Local Level Governance of

Natural Resources
and the
Environment

Briefing note for embassies

Table of contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 3
2 Why local NREG? ................................................................................ 4
3 Why aim for a stronger involvement of local governments in NREG?........... 5
4 Entry points: National policy influence on local NREG ............................... 6
4.1 Political decentralisation reforms ..................................................... 7
4.2 Policy framework for devolving NREG............................................... 8
4.3 Rights over land and natural resources............................................. 9
4.4 Investing in the productivity of natural resources............................. 10
4.5 Strategic environmental assessment .............................................. 10
4.6 Initiatives around payment for environmental services ..................... 11
5 Instruments ..................................................................................... 12
5.1 Knowledge management .............................................................. 12
5.2 Policy and political dialogue .......................................................... 13
5.3 Support for policy development and implementation ........................ 13
5.4 Complementarity ........................................................................ 14
6 By way of conclusion ......................................................................... 14
Resources .............................................................................................. 15

Photo frontpage by Adam Rogers/UNCDF

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1 Introduction

This briefing note1 deals with the governance of natural resources and the
environment in relation to local economic development and equity2 in rural areas.
Natural resources are a source of subsistence and income for rural people and of
revenue for government and elites. The productivity and sustainability of most
rural economic activities depend on the state of the environment and on the
institutions that govern access and management of the natural resource base.
Governance in relation to natural resources and the environment is a relatively
new policy area within DMW. Both the national and the sub-national level need to
be addressed (DMW, 2006).

The briefing note has a particular focus on the role of sub-national governments
in natural resources and environmental governance (NREG) and the following
three issues will be addressed:

• The importance of stressing the role of local government in natural resources

management and environmental governance, taking into account multi-
stakeholder and multi-level processes;
• The influence of the relationship between national policy and sub-national
levels of government (also referred to as micro-macro linkages) on local
capacities for NREG, thus providing entry points for embassies within national
policy frameworks;
• Possible instruments that can be used by embassies to reinforce local
governance of natural resources and the environment.

Since the 1990s, support for decentralisation has become part of Dutch bilateral
development cooperation and about 20 embassies are currently undertaking
activities in this field (Nibbering and Swart, 2008). Embassies are engaged in
policy dialogue on good governance, and may be involved in support
programmes related to decentralisation or deal with this matter in the context of
sector-wide approaches.

In 2007, embassies in east and southern Africa met with staff of the Ministry to
discuss the contribution of local governments to social and productive service
delivery. This workshop showed that the potential and challenges of
decentralisation processes for improving social service delivery (e.g. education,
health and drinking water supply) are becoming better understood, including the
linkages with public finance management, public sector reform and existing
accountability mechanisms. However, there is much less insight into how local
governments contribute to local economic development, which includes NREG, in
order to promote prosperity and equity. Productive service delivery by local
governments is not yet receiving systematic attention either in policy analysis or
in interventions. This is the main reason why DMW and DDE agreed to provide
more information to embassies on this topic, such as this briefing note.

Productive service delivery by local governments seeks to enhance income

generation, employment creation and economic activity among entrepreneurs,
communities and employees (van den Boom and van der Wal, 2007). These

3
services include legislation and regulation for private sector activities; allocation
and administration of property rights; land use planning; investments in
infrastructure (roads, markets etc.); or encouraging the availability of local
business support services. The various services build economic capacity and
determine the setting for private sector investments and development. Taxation
policies of local governments also affect the private sector (Hilhorst et al., 2008).

Local governments are expected to promote public-private dialogues and

collaboration towards Local Economic Development (LED), that is “the process in
which partnerships between local governments, community-based groups and
the private sector are established to manage existing resources, create jobs and
stimulate the economy of a well-defined area” (Helmsing 2001, see also ILO and
World Bank on LED)3.

The focus of this briefing note is on one aspect of productive service delivery by
local governments – the governance of natural resources and the environment,
which provides the basis for sustainable economic development. It explores ways
for strengthening the guiding and coordinating role of local government in these
matters.

