‟ action system theory, it makes sense to look at the larger framework of
systems theory of which his is a part.

4. A General Note on Systems Theory and System Analysis

The term „systems theory‟ was coined after Ludwig von Bertalanffi‟s „General System Theory‟ (1968). In
the subsequent sections, we would look at how it has transformed over the years from Parsons to neo
functionalists like Alexander and Luhmann. Let us took at the common characteristics of the system
analyses. The approach to the analysis of systems is based on the premise that „intricate relationship of
parts cannot be treated out of the context of the whole. Systems theorists reject the idea that society or
other large-scale components of society should be treated as unified social facts. Instead, the focus is on
relationships or processes at various levels within the social system‟ (Ritzer 2011:331). Another
important characteristic of any systems approach is that it views sociocultural systems in terms of
processes, of a complex web of information networks and communication (Ritzer 2011). One common
theme running through various forms of functionalism is „integration‟. Systems theory in general
(however unlike Parsons‟ action theory) leaves scope for analysis of sudden changes and developments,
and dynamism in the society. Systems theory is also known as the „cybernetic approach‟. Cybernetics is a
concept often used in the natural sciences primarily physics. „Self-regulation through information
processing‟ or the feedback system which is the „process by which a machine or system monitors its own
performance and uses that information to regulate its continued performance‟ (Shibutani 1986:119). This
is the key idea behind cybernetics. For example a thermostat measures the heat ouput and feeds it back
into the furnace that regulates fuel input (ibid). The heating system is thus self-regulating (ibid). Such idea
of cybernetics is present in Parsons‟ „Cybernetic Hierarchy of Control‟ (Turner 2007: 73). Hence, the
systems theory is based on the feedback mechanism between the environment and the society. Hence
Parsons‟ functionalism was a subtype of the system theory.

5. Parsons and The Social System

Wells (1978) argues that Parsons‟ work has been so „prolific and important for contemporary theory that
he is best perhaps seen as a “school” of functionalism by himself‟. The most significant contribution of
Parsons was his AGIL model through which he illustrates that every social system satisfies four
functions- adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latency – in order to maintain order and „survive‟
(Ritzer 2011:242). These four „functional imperatives‟ ensures the adjustment of the system to maintain a
system of order, by channelizing and balancing out disruptive tendencies within the system. These four
functions are catered to by four systems respectively– the organismic (adaptation), personality (goal
attainment), the social system (integration) and the cultural system (latency) The novelty of this approach
lies in the way in which he integrates the fours systems, through „internalization of values through
socialization‟ and modes of social control (Turner 2007: 67). He starts with the „unit act‟ which comprises
the „motivated actor‟ seeking out goals, in the process being circumscribed by his situational and cultural
norms and constraints. A social system in Parson‟s view comes to exist when „variously oriented actors
interact, they come to develop agreements and sustain patterns of interaction, which become
“institutionalized.” Such institutionalized patterns comprise the social system (Turner 2007: 63). It is
important to note here that Parsons saw the social system as a system of interaction, but interaction per se
was not central to his theorizing. On the contrary it was the concept of „status‟ and „role‟ which according
to him formed the social system (Wallace and Wolf 1995). Status refers to the structural position within
the social system‟ and role is „what the actor does in such a position seen in the functional significance for
the larger system‟ (Ritzer 2011:244). Parsons‟ other significant contributions to the functional school of
thought, apart from the action system, were the pattern variables, system problems and theory of
evolutionary change (Wallace and Wolf 1995:27). Throughout his work, it can be seen that his concern
was primarily the system as a whole and any reference to individual actors was in the actors‟ relation to
the society.

6. Merton: Structures in the System are Not Always Functional

Merton is known for his contribution to functionalism as bringing in greater scope for meso-levels of
analysis through his „middle range‟ theories (of deviance for example). Such theories have an empirical
grounding instead of being explanations structured around the realm of abstraction. His ideas are more
methodologically oriented rather a claim over a grand theory. Merton highlighted that one need not
theorize about society as a whole, but could engage in analysis of an institution or a group for example
(Ritzer 2011). Turner (2007) calls Merton‟s functionalism, „empirical functionalism‟ primarily because
Merton insists that „empirical tests, not theoretical assertions, are crucial to functional analysis‟ and this
„led him to develop his “paradigm” of functional analysis as a guide to the integration of theory and
research‟ (Ritzer 2011: 253).

