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A history of BBC local radio in England

c1960 – 1980

Matthew Linfoot
School of Media, Arts and Design

This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of

Westminster. © The Author, 2011.

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A HISTORY OF BBC LOCAL RADIO IN ENGLAND
c1960 – 1980

MATTHEW LINFOOT

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements of the University of Westminster for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 2011
 ABSTRACT

The story of BBC Local Radio in England, from the days of its conception
around 1960, through to the launch of the first stations in 1967 and the
finalisation of how to complete the chain in 1980 is a neglected area of
research in media history. This thesis tells this story, using previously
undocumented research from the BBC Written Archive Centre, and
supplemented by oral history interviews with key participants. The approach
is multi-faceted. Part of the investigation lies in gaining a greater
understanding of how the BBC operated as an institution during these
years. The internal culture of the BBC presents a series of complex issues,
and the evolution of local radio illustrates this in many ways, in matters
concerning management, autonomy, technology, the audience and finance.
Linked to this are the differing notions and definitions of what „local‟ meant,
in terms of the original concept and the output in practice. For local radio,
this had a crucial impact on station location, the size of the transmission
area and the degree to which the stations were able to represent and
embody their communities. This history also assesses the impact the
stations made, often in contrast to the popular image and perception of local
broadcasting. The original contribution to knowledge that this thesis makes
is in narrating this history for the first time, and in doing so, challenging
previous assumptions about the nature of local broadcasting as part of the
BBC and as part of the wider community.

ii
 DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Matthew Linfoot, hereby declare that all the material contained

in this thesis is my own work.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to all those who
have helped and supported me in the course of writing and researching this
thesis. I am particularly indebted to the four local radio pioneers, Michael
Barton, Robert Gunnell, Owen Bentley and Robert McLeish, who have all
been most generous with their memories, comments and contributions. My
heartfelt gratitude is due to the archivists at the BBC Written Archive
Centre, Caversham, for their patience and help, especially Els Boonen. I
would also like to thank Huw Williams, librarian at the Oxford and
Cambridge Club for his advice and suggestions.
I am indebted to my colleagues at the University of Westminster for their
support during the period of research and writing up, particularly Sally
Feldman, Geoffrey Davies, Colin Sparks, Anthony McNicholas, Peter
Goodwin, Silke Lange and Kristin Skoog. Although Paddy Scannell has now
left Westminster, he was instrumental in helping me develop the original
idea from the outset, and his work has always been very inspirational to me.
I would like to thank my father, Denis Linfoot, for his advice and support,
particularly in helping me with proof reading. And finally I must put on record
my gratitude to David Hendy who has been the best possible supervisor,
whose advice I value more than any others, and without whom I would not
be in the position of submitting this work. My thanks to you all.

iv
GLOSSARY
ABBREVIATIONS: BBC-related

Director of Sound Broadcasting: DSB

Assistant Director of Sound Broadcasting: ADSB
Managing Director Radio: MDR
Director of External Broadcasting: DEB
Director of Engineering: DE
Controller, Programme Organisation: CPO
Controller, Programme Planning: CPP
Controller, Sound Broadcasting Engineering: CSB (Eng)
Head of Sound Broadcasting Administration: HSBA
Establishment Officer: EO
Head of Home Service: HHS
Head of Light Programme: HLP
Controller Midland Region: CMR
Controller North Region: CNR
Controller West Region: CWR
Head of West Regional Programmes: HWRP
Assistant Head of West Regional Programmes: AHWRP
General Manager Local Radio Development: GMLRD or GMLR
Local Radio Training Officer: LRTO
Director-General: DG
Director of Public Affairs: DPA
Director of Public Relations: DPR
Head of Talks and Documentaries Radio: HTDR
Controller Radios One and Two: CR1&2
Controller Radio One: CR1
Controller Radio Two: CR2
Controller Radio Three: CR3
Controller Radio Four: CR4
Controller English Regions: CER
Head of Religious Programmes: HRPR
Head of Recording Services Radio: HRSR
Controller Local Radio: CLR
Deputy General Manager Local Radio: DGMLR
Local Radio Organiser: LRO
Deputy Managing Director Radio: DMDR
Local Radio Education and Programme Services Organiser: LREPSO
Chief Assistant Radio Four: Ch Asst R4
Network Editor (Radio) in Bristol: NER (Bristol)
Presentation Editor Radio Four: Pres Ed R4
Assistant Head Radio Two: AHR2
Head of School Broadcasting Radio: HSBR
Editor Radio News: Ed RN
Editor News and Current Affairs Radio: ENCAR
Network Editor Radio Birmingham: NER (Birmingham)
Chief Assistant Radio Three: Ch Asst R3
Head of Radio One: HR1
Head of Current Affairs Magazine Programmes: HCAMP
Head Further Education Radio: HFER
Chief Assistant Radio Management (programmes): CARM (progs)
Chief Engineer Radio Broadcasting: CERB

v
Assistant Chief Engineer Radio Broadcasting: ACERB
Head of Radio Training Section: HRTS
Deputy Editor Radio News: Dep Ed RN
Head of Audience Research: HAR
Head of Planning and Development, Radio: HPDR
Head of Outside Broadcast, Sound: HOB (s)
Town and Country Radio: TCR
Local Radio Council: LRC
Schools Broadcasting Council: SBC
General Advisory Council: GAC

ABBREVIATIONS: Misc

Postmaster General: PMG

Very High Frequency: VHF
Medium Wave: MW
Medium Frequency: MF
Long Wave: LW
Long Frequency: LF
Transmission: Tx
Association of Municipal Corporations: AMC
South Western Broadcasting Ltd: SWB
National Broadcasting Development Committee: NBDC
Local Radio Association: LRA
Television and Radio Committee: TRAC
Workers Education Association: WEA
Independent Local Radio: ILR
Independent Broadcasting Authority: IBA
National Union of Journalists: NUJ
Association of Broadcasting Staff: ABS

vi
 CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

GLOSSARY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE……………………………………………………..1

Section One: Contexts – Media & Community in Post-War Britain

CHAPTER ONE: A discussion of the historical perspectives............................5

- Introduction………………………………………………………………5
- The BBC‟s local audiences before the 1960s………………………..8
- Constructing Communities……………………………………………17
- Portrayals of „everyday life‟ on Television and Radio………………22
- Conclusion………………………………………………………………26

CHAPTER TWO: A discussion of the historiographical perspectives……........28

- Broadcasting Histories – A Critique…………………………………..28

- Personal Testimony…………………………………………………….39
- Conclusion……………………………………………………………….50

CHAPTER THREE: Methods, Sources and Questions………………………….53

- Versions of Media History……………………………………………..53

- Research Questions……………………………………………………56
- Sources………………………………………………………………….60

Section Two: Origins

CHAPTER FOUR: c1955 – 1960: The Pre-Experimental Period………………65

- Introduction to Section Two……………………………………………65

- Moving from „regions‟ to „local‟………………………………………...67
- Frank Gillard and developments c1954 – c1960…………………….69
- The run-up to Pilkington………………………………………………..77

CHAPTER FIVE: 1961 – 1962: The Closed-Circuit Experiments………………80

- The Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting 1961 – 1962………….80

- The closed-circuit experiments………………………………………..90
- Station staffing…………………………………………………………..92
- Programme content…………………………………………………….96
- Education……………………………………………………………….101
- Representation and access…………………………………………..103
- Station locations……………………………………………………….106

vii
 - The commercial experiment in Bristol……………………………….109
- Critical reaction………………………………………………………...110
- Conclusion……………………………………………………………...112

CHAPTER SIX: 1962 – 1966: Pirates and White Papers………………………114

- The Pilkington Committee‟s Report…………………………………114

- The BBC gets ready…………………………………………………..118
- External interests………………………………………………………121
- The Labour Governments…………………………………………….125
- Conclusion……………………………………………………………..135

Section Three: Developments

CHAPTER SEVEN: 1967 – 1969: Going on Air…………………………………138

- Introduction……………………………………………………………..138
- Who would like a station?..............................................................138
- „A three-stage Dutch auction‟………………………………………...143
- Other factors in the selection process………………………….……147
- The first eight stations, 1967 – 1969……………………….………..152
- VHF and relay………………………………………………………….159
- Critical reaction………………………………………………………...162
- The Evaluation………………………………………………….………170
- The BBC‟s submission………………………………………………...173
- Local radio and the licence fee………………………………….……176
- Conclusion……………………………………………………………...183

CHAPTER EIGHT: 1970 – 1976: Under Threat…………………………………185

- Introduction……………………………………………….…………….185
- Twelve new stations 1970 – 1972……………………………….…..186
- Fighting for survival……………………………………………………191
- The Crawford Enquiry: Rural Affairs…………………………………200
- Annan: c1975 – 1976………………………………………………….209
- 1975: Taking stock of commercial competition……………………..212
- The Ennals Report……………………………………………………..215
- Conclusion………………………………………………………………220

CHAPTER NINE: 1977 – 1980: Completing the Chain………………………….224

- Introduction……………………………………………………………..224
- Annan and the BBC‟s response……………………………………...226
- The Way Forward………………………………………………………236
- The Governor‟s Sub-group…………………………………………….241
- The First Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report…………243
- Town and Country Radio………………………………………………246
- The cut in hours: „for most people, reality is local‟…………………..249
- The Second Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report……..254
- Lane End and the Green Paper……………………………………….258
- The Third Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report………..263
- Conclusion……………………………………………………………….266

viii
Section Four: Inside Local Radio

CHAPTER TEN: The Station……………………………………………………..269

- Introduction……………………………………………………………269
- The Station Manager and the Staff…………………………………270
- The programmes……………………………………………………..274
- The shift to sequence programmes…………………………………276
- Minority programmes…………………………………………………282
- „Pure amateursville‟: ethnic programmes…………………………..285
- „Flatulence and jam-making‟: educational programmes………….292
- The Local Radio Councils……………………………………………297
- The wider BBC………………………………………………………..303
- Conclusion…………………………………………………………….307

CONCLUSION:………………………………………………………………………….310

APPENDIX A Key Dates………………………………………………………………..321

APPENDIX B The Ennals Report: List of recommended stations………...325

SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………..327

ix
 INTRODUCTORY NOTE

„Healthy national life is founded on healthy local life, and a healthy

national culture springs from lively local cultures.‟1

BBC Local Radio has been an integral part of BBC radio production for over
40 years, serving communities and audiences in England through a network
of around 45 stations. Despite the long provenance of the service, the many
millions of pounds of investment and the countless listeners, there is no
history of BBC Local Radio and I want to contribute a significant body of
primary research around this subject to the canon of broadcasting history. As
the quote above illustrates, activity at a local level enables broadcasters to
make connections with audiences, to reflect local lives for the benefit of the
wider, national sensibility, in terms of society, politics and culture. In the
BBC‟s case, this allows it to fulfill a key aspect of its public service remit.

One of the challenges in undertaking this research is piecing together the

chronology. This does not just involve putting together a time line of the
significant events that determined the development of the service. There is a
more evolutionary process at the heart of BBC Local Radio, which touches
on programmes, production practices, staffing, the audience and
relationships within the wider BBC.

I see my contribution to knowledge in the following terms. First I am telling

a story that has not been told before, where BBC Local Radio is brought to
the foreground and becomes the sole subject and focus. Most significantly,
this is drawn almost entirely from unpublished archival material and
interviews with key participants. Secondly, and looking at the bigger picture,
this thesis puts Local Radio in the spotlight as a BBC service and assesses
its significance in terms of three key areas: institutional policy and corporate
history; the role of radio and the community; the story of broadcast
techniques and production practices. Thirdly, I aim to add a much stronger
element of local broadcasting to the predominantly national-focused

1
Eliot T S quoted by Frank Gillard in BBC Serving Neighbourhood and Nations (London: BBC
Publications 1977) p 19

1
historiography of British broadcasting history, and to demonstrate the close
connections between the two.

The thesis is divided into four sections. The first, comprising three
chapters, looks at the connections between notions of community and an
emerging consciousness in the media in the 1950s. I also discuss the
available literature relevant to local radio, from a historiographical
perspective, identifying the gaps that this research fills. Using this previously
published material, I explore the social, cultural and political trends that
created a set of circumstances, which allowed the emergence of local
broadcasting. My argument here is that this shift in society‟s attitudes was
reflected in an important change in the way the BBC saw its public service
responsibilities, which became more geared to its diffuse and non-
metropolitan audience. Chapter Three contains my key research questions
and sources.

Section Two consists of three chapters, which cover the years c1955 to
1966. This is the start of the main body of the thesis, relying on my own
research of primary sources. The intention here is to argue that the BBC was
able to advance local radio as part of its public service remit against a
backdrop of major events, such as the Pilkington Committee, 1961- 62, and
discussions affecting broadcasting on a national and local level. I also show,
for the first time, the significance of the BBC‟s closed-circuit experiments
during the same period. I argue in Chapter Six that the BBC succeeded in
manoeuvring itself into a position of readiness to launch local radio by the
mid 1960s, despite the fact there was no guarantee that it would be given the
go ahead.

Section Three is called „Developments‟ and charts how local radio was
finally launched, with an eight-station experiment, and how the BBC set
about nurturing the service with the hope of making it permanent and
creating more stations. As I shall argue, BBC Local Radio faced considerable
challenges from the late 1960s through to the end of the 1970s. Some of
these were political problems, caused by changes in government and policy
(Chapters Eight and Nine, the arrival of Independent Local Radio and the

2
Annan Report). Other obstacles were internal to the BBC, such as the
tensions that existed between the local Station Managers and senior
management, which came to a head in the late 1970s (see Chapter Nine).
Then there are the issues of how the BBC struggled with its definition of local
radio, presenting it as community radio, yet never quite fulfilling the promise
to everyone‟s satisfaction (Chapters Eight and Nine). As I argue in the thesis,
there were intrinsic structural issues, which served local radio when it was
just eight stations, but which created difficulties when attempts were made to
expand. Crucially, problems with resources, programme quality and
wavelengths caused the BBC to revisit, over and over again, how it defined
local radio, what the optimum size for a station should be and how to resolve
the tension between geographical coverage and community needs.

The thesis concludes in 1980, with the Third Home Office Local Radio
Working Party Report. This was effectively the end point for the first, and
major stage, in local radio development at the BBC, resulting in
approximately 90% coverage of England by the late 1980s. The new wave of
stations were characterised by their county-wide boundaries, a necessary
compromise from the original concept, yet a success in many of the other
objectives that the BBC set out to achieve.

There are a couple of important definitions to be made here. First, this

research concentrates on BBC Local Radio. The commercial sector launched
its first local radio stations in 1972, and the paths of BBC and commercial
local radio have converged and diverged over the years. It is impossible –
and not desirable - to separate completely one sector from the other.
Nevertheless, the research concentrates on local broadcasting as a part of
public service output, as it emerged from the BBC as a media institution and
organisation. Although previous research has been carried out in the history
of BBC Local Radio as part of the wider BBC story, as will be explored further
on, research has not been conducted up to now solely on the causes,
genesis and development of BBC Local Radio in its own right.

Secondly, BBC Local Radio has developed across what are now called
the English Regions and Nations. Again, however, the focus of enquiry is

3
more precise and addresses the English aspect of local radio, with
reference where necessary to the individual nations. The circumstances
surrounding Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales are all particular and
specific to a different set of social, cultural, geographic and political
considerations so that the questions and issues raised by the experience of
local broadcasting in England cannot be said to be generically applicable
across the borders.

4
 Section One: Contexts - Media and Community in
post-war Britain

CHAPTER ONE:
A discussion of the historical perspectives

Introduction

„Radio Leeds will do its best to fill the need for information in a
confusing age, to wipe out the pools of loneliness in the midst of a
bustling city, to let the people and their servants in the City Hall get
together more fruitfully to provide an audience for the music-maker,
the teacher, the debater, the ordinary man in Leeds and, more
important, the extraordinary man. Radio Leeds can help Leeds
know itself better than ever before.‟2

This is an extract from a speech made by Phil Sidey on the eve of the
opening of the fifth local radio station to be launched by the BBC in June
1968. Sidey was the first Station Manager for Radio Leeds and his words
captured the sense of excitement and expectation, aspiration and
achievement that embodied the BBC‟s local radio enterprise. There were
some well-chosen phrases in the speech that were used to justify and
underpin the ethos of local broadcasting. It should – in keeping with all good
radio – provide companionship to the listener, be a source of information
and a means of communication between different parts of the population.
But the context of the period in which Sidey was speaking went further, in
framing these aims in language that was bold and stark. For many, the late
1960s were a „confusing age‟, with accompanying social dislocation, the re-
building of communities, the growth in technology and industry and the
affluence that was brought to some (but not all). Participation in many
aspects of civil life that were previously taken for granted was less common
(such as voting at elections) and democracy seemed distant and
unconnected. Hence the exhortation for citizens and servants to engage.
Finally, and crucially, the station existed to serve a specific location, to give
the city itself a voice and identity on the airwaves through the voices of its
citizens. This was what put the „local‟ in local radio. BBC Local Radio was

2
Ariel „A Radio-Leeds Type Greeting‟ by Phil Sidey 12 December 12 1968 13: 12

5
conceived as a network of stations that would serve local populations,
bound by common interests of geography, outlook and interests. These
then were the aspirations, the goals that the founding fathers hoped local
radio could achieve, and in a sense, this quote provides the narrative
structure for the objectives of this thesis too. In the course of the research, I
am setting out to argue that by launching local radio, the BBC discovered
much more about itself, its own audience and its role in national and local
broadcasting.
This section contains three chapters. The first is an overview of the
history and related literature, which I use as the basis for the parameters of
the local radio story. It begins by establishing the broad outlines of the
chronology and then looks at what has already been written about the
organisation of BBC radio, with particular reference to the regional structure
and how the BBC‟s scheduling policy changed over time, in response to the
perceived shift from paternalism to populism. I will then argue that changes
in post-war Britain had an impact on the earning-capacity of the population,
how they chose to spend their excess income and leisure time and how in
turn that affected media-consumption.
The chapter then turns to planning and post-war reconstruction, and the
access of regional voices to the airways, to argue that non-metropolitan
representation did not begin with local broadcasting and that some notable
broadcasters already had a clear perception of how to relate to their
audience. I then go on to argue that the wider concerns facing communities
in relation to culture, communications and technology were framed by
contemporary writers at the time. From this I will argue that the gaps that
existed in the landscape of localised involvement, coupled with renewed
interest in culture and community and the opportunities afforded by new
technologies were regarded by many at the time as things best satisfied by
the creation of a new tier in broadcasting.
In the next chapter, I examine previously published work about BBC
history and key points in the narrative concerning the early years of BBC
Local Radio. The studies under consideration include not just histories, but
primary sources too, in the form of memoirs and autobiographies. These
texts are critiqued in detail to pinpoint omissions and highlight alternative

6
 interpretations. While the primary focus rests with the BBC, the fluctuations
and vicissitudes of the local commercial radio world when it impacted on the
BBC are also taken into account. Instances include the launch of the
commercial service and how the BBC adapted to the end of its monopoly in
radio, how successive governments approached the two sectors in terms of
station and wavelength apportionment. But in fact the threat, as the BBC
saw it, of commercial competition underscored the whole debate concerning
the introduction of local broadcasting dating back to the 1950s. So the
themes raised by the existence of the independent sector are key, even if
this thesis is not a history of those particular stations.
Before discussing the academic literature, it would be useful here to
outline the key events in the timeline, from the early 1950s to the late
1970s, in order to see the context within which they are operating.3 In 1951,
local broadcasting as a modern concept was first raised as a possibility with
the Beveridge Report, which recommended that the BBC carry out an
experiment of local broadcasting using Very High Frequency (VHF). 4
Although these experiments did not occur, the BBC did develop and start to
build a network of VHF transmitters to support its MF and LF radio
coverage. Between 1961 and 1962 the BBC carried out a series of „closed-
circuit‟ (ie not broadcast) trials, to test the possibilities of local broadcasting
in sites across the UK. These experiments formed part of the BBC‟s
evidence to the Pilkington Committee, which included in its
recommendations the creation of 250 local radio stations to be set up by the
BBC.
It was not until December 1966 that the BBC was granted permission to
have a two-year experiment with eight local radio stations in England. The
first of these was Radio Leicester, which launched on 8 November 1967.
In 1969, the government agreed that the BBC could continue with local
radio on a permanent basis and gave permission for the creation of 12 more

3
See Appendix A for a list of key dates
4
Chronology taken from Lewis P & Booth J The Invisible Medium: Public, Commercial and
Community Radio (London: Macmillan 1989) pp 210 – 212; Briggs, A The History of
Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: Vol V Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995) pp 1013 – 1075; Crisell A An Introductory History of British Broadcasting (London &
New York: Routledge 1997) pp 142 - 147

7
stations, making 20 in total. The BBC policy document Broadcasting in the
70s further consolidated this by proposing to dismantle the regional
structure and replace it with local radio.
The incoming Conservative government halted BBC local radio
expansion in 1970 and subsequently licensed a network of commercial local
stations, the first two of which, LBC and Capital, went on air in October
1973. In 1974 the Crawford Committee recommended that the BBC and the
IBA should do more for disenfranchised rural areas. The BBC conducted
two „mini-local‟ experiments in Barrow-in-Furness and Whitehaven, in 1975
and 1976 respectively. Further local radio expansion was frozen, with the
BBC at 20 stations, IBA at 19 stations, pending the Annan Enquiry into
Broadcasting. Its report, in 1977, proposed the transfer of local
broadcasting control and regulation away from the IBA and the BBC, to a
new „Local Broadcasting Authority‟. After public consultation this proposal
was dropped, and the Home Office Local Radio Working Party was set up,
which included representation from both the BBC and the IBA.
This Working Party published three reports. In 1978, it proposed 18 more
local stations (totals: BBC 29; IBA 28). The second report in 1979 awarded
the BBC one more station, and IBA 14. The third report in 1980 authorised
another 36 stations, bringing the totals to: BBC – 40 stations; IBA - 68. 1980
was in a sense the watershed year for BBC Local Radio as it marked the
zenith of its biggest phase of expansion, and also the period when it began
to change into a more „county-wide‟ service. The earlier parts of the story
(from 1960 – 1970) are those referred to most frequently in this chapter,
largely because this is the period, which most concerns the existing
literature and previous histories.

The BBC’s local audiences before the 1960s

Having established the chronology covered by the existing literature and the
parameters of my research period, this section argues that for local radio to
emerge into the BBC‟s consciousness as a concept, there needed to be
certain technological and cultural circumstances. As I will explain, these
criteria had their roots in BBC radio‟s early history and the way the regional
pattern accommodated local broadcasting to some degree. I will also show

8
 how changes in society and culture in post-war Britain, with groups and
individuals becoming more interested and concerned by their surroundings
and place in Great Britain and the emergence of new ideas connecting
community and people, contrasted with the BBC‟s tendency towards
centralisation. Coupled with this were changes in technology, and how this
made an impact on listening habits.
The pre-Second World War non-metropolitan origins of BBC radio can be
traced back to the early days of the organisation in the 1920s. Originally the
British Broadcasting Company oversaw a network of local, separate
stations, which were connected to London by telephone links and
„simultaneous broadcasting‟ (or networking as it would be called today). 5
The nine stations were based in London, Manchester, Birmingham,
Newcastle, Glasgow, Cardiff, Aberdeen, Bournemouth and Belfast. Each
station covered about twenty miles in radius – although the exact distance
depended on whether one was listening on a valve or crystal set. The focus
was very much on fostering regional participation and showcasing local
talent. Many of the programmes produced relied on informality,
improvisations and local characters.6 Each station developed close
connections to their audience, by exploiting civic relationships and a
creative use of participants and locations, such as programmes broadcast
from the bottom of a mine, in Leeds-Bradford and a soundscape of the
Thames.7 Despite some of the difficulties involved, Scannell and Cardiff
point out that
„the local stations had, each in their own way, adapted
themselves to the areas they served, and offered not only
entertainment but a public service to their community of a rather
different kind to that which was taking shape in London.‟8

However, as Peter Eckersley (radio pioneer and the first Chief Engineer
at the BBC) recounted, local jealousies began to threaten this arrangement.
For example, Sheffield complained about poor reception quality from the

5
Lewis P & Booth J The Invisible Medium: Public, Commercial and Community Radio
(London: Macmillan 1989) p 23
6
Scannell P & Cardiff D A Social History of British Broadcasting Vol 1 1922-1939 (Oxford:
Blackwell 1991) p 309-310
7
Scannell & Cardiff Op cit p 310
8
Scannel & Cardiff Op cit p 314

9
 Manchester station and instead chose to take London‟s „feed‟ from a
telephone wire, along with an opt-out for an hour‟s local programming each
day.9 Nine other relay stations followed suit, all taking output from London,
rather than their nearest regional station.10 Writing in 1924, Reith
commented on this centralisation:
„Personally I think it is altogether unfortunate that there should
be this demand for London programmes in the relay
stations……stations will, I imagine, be grouped by areas according
to the characteristics, national or local, of the people and a more
satisfactory service be given.‟11

Reith‟s complaints about the added burden the relay stations placed on
the London headquarters in terms of administration and cost could be seen
as disingenuous. Gradually a clearer demarcation emerged between the
editorial control of the staff in the London headquarters and the regional
producers. Seemingly small adjustments, such as station announcers
adopting anonymity and formal dress, the abandonment of many quiz
shows and the reduction in spontaneity in children‟s programmes, combined
to reinforce what Scannell and Cardiff call a „them‟ and „us‟ divide.12 But
perhaps the final drive to centralisation was Eckersley‟s technical
breakthrough, the „Regional Scheme‟.13
This involved a powerful long-wave transmitter based at Daventry, which
could broadcast a single national programme. This got round the problem of
reaching remote rural areas, which would otherwise need large numbers of
medium-wave transmitters. But to preserve some kind of localised output,
the long-wave system also allowed for other transmitters in the Regions to
provide alternative broadcasts on different wavelengths. This had the effect
of supplying a supplementary service for each large locality, at certain times
of the day. From 1929, national output from London was complemented by
six Regional services for London and the South East, Birmingham and the
Midlands, the North of England, Scotland, Wales and the West of England

9
Eckersley P The Power Behind the Microphone (London: Jonathan Cape 1941) p 70
10
Eckersley op cit p 54
11
Reith, J C W Broadcast Over Britain (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1924) p 63
12
Scannell P & Cardiff D A Social History of British Broadcasting Vol 1 1922-1939 (Oxford:
Blackwell 1991) p 317
13
Scannell & Cardiff Op cit p 318