2 Why local NREG?

The principle of subsidiarity implies that a central authority should perform only
those tasks which cannot be performed effectively by a competent lower
authority4. Subsidiarity is one reason for promoting decentralised management of
natural resources and ecosystems as a whole, such as forests, wetlands, grazing
areas, and fisheries. Justice in natural resource governance may be another
reason. These resources are subject to seasonal and annual variations, which
affect composition and availability. This variability is likely to increase under the
influence of climate change. Moreover, most of these natural resources are used
by a range of groups, who may live locally or come from elsewhere and perceive
the resources as de facto “common property”. A decentralised form of
management creates more room for adaptive and flexible decision-making in
response to day-to-day developments. Such a system is likely to contribute to
more efficient, equitable and sustainable resource use.

The most appropriate level for natural resource management varies. The area of
a forest, a lake or a grazing area may cover the administrative boundaries of
several local governments. In other cases, these resources are relatively small in
size and are managed by a single village. For managing larger ecosystems,
alliances of local governments are required, and legislation to facilitate such
arrangements (e.g. mancommunidades, intercommunalité). Local decisions may
have implications for other actors. For example, changes in vegetation cover
upstream may cause erosion and flooding downstream, when affecting the
hydrology of the watershed, or they impact on water quality, biodiversity, etc.
Management of this type of complex ecosystems requires a holistic approach,
taking into account the various functions of the resource and the different
perspectives of actors concerned.

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In many places, sophisticated but informal management systems sustain
productivity, regulate competition and prevent conflict over resource use.
However, these locally-recognised systems of rights and responsibilities are not
necessarily acknowledged in formal legislation.5 When de jure management
control over such resources has been transferred to the central state, customary
authorities try to uphold informal management systems, since they will be the
first to experience the consequences of overuse, degradation and conflict.
However, their efforts are undermined in cases where central authorities overrule
local management decisions. In such situations, trust between government
officials and local resource users is low. The capacity of local institutions to
regulate resource use may also be undermined by growing pressures on natural
resources (for example by demographic changes, market demand for
environmental goods) and the unravelling of social capital. Common property
regimes may erode into “open access”, leading to what has been called the
“tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom and Field, 1999).

In response to the disempowerment of local resource users in managing their

resource base, initiatives to promote participatory natural resource management
by local communities have emerged. In these approaches, local users’ awareness
and knowledge of ecosystems as well as their vested interest in sustaining
resources are acknowledged. They participate in decision making on resource
management and are responsible for implementation. This recognition of local
knowledge represents a paradigm change; thus far policy makers have tended to
hold local users responsible for resource degradation. These participatory
initiatives have produced locally-accepted agreements on regulating resource
use, but they were seldom institutionalised in policies and legislation: they were
merely tolerated by government. As a consequence, enforcement of agreed
regulations becomes difficult, since communities have no formal power to
penalise trespassers.

3 Why aim for a stronger involvement of local governments in

NREG?
In contrast to most community institutions for managing natural resource use
and the environment, local governments have a legal status and are part of
government administration. The proliferation of local governments and their
growing discretionary space and downward accountability are an opportunity for
strengthening decentralised management of natural resources (Hilhorst, 2008).

However, some communities may regard local government structures as an

imposition on their existing customary institutions. In order to be effective, local
governments need to reconcile legitimacy with legality. They have to
welcome participation and collaborate with existing organisations and structures,
including customary authorities. This requires councillors and staff to be willing
to and capable of operating in non-hierarchical, collaborative relationships.

Local governments deal with an array of issues and demands; NREG may not be
their first priority. Local government development plans are unlikely to start from
an environmental perspective. They also tend to have limited specialist

5
knowledge among their staff and need to call on external capacities supplied by
sector ministries, or hired expertise such as consultants. In addition, increasing
tax collection is often a major concern for governments. Taxes and levies on
natural resource use such as on firewood, timber and grazing lands are all
potential sources of revenues. Short-term interests in increasing tax revenues
are not necessarily balanced with long-term interests in sustainable resource
use. Local governments may not realise that NREG is a condition for economic
growth, and that in the long run, a well-managed natural resource will generate
more revenues in the form of income and taxes.

NREG involves multiple stakeholders. Donor agencies need to be aware of

their influence on local interactions and power relations through the politics of
choice and the effects of recognition. Naturally, the structures that agencies
choose will receive more resources and support, gain in visibility and become
stronger in local policy arenas. Agencies can support local government or choose
“parallel” organisations, such as local line ministry offices, NGOs, customary
chiefs, private corporations, or user committees that are directly involved in
actual management of natural resources. However, when these organisations
overtake the responsibilities of elected local governments, they run the risk of
draining local administrations of authority and resources, thus undermining their
legitimacy (Ribot, 2008).

