NUREGIIA-0225

International
Agreement Report

Analyzing Operator Actions

During Loss of AC Power
Accident with Subsequent,
Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
Prepared by:
I. Parzer', B. Krajnc 2, B. Mavko'

'[Link] Stefan Institute

Jamova cesta 39
SI-1000, Ljubljana, slovenia
2NPP Kr ko
Vrbina 12
S1-8270 [Link], Slovenia

A. Calvo, NRC Project Manager

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

April 2010

Prepared as part of
The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange
Under the Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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 NUREG/IA-0225

International
Agreement Report

Analyzing Operator Actions

During Loss of AC Power
Accident with Subsequent
Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
Prepared by:
I. Parzer', B. Krajnc 2, B. Mavko'

'Jo;ef Stefan Institute

Jamova cesta 39
SI-1000, Ljubljana, slovenia
2
NPP Krko
Vrbina 12
S1-8270 Kr~ko, Slovenia

A. Calvo, NRC Project Manager

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

April 2010

Prepared as part of
The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange
Under the Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 ABSTRACT

The thermo-hydraulic analysis of plant response on total loss of AC power is very demanding
and challenging job due to a number of phenomena included. Such an analysis becomes even
more complicated and interesting if we include also the assumption of total loss of secondary
heat sink.

In this paper we are presenting the NPP Kr~ko specific analysis of complete loss of AC power
with subsequent total loss of secondary heat sink and influence of specific operator actions. The
aim of this analysis is to verify if emergency operating (EOP) or severe accident management
guidelines (SAMG) procedures should be changed and if design change on pressurizer
pressure relief valves (PORV) should be implemented to be able to cope with this kind of
accidents better.

The analyses were performed with three different state of the art codes used at NPP Kr~ko and
IJS: RELAP5/MOD3.3, ANTHEM and MAAP4. The last two codes are used in the NPP Krko
plant specific full scope simulator, one for the simulation of the design bases transients and
accidents and the second for simulation of the severe accidents.

This type of analyses has been done also for the simulator validation, performed during vendor
and site acceptance testing.

iii
 CONTENTS
Page

A b stra c t ........................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgement ......................................................................................................... viii

A b b re v ia tio n s .................................................................................................................. ix

1 . In tro d u c tio n ............................................................................................................. 1 -1

2. Plant description ..................................................................................................... 2-1

2 .1 C o nta in m e nt ................................................................................................................... 2 -1
2 .2 T u rb in e B uild ing ............................................................................................................. 2 -1
2 .3 A ux ilia ry B u ild ing ............................................................................................................ 2-1
2 .4 Inta ke S tructu re ............................................................................................................. 2-1
2.5 Fuel Handling Building ................................................................................................... 2-1
2.6 Nuclear Steam Supply System ....................................................................................... 2-2
2 .7 R e a cto r C o re ................................................................................................................. 2-2
2.8 Reactor Coolant System ................................................................................................ 2-2
2.9 Auxiliary Systems .......................................................................................................... 2-3
2.10 Engineered Safety Features Systems .................................................................... 2-3

3. Accident progression and operator actions ............................................................. 3-1

4. Input model description ........................................................................................... 4-1

4.1 Hydrodynamic component description ..................................... 4-1
4.2 Regulation and protection logic ...................................................................................... 4-4

5 . R e s u lts .................................................................................................................... 5 -1
5 .1 Ba se a n a lyse s ................................................................................................................ 5-1
5.2 Variation analyses ........................................................................................................ 5-10

6. RELAP5/MOD3.3 run statistics ............................................................................... 6-1

7 . C o n c lu s io n s ............................................................................................................ 7 -1

8 . R e fe re n c e s .............................................................................................................. 8 -1

V
 Figures

Page
1. NPP Krko nodalization scheme ........................................... 4-2
2. Primary system pressure - RELAP5/MOD3.3 ....................................................................... 5-4
3. Primary system pressure - SIM- ANTHEM ...................................... ..................................... 5-4
4. Primary system pressure - MAAR4 ....................................................................................... 5-5
5. Total primary leak - RELAP5/MOD3.3 .................................................................................. 5-5
6. SG 1 valves flow - RELAP5/MOD3.3 .................................................................................... 5-6
7. SG 1 WR level - RELAP5/MOD3.3 ....................................................................................... 5-6
8. Accumulator no.1 level - RELAP5/MOD3.3 ........................................................................... 5-7
9. P R Z level - R ELA P 5/M O D 3.3 ............................................................................................... 5-7
10. Primary mass - RELAP5/MOD3.3 ........................................................................................ 5-8
11. C ore level - R ELA P5/M O D 3.3 .............................................................................................. 5-8
12. Rod cladding temperature - RELAP5/MOD3.3 .................................................................... 5-9
13. Core exit temperature - RELAP5/MOD3.3 ........................................................................... 5-9
14. Primary system pressure without and with depressurization using PRZ relief valves -
MA A P4 ..................................................................................................................................... 5 -1 1
15. Primary system pressure without and with depressurization using PRZ relief valves -
R E LA P5/M O D 3 .3 ..................................................................................................................... 5-11
16. Consumed CPU time for all base and variation analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3 .......... 6-1
17. Mass error for 3 base analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3 ................................................. 6-3
18. Time step for 3 base analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3.. ...................... 6-3
19. Courant At for 3 base analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3 .................................................. 6-4
20. Mass error for 3 variation analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3 ............................................ 6-4
21. Time step for 3 variation analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3 .............................................. 6-5
22. Courant At for 3 variation analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3 ............................................ 6-5

vi
 Tables

Page
1. Loss of all AC power - assumptions common for all analyses .............................................. 5-2
2. Comparison of available time - time until the core heatup - degradations starts ................... 5-2
3. Loss of all AC power - assumptions for MAAP analyses .................................................... 5-10
4. R u n tim e sta tistics ................................................................................................................. 6 -1

vii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The RELAP5/MOD3.3 NPP [Link] base input model, nodalization diagram and plant full scope
simulator data are courtesy of Kr~ko NPP.

viii
 ABBREVIATIONS

AC Alternating Current
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater
CC Component Cooling
CET Core Exit Temperature
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling system
EOP Emergency Operating Procedures
HPIS High Pressure Injection System
IJS Institut "Jo2ef Stefan"
LPIS Low Pressure Injection System
MFW Main Feedwater
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System
PORV Power Operated Relief Valve
PRZ Pressurizer
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
RCS Reactor Coolant System
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
RHRS Residual Heat Removal System
SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidelines
SG Steam Generator
TSC Technical Support Center

ix
 1. INTRODUCTION

Station blackout is the accident where it is assumed that all plant AC power sources are lost.
That means that all the offsite AC power sources are unavailable and at the same time it is also
assumed all AC sources on the site are lost. Within this paper we are going to discuss
concurrent total loss of all AC and loss of secondary heat sink (no SG feed available). One
should know that this type of the accident is beyond the design bases of all the nuclear power
plants currently operating around the word. If AC power is not recovered within certain time this
scenario will lead to the severe accident sequence of events when the core damage and
degradation becomes unavoidable.