10
 and Northern Ireland. The only problem was, these regions were defined
not by the people, places and characteristics of the geographical areas, but
by the physical landscape that determined where the transmitters could be
sited.14 Scannell points out that the regional, and national regional, divisions
were created by the BBC, which „presumed….the unity of the culture and
identify of the United Kingdom, a presumption that glossed over its many
disunities.‟15 In contrast, Lewis & Booth argue that the regional structure
enabled Reith to contend that the newly-formed British Broadcasting
Corporation was not therefore a complete monopoly, because there was
some diversity for the listeners, depending on where they lived.16
Scannell and Cardiff demonstrate how, in the 1930s, programme
scheduling and content were subject to quite rigid controls, when they
emanated from London. This extended to the style of presentation, music
policy, news, talks and features. The services based in the regions enjoyed
more autonomy - although this did not represent a complete choice for the
listener: it was a variation of the national output. In some instances there
was an opportunity to bring more familiar and local-based voices to the
listeners. The North Region, in particular, pioneered mobile recording
techniques, resulting in programmes from diverse locations such as a
railway marshalling yard, a post office and a passenger steamer port, all
featuring average, working people. Groundbreaking series included Harry
Hopeful, Cotton, Wool, Coal and Pounds, Shilling and Pence, all of which
resisted the national trend in the 1930s to portray ordinary folk as victims, or
stereotypical representatives of the „man on the street.‟17
During the Second World War, the BBC‟s sound broadcasting structure
became more centralized. At the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, the BBC
had envisaged a rather austere wartime schedule with news and talks
emanating from London – as the regionalised transmitters were closed
down in case they inadvertently aided enemy aircraft.18 But feedback from
the armed forces resulted in a more informal and varied approach, with the
14
Scannell & Cardiff ibid p 320
15
Scannell P „The Origins of BBC Regional Policy‟ in Harvey S and Robins K (ed) The
Regions, the Nations and the BBC (London: bfi Publishing 1993) p 35
16
Lewis & Booth ibid p 54
17
Scannell & Cardiff ibid p 338; 349
18
Lewis & Booth ibid p 72

11
 establishment of the Forces Programme in January 1940 to complement
the Home Service.19 The former was a mixture of variety, music and
entertainment, intended to enliven morale and help the wartime spirit, with
programmes such as Workers’ Playtime. In a sense the war was THE
national event, which unified all attention and focus and not surprisingly in
broadcast terms regionalism largely took a back seat.
Lewis & Booth argue that the wartime structure created more cultural and
geographical distance between the BBC and their audience.20 In contrast
Sian Nicholas explores the impact of some of the North Region‟s pre-war
experimental programmes, which resulted in more opportunities for ordinary
people to be heard in front of the microphone – this time for a national, not
just regional, audience. Producer Geoffrey Bridson followed up his series
Harry Hopeful with Billy Welcome, in which Wilfred Pickles met men and
women in the Northern dales.21 Pickles was also employed as a news
reader for several months in 1942, showing that a genuine Yorkshire voice
reading the news could be appreciated by the listeners.22 Other
programmes included My Day’s Work, Everyman and the War, Go To It and
We Speak for Ourselves.23
Nicholas‟ research shows that BBC producers during the war made a
conscious effort to get regional accents and dialects on the airwaves, in
discussion programmes, talks, features and even comedies such as ITMA.
„This kind of „public access‟ continued throughout the war, as the
BBC made a virtue of bringing onto the air the people of Britain
from all regions, occupations and backgrounds, demonstrating to
listeners across the country that they too were being heard and
seeking to foster national unity by portraying a democratic Britain
proud of its regional and class diversity‟.24

They may not have been wholly successful, as one critic pointed out,
commenting on a BBC programme: „are all soldiers Cockneys, or all

19
Nicholas, S Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the wartime BBC 1939-45
(Manchester: Manchester University Press 1996) p 51
20
Lewis & Booth ibid pp 72 - 74
21
Nicholas ibid p 233
22
Pickles W Between You and Me (London: Werner Laurie 1949) Chapter XIII
23
Nicholas ibid p 239
24
Nicholas ibid p 240

12
 Cockneys soldiers?‟25 Nevertheless, Nicholas‟ research shows that,
because the Regional system was temporarily dismantled, wartime
broadcasting to the nation as a whole allowed the opportunity for non-
metropolitan programmes – and voices – to be heard by new audiences.
After the war, the variations based in the regions restarted and the
national schedule was re-organised into the Light Programme, the Home
Service and the Third Programme. These networks were dictated more
along the lines of the tastes of individual groups rather than communities of
interest. William Haley, now the Director-General, envisaged a pyramid
approach to listening, with the Third Programme at the pinnacle, the Light
Programme at the base and the Home Service in the middle. The notion
was that the listener would find their place somewhere on the continuum of
this spectrum and that over time they might be able to aspire to shift further
up the pyramid.26
Lewis & Booth reflect that there were still strong elements of pre-war
paternalism here, as the BBC continued to dictate what was felt to be
appropriate listening for the audience. Meanwhile, the BBC capitalised on
its access to major national events and created for itself the status of the
national broadcaster, serving as a unifying focus for the audience.27
However the dilemma for the BBC regions was how to mediate their content
to avoid being dominated by a national perspective. Using the 1951 Festival
of Britain as an example, Chaney‟s research into civil ritual in mass society
highlights three potential scenarios to demonstrate a regional interpretation
of events of significant interest: „local man visits major metropolitan event‟;
„big London orchestra visits our quaint town‟; or the rather officious „local
civic banquet held in honour of big national event, with councillors and
squirearchy attending.‟28
The Festival of Britain provided Chaney with several instances of how
local programmes worked with the themes inherent in the event to produce
relevant and interesting work, such as the West Region‟s broadcast from
25
Nicholas ibid p 239
26
Lewis & Booth ibid pp 78 - 79
27
Scannell, P „Public Service Broadcasting: The History of a Concept‟ in Edward Buscombe
(ed) British Television: A Reader (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) pp 53 - 54
28
Chaney D „A symbolic mirror of ourselves: civic ritual in mass society‟ Media, Culture &
Society 1983 Vol 5 pp 119-135

13
 the Fawley Oil Refinery or the extended series on the county of
Northamptonshire made by the Midland Region. Despite this, Chaney
argues that the BBC‟s coverage of the Festival of Britain in 1951 was less
successful than, say, the Victory Parade of 1946 or even the Coronation of
1953 as a media event because the BBC was unsure what it represented.
Did the Festival of Britain represent intellectual accomplishment or
institutional achievement? Chaney suggests it veered towards the latter in
most respects, particularly in sound output where it was treated more as a
news event.29
The inference which Chaney does not draw, I would argue, is that while
the lack of clear thought may have been reflected in less than imaginative
output from the networks, the regions, given the right amount of space and
autonomy, were able to come up with more appropriate and creative
programmes for their audience. They did not always need to rely on events
and occurrences outside their territory either, thus illustrating the potential
that more local broadcasting could fulfill.
So the changing needs of different parts of the country presented the
BBC with a challenge. It now had to reflect these developments in audience
taste against the backdrop of a shifting, post-war Britain. These changes in
society can be summarized as follows. The revival in the UK‟s economic
fortunes brought a rise in real wages, up by 20% between 1951 and 1958.30
This affluence resulted in greater home ownership and the corresponding
focus on domestic lifestyles. This included the acquisition of new consumer
products, many of which were labour-saving devices, and this in turn gave
large numbers of people more free time to pursue other leisure pastimes,
some home and family-based and others more group oriented in the outside
community.31
Historians of the period such as Sandbrook and Hennessy detail the
various pursuits that became more popular, from rambling and cycling clubs

29
Chaney ibid p 129
30
Lewis & Booth ibid p 79
31
Scannell P Developments in Television in the UK and USA University of Westminster
lecture June 3 2008

14
 to gardening and do-it-yourself.32 In terms of domestic pastimes, a Gallup
survey in 1957 found that almost nine in ten people had listened to the radio
in the past week, along with two out of three watching television, while
knitting, gardening, reading and needlework were all popular too.33 By the
end of the fifties, there were estimated to be 3,000 amateur football teams,
5,000 cinemas and almost as many dance halls.34 Sandbrook notes „It was
a world of anglers, knitters and amateur footballers, poised to confront the
new cultural challenges of the 1950s.‟35
But what was the relevance of this to the BBC? Radio indulged these
minority interests in some ways, such as the so-called „hobby programmes‟
on Network Three, the re-launched subdivision of the Third Programme –
which cynics soon dubbed the „fretwork network.‟36 Arguably Network Three
was not the right place to try and interest an audience versed in high culture
with everyday hobbies and pastimes. So how else could the BBC respond
to broader changes across society and culture in their existing output? From
a technical perspective, the answer lay in the means of broadcast.
National broadcasting could not cater for minorities. However there was
an alternative method of transmission, Very High Frequency (VHF), which
made more localized broadcasting possible. VHF had several advantages
over MW or LW. It was transmitted in a different way – in lay terms it
travelled in straight lines and was not subject to night time deflections that
reduced the capability of MW or LW. At night time, the MW signal
deteriorated badly and was subject to much interference. VHF had a
stronger signal but as it took up more bandwidth, there were not as many
wavelengths available – and far fewer receivers to listen on. The BBC had
been experimenting with VHF since 1946 and made plans for a national

32
Hennessy P Having it So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Allen Lane 2006); Sandbrook
D Never Had It So Good: A History of Britain from Suez to the Beatles (London: Little Brown
2006)
33
Sandbrook ibid p 130
34
Sandbrook ibid p 146
35
Sandbrook Ibid p 146
36
Carpenter H with research by Jennifer Doctor The Envy of the World: Fifty Years of the
BBC Third Programme and Radio 3 1946-1996 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1996) p
183

15
 VHF network. The Beveridge Report in 1951 had recommended that the
BBC begin experiments in local broadcasting using the new frequencies. 37
These never took place but BBC engineers continued to develop the BBC‟s
VHF network, and completing UK coverage was a long-held BBC goal.38
The three national services (Home, Light and the Third Programmes)
continued to be broadcast on MW and LW, but as VHF became more
available, it was used to supplement transmission. However the BBC‟s
preferred configuration of VHF transmission (horizontal polarization) was
based on fixed reception (ie aerials attached to buildings). This was not
suitable for car radios or portable transistors. So despite the fact there was
now a new means available for increased radio provision, it was tempered
by the limited means of reception. Owners of portable radios tended to
listen more to MW, while those with traditional „fixed point‟ receivers had to
decide whether it was worth the trouble and expense of upgrading to a
VHF-capable set.
So the two technologies almost contradicted each other. VHF allowed
more localized broadcasting, but the audience was slow to adapt to it and
the BBC preferred to use it for other priorities. Meanwhile transistor radios
turned MW into a very portable frequency, but the new, minority audience
this attracted was characterized by its interests, not by location, so it could
not be served by localized, VHF-transmissions. Moreover, the listeners best
served by portable radios were young people, and the output they wanted
to hear was pop music.39 Teenagers and young people were increasingly
forming their own identity and culture, which pop music played a big part in.
The BBC had very little on offer for them – instead they found their outlet on
stations like Radio Luxembourg, which by the late fifties was playing six
hours of new material each night.40 The BBC regarded popular music as too
much of a minority taste for its networks – putting it in the same category as
jazz music.41 Lewis & Booth note the way young people began to

37
Lewis & Booth ibid p 26
38
Curran C A Seamless Robe – Broadcasting, Philosophy and Practice (London: Collins
1979) pp 256-181
39
Crisell A „Local radio: attuned to the times or filling time with tunes?‟ in Franklin B and
Murphy B (eds) Local Journalism in Context (London: Routledge 1998) p 26
40
Sandbrook ibid p 463
41
Lewis & Booth ibid p 79

16
 appropriate their own space in private and public and music was one way of
setting themselves apart physically and culturally from the older
generation.42 Portable radios helped this process. By definition the
transistor radio could be taken anywhere – eg the bedroom, away from the
parental-dominated living room – ideal for teenagers listening to pop
stations.
So to summarise, these are the circumstances that sound broadcasting
found itself in by the early 1960s. Originally, the BBC had used „old‟
technology to broadcast on a local basis, but had moved away from these
origins, to a structure that included a Regional stratum. Changes in
technology made more localised broadcasting possible once again.
However, was there a definable audience who actually wanted it? If local
broadcasting was to capitalise on targeted output, there needed to be a
much clearer indication of what a „local community‟ was, and what the
relationship might be with local broadcasting.

Constructing communities
As I have argued, despite the existence of the regional framework, it was
debatable exactly how representative the BBC‟s locally produced
programmes could be to indigenous audiences and how closely they could
reflect their own concerns, issues and interests. At the same time there
were now the technological means to expand provision, or at least re-
allocate existing patterns to free up some spare capacity. This section starts
by defining aspects of community from the perspective of sociological
studies looking at the impact of large scale re-building and reconstruction.
And linked to this, it will examine issues of accent and regional identity.
Then I will turn to the ideology that could be said to lie behind some of the
concepts of local broadcasting and how these were being discussed by
contemporary commentators, with particular reference to ideas about
community and culture. From this, I will argue that local broadcasting could
only become a reality when there was a clear identification from key parts of

42
Lewis & Booth ibid p 82

17
 society with the need to find outlets on the media for community interests.
Local radio was only viable when there were local voices to be heard.
As I have identified above, there were changes in society, leisure and
identity in post-war Britain. At the same time there are also broader
geographical and cultural influences to take into consideration. In the late
1940s and 50s, „planning‟ became the new mantra, to re-build the country
after the privations and ravages of war. Regional government was
supplemented by regional planning. As Colls puts it „nationalisation and
welfare were to be the new levers of unity and a battery of regionalised
plans was put in place.‟43 Established communities were facing a
fundamental threat in the face of physical demolition and reconstruction.
Municipal redevelopment occurred on a massive scale, with the combined
efforts of architects, planners, local politicians and contractors. During
Macmillan‟s tenure as Minister for Housing in the early 1950s, the
developers met the target of 300,000 new homes.44 But that was just the
beginning. Alongside suburban development, the inner cities were turned
into building sites for the new craze of tower blocks. In four years, 1956 –
60, high-rise building increased from being 3% of new constructions to 16%,
and would reach 26% by 1966.45 Tower blocks provided a pragmatic
solution to space shortage while at the same time a change in the funding
arrangements brought greater subsidies for increased storeys and the
opportunity for futuristic design harnessed the emerging optimism for a new
technological age.46 The pace of change accelerated to break neck speed,
so much so that in little more than 30 years
„much of the ancient palimpsest, the mixture of public and
private buildings, high streets and back lanes which has given
[towns] for so long a sense of place, of physical coherence and
individual community identity‟47

were gone. There is a rich collection of academic work, both

contemporaneous and retrospective which has viewed these tower

43
Colls, R Identity of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002) p 316
44
Hennessy P Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Penguin 2007) p 21
45
Hennessy ibid p 493
46
Hennessy ibid pp 493 - 4
47
Clarke P quoted in Daunton M (ed) Cambridge Urban History Vol iii (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2000) p xix

18
 blocks as a challenge to social cohesion. Young and Willmott were
reaching the end of their Bethnal Green research when high rises
began to appear, but it was clear they were not popular: young
families felt isolated, children could not play nearby, design and
architecture were not conducive to friendliness and neighbourliness.48
Michael Young later described how he believed local councillors were
„hood winked and out-talked by the clever architects and town-
planners. They gave way…..to what they thought to be the modern
fashion – the architectural and planning ideologies‟.49
In terms of housing – and community - , the key pieces of legislation
were the New Towns Act 1946 and the Town Development Act 1952, which
established new settlements based in urban dispersal and the expansion of
existing towns. These included places like Stevenage, Crawley, Basildon,
Corby and Newton Aycliffe.50 Researchers such as Young and Willmott51
described the social upheaval brought about by the decline of inner city
communities and the transplant of populations to new estates, which in turn
disrupted traditional kinship networks.
But what were the alternatives, particularly since the new developments
brought vastly improved basic amenities, such as hot water and indoor
plumbing? Writer and journalist Ray Gosling weighed up the options in his
witness testimony. The latter section of his 1980 memoir Personal Copy
included a vivid account of the struggles to contain the slum clearances in
Nottingham, particularly in the St Ann‟s district where Ray lived.52 This
happened in the very years when Radio Nottingham went on air for the first
time (1968 – 71). In many ways Gosling‟s conclusions mirrored those of
Young & Willmott after their Bethnal Green field work. They wrote
„the sense of loyalty to each other amongst the inhabitants of a
place like Bethnal Green is not due to buildings. It is due far more
to ties of kinship and friendship, which connect the people [authors‟
italics] of one household to the people of another. …..If the
authorities regard that [community] spirit as a social asset worth

48
Hennessy ibid p 493
49
Hennessy ibid pp 493 - 4
50
Sandbrook D White Heat: A History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties (London: Little Brown
2006) p 177
51
Young M and Willmott P Family and Kinship in East London (London: Penguin 1957)
52
Gosling R Personal Copy (London: Faber & Faber 1980)

19
 preserving they will not uproot more people but build the new
houses around the social groups to which they already belong.‟ 53

Over twenty years later, Gosling echoed the sentiment, as he bemoaned

the effects of redevelopment „we were a slum rich in life and now we‟ve
become a very boring, decent council house estate.‟ 54
So these academic and eye witness accounts captured the challenges to
social cohesion that existed in the post-war geophysical landscape. It is
clear that there are alternative interpretations about the effects on
community of redevelopment and mobility and furthermore, the available
research does not attempt to gauge the impact on the notion of community
spirit, which admittedly is difficult to do in retrospect. Nevertheless, post-war
reconstruction and development had an impact on units of the population,
from the family to the neighbourhood. The task of this research is to assess
the importance of local radio in this landscape. Local broadcasting could
never lay claim to altering the course of this social reconstruction, but
instead, I will argue (following the Hoggart/Williams line, below), local radio
could articulate that change, by providing a place where people could have
a dialogue, share their experiences and concerns, debate the issues, think
about the past and the future. In other words, changes in society created a
need, almost a problem, that local radio could solve.
But how could the medium of radio specifically provide this solution?
Colls‟ work on identity and nationhood contrasts political and „state‟
definitions of place with those moulded by geography and land.55 One facet
of this was the use of language and speech, which according to Colls in the
1930s and 40s was dominated by the BBC‟s use of Received
Pronunciation. Despite the fact that it „controlled so little of the territory‟ 56 its
real purpose was to establish a kind of social hierarchy through teaching in
schools and re-enforcement on the airwaves. „No less than English land,

53
Young & Willmott ibid p 199
54
Gosling ibid p 218
55
Colls, R Identity of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002) pp 225 - 244
56
Colls ibid p 232

20
 English speech was enclosed. It became as much as means of keeping
people out as bringing people in.‟57
As mentioned above, one of the most notable regional voices that
listeners may have heard on the BBC was that of Wilfred Pickles, a
newsreader from Halifax, who was employed during the Second World War
and went on to present the long-running radio quiz show, Have A Go.
Pickles‟ 1951 memoir argued for a less metropolitan sound to the BBC and
more regionalisation.58
„I say it is misusing the qualities of ordinary folk…..in the shape of
their personalities, to try to canalize what they say into one avenue of
conversation…….The trouble is that they‟re trying to standardize
expressions and smiles just as they tried to standardize English.‟59

Have A Go took the show to the audience, travelling the length and
breadth of the country visiting pubs, clubs, village halls and factories,
featuring a range of accents and popular interests: „You can‟t go wrong with
real people and real life.‟60
In reading these texts, I would argue that the expectations of society
were beginning to shift against a backdrop of economic and industrial
change. Pickles demonstrated there was still an appetite for a diverse
public to be heard and seen on radio and television. The regional
broadcasting model was limited in the extent to which it could reflect all the
minority interests of its audience and capture the diversity of the population.
So the alternative option was to invest in even more local forms of
broadcasting, profiting from those social networks and kinship structures
identified by the work of Young and Willmott and others. As communities
began to shift and re-align, having access to local media could be seen as a
possible way to re-create cohesion and bring positive benefits. The new
estates might, as Gosling said, be places where „no one comes into the
area any more to work, shop, dance or sing‟61 but I would argue that radio
was a crucial conduit for re-discovering some of the public pleasures that
had been lost. This invokes Phil Sidey‟s speech at the opening of the

57
Colls ibid p 233
58
Pickles W Sometime….Never (London: Werner Laurie 1951) Chapter VII
59
Pickles Op cit p 128
60
Pickles Op cit p 116
61
Gosling ibid p 219

21
 chapter and his intention for Radio Leeds to help and facilitate the local
population to find some of the connections that had been lost, to make
sense of the changes in life and society and play their part as citizens.

Portrayals of ‘everyday life’ on television and radio

At the same time, it is important to recognize that this appetite for the
reflection of ordinary lives in the media was already being met and written
about, to some extent. As Sandbrook and Hennessy among others
establish, „everyday life‟ underwent a wide-reaching re-definition in the post-
Second World War years.62 The collective impression of historians and
cultural commentators suggests that the balance between working life and
leisure time began to shift after 1945, so that disposable time, hobbies and
recreation became a more significant factor in the equation. Everyday life
began to be more noticeably written about, filmed, recorded, photographed
in such a way that it became historicized.63 That is not to say that these
activities did not occur before (indeed dating back to Edwardian times) but
there was an increase in the emphasis placed on the balance in peoples‟
lives between work and non-work.
There were two notable depictions of „everyday life‟ in broadcasting
terms, which captured the imagination of their respective audiences in a
very short space of time. One was the long-running radio serial, The
Archers, which began with a pilot in 1950 and then launched in January
1951. Despite the original intention to incorporate agricultural messages for
farmers, nevertheless it set out to portray an „everyday story of country folk‟.
The combination of strong characters and interesting stories suited the
audience‟s liking for a domestic focus and a (rather romanticized) notion of
rural England, so that within five years it had reached 20 million listeners.64
The other example was Coronation Street, which started in 1960. This
concerned another community, but there the focus was the industrial North
of England, a great urban sprawl, not quite as nostalgia-filled but still

62
Hennessy; Sandbrook ibid
63
Scannell P Developments in Television in the UK and USA University of Westminster
lecture 3 June 2008
64
Sandbrook ibid p 382

22
 inhabited by lively, engaging characters. Again this had reached the 20
million mark in terms of viewers, in less than two years.65
These programmes demonstrated the appetite for domestic dramas that
portrayed a sense of community and belonging for its fictional dwellers but
also gave that same feeling to the viewers and listeners. Jordan defines
„Social Realism‟ as a genre, and applies this to Coronation Street.66 For her,
the storylines were rooted in personal events, which were situated in
recognizable and commonplace locations to which the viewer could relate.
„These events are ostensibly about social [Jordan‟s italics] problems, they
should have as one of their central concerns the setting of people in life.‟67
This is a crucial spur for local broadcasting, I would argue. If interest in
everyday life could work in a dramatic way, imagine what the viewer or
listener might have also gained from hearing real people, neighbours,
friends, family, engaged in issues, dramas and interests common to all?
Frank Gillard, regarded as the founding father of BBC Local Radio, summed
up how the service might sound, in an oft-repeated phrase: „aiming to
present on the air, and in many different forms and through a multitude of
local voices, the running serial story [my italics] of local life in all its
aspects.‟68 This was very reminiscent of an „everyday story of country folk.‟
Similarly there were resonances between the picture conjured by
Coronation Street and the work of Richard Hoggart. The Uses of Literacy69
depicted a Northern working class lifestyle not too dissimilar from the
fictional world of Weatherfield. Here too were found a warm-hearted, honest
homogeneous community, with its own traditions and rituals, colourful
characters and hardships. Richard Dyer points out that Coronation Street
emerged at the same time as The Uses of Literacy, when there was a
desire to legitimate a strand of culture that was authentically working class.
He identifies four key elements from The Uses of Literacy that are visible in
Coronation Street: the emphasis on common sense; the absence of politics
and work; the stress on women and the strength of women; and the
65
Sandbrook op cit p 400
66
Jordan M, as quoted in Cooke, L British Television Drama: A History (London bfi publishing
2003) p 36
67
Jordan, as quoted in Cooke Op cit p 36
68
Yorkshire Post „Radio Station in Every City‟ 11 December 1963
69
Hoggart, R The Uses of Literacy (London: Harmondsworth 1958)

23
 perspective of nostalgia.70 But alongside this picture, which Hoggart lovingly
portrayed, there were the threats posed by self-improvement, education,
affluence and the accompanying cheap and shallow proliferation of mass
entertainment. Hoggart accepted that education could promote
advancement – especially to escape financial hardship – but he did not
want to see his native society disappear: „the steam-and-soda-and-hashed-
meat smell of wash-day, or the smell of clothes drying by the fireside; the
Sunday smell of the News of the World-mingled-with-roast-beef‟ for
instance.71 The net effect was two-fold. By dismissing the sensationalist
mass entertainments on offer Hoggart was also closely linked, by
implication, to those who despised the American influence in popular
culture. This included anything tainted by commercialism – which in
television terms meant the cheapening of programmes broadcast by the
independent companies with their quiz shows and variety nights. In radio
terms, the spectre of commercial stations brought with it the inevitable pop
music, which Hoggart especially railed against
„the juke-box boys …..who spend their evenings listening in
harshly-lighted milk bars to their…‟nickelodeons‟…..almost all are
„vocals‟ and the styles of singing much advanced beyond what is
normally heard on the Light Programme of the BBC‟.72

Secondly, Hoggart‟s defence of the working class and their authentic

experience conformed to the popular image which owed much to Chaucer,
Shakespeare and Victorian sentimentality.73 As cultural historian Robert
Hewison puts it, at the core was „a sense of the personal, the concrete, the
local; it is embodied in the idea of first, the family, and second, the
neighbourhood.‟74
Raymond Williams also made a case for reconnecting culture with
politics and class.75 But he put an explicit emphasis on communication, and
the potential for communication and community (as opposed to mass

70
Cooke, L British Television Drama: A History (London: bfi Publishing 2003) p 36
71
Hoggart ibid p 39
72
Hoggart ibid p 248
73
Sandbrook ibid p 184
74
Hewison R In Anger: Culture in the Cold War 1945-60 (Oxford: Oxford University Press:
1981) pp 177 - 8
75
Williams R Culture and Society 1780 – 1950 (London: Chatto & Windus 1958)

24
 communication) as made possible by changes in society and technological
advances. Here Hoggart and Williams diverged. Hoggart could be seduced
by the past, with a sense of viewing the world through rose tinted glasses,
yearning for a world that was on the verge of extinction. This was very much
embodied in the early years of Coronation Street.76 For Williams this was
less about nostalgia for the past and more about mutual support and
contributing to „the advance of consciousness which is the common need.‟77
Britain in the Sixties: Communication, published in 1962, explored various
notions of transmission and reception and the impact on the „mass‟
audience. Williams concluded that the term „the masses‟ was no longer
appropriate, as there were now multi-form, fragmented audiences but the
ownership of media broadcast and publishing had narrowed.78 He proposed
a greater democratic system, which would be a genuinely public service,
provided there were no great broadcasting monopolies.
„The BBC has an excellent definition of Public Service
Broadcasting but it exemplifies the dangers of the very large
organization in which producers can become subject to
administrators. The development of regional and local broadcasting
could become the means of transferring control of this Public
Service Broadcasting to the producers themselves, who already
have the nucleus of independently regionally based companies.‟79

Here was a very explicit enunciation of the potential for local radio,
linking it to the BBC‟s core remit. In this instance, Williams concluded that
education would be the best programme content, and this would include the
way speech, writing and creative expression were taught, as well as training
skills related to broadcast production. Hoggart‟s denunciation of the
downside of popular culture did not include broadcast media explicitly -
apparently he did not own a television set while he was writing The Uses of
Literacy80 - but in 1965, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies
published a pamphlet which set out some of the contemporary debates

76
Cooke ibid p 36
77
Williams ibid p 320
78
Williams R Britain in the Sixties: Communication (London: Penguin) 1962
79
Williams R op cit pp 126 - 7
80
Corner, J „Studying culture: reflections and assessments. An interview with Richard
Hoggart‟ Media, Culture & Society 1991 Vol 13 pp 137 -151

25
 surrounding local broadcasting.81 In the introduction, Hoggart and Stuart
Hall picked up where Williams left off in seeking a less institutionalised
structure: „Essentially she [the pamphlet‟s author, Rachel Powell] is asking
us to think about creative amateurism, which is neither parish pumpery of a
narrow kind nor the professionalism which is so easily a form of
patronage.‟82
In the pamphlet, Powell highlighted the compelling arguments for local
radio. „Socially we can use local radio as a means whereby people in a
town can talk and get to know one another‟.83 Besides allowing a voice for
democracy, promoting culture and social good, education was again at the
core of the remit, in terms of training and schools broadcasts. Yet there was
a sting in the tail: Powell rejected both the BBC‟s claim to run the service in
the long term and any commercial aspirations in the short term, as this
would result in centralisation and a diet of pop music. Powell ultimately
envisaged a community service, where news was liberally interpreted; there
were no restrictions on debate and argument, with complete local
autonomy. Overall there is a discernible thread here, linking Hoggart‟s and
Williams‟ core ideals. The zeitgeist for empowerment and inclusion had its
roots in scholarly and academic thinking, as Colls puts it
„In the 1960s the new freedoms of expression and
communication, the new universities and polytechnics, and that
combination of affluence and welfare which was so new to human
history, powered the mass search for what was authentic or in the
argot for what was real [author‟s italics].‟84

Conclusion
In the post-war years, audiences became more interested in seeing and
hearing representations of lives and communities similar to their own.
Emerging theories around class, culture and communication mirrored this
development. Media commentators, writers, producers, directors and so on
were also considering how and when to respond to this growing interest,

81
Powell, R The Possibilities for Local Radio (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies,
Birmingham University 1965)
82
Powell op cit p i
83
Powell op cit p 12
84
Colls, R Identity of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002) p 366

26
 although the alignment of the various factors might be due to conditions
outside their control.
In The Uses of Literacy Hoggart praised the „resilience‟ of the working
classes as witnessed in the hobbies and leisure activities, the clubs and
societies. These, he argued, had helped preserve a sense of identity and
avoided the pitfalls of the lumpenproletariat.85 So, I would propose, what
better way to promote these unifying experiences and continue the process
of self-fulfilment than through involvement in localised radio? Even better,
this could have been a means to celebrate and revive previously lost
authentic cultural experiences, through the embodiment, to borrow
Hewison‟s phrase, of family and neighbourhood. What is being witnessed
here was an exploration of how academic thinking and contemporary ideas
formed the backdrop to the debate that began to frame local broadcasting.
It is not a complete solution to the cultural malaise that Hoggart described,
but local broadcasting resonated with notions of community, belonging,
personal interaction and making sense of past traditions and ways of life in
the face of progress.