The capacity of all actors to work in collaborative partnerships and networks is

important for governance outcomes. In line with subsidiarity principles and
building democracy, it seems best that local governments focus on overall
management of agreements, equity, ensuring adherence to contracts, and
monitoring fulfilment of commitments. Actual implementation may be delegated
or contracted out by local governments to user committees6. Local user
committees and associations are often perceived by communities as being more
effective, legitimate and transparent with respect to natural resource
management. Together, these committees, associations and other organisations
working on NREG can push local authorities to respect their mandate and
improve performance.

4 Entry points: National policy influence on local NREG

Ultimately, NREG policies will be judged on the extent to which they strengthen
local capacities to manage and use natural resources in a sustainable way, and
enhance justice in natural resource governance. Policies addressing NREG have
to accommodate the following principles:
- The ecosystem is the point of departure, which may not be identical to
administrative boundaries;
- Sustainable resource use and no mining of assets;
- Subsidiarity of management;
- Equity with respect to access and even affirmative action – where access to
natural resources is contested, marginalised groups may lose out.

The focus of this section is on the decision and actions required at the national
level for making NREG legal and feasible at the local level.

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4.1 Political decentralisation reforms

This briefing note assumes that elected and empowered local governments exist
in rural areas. Such presence is a relative new phenomenon in a number of
countries and the product of political decentralisation. This is defined as the
transfer (or devolution) of authority and resources from higher to lower levels of
government.7 Political decentralisation may result in more local autonomy in
planning, programming and spending resources. Unlocking this potential requires
a repositioning of central government away from implementation, while
concentrating on setting policies, providing guidance, informing, supervising,
inspecting and arbitrating. Oversight by central government is required to ensure
that the rule of law is respected. It is also the responsibility of central
government to ensure that natural resources and biodiversity are safeguarded, in
accordance with national policies and international commitments, as well as to
prevent exclusion and social injustice in the name of local autonomy.

The growing discretionary space for local governments may give new impetus to
territorial planning8 and offers opportunities for NREG (EC, 2007). What is
possible depends on the balance between mandate and responsibilities versus
the resources and authority actually transferred. The outcome determines local
governments’ capacity to act.

Local capacity is also determined by the extent to which deconcentrated levels of

ministries collaborate with local governments. Incentives may be needed to
encourage ministries and departments to work in partnership with local
governments. Responsibilities for natural resources and the environment are
located in various ministries and agencies (agriculture, livestock, forestry, water,
environment, waste management, land administration, land use planning,
development planning, finance and local government).

The number of governments pursuing institutional reforms towards

decentralisation is increasing. Countries embark on political decentralisation for a
number of reasons. These include an improvement in the effectiveness and
efficiency of service delivery by reducing transaction costs, and better integration
of local needs and aspirations into local decision making. This may also increase
equity and efficiency. Other reasons are a more enabling environment for local
development; modernising the operation of the state; and expanding
democratisation. Political decentralisation may create openings for improving
governance in terms of more space for citizen consultation and participation,
while the increased proximity may facilitate information exchange and improve
transparency. Political decentralisation reforms take many years and pass
through several stages. It can be a politically charged process. Moves towards
more decentralisation may be followed by trends towards recentralisation.
Devolved competences may be constrained later on, such as by earmarking
funding and strict and detailed management requirements, which leave limited
discretionary space for decision making.

Political decentralisation has passionate supporters and opponents; debates may

easily become normative. From a NREG perspective, it is more worthwhile to

7
take a context-specific and pragmatic approach, while linking up to choices
of the partner country – although not in an uncritical manner (Nibbering and
Swart, 2008). Whether local government is more equitable and significant for
poor and marginalised people depends on the quality of local leadership and the
ability of local organisations to express their expectations, and to engage
effectively.

Political decentralisation does not automatically lead to better governance. Local

government councillors and officials are not necessarily acting transparently and
in the interest of all citizens. Power without accountability breeds corruption and
exclusion, and this is also true at the local level. Local governments are just as
prone to entrenched norms and values that reduce political participation – for
women, young people or minorities, for example – as other politicians and
government staff. Local governments have to deal with political pressure and
commercial interests. There are potential risks of party political struggles
intruding upon the management of local affairs; local governments are also
vulnerable to co-opting by local élites, clientelism and corruption. Better
governance is about transparency, multiple forms of accountability,
responsiveness and equity. Local governments need to adhere to accountability
as an obligation, while citizens, their organisations and the private sector have to
voice their concerns and be willing to hold local government to account.