Two significant differences exist between Merton and Parsons (Ritzer 2011). Firstly, Parsons bent
towards grand theorizing, whereas Merton stuck to middle-range theories. Secondly, Merton gave
structural functionalism a push towards Marxist approach by taking into account conflictual situations in
which functions do not always foster social order. Merton critiques the three postulates upheld by
classical, structural-functionalism. First, the functional unity postulate which presumes that all
„standardized social and cultural beliefs and practices are functional for society as a whole as well as for
individuals in society. This view implies that the various parts of a social system must show a high level
of integration‟ (Ritzer 2011:252). To this Merton remarked that this may be true of simple, primitive
societies but such a generalization to larger and complex societies cannot be made. The second criticism
was raised against the „universal functionalism postulate‟ according to which all „cultural forms and
structures have positive functions‟ (Ritzer 2011:252). This was disproved through his concept of
„dysfunction‟. Merton challenges the notion upheld by functionalists that everything (any institution or
structures) which exists in society is functional for the society. For instance, something that is functional
for one social group might be dysfunctional for some other group. Let us take the example of poverty.
Poor people are recruited in underpaid, „dirty‟ jobs which otherwise would not have takers. The existence
of the poor gives scope to philanthropists to engage in social service. Poverty however, is dysfunctional
for the poor themselves (Wells 1978:9). Thirdly, he showed that there exist functional alternatives and
voiced against the postulate of indispensability, which upheld the view that those social structures that are
present in the society are most suited to perform the functions and that no other alternative could possibly
meet those needs (Ritzer 2011). It is here that one could find traces of Marxian approach of challenging
the status quo. Merton opined that there are manifest or more evident consequences of social structures.
Those are easily discernable as their consequences are understood as „intended‟. But there are those
functions whose consequences are latent or unintended (Ritzer 2011). It is the latter that a sociologist
should interest oneself with. He also distinguishes between the „latent‟ and „unanticipated‟ consequences.
Latent consequences are unanticipated, but the latter includes two more types of consequences. They
could be dysfunctional unanticipated consequences or non-functional consequences that are „irrelevant to
the system‟.

7. Criticisms of Structural Functionalism

One common criticism leveled against structural-functionalism, to which Parsons and Merton belonged
(Ritzer 2011; Wallace and Wolf 1995) is that it tends to overstress the harmony or order aspect of social
relationships and overlook aspects of conflict, which can lead to positive social changes and need not
always be „destructive‟ in nature (Ritzer 2011:259). Secondly, questions of agency-structure and the
dialectics between them is overlooked. They seem to be preoccupied only with the constraining effects of
societal values and norms. Ritzer citing Gouldner reflects that, „Human beings are as much engaged in
using social systems as being side by them‟ (Ritzer 2011:259). Thirdly, structural-functionalists fall in the
trap of considering the social reality as projected by the ruling elites to be the real society, without
questioning how such a society has come into being in the first place (Rizer 2011). Lastly, teleology and
tautology are the biggest traps into which structural-functionalism succumbs to. Agreeing with Turner and
Maryanski, Ritzer (2011) opines that it is not „teleology‟ per se but „illegitimate teleology‟ which is
problematic. A teleological argument is one in which certain social structures and processes are believed
to exist because it fulfills some function in society. But „illegitimate‟ teleological argument is one in
which just justification is stretched to its extreme form (Ritzer 2011). An example cited by Ritzer in this
regard, is that, family must exist in order to fulfill the end of procreation and socialization in society;
hence the society „needs‟ a family, is illegitimate teleological argument because there could exist some
other institution/s which may fulfill the same function. A tautological argument is a form of „circular
reasoning‟ in which the conclusion is a „restatement of the premise‟ (Ritzer 2011: 260). So, a social
system is defined as per the interrelations between various parts and the parts comprising the social
system are explained by virtue of its relationship to the social whole. In such circular reasoning, Ritzer
(2011) opines neither the society nor the parts are explained properly.