This type of the accidents would also result in loss of coolant accident due to the fact that the
operators would not be able to isolate the letdown and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff lines.
This is true in case of NPP Krko and many other plants of same or similar design,.since
isolation valves on those lines are motor driven valves. As a consequence of loss of seal
injection and the fact that the thermal barrier cooling is also lost, reactor coolant pumps (RCP)
seals are exposed to high temperature of the primary coolant. This will cause seals degradation
and seal leakoff flow will develop to a break flow. This is one of the well-known safety issues,
which are known as the unresolved safety issues. This one was recognized as no.25 [1]. As a
response on this issue the industry initiated a large research program, which resulted in certain
seal improvements. New seals have higher temperature resistance so it is predicted that instead
after approximately 30 minutes they would fail after approximately 2 hours.

If the AC power is not recovered before the core is uncovered and significantly overheated, core
melt and consequently primary system failure from high pressure could not be avoided. As soon
as the core exit temperature is higher than 650 °C for more than 30 minutes it is considered that
accident becomes a severe accident. For this type of the accidents nuclear industry, including
NPP [Link], have developed so called Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG),
where the main objectives are to maintain fission products barriers intact (primary system and
containment). If this is not possible or in case that release of fission product is in progress then
these procedures (SAMG) will suggest actions to minimize the fission products release to the
environment, with the purpose to protect the public health.

1-1
 2. PLANT DESCRIPTION

NPP Kr~ko is a Westinghouse 2-loop PWR plant, in commercial operation since 1983.

2.1 Containment

The NPP Krko Nuclear Power Plant utilizes a cylindrical steel shell with a hemispherical dome
and ellipsoidal bottom designed to accommodate normal operating loads, functional loads
resulting from a loss-of-coolant accident, and the most severe loading predicted for seismic
activity. A concrete shield building surrounds the steel shell to provide biological shielding for
both normal and accident conditions and to provide collection and holdup for leakage from the
containment vessel. Inside the containment structure, the reactor and other NSSS components
are shielded with concrete. In addition to a containment spray system, a containment
recirculation and cooling system is provided to remove post-accident heat.

2.2 Turbine Building

The turbine building contains the turbine generator and all the power conversion related
accessories. The building is of closed construction. The building does not contain any safety
related equipment and is designed in accordance with local and national building codes.

2.3 Auxiliary Building

The auxiliary building structures are of reinforced concrete design with shear walls and beam
and slab floor systems. The portion of the auxiliary building that is below grade elevation is
suitably protected with a waterproofing membrane to prevent the intrusion of groundwater. In
addition, redundant safety equipment below grade is located in separate compartments to
preclude simultaneous flooding due to a fluid-system rupture.

2.4 Intake Structure

The intake structure consists of two separate substructures: a non-safety category structure
containing the main condenser circulating pumps and related equipment and a safety category
structure containing the service water pumps and the related equipment. For cooling water
intake, a dam has been built across the Sava River with the pumping station, and water intake
and discharge structures. Two batteries of cooling cells are included for combined cooling in the
event of low river flow rates.

2.5 Fuel Handling Building

The fuel handling building is an integral part of the auxiliary building and is a reinforced concrete
structure that utilizes shear walls and beam and slab floor systems. The spent fuel pool within
the fuel handling building is lined with stainless steel to prevent leakage of water.
2-1
2.6 Nuclear Steam Supply System

The power rating of the NPP Krko nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) is 2000. MWt,
composed of 1994 MWt core power output plus 6 MWt of reactor coolant pump heat input. The
NSSS consists of a pressurized water reactor, reactor coolant system (RCS) and associated
auxiliary fluid systems. The RCS is arranged as two closed reactor coolant loops connected in
parallel to the reactor vessel, each containing a reactor coolant pump and a steam generator.
An electrically heated pressurizer is connected to one of the loops.

2.7 Reactor Core

The reactor core is composed of 121 fuel assemblies. Square spacer grid assemblies and the
upper and lower end fitting assemblies support the fuel rods in fuel assemblies. Each fuel
assembly is composed of 16 x 16 rods; of these only 235 places are used by fuel rods; of the 21
remaining places, 20 places which are evenly and symmetrically distributed across the cross
section of the assembly, are provided with thimble tubes which may be reserved for control
rods, and one control instrumentation tube for incore thimble.

Of all fuel assemblies in the core, 33 are equipped with control rod clusters. The core is of the
multi-region type. All fuel assemblies are mechanically identical, although the fuel enrichment is
not the same in all assemblies. Fuel assemblies with the highest enrichments were placed in
the core periphery, and the two groups of lower enrichment fuel were arranged in a selected
pattern in the central region. Core design strategy depends on plant operation strategy (length
of cycle) and improvements in fuel design.

2.8 Reactor Coolant System

The RCS consists of two reactor coolant loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel, each
loop containing a reactor coolant pump and a steam generator. The coolant loops are filled with
high pressure water driven by the reactor coolant pumps. The water circulates through the
reactor core to remove the heat from the fuel assemblies generated by the nuclear chain
reaction. The heated water exits from the reactor vessel and passes via the coolant loop piping
to the steam generator. Here it gives up its heat to the feedwater to generate steam for the
turbine generator.

The reactor coolant pumps, one per coolant loop, are Westinghouse vertical, single-stage,
centrifugal pumps of the shaft-seal type. The power supply system to the pumps is designed so
that adequate coolant flow is maintained to cool the reactor core'under all conceivable
circumstances. The pump capacity is about 17,000 t/h. All pump parts in contact with the
coolant are made of austenitic steel or stainless steel covered.

The steam generators, one per loop, are vertical U-tube units, recently installed Siemens-
Framatome steam generators type SG 72 W/D4-2, which replaced highly degraded
Westinghouse D-4 steam generators with preheater. Internal moisture separation equipment
reduces the moisture content of steam to 0.1 % or less.

The reactor coolant piping and all of the pressure-containing and heat transfer surfaces in
2-2
contact with reactor water are stainless steel except the steam generator tubes and fuel tubes,
which are Inconel and zircaloy, respectively. Reactor core internals, including control rod drive
shafts, are primarily stainless steel.