Despite this range of challenges, political decentralisation has transformed the

rural institutional landscape in a number of countries, where for the first time
rural communities have been given legal powers to work on local priorities and
develop potentials. These new prerogatives offer opportunities for promoting
sustainable economic development and improving NREG. Finally, although the
focus of this section is on the relationship between local government and central
government over the transfer of authority and resources, management of natural
resources requires a multi-level approach. The role of the meso-level – the
region, province, or department – in bridging the micro-macro gap is equally
important.

4.2 Policy framework for devolving NREG

Local-level NREG is only sustainable when grounded in legislation and national

policies, particularly those addressing the environment, natural resources and
decentralisation. This ensures that local governments are sufficiently empowered
to deal with NREG-related challenges. The formal mandate of local government
with respect to NREG varies amongst countries. Responsibilities related to
environmental pollution, waste management and land use planning are devolved
often to local governments. Land use planning in particular can be an important
tool for NREG, assuming that the instrument is user-friendly, has legal effect and
will not be limited to technical uses. The transfer of responsibilities over the
allocation and management of land and natural resources is much slower. Often,
central government and ministries continue to control priority setting, planning,
budgets and the deployment of human resources.9

This slow pace of devolution may reflect the strength of forces which seek to
preserve the status quo around control of land and natural resources.10 There will

8
be resistance when these resources play an important role in power relations and
are an opportunity for financial gain, which in turn may have a severe impact on
the quality of governance. Illegal logging, for example, causes environmental
damage, deprivation of assets, revenue and taxes for forest-dependent
communities, and for local and national governments. In addition, the illegality
context provokes corruption, which demoralises and undermines trust in
government officials and structures; unfair competition damages the
development of honest enterprises (Pye-Smith, 2000). Local governments need
to bargain collectively with central government to ensure that they are granted
the rights they need to manage the environment and natural resources, and that
the rights they have been granted in law are transferred to them in practice
(Ribot, 2008).

Another reason for the slow pace of devolving responsibility for the management
of natural resources is central government’s doubts about local capacities to
manage natural resources in a sustainable way. The following sequence can be
followed for devolving powers related to natural resource management
progressively to local government, while addressing concerns over local capacity
and risks to the environment, and minimising the risk of provoking conflict and
resistance (Ribot, 2004).

• Transfer additional funding with all centrally mandated obligations.

• Establish environmental subsidiarity principles to guide the transfer of
sufficient discretionary powers.
• Transfer powers before requiring demonstration of capacity; First transfer
decisions and powers that are unlikely to incite violence or lead to
environmental damage.
• Transfer political decisions related to allocation of access and benefit
distribution before transferring highly technical resource management
decisions.
• Transfer finance and revenue-raising powers before transferring
management obligations.
• Establish minimum environmental standards, which specify the minimum
requirements for the use and management of the natural resource base.
Standards need to be simple and restricted to essential protections so as
to “maximise” local discretion and the space for local democracy.

4.3 Rights over land and natural resources

The local willingness to invest in the sustainable management of natural

resources depends on the security of rights to access that resource and benefit
from the produce (Shyamsunda et al., 2005). NREG at the local level frequently
concerns de facto common pool resources and often the legal position of local
institutions regulating access and management is weak. This insecurity of rights
will affect local capabilities to regulate resource exploitation and possibilities to
improve the value of products.11

Several countries have decided to provide more legal security to customary

systems of land use, but these tend to focus on cultivated lands. Instruments
used are registration and certification, and local governments may play an

9
important role in this form of land administration (and may also use the system
for taxation purposes). However, when efforts to secure farmland are not
accompanied by measures to protect rights to collectively used natural
resources, then these initiatives may provoke more degradation. When feeling
insecure by growing demand for land to government from migrants and
investors, for example, communities may decide to convert their forest lands into
farm land in order to secure their rights.