In the next section, we look into the travails of neofunctionalism which emerged from within the critiques
of structural-functionalism (Turner and Maryanski 1988)

8. The ‘Neo’ in Functionalism

8.1 Towards a Synthetic Approach

According to Ritzer (2011) the strength and appeal of Parsonian theory lay in his ability to incorporate
various dimensions of the social world viz. the social, cultural and personality. However towards the end
of his career, his approach began to value the cultural system more than the others, such that, the other
systems were seen as being determined by the cultural system. It was at this instance that
neofunctionalism asserted its theoretical importance in sociology.

During the mid-1980s Alexander remarked that neofunctionalism was a „tendency rather than a developed
theory‟ (Alexander cited in Ritzer 2011:252). Some of the characteristics of neofunctionalism can be
noted as the following. Firstly, neofunctionalism provides a „descriptive view of society‟ which looks at
society comprising different components each of them forming interaction patterns. Such a view looks for
multidimensional causality of phenomena and is open-ended in nature (Ritzer 2011). Neofunctionalism
takes macro and micro forms of social phenomenon into account. It proposes a general idea of action
including the „rational‟ as well as „expressive‟ content of actions. Very importantly, it has been pointed
out that it views conflictual situations as a part of the social system. „There is a concern for equilibrium
within neofunctiolasim, but it is broader than the structural-functional concern, encompassing both
moving and partial equilibrium‟ (Ritzer 2011). Neofunctionalism refrains from adhering to the notion of
„static equilibrium‟ (Ritzer 2011). Lastly, Ritzer (2011) notes that change is not engendered by
conforming and harmonious resettlements but often through „individuation and institutional strains‟
(Ritzer 2011). Thus, neofunctionalism‟s difference from structural-functionalism approach was that it was
not bound by an overarching conceptual edifice, but was open to ideas from exchange theory, symbolic
interactionism, phenomenology etc. Alexander and Colomy remark that neofunctionalism is a „loosely
organized package‟ with a number of „proliferations and variations at different levels and at different
empirical domains‟ (Alexander and Colomy cited in Ritzer 2011).

Thus, the most important features or „tendencies‟ of neofunctionalism can be summed up as the following
(Alexander cited in Wallace and Wolf 1995):

1. To create a form of functionalism that is multidimensional and includes micro and macro levels
of analysis
2. To push functionalism to the left and reject Parsons‟ optimism about modernity
3. To argue for an implicit democratic thrust in functional analysis
 4. To incorporate a conflict orientation
5. To emphasize contingency (uncertainty) and interactional creativity‟ (Wallace and Wolf 1995
:68).

Hence, it can be concluded that neofunctionalism recognized the futility of a one-sided emphasis on either
macro or micro level analyzing and in the 1980s functionalism saw a qualitative transformation towards
acknowledging the importance of both. Also, in works of other sociologists, like Giddens and Habermas,
this shift towards a synthetic approach was evident.

8.2 As Continuity or Critique of Functionalism?

Neofunctionalism grew amidst the criticisms pitched against structural-functionalism. It contained the
„double element of continuity and internal critique‟ of the earlier functionalism (Alexander 1998:54).
Jeffrey Alexander and Paul Colomy define neofunctionalism as „a self-critical strand of functional theory
that seeks to broaden functionalism‟s intellectual scope while retaining its theoretical core‟ (1985:11).
Thus, it seems clear that Alexander and Colomy see structural-functionalism as extremely narrow. The
goal of the neofunctionalists is the creation of a more synthetic theory (Ritzer 2011:261). It is argued that
Parsonian functionalism originally was synthetic in nature, as is evident in his AGIL system approach, but
gradually in his later works his theory assumed a narrow approach of cultural reductionism (Ritzer 2011).
This was troubling to a new group of thinkers, adherents of the functionalist approach, or the
neofunctionalists. Alexander, Colomy, Richard Munch and Luhmann are some of the noted
neofunctionalists.