85
Hoggart ibid p 248

27
 CHAPTER TWO:
A discussion of the historiographical perspectives

Broadcasting Histories
In this chapter I will discuss previously published literature, which deals with
BBC radio and local radio in particular, for the period of the thesis, 1960 -
1980. The works of Briggs, Lewis & Booth, Hendy and Crisell concern BBC
history from an academic perspective, while those of Sidey, Purves,
Trethowan etc can be classified as personal memoir and autobiography.
Taken together, these works enable us to build an impression, from many
perspectives, of the chronology, experiences and contributions of local
radio, and what its significance is to the study of media and broadcasting
history.
However, I will argue that this literature also presents significant
problems, especially as none of the works provides a comprehensive
evaluation of the chronological history of local radio covering the years 1960
- 1980, based on primary sources. In particular, I will demonstrate that while
Briggs uses some aspects of local radio‟s genesis and evolution to illustrate
the central themes of his argument regarding BBC history, he displays little
empathy and understanding for the ecology of local radio on its own, and
does not present it in a broader social and cultural context, which I have
begun to explain above. Lewis & Booth do have a clear perspective for their
analysis of local broadcasting history, in the context of community media.
While this is very pertinent to a history of BBC Local Radio, it is
chronologically incomplete and again lacks other aspects of the
broadcasting and corporate ecology. Hendy‟s work is valuable, but largely
from the perspective of Radio Four, with a strong London-centric bias.

The starting point for any history of the BBC has to be the five volumes of
Asa Briggs‟ „The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom‟. Of
particular interest are Volume I („The Birth of Broadcasting 1923-27‟), which
includes an overview of how the regional pattern of broadcasting emerged,
which had a long-lasting impact on the structural and organisational
arrangements for radio transmission and production outside London for the

28
 next 40 years, and Volume V („Competition 1955-74‟).86 Volume V
identifies several key themes that shaped the BBC‟s development in the
post-war period, including challenges to the BBC‟s monopoly in the form of
commercial competition and restrictions imposed by shrinking resources.
„Competition‟ is an apposite title for the context in which Briggs deals with
the arguments and events preceding the creation of BBC Local Radio in the
late 1950s and early 1960s. However, this also illustrates the flaw with
Briggs: his use of aspects of the local radio story as part of a thematic
approach, which restricts his horizons and inevitably neglects other key
areas of the history.
Briggs‟ use of the competition analogy begins with the Pilkington
Committee, which took place against the backdrop of the change in the
competitive landscape caused by the arrival of independent commercial
television.87 If local sound broadcasting were to be given the go-ahead,
Briggs argues, there were two implications: either the BBC produced it or it
was given to direct commercial competitors – which would signal the loss of
its sound monopoly.88 Competitive challenges continued, with the arrival of
pirate radio and pop music output, which wrong-footed the BBC‟s out-dated
music offerings and provided the final impetus to re-organise the networks.
Parallel to this, Briggs contextualises the creation of local radio within the
regional and global spheres of broadcasting, and the competition for
resources:
„Both in domestic and external broadcasting not totally dissimilar
structural questions were arising about the relative share of resources to
be devoted to regions and about the balance between institutional
centralisation and decentralisation‟.89

The climax of Volume V centres on the seismic introspective exercise of

Broadcasting in the 70s, again occasioned by competition, partly for limited
resources and partly a need to reposition radio for a new age and a new
media landscape. So Briggs‟ examination of the genesis period of local

86
Briggs, A The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: Vol 1 Broadcasting and
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995); Briggs A: The History of Broadcasting in the
United Kingdom Vol V Competition 1955 – 74 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995)
87
Briggs Vol V Op cit Chapter IV
88
Briggs Vol V Op cit p 630
89
Briggs Vol V Op cit p 623

29
 radio raises one of the crucial questions for this history: did the BBC enter
into local broadcasting simply to prevent their commercial rivals from doing
it? Was this a pre-emptive strike to hold onto the last remaining BBC
monopoly – and if so, why? Or was it a move motivated by a genuine desire
to represent more closely the needs and interests of the audience on a local
level – something the BBC believed it could do better than commercial
organisations? Briggs does not provide a definitive conclusion here so this
complex question merits some lengthy and considered debate, using
primary sources, during the course of the thesis.
He does, however, explore the degree to which demand for the service
may have existed, which emerged through the debate and subsequent
recommendations in the Pilkington Report. Briggs points out how the
Committee felt it would not be acceptable for them to deny the public the
opportunity to try something new. In their view, it was considered the
responsibility of „authority‟ to provide a lead to find out what the public want,
without resorting to elitism or condescension.90 It could be argued that
introducing commercial local radio would have been an alternative, again
providing choice and a new service. But as Milland shows, a significant
minority of Tory MPs were not keen on the only other example of private
enterprise in broadcasting available to them – that of commercial television.
The programmes were regarded as low-brow and in any case the huge
amounts of money being raised by advertising revenue were simply a sign
of another monopoly in operation.91
In Briggs, there is some mention, though not in any detail, of the
experimental stations that Gillard instituted in 1961-62.92 There is a great
deal of archival evidence around these trials, which will be used in later
chapters to illustrate various aspects of the BBC‟s evolving ethos of local
broadcasting. The trials could not be publicly broadcast but tapes were
made, edited and broadcast to select groups of the public. While Briggs
details how one such tape helped persuade the Pilkington Committee of the

90
Briggs Vol V Op cit p 276
91
Milland J „Courting Malvolio: The Background to the Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting,
1960-62‟ Contemporary British History, 2004 18: 2 pp 76 – 102
92
Briggs Vol V ibid p 627

30
 desirability of local broadcasting,93 I will go further in exploring how the key
concept of local radio can be traced back to these experiments, including
the tricky question of the extent and appetite of public demand.
In Chapters VI and VII of Volume V, Briggs outlines the set of political
circumstances that resulted in the eventual launch of the service. The thrust
of Briggs‟ argument, from the BBC‟s point of view, focuses on whether and
to what extent the local service could be accommodated within the regional
framework. The evidence here is drawn from public pronouncements and
BBC publications,94 which were one forum for the debate. Briggs‟ strength
lies in examining the minutiae of detail and nuance between these
publications. One pamphlet (Local Radio in the Public Interest: The BBC’s
Plan) occupies three pages of analysis, which Briggs uses to good effect to
illustrate how Gillard and the BBC Director-General Hugh Greene shifted
the emphasis on different aspects of the promised virtues of local
broadcasting, vis-a-vis wider participation in democracy, by comparing it to
earlier public statements that concentrated more on the potential for
widening education and skills.95 However other parts of the story merit just
as much close inspection. Briggs notes the shift from „if‟ local radio was
launched, to „when‟ it was launched96 but he neglects to explain how the
BBC manoeuvered itself internally into a position of readiness, so it was
able to launch local radio within only ten months of the government giving
the go-ahead at the end of 1966. I will provide more evidence to show how
important the speed of the launch of the service was in shaping the first
eight stations, and the problems that resulted.
The eventual White Paper on Broadcasting in December 1966 gave the
new pop music station to the BBC and with it, the go-ahead for local
broadcasting, but the formula for financing and resources for local radio
relied on local authorities and corporations paying for the stations.97 Briggs
points out the inefficiency in the wording, which prohibited raising any

93
Briggs Vol V ibid p 627
94
For example Yorkshire Post „Radio Station in Every City‟ December 11 1963; BBC Local
Radio in the Public Interest: The BBC’s Plan (London: BBC Publications 1966)
95
Briggs Vol V ibid p 627
96
Briggs Vol V ibid p 620
97
Home Office White Paper on Broadcasting (Cmnd. 3169 HMSO 1966)

31
 revenue by a „subvention of the rates.‟98 The overall effect was to deprive
the new stations of a stable financial footing. While this is part of the story, it
was only one of the factors that influenced the creation and existence of the
first eight stations. Briggs, and all the other published sources, significantly
underestimate the precariousness of this experimental period, which I will
re-address.
According to Briggs, local radio‟s destiny, in the years immediately after
the launch of the service, 1968 – 70, was dominated, first by financial
constraint, secondly by the relationship with the regions and thirdly by
wavelength scarcity. These issues informed a series of internal debates
which culminated with the document Broadcasting in the 70s, a key period
which ensuing chapters will explore more fully as part of the research. The
final version of Broadcasting in the 70s pledged to plough on with the
expansion of local radio to 40 stations: „There is a demand for local radio.
We want to satisfy it over the country as a whole‟.99 Shortly afterwards
however, the election of a Conservative government brought the future of
BBC Local Radio into doubt. One of the tasks of my archival research is to
explain just how it succeeded in riding this cycle of uncertainty and
expansion.
Hendy‟s history of Radio Four provides a useful point of comparison at
this stage in the story.100 This provides informative and informed analysis,
particularly regarding how local radio was viewed, both negatively and
positively, by influential personnel within the radio directorate and the
networks from 1967 onwards. Hendy also chronicles the impact local radio
had on the networks. For example the way that the first local radio stations
encouraged more varied and localised accents on air, and how they began
to innovate programmes that allowed a degree of open access and direct
questioning of participants.101 Chapter 9 (Under Siege)102 marks the crucial
turning point in the relationship, with the prolonged debate about plans to
complete the local radio chain – and then merge it with either Radio Two or

98
Briggs Vol V ibid p 640
99
BBC Broadcasting in the 70s (London: BBC Publications 1969) p 13
100
Hendy D Life on Air: A History of Radio Four (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007)
101
Hendy Op cit p 69; p 126
102
Hendy Op cit

32
 Four. This is a critical period in the local radio story and needs to be
examined in equal detail from the perspective of those running (and
defending) local radio at the time. However, Hendy is preoccupied with the
metropolitan centre of radio, so his history casts little light on the crucial
decision-making and shifting relationships as they played out in the local
stations on the ground.
Arguably the key player in the early history, Frank Gillard, does not
receive as much attention as he might in any published history. His role in
formulating policy in the 1950s is documented by Briggs,103 but he could
have explored further Gillard‟s working relationship with the Director of
Sound Broadcasting during this period, and gone into more detail about
how his own ideas of local, small scale broadcasting were evolving. As I will
show, the Archive reveals a very detailed and comprehensive evolution of
Gillard‟s thoughts and plans on the subject. Gillard as an individual
deserves considerable attention, because he was the driving force behind
the BBC‟s adoption of local broadcasting. One can delve deeper into some
of the sources, including his own BBC Oral History interview104 and looking
further back into his career for some of his motivation.
For example one can draw out from Hannon‟s illuminating article about
the BBC‟s war correspondents, of whom Gillard was one, examples of
organisational and tactical approaches that will have influenced Gillard‟s
„campaign‟ for local broadcasting.105 The crucial point, I would argue, is that
when one compares a greater range of primary sources and oral history
interviews with Briggs‟ own summary, it is clear that Gillard‟s passion for
local broadcasting, his evangelical thrust, has been rather underplayed in
the secondary literature. Briggs does however usefully include Gillard‟s
pursuit and conversion of the Pilkington Committee, but even this
chronology needs to be re-assessed in the light of my archival research.106
The 1960s ended with Gillard‟s retirement from the BBC, and his
replacement by Ian Trethowan. Moving forward three years, Briggs‟ final

103
eg Briggs Vol V ibid Chapter V
104
Gillard F BBC Oral History Interview 1NBSC 145S 14 July 1983
105
Hannon B P D „Creating the Correspondent: How the BBC reached the frontline in the
Second World War‟ Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 2008 28: 2 pp 175 – 194
106
Briggs Vol V ibid p 630

33
 inclusion of local radio in Volume V comes with the Crawford Report and its
chastisement of the BBC and the IBA for the reduction in small-scale rural
broadcasting.107 Tantalizingly this is the point, 1974, where Briggs‟ original
research into BBC history comes to a full stop, opening up the field for new
scholars (although Crisell and Lewis & Booth touch on the later period – see
below). Furthermore, Briggs‟ own disposition towards local radio has to be
crucial to the way it is discussed, so it is worth pausing for a moment to
consider his role in chronicling BBC history. Although, as a historian, he had
a very good relationship with Frank Gillard, Briggs acknowledged his own
blind spot to local radio:
„”I gave every blessing that I possibly could do to Frank Gillard
when he was collecting the oral history things……I was not greatly
keen, to tell you the truth, on local radio. I can‟t say that was a very
powerful influence on me…”108

This is a significant factor in the historiography of local radio, which could

be said to have been neglected or at least not given due prominence in the
history books. There seems to me to be a critical difference between those
individuals who understand it, its raison d’être, the form, functions,
achievements and the contribution it has made to the world of broadcasting
and to the legacy of the BBC, and those who do not. Briggs by his own
admission is in the latter category. One of the central aims of this research
is to re-position BBC Local Radio in a more appropriate – and prominent –
context. There are also those who have been more positively disposed to
local radio in their writings – and I shall come on to those in due course.
There is an alternative interpretation of local radio‟s formative history in
Lewis & Booth‟s The Invisible Medium.109 Chapter Six offers a more socio-
cultural view of the establishment of local radio, beginning with the three
key trends of specialization, decentralization and democratization within the
context of community.110 Almost immediately they flag up a word of caution
when it comes to telling the narrative:

107
Home Office Report of the Committee on Broadcasting Coverage (Cmnd 5774 HMSO
1974)
108
Briggs A Oral History Interview with David Hendy (unpublished quote) 6 May 2008
109
Lewis P & Booth J The Invisible Medium: Public, Commercial and Community Radio
(London: Macmillan 1989)
110
Lewis & Booth Op cit p 89

34
 „The managers of radio, not usually themselves in control of
events since power passed to television, have nevertheless
colluded in a rewriting of history that justifies the present
arrangements at any particular time.‟111

Lewis & Booth suggest that this collusion stems from how the original
causes and inspiration for local radio were (mis)interpreted by the founding
fathers. The roots can be traced back to changing notions of localness and
the realignment of traditional population groups in geographical, social and
class terms, as outlined earlier. Lewis & Booth argue that these shifts in
society were appropriated in the 1960s by „radio‟, to justify local services,
just at the point where sociologists were able to explode these theories as
„myths‟ of localness and community.112
This assertion requires further consideration in the course of the thesis
but it is fair to say at this point that Lewis & Booth have a strong agenda in
their appraisal of local radio. They believe that previous media histories
were presented by the so-called „selective tradition‟ of the broadcasting
institutions, and so consequently „…our position is one that is generally
supportive of the critique of mainstream broadcasting implied in the practice
of community radio‟.113 Indeed in Chapter Ten, they advocate the creation
of a community „publishing house‟ to provide material for community
stations. This would be entitled to a slice of the licence fee and run on
public service broadcasting lines.114 So in the light of this it is fair to say
that Lewis & Booth have a strong overarching agenda to their history, which
posits their own definitions of „local‟ and „community‟ as the core impetus to
local radio.
This is how their narrative of „local‟ runs. They argue that social groups
were becoming aligned more in terms of age or commonality of interest (or
both) than geography. Secondly the lobby for commercial radio coalesced
around the term „local‟ as well, thus bolstering the appeal and profile of the
sector. According to Lewis & Booth, it was the Pilkington Committee that set
the philosophy for what defined local output – „the material broadcast would

111
Lewis & Booth Op cit p 89
112
Lewis & Booth Op cit p 92
113
Lewis & Booth Op cit p 4
114
Lewis & Booth Op cit p 203

35
 be….of particular interest to the locality served by that station rather than to
other localities‟,115 although it would still need to take some network
programmes too during the day. Finally, the BBC‟s vision emerged from
documents like the aforementioned Local Radio in the Public Interest where
it was stated there was expectation that many local organizations would get
involved with local stations and make programmes, with the BBC providing
training and maintaining editorial control.
Lewis & Booth then argue why the original hopes for local radio were not
fulfilled by the BBC.116 It was hampered by wavelength restrictions on two
counts: the original service was broadcast on VHF and not everyone had
the correct receiver; secondly the station coverage area was defined by the
transmission feasibility rather than by a natural geographical or socially-
defined community. As Briggs also observes, the service was ill-equipped
financially, relying initially on local authorities for revenue, and eventually
needed to rely on licence fee funding. There was a tendency towards
centralization from BBC management and administration, and on the
stations, a bias towards BBC journalism, rather than community access.
Local radio became prone to disproportionate financial cuts over the years –
and so many contributors from communities were regarded as cheap
voluntary labour. And even these areas of output – evening access
programmes, education and social action work – often disappeared in
cutbacks at the expense of traditional news and local current affairs. 117
While Lewis & Booth‟s observations have foundation, particularly with
regard to the precarious financial situation local radio found itself in and
frequency shortage, more in-depth investigation is needed to amplify their
analysis, to raise questions about the genuine and realistic aspirations of
local radio. The sources cited by Lewis & Booth in Chapter Six, for example,
are drawn from previously published media and academic works,
government papers, contemporary newspaper reports and BBC

115
Home Office Report of the Committee on Broadcasting 1960 (Cmnd 1753 HMSO 1963)
para 842
116
Lewis & Booth Op cit pp 95 - 96
117
Lewis & Booth Op cit pp 95 - 96

36
 publications. Not one reference comes from the BBC‟s archive files, which
contain the relevant internal papers, memos and minutes.118
There is a further critique to be made of their underlying argument.
According to Lewis & Booth, if one creates a model of „community‟ radio,
and compares BBC Local Radio to it, the model will be found wanting. I will
argue that the BBC in fact had no clear idea of what „community‟ radio was,
and used the term interchangeably with „local radio‟. Lewis & Booth identify
one key difference between commercial stations and public service models
and the community sector. In the former, listeners, they contend, are
„captured as objects‟ for advertisers or to be informed and entertained.
Community radio wants to treat listeners as participants and subjects.119
Local radio‟s founding fathers (both BBC and independent) evidently
thought they could do both: the gap in previously published work for my
research to fill is to explore the extent to which the BBC recognized this
failure and the reasons for it.
Since Lewis & Booth are writing in the late 1980s, they have a broader
canvas to survey and they comment on the early traumas suffered by
commercial local radio when it began, as it struggled to raise sufficient
advertising revenue.120 But given their undoubted support for the
establishment of the third „tier‟ in radio broadcasting - community radio – it
is legitimate to ask if they are viewing the past in the context of the
contemporary situation. This is precisely the kind of approach that Briggs
himself said he avoided when it came to his work: in relating culture to both
society and history, one risks „reading back into the past current fashions of
description and explanation‟.121 He chose to concentrate on the thoughts
and deeds that people had in their minds at the time and the extent to which
they changed. He attempts to leave aside the agenda or issues in
broadcasting at the time he is writing.122
Like Briggs, Lewis & Booth have highlighted significant milestones along
the way but more work needs to be done to show the nature of how the
118
Lewis & Booth Op cit pp 219 - 222
119
Lewis & Booth Op cit p 7
120
Lewis & Booth Ibid p 100
121
Briggs A „Problems and Possibilities in the writing of Broadcast History‟ Media, Culture &
Society January 1980 Number 1 pp 5 -13
122
Briggs Vol V ibid pp 5 - 13

37
 BBC‟s blueprint evolved over time. What Lewis & Booth do not give enough
credit for is the theory that the architects of local radio recognized the
exigencies of contemporary political, cultural and social demands and
worked out ways of meeting them. Briggs‟s in depth analysis of Greene‟s
and Gillard‟s public pronouncements shows these nuances at work.123 One
snapshot of local radio‟s stated ambitions taken in isolation might not reflect
the depth and breadth of the long-term strategy. There is scope to explore
further Lewis & Booth‟s emphasis on community involvement and to the
access aspirations of BBC Local Radio and ask whether this is misplaced.
One further assertion made by Lewis & Booth can be challenged here.
They conclude that local radio was given the go-ahead „as a diversion from
the success of the pirates [radio stations]‟, the plans having been, as they
put it, „brought out of the cupboard‟.124 This is an over-simplistic analysis of
the circumstances, cause and effect, which led to the creation of the local
radio experiment, something that I argue Briggs also overlooked (see
above). Undoubtedly the government debate and legislation which were
needed to curtail the operations of pirate radio dovetailed with the White
Paper that saw the reorganization of BBC radio, but – as I have already
explained and successive chapters will show in more detail – this context
and process can be traced back over a decade previously and can not be
viewed in isolation with respect to one event.
There is a further element to this point, which Crisell highlights: the
degree to which pirate radio could be said to have stimulated a nascent
demand for alternative radio services.125 He argues, citing Smith, that the
pirate stations confronted the BBC‟s monopoly, which was translated into a
community-centred aspiration for greater access to local broadcasting.126
Furthermore, Crisell and Starkey argue that the advent of BBC and
independent (or commercial) local radio was also a challenge to the limited

123
Briggs Vol V ibid pp pp 628 - 630
124
Lewis & Booth ibid p 86
125
Crisell A Understanding Radio (London & New York: Routledge 1994) p 33; Crisell A An
Introductory History of British Broadcasting (London & New York: Routledge 1997) pp 143 -
146
126
Crisell Understanding Radio Op cit; Smith A (ed) British Broadcasting (Newton Abbot:
David & Charles 1974) pp 151 - 152

38
 availability of radio, because of the lack of frequencies.127 But, the argument
continues, the liberation of the airwaves by the use of VHF (and local radio
on MW by the early 1970s) was not fully exploited by the BBC or
Independent Local Radio (ILR).128 As I have already argued, the audience
profiting most from portable radios were younger listeners, in search of pop
music, as a secondary aural experience. BBC Local Radio was not in
competition with Radio One, and so its emphasis was on content for
primary listening consumption, akin to Radio Four, attracting a different
audience.129 Even though ILR‟s listeners were of the younger, portable
radio-owning demographic, the Sound Broadcasting Act of 1973 still
required commercial stations to provide programmes with a high-value,
intellectually-stimulating content.130 So the issue here for further exploration
is the impact of pirate radio on BBC Local Radio, in terms of providing
opportunities for re-organising BBC radio services and creating new
audiences, even though, on the face of it, they were actually unconnected in
many ways – different listeners and dissimilar content. Elsewhere, Crisell‟s
attention is focused on local radio‟s news provision in the 1970s onwards,
again often in comparison with the commercial sector.131 This has been an
interesting – and indeed core - development, but as I will demonstrate,
news services were not integral to the original design for local radio and is
another example of how the intentions of the founders were moulded by
events and resources over time.