Governments legally own over 70% of the world’s forests on behalf of their
citizens12. However, the way central government agencies perceive their
stewardship role is changing, partly in response to the growing value of land and
natural resources such as timber, firewood, and minerals. These resources are
increasingly sought after by national and international investors who aim to seize
opportunities presented by rising prices for land, food, biofuels and timber (and
perhaps even for carbon sequestration and nature parks – see Alden Wiley,
2006). Often these investors request that central government agencies or
ministers allocate large tracts of land which are now used for rainfed farming,
grazing or which concern wetlands and forests. These lands are regarded as free
lands at the central level; local governments and user groups are generally not
consulted. When such requests are granted, often existing legislation is
bypassed. Legislation and policies to protect the environment such as
environmental impact assessments are not applied, raising concerns about
respect for the rule of law. There are also concerns about the transparency of
contract negotiation, the lack of involvement of local communities, the correct
informing of parliament, oversight of the conditions of the concessions and
transparency of revenue use.

4.4 Investing in the productivity of natural resources

Sustainable land use and productivity of natural resources can be improved by

investing in soil and water conservation, irrigation schemes, tree planting and so
forth. Farmers’ efforts to improve their land may need to be accompanied by
government action, given the scale of investment required and the time it takes
before benefits can be reaped. Local governments can support such initiatives by
using investment funds for economic development, where available, and by
lobbying ministries, programmes, and projects to invest in their area.

Where poverty is severe, so-called productive safety nets (forms of food-for-

work programmes and labour- intensive public works) can also be used to
generate employment immediately, while investing in public works that
contribute to more sustainable and productive use of natural resources. The
challenge is to make sure that these programmes are well-targeted to ensure
that the neediest households benefit and contribute to sound investments that
meet local priorities. This can be achieved by working through local
governments, while assisting them in local consultation and planning and in
targeting, such as has been the case in Rwanda.

4.5 Strategic environmental assessment

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Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) can play a role in improving
environmental governance, and is used at both central and local levels. Local-
level SEA may facilitate the integration of environmental sustainability in decision
making and strategic planning, and even improve local revenues from collecting
taxes. The use of local level SEA can be mandatory (as in China, and planned
for Ghana) or voluntary (as in some eastern European countries). SEA at the
local level is used for gathering appropriate information and to promote
alignment with national policies (as we have seen in certain districts in Ghana);
to bring all stakeholders into the local government planning process, especially
weaker actors (Nicaragua); and to enhance insight in the key issues - for
example discussions on timber exploitation, ecotourism and use of pesticides
(Nicaragua). Local Environmental Action Plans in eastern Europe have enabled
better natural resource management and waste management at city level.
However, SEA needs to be integrated better into the local planning cycle and
more robust legal procedures may be required to back this up.

Inevitably, some environmental changes faced by local governments have to be

addressed at higher levels. Support for dealing with environmental challenges
will improve via better cooperation amongst local government and good contacts
with environmental protection agencies and specialised NGOs. Associations of
local governments can assist with strengthening this type of coordination.

4.6 Initiatives around payment for environmental services

Payment for environmental services (PES) is a new (inter)national policy area

that aims to link NREG-related issues such as land use, ecosystem management
and integrated water resource management to national poverty policies. PES
schemes seek to reward those whose lands and resources provide
environmental services (such as water purification, flood control, breeding
grounds for fisheries, carbon sequestration, etc.) with subsidies or market
payments from those who benefit. PES schemes are also being developed by the
private sector13. NGOs are taking the lead in developing REDD (Reduced
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) policies. REDD should become a
mechanism for compensating countries for reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation, thus generating a flow of funds for helping preserve
rainforests and delivering economic benefits to rural communities. There are also
compensation schemes for CO2 emissions (air travel etc.). A more indirect use of
PES principles is by using trade mechanisms, such as certification schemes to
promote sustainable natural resource use and procurement.

Arranging payments for benefits provided by forests, coral reefs and other
ecosystems is a way to recognise their value and ensure that these benefits
continue well beyond present generations. In the case of payments for
watershed services, local governments are often involved, particularly in Latin
America. However, there is little evidence yet that these PES schemes around
watersheds are living up to the high expectations placed on them (Porras et al.,
2008).

Setting up PES schemes requires an assessment of the range of ecosystem

services that flow from a particular area, and who they benefit; next an

11
estimation of the economic value of the benefits to different groups of
beneficiaries is needed. The final step is the design of a policy, subsidy, or
market to capture this value and reward landholders or resource managers for
conserving the source of the ecosystem services. Unsurprisingly, methods for
evaluating actual benefits of PES (in terms of environmental goods and services)
under different types of land use are subject to discussion. Other challenges
include how to integrate PES in economic policy and public finance management;
dealing with competing claims, making PES more “pro-poor”, and involve the
actual local managers of natural resources.