An electrically heated pressurizer connected to one reactor coolant loop maintains RCS
pressure during normal operation, limits pressure variations during plant load transients, and,
keeps system pressure within design limits during abnormal conditions.

2.9 Auxiliary Systems

Auxiliary systems components are provided to charge the Reactor Coolant System and to add
makeup water, purify reactor coolant water, provide chemicals for corrosion inhibition and
reactivity control (CVCS - Chemical and Volume Control System), cool system components
(CC - Component Cooling), remove residual heat when the reactor is shut down (RHRS -
Residual Heat Removal System), change fuel and cool the spent fuel storage pool, sample the
reactor coolant water, provide for safety emergency injection, and vent and drain the Reactor
Coolant System.

2.10 Engineered Safety Features Systems

Engineered safety features are provided to prevent accident propagation or to limit the
consequences of postulated accidents, which might otherwise lead to damage of the system
and release of fission products. The principal criteria is that under the conditions of a
hypothetical loss of coolant accident, the system can, even when operating with partial
effectiveness, maintain the integrity of the containment, and limit the potential offsite radiation
dose to less than the values of applicable US Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 100). A number
of engineered safety features are included in this plant, as follows:
S Containment Spray System
S Hydrogen Control System
$ Emergency Core Cooling System
$ Component Cooling Water System
$ Essential Service Water System
$ Auxiliary Feedwater System

2-3
 3. ACCIDENT PROGRESSION AND OPERATOR ACTIONS

Current emergency operating procedures cover design bases accidents and also a part of the
beyond design bases accidents. One should know that this type of the procedures have been
enhanced and completely revised after Three Mile Island accident in beginning of eighties of the
past century. Emergency operating procedures have been developed with the goal to cover
accidents with initiating frequency higher than I E-6 per year. They have been developed on a
bases that the operators do not need to know what kind of accident is in progress, that's why
they are also called as "symptom based" and not "event based" as before. Among these
procedures one covers the case in which all AC power is lost. Within this procedure operators
are instructed to try to restore the offsite or onsite AC power source, to power at least one train
of emergency core cooling systems. In the meantime the operators are instructed to isolate
paths through which primary coolant is lost - mainly letdown and reactor coolant pump seal
leakoff lines. Due to high primary coolant temperature and no thermal barrier cooling, reactor
coolant pump seal degradation is expected due to high temperature seal leakoff flow. As a
consequence a relatively small leak flow will be increased to a break flow with the upper bound
value of 25 gpm [2]. If the secondary heat sink is available the operators are instructed to
cooldown and depressurize the primary system with secondary heat sink - steam generators.
There are the following main benefits of this action. The first is to decrease the leakage - break
flow of the primary coolant due to lower primary pressure and the second is that if the primary
pressure will decrease low enough so the-passive injection of additional borated water from the
accumulators can be expected. By this we would gain some cold borated water and increase
the mass of the primary coolant. As a consequence operators are gaining some additional time
for AC power restoration.

If in a case of loss of all AC power we also assume the failure of the turbine driven auxiliary
feedwater pump, this will cause also the loss of secondary heat sink. Per the current EOP
procedures [3] operators are not instructed to initiate primary system cooldown by opening of
the steam generators pressure control valve(s). They are instructed to loop in the procedure,
trying to restore secondary heat sink and AC power. Due to that the primary temperature and
pressure will, after all the secondary side steam generator water will boil off, start to increase
(see Figure 1, 2 or 3 case with 0 SG and 0 PRZ PORVs). Available analyses [2], [4], [5], [6]
indicate that the break flow through the letdown line and reactor coolant seals will not be large
enough to bring the pressure below the accumulator injection pressure. Above-mentioned seal
improvements support such a conclusion even further.

Since the pressure and the temperature will increase in the primary system and the fact that
pressurizer pressure relief control valves are not operable due to the fact that there is no
instrument air available, primary safety valves will control the pressure in the reactor coolant
system. Consequently the break flow rate will significantly increase and speed up the coolant
depletion. This will cause the core uncovery and heatup of the core up and above the 650 °C. At
this point the operators are instructed to leave emergency operating procedures and enter the
severe accident management guidelines. Within these procedures [7] technical support center
(TSC), which is responsible for making the decisions and instructions for the operators, will not
be able to provide the instructions how to decrease the primary system pressure. For further
development of this type of the accident it is beneficial that the primary system fails at low

3-1
internal pressure (reactor vessel failure or hot leg creep failure) [5], [7].

Even with use of SAMG procedures-TSC and the operators will not be able to prevent further
core degradation without any AC power. Eventually core will melt and primary system will fail
from high internal pressure (see Figure 3 and 4). Operators and plant technical support team
will then focus on trying to prevent containment failure and to minimize fission product release
to the environment.

As can bee seen from the above discussion it is essential to try to meet the following objectives
during such an accident:
$ prolong as much as possible the time until the core will be overheated, melted and the
primary system would fail - to gain additional time for AC power restoration and
$ decrease the primary pressure to prevent high pressure reactor vessel failure, which is
causing potential threat to the containment integrity due to so call direct containment
heating phenomena [4]. Small very hot particles could cause very rapid containment
pressure increase and its failure. In case that the containment reactor vessel would fail
at low pressure, core debris would be relocated into the reactor cavity and no immediate
threat to the containment integrity is expected [5].

To get appreciation of certain key operator actions and to see if it is feasible also to consider
any potential design change in the future, we decided to perform further analyses of this
transient.

3-2
 4. INPUT MODEL DESCRIPTION

To perform this analysis, NPP Kr~ko has provided the base input model, so called "Master input
deck". The scheme of the NPP Kr~ko nodalization for the RELAP5/MOD3.3 [8] code is
presented in Figure 1. A full two-loop plant model was developed, including the new Siemens-
Framatome replacement steam generators (RSG) type SG 72 W/D4-2.

The model-consists of 469 volumes, connected with 497 junctions. Plant structure is
represented by 376 heat structures with 2101 mesh points, while the reactor protection and
regulation systems, safety systems operational logic and plant instrumentation is represented by
401 logical conditions (trips) and 575 control variables.