Personal Testimony
Alongside these texts from a historical viewpoint are various biographical
works and personal testimonies. In a hierarchical order, these start with the
memoirs of one Chairman of the Governors132 and various Directors-

127
Crisell A & Starkey G „News on local radio‟ in Franklin B (ed) Local Journalism and Local
Media: Making the Local News (London: Routledge 2006) p 18
128
Crisell and Starkey Op cit
129
Crisell A „Local Radio: attuned to the times, or filling time with tunes?‟ in Franklin B and
Murphy D (ed) Local Journalism in Context (London: Routledge 1998) p 26
130
Crisell and Starkey ibid p 18
131
Crisell and Starkey ibid pp 18 - 25
132
Hill, Lord Behind the Screen: The Broadcasting Memoirs of Lord Hill of Luton (London:
Sidgwick and Jackson 1974)

39
 General.133 These are important for several reasons. They give the reader –
and scholar – an impression of how key individuals who were leading and
influencing the BBC during the crucial period of radio reorganisation viewed
local radio, as a concept and as a part of the service. I will then analyse
personal memoirs from several staff members with first hand knowledge of
working in the early days of BBC Local Radio. All these memoirs are in the
public domain, and are by definition the result of how the authors wish to
chronicle certain events and their involvement in them. As Peter Burke
points out, the degree to which perceptions of one or a sequence of events
as witnessed by different people can be taken into account is one facet that
might define cultural history.134 Burke also illustrates how self-presentation
in biographies has shifted the focus from a stark contrast of truth or fiction.
The three narratives he offers – self-preservation within a culture; casting
oneself in a type of role; portraying a life in one or more dramatic scenarios
– provide the necessary critical context, with which to approach the relevant
memoirs here.135
Lord Hill became Chairman of the Governors in September 1967, and his
period of office covered the vital, nascent years of BBC Local Radio, which
he refers to with insight and perception in his memoirs, although one can
trace all three of Burke‟s concepts of biography within them.136 As Hill
arrived at the BBC from the ITA, Hugh Greene‟s attitude was very
distrustful, and intriguingly it was Frank Gillard who suggested brokering a
meeting between them to try and create a working relationship.137 1969 was
a crucial year for BBC Local Radio as the 18-month experiment was
drawing to a close and the government needed to decide its future. Hill was
very clear about the value of the service: „Local radio had succeeded at a
moment when there was growing resistance to the dominance of London.
We needed non-metropolitan broadcasting in which local feeling and

133
Greene, H C The Third Floor Front (A View of Broadcasting in the Sixties (London: Bodley
Head 1969); Curran C A Seamless Robe – Broadcasting, Philosophy and Practice (London:
Collins 1979); Trethowan I Split Screen (London: Hamish Hamilton 1984); Milne A DG The
Memoirs of a British Broadcaster (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1988)
134
Burke, P What is Cultural History? (Cambridge: Polity Press 2004)
135
Burke ibid p 88
136
Hill, Lord Behind the Screen: The Broadcasting Memoirs of Lord Hill of Luton (London:
Sidgwick and Jackson 1974)
137
Hill Op cit p 73

40
 interests could be expressed.‟138 Through the negotiations around local
radio‟s future – which became integral to Broadcasting in the 70s, and the
BBC‟s financial position - Hill made it clear that he did indeed support and
foster non-metropolitan broadcasting wherever possible. It appears from the
memoirs that Hill was well placed to defend local broadcasting. He had an
appreciation for the potential reach and impact of radio, maybe harking
back to his days as the wartime „Radio Doctor‟, although he does not
explicitly say this. But as Chairman of the BBC he was in a position of great
influence, defending the Corporation when necessary. Hill certainly worked
hard at convincing Christopher Chataway, the first Conservative Minister of
Posts and Telecommunications, of the value of BBC Local Radio and of
how commercial radio would differ from it – and certainly could not replace
it.139 Hill‟s perspective is interesting because he took a policy position on
local radio, which he maintained against some implacable opposition. His
impact on – and his appreciation of – the issue of local broadcasting can be
judged by a letter he received on his retirement from the BBC in 1972,
signed by all the Station Managers from BBC Local Radio and a covering
note from Ian Trethowan: „They are all well aware that but for your own
efforts in the winter of 1970/71, BBC Local Radio might no longer exist‟.140
The recollections of Charles Curran and Ian Trethowan also covered
relevant aspects of the local radio story from its inception to the early
1970s, while Alastair Milne touched on the story in the mid 1980s. Each
had, in some respects, his own perspective, which will be addressed
shortly, and each was certainly sympathetic to the ideals of local
broadcasting. Yet there are omissions to the canon. The two most influential
figures for the first decade – Sir Hugh Greene and Frank Gillard – are
partially missing from this area of historiography. Hugh Greene did provide
a slim volume of writings and extracts141 which captured his zest for energy,
creativity and innovation: „I wanted to open the windows and dissipate the
ivory-tower stuffiness….which still clung to some parts of the BBC. I wanted

138
Hill Op cit p 126
139
Hill Op cit p 161
140
Hill Op cit p 254
141
Greene, H C The Third Floor Front (A View of Broadcasting in the Sixties (London: Bodley
Head 1969)

41
 to encourage enterprise and the taking of risks.‟142 That exhortation to take
risks may certainly have included embarking on local broadcasting but he
restricted himself to the main facts – of which noting his support for local
radio was one143 - yet offered little else that clarified his own role and
involvement in such a tumultuous decade in broadcasting history. Frank
Gillard did not leave a memoir at all, although there a number of published
articles and interviews from which one can learn more about his thoughts.
Curran, Trethowan and Milne all clearly had an empathy with local
broadcasting – although there was a difference in emphasis. When
Trethowan took over as Managing Director of Radio, he was aware one of
his responsibilities was the nascent chain of local radio stations „a group of
skinny but lusty voiced infants.‟144 Frank Gillard sent him off to visit one of
the stations, from where he returned and reported (he admitted
„portentously‟)……‟I have seen the future and it works.‟145 Milne and Curran
were less explicit in their conversion to local radio – Curran recalled
speaking to Gillard prior to one of his visits to see American small-scale
broadcasting in the 1950s146 while Milne chose examples of the positive
impact of local radio, eg singling out the efforts of Radios Sheffield,
Nottingham and Humberside during the 1984-85 miners‟ strike.147 More
obvious contrasts emerged in the way these three chose to describe and
highlight aspects of their work and the impact it had on local radio. Curran‟s
major pre-occupation was with frequencies and wavelengths – he devoted
almost 25 pages to dealing with the subject, noting „Control of airtime
dictates all other decisions. This is more than theory. It is inescapable
practice.‟148
Trethowan too wrestled with wavelength and frequency issues, but his
style was more avuncular, as he described discussing these over lunch with
Christopher Chataway and then adjourning to an office so they could figure

142
Greene ibid Preface
143
Greene Ibid Chapter Two; Chapter Six
144
Trethowan I Split Screen (London: Hamish Hamilton 1984) p 124
145
Trethowan Op cit p 124
146
Curran C A Seamless Robe – Broadcasting, Philosophy and Practice ( London: Collins
1979) p 156
147
Milne A DG The Memoirs of a British Broadcaster (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1988) p
103
148
Curran ibid p 184

42
 out the logistics over a map.149 His style was evidently more relaxed and
informal than Curran‟s, but he was no less intellectual, as he discussed, for
example, how an early meeting with Archbishop Temple had a profound
influence on him.150 Milne had less to say about local radio per se, although
he established the Director-General‟s Study Group in 1985, which
recommended revisions to the English Local Radio chain151 and the re-
organisation of the English regions structure.152 Milne‟s book, again,
contained contrasts to those of Trethowan and Curran. There was much
more of a sense of the struggles that he faced within the hierarchy of the
BBC and within the Board of Governors, plus the external political rows
which tended to dominate his leadership, and indeed his memoir.
What also emerges from the memoirs and writings of BBC leaders is the
relationship with the outer reaches, geographically and metaphorically
speaking, of the organisation and how this began to change. While Milne
may have been pre-occupied with issues to do with television, a changing
(and less favourable) political landscape and new technologies, he still
demonstrated an appreciation of the BBC as a whole. For example he
mentioned that he made the effort to make annual visits to local and
regional BBC outposts.153 Trethowan offered a more perceptive analysis,
which explained some of the tensions that arose between the „centre‟ and
the staff across the country. The example he gave was the way that BBC
Governors could pay a visit to a local station and over informal meetings
with staff quickly become caught up in „simmering squabbles fomented by
staff in the regions against their central managers.‟154 This was what they
fed back to the Board of Governors, which he felt was not always
constructive. Trethowan drew another interesting comparison: „The local
radio stations are an integral part of the fibre of the communities which they
serve and bring the BBC much closer to the homes of the public.‟ Network

149
Trethowan ibid p 128
150
Interestingly Temple was a founder member of the Workers Educational Association –
which Richard Hoggart had a great interest in too.
151
Milne ibid p 138
152
Milne ibid p 178
153
Hill also made it clear he visited all 20 of the BBC local stations during his Chairmanship.
Hill, ibid p 276
154
Trethowan ibid p 157

43
 television, on the other hand, despite some diversity, still had elements of
„tablets of stone being handed down to the people from a distant
mountain.‟155 This raises the scope for more detailed examination of how
important autonomy was to the local stations, the relationship between them
and central administration and how this was perceived by staff.
Next there are the memoirs and autobiographies available from those
who worked much more closely at the „coal face‟ of local broadcasting. This
chimes with Seaton, who champions the role of the producers, the
reporters, the researchers, the staff who embody the living institution that is
the BBC.156 She rightly revels in the idea of the creative hub, which exists in
a kind of equilibrium axis between the Governors and the regulators. „How
you grow great institutions, secure and adaptable, yet looking after us, is
one of the great mysteries of contemporary history.‟157 Likewise Sloan coins
this particular vantage point the „professional interpretation.‟158
One such professional viewpoint came from Libby Purves who wrote
about her career as a radio broadcaster and journalist, framed as „true love
story for radio.‟159 She spent seven years at Radio Oxford, first as a student
volunteer, then returning after training to work as a Programmes Operation
Assistant, until she resigned and became a freelance reporter in 1977.
Again this was a personal memoir, which incorporated anecdotes and
examples of her work with a degree of reflection and analysis about the
function and achievements of radio and particularly how it operated within
the BBC. Purves‟ descriptions of her time at Radio Oxford are illuminating
for several reasons. She offered one view of the relationship between the
station and the BBC‟s centre, contrasting neatly with the perspective offered
in the other direction by the managers‟ and leaders‟ memoirs. In her
account, the central directorate was „benevolent‟ and really only took notice
if there were adverse comments in the press: it was unlikely, she said, for
most of the far-flung stations to attract such attention from the metropolis.

155
Trethowan ibid p 158
156
Seaton J: „Writing the History of Broadcasting‟ in Cannadine D (ed) History and the Media,
(London: Palgrave Macmillan 2004) pp 146 - 158
157
Seaton ibid p 158
158
Sloan D W, Perspectives on Mass Communication History (New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates 1991). p 10
159
Purves L Radio: A True Love Story (London: Hodder & Stoughton 2002) p 1

44
 Consequently the local stations „could take risks, both editorially and
technically.‟160 Indeed she went so far as to say the BBC was „a bit
embarrassed and equivocal about local radio [so it] kept off its back.‟ This
benefited the staff who could „have [their] disasters in private and learn all
the faster for it.‟161
One outcome of this autonomy was the way that local stations made
significant innovations, such as pioneering the phone-in, frequent use of
radio cars and treating outside broadcasts in a creative, challenging way.
According to Purves, the rest of the BBC paid little attention to these
endeavours, until they too decided to experiment in the same direction.162
Although the schedule was a „curious hybrid‟163 there was huge scope for
experimentation with content and format „especially if it cost nothing.‟164
Purves described the breadth and range of the programmes she worked on
and produced, from live shows to features, from morning news sequences
to Christmas Day phone-ins.165 The station provided an extraordinary
opportunity for training and trying out and developing new skills, which
prompted Purves to make a further connection. One of her series involved
interviews with people who were skilled in particular crafts and jobs, many
of which were dying out. It struck Purves that she too was a craftsman
learning new skills, „with my knobs and chinagraphs and razor blades.‟166
This notion of the radio professional as a skilled job sometimes gets
overlooked in the history – and particularly in relation to local radio, which
afforded so many opportunities to nurture and develop new talent.
Another – and often contrasting - account of life in a local station came
from Phil Sidey, who was the founding Station Manager at Radio Leeds.167
His book covered a two-year period beginning with the setting up of the
station in the summer of 1968. Sidey was an unabashed controversialist
and, although he had a similar perspective to Purves in some ways, he was

160
Purves Op cit p 78
161
Purves Op cit p 80
162
Purves Op cit p 81
163
Purves Op cit p 82
164
Purves Op cit p 38
165
Purves Op cit pp 77 - 95
166
Purves Op cit p 105
167
Sidey P Hello Mrs Butterfield (Claverdon: Kestrel Press 1994)

45
 more extreme in the way he expressed it. He made it clear that he was
writing from memory, in the mid-1990s, „so I can only present the „facts‟ as
they appear to me.‟168 His sole aim was to „record the achievements of my
small band of outlaws.‟169 But Sidey was being disingenuous when he said
he was not „firing arrows at the sheriff‟s men.‟170 In fact he had staunch
views about the role of BBC management in the local radio enterprise –
which contrasted strongly with Purves‟ - and pointed out at every
opportunity his distaste for what he saw as their interference and lack of
understanding.
An early example of this is the issue of newsgathering. It was originally
envisaged that the stations would strike deals with local newspapers, which
would become their supplier of news stories. Sidey, with a background in
print journalism, saw this was unlikely to work - what newspaper would give
away exclusives? - so he recruited people with a similar training to his and
announced that this newsroom would gather the news independently. He
cited opposition to his plan from other BBC managers and it was only the
arbitration of Frank Gillard that granted Sidey permission to gather his own
news.171
Another aspect of journalism which Sidey touched on was the
relationship with the local press, and in this particular case the Yorkshire
Post and Yorkshire Evening Post who were both, according to Sidey, „well
into a campaign to strangle Radio Leeds at birth.‟172 Indeed in order to get
the station mentioned in the press, Sidey claimed they had to buy a
greyhound called Radio Leeds and enter it for races, so when it won, the
newspaper reports printed the name.173 While this provided one, albeit
entertaining, example of relations with the local press, the relationship
between BBC Local Radio and local media is one that will be explored
further in this thesis. A final example of the news issue for Sidey was the
lack of interest shown by the central news division for any local material,
despite examples of major stories which the station covered, which were of
168
Sidey Op cit p 167
169
Sidey Op cit pp 167 - 168
170
Sidey Op cit pp 167 - 168
171
Sidey Op cit pp 37 - 39
172
Sidey Op cit p 13
173
Sidey Op cit p 158

46
 interest to a national audience. „London seldom accepted our news tip-offs
and for some time refused to give any credit to Radio Leeds for the stories
they did take.‟174
There were two sides to Sidey‟s relationship with the hierarchy of the
BBC. He tended to vilify the faceless departments and bureaucrats, yet
humanised many of the key individuals, both within the management and
influential people outside the BBC. Sidey gave examples of incidents which
resulted in discussions at a high level about the way Radio Leeds was
being run, such as the seven-day exercise called Teenage Week involving
local youngsters in all aspects of production, bar news.175 Sidey cited „a
spokesman from the Board of Management‟ who cautioned him against the
enterprise, because „our friends in Parliament are very worried.‟ 176
These impressions contrasted with the pictures he painted of various
figures of note, such as Frank Gillard, Lord Hill and Ian Trethowan, as well
as politicians. These are very useful examples that give us a flavour of how
these individuals were perceived from the perspective of a local station
manager, despite the fact it was someone so contrary – almost
manipulative – as Sidey. So while he recounted how unpopular Lord Hill
was within the BBC, to Radio Leeds Hill was a welcome friend: „I thought he
might make a good ally and invited him to the station.‟177 On a later visit, Hill
apparently gave some invaluable advice to Sidey: „„ Above all hang on to
your autonomy.‟‟178
Throughout the memoir, Sidey adopted a vigorous, humorous style – if
not actually arrogant in places.179 As far as he was concerned, he was
usually in the right about most confrontations, each encounter with
management concluded with a joke or aside at their expense, and the final
outcome was always an on-air success for the station. While this is lively
and engaging, I will argue that this helped promulgate the mythologising of
early local radio. The issues at stake were doubtless valid and can be

174
Sidey Op cit p 81
175
Sidey Op cit pp 53 - 68
176
Sidey Op cit p 56
177
Sidey Op cit p 81
178
Sidey Op cit p 97
179
for example Sidey Op cit p 132 and the „true‟ origins of the phone-in: „It’s Your Line was
certainly not the last phone-in…….that network stole from local radio‟.

47
 verified with research in the BBC Archive – which Sidey acknowledged he
had not done180- but the representation of them here conforms to Burke‟s
notion of dramatising a scenario for posterity.181 This has two effects on
how this memoir can be viewed as a source of history for local radio.
We are certainly aware of the autonomy that local stations had,182 but
Sidey‟s version of this suggests outright confrontation. I will argue that there
were limits and contradictions to the notion of autonomy, in editorial and
managerial terms. Secondly, Sidey produced copious examples of the kinds
of items and features, which he popularised on the station, but many of
these fell perilously close to the category of stunts and stereotypes. There
were competitions for gargling on air, while „singing‟ tunes or giving political
speeches, there were searches for talking birds, kidnapping and ransoming
local celebrities with the involvement of rag week students, even an incident
when a coffin was launched off the coast of Scarborough. If one looks at
how the mocking self-image of local radio had become popularised, writings
such as these may have had a hand in it. Even the title of Sidey‟s book
played to this stereotype: „Hello Mrs Butterfield: the hilarious story of ‘Radio
Irreverent’, the first two years of BBC Radio Leeds.’ That is not to ignore the
community-focused, access side of the station, which Sidey also
recollected. Apart from the previously mentioned Teenage Week, there was
a wide range of participation from all parts of the community, including
amateur musicians, sports clubs and so on. Much of it was championed by
the Education Producer, with the help of Leeds University and the Workers‟
Educational Association. Sidey said he coined the phrase „Walk-in-and-talk
radio‟, to describe the notion of open access.183 There were doubtless
countless similar examples from other local stations across the country and
over the ensuing years.
It is clear that both Sidey and Purves shared the same vision about what
local radio was meant to do, and again there was the example of pioneering
the phone-in – which Sidey, perhaps not surprisingly, laid claim to having

180
Sidey Op cit Preface
181
Burke ibid p 88
182
Briggs Vol V ibid p 636
183
Sidey ibid p 35

48
 invented, with programmes such as Chatback and Checkpoint Leeds.184 It
is interesting to note, though, that despite the fact they were at opposite
ends of the staff hierarchy, Sidey and Purves both shared the same
ideology and aspirations for local radio. That suggests a remarkable degree
of shared vision among the pioneers. According to Sidey, he already had a
fully-formed idea of the ethos of the station, while Purves picked hers up
during her student volunteering days and probably had them re-enforced
during her Programme Assistant training course.
Moreover, I would argue that this pioneering spirit, like Sidey‟s
confrontational anecdotes, may have had an influence on the mythologising
of local radio, which comes across in the memoirs. Both Sidey and Purves
took evident pride in their work and talked about the achievements of their
programmes, interspersed with critical analysis. But again, the danger for
this kind of memoir was the selection of triumphs and success, usually
quantified by audience response or self-congratulation. While it might not be
possible to listen to and review the output in hindsight, there are other
sources available, such as the BBC‟s Programme Review Board and other
related files in the Archive, which can provide different perspectives on a
range of local radio programmes.
Significantly, Sidey concluded by stating explicitly what he had been
obliquely saying all along, that local broadcasting was a battle, which he
and his ilk had all but lost. „The grim business of audience numbers, and
warding off commercial, political and internal……assaults seems to have
taken much of the service and so the pleasure, out of public service
broadcasting.‟185 He did not go into the circumstances of his departure in
July 1970, but he was careful to mention the successes and further
achievements of his former colleagues, which Purves did too - underlining
the effective training ground that local radio provided. But above all else, he
left the reader with the impression that there was a gulf between stations
like Leeds and senior managers in London: „at….times it was difficult to

184
Sidey ibid p 129
185
Sidey ibid p 167

49
 keep up the pretence to my colleagues that the BBC was behind their
efforts to win the experiment for the Corporation.‟186

Conclusion
In this chapter I have contrasted and compared previously published media
histories, in order to identify gaps that need further explanation. In
particular, several fundamental issues merit closer inspection. First the
question of whether the BBC launched its local radio service merely as a
tactical device to stop commercial rivals from doing it first. Secondly, there
is the issue of audience demand: for an area of output that was so rooted in
serving its audience, how - and with what success and impact - did the
BBC attempt to meet those needs and tailor its content accordingly?
Coupled to this is the dilemma of how the BBC should go about inventing
something that did not exist and persuade listeners that they needed it.
Thirdly, there is the role played by Frank Gillard, which is central to the early
history of local radio and needs to be critically assessed in this context in
more detail. This also involves the relationships between the key figures in
BBC management and other stakeholders, such as government Ministers.
Fourth, there are also key stages in the chronology that require more
attention. For example in the post-Pilkington years, the BBC „machine‟
readied itself into a position for the launch of the first local radio stations.
Despite the sure-footedness and confidence of the planning, the BBC had
then to deal with the precariousness of the financial settlement and the
actual task of establishing the stations, which was not as straightforward as
had been envisaged. Another phase requiring further enquiry is the
transition period once the stations are on air – and how they grew from a
point of weakness (still deemed experimental) to one of strength
(permanence and expansion). Fifthly, since Briggs‟ history stops in the mid-
1970s (and Crisell and Lewis & Booth only provide an outline of selected
subsequent events), this thesis will chart the growth of BBC Local Radio
into 1980 in more detail, which has not been attempted until now.

186
Sidey ibid p 81

50
 In terms of tone and perspective, one could argue that Briggs‟ lack of
interest and empathy in the subject of local radio has perhaps relegated it in
terms of prominence from the narrative. While still maintaining correct
historical objectivity, there is room, following a more nuanced approach,
taking in relationships, human dynamics and personalities, which Briggs‟
rather institutionalized and at times bureaucratic narrative sometimes skirts
over. As Samuel writes „institutional histories are almost by force of
necessity self-inflating and self-obsessed.‟187 To counter some of the bias
that Lewis & Booth incorporate towards community radio, this thesis will set
out how the BBC evolved its own definitions of „localness‟ and how that
translated into a distinctive style of programmes.
In doing so, there‟s a model to be drawn from Medhurst‟s work on
broadcasting history in Wales.188 As he has argued, the BBC was slow to
recognise the linguistic and cultural differences that existed in Wales, as it
maintained during the mid-Twentieth Century that a scattered population
and difficult geophysical landscape hindered a separate broadcasting
structure.189 Medhurst‟s research into the impact of the Beveridge and
Pilkington committees of enquiry on Welsh broadcasting highlights the
parallels that exist with local radio. In both cases, the issue concerned
giving a voice to previously underserved communities.190 My research will
follow a similar path, charting the interaction between the strategy of a
monolithic BBC, government policy and the diffuse audience. The difference
in this instance, was that the Welsh campaign for broadcasting freedom
emerged from a cultural defence of national identity.191 Local radio had no
such proponents lobbying for a definable cause. Yet my research will
explore the tensions that emerged once local radio was established,
between minorities and the way the BBC acted as a de facto „nation‟,

187
Samuel, R „The Voice of Britain‟ in A. Light (ed) Island Stories Unravelling Britain: Theatres
of Memory Vol ii (London: Verso 1998) p 172
188
Medhurst J „Minorities with a message: The Beveridge Report on Broadcasting (1949 – 51)
and Wales‟ Twentieth Century British History 2008 19: 2; Medhurst J „Television in Wales, c
1950-70‟ in Bailey M (ed) Narrating Media History (London & New York: Routledge 2009);
Medhurst J „”You say a minority, Sir; we say a nation”: The Pilkington Committee on
Broadcasting (1960-62) and Wales‟ Welsh History Review 2004 22: 2
189
Medhurst „Minorities with a message‟ ibid p 222
190
Medhurst „Minorities with a message‟ ibid; Medhurst „”You say a minority, Sir; we say a
nation”: the Pilkington Committee in Broadcasting (1960-62) and Wales‟ ibid
191
Medhurst „Minorities with a message‟ ibid p 231

51
struggling to come to terms with the idea of autonomy and broadcasting
freedom.
In terms of personal testimony, the material left by Sidey and Purves is
rich in colour and useful for descriptive purposes. At the same time, it
leaves several issues that merit closer inspection. One area is community
interaction in terms of programming and how it is possible to contextualise
this to address whether this made the impact that the BBC envisaged. This
foregrounds two descriptors which were central to the service over the
years – that of being „local‟ and „community‟ – and so it is fair to ask
whether local radio lived up to one or other, both or neither of these
attributes.
Next, the testimony of individuals directs the researcher towards the
shared experience of the staff and the common goals or ethos behind the
service. Based on the evidence of Sidey and Purves, I would argue that
there was a unitary concept, which they both participated in. This research
will address where this came from and whether this was a common
experience.

52
 CHAPTER THREE:
Methods, Sources and Questions

Versions of Media History

Having explored the available historical writings in the previous chapter, I

will now place them in the context of media and broadcasting studies and
work out where a history of BBC Local Radio might fit, aside from being an
addition to the canon. James Curran‟s narratives might provide a useful
starting point when examining the framework.192
The first one that Curran outlines is the liberal narrative, which espouses
the process of democratisation through the development of mass media.
The media break from direct government control and reach true
independence with the establishment of the commercial sector. Such media
freedom, so the narrative goes, empowers people, and narrows the gap
between the political elite and the general public, through the principles of
public service broadcasting. Next is the populist narrative, which according
to Curran, only evolved in the writings of media commentators in the 1980s.
Yet it has its roots in the efforts of an enlightened intelligentsia, such as GM
Trevelyan and Matthew Arnold, who proposed to democratise areas of
knowledge and high culture with institutions supported by the state, such as
workers‟ education associations, libraries and public service broadcasting.
The reality of this, argue critics, was the reassertion of a cultural hierarchy,
by a different structure – a state monopoly replacing the intellectual elite –
with restricted opportunities for intervening market forces.193
With the rise of pluralism and different „moralities‟ in terms of social
attitudes, for example the social reforms of the 1960s concerning divorce,
abortion and homosexuality, competing forces began to break away from
the accepted norms. This led to the libertarian narrative (as distinct from the
liberal one above) as these competing forces clashed over the way the
media should be regulated, or abandoned completely. The outcome was

192
Curran J Media and Power (London: Routledge 2002) Chapter One. I am omitting the
feminist narrative, which I do not think is relevant to this discussion.
193
LeMahieu D L A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind in
Britain Between the Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988)

53
 greater freedom and tolerance in many respects though how long this
endured is debatable.
The anthropological narrative grasps the part played by the media in
forging social bonds between people and sustaining a sense of national
community. It emphasises the constructed and changing nature of identity
and place, leading to the aspiration of greater social inclusion. As Curran
points out, these four narratives all have positive elements, which promote
progress and greater freedoms. The fifth narrative argues instead that
democratic involvement has been constrained, as the mass media have
fallen under the influence of marketing, public relations and big business.
This narrative, named as radical, suggests that the ongoing march of
prosperity and choice has been halted by apathy and the re-assertion of
elite control.
These narratives are not mutually exclusive, and it is not necessary to
choose one or the other. They have varying degrees of applicability to the
historiography of radio as related in the previous chapter. For example, the
populist narrative is supported by Scannell and Cardiff‟s assessment that
the BBC went through a period of popularisation from 1931 onwards. 194
They demonstrate how more output was devoted to parlour games, drama
serials, variety and comedy shows, in a break from the previous sense of
paternalism in programmes. As I have shown, from the wartime years
onwards, there was increasing pressure on the BBC to address the needs
of specific groups, in an effort to serve audiences more effectively and
secure their loyalty, with varying degrees of success. Curran takes the
process further, to the introduction of commercial television and says that it
reached its apotheosis when commercial local radio was created.195
Similarly an anthropological interpretation can be given to the evolution of
BBC radio. In the late 1920s and 30s it was essentially nation-centred,
despite the regional variations.196 In the post-war years, the radio networks
followed broad class distinctions in terms of scheduling, but with the
underlying aspiration that listeners might chose to move from one network

194
Scannell P & Cardiff D A Social History of British Broadcasting Volume One 1922-1939
(Oxford: Blackwell 1991) Chapter 11
195
Curran ibid pp 20 - 22
196
Scannell & Cardiff ibid Chapter 13

54
 to the other. As Curran and Scannell have made clear, radio in its heyday
was especially good at portraying a particular brand of national unity and
identity by broadcasting key events, such as cup finals, major sporting
events, royal occasions and so on. This became entrenched in a BBC
calendar that seemed to epitomise national order and stability.197
My hypothesis is that no single media narrative can be used to explain
local radio but that various facets from some of them illuminate the story.
One clear goal of the research is to produce an „ideology,‟ or ecology of
local radio, which might in part be explained by concepts of media theory.
For example, I will argue that there are firm roots of an ideology of local
radio to be found within a liberal narrative, in particular the focus on public
service broadcasting as a way of empowering the audience and providing
an outlet for more demotic involvement in the output as local stakeholders.
Going further, there were strong aspirational desires for local radio to
harness widespread popular participation. By creating stations that had a
degree of autonomy, whose airtime was devoted to responding to the
immediate needs, concerns and interests of the local audience, the BBC
could be said to be breaking free from any residual elite paternalism, to
create so-called „access media‟.
Conversely a radical narrative interpretation could be used to argue that
the BBC was motivated more by the desire to stem commercial competition
and preserve their sound broadcasting monopoly rather than to provide
genuine choice and a local alternative. Equally useful may be the
anthropological interpretation. As I have argued, the roots of local radio
originated in the shifting needs of different and emerging communities –
however these are defined. Creating local radio can be seen as one
outcome of this changing landscape, which resulted in different groups of
the population finding representation and ways of expression on the
airwaves. In summary I intend drawing on elements from all of Curran‟s
narratives to conclude which, if any, best serves as a theory to underpin
local radio.