Alexander opined that the analytical model by Parsons‟ was one the most important contributions made
by sociologists (Collins1997). The classical sociological thinkers like Marx, Durkheim and Weber had
emphasized only one dimension of social reality. For instance, Marx talked about only the material
conditions which leads to class struggle and engaged in economic determinism. Alexander highlighted the
multidimensional approach of Parsons, so vital to any social analysis. According to Alexander the critics
of Parsons‟ functional approach, viz. the conflict school and phenomenological school theorists failed to
see how their own approaches could fit in the larger analytical scheme generated by Parsons. For instance,
conflict theory reduces everything to economics and politics and the phenomenological school reduces
social analysis to the level of individual, culture and interaction, thereby discounting the macro-level of
analysis. These lacunae, according to Alexander can be incorporated into the Parsonian model of analysis
(Collins 1997). Randall Collins (1997) argues that Alexander unlike his critics was making „an effort to
purify it in the light of modern postpositivist philosophy, and to introduce the insights of conflict theory
and phenomenology‟ (1997:73).

A similarity between Parsons (functionalism) and Alexander (neofunctionalism) is that both take recourse
to classical sociologists like Durkheim, for instance arguing that beneath any utilitarian action which on
the surface appears to be driven by self-interests is actually the result of „common values‟ or shared
understanding about how to achieve goals (Collins 1997:73). In sync with his objective of bringing about
a multidimensional action theory, Alexander also includes elements of Marx‟s conflict theory. However
Collins (1997) critiques this by saying that Alexander does not clearly mark the entry point of Marxian
model of analysis, in fact Collins posits that Alexander has far from developed a full blown system
theory.
However, there are important lessons to be learnt from errors made by Parsons as pointed out by
Alexander. According to Alexander, as noted by Collins, is that one must remember that there exists a
distinction between abstract analytical dimensions of any theory and empirical phenomenon. One must
not confuse them. Also, one should not valorize only the empirical aspect of any theory, but understand
that analytical concepts can become even more valuable to analyze social phenomena. As an example
Collins looks at how Parsons confused the analytical concept of values by locating it empirically,
ignoring the fact that values are not generalizable and often vary across time. For Collins thus, „the
analytical importance of values should be to point us towards the mechanisms that produce them in each
situation, so that we may examine the extent to which they are produced and see how they may fit into
situations of class conflict, political domination and other less-than-ideal phenomena of real life. Seen
analytically rather than concretely, values become a tool in a social conflict analysis‟ (1997:74). Thus, the
above section clearly demonstrates that neofunctionalism is both continuity and a critique to classical
functionalism.

9. A Glimpse of Luhmann’s Social System Analysis

Luhmann was inspired by theorists from different strands of thoughts. His works are drawn from
Husserlian phenomenology, rework of it through Derrida‟s deconstruction, theories taken from Weiner‟s
cybernetics, accounts of emergence and self organization (autopoiesis) drawn from biology and structural
functional accounts of Parsonian social system. For Luhmann a social system comprises meaningful
actions and interrelations between people, thereby distinct from the environment (Wallace and Wolf
1995:70). There are three types of social systems which he talks about – the face-to-face interaction
systems of human beings, the organization system in which membership is linked to specific conditions
and the societal systems. However, Luhmann notes that these systems are not mutually exclusive systems
and social action cuts across all three systems. But in simple societies, there is greater enmeshing of the
three social systems. With societies becoming vast and complex, these three systems do become more
distinct and disparate (Turner 2007). Precisely what form the social system will take depends on how
mechanisms of reducing complexity in societies are deployed. Speaking of Luhmann, Turner (2007) notes
that there exist three dimensions under which complexities are tackled. Firstly there is the temporal
dimension which brings with it an association of past, present complexities and reaches up to the future.
Thus, mechanisms must be in place to orient the actions of people in the temporal field. Secondly, there
could be complexities in material dimension of the environment regarding questions of order in the
various kinds of actions people undertake within the physical space. Thirdly, there is the concern over
which symbolic forms of communication assume importance over others and how symbols are chosen to
organize social actions? Thus, complexities around these three dimensions are resolved by the social
system and this in turn would determine how the social system is able to separate itself from the
environment.