4.1 Hydrodynamic component description

Components numbered from 101 to 165 represent reactor vessel in the following manner:
171, 173 and 175 - lower downcomer
101 and 103 - lower head
105 - lower plenum
107 - core inlet
111 - reactor core
115 - core baffle bypass
121 - core outlet
125, 131 and 141 - upper plenum
151 and 153 - upper head
165 - upper downcomer
113 and 145 - guide tubes

Components numbered 51, 53 and 55 represent the pressurizer surge line and volumes 61, 63,
65, 67 and 69 represent the pressurizer vessel. Pressurizer spray lines (80, 81 and 84) are
connected to the top of the pressurizer vessel and include the spray valves numbered 82 and
83. Valves numbered 28 and 32 represent the two pressurizer PORVs and valves numbered 14
and 22 represent pressurizer safety valves.

Primary piping is represented by the following components:

201, 203, 205, 207, 209 and 211 - hot leg no.1
251, 253, 255, 257 and 259 - intermediate leg no.1 with cold leg no.1 loop seal
265, 271, 273, 275, 277 and 279 - cold leg no.1 with the primary coolant pump no.1
301, 303, 305, 307, 309 and 311 - hot leg no.2
351, 353, 355, 357 and 359 - intermediate leg no.2 with cold leg no.2 loop seal
365, 371, 373, 375, 377 and 379 - cold leg no.2 with the primary coolant pump no.2

Loops are symmetrical except for the pressurizer surge line and CVCS connections layout.

4-1
 I
I&I~ ~I~I
~1 II

U
U

d
U
'I,
n
~1)
C

Figure 1: NPP Kr§ko nodalization scheme

4-2
ECCS piping nodalization and connections are represented by hydrodynamic components
numbered from 701 to 882. The hydrodynamic components representing HPIS pumps are time-
dependent junctions 703 and 803, while time-dependent junctions 750 and 850 represent LPIS
pumps. Accumulators are numbered 701 and 801 their lineup provides cold leg injection only.
ECCS connects to both cold legs (junctions 719-01 and 819-01). Direct vessel ECCS injection
through junction no. 746 and 748 opens simultaneously at the SI signal generation.

Primary side of the SG is represented by inlet and outlet plenum, among which a single pipe is
representing the U-tube bundle:
215, 217 and 219 - - SG 1 inlet plenum (hot side) and tube sheet inlet
223, 225, 227, 233, 235, and 237 - SG 1 U-tubes
241, 243 and 245 - SG 1 tube sheet outlet and outlet plenum (cold side)
315, 317 and 319 - - SG 2 inlet plenum (hot side) and tube sheet inlet
323, 325, 327, 333, 335, and 337 - SG 2 U-tubes
341, 343 and 345 - SG 2 tube sheet outlet and outlet plenum (cold side)

The parts of the SG secondary side are represented by the following hydrodynamic
components:
415, 417 and 419 - SG 1 riser
421 and 427 - SG 1 separator and separator pool
411 and 413 - SG 1 downcomer
423, 425 and 429 - SG 1 steam dome
515, 517 and 519 - SG 2 riser
521 and 527 - SG 2 separator and separator pool
511 and 513 - SG 2 downcomer
523, 525 and 529 - SG 2 steam dome

Main steamlines are represented by volumes 451, 453, 455, 457, 459 and 461 (SG 1) and 551,
553, 555, 557, 559 and 561 (SG 1), divided by main steam isolation valves (458 and 558). SG
relief (482 and 582) and safety valves (484, 486, 488, 492, 494 and 584, 586, 588, 592, 594)
are situated upstream the isolation valves. Turbine valve (604) and steam dump (611) flow is
regulated by corresponding logic.

Main feedwater (MFW) piping is represented by volumes 471, 473, 475, 407, 409 (SG 1) and
471, 573, 575, 507, 509 (SG 2), branching from main feedwater header (500).

Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) is injecting above the SG riser (via volumes 437, 443, 445 and 447)
and its piping is represented by volumes 671, 673 (motor driven AFW 1), 675, 677 (AFW 2), and
681, 683, 685, 687, 695, 697 (turbine driven AFW).

4-3
4.2 Regulation and protection logic

In order to accurately represent the NEK behavior, a considerable number of control variables
and general tables are part of the model. They represent protection, monitoring and simplified
control systems used only during steady state initialization, as well as main plant control
systems:
$ rod control system,
$ PRZ pressure control system,
$ PRZ level control system,
$ SG level control system and
$ steam dump.

It must be noted that rod control system has been modeled for point kinetics. Present model can
be used for transient analysis with two options:
$ with constant or predefined core power transient as function of time (including decay
power calculation) or
$ with rod control system in auto or manual mode.

The following plant protection systems are defined using trip logic:
$ reactor trip,
$ SI signal,
$ turbine trip,
$ steamline isolation,
$ main feedwater isolation and
$ auxiliary feedwater start.

4-4
 5. RESULTS

For the reason stated above the analyses with the state of the art tools were performed to check
below listed potential procedure and/or design change:
S Potential emergency operating procedure change by which the operators would be
instructed to start secondary side depressurization even in the case if there is no feed
into SG.
S If the potential design change which will assure pressurizer PORV operability under total
loss of all AC power would increase available time before the core heatup starts (to open
the primary system bleed path with the purpose to get feed from the accumulators) and
would depressurize primary system enough after core degradation and relocation.

Since this accident is very complicated and the operator actions are very important the following
tools have been used to perform required analyses:
$ RELAP5/MOD3.3 (for the analyses of available time before the core degradations
starts),
$ ANTHEM (for the analyses of available time before the core degradations' starts) and
$ MAAP4 (for the analyses of available time before the core degradations starts and
analysis for potential primary system depressurization at the point of entrance to the
SAMG procedures and no operator actions for primary system cooldown and
depressurization was performed before).

For above mentioned, the analyses of the accident up to the point of fuel heatup due to low
coolant level in the core was first performed with the RELAP5/MOD3.3 code [7], [9] and with the
NPP Krko plant engineering simulator using ANTHEM.

ANTHEM [10], [11] is the two phase 5 equation (plus conservation equation for non-
condensable mass), drift flux code build in the simulator for the simulation of the nuclear steam
supply systems. With this plant engineering simulator we have capability to simulate all the
design bases and beyond design bases accidents. Due to that for the nuclear steam supply
systems and containment simulation we use ANTHEM for simulation of all the accidents that are
covered by the emergency operating procedures and MAAP4 code ifwe want to simulate
severe accidents including core degradation, core relocation, reactor vessel failure, molten core
concrete interaction and containment failure.

5.1 Base analyses

For the first set of the analyses the assumed operator actions and sequence of main events is
seen from Table 1 and Table 2.

All RELAP5/MOD3.3 runs include 1000 s of initial steady-state, while ANTHEM and MAAP4
curves start from the occurrence of Loss of all-AC power.