197
Scannell, P „Public Service Broadcasting: The History of a Concept‟ in Buscombe E (ed)
British Television: A Reader (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) pp 46 - 59

55
 Research Questions
This section pulls together the various strands of enquiry and summarises
the critical issues for further investigation and the questions that need
addressing in the course of the research. The overall objective is to re-
examine the chronology of events as it appears surrounding BBC Local
Radio, from c 1960 to 1980 – its gestation, birth, evolution and growth. As I
have explained, previously published work has covered some aspects of
the history, to varying degrees, and whilst this work does not claim to be
THE definitive history, just as Briggs deliberately avoided the same claim for
his magnum opus,198 there is an explicit intention to re-position the story of
local radio more centrally to the discourse and narrative of radio media
history. The reason for this claim rests on the breadth and extent of the
themes, narratives and ideas that local radio connects with, and which in
turn yield the questions that need to be addressed.
The areas under investigation break down into various social and cultural
debates of the time. These include definitions of community and „localness‟;
the desire for greater democratic involvement and empowerment; the
policies of political parties, governments, regulators and the opportunities of
open market competition; the impact of technology; the position(s) of the
BBC towards local radio as an institution and the role of key individuals
within it; the structure and operation of the local radio stations, the content
of the output and its relationship to existing production strands such as
news. And finally the connections that local radio as a concept and in
practice had with media narratives and whether they inform each other.
In terms of social history, I have made the claim in the previous chapter
that local radio was in some way connected to the prevailing debates
around culture, society and communication. It provided a link that validates
the arguments proposed by Williams and Hoggart in favour of greater
involvement and empowerment for the audience, in terms of education,
political awareness and media consumption – and even production. In the
course of the research I intend to look more closely at what the evidence
tells us about the impact of this new form of media.

198
Briggs A: „Problems and Possibilities in the writing of Broadcast History‟ in Media, Culture
& Society 1980 Number 1 pp 5 - 13

56
 Fundamentally I want to ascertain whether local radio was actually a
response or solution to the deficit that Hoggart and others identified,
whether there was a cause and effect at work here that brought local radio
into being. Essentially, this means the extent to which local radio was
advanced by this social upheaval and to what degree local radio could
justify its role as providing more cohesion for fractured communities. This
extends to the geophysical location of the stations, where they were sited,
the transmission areas they covered and the names they used.
As Briggs identifies, political ideology and market forces were at the
heart of broadcasting history in the period under consideration and beyond.
No matter what the extent of the broadcasters‟ or sociologists‟ or business
sector‟s aspirations, the media were also a significant factor in party politics.
And it did not divide neatly along party lines. For example it was a Labour
government that gave the go-ahead for local broadcasting by the BBC, it
was also a Labour Minister (Tony Benn) who came closest in this period to
making parts of BBC radio take advertising and inventing an entirely
different model for local radio.199 And it was an earlier Conservative
government, under Macmillan – who had already taken away the BBC‟s
television monopoly – that pulled away from creating commercial local radio
despite the opportunity to do it. So the key question is what impact the
nuances, twists and turns of political agendas, manifestos and pledges had
on the history. The task is also to assess where the range of influences
came from at any particular time, including the lobby for commercial
broadcasting from the business, local newspaper and independent
television sectors, and whether events led politicians, or vice versa, or
elements of both.
Central to the issues under consideration is the role of the BBC as an
institution. This includes asking how far the BBC believed local radio was
created as part of its public service ethos. This question can be extended to
incorporate the structure of the organisation and how – in theory and reality
– the relationship between the diffuse and scattered stations was mediated

199
Freedman D „Modernising the BBC: Wilson‟s Government and Television, 1964-1966‟
Contemporary British History 2001 15:1 pp 21 - 40

57
 with the centre. The role of key individuals, notably Frank Gillard but many
others as well, needs to be addressed, to identify the impact they had on
local radio and to what degree the service bears their imprint.
Returning to the notion of an ideology or ecology of local radio,
assessing the look and feel of the stations and how they operated will help
provide some definition to the concept. This includes the role of the Station
Manager, who was given considerable autonomy within the BBC structure,
the evolution of new production practices, the schedules, the style of
broadcasts and the range of voices being heard on air. As already
documented, many felt proud of the creativity and quality of their
craftsmanship in producing local radio programmes. So was there a legacy
here in terms of the aesthetic quality of what was produced and the
practical considerations that this entailed in terms of new production
techniques? And what could the audience expect from a service that they
had never heard before?
Those best placed to translate the aspirations into programmes were of
course the radio producers themselves and Scannell‟s interpretation of the
production process in one celebrated instance is informative. In terms of
speech content, broadcasters had learned from the early days of radio to
avoid sermonising and „talking at‟ the audience. Talk on the radio had
developed into a „conversation‟ – where the spoken words were directed at
the audience, they understood that it was intended for them, speakers were
clearly identified and did not talk over one another, and finally (in an ideal
world) it was entertaining.200 That was part of the „care structure‟ that was
invested in making these programmes, the „intentionality‟ of the producers.
As Scannell points out, practices have their history – what was produced
was the result of experience and time and accumulated knowledge. A
further research question is therefore how does the „care structure‟ translate
this to a „new‟ practice, such as local radio and a style of broadcasting
where there was no precedent?201 Scannell talks about the „phenomenology

200
Scannell, P „The Brains Trust: A Historical Study of the Management of Liveness on
Radio‟ in Simon Cottle (ed) Media Organization and Production (London: Sage 2003) pp 103
- 106
201
Or if there is a near relation – local broadcasting of the 1920s – one that had slipped out of
the public and BBC‟s consciousness.

58
 of broadcasting‟. By this he includes aspects of „intentionality‟, „dailiness‟,
the „technological care structure‟ and the meaning of „live‟.202 Scannell
demonstrates how life became „historicised‟ in the late 1940s and 50s as
„mass culture‟ evolved more into separate private and public spheres,
echoing Briggs‟ conclusion that the original revolution in „mass
entertainment‟ (cinema and variety shows) took place outside the home
while the second revolution (radio and television) took place within.203 The
resulting use of radio and then television gave the audience the opportunity
to see into and share everyday experiences for the first time, to make
connections and confound expectations of an atomised existence. Can local
radio be said to be a cause or an effect of this evolution? Certainly I will
explore whether there is a correlation between this process and the
beginnings of interest and discussion about reflecting everyday life on a
more local level in terms of broadcast media, as they emerged in the late
1960s and beyond.
This raises two further issues. One concerns those who were brought
before the microphone. While the mechanics of broadcast production may
have been similar to network practices – tape recordings, live studio,
outside broadcast – technology helped with newer, more portable
equipment. Local radio‟s avowed aim was to get ordinary men and women
on air – and access to portable equipment and the invention of the phone
made this easier to achieve. But how practical was this aspiration and how
was it received by those listening? This leads to the second question, that
of programme genres and scheduling. As Scannell has demonstrated, there
was an intimate and ritualised relationship between the listener and their
involvement with the radio. This incorporated daily routines, the unspoken
acknowledgement of the formats and conventions of what was heard, and
how the listener constructed some kind of meaning. The challenge facing
the listener in terms of local radio was hearing unfamiliar voices from
different locations, in a non-conformist structure where the daily pattern of
listening was being re-configured. For example hearing local traffic and
202
Scannell P Radio, Television & Modern Life (Oxford: Blackwell 1996) pp 169 - 171
203
Briggs A: Mass Entertainment – The Origins of a Modern Industry (Adelaide: The Griffin
Press 1960)

59
 weather reports at breakfast time, listening to news items relevant to a
relatively small area of the population, hearing from music or drama
enthusiasts from the community. How would local radio transcend this
phenomenology? Or to put it in a less abstract way, what was it about local
output – the scheduling, the production values, the programme content –
that made listeners switch to their local station and not a national or
commercial one?
I also return to the question posed in the previous chapter, concerning
the relative lack of scholarly interest in BBC Local Radio until now. There is
a perception of local radio as being „second class‟ broadcasting, with a
penchant for trite items and uninteresting phone-ins, lampooned easily by
the likes of Alan Partridge and indeed by many network presenters. Is there
something within the history that explains how it acquired this reputation
and whether it is deserved?

Sources
Media history does not follow a specific methodology, yet there has been a
debate over the years about the connections between histories of the media
and other social sciences. The impetus for Briggs, Hendy, Lewis & Booth
and others has been to focus not just on one or more medium of
broadcasting, but also on the relevance of wider social, political, cultural,
technical and economic factors. As Briggs identifies, writing about his own
history of the BBC, the relationship between the media and society is not
one of foreground to background: „broadcasting registers perception and
experience and the extent to which it influences them.‟204 Citing the
emergence of multi-layered social history in the 1950s, O‟Malley argues that
the break with „politically orientated, empirically dominated constitutional
history into a more theoretical style of history….facilitated the emergence of
studies on media and communication history.‟205 This helped to create a
climate where questions about communications and media could develop
further. As I have argued in the earlier chapters using previously published

204
Briggs A „Problems and Possibilities in the writing of Broadcast History‟, Media, Culture &
Society 1980 Number 1 January p 10
205
O‟Malley T „Media History & media Studies: aspects of the development of the study of
media history in the UK 1945-2000‟ Media History 2002 8: 2 p 164

60
 sources, there are connections to be made between the BBC and certain
aspects of British life, which underpin the key questions being explored in
this thesis.
The main source for primary research about BBC Local Radio is the
BBC‟s Written Archive, which contains reports, research documents,
memos, letters and minutes relevant to this period. Despite the breadth and
quantity of material available, there are a number of drawbacks to be
acknowledged. First, it should be noted that the BBC operates a policy that
prohibits access for scholars and researchers to any files post-1979. Even
those files which are made available are vetted prior to reading, for legal
and other reasons. This calls into question the reliability and completeness
of the archive material. Marwick highlights the difference between „witting‟
and „unwitting‟ testimony, in the sense that varying interpretations are
possible by looking at deliberate and unintentional meanings in the
evidence.206 Contradictions are therefore likely to be found, sometimes at
face value, but also in the subtext and nuances of documents and sources.
I argue that such tensions should be regarded as a matter of course for a
historian, to view archival material sceptically and to interrogate them fully.
As Marwick says, it is only through examining primary sources that we can
be sure of learning about states of mind, motives, values, intentions and
accomplishments, aside from the straightforward chronology.207
I am also following Seaton‟s advice to seek a clear sense of the holistic
institution and so I am delving into a range of different aspects, from policy
to technology, from the staff who worked on local radio making the content
to the impact the service had on the wider audience.208 Many of the archival
files are rich in detail, providing colourful contemporary accounts, well-
written and crafted papers and testimonies which enable one to hear the
„voices‟ of the individuals involved and get an understanding of their
perspective and motives. From this it is possible to build a picture of how
local radio operated within the BBC. In terms of the post-1979 embargo, this
206
Marwick A The New Nature of History - Knowledge, Evidence, Language (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan 2001) p 172
207
Op cit p 152
208
Seaton, J „Writing the History of Broadcasting‟ in Cannadine D (ed) History and the Media
(London: Palgrave Macmillan 2004) pp 146 - 158

61
 is obviously an inconvenience, and prevents serious research to any great
depth into BBC history post-1980, but it did not pose a significant obstacle
to this thesis, as I had sufficient archival documentation from which to draw
an accurate picture of the story until the end of 1980, concluding with the
Third Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report.
There are still two other factors to be considered. One is the tendency for
BBC files to be heavily „management‟ focused, so discussions concerning
local radio often emanate from the Board of Management or Board of
Governors minutes and their related papers. Secondly, related to this, there
is a metropolitan bias in existence, so local radio is sometimes represented
in the Archive as an adjunct to policy and strategy from a centralist, London-
based perspective. Despite these biases, it is worth remembering Seaton‟s
point that the BBC is very conscious of its role at the heart of public service
broadcasting and this is reflected in its internal discussions and debates. In
other words, one should feel confident that the issues and policies being
discussed by senior managers are those concerns shared by the wider
organisation and the audience.209 In conducting my research, I have
selected files that represent not just the management perspective but also
discussions at a local level, such as minutes of the Local Radio Councils
and files concerning educational and ethnic minority programmes.
The Archive also contains oral history interviews gathered by the BBC, in
a project initiated by Frank Gillard, where senior management personnel
have been invited to record their thoughts about their careers at the
Corporation. Frank Gillard himself was interviewed twice, and his views on
local broadcasting are particularly relevant here. In addition I have
conducted my own interviews with key participants in the story of local
broadcasting. These are with Owen Bentley, Robert McLeish, Robert
Gunnell and Michael Barton. These individuals are selected for various
reasons. Several were Station Managers on some of the first stations, so
they have a unique insight of the period from the experimental stage in the
late 1960s through to the first expansion in the mid 1970s. Bentley, as
Station Manager, created the early incarnation of the Asian Network, and

209
Seaton J „Writing the History of Broadcasting‟ in Cannadine D (ed) History and the Media
(London: Palgrave Macmillan 2004) p 156 - 7

62
 thus has relevant experience of local radio‟s provision for ethnic minority
programmes. McLeish subsequently became the Local Radio Training
Officer, and so brings a perspective on the Local Radio Headquarters Team
and how it operated. He also kept contemporary diary entries during the
period, extracts from which are published in this thesis for the first time.
Barton was the first, and only, Controller of Local Radio, from 1975 to 1988,
and as such had vital involvement in most aspects of the management of
BBC radio, local and network, at a senior level.
As with interpreting archival sources, there are questions that need
addressing concerning the substance of oral history material. One
advantage the historian has is the ability to piece together individual
contributions to create a new, more holistic perspective.210 As Briggs points
out, staff members have one angle or point of view, whereas the historian
has many. Seaton recognises that personal testimonies are also a vital
democratizing complement to the Archive by giving voice to BBC
employees from a range of backgrounds. „Interviews animate the files,
explain the real story and give you a flavour of the people and their
concerns.‟211 This certainly helps to illustrate the pioneering spirit of local
radio, but can oral history interviews be relied on as data? For example,
Marwick distrusts oral history because of the fallibility of human memory. 212
Much has been written about the contribution of oral testimonies to social
history,213 and this serves as a reminder of the interdisciplinary nature of the
BBC and media history. Just as Thompson says, „oral history offers a
challenge to the accepted myths of history‟, so oral history evidence can be
used to challenge, contradict or confirm alternative written sources.214 If a
witness can offer a testimony that is contemporaneous to other sources, it
deserves to be treated, and interrogated, with equal value and scepticism.
One final source for the media historian might be the output, or the
broadcast product. In the case of BBC Local Radio, this has not been used

210
Briggs ibid p 12
211
Seaton ibid p 155
212
Marwick ibid p 157; 166
213
eg Perks R and Thomson A The Oral History Reader (London and New York: Routledge
1998); Thompson P The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1988)
214
Thompson P in Perks A and Thomson A Op cit p 28

63
 as part of this research, with some exceptions. The reasons for this are
relatively straightforward. It would be impractical to listen to the number of
programmes broadcast over the course of the first 13 years of local radio‟s
existence and comment on them effectively. Also there is the question of
access and availability. A number of programmes have been archived at a
local or county level, but there is no consistency to this operation and
neither has it been catalogued in a systematic way. I would also argue that
other factors apart from the programmes themselves are more relevant. For
example, how the output was consumed and received tells us about the
intentions of the programme makers, and whether these aspirations were
satisfied. As Seaton points out, the Weekly Programme Review Board
minutes, in the BBC Written Archive, are a valuable source for helping the
historian understand this kind of detail, and they have been consulted for
this research.215 Taking this point one step further, Scannell articulates the
aim to „make visible the hidden labour of production…to account for the
form and content of the realized end-product as determined by the hidden
life and unseen labour.‟216 Similarly my focus in the research is to reveal
more about the processes involved in the making of the output, and how
these efforts matched the aspirations of the service and the BBC. This will
help me enunciate the aesthetic of local radio and the ecology of production
better than analyzing the programmes themselves.
There are, however, some notable exceptions. First, there are the
surviving recordings from the local broadcasting experiments of 1961 – 62,
held by the National Sound Archive at the British Library.217 These are
crucial extracts of the early attempts to realise the potential of local
broadcasting and are in effect milestone artefacts, which will be examined
in some detail in subsequent sections in this chapter. Secondly I have made
use of programmes that are contemporary to this history, which report local
radio in one context or another. This includes recordings of the opening day
of broadcasts from Radio Leicester on 8 November 1967.

215
Seaton ibid p 157
216
Scannell P Media and Communication (London: Sage 2007) p 4
217
National Sound Archive: Local Broadcasting ST 29018; Local Broadcasting Experiment at
Poole LP 27013; Local Radio Experiments T 37230

64
 Section Two: Origins

CHAPTER FOUR: c1955 – 1960:

The Pre-Experimental Period

Introduction to Section Two

This section contains three chapters, in which I explore the major

milestones in the years immediately preceding the „official‟ beginning of
BBC Local Radio. Through these events, I will set out the key debates
concerning the possibility of localised broadcasting from the late 1950s to
mid 1960s from both the BBC and commercial organisations and
individuals. Chapter Four demonstrates how the issue of local broadcasting
began to emerge more prominently in BBC strategic thinking and policy
from the mid to late 1950s. These issues were aired further in front of the
Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting, 1961-62 (Chapter Five), during
which process the BBC developed their case for the right to create local
broadcasting. Running concurrently with the Pilkington Enquiry was a series
of experiments in local broadcasting organised by the BBC, from April 1961
to May 1962. These were not broadcast publicly but took place on a
„closed-circuit‟ basis. Chapter Five documents for the first time in detail how
important these exercises were in framing the BBC‟s ideas around local
broadcasting, in terms of organisation, staffing, facilities and output. These
exercises also provided recorded material to be played to a whole range of
notable individuals and organisations, beginning with the Pilkington
Committee itself, to illustrate just what local radio, as run by the BBC, might
sound like. Chapter Six assesses the period from 1962 to late 1966, when a
variety of factors had an impact on the eventual White Paper proposal to go
ahead with local radio in December 1966, which gave the BBC permission
to begin an on-air experiment for nine local stations.
The events outlined above in turn illustrate the key arguments I wish to
advance, regarding the positioning of the BBC as a potential provider of
local broadcasting services and how they shaped the subsequent launch of
the stations. Namely, that the BBC began to develop a strategy for the
development of local broadcasting which was based partly on the dawning

65
realisation that the regional service was not wholly satisfactory for meeting
local needs and also on the recognition that commercial competitors could
exploit the gap in the market and so challenge the BBC‟s sound monopoly.
From the late-1950s, the BBC‟s interest in local broadcasting increased, in
terms of the vision of notable individuals, such as Frank Gillard, and in the
way it gained significance as a policy objective at a strategic level. So one
question to be addressed in Chapter Four is why local broadcasting
emerged in this way at this time, and the degree to which external factors
played a part, such as the possibility of commercial competitors establishing
stations before the BBC. Secondly, and linked to this, is the question about
demand. Was there an identifiable or quantifiable demand for more
localised services and what impact did this have on the way the BBC,
potential competitors and the government engaged with the debate?
The second chapter in this section (Chapter Five) looks at how the
experimental stations of 1961-62 were used by the BBC to answer specific
questions at the time: what would local broadcasting sound like? How would
it be structured and operated? What were the risks and challenges
involved? My response to these experiments is to ask whether they
succeeded in meeting the BBC‟s expectations and whether the BBC‟s
evaluations were justified, and to relate the trials back to the question of
demand and the audience.
In the post-Pilkington phase (Chapter Six), the debate moves on as the
landscape of broadcasting shifted for political reasons, such as the change
of government in 1964, and with the arrival of pirate radio stations. The
archive material in this period is analysed by me to explain why local
broadcasting came back onto the agenda and what impact these other
factors had on the debate. Finally, the provisions of the White Paper which
proposed the start of local broadcasting need to be interpreted to
understand the organisation, structure and funding of the proposed stations
and how the events of the previous eight years may have shaped them.
A note on terminology. The BBC files in this period (late 1950s to early
1960s) show that the phrase „local broadcasting‟ was how most BBC staff
chose to describe the concept, which was in keeping with the phrase „sound
broadcasting‟ for non-television output. However, press cuttings show that

66
 the word „radio‟ was in much more common usage in the earlier period. Of
course it is debatable whether this reflected the preferred language of the
readership or was more defined by the art of subbing and the availability of
space in newsprint terms. Neither is there an obvious correlation between
the phrase used and the type of newspaper or publication involved. Hence
the word „radio‟ (in various connotations – local, network, technical etc)
crops up in the Daily Telegraph218 and The Times,219 in the same way as it
does the Daily Mail.220 However everyday parlance may have been
different. There is also one interesting observation from the Head of
Audience Research, contained in the quarterly report from the Director of
Sound Broadcasting in 1957, who pointed out that the public did not use the
term „sound broadcasting‟, but instead talked about „radio‟ and the
„wireless‟.221 In the course of the thesis I may use the terms „radio‟ and
„sound broadcasting‟ interchangeably, but I think there is a distinction to be
observed between „local sound broadcasting‟ (as used in the 1950s) and
the establishment of the phrase „local radio‟ from about 1965 onwards. By
the time the service was created and consolidated, from 1967 onwards, it
became BBC Local Radio. I will therefore reflect this shift in identity by
using the right terms, relevant to the respective period.

Moving from ‘regions’ to ‘local’

The significant events in the chronology under discussion in this section
include visits to the United States by Frank Gillard in 1954 and 1959 and
two major BBC reports: Area and Local Broadcasting222 in late 1959 and the
Consolidation and Development of Sound Broadcasting the following
year.223 Parallel to this was the emerging interest in local broadcasting from
potential competitors and the response of the government. What this
section addresses are the reasons for the emergence of local broadcasting

218
Eg „BBC Plans Expansion of VHF Radio‟ Daily Telegraph 7 December 1959
219
Eg „Aims of Radio Yorkshire‟ The Times 8 December 1959
220
Eg „Tory Blow to Commercial Radio‟ Daily Mail 13 October 1960
221
BBC WAC Report from the Director of Sound Broadcasting September – December 1956
R1/93
222
BBC WAC Area and Local Broadcasting Report 1 December 1959 R1/95/2
223
BBC WAC Consolidation and Development of Sound Broadcasting 1960 R1/96/1

67
 as a significant issue for debate and the possible motivations for the BBC in
promoting it.
As has already been noted, the major technological breakthrough that
allowed for the possibility of localised broadcasting was the VHF system.
However the BBC did not initially take the initiative to use this for deviating
from the national and regional structure. The problem for the BBC as they
saw it was wavelength congestion. The twelve medium wave frequencies
allocated to them under the Copenhagen Plan of 1948 were employed to
capacity, and the combination of lax international observance and limited
transmitter power resulted in poor reception and common interference.224 In
their evidence to the Beveridge Committee on Broadcasting, the BBC
proposed using VHF to strengthen their existing output. The Beveridge
Report however came up with a different idea and suggested that „use of
VHF could make it possible not merely to give the existing BBC
programmes to people who now fail to get them, but to establish local
stations with programmes of their own.‟225 The Committee went further and
proposed that the BBC be obliged to carry out a series of experiments in
local broadcasting „in suitable localities, and ….leaving room for
development of many local stations later if experiment proves their value.‟ It
also mooted the idea that these stations could eventually be run by
universities and voluntary bodies.226 There was, however, no other pressure
to pursue this idea from either the government or public demand. Neither
was there any financial provision for these stations, and the BBC proceeded
instead with consolidating their VHF provision for existing services.
Nevertheless, by the mid-1950s onwards, the potential for linking VHF to
local broadcasting was being recognised as a potential way forward for
developing future BBC services. This began to be discussed and written
about in internal BBC papers and documents and commented on in the
press. This shift can be attributed to the work of several key BBC

224
Curran C A Seamless Robe – Broadcasting, Philosophy and Practice ( London: Collins
1979) p 158
225
Home Office Report of the Committee on Broadcasting 1949 (Cmnd. 8116 HMSO 1951)
pp 78-79
226
Op cit

68
 executives and the influence of one man in particular, as the next section
argues.