Finally, lessons have to be learned from existing benefit sharing systems to

enhance the effectiveness and governance. Such schemes exist around timber
royalties and often involve local governments, villages and even customary
chieftaincies. They are managed by sector ministries or the ministry of finance.
Challenges remain with royalty recovery, transparency of resource management
and disbursement, accountability mechanisms, and whether local managers of
natural resources actually receive their share and invest in maintaining the
resources.

5 Instruments
5.1 Knowledge management

The context analysis of the multi-annual strategic plan (MASP) of the embassy is
likely to include an assessment of the state of natural resources and the
environment, its implications for economic development and other effects on
security and governance. In addition, a track record will be available at those
embassies that have selected NREG-related sectors. Embassies may decide to
undertake a deeper analysis of the institutional context for NREG (e.g. sector
SGACA - strategic governance and corruption analysis), to better substantiate
the selection of entry points in national policy frameworks and identify partners.
Such an analysis explores in more detail governance aspects related to natural
resources and the environment, and identify drivers of change.

Given that governance in relation to the environment and natural resources is a

relatively new policy area, knowledge management, innovation and research is
important for DMW and for embassies. Also, partner countries may need to
strengthen local research and knowledge management capacity to ensure that
policies are rooted in country-level experiences. Moreover, partner countries
need to build and maintain capacity to analyse the effects for NREG of policy
initiatives and assess the opportunities offered by new global environmental
policies (e.g. PES schemes, FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement Governance and
Trade), REDD, sustainability criteria for biofuel, international conventions on
biodiversity, climate change, etc.).

Embassies may consider facilitating long-term partnerships between local

research institutions such as NGOs and academia and Dutch knowledge
institutes, and facilitate access to training opportunities (such as via NUFFIC). At
the embassy level, policy development on NREG benefits from pooling knowledge

12
and research, joint strategy development and division of labour amongst
development partners, as is happening in Ghana, for example.

5.2 Policy and political dialogue

Matters related to the policy context for local level NREG can be raised in policy
and political dialogues with the government of partner countries. Natural
resources and the environment are clear domains for diplomacy, as issues
related to control over land and natural resources are often politically sensitive.
The interests are considerable, as land-related matters touch also upon issues of
belonging and heritage, not to mention rural livelihoods.

From time to time embassies and development agencies may be in a position to

be a catalyst in promoting wider consultation, to help to balance powerful vested
interests, and encourage respect for the rule of law. Currently, policy decision
making is not always evidence-based or transparent, and may contradict
prevailing legislation to protect the environment. A related entry point is by
encouraging partner countries to respect international treaties which have been
signed by the partner country.

5.3 Support for policy development and implementation

A number of ongoing support programs by embassies may touch upon issues

that influence the setting for local NREG, such as programmes in support of
decentralisation; public sector reform; public finance management and fiscal
decentralisation; judiciary reform; land policy and administration; environment;
rural development; rural private sector development; renewable energy
(biofuels). Matters related to local NREG can be accentuated and discussed in
policy dialogues.

Encouraging policy alignment and harmonisation is another area where

embassies can contribute. The linkages between decentralisation policy on the
one hand and natural resource management, environmental protection and land
administration on the other are an obvious entry point. Public finance
management mechanisms (taxes, levies and royalties) can be assessed with
respect to their possible effect on natural resource use, whether positive or
negative.

Embassies can also decide to contribute actively to conducive policy contexts for
local NREG. This may include providing assistance to the partner country in
clarifying and strengthening the role of local government on matters concerning
the environment and sustainable use of natural resources. Support programs
may focus on the revision of the legal framework, decrees and procedures,
implementation, and (participatory) monitoring. Occasionally, support for pilot
projects to improve policy implementation by testing alternative approaches in
different contexts can be considered (Lund, 2006). Such pilots need to be
accompanied by solid analysis, documentation and communication to ensure that
appropriate policy lessons are drawn.

13
When embassies are engaged in sector support programmes related to natural
resource and the environment, indicators related to local NREG can be included
in a performance assessment framework.