5-1
 Table 1: Loss of all AC power - assumptions common for all analyses
Time (s)
Assumed action - Event (All analyses)
Number of PRZ PORVs--> 0 1 2
Loss of all AC/Reactor trip/loss of all SG feed 0.0 0.0 0.0
Assumed letdown isolation and start of RCP seal 300 300 300
degradation 300 _300 300
Assumed complete RCP seal degradation 2100 2100 2100
Assumed start of the first SG depressurization' N/A 300 300
Assumed first PRZ PORV opening_ N/A Note 2 N/A
Assumed second PRZ PORV opening 2 N/A Note 2 Note 2

Table 2: Comparison of available time - time until the core heatup - degradations starts
Assumed action Time (s)
- Event RELAP5/MOD3.3 E-SIM-ANTEM E-SIM-MAAP4
PRZ PORVs-> 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Time before
core heatup 3 9600 7040 12100 8500 6110 12270
RCS/Reactor 10400 9190 15200
vessel failure 10400I9190 15200

On Figure 2 primary pressure behavior for all the cases analyzed by RELAP5/MOD3.3 is
shown. On Figure 3 the same parameter is shown calculated by plant engineering simulator -
ANTHEM and on Figure 4 with MAAP4 (with the maximum seal break -300 gpm). MAAP4 code
is built in the plant engineering simulator for the simulation of the severe accidents.

As it can be seen from the figures all the three codes are providing very similar prediction. The
differences seen are mainly due to the fact that in RELAP5 analyses for all the breaks we
defined the fix boundary conditions, while on simulator the break flow depends on the variable
conditions in the system to which the break flow is directed. One can also observe that the plant
engineering simulator is predicting higher rate of primary system pressurization after plant
cooldown by the secondary side is terminated (no secondary heat sink). The reason for that is
slightly higher decay power calculated by the core model and as already mentioned slightly
different boundary conditions. It has to be pointed out that for the MAAP4 analyses we doubled
the size of the assumed break on the RCP seals, since this assumption is conservative.

Based on Table 2 and Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 it can be concluded that in the case of
loss of all AC and secondary heat sink the operators should try to depressurize the primary
system as soon the steam generators are empty.

I Second SO depressurization was assumed to be started by the operator when in the first SG wide range level drops
below 8%
2 Pressurizer PORV opening depends on second SG wide range Level. It is assumed that operators would open one
or both pressurizer PORVs after the second SG water on the secondary side is almost depleted (level < 4%)
3 Time until the fuel rod temperature is below 850 'C (RELAP) and core exit temperature below 750 0C

5-2
For better insight into the analyzed scenarios, additional parameters are shown in Figure 5 to
Figure 13.

From total primary leak flow (seal leak + PRZ valves) curve, shown in Figure 5, one can
recognize period of increasing RCP leak flow (300 s - 2100s). This is followed by a certain
period of quasi steady leak flow. At the end of this period secondary heat sink was lost due to
SG valves opening (Figure 6) and consequent depletion of the secondary inventory (Figure 7).
After the secondary heat sink was completely lost, primary pressure increased to the point,
when PRZ safety valves started to open. In the case labeled "0 PRZ PORVs", only PRZ safety
valves were opening/closing on their set/reset pressure setpoints, while in the other two cases,
labeled "1 PRZ PORV" and "2 PRZ PORVs", PRZ PORV(s) were opened by the operator to
mitigate the consequences of the station blackout sequence of events. After the valves opening
primary pressure was successfully decreased for a certain period of time, so RCP leak flow was
decreased. Some spikes can be observed in the cases "1 PRZ PORV" and "2 PRZ PORVs".
These origin from accumulator injection (Figure 8).

PRZ gradually emptied (Figure 9) after the PRZ valves opening and was not restored due to
continuous primary coolant leakage. Primary inventory was also gradually lost (Figure 10),
which soon caused core uncovery (Figure 11) and unavoidably led to core heatup (Figure 12
and Figure 13).

By opening this additional break in the primary system intentionally and in fact starting the bleed
procedure they would be able to get feed from the accumulators which will have two long term
effects. Time between beginning of the accident and core heatup will increase giving more time
to the operators for the AC power restoration. This would only be true in the case when both
pressurizer PORVs could be opened. If this is not the case then it is better not to perform these
actions, since we only increase the coolant depletion rate but we are not able to get passive
injection from the accumulators.

The second important effect, which is seen from the Figure 2 and Figure 3 as well as from the
Table 1, is the primary system depressurization, which can be achieved by two pressurizer
PORVs. This is one of the important objectives when we entered the area of severe accidents.

5-3
 PRZ pressure (p 069010000)
200

E
0.
180
160
140
•.= 120
-
------
SOPRz -------------

1 PRZ PORV
SGPO
'100 ---- -2 PRZ PORVs
. 80
0.
60 N--------- ---------
40
20
0
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 2: Primary system pressure - RELAP5/MOD3.3

200
PRZ pressure

180 -------------

160
140 ------------- - ----- 0 PRZ&SG PORVsI
N~ 120 '--- 1 PRZ PORV--
E
100 ------- '2 PRZ PORVs

CL.
80
60
-
------j:j
---------- -
---
-------------
- - -
---- - - - - - - - - - - - -

40 - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - -

20 - - - - - - - - - - -

0
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 3: Primary system pressure - SIM- ANTHEM

5-4
 I P7 nrgmccm~ra
s n.*
200 " O"RZ-S"P....
' 1-
0 PRZ&SG PORVs

18 ------------ ---
-- 1
--- 1. - 2 PRZ PORVs oRvs

16 0 - - - - - - -
140 . ..
0'=1
120
20

0 ,

0 5000 10000 15000

Time [s]

Figure 4: Primary system pressure - MAAP4

Total primary leak (RCP seal + PRZ valves) flow

120 (cntrlvar 761)
0 PRZ&SG PORVs
-'--i 2 PRZ PORVs

80

6400 r-------------------

2 0 --- -- -- -- -- -- -- . . . . .... . . . .. . . . .. . . . .