Frank Gillard and developments c1954 - c1960

Gillard‟s full life story merits a biography of its own, although there is a brief
portrait in Leonard‟s Miall‟s Inside the BBC: British Broadcasting
Characters.227 When he died in 1998, obituaries in the national press noted
his many achievements.228 He was born in Devon in 1908 and after
graduating from university he taught in various schools before the Second
World War. During this period he gave talks on the BBC in the West Region
and joined the Corporation in October 1941 as a Talks Assistant. Gillard
rose to public prominence as a war correspondent, covering the ill-fated
Dieppe Raid in 1942, reporting with the Eighth Army from Sicily and Salerno
and then in 1944 he broadcast nightly on the progress of the liberating
Allied armies from the D-Landings in Normandy through to the liberation of
Paris. After the war, Gillard returned to BBC Bristol where he became the
West Regional Director of Programmes, but his commentary skills were put
to good use still, notably for Royal events such as Princess Elizabeth‟s
wedding and the Coronation in 1953.229 Gradually Gillard‟s career took him
to more senior roles within the BBC hierarchy. In January 1954, the minutes
of the BBC Board of Management recorded that, at the suggestion of the
Director of Sound Broadcasting, Gillard was granted a two-month study visit
to see university and other local stations in America.230 Gillard always
credited this trip, and at least one subsequent one in 1959,231 with leaving a
powerful and lasting impression on him and his thoughts on local
broadcasting. Speaking in 1997, he recalled the first visit in the following
terms:
„I judged while the BBC had little to learn from network radio systems
there, the little local stations which existed in every town and city
provided a much appreciated public service which up to that time was
lacking in Britain. Yet this is a land where local life, traditions and culture
227
Miall, L Inside the BBC: British Broadcasting Characters (London: Weidenfield and
Nicolason 1994)
228
Eg The Independent Obituary: Frank Gillard by Lawrence Miall 23 October 1998
229
Miall Inside the BBC: British Broadcasting Characters ibid pp 63 - 67
230
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 25 January 1954 R2/7/1
231
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 April 1959 R1/27/1

69
 are greatly rooted and prized. Now the BBC had shown its value as a
national instrument and this was the time to prove that it could provide a
corresponding service at a local level and make a substantial
contribution to the enrichment of local life.‟232

This is obviously a fully formed and rounded analysis from the benefit of
hindsight, to illustrate what he went on to help achieve. In a sense these
kinds of broad statements became part of the historiography of the BBC
and entered into the mythology of the organization. I would argue that the
files show that Gillard‟s observations of local broadcasting in America may
have inspired him but it took a lot more thought and experience to construct
a viable system.
The starting point was not so much how to create a local service, at this
stage, but more how the regional system might evolve. On his return to the
UK, Gillard was seconded to act as Chief Assistant to the Director of Sound
Broadcasting for a year from 1955. During this period he wrote a paper,
which he hoped would stimulate a debate and begin to influence other key
people at the BBC. An Extension of Regional Broadcasting identified how
important regional origins were to national culture and „broadcasting, which
is one of the greatest instruments of our day for the nourishment of culture,
must accept some responsibility for the whole plant from roots up.‟233 For
Gillard, regional broadcasting was only „a limited operation‟234 with two main
functions. These were to serve the regional requirements of the domestic
audience in that locality, and to represent the region to listeners across the
country. Gillard acknowledged that the regions supplied specialist
programmes and that they provided valuable opportunities as a training
ground for staff. The element that could be exploited further was
newsgathering on a more local (and non-metropolitan) basis. The facility for
VHF made this possible: „the presence of the local transmitter in each town
and city…would not only increase the flow of information, it would vitalize

232 th
BBC Local Radio: 30 Anniversary Programme tx various stations and dates 1997
233
BBC WAC An Extension of Regional Broadcasting 1955 R34/731/5 See also Briggs Vol V
ibid pp 624-627
234
BBC WAC Op cit

70
 the community.‟235 So Gillard suggested what Beveridge had also mooted –
that VHF could be used to provide localized frequencies.
Gillard offered three options as a way forward: news programmes which
local areas could broadcast to opt out of regional broadcasts at key parts of
the day; local communities could produce their own bulletins; or the regions
could be split into three or four smaller units. This last proposal was the one
Gillard favoured.236 Briggs notes that this document stopped short of a full
scale network of local stations: Gillard talked more about „areas‟ as the
smaller unit within the region, but this was only the starting point for
discussions about sub-divisions which became more familiar over the
years.237 For the time being, nothing came of Gillard‟s initial ideas at
managerial level. It is probably fair to say too that Gillard did not find many
allies for his ideas in the higher echelons of the BBC at the time. In his BBC
oral history interview, Gillard said that he came back from America to
„preach the gospel of local radio‟, but that neither Wellington (Director of
Sound Broadcasting) nor Ian Jacob (Director-General) was enthusiastic.238
It is not known whether Gillard took umbrage at this, or whether he simply
preferred the West Country to London. But after the year-long secondment
ended, Gillard returned to Bristol where he was subsequently appointed
Controller of the West Region.
This regional domain gave Gillard an excellent opportunity to practise
some of his ideas about targeted broadcasting. The Director of Sound
Broadcasting‟s Report (January to March 1956) included a note from Gillard
that the new VHF transmitter in Wenvoe had allowed more detailed news
broadcasts for Somerset, Wiltshire and Gloucestershire. There was also a
special commentary on the Devon/Yorkshire County Rugby Union
Championship carried on the Hessary Tor VHF transmitter. The report
added that there was a positive local reaction and a demand to hear more
output of this kind.239 This was not just confined to the West Region. The
DSB report of April to June 1959 included this from the Controller of the

235
BBC WAC Op cit
236
BBC WAC Op cit
237
Briggs Vol V ibid p 626
238
BBC WAC: Oral History Interview: Frank Gillard 14 July 1983
239
BBC WAC Report from the Director of Sound Broadcasting January - March 1956 R1/93/1

71
 Midland Region: „In one form or another the Region has undertaken a very
much larger amount of local broadcasting in the last three months than at
any time in the last twenty years.‟240 Not only were there examples of
different editions of sports programmes, but Signpost featured separate
editions representing the interests of different local government authorities.
Despite the fact that Gillard‟s ideas did not initially find favour, that is not
to say that the BBC as an organization in the 1950s was opposed to
broader development. For example a radical overhaul of the BBC‟s sound
broadcasting structure was proposed in The Future of Sound Broadcasting
in the Domestic Services241 in March 1957. This report was the result of a
working party chaired by Gillard‟s successor as Chief Assistant, Richard
D‟A Marriott, on which Gillard sat as one of the members. The gist of the
report, in conceptual terms, was to move away from the paternalism of the
past and „to cater for the needs and tastes of the audience without seeking
as it has perhaps too much in the past to alter and improve them.‟242 The
report proposed keeping the existing networks with more integration and
less competition and duplication between them.243 Although the Regions
were largely unaffected by the main aspects of the report, it did note that
the use of VHF transmitters in various parts of the country „opens up a
promising development in the field of local news and information but not
entertainment.‟244 So the practical opportunities made available by VHF
transmitters, as illustrated by the examples from the West Region and
elsewhere, and the policy implications from a strategic point of view were
slowly becoming part of an emerging strategy.
The next stages in this development came quite quickly. In spring 1959
Gillard paid another visit to America, and a handwritten letter to D‟A Marriott
in the Archive outlined the situation there as he saw it.245 Gillard wrote that

240
BBC WAC Director of Sound Broadcasting Report April – June 1959 R1/95/2
241
BBC WAC The Future of Sound Broadcasting in the Domestic Services R1/93/1
242
BBC WAC Op cit
243
BBC WAC Op cit Probably the most significant element was the creation of the „Third
Network‟ to complement the Third Programme – which caused a public outcry and led to the
creation of The Third Programme Defence Society.
244
BBC WAC The Future of Sound Broadcasting in the Domestic Services R1/93/1; Gillard, in
his An Extension of Regional Broadcasting, made it clear that entertainment provision was
not a priority of regional output – it could be produced anywhere.
245
BBC WAC Letter from Frank Gillard to R D‟A Marriott 18 February 1959 R 34/1584/1

72
 the networks were in a „very shaky condition‟ with the result that the local
stations had discovered new independence. Although they took less
network material, they were in competition with one another, which resulted
in large quantities of daytime music. The evening scenario was more
promising as there was an assumption people watched television, so there
was less frivolous music. „There is a noticeable move on all hands to build
up local personalities and to exploit local issues as a means of keeping
radio alive and healthy.‟ He concluded „it is only possible to believe what is
seen by one‟s eyes and heard by one‟s ears – and a lot of that puts a heavy
strain on one‟s credence!‟246 So it is clear that Gillard deplored the worst
aspects of American radio, and the main culprit was the use of repetitive
pop music by day. At the same time, he was most impressed with the focus
on local news stories, and how that bonded with the audience. This theme
was taken up by Wellington in his report on Sound Broadcasting in the first
quarter of 1959. Commending Gillard‟s work in America, Wellington
commented „How many people would be content with a British version of
the “uncreative stream of light music records interspersed with local
information” which he [Gillard] describes in the USA?‟247
While Gillard was in America, another high-level BBC working party was
convened, charged with looking at area and local broadcasting. Again, it
was chaired by Richard D‟A Marriott, who had been promoted to Assistant
Director of Sound Broadcasting. Other members included the Controller of
the North Region and the Head of Audience Research. Gillard was not one
of this committee but he still hoped to be of assistance. In the handwritten
letter from Gillard quoted above, written in New York in February 1959, he
wished D‟A Marriott („My dear Dick‟) luck with „your Area and Local
committee‟ and he offered to help with any research that may be of use
while he was in the US.248 Richard D‟A Marriott responded in a short note:
„The committee is under weigh as you say but it is all very difficult and I
sometimes despair of arriving at a sensible solution.‟249 D‟A Marriott pointed
out the relevance of overseas experiences to their way of thinking. He was

246
BBC WAC Op cit
247
BBC WAC Director of Sound Broadcasting Report January – March 1959 R1/95/2
248
BBC WAC Letter from Frank Gillard to R D‟A Marriott 18 February 1959 R 34/1584/1
249
BBC WAC Letter from R D‟A Marriott to Frank Gillard 23 February 1959 R34/1584/1

73
 interested in looking in more detail at individual communities to discover
how they are adapting to radio usage. The Archive contains various
versions of the committee‟s report, dating from 1 September 1959250 to the
one that was presented to the Board of Governors on 1 December 1959,251
by the Director-General. D‟A Marriott made it clear that the task of the
working party was to look at policy and strategy for area and local
broadcasting, with a particular emphasis on practical detail, which could be
used for decision-making. It was known that the government was due to call
an enquiry into broadcasting, to be headed by Sir Harry Pilkington, so this
was one of a number of strategy initiatives to gather ideas and information
about the BBC‟s services which might be used in evidence to the
committee.
But there was another, more pressing, reason for considering this
particular issue. The final version of the report stated explicitly that
commercial interests were keen to exploit the absence of local
broadcasting. If commercial companies were granted permission to start
radio broadcasting, the BBC‟s monopoly on sound would be broken. But
was this cause enough to start local sound broadcasting? The earlier
version of the report said that the key consideration was the preservation of
public service broadcasting and the only way to maintain this was to keep
the sound broadcasting monopoly. This meant starting to think about a
service that would be „satisfactory‟ to the public, and would make the
introduction of commercial broadcasting „difficult.‟252 The later version of the
report shifted the emphasis and accepted that commercial aspirations in
local broadcasting were not the only compelling argument in favour of the
BBC‟s involvement in it, „real though the danger to public service
broadcasting would be if the BBC monopoly in sound broadcasting were
broken.‟253
What both versions of the report united around was their belief that the
BBC had a superior claim on this field of broadcasting. Comparisons with
250
BBC WAC Area and Local Broadcasting: Report of a Committee to DSB 1 September
1959 R34/1585/1
251
BBC WAC Area and Local Broadcasting: Board of Governors Papers 1 December 1959
R1/95/2
252
BBC WAC ibid R34/1585/1
253
BBC WAC ibid R1/95/2

74
 the loss of the television monopoly were not helpful as the service was in its
infancy and there was only one channel. In sound broadcasting, the BBC
had thirty years‟ experience, with three networks‟ worth of output. However,
the committee identified two possible gaps that commercial rivals could fill:
the absence of popular gramophone music and a local service.254 It is fair to
say that the original version of the report was the more far reaching.255
Some of the arguments went forward into the final recommendations, and
some did not. The case for the BBC to move into local broadcasting was
comprehensive and was developed in subsequent discussions. The report
acknowledged the difficulty in promoting something that did not exist but
equally a commercial operation would have had to justify clamour for it too.
But while there may not be evidence of a need for local broadcasting, the
report did identify
„there is moreover a deep and widespread feeling ….of suspicion
and resentment against metropolitanism, London-based culture,
centrally-controlled policy, uniformity of taste and conformism of
opinion and corresponding belief in diversity and freedom and the
value of reflecting the smaller communities.‟256

I would argue that this taps into an awareness of the rise in interest in
„localism‟ and community from a cultural and social perspective from people
such as Hoggart, as outlined in Chapter One.
The working party also accepted that the BBC‟s regional programmes
could not reflect the wide degree of local interests but that the advent of
VHF made it possible to site local transmitters and develop more focused
services. They advocated taking up the gauntlet of the Beveridge report,
and holding four trials, in Bristol, Hull, Birmingham and Norwich. In terms of
how the local structure would operate, the report envisaged around 70
stations in England. These would include large conurbations, self-contained
towns, such as Nottingham or Leicester and medium sized towns that
served wider areas. The stations would be equipped simply and
economically, with 15 staff.

254
BBC WAC ibid R34/1585/1
255
Briggs Vol V ibid p 35
256
BBC WAC ibid p 11R34/1585/1

75
 This basic blueprint is relevant as it was the first attempt to put down on
paper some of the aims and aspirations for local broadcasting. Many of the
ideas remained central to the proposition through its subsequent iterations
over the years. For example, the role of the Station Manager, who – the
report envisaged – would have as much freedom and independence as
possible, under the Regional Controller.257 On the other hand, notions of
what the output might be like were less thought out. It was assumed the
standard would not be as high as network programmes, and those on air
were referred to as „performers‟: there was no grasp of the professional
range of roles needed for production at this stage.
Apart from the re-organisation of the networks, the biggest surprise of the
report was the recommendation that the BBC should accept advertising
revenue. The report suggested various alternative sources of revenue to
pay for local broadcasting: local government grants, a rise in the licence fee
or advertising. The first option would not raise enough income and could not
be relied upon for secure financial planning year-on-year and BBC
Television would claim any increase in licence fee revenue. So the report
came out in favour of accepting advertising on a local system. It argued that
this was not inconsistent with public service principles as adverts could be
made to a high standard and it would not impair the impartiality of
programmes as commercials were kept separate and there was no question
of allowing sponsorship either.
Again, there was the argument about excluding the possibility of a
commercial rival. If the BBC took advertising, there would be no need for
commercial radio – and conversely, if the BBC did not do advertising, they
would be creating a de facto competitor who would. While these arguments
may sound like logical tautology, the report finally came out and said they
could not think of any other way of paying for local broadcasting. What is
interesting here is the balance between aspiration and any realistic
possibility of achieving the objectives. While more or less admitting that the

257
BBC WAC ibid R34/1585/1. The status of the Station Manager remained integral to the
ideals of local radio throughout but this suggested chain of command was quietly dropped
within a year.

76
 BBC did not have the funds for local services, the desire to create them
forced it to address some radical solutions.
To underline the point about the threat of the commercial opposition, the
report argued that if the BBC lost the sound monopoly, they might only
retain about 30% of the audience, which made a £1 licence fee hard to
justify. If commercial competitors then got hold of a BBC network, their
sound services would be in terminal contraction and decline. For these
reasons, the report‟s authors suggested that the BBC should stake their
claim on local broadcasting and expanded network hours soon and then
wait for the commercial lobby to answer. Allowing competitors to set the
agenda would make any BBC response seem defensive, so it was better to
be seen to be proactive. Yet, despite everything that had been said in the
report, the authors said they did not want to give the impression that they
were coming up with new ideas to stop anyone else from doing it!
By the time the report was presented to the Board of Governors, many of
the more radical ideas had been watered down, such as network
reorganization and the introduction of advertising. However, the case for the
BBC laying claim to local broadcasting was accepted, with the Light
Programme as the probable sustaining service. The emphasis was still
clearly on the BBC‟s ability to do local programming better than anyone
else. Any alternative would have stark consequences, as the report
concluded that the BBC must make it clear to the incoming Committee of
Enquiry „that the local station is more open than anything else in the whole
range of broadcasting to exploitation at the lowest level of taste and
standards in the interests of commercial profit.‟258

The run-up to Pilkington

Hugh Carleton Greene took over as Director-General from Jacobs in
January 1960 and at his first Board of Governors meeting, the
recommendations of the report were accepted and it was agreed that the
„BBC should move experimentally into the field of local
broadcasting and that the D-G should undertake to produce a plan

258
BBC WAC Area and Local Broadcasting: Board of Governors Papers ibid R1/95/2

77
 for a limited experiment to be based, as far as possible, on existing
BBC centres and staff, using available frequencies.‟259

This was a very significant step as it marked the BBC‟s commitment at

the highest level to start developing local broadcasting. More than this, the
BBC executives were actually following two strategies. On the one hand,
various aspects of policy were pulled together into a further paper, The
Consolidation and Development of Sound Broadcasting, which set out
some of the key items that would figure in the evidence for the Pilkington
Committee. These included some extension in broadcasting hours for the
Light and Third Programmes and the development of local broadcasting. 260
At the same time, more immediate and practical steps for embarking on
local broadcasting were explored by a committee set up under the
Controller of Sound Broadcast Engineering. This recommended six stations
for the experimental stage, rather than the original four, which could be
accommodated on VHF frequencies already operated by the BBC if the
Post Office would not allow them to use the range 95-97.5 Mc/s. It also
suggested, since only 20% of the population had VHF receivers, that MW
be used during the day to enhance the signal.261
The Director of Sound Broadcasting thought it a good idea to get started
as soon as possible, with a rate of growth set at one station every two
months.262 If these proposals went ahead by April 1964, Sound
Broadcasting would be in deficit by £6 million and spending £4 million per
year more than their budget. These changes could only therefore be
financed by the entire additional proceeds of a 30/- licence fee for sound.
Hugh Greene went to the Director-General of the Post Office, Sir Ronald
German, and asked for permission to start local broadcasting on the lines
outlined above. German replied he did not feel able to allow the BBC to
proceed for „political reasons.‟263

259
BBC WAC Board of Governors Meeting 14 January 1960 R1/28/1
260
BBC WAC The Consolidation and Development of Sound Broadcasting 1960 R1/96/1
261
BBC WAC Op cit
262
BBC WAC Op cit 12 stations by April 1962, and another 12 by April 1964
263
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 June 1960 R1/28/1 The Board of Governors‟
minutes show that the BBC returned to their request to run a local broadcasting experiment
over the next six months but the government was deferring all broadcast issues to the
Pilkington Committee.

78
 The evidence examined in this period begins to build a picture that can
answer some of the central questions posed by these three chapters. BBC
personnel at a top level were very aware that local broadcasting had the
potential to fill a gap in the market which one or more commercial
competitors might take advantage of and so bring to an end the BBC‟s
monopoly in sound broadcasting. But it would be too simplistic to argue that
the BBC embarked on local broadcasting solely to prevent this scenario.
First, the BBC did not actually have the power or authority to start local
broadcasting on its own. It needed government and Post Office approval. At
the same time as preparing documentation and arguments for the Pilkington
Committee, the BBC tried to circumvent the political channel by appealing
directly to the Post Office for permission to start the service, almost by the
back door. Curiously the BBC did not actually have the funds for a trial and
it had not worked out in detail how to operate the stations.
Secondly one can interpret the internal papers from the late 1950s as
showing that those advocates of local broadcasting within the BBC were
exploring these arguments about the sound monopoly and commercial
competitors as a way of persuading others within the Corporation of the
necessity to accept this as the next logical extension of the BBC‟s services.
So the desire to start local broadcasting was motivated to some degree by
self-preservation, inspired by some radical hypothesizing about the possible
outcomes of not going ahead.
However local broadcasting was still a theoretical concept, and Gillard‟s
contribution was to flesh this out at a grass-roots level, using his
observations of American radio to begin to devise a UK model. More
importantly, his vision was rooted firmly in a public-service justification,
which became the cornerstone of the BBC‟s policy. At the same time, it also
provided the BBC with useful ammunition to counter arguments that they
were only creating local broadcasting to stop anyone else from doing it,
which would come to the fore in the public debates surrounding the
Pilkington Committee‟s deliberations. As I will argue in the next chapter, the
BBC became increasingly reliant on their public service credentials as the
forces of potential commercial competition coalesced into a formidable
lobby.

79
 CHAPTER FIVE: 1961 – 1962:
The Closed-Circuit Experiments

The Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting 1961 - 1962

The period 1961 – 1962 was very significant for the local broadcasting
debate as the main issues were discussed in public, via the press and in
evidence to the Committee on Broadcasting. It was also a chance for other
interested bodies, such as the Musicians‟ Union and the Association of
Municipal Authorities and local newspaper owners to have their say. Local
broadcasting however was not the only topic under discussion. The enquiry
also dealt with television services – the potential for „pay-TV‟, a fourth
television channel, extending the hours of broadcast and so on.
Briggs‟ analysis of the Pilkington Committee highlights one of the key
elements that underpinned their deliberations: the relationship between
broadcasting and cultural standards in the community.264 Dennis Lawrence,
the Committee‟s Principal Secretary, prepared the draft outline of the
enquiry‟s main tasks before they met, which included this crucial question:
should broadcasting authorities take a paternalistic role in nurturing cultural
standards for society, and if so, how can they judge what the public actually
want? And who, indeed, are the „public?‟265 Lawrence went on to argue that
the majority did not represent the public in their entirety, that there were
minorities too who should be catered for. Finally, the Committee might
conclude that it was not good practice to deny the public the opportunity to
try something new – it was their duty in fact to give a lead, and show them
what they might like, even though they did not know it yet. 266
At the outset of the enquiry, one could apply this guidance to local
broadcasting, as a new service which the public did not know much about
nor realised they wanted, but intriguingly it could either lead the Committee
towards a public service model as run by the BBC or make them lean to a
commercial service. The views of one committee member might already
have been known in this respect: Richard Hoggart‟s writings on culture and

264
Briggs Vol V ibid p 275
265
Briggs Vol V ibid p 275
266
Briggs Vol V ibid pp 275 - 276

80
 the media as explored in Chapter One gave an indication of his preference
for using public services for promoting cultural and social benefits.
However, much still rested on the evidence presented before them. To
this end, activity within the BBC was intense. Not only was evidence being
gathered and organized for the Committee, but preparations were being
made to ready the Corporation to put into practice their local broadcasting
scheme, should they be given the green light. Both these areas of activity
were linked – one informed the other in many respects - and the paperwork
in the Archive shows that projections were constantly being modified and
updated.
In his BBC oral history interview, Frank Gillard gave a summary of the
main events. He recalled going with Hugh Greene to see the Pilkington
Committee „early on‟ but „I came out feeling it [local broadcasting] was a lost
cause.‟267 On another occasion he remembered „they were distinctly chilly
to the BBC‟s local broadcasting proposals.‟268 The oral history interview
went on to describe how the Pilkington Committee asked the Chairs of the
Regional Advisory Councils to give evidence about regional broadcasting.
The Chairman in the West Region asked Frank Gillard to accompany him,
but again the Committee did not seem to respond to local broadcasting.
Then Gillard remembered that there was a local member of the
Committee called Shields.269 Gillard invited him to stay for the weekend,
persuaded him of the case for local broadcasting and so Shields agreed to
get it reinstated in the agenda. According to Gillard‟s account, he then went
to Hugh Greene and pointed out that „we‟ll never convince these people
until we give them a demonstration of the sort of product that we are
thinking of…can we get a licence to operate an experimental station?‟270
Hugh Greene replied that the Post Office would not allow it, which is
corroborated by the Board of Governors minutes as quoted in the previous
chapter.271 So Gillard suggested creating dummy stations and taping
everything. Greene asked how much and Gillard said £6,000 and the reply
267
BBC WAC: Oral History Interview: Frank Gillard 14 July 1983
268 th
BBC Local Radio: 30 Anniversary Programme tx various 1997
269
Briggs Vol V Chapter IV ibid This is J S Shields, head of a school in Winchester and
brother of Lord Reith‟s first secretary
270
BBC WAC: Oral History Interview: Frank Gillard ibid
271
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 June 1960 R1/28/1

81
 was „it‟s a deal.‟272 Again, on a future occasion, Gillard recalled how they
hastily organized 16 „dummy stations‟, recorded the output and played the
tapes to the Pilkington Committee, which they found „very convincing.‟273
The central facts of this account are doubtless true: the initial response of
the Pilkington Committee to local broadcasting was hard to gauge274 and
the BBC was able to make further representations on subsequent
occasions. But Gillard‟s order of events is too neat. For instance the taped
extracts from the trial stations were played to the Committee on 20
September 1961, at which point only six exercises had taken place.275 This
section demonstrates how the main events shaped the BBC‟s policies and
plans, which were evolving from a strategic point of view and how this
informed the case they made to the Pilkington Committee. In doing so, I will
again address questions concerning the BBC‟s motivation for embarking on
local broadcasting, the extent to which the BBC could be said to orchestrate
and lobby for their position and to what extent there could be said to be
public demand for it. The main sources for research come from two
documents: a report titled The Future of Sound Broadcasting: Local
Broadcasting276 which became the basis for the second report, the BBC‟s
evidence to the Committee, Memorandum No 12277, submitted in February
1961.
Later that same year, the Director-General authorised a committee to be
established which would pull together the work of the closed-circuit
experiments so that the BBC was in readiness to launch a service if asked
to do so. This committee operated under the Director of Sound
Broadcasting, with D‟A Marriott in the Chair, and Gillard‟s participation, to

272
BBC WAC Oral History Interview Frank Gillard ibid
273 th
BBC Local Radio: 30 Anniversary Programme tx various 1997
274
Eg According to R E L Wellington, the Committee had made few if any comments on
sound broadcasting and it was hoped that silence equalled consent. BBC WAC Report by
Director Sound Broadcasting July - September 1961, Board of Governors Papers R1/97/7.
Gillard maintained that the majority of the Committee was against local broadcasting from the
outset. Correspondence with Owen Bentley and the author, 21 April 2011
275
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167 p 3
276
BBC WAC The Future of Sound Broadcasting: Local Broadcasting 25 November 1960
Board of Governors Papers R1/96/9
277
BBC WAC BBC Memorandum: The Future of Sound Broadcasting – Local Radio February
1961 R102/43