As the three social systems grow increasingly more differentiated, it starts posing problems for the
system. For example, „bottlenecks‟ in the social systems occurs when there are conflictual perspectives at
the interaction system. This could impede organizational efficiency and proper functioning of the societal
system. However, Luhmann notes that despite the existence of potential disruption, there are „processes
that function to maintain social integration‟ (Turner 2007:107).
Another point of interest which according to Turner (2007) is a significant contribution of Luhmann is
that unlike classical functionalists, like Parsons and Durkheim, he does not necessitate the acceptance of
social norms and values as quintessential to maintain order. In fact, according to Luhmann, there does
exist disagreements of values and norms and this is not a defect or „pathological‟ to use Durkheim‟s term.
„The impersonality and neutrality of many encounters in complex systems can be seen as normal and
analyzed less evaluatively‟ (Turner 2007:109). Also, as systems become more differentiated, they
generate a lack of „emotional embeddedness‟ and this provides the space and flexibility for individuals to
pursue different options and not be chained down by traditions (ibid).

10. Luhmann versus Parsons’ System Analysis

Luhmann critiqued Parsons‟ rigid AGIL model which reduced the „dynamism of systems analysis by
reifying it as a fourfold table‟ and instead stressed on „the tension between the internal and external
environments of systems‟; in the process Luhmann „has developed a more supple and dynamic model‟
(Alexander 1998:68). Luhmann‟s deep engagements with Parsons‟ works highlights the absence of any
mention of „self-reference‟ and „complexity‟ in the latter‟s works (Wallace and Wolf 1995: 69). Ritzer
(2011) explains that according to Luhmann, society‟s capacity to refer to itself is central to our
understanding of it as a system‟ (Ritzer 2011:336). Also, Luhmann critiques Parsons for his inability to
capture contingency as a part of his grand theorizing. This Luhmann believes is inadequate as Parsons
analyses „modern society as it is‟ and overlooks the fact that it could be otherwise (Ritzer 2011:335).
Luhmann‟s system analysis was different from that of Parsons in the following way: „Whereas Parsons'
system is metaphysical, Luhmann's is not. Accordingly, Luhmann does not understand the social system
to be a type of cosmological arrangement, whereby roles are regulated by an omnipotent regulatory
mechanism. Also in opposition to Parsons, Luhmann views social action to be the force that constructs
the relational networks thought to comprise the "system", instead of having this action constrained by it.
The uniformity found in every social system is not presumed by Luhmann to be established on some
foundation sui generis, but emerges from collaborative or collective decisions. In short, the focus of each
author is different, with Parsons concentrating on the systemic control of action, while Luhmann stresses
the construction of the social system through action. Whereas Parsons views the social system to exist sui
generis (a la Durkheim), Luhmann understands it to embody collective praxis‟ (Murphy 1982:301). This
highlights the divergence in the system analysis of a classical functionalist like Parsons and a
neofunctionalist like Luhmann.

The social system according to Luhmann has „structural autonomy‟ (Luhmann cited in Wallace and Wolf
1995: 70). Luhmann opines that „self-referential systems are not only self-organizing or self-regulating
systems… They exist as a closed network by continuing to produce the elements which are needed to
continue to produce the elements‟ (ibid). However, Wallace and Wolf (1995) critique this very idea of
Luhmann that societies can do self-reflecting on its own as if it possesses a mind of its own. They contend
that it is ultimately the people who do the thinking and through decisions, foster social change.

Even though Luhmann tangentially touches upon Weberian meaningful action, he does not wish to focus
on human beings and subjective experiences. His theoretical emphasis is on „communication units‟
(Wallace and Wolf 1995:71). Wallace and Wolf (1995) remarks that Luhmann is less optimistic than
Parsons about the future. According to Luhmann „modern world is too complex for shared norms or even
value generalization‟ and he „criticizes Parsons for overestimating not only the social consensus that is
functionally necessary but also the consensus that exists in actuality‟ (Wallace and wolf 1995: 71). It is
the „common acceptance of schematized [or structural] contingency‟ is what makes society and
integration possible (Luhmann cited in Wallace and wolf 1995: 71). Wallace and Wolf (1995) question
the possibility of consensus by virtue of experiencing the same uncertainties that Luhmann advocates for.