0 5000 10000 15000

Time [s]

Figure 5: Total primary leak - RELAP5/MOD3.3

5-5
 SG 1 valves integral flow (cntrlvar 847)
60000

50000

W40000

30000

20000

10000

0
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 6: SG 1 valves flow - RELAP5/MOD3.3

SG 1 level (cntrlvar 40)

100 i

90 - --- - - - - - - - - - 0OPRZ&SG PORVs

-1PRZPORV
80 -----------
: - 2)IDZPfl/V
70 -----------

60 ------------
-.J 50 -

40
30
20
10
0 I

0 5000 10000 15000

Time [s]

Figure 7: SG 1 WR level - RELAP5/MOD3.3

5-6
 Accum. no.1 level (cntrlvar 623)
100
90
.0 PRZ&SG PORVs
1-PRZPORV
80
- 2 PRZ PORVs
- -- -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
70
I I

*" 6060 -- -- - -- ---

0 50 - - - --- - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

40 - -- -- -- -- -
`ýý I ----- ----------------
-------------
- - - - - - - - - - -
------ -----
-
-------------------
30 -- - - - - - - - - -

20 - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--------------------
10 - -- -- -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------------------
0
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 8: Accumulator no.1 level - RELAP5/MOD3.3

PRZ level (cntrlvar 4)

140

120

100

• 80

o 60

40

20

-20
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 9: PRZ level - RELAP5/MOD3.3

5-7
 Primary mass (cntrlvar 191)
140000
-0 PRZ&SG PORVs I
120000 -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 PRZ PO RV
2 PRZ PORVs
i
100000

. 80000
6000 - ------ --- ---

80000------------------------------
- -- -

400-----------------,
-------. -
--..--
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 10: Primary mass - RELAP5/MOD3.3

Core collapsed level (cntrlvar 5)

120
0 PRZ&SG PORVs
100 ',--.----- -T 1 PRZPORV
-2PRZPORVs
8 0 --
_ - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -

(D 6 0 -,-- -- - - - ----
-- I

4 0 -- - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - --

0 5000 10000 15000

Time [s]

Figure 11: Core level - RELAP5/MOD3.3

5-8
 Rod cladding temperature (httemp 111900816)
2000
- 0 PRZ&SG PORVs
-1 PRZPORV
U1500 - -'--2PRZ PORVs
0

4)00

500

0.

0 5000 10000 15000

Time [s]

Figure 12: Rod cladding temperature - RELAP5/MOD3.3

Core exit temperature (cntrlvar 609)

1200

1000

0
800

600
C.
E
400

200

0
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 13: Core exit temperature - RELAP5/MOD3.3

5-9
5.2 Variation analyses

Second set of analyses performed only with the plant engineering simulator with MAAP4 code
was done with the objective to verify if the primary system can be depressurized ifwe do not
assume operator actions for SG depressurization. Here the objective was to check if it is
feasible to'expect that the operators will be able to depressurize primary system below the
pressure for high-pressure debris ejection. For NPP Krko that would mean that at the time of
the primary system failure internal pressure would lower than 22 kp/cm 2. For this analyses it
was assumed that we would not change any of the steps in the emergency operating
procedures, but rather in the SAMG procedures. It was assumed in the analyses that the
operators would deliberately open both PRZ PORVs as soon as the core would be overheated -
core exit temperature would be higher than 750 T. During such an accident, assuming station
blackout, loss of secondary heat sink, no injection and seal failure, core damage can not be
avoided any more. Then the primary objective is to decrease the primary system pressure.
Assumed operator actions and sequence of main events listed in Table 3

As it can be seen from the Figure 14, if the operators would be able to open both pressurizer
PORVs, primary pressure would drop below 22 kp/cm 2. It is then expected that primary system
would fail from low internal pressure. Even if they would open only one PORV this would not
prevent the vessel failure however will fail from significantly lower pressure.

The same sorts of analyses have been performed by RELAP5/MOD3.3, to compare with
MAAP4 results, of course only up to the point of significant core overheat. The only difference
from the assumptions given in Table 3 was, that the second PRZ PORV opening (one or both
PORVs) was performed when rod cladding temperature in core node-no.8 exceeded 850 TC
(instead core exit temperature > 750 °C).

Pressure development for the base case and the two variation cases is shown in Figure 15. It
can be observed that even quantitatively both RELAP5/MOD3.3 and MAAP4 predicted the
course of the transient very similarly.

Table 3: Loss of all AC power - assumptions for MAAP analyses

Assumed action - Event Time (s)

(All analyses)
Number of PRZ PORVs 2
Loss of all AC/Reactor trip/loss of all SG feed 0.0
Assumed letdown isolation and start of RCP 300
seal degradation
Assumed complete RCP seal degradation 2100
Assumed start of first SG depressurization N/A
Assumed first PRZ PORV opening N/A
Assumed second PRZ PORV opening Core exit temperature > 750 DEGC

5-10
 PR7 n ru _••iir•
200
,, - 0 PRZ&SG
PORVs
10
-- - -7 - - - - 2 PRZ PORVs at
14 0 . .. - - -C
-- .. E T 75 0 D E GC
f- 10-...- 1 PORV at CET
0750 DEGO
100 J ---- 1----------
-

2060---------i!~j-
T------ -- -
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Time Is]

Figure 14: Primary system pressure without and with depressurization using PRZ relief valves -
MAAP4

200 PRZ pressure (p __________,____

069010000)
-O0 PRZ&SG PORVs
180 ---------------------------- -, 2 PRZ PORVs at clad T 850oC
-,160 ----------- 1 PRZPORVat clad T 850oC
140
1 -4 - 0. - - - . -
. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - -
0i

• 100
CL 12.
80 ---------------- -- ----------. .. - - -
-- ---
-' - - - - - - -
2i80

60-------- ---
I------
'0 _0
4 0 -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -*

20 .. .................... ...................-- - - ----- .. .- ..-

0 5000 10000 15000 20000

Time [s]

Figure 15: Primary system pressure without and with depressurization using PRZ relief
valves - RELAP5/MOD3.3

5-11
 6. RELAP5/MOD3.3 RUN STATISTICS

MOD3.3 Calculations were performed on SUN FIRE V880 server with 4 UltraSPARC III 750
MHz processors, with 16 GB main RAM, running under SOLARIS 9 operating System.

Table 4 shows run-time statistics for all the analyzed cases.

Table 4: Run time statistics

An
I dcasComputer I time [s]CPU 1Total steps (NT)of
time number Total number of Grind time
volumes (N) CPU/(NT*N)
all cases - 1000 s of steady state 1669.90 26172 469 1.36E-04
0 PRZ&SG PORVs 7293.84 98268 469 1.58E-04
1 PRZ PORV 45931.01 688048 469 1.42E-04
2 PRZ PORVs 55307.01 850588 469 1.39E-04
1 PRZ PORV at clad T 850 0 C 11408.40 169260 469 1.44E-04
2 PRZ PORVs at clad T 8500 C 42654.50 659750 469 1.38E-04

Consumed CPU time for all base and variation analysis cases is shown in Figure 16.