5.4 Complementarity

Non-state actors, such as producer organisations, NGOs, and the private sector
will communicate NREG-related concerns to their governments. These actors are
involved in capacity building and assist local users in claiming rights and
requesting more accountability. Associations of local governments and
municipalities are key actors in matters concerning decentralisation.
Strengthening the synergy between the work of embassies and civil society, the
private sector, local government associations and academia is therefore crucial.

In the Netherlands, the VNG (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten) plays a

strong role in international associations of local governments. The commission
for environmental assessments (commissie MER) is expert in strategic
environmental assessments. A number of civil society organisations specialised in
environmental issues (International Union for Conservation of Nature, World
Wildlife Fund, Friends of the Earth etc.) engage in initiatives such as FLEGT,
REDD, PES and certification schemes. As already indicated above, another
element of promoting complementarity is to encourage partnerships with
research, training institutions and specialised NGOs.

6 By way of conclusion

This briefing note on NREG has set out the importance for decentralised
management of natural resources and the environment for sustainable local
economic development and equity. It explained the strategic contribution of local
governments to this multi-stakeholder process, and why it matters to strengthen
their capacity to act in combination with effective accountability mechanisms.
This is where national policies come in and where embassies can make a useful
contribution to reinforce local governance of natural resources and the
environment.

14
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Boom, R. van den, and F. van der Wal (2007). Introductory paper. Decentralisation
Workshop, Arusha, February 2007.
DMW (2006) Knowledge, innovation and research strategy – briefing paper.
European Commission (2007). Supporting decentralisation and local governance in third
countries. Tools and methods series. Reference document no. 2. Europeaid.
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162, 1243-1248.
Helmsing, B. (2001). Local Economic Development in Low and Middle-Income Countries:
New generations of Actors, Policies and Instruments.Unpublished paper, ISS, The Hague.
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End notes
1
This briefing note is prepared by DMW with support from the Royal Tropical Institute
(KIT) with contributions from Rob van den Boom, Thea Hilhorst and Govert Visser. The
briefing note is based on a literature review and workshops organised by DMW, KIT and
Aladin; consultations with VNG, ISS, WUR, commissie MER. It is accompanied by a
“resource folder”, prepared by Kathelijne Smits and available via DMW, containing
pointers to sources of information for specific themes such as forest management; water
management; agriculture; management of pastures; managing access to land and
natural resources; marine resource management ; mining; wildlife; tourism;
environmental policy and environmental impact assessment; mainstreaming of
sustainable natural resource use.
2
Growth and equity is one of the four focus points in the latest policy brief of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (2007).
3
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/EXTLE
D/0,,menuPK:341145~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:341139,00.html
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/empent/empent.portal?p_prog=L
Most experience with this form of local economic development is gained in urban
environments and at the regional level, particularly in Latin America. For example, LED is
official policy in South Africa and received much attention in Bolivia (“municipio
productivo”) (VNG, 2007; Janvry & Sadoulet 2004).
4
Subsidiarity is a dynamic process and entails a struggle among multiple levels of
political administrative organisations and groups within society (Ribot, 2008)
5
To make matters even more complicated, these laws may be perceived locally as
inappropriate from an ecological point of view and unjust from a rights perspective.
6
Local user committees may need supported to strengthen capacity and structures, and
to link up “officially” to local government.
7
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/interlaken/Compilation.pdf
8
The recent decentralisation model reintroduces the notion of territorial (regional)
planning (aménagement du territoire), which should help to place local development
planning in a broader spatial perspective. This makes it possible to take into account
potential social and economic synergies between urban and rural municipalities and to
promote cooperation between different municipalities.
9
Even when no authority is devolved, often rural local governments are de facto involved
in NREG by supporting local agreements or assisting with conflict prevention. Most of
these experiences tend to be informal and not well publicised.
10
Forest laws may contain double standards when requiring stricter management from
local communities and small entrepreneurs than from large-scale commercial forestry-
based industries.
11
The quality of “wild” or “forest” coffee, a non-forest timber product around which value
chains are being set up in Ethiopia, depends on harvesting at the right time – but this
has become difficult in practice as forest coffee beans are considered by some (migrant)
groups as open access. Those tending the wild coffee plants prefer to harvest the beans
green, to ensure having a product instead of taking the risk to wait for the berries to
mature.
12

http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/forest_issues/from_exclusion_summ_jul08_en
g.pdf
13
For example, the Rabobank pilots a project to compensate Brazilian farmers with large
landholdings not to deforest in return for carbon credits.

16