According to Turner (2007), Luhmann‟s functionalism can be classified under the „general systems
approach‟ because „it stresses that human action becomes organized and structured into systems. When
the actions of the several people becomes inter-related, a social system can be said to exist‟ (Turner
2007:103). Turner also mentions that such an approach is common with Parsons as well. An inter-related
system of actions becomes integrated into a whole in terms of symbolic modes of communication, for
example through words. One would also find an incorporation of Parson‟s view in Luhmann‟s
understanding of the social system, that - „all social systems exist in multidimensional environments,
which pose potentially endless complexity with which a system must deal‟ (Turner 2007: 103). Hence,
complexity-reduction mechanisms also need to exist in order to bring about a sense of order. Like most
classical functionalists, this neofunctionalist also addresses this functional pre-requisite, viz. „the need to
reduce the complexity of the environment in relations to a system of interrelated actions‟ (Turner
2007:104). So what makes Luhmann‟s approach different?

Parsons and Merton belonged to the structural-functional school of thought. The former stressed more on
abstracted, grand categorization whereas Merton‟s functional orientation was towards relatively empirical
understanding of functional needs that are to be addressed in particular given situations (Turner 2007). To
note Turner (2007): „while all forms of functional analysis, whether Parsons‟ or Merton‟s, have become
recessive in American theoretical circles, functionalism has, to my surprise, enjoyed a revival in Europe
over the last decade, especially in Germany‟ (Turner 2007:102). The thrust to functionalism in a new way
was brought about by Parsons‟ former student Luhmann. According to Luhmann, Parson‟s theory has
become too concerned with its own architecture and complexity that it became much severed from the
empirical phenomena (Turner 2007). Luhmann‟s conceptualization is not as empirically rooted as
Merton‟s and neither as complex as that of Parsons‟, according to Turner. Yet, Luhmann‟s scheme „tends
to bind empirical reality to its purposes‟ (Turner 2007:103).

11. Conclusion

Classical functionalism in sociology has been critiqued in several ways. Neofunctionalism emerged from
within the critique and a reworking of the Parsonian functionalism. However, in its critique of old school
functionalism the neofunctionslists often overlook the important methodological contributions of
functional analysis (Turner and Maryanski 1988). Neofunctionalists, according to Turner and Maryanski
(1988) must recognize that functionalism provides a basic analytical tool to compare different societies by
formulating a list of „basic problems that social systems confront‟ and this provides a common yardstick
for such comparisons. It is a futile attempt by the neofunctionalists to ignore or „downplay‟ the (however
controversial) idea of system/functional requisites because how else would one „record, catalogue, and
array comparative data‟? (Turner and Maryanski 1988).

12. Summary
 In this chapter we see that idea of „social systems‟ was predominant in sociological and
anthropological theorizing since the emergence of sociology as a discipline. However it was
 popularized much after Spencer and Durkheim and a significant revival took place in the 1940s
and 1950s with Parsons and Merton as its central theorists. They were known as the structural
functional sociologists.
 When functionalism is mentioned, it is generally structural-functionalism that we refer to.
 A range of critiques were raised against structural-functionalism.
 At this historical juncture (the 1960s) functionalism was being remodeled by retaining some
elements of it and discarding the others. Alexander, Colomy, Munch, Luhmann were among the
noted neofunctionalists.
 However it is argued that neofunctionalism is functional in nature because it cannot overlook the
methodological importance that functional thinkers highlighted for large-scale macro, societal
comparisons. And the argument goes that even though neofunctionalism tried to identify itself as
a distinct, it remains embedded in various degrees within functionalism. This can be seen in the
works of different neofunctionalists.

13. References

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Murphy, John W. “Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann: Two Versions Of The Social "System."
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