Mass error, time step and Courant At for the 3 base analyses cases and the 3 variation
analyses cases are shown in Figure 17 to Figure 19 and Figure 20 to Figure 22, respectively.

Consumed CPU time

60000

50000

.•. 40000

(L
30000

20000

10000

0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Time [s]

Figure 16: Consumed CPU time for all base and variation analyses cases-
RELAP5/MOD3.3

6-1
Next is the excerpt from base case simulation with 0 PRZ&SG PORVs (time step statistics):
0 advancement total between edits]
attempted: 26302 26302 1 [Link]- 0. sec last dt- 3.823475E-02 sec emass 8.279464E-03 kg
repeated: 0 0 1 [Link]= 0. sec [Link]- 3:823475E-02 sec teass- 1.040078E606 kg
successful: 26302 26302 1 [Link]- 0. sec [Link]= 2.385202E-10 em/tm- 7.960427E-09
requested: 26304 26304 1 [Link]- 0.100000 sec cpu= 2.15907 sec time- 999.990 sec
attempted: 28550 2248 1 [Link]- 3.293432E-02 sec last dt- 5.839124E-02 sec emass= 10.4555 kg
repeated: 0 0 1 [Link]- 0.100000 eec [Link]= 0.220598 sec tmass- 1.034003E+06 kg
successful: 28550 2248 1 [Link]- 8.897246E-02 sec [Link]- 3.884262E-07 em/tv- 1.011170E-05
requested: 28552 2248 1 [Link]- 0.000000 sec cpu- 179.494 sec time- 1200.00 sec
attempted: 36886 8336 1 [Link]- 6.002535E-02 sec last da= 6.672375E-02 sec emass- 12.3051 kg
repeated: 0 0 1 [Link]- 0.i00000 sec [Link]= 0.414794 eec tmass- 1.011846E+06 kg
successful: 36886 8336 1 [Link]- 9.596929E-02 sec [Link]= 1.421074E-07 em/tm- 1.216107E-05
requested: 36888 8336 1 [Link]- 0.100000 sec cpu= 844.417 sec time- 2000.00 sec
attempted: 45161 8275 1 [Link]- 5.408423E-02 sec last dct= 5.408423E-02 sec emass- 14.0035 kg
repeated: 0 0 1 [Link]- 0.100000 sec [Link]= 0.333887 sec tmass- 991881. kg
successful: 45161 8275 i [Link]- 8.459215E-02 sec [Link]= 9.242832E-08 em/tm- 1.411813E-05
requestedý 45163 8275 1 [Link]- 0.100000 sec cpU= 1499.03 sec time- 2700.00 sec
attempted: 46394 1233 1 [Link]- 5.949265E-02 sec last dt- 0.216676 sec emass- 17.9101 kg
repeated: 0 0 1 [Link]- 0.250000 sec [Link]- 0.288100 sec tmass- 983268. kg
successful: 46394 1233 1 [Link]- 0.243309 sec [Link]= 1.825119t-06 em/tm- 1.821492E-05
requested: 46396 1233 : [Link]= 0.250000 sec cpu= 1597.83 sec time- 3000.00 sec
attempted: 65445 19051 1 [Link]- 1.994276E-03 sec last dt= 0.132841 sec emass- 44.3164 kg
repeated: 730 730 1 [Link]- 0.250000 sec [Link]= 0.328195 sec tmass- 922300. kg
successful: 64715 18321 [Link]- 0.163747 sec [Link]- 2.378124E-07 em/tm- 4.804983E-05
requested: 64717 18321 [Link]- 0.250000 sec cpu= 2956.55 sec time- 6000.00 sec
attempted: 69494 4049 1 [Link]- 0.125000 sec last dt- 0.191908 sec emass- 86.9009 kg
repeated: 732 2 1 [Link]- 0.250000 sec [Link]= 0.487488 sec tmass- 912773. kg
successful: 68762 4047 1 [Link]- 0.247097 sec [Link]= 2.395330E-06 em/tm- 9.520533E-05
requested: 68764 4047 1 [Link]- 0.250000 sec cpu- 3260.92 sec time- 7000.00 sec
attempted: 113784 44290 1 [Link]- 5.171839E-03 sec last dt= 6.922516E-02 sec emass- 92.1338 kg
repeated: 739 7 1 [Link] 0.100000 sec [Link]= 0.224675 sec teass- 872500. kg
successful: 113045 44283 1 [Link]- 4.064765E-02 sec [Link]= 3.580817E-07 em/tm- 1.055975E-04
requested: 113047 44293 1 [Link]- 0.160000 sec cpu- 6474.08 sec time- 8800.00 sec
attempted: 124566 10782 1 [Link]- 7.079435E-03 sec last dt- 0.200000 sec emass- 90.2556 kg
repeated: 740 1 1 [Link]: 0.200000 sec [Link]- 0.240902 sec tmass- 864452. kg
successful: 123826 10781 [Link]- 0,179975 sec [Link]= 2.737707E-05 em/tm- 1.044079E-04
requested: 123827 10780 1 [Link]- 0.200000 sec cpu= 7295.71 sec time- 10740.5 sec

6-2
 Mass error (emass 0)
250

200

"- 150

100

-- 0 PRZ&SG PORVs
50
-1 PRZPORV
2 PRZ PORVs
0
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 17: Mass error for 3 base analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3

Time step (dt 0)

0.3

0.25

0.2

j0.15

0.1

0.05

0
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 18: Time step for 3 base analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3

6-3
 Courant time step (dtcrnt 0)
0.9
0 PRZ&SG PORVs
0.8
-- 1PRZPORV
0.7 - 2 PRZ PORVs
-0.6

4'E
0.5

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0 5000 10000 15000
Time [s]

Figure 19: Courant At for 3 base analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3

Mass error (emass 0)

250

200

.-. 150

100

50 - - - -- - - - - - - - - 1--0 PRZ&SG PORVs

-2 PRZ PORVs at clad T 850oC
-1 PRZ PORV at clad T 850oC
0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Time [s]

Figure 20: Mass error for 3 variation analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3

6-4
 Time step (dt 0)
0.30 PRZ&SG PORVs
0.25 0.5 - ----- 2 PRZ PORVs at clad T 850oC
- 1 PRZ PORV at clad T 850oC

-0.2---------

. .
-. -. . - -- -- -- - - - - - ---
- - - - - - - -

0.05

0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Time [s]

Figure 21: Time step for 3 variation analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3

Courant time step (dtcrnt 0)

0.9 , I
0 PRZ&SG PORVs
0.8 ------ 2 PRZ PORVs at clad T 850oCi
0.7 .... . ..- 1 PRZPORVatcladT850oC

- 0.6 ---.. - - - - - .'--

- - - - ....
-.. .