82
 address all aspects of policy, engineering, general administration,
recruitment, training, finance and facilities.278
It is interesting to note that initially preparations by the BBC for the
Committee of Enquiry were felt to be slow. Wellington said in his report for
the last quarter of 1960 that no detailed arrangements had been made
regarding local broadcasting because „it does not lend itself to central
planning.‟279 However in accepting that the general principles were clear, he
said there was a need to work out practical consequences and a senior
member of staff [Gillard] would be seconded to this. But by the following
quarter, the report stated that preparations had been intensifying in the run-
up to putting the local broadcasting case to Pilkington. At the same time, the
West Region staged the first of the trial stations, on 22 March 1961. Gillard
had then been asked to bring up to date the thoughts and suggestions for
local broadcasting so far.280
The central aspirations and rationale for the BBC‟s case to run local
broadcasting as explored in The Future of Sound Broadcasting: Local
Broadcasting and Memorandum No 12 can be traced back to the earlier
papers cited above. The documents set out the BBC‟s case for running
local broadcasting: how this would work in practice, and laid great stress on
how bad it would be if the operation was conducted by commercial
companies. Other scenarios were also explored. The first paper - The
Future of Sound Broadcasting, drafted by Wellington as Director of Sound
Broadcasting, – can be seen as a sounding board for the Memorandum. It
was longer than the Memorandum and more far-reaching in some respects.
For example, Wellington was honest about the level of demand:
„It is a characteristic of broadcasting that one can never be sure
how far an extension of it into a new field will be welcomed; supply
in the field of broadcasting generally comes before the demand
which it creates.‟281

278
BBC WAC „Announcement from the Director-General for Distribution B Subject: Local
Broadcasting Committee‟ 30 November 1961 R102/43
279
BBC WAC Report by the Director of Sound Broadcasting October – December 1960 18
January 1961 Board of Governors Papers R1/97/9
280
BBC WAC Report by the Director of Sound Broadcasting January – March 1961 19 May
1961 Board of Governors Papers R1/97/9
281
BBC WAC The Future of Sound Broadcasting: Local Broadcasting 25 November 1960
Board of Governors Papers R1/96/9

83
 Wellington laid much stress on the commercial competition as presenting
a threat to the BBC‟s sound monopoly. He revisited the hypothetical
scenario, which the D‟A Marriott Committee had also painted, whereby
commercial stations could unite as a de facto network and take away the
radio audience thus denying the BBC‟s claim to the licence fee. The
conclusion put heavy emphasis on the BBC‟s pre-eminence in the world of
broadcasting and why it should be given the opportunity to run local
broadcasting.
„Nothing should be allowed to obscure the fact that local
broadcasting cannot be separated as an issue from national
broadcasting and the preservation of the BBC‟s monopoly which is
a fundamental pre-requisite of the BBC‟s status as the main
instrument of broadcasting.‟282

In the version of the report submitted to the Board of Management, prior

to the Board of Governors, the word „public‟ was inserted in pencil between
„BBC‟s‟ and „monopoly‟, perhaps as an effort to validate the monopoly. 283
The stance taken here was both provocative and grandiose. The BBC‟s
main pitch was summarized as follows:
„A service of local news and programmes reflecting the interests
of self-contained communities would be of real value in the
framework of public-service broadcasting and the use of local
stations, combined with the national networks, would enable the
BBC to offer a more comprehensive service than has hitherto been
possible in sound broadcasting.‟284

The plan they put forward at this stage involved 80 to 90 stations,

created at a rate of 18 per year, faster than previous papers had envisaged.
They would use VHF: the use of MW was not possible due to interference,
the lack of an international agreement and poor reception after dark. The
annual running cost of each station would be £28,000 per year, with
£17,500 for start-up capital. Each station would broadcast for two to three
hours a day, and there was no standard blueprint for the schedule: the
station should work with the local community who would have

282
BBC WAC op cit
283
BBC WAC The BBC‟s Plan for Local Sound Broadcasting by R E L Wellington 3 November
1960 Board of Management Papers R2/13/3
284
BBC WAC BBC Memorandum: The Future of Sound Broadcasting – Local Radio February
1961 R102/43 p 5

84
 representatives on a local advisory council. The Station Managers would
have independence in how they operated, able to turn to the Regional
Controller for advice.285 The BBC made it clear to Pilkington that it
appreciated the audience might be small, but it was not chasing listeners for
their own sake.
Various alternative structures were addressed. Stations run by local
authorities would not work because they could not be impartial but it might
be feasible to work with universities for educational broadcasting. Some
local newspapers wanted to run local broadcasting but others were happy
for the BBC to do it. The BBC cautioned against the former, as this would
create a monopoly of local media where there was only one paper in the
vicinity. Commercial companies running stations would need large
audiences to maximize advertising revenue, which would have an impact on
the type of programming they could provide. The Memorandum also
questioned the commercial companies‟ figure of £30,000 annual running
costs as these companies did not have at their disposal the BBC‟s
infrastructure for organization and sustaining services. Finally the BBC
argued for their retention of the sound monopoly, but in a way that laid
stress on avoiding destructive and unnecessary competition to a perfectly
good publicly-funded broadcasting system.
In examining evidence like the Memorandum, I have identified how the
BBC as an organisation began to write its own narrative. Key events and
aspirations were repeated which become part of the dogma. These included
the Beveridge Committee‟s suggestion that the BBC become custodians of
a local broadcasting experiment in the early 1950s, that the Corporation
chose instead to use VHF to bolster the networks but in so doing created a
more comprehensive coverage of transmitters that could be used for local
broadcasting. The narrative promoted the BBC‟s roots in regional
broadcasting – and before that, the existence of the original local stations in
the 1920s. A research report written by the Leicester University Centre for
Communication on the early years of BBC Local Radio called these

285
See Chapter Four: the line of management was now less direct and more „dotted‟.

85
 recurring motifs „a cliché of the Corporation‟s local radio publicity.‟286 The
visits to America by Frank Gillard were often referred to, as further evidence
that the BBC was not rushing into the field. The fact that the BBC had
requested permission from the Post Office to start experiments, and that
this had been refused, was used to validate their intentions further. These
examples were not myths in the sense that they were untrue but they added
a sense of tradition and longevity to the BBC‟s claims, which other
claimants could not match. The Memorandum that dealt with Local
Broadcasting was submitted to Pilkington in February 1961. At the Board of
Management meeting on 17 April 1961 Hugh Greene noted that the
Committee would return once again to local broadcasting in May so it was
important to gather as much material as possible before then. The
suggestion was for a 45-minute talk from Gillard with taped extracts from
the Bristol station.287 The Director-General was able to report back to the
Board at the end of May that the case for local broadcasting had been put
„fully and satisfactorily‟: „nothing had been said or implied which should
deter the BBC from going ahead with further experiments and with its plans
for the training of staff of which the Committee had been informed.‟288
Reading between the lines, the implication here was that the BBC would
continue to press ahead with its intention of making local broadcasting a
reality unless they were actively prevented from doing so.
On 20 September, a further playback session of material from the first six
stations took place.289 The following month, permission was given for Hugh
Greene to make another submission, in the form of a direct letter to Sir
Harry Pilkington.290 Aside from the detail, the letter was a direct way of
underlining the BBC‟s commitment to extrapolating what local broadcasting
might mean in practice and reminding the Committee of the ongoing

286
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167 p 1
287
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 17 April 1961 R2/14/2
288
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 28 May 1961 ibid
289
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 25 September 1961 ibid
290
BBC WAC Letter from the Director-General to the Chairman, Committee on Broadcasting
13 October 1961 R1/97/9 The impetus for this came from the recent European Broadcasting
Conference in Stockholm concerning frequency allocation. Provided the necessary VHF
wavelengths were made available in time, it would be possible to cover larger geographical
locations than previously thought. In practice this might mean that there would be 20
area/local stations and say 100 urban/local stations by 1970.

86
 experiments, which would now include stations covering larger areas. The
BBC argued that this would not dilute the definition of what constituted a
community, nor would it affect the original financial projections. 291
My conclusion is that the evidence here shows how the BBC waged an
assiduous campaign to persuade the Pilkington Committee of its rightful
claim to launch and run local broadcasting. This was achieved through a
combination of reports and strategy documents, and by Gillard‟s own efforts
to bring the Committee round, one-by-one in some cases, with the help of
the taped extracts.292
There were, however, other parties interested in running local
broadcasting. By January 1962 there were 304 commercial broadcasting
companies registered with an interest in sound broadcasting.293 Of these,
89 were directly linked to commercial television companies and 114 tied to
newspaper publishing; some had connections to both. Another 178 had no
association with either but appeared to be localized entrepreneurs looking
for a business opportunity. Some of these also had overt political links. For
example one of the earliest potential bidders was Radio Yorkshire, formed
by Geoffrey Hirst, Conservative MP for Shipley.294 The Pilkington
Committee received evidence from a number of these companies. These
included Bristol and West England Radio Ltd and Southern Broadcasting
Co Ltd, later renamed Southdown Radio.295 Another proposal came from
Home Counties Newspapers Ltd, which controlled 14 local weeklies in the
Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire areas and registered four
subsidiaries to run stations.296

291
This seems to have created some confusion as the Secretary to the Board of Governors
sent a follow up letter to Dennis Lawrence of the Committee in an attempt to clarify the use of
language. The label „area/local‟ seems to have been confused with previous limited range
transmitters on VHF on the Home Service regions. So Farquharson suggested that the term
„local broadcasting‟ should be used to describe all of the new services, from area/local to
urban/local, and „regional broadcasting‟ remained the preserve of the regional Home Service.
BBC WAC letter from the Secretary of the Board of Governors to D G C Lawrence esq
Committee on Broadcasting 17 October 1961 R1/97/9
292
Correspondence between Owen Bentley and the author 21 April 2011
293
BBC WAC data from Local Broadcasting Committee 1961 - 1962 Basic Papers R102/43
294
The Times „Aims of Radio Yorkshire: MP on need for „truly local‟ programmes 8 December
1959
295
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167
296
BBC WAC op cit

87
 Perhaps the bid that attracted the most attention came from the Pye
Company in Cambridge.297 This plan utilized MW and VHF by day and VHF
only by night, and claimed that using the BBC‟s own technical data, it would
be possible to accommodate over 100 stations on MW. So any town with a
population over 50,000 would get a station, plus other larger towns served
by VHF. Areas which would benefit from social and educational input would
be a priority, such as Yorkshire and Lancashire. The type of output was not
dissimilar to BBC proposals, although there was little detail about who
exactly would run the stations298. The costs would be between £20 – 30,000
per year per station, with a staff of six to 15.
The BBC was questioned about the disparity between these figures and
their own but it was quick to point out that Pye made no provision for the
administration costs, a sustaining service, needletime and so on.299 Bristol
and West England Radio also produced a closed-circuit trial, which the BBC
analysed internally (see below) but there was comment in the press about
whether the BBC had an unfair advantage in being able to play their
recordings to Pilkington.300 Other potential bidders were written about at the
time, such as discussions from the London County Council301 and Berkshire
County Council about running their own stations,302 but neither of these
amounted to anything concrete.
While the lines were drawn quite conclusively between the BBC and its
potential commercial rivals, the press themselves were in two camps. Some
newspaper owners were not in favour of local commercial radio as they felt
it would affect their advertising revenue. A group of 80 newspaper
proprietors made it known to Pilkington that they preferred local
broadcasting under the BBC,303 although those newspaper owners
favouring commercial radio numbered 321 and they made a similar

297
Sunday Times „The 100 Towns that could go on air‟ 16 October 1960
298
Op cit The article talked vaguely about „associations, the Press, universities‟
299
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 25 September 1961 R2/14/3
300
BBC WAC op cit
301
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 17 July 1961 R2/14/2 Subsequently the LCC
agreed to back the BBC on local broadcasting and submitted this to Pilkington.
302
Berkshire Chronicle „Should authorities run local radio?‟ 1 December 1961; Windsor
Express „County puts off any decision on local radio‟ 19 January 1962
303
Birmingham Post ‟80 papers oppose local radio‟ 12 January 1961

88
 submission.304 The BBC themselves became more adept at putting their
case publicly. For example when letters appeared in The Times from both
camps in the newspaper debate, the BBC Head of Publicity promised to
contact its supporters within the newspaper fraternity to respond and defend
the BBC.305 The BBC was also making the most of good relationships with
other external supporters. In a speech to the Association of Municipal
Corporations (AMC) in July 1961 the Director-General expounded the
virtues of a BBC-run system, with emphasis on local partnerships, public
information about local authority work and encouraging participation. 306 The
AMC were also thanked for their supportive submission to Pilkington.
Contemporary press reports illustrated how the BBC‟s campaign was
increasingly taken into the public domain, such as the speech by Hugh
Greene at the Manchester Luncheon Club in November 1960, when his
arguments were tailored to the business and public sector clientele in the
audience.307 He reiterated the key points that a BBC-run service would not
compete with local newspaper advertising, that the commercial companies
had not calculated the cost of the service properly and that they were only
interested in a quick profit: „it is on local broadcasting that people who
wanted to mint their own half crowns had fixed their hopes – they wanted
radio for profit not for the public.‟308
But coverage was not always so positive. More and more disparaging
comments about local broadcasting began to emerge in this period. The
phrase „parish pump‟ cropped up frequently. For example the leader
comment in The Times (19 February 1962) argued that 150 stations would
reduce programmes to „a level of triviality and mediocrity…..even if the
parish pump could be kept gurgling away 365 days a year it would have no
listeners.‟309 Another article in The Guardian disparaged local radio as run
by the BBC. Arthur Hopcraft said the stations would run out of material in

304
Op cit
305
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 16 January 1961 R2/14/2
306
BBC WAC „Local Broadcasting and Local Authority‟ by Hugh Greene 20 July 1961
R102/43
307
The Times „No room for ITV under the BBC Umbrella‟ 10 November 1960
308
Op cit This neat phrase is reminiscent of Roy Thomson‟s „licence to print money‟ which is
how he described his Scottish Television franchise.
309
The Times „On the local‟ 19 February 1962

89
 six months, the BBC would not have come up with the idea if it was not for
the commercial operators, and there would not be enough talent to run the
stations.310 The piece was accompanied by a cartoon, depicting a Station
Manager on his bike with a tape recorder trying to find people to interview.
There were some interesting allegiances here. The Times was under the
editorship of William Haley, a former Director-General of the BBC, yet he
was no friend of local broadcasting. The BBC Board of Management
pondered whether he realised his leader piece could be interpreted as
advocating the end of the BBC‟s sound monopoly and the advent of
commercial broadcasting.311 The Guardian was sceptical too. But the left-
leaning Daily Herald argued that local broadcasting would be good for
restoring interest in local government and civic responsibility. There was
also a lesson for the Labour Party as increased access to better news
provision increased the political conscience.312

The closed-circuit experiments

The sixteen trials in local broadcasting conducted during the sitting of the
Pilkington Committee were a very significant exercise for the BBC.313 They
enabled them to test out the hypothesis that underpinned the whole concept
of local radio, exploring many practical implications such as staffing,
scheduling, management, technical requirements and so on. They also
produced output that was recorded and could be used for lobbying
purposes – beginning with the Pilkington Committee itself. The trials
generated large amounts of paperwork, including evaluations and reports,
which formed the material used as the basis for this section. Many of the
discoveries that took place at this time helped with the long term plans for
local broadcasting: indeed short term too, as there was a hope that the BBC

310
The Guardian „Radio Oswaldtwistle‟ 23 March1962
311
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 19 February 1962 R2/15/1
312
Daily Herald „Room on the air for the locals‟ 22 February1962
313
BBC WAC R102/52/1; R102/68/1 The trials took place as follows: 1961: 22 March, Bristol;
10 May, Portsmouth; 20 June, Norwich; 18 July, Hull; 24 August, Dundee; 5 – 11 September,
Bournemouth, Poole and Christchurch; 19 – 21 October, Swansea; 21 November, Wrexham;
29 November & 12 December, Portsmouth (as part of a BBC exhibition); 1962: 15 – 18
January, Durham; 15 – 17 February, London; 20 – 22 March, Dumfries; 5 – 7 April, Isle of
Wight; 11 – 14 April, Vale of Evesham; 30 April, 1 – 2 May, Llyn Ac Afrom. Merseyside was
scheduled for the end of June but cancelled due to the publication of the Pilkington Report.

90
 might be embarking on creating local stations for real within a very short
time of the Pilkington Report.
The following sections explore the trials in detail, by looking at them in a
thematic way: staffing; content; station locations; education; technical
considerations. There is also a section that looks at a closed-circuit trial
conducted by a commercial operator. South Western Broadcasting Ltd in
Bristol produced its own dummy station in March 1962, which Frank Gillard
witnessed and wrote about. This provides an interesting comparison to the
BBC‟s operations, although it was only a single enterprise. The main
sources for this section are two reports by Gillard: an interim report on local
broadcasting, which covered the first eight experiments, up to November
1961,314 and a further one in 1962 which was drafted just before the
Pilkington Report and finalized after the first White Paper.315 Other sources
are also drawn on.
Despite the fact that many hours of audio were recorded over these 14
months, very little survives. There is a 45-minute compilation from the
experiment in Stoke from October 1961,316 a short radio news package from
the Bournemouth, Poole and Christchurch trials the previous month,317 and
a 40-minute compilation of extracts from various locations, including some
of those from Stoke.318 This last example is described in the British Library
catalogue as being „used by Frank Gillard in his crucial session with the
Pilkington Committee‟ and is dated „c September 1961‟, but it should be
noted that it includes clips from the experiments in Durham (15 – 18
January 1962) and the Isle of Wight (5 – 7 April 1962) both of which
occurred after the Pilkington Committee was played audio extracts by Frank
Gillard. It is a small point but it illustrates the degree to which the audio was
being assessed and updated constantly, for lobbying purposes.
The trials were organized by a cross-section of senior staff from Sound
Broadcasting and the Regions. Gillard himself took an executive role,
although he was more involved in the first trial since it took place in his
314
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
315
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962 & 11
July 1962 R102/71/1
316
National Sound Archive: Local Broadcasting ST 29018
317
National Sound Archive: Local Broadcasting Experiment at Poole LP 27013
318
National Sound Archive Local Radio Experiments T 37230

91
 region. Michael Barton who worked on the station in Hull recalled: „It was
fun, it was very inventive……..and of course the man himself Frank Gillard,
listening and recording everything.’319 Commenting on those first
experimental broadcasts in Bristol, Gillard said „It was marvellous. I can still
recall it to this day. I can hear in my ears the tones of voices of some of
those contributors. At the end of the day, I knew that local radio was a
certainty you know.‟320 Although that is a noble sentiment for posterity, this
section will show that it was not necessarily so straightforward.

Station staffing
There were a number of practical issues involved in running the stations,
and staffing was a priority. Gillard‟s interim reports all assessed the
numbers needed to run a station, the grades of the staff required,
recruitment, the roles, the shift patterns, the skills, training requirements and
so on. The trials were used as evidence to help assess these criteria and
they did provide valuable lessons. However the experiments could not
necessarily replicate the real conditions of an on-air station. Some aspects
of the putative organisation could be put to the test in a genuinely
experimental way, such as trying out various permutations of shift patterns
and roles. This then raised subsequent issues that needed further thought,
such as skills and training. But of course there was no time or mechanism
for trying out a recruitment strategy before the trials got underway.
Many of the staff during the trials were seconded or had volunteered to take
part, such as Michael Barton. He was a producer based in Manchester for
the North Region: „I was called up, as it were, from my Manchester
production job to go to Hull, my home town. It was a lash up studio with
very, very basic equipment in the Guildhall.‟321 Lincoln Shaw, who worked
as a reporter in the Stoke trial, concurred: „We were a small team and we all
knew each other because we were volunteers from the Midland‟s
newsroom. It was good fun.‟322 This captures the enthusiasm and

319
BBC Radio Four: Archive Hour „Close to Home‟ 10 November 2007
320
BBC WAC Oral History Interview: Frank Gillard 14 July 1983
321
BBC Radio Four: Archive Hour „Close to Home‟ 10 November 2007
322
Op cit

92
 innovation that the trials were trying to harness, but at the same time testing
out the limits of organization and structure.
Quite a few members of staff worked on more than one experiment, so
their experience was accrued. The basic template for the staffing
arrangement came from the D‟ A Marriott report, which catered for 15
personnel.323 Some pilot projects used fewer staff, such as Bristol, where it
was concluded that more staff would have meant a „richer, fuller day‟s
broadcasting.‟324 Others had too many, for example Dundee, where matters
were not helped by people staying on after their shifts had finished.325
Gillard‟s conclusion was that a Station Manager needed organisational
flexibility, so that he could choose whether to have, say, more staff
producers and supplement them with freelance announcers or news
reporters.326 However a minimum, or average, staffing requirement evolved
so that the posts and grades could be identified. By July 1962 it was
envisaged there would be one Station Manager, one station organizer who
would take on the role of scheduling, four programme assistants who were
producers essentially, plus various other assistant roles, secretarial support
and an engineer.327 This came to 13 in total, but it made no provision for
dedicated news staff.
In terms of a working pattern, the experiments explored many different
permutations, though these were limited when it came to one-day trials. The
longer experiments gave a greater opportunity for variety. There was no
expectation at the outset to provide a full-day service – but the original goal
of three hours original programming soon rose to five.328 The key periods
for operation were early morning, lunchtime and early evening, which made
shift working inevitable. Outside of these times, the stations experimented
with taking one of the networks as a sustaining service.329

323
BBC WAC R34/1585/1
324
BBC WAC memo CWR to DSB Subject Radio Bristol 21 March 1961 R102/52/1 Vol I
325
BBC WAC memo from AW Coysh to HSP 26 August 1961 Op cit
326
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
327
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962
R102/71/1
328
BBC WAC memo from DSB to CWR „Local Broadcasting Plans‟ 26 September 1961 Local
Radio Experiments Policy 1961-1962 R102/47/1
329
In Bristol, staff worked two shifts, 6.15am to 2pm, and 1pm to 7.50pm BBC WAC Local
Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962 R102/71/1; while in

93
 Selection and training was something that required careful thought, ably
demonstrated by the Durham trial, which came just over mid-way through
the experiment, and was something of a watershed. The conclusion was
that this station had not been successful, and the lessons learned pointed
towards better staff organization. For instance poor training on the
equipment meant the first day „was really rather a fiasco.‟330 Some of the
announcers were not suitable to be heard on air, and only three out of a
team of 11 clearly stated they wanted to work in local radio.331
An example of the horrors heard in this trial was the item on Durham
shops, recorded in a memo from the Secretary of the Local Broadcasting
Committee: „I was particularly shocked that the girl [announcer] advocated
the mixing of plastic flowers to eke out the supply.‟332 Whether this
observation is entirely serious or not, the conclusion that PA Findlay arrived
at is noteworthy: „for the future it seems to me that we should no longer put
on experiments intending to show that local broadcasting works but should
accept that as being proved.‟333 He said that instead what they needed to
do in future was get the best teams possible together to work with the
equipment and production. Gillard‟s reports stressed that local broadcasting
had to have the best possible teams.
„It would not be for the burn outs, unless they could find second
wind and new enthusiasm for the local medium and certainly not for
those who were troublesome or difficult or who had failed to make
good elsewhere at the BBC.‟334

So he was setting the bar high. But to get good staff, Gillard was aware
that the BBC had to pay the equivalent rates to network. By its nature, local
broadcasting might well suit younger people, who were more mobile and

London, staff worked in 12 hour shifts on a three-day rotation, BBC WAC Report on Radio
London Experiment by C Max-Muller February 1962 Local Radio Experiments London 1962
R34/1644. Staff in Bournemouth tried a 14 hour day and apparently liked it, but Gillard
thought it was necessary to have an „overlap‟ period in the middle otherwise the burden was
on the Station Manager to give continuity
330
BBC WAC Memo from Secretary Local Broadcasting Committee to ADSB Subject Radio
Durham 22 January1962 Local Radio Experiments 1961 Vol II R102/68/1
331
BBC WAC Report on Local Broadcasting from Humphrey Baron, Belfast: Review of Radio
Durham Experiment Local Radio Experiments 1961 Vol II R102/68/1
332
BBC WAC Memo from Secretary Local Broadcasting Committee to ADSB Subject Radio
Durham 22 January 1962 Local Radio Experiments 1961 Vol II R102/68/1
333
Op cit
334
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1

94
 flexible. At the same time, Gillard pointed out, it was important to look
outside the BBC for potential staff. He noticed how many newspaper
journalists appeared at the news conferences he held, who attended not
just out of duty, but out of keenness to get involved in local radio too.335
As training was identified as vital, the BBC started to organize a
specialist centre in Poole, which held two courses on the techniques of local
broadcasting in January 1962. There were 12 attendees at each, whose
substantive jobs ranged from talks producers, announcers, senior
programmes assistants and programme organizers.336 There certainly
seemed to be a healthy demand too. One hundred and eighty five members
of staff registered an interest in becoming a Station Manager and after
interview, 47 were placed on a list of top candidates and each was invited to
observe the remaining pilots.337 Gillard recognized that the scale of the
recruitment and training organization – should the BBC be commissioned to
start local radio – would have been quite formidable: some 1,750 staff to fill
all the projected stations.338 But rather than be daunted by this, Gillard
thought creatively: once the first stations were on air, they could become
the training ground for the next wave of recruits and stations.339
The Station Manager would be pivotal to the success of local
broadcasting, so it was important for the manager to be independent and be
able to make quick decisions on the spot.340 In addition, another key idea
emerging from the experiments did take root to become a reality – the
notion of a station handbook which was in effect a guidebook on how to

335
Op cit [this comment has the word „yes‟ written in pencil next to it]
336
BBC WAC Report from Director of Administration 31 January 1962 Board of Governors
Papers R1/98/2
337
BBC WAC Report by Director Sound Broadcasting October – December 1961 3 January
1962 R1/98/1 Some in the press were cynical about the motives of volunteering to run one of
the new stations. Arthur Hopcraft wrote that the high demand was because of the promised
salary – often £1,000 per year more than most current BBC posts had to offer. The Guardian
„Radio Oswaldtwistle‟ by Arthur Hopcraft 2 March 1962
338
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962
R102/71/1
339
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
340
BBC WAC Op cit

95
 deal with a whole raft of editorial, legal, personnel, financial and policy
issues.341

Programme content
One of the big challenges for the experiments was to prove that there was
enough content to fill the schedule. As already noted, the original
expectation was for three hours a day, concentrated around early morning,
lunchtime and early evening. Not all the content would be directly produced
by the station team – there was allowance for educational material too, as a
later section will explain. By their very nature, the trials needed to
experiment with programme genres and formats, to work out what might be
suitable and what was not successful. One might have thought the task was
most straightforward when it came to news output. However, while the
Regional centres may have operated efficiently for gathering news on a
wide geographic scale, no such structure existed on a local level.
The news reporter from Stoke, Lincoln Shaw, said:
„When I arrived I was told a news service would be provided, and it
turned out to be carbon copies of stories that had been in the paper
the day before, brought in by an elderly freelance who thought
that‟s what we wanted. Of course we didn‟t.‟342

It also became clear that being familiar with the locality was crucial to
getting good stories. In Dumfries, the output sounded too much as though
the BBC had „come to the town‟ to do programmes about it, not as part of
the community.343 The Durham project came in for criticism again over its
news coverage: it missed the big story on the Monday night/Tuesday
morning, which was the rise in coal productivity and the impact on miners‟
wages, preferring instead to lead with the problem of dirty milk bottles.344

341
Gillard notes that the BBC Secretary, C Shaw, was working in a first draft of the Handbook
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962
R102/71/1
342
BBC Radio Four: Archive Hour „Close to Home‟ 10 November 2007
343
BBC WAC Report on Radio Dumfries by John Gray 30 March1962 Local Radio
Experiments 1961 Vol II R102/68/1
344
BBC WAC Memo from Secretary Local Broadcasting Committee to ADSB Subject Radio
Durham 22 January 1962 Local Radio Experiments 1961 Vol II R102/68/1 There was one
highlight though: „An amusing and racy interview with a Chester-le-Street man who keeps
lions in his backyard‟.