E0.5 ----

0.4 - ----- ------- ----------------

0.4
0.2~~~~ - - ......

0 5000 10000 15000 20000

Time [s]
Figure 22: Courant At for 3 variation analyses cases- RELAP5/MOD3.3

6-5
 7. CONCLUSIONS

Loss of all AC power is one of the most challenging plant transients. If the power is not restored
within certain time, and if the capability to feed the steam generators is also lost this accident
will progress to a severe accident. The aim of the presented analysis was to verify if the
emergency operating or SAMG procedures should be changed and if the design change on
pressurizer PORV should be implemented to be able to cope with this kind of accidents better.

The analyses were performed with three different state of the art codes used at NPP [Link] and
IJS: RELAP5/MOD3.3, ANTHEM and MAAP4. It can be concluded that no change to the
existing emergency operating procedures can be recommended. However it can be concluded
that if the operators would be able to open both pressurizer relief valves after the core heatup
starts, this would have positive effect on further progression of the severe accident. As it can be
concluded from the presented analyses by performing this action within SAMG procedures,
primary pressure will be at the time of the primary system vessel failure significantly lower than
in the case that there will be no operator actions for primary system depressurization. If in such
situation operators would be able to open only one pressurizer PORV would this be beneficial
for later accident progression.

Comparing RELAP5/MOD3.3, ANTHEM and MAAP4, it can be concluded that all the three
codes predicted very similar transient course in all the analyzed scenarios.

It has to be pointed out that before making any specific conclusions related to design change
and SAMG procedure change, further analyses including cost benefit analyses shall be
performed, since we are dealing with very low probability events.
 8. REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0933, "A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues", Rev.3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, July 1991
2. WENX 91/04 Station Blackout analyses for NPP Kr~ko, Westinghouse, Brussels, March
1991
3. NPP Kr~ko Emergency Operating Procedures, Rev.10, February 2001
4. US NRC, NUREG 1150, Severe Accident Risk, An assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power
Plants, Final Report, January 1991
5. EPRI - FAI 91/19 "Severe Accident Management Guidelines Technical bases Report",
September 1991
6. Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Kr~ko, SUBMITAL REPORT,
Volume 1 and 2, August 1995
7. NPP Kr~ko Severe Accident Management Guidelines - SAMG, Rev.2, April 2002
8. Information Systems Laboratories, Inc., Nuclear Safety Analysis Division: RELAP5/MOD3.3
'Code Manual, Vol.#1: Code Structure, System Models, and Solution Methods, Vol.#2:
Users' Guide and Input Requirements, Vol.#3: Developmental Assessment Problems,
Vol.#4: Models and Correlations, Vol.#5: Users' Guidelines, Vol.#7: Summaries and
Reviews of Independent Code Assessment Reports, Vol.#8: Programmers Manual
NUREG/CR,]5535 Rev.1, Rockville, Maryland, Idaho Falls, Idaho, USA, December 2001,
Vol.#6: A. S. Shieh, V. H. Ransom, R. Krishnamurthy: RELAP5/MOD3 Code Manual -
Validation of Numerical Techniques in RELAP5/MOD3.0, October 1994 [Issued with minor
revisions December 2001]
9. Krajnc, B. and .Parzer, I.: Analyzing Operator Actions To Gain Time In Loss of AC Power
with Subsequent Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Accident, 4th International Conference on
Nuclear Option in Countries with Small and Medium Electricity Grids Dubrovnik, Croatia,
June 16-20, 2002.
10. Boire, R and Salim, J. "ANTHEM: Advanced Thermal Hydraulic Model for Power Plant
Simulation", CSNI Specialist Meeting on Simulators and Plant Analyzers, Technical
Research Center of Finland, Espoo 1994
11. Salim, G., Vivier, P., Filiatrault, P. and Boire, R., "ANTHEMTM NSSS Model Validation",
Proceedings of the 2000 Western Multconference, Society of Computer Simulation, San
Diego, California, January 2000

8-1
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER
(9-2004) (Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev.,
NRCMD 3,7 and Addendum Numbers, If any.)
NUREG/IA-0225

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

(See instructions on the reverse)

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

Analyzing Operator Actions During Loss of AC Power Accident with Subsequent MONTH YEAR
Loss of Secondary Heat Sink April 2010

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

Iztok Parzer (lJo2ef Stefan Institute), Bo~idar Krajnc (NPP Krko), Borut Mavko (1Jo2ef Technical
Stefan Institute)
7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, and mailing address;if contractor,
provide name and mailing address.)

Jo~ef Stefan Institute NPP Krtko

Jamova cesta 39 Vrbina 12
SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia S1-8270 [Link], Slovenia
9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type 'Same as above'; if contractor,provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and mailingaddress.)
Division of Systems Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
A. Calvo, NRC Project Manager
11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)
The thermo-hydraulic analysis of plant response on total loss of AC power is very demanding and challenging job due to
a number of phenomena included. Such an analysis becomes even more complicated and interesting if we include also
the assumption of total loss of secondary heat sink.

In this paper we are presenting the NPP Krko specific analysis of complete loss of AC power with subsequent total loss
of secondary heat sink and influence of specific operator actions. The aim of this analysis is to verify if emergency
operating (EOP) or severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) procedures should be changed and if design
change on pressurizer pressure relief valves (PORV) should be implemented to be able to cope with this kind of
accidents better.
The analyses were performed with three different state of the art codes used at NPP Kr~ko and IJS: RELAP5/MOD3.3,
ANTHEM and MAAP4. The last two codes are used in the NPP Krko plant specific full scope simulator, one for the
simulation of the design bases transients and accidents and the second for simulation of the severe accidents.

This type of analyses has been done also for the simulator validation, performed during vendor and site acceptance
testing.
12. KEY WORDS/DESCRI PTORS (List words or phrases that wiltassist researchersin locatingthe report.) 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Thermo-hydraulic unlimited
MAAP4 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RELAP5/MOD3.3 (This Page)
Krko NPP unclassified
Steam generators (SGs) (This Report)
ANTHEM unclassified
Westinghouse 2-loop PWR plant 15. NUMBER OF PAGES
Jo2ef Stefan Institute
Republic of Slovenia 16. PRICE
Nuclear steam supply system
NRC FORM 335 (9-2004) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
Fwdnag [Link] Progro
NUREGIIA-0225 Analyzing Operator Actions During Loss of AC Power Accident with April 2010
Subsequent Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

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