96
 The London experiment covered three days in February 1962, and in his
evaluation, Derek McAllister was pleased with the quantity of news but
pointed out that a minor raid in Wallington simply would not interest the
listener in Chigwell.345 This threw the focus on to the paradox of scale vs
relevance and the question of what exactly the optimum size for a local
station should be, yet still maintaining local interest.
Gillard‟s November 1961 report found news had gone well, even with
small stations like Norwich, which had managed to get enough stories.346
He envisaged news agencies would quickly spring up where they did not
already exist, to serve local stations and that opportunities for freelancers
would also increase. In terms of future planning, there were various
hypotheses. It might have been possible for the BBC to create a staff
newsroom, working with Regional news editors. Another option would have
been to work with local newspapers to provide the news. But then what
would happen with a scoop? Would the paper hold onto it for their next
edition? There was also the potential for listeners to contribute news items –
but this idea was not tested in the experiments.
In terms of broader programming, there was a wide range of output. It
became clear early on that elaborate features, such as dramas with
professional actors, were unlikely to be viable for local broadcasting. That
put the emphasis on live programmes or shorter, pre-recorded „packages‟,
which were easier and cheaper to produce. Within those boundaries the
experiments were given free rein to explore a range of subjects. It is
interesting to compare the first experiment in Bristol with the later one in
London. The former had programmes with self-explanatory names, which
attracted some criticism, such as Your Evening Out, which R D‟A Marriot
said had „too much information‟347 and What’s On?, which was „too long a
list.‟348 Also in Bristol, there was Round The Town, which featured „too

345
BBC WAC memo from Derek McAllister to Maurice Ennals Subject: Radio London
Experiment 20 February 1962 Local Radio Experiments London 1962 R34/1644/1
346
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
347
BBC WAC Comments from R D‟A Marriott Local Radio Experiments 1961 Vol I R102/52/1
348
BBC WAC Op cit

97
 much [local MP] Wedgewood Benn‟349 according to D‟A Marriott, and It’s My
Advice and Thought for the Day, both of which needed more local angles.350
The schedule for the London station demonstrated much more variety,
but individual programmes still suffered from criticism. In particular, What’s
On in London was dull, From the Council Chamber „failed lamentably‟ and
Coffee Break did not have enough local material and there would not be
enough resources for the packages. On the plus side, a community
programme called With the West Indians was well-received, Thought for the
Day was well-presented and My Choice had a good format.351
One format that often worked well involved playing music, such as
requests or a guest‟s choice, eg in Dundee, a retired matron brought in her
favourite music and talked about her life in Looking Back.‟352 The difficulty
here was the limited amount of needletime allowed: too many disc-based
programmes would have swallowed that up in no time.353 Gillard‟s solution
was for each station to build a stock of 600 – 700 records, plus all the latest
releases, so they could manage request programmes. Live music could be
encouraged because the rights issues were easier to deal with, but
negotiations with the Musicians‟ Unions would be needed over commercial
discs.354 There was no shortage of local notables willing to be interviewed,
which was useful evidence that there was genuine support for the idea.
Programmes such as a question and answer session with a local MP on the
Isle of Wight for example355 also bolstered the claim that local radio would
enhance participation and civic duty and it played well with figures with a
wider profile who might champion the cause further afield.
The tapes in the National Sound Archive include stories and items that
from today‟s perspective could be judged uninteresting or negligible. For
example, a critique of lamppost designs in Bournemouth, the Lord Mayor

349
BBC WAC Op cit
350
BBC WAC Op cit
351
BBC WAC Op cit
352
BBC WAC Op cit
353
Eg BBC WAC Memo from CWR to DSB Subject Radio Bristol 28 March 1961 Local Radio
Experiments 1961 R102/52/1
354
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962
R102/71/1
355
BBC WAC Isle of Wight LB Exercise by News Editor West Region 8 April 1962 Local Radio
Experiments 1961 Vol II R102/68/1

98
 discussing his engagement diary for this year and why he had fewer duties
than his predecessor (location unknown)356. Michael Barrett, a reporter from
the Potteries, picked out a personal favourite:
„I‟m almost ashamed to say that on one Saturday programme we
did a presentation about church activities….[which announced a
change in church service times] “to allow mothers more time to
prepare the Sunday lunch”. My goodness, we‟d be hounded out of
the country if we did that today.”357

On a more serious note, there are some very valuable examples too. In
Hull, there was a location interview with a fish worker‟s wife who lived with
their eight children in a two-room cottage. The reporter described their living
conditions in measured, objective tones, being careful to include the
dimensions of the property and asking practical questions about how she
managed. It painted a very realistic picture without recourse to sentiment.
The next section featured a studio interview with the Hull Corporation
Housing Manager, as the announcer said “it is our policy to hear every side
of both questions.” [sic] The Housing Manager explained that the family, the
Lowthorpes, should have put their names on the housing waiting list sooner,
but in any case their street had been identified for slum clearance and
would be pulled down early the following year.358
From a contemporaneous perspective this is a notable example of good
journalism: robust questioning, being fair and impartial but at the same time
raising a topic that resonated with aspects of what it meant to live in this
area and began to explore definitions of community. Further it is also worth
noting that although the surviving audio may not be wholly representative,
there do not seem to be many items that carry with them a sense of place
and community. A couple of exceptions are a location interview from a
Welsh colliery (probably Swansea) about the threat of mechanization and a
studio discussion featuring housewives in Norwich talking about how
welcoming the town is to newcomers and the problems of fitting in.359
Overall, however, there is the impression that the programme-makers were

356
National Sound Archive: Local Broadcasting ST 29018
357
BBC Radio Four: Archive Hour „Close to Home‟ 10 November 2007 and National Sound
Archive: Local Radio Experiments T 37230
358
National Sound Archive: Local Radio Experiments T 37230
359
Op cit

99
 struggling to capture distinctive and coherent descriptions that rooted the
experiments in their specific locations, relying instead on vague ideas of
generic localness. This may have been due to the inexperience of the
producers and their own lack of local knowledge. However it was not
explicitly highlighted in the meticulous evaluations, by Gillard and others,
either.
Some aspects of the London experiment took an alternative approach to
representation, demonstrating the use of programmes for a more diverse
audience, such as the aforementioned West Indian broadcast. A script is
preserved in the file for the prototype show, With the West Indians,
presented by Mr Dick Pixley who came from Jamaica and was credited with
a good voice.360 In this pilot, Dick had a co-presenter in the studio („my
sister Jeanie‟) and together they introduced news from home, an interview
with a West Indian of the week, Topical Titbits and played new songs.
Despite the fact that the exchanges were heavily scripted, there was a very
informal tone to the dialogue, such as „‟Hey brother Dick, isn‟t it time you did
some work? Check your old bag of tricks,”361 which would have been quite
challenging to audience and broadcasters alike, but validated the
adventurous nature of experimenting with new ideas on the radio.
The other issue that needed attention in the course of the closed-circuit
trials was the choice of a sustaining service and how to construct the output
so that it flowed from one programme source to another. There was some
discussion about whether the Home Service or the Light Programme was
the most suitable and how to seque into the sustaining service. G Max-
Muller, writing about the London experiment, thought listeners would get
confused if constantly told „we‟re now joining the Light‟: it sounded as
though Radio London was the opt-out service, not one in its own right.362
But a sustaining service was necessary as there were not enough
programmes and resources to fill an entire schedule. Gillard concluded that
the Light Programme was the most obvious choice for a daytime sustaining
360
BBC WAC Memo from Harold Rogers to HOB(s) Subject: Radio London – West Indian
Programme received 24 December 1961 ibid Local Radio Experiments London 1962
R34/1644/1
361
BBC WAC Op cit
362
BC WAC Report on Radio London Experiment by C Max-Muller undated Local Radio
Experiments London 1962 R34/1644/1

100
 service, with possibly room for longer items from the Home in the
evenings.363

Education
Education covered three distinct areas: schools broadcasting, further
education (which also included adult education) and higher education. The
first two had their own departments within the BBC, so anything involving
schools and curricula needed to be negotiated through the relevant staff.
The other area relied more on links and partnerships with bodies at a local
level. However, it is evident from the experiments that education provision
as a whole did not meet expectation.
Schools Broadcasting already existed on the networks as nationally
produced content. The Head of Schools Broadcasting thought local output
could be most effective for say geography, history and local government.
There were also opportunities for talks by local experts and „star‟ teachers.
There might even be a call for „radio lessons‟ if there was an epidemic or
school closure due to bad weather.364 Of course there was the issue of
quality: programmes had to meet existing standards, so there would have to
be a Schools Producer on each station, who worked in conjunction with a
local advisory council.365 However by the time the experiments had started
in March/April 1961, friction had emerged between the various internal
bodies. The Head of Educational Broadcasting felt that the Schools
Broadcasting Council was not being consulted about how the service might
develop. He warned that overzealous local authorities might jeopardize the
BBC‟s working relationship with teaching organizations, leading to „lower
standards and faulty co-ordination.‟366
There was certainly a question mark over the standard of work that might
be offered for broadcast. The feedback from several trials noted
disappointment with the schools programmes. For example in Hull, where a

363
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962
R102/71/1
364
BBC WAC Memo from Head of Schools Broadcasting to Head of Educational Broadcasting
Subject: Local Broadcasting 9 September 1960 Local Radio Educational Policy R99/9/1
365
BBC WAC Op cit
366
BBC WAC Memo from Head of Educational Broadcasting to DSB 7 April 1961 Local Radio
Educational Policy R99/9/1

101
 schools debate on houses versus flats was pronounced „[not] worth doing‟:
„overall the school‟s programmes were sub standard and lacked polish but
showed imagination.‟367 In this instance the output for schools was made by
the Hull Education Authority.
The central problem was how to encourage and engage with outside
bodies to help produce work, without either losing editorial control or
exploiting them. „With the introduction of local broadcasting, the BBC will
face a lessening of their „sound‟ monopoly‟, wrote Rodney Bennett, „not in
„air space‟ but in control over broadcast materials.‟368 To help assess the
immediate problem, in early 1962, the BBC‟s Further Education Unit
commissioned two programmes in which they would act as consultant and
hand over production to two external producers. These were Dartington Hall
in Devon, which made a programme about teaching music, and Nottingham
University, whose programme was about how local manufacturers were
preparing for the Common Market. The two programmes were played to
local people in each area and their feedback was evaluated.369 The results
were not terribly promising. It was agreed that the programme quality in
each case was average. There were problems with casting and with
technical quality. The report concluded that there was no shortage of
volunteers to take part in educational work but the BBC had to provide the
facilities and resources. Also partner institutions would want to be paid. One
solution was offered by Gillard – to build up a library of local programmes
with the help of national or regional bodies that could be loaned out.370
The absence of higher education content in the trials was noted, largely
because the earlier ones took place when the local universities were on
vacation.371 However the experiment that took place in the Potteries was

367
BBC WAC Memo from A W Coysh to Head of North Regional Programmes Subject Radio
Hull undated Local Radio Experiments 1961 R102/52/1 Vol I
368
BBC WAC General Comments on Local Broadcasting by Rodney Bennett 1 June 1962
Further Education – Local Broadcasting R15/404 His underline.
369
BBC WAC Local Broadcasting: A Report on Two Further Education Experimental
Recordings by Jean Rowntree 22 June1962 Local Broadcasting 1962 File 1a R15/505
370
BBC WAC Op cit
371
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962
R102/71/1

102
 apparently initiated by the University of Keele.372 The University College of
North Staffordshire produced two programmes for broadcast. The quality
was deemed to be good but the content was „too intellectual‟ for the
audience.373
In the absence of much useful contemporary practical evidence about
the way education in its various iterations might work in relation to local
broadcasting, Gillard drew up more scenarios about the various structures.
For instance he suggested building relationships with key personnel at each
university so that high profile research and news stories could go on air. He
thought there would be room for general university news, rag weeks etc.
With regard to schools output, there needed to be a Chief Education Officer
in each area, with a Schools Broadcast Council advising them. Only
programmes approved by a local educational authority could go on air. He
hoped for two schools programmes a day and perhaps teachers seconded
to the BBC too. For Further Education, there needed to be partnerships with
Local Education Authorities, the Workers‟ Education Association and Extra
Mural Departments at Universities. The BBC would help by loaning studios
and airtime. However there was no mention of making BBC staff available
to them.374

Representation and access

The opportunities for genuine interaction with listeners were limited in the
experiment, for practical reasons. Nevertheless, many of the theoretical
considerations were addressed, so that they could be integrated into policy
and practices at a later stage. For example, Gillard was keen to get
contributors on air using the telephone – which he had heard used in
America. One technique was to record their voices and play them out with a
five second delay, which got around any potential legal problems.375
However the Post Office in the UK needed persuading. The telephone line
came under their jurisdiction and while Gillard saw great potential for phone
372
BBC WAC Letter from Director-General to Sir Ronald German Subject: Local Broadcasting
Exercises 9 August 1962 Local Broadcasting Papers 1961 – 64 R78/607/1
373
BBC WAC Report from Topicality Producer Midland Region to Head of Midland Regional
Programmes undated Local Radio Experiments 1961 R102/52/1 Vol I
374
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
375
BBC WAC Op cit

103
 debates and putting questions to studio guests, the Post Office were
reluctant. Gillard was determined to keep pressing for it.376
Another form of access would be to allow minority groups and local
figures on to programmes to put their arguments or cases forward, a kind of
„Hyde Park Corner of the Air.‟377 Again, guidance might be needed on how
to distinguish those sects which were mainstream and reputable from those
who were not. This is just one example, but it demonstrated that the BBC
had still not got a clear concept of how the issue of genuine access to its
airwaves was going to work in practice.
It was also apparent from the outset that local broadcasting required new
ways of working, both inside the studio and outside. One of the great
innovations was the way announcers might operate the broadcast desk
themselves, or „self-op‟ as it came to be known. This meant developing
alternative equipment and designing studios that could accommodate this.
The other aspect of production was having ready access to portable tape
recorders and – a very exciting and important acquisition – using a radio
car. The use of mobile broadcast units was familiar in the Regional centres,
but there was recognition of the potential for a modified version that could
be used in every local station as a means of achieving quick, direct contact
with the audience. Some argued that there was no need for a radio car if
there was a tape recorder to hand, but Gillard pointed out that the car
brought immediacy to an event, even if it sounded rough around the
edges.378 Norwich provided good examples of how the equipment helped
produce the type of output they were looking for. The radio car was sent to
report from the Milk Marketing Board in Night Call although an interview at a
motor factory was thought to be too long.379 In the London experiment, it
was pointed out that although the radio car was a great asset, it had to add

376
BBC WAC Op cit
377
BBC WAC Op cit Gillard drew the line at some religious groups, commenting, possibly with
tongue slightly in cheek: „Few Station Managers would want to open up their facilities to rabid-
hot gospellers who flourish in every city by making outrageously emotional appeals on
vulnerable citizens of limited intelligence.‟
378
BBC WAC Op cit
379
BBC WAC Memo from A W Coysh to head of Midlands Regional Programmes Subject
Local Broadcasting Exercise: Norwich 20 June 1961 Local Radio Experiments 1961
R102/52/1 Vol I

104
 value to the story. So there was no point reporting from the site of the
Queen‟s visit after she had left.380
Similarly, although portable recorders themselves were not an
innovation, by equipping each experiment with them and providing training
for all the reporters, it meant that a 20-minute feature about a local event
could be recorded in the morning, edited and played out in the lunchtime
slot. The unique aspect was the way staff themselves proved adept at all
these requirements: moving from typewriter, to „panel‟ operation (the desk)
and then to the radio car. The early stations made provision for a studio
manager to operate the desk and for an engineer to go out with the reporter
in the radio car but it quickly became apparent that these operations could
be managed solo and the staff put to better use elsewhere.381 Commenting
on the Norwich experiment, A W Coysh said „This is the kind of local
broadcasting all rounder we must try to find or breed.‟382
Gradually the studio layout evolved to include two desks – one intended
for self-operation, one for assisted use. The other technical consideration
could not actually be tested out as part of the trials: that of using
wavelengths and frequencies. But the trials did demonstrate that there was
interest in traffic and travel updates, particularly in London, which meant a
potential audience could listen in their cars. That would require a MW
frequency for a station, given that there were so few car radios equipped
with VHF. This and the slowness of domestic VHF penetration made Gillard
begin to wonder about getting a supplementary service on MW, at least in
the daytime for the urban stations.383

380
BBC WAC Report from Robert Gunnell to HOB(s) Subject: The London Experiment March
1962 Local Radio Experiments London 1962 R34/1644/1
381
BBC WAC Memo from CWR to DSB Subject Radio Bristol March 28 1961 Local Radio
Experiments 1961 R102/52/1 Vol I and also Report from Topicality Producer Midland Region
to Head of Midland Regional Programmes undated Local Radio Experiments 1961 R102/52/1
Vol I Feedback from the Stoke experiment suggested solo operation for the radio car, unless
it was a woman: „problems with handling long lengths of cable might arise‟.
382
BBC WAC Memo from A W Coysh to head of Midlands Regional Programmes Subject
Local Broadcasting Exercise: Norwich 20 June 1961 Local Radio Experiments 1961
R102/52/1 Vol I
383
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
only one in three or one in four homes having a VHF receiver by 1964

105
 Station locations
Related to the question of frequencies was the whereabouts of the stations
themselves. In his interim report, Gillard went into considerable detail,
discussing how stations could be broken down into sub-divisions of urban,
area and rural types.384 Up to a point the experiments had attempted to
cover these different station definitions. It is also noticeable that trials took
place in Wales and Scotland. The exercises in Dundee and Swansea were
useful as urban locations and Llyn Ac Afrom brought up issues around a
rural site with interesting language and identity issues. At this point there
was no discussion of whether they fitted into the English local blueprint or
whether they deserved separate consideration given their own national
identity. There were putative plans for experiments in Londonderry and
Belfast after the Merseyside trial but nothing came of them.385
By the time of the final evaluation of all the experiments, Gillard
advocated creating eight stations in England in the first year. He said these
should represent a diversity in terms of urban, rural, industrial and so on,
but also be centres with potential for good local broadcasting that could be
established quickly. Gillard suggested a good geographic spread of
stations around the country, with one near London. A list of the first stations
would include Bristol, Norwich and Sheffield, with Dundee, Wrexham and
the Medway Towns as a follow up.386 However discussions about locations
concentrated largely on technical and geo-physical attributes. In the Interim
Report, it was only Para 30 (out of 32) that finally tackled the concept of
community. Gillard shied away from actually defining it, preferring instead to
„enunciate‟ what it might be [my italics]. He suggested enlisting the help of
geographers and sociologists like Dudley Stamp and Lewis Mumford. From
a layman‟s perspective, community might arise from common industry,
commerce or communications. Sometimes it was apparent where local

384
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
385
BBC WAC Report by DSB October – December 1961 3 January 1962 Board of Governors‟
Papers R1/98/1
386
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Committee Interim Report 21 June 1962
R102/71/1

106
 newspapers were distributed. Where a sense of community was lacking,
local broadcasting, said Gillard, should help to unify it.387
Ironically perhaps it was the problems faced by defining community in
London that forced executives to pay more attention to the diversity of the
audience. P A Findlay, Secretary of the Local Broadcasting Committee,
thought that there were two conditions to be met in defining community.
Most of the audience must spend their time living or working in that
community and it should be of such a scale that the population are familiar
with the events and places talked about on air.388 This was difficult to
establish in London but it could not be left out of the project. Findlay thought
it might also be possible to target certain groups of interest, such as market
traders, City business, the Port of London and so on.389
Gillard had originally envisaged a different blueprint, working from a
central location in the heart of London but then devolving to smaller satellite
stations around the boroughs.390 Another Committee member wrote to D‟A
Marriott that there was plenty of cultural diversity to explore in London, but
was it genuine local broadcasting or a sub-region? „It needed the war to
display that under the surface London is a heap of villages and full of the
richest and most fascinating human stories in the country.‟391 Postgate
argued that the way to deal with this effectively was to find items with
universal rather than parochial interest, for example vandalism in
Tottenham should be interesting for councils all over London whereas shop
prices in Richmond were not.
This is a critical point. Notions of community and aspirations of how local
broadcasting might reflect this are hard to find in the experiments. This may
be partly because it was a practice-based exercise, where the focus was
internalized within the BBC and since no one heard the output, it was hard
to connect with the real audience. Certainly from the perspective of those

387
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
388
BBC WAC Memo from P A Findlay to Members of the Local Broadcasting Committee
Subject: Local Broadcasting in London 23 March 1962 Local Radio Experiments London
1962 R34/1644/1
389
BBC WAC Op cit
390
BBC WAC Minute 3 of the Local Broadcasting Committee 20 December 1961 Ibid
391
BBC WAC Memo from R S Postgate to ADSB Subject: Reflections on the Radio London
Experiment undated. Local Radio Experiments London 1962 R34/1644

107
 working on it, it was more to do with their work experience than a
sociological experiment, as Michael Barrett said:
„Most people believed, I think it‟s true to say, that local radio
was just a joke. It would never happen. Who wanted it, for
goodness sake? For me it was a great experience – it was a
chance to break new ground, to learn more……about broadcasting
in a way that hadn‟t happened yet.‟392

So ideals about community-access and connections were taking longer

to formulate and were much harder to evaluate. Indeed, in some quarters of
the BBC there were still doubts about the validity of local broadcasting.
Richard D‟A Marriott was one, for example, who expressed caution after the
Bristol trial, but by the second, in Portsmouth, said „I confess I took to it a
little easier this time.‟393 But he did want to remind everyone how
controversial this kind of programming would be. He envisaged so many
letters of complaint, queries and calls that the legal department in London
might have to be strengthened. Even if this kind of sentiment was intended
as prevarication, Gillard took it on board and incorporated questions of
policy and regulation in his plans.
One example was the role of the advisory council, which would be
critical.394 Their inclusion had not been a firm commitment up to this point
(November 1961) but the Association of Municipal Councils was keen on
them, particularly as a vehicle for local authority representation. Gillard
envisaged the council as having representatives from walks of local, civic
and municipal life. Their brief would be to advise the local Station Manager
on general issues but not specific programme content. There would also be
an advisory committee for education, religious matters, and even one for
keeping an eye on naming commercial brands.395

392
BBC Radio Four: Archive Hour „Close to Home‟ 10 November 2007
393
BBC WAC Memo from ADSB to CWR Radio Portsmouth undated Local Radio
Experiments 1961 R102/52/1 Vol I
394
BBC WAC Local Radio Local Broadcasting Interim Report 14 November 1961 R102/72/1
395
Several of the pilot programmes had thrown up the issue of naming products and retailers
on air (eg the Durham experiment), which was not permissible under current practice and this
needed reviewing. Gillard also suggested each station record their daily output on a reel-to-
reel recorder set to the lowest speed, for legal checks.

108
 The commercial experiment in Bristol
There was one trial that the BBC did not conduct: it was an experiment by
one of the commercial companies also interested in local broadcasting,
South Western Broadcasting Ltd in Bristol who produced their own dummy
station in March 1961, and it makes an interesting comparison with the
BBC‟s efforts. The press release announcing Britain‟s „first ever
independent local radio programme‟ promised a station with news, topical
programmes and entertainment.396 The two attractions advertised were „top
stars of showbusiness‟ provided by a company called Commercial Radio
(London) Ltd and a news service provided by another London company,
Independent Radio News Ltd.397 The actual experiment took place on 30
March, only eight days after the BBC‟s own Bristol trial, and the Archive
contains a document from Gillard with his observations and comments.398
Compared to the BBC‟s Bristol trial, this was certainly ambitious. Instead of
three hours of original programmes, SWB were aiming for 20 hours a
day.399 In fact large chunks of this trial were recorded music, including eight
straight hours of discs. There were „packaged‟ programmes too, which
featured show business artists such as Charlie Drake and Eartha Kitt
promoting their latest appearance or record. Other proposed programmes
included a daily serial about a Bristol family The Westons, Women’s Page,
Children’s Magazine and Leisure for Learning. Gillard thought the national
news was up to BBC standard although there was not any local follow up
from a radio car or live interviews.
Gillard‟s main critique concerned operational issues: the putative range
would be 25 miles, covering a population of 50,000. Ad revenue was
calculated at £3,500 per week, which even with a staff of 30 to 40 could
produce a considerable profit. The station would be broadcast on MW by
day and VHF by night. However Gillard thought that there would not be a
big enough VHF audience to satisfy advertisers and SWB had not factored
in hidden costs like using records. „Unfortunately these points are unlikely to
396
BBC WAC Press Statement from South Western Broadcasting Limited 23 January 1961
Local Radio Experiments 1961 Vol I R102/52/1
397
BBC WAC memo from CWR to DSB Subject: SWB local commercial radio demo 2 April
1962 BBC WAC Local Radio Experiments 1961 Vol I R102/52/1
398
BBC WAC Op cit
399
BBC WAC Op cit „enough to stagger anyone who knows his Bristol!‟ commented Gillard

109
 spring to the minds of lay observers and we shall have to work very hard to
make them known‟ he wrote.400
So it is very clear that the BBC was determined to lobby hard for its own
case and exploit the weaknesses of their opposition. But it is interesting that
more was not made here about the obvious difference - indeed flaw - with
the SWB station: that it did not seem to be very local. The music, the
entertainment, even the news provision were all London-focused.
Arguments concerning community provision and the public-service nature of
the BBC‟s proposals needed to be put across more clearly – and it was
these kinds of issues that might well have appealed to the „lay observer‟
more readily.

Critical reaction
Although the closed-circuit experiments were not broadcast, they were still
used as a means of publicity. Journalists were invited to come and sit in on
some of the trials, and listen to output – either „live‟ or to edited highlights. It
was a balancing act though, as the BBC was aware of the risk of generating
too much interest and excitement when the experiment might have come to
nothing. Also, there was no guarantee of positive coverage. Reporting from
the Stoke trial, The Times felt that „the day has been a mixture of the good
and the abysmal in entertainment, with the topical news and the discussions
emerging as by far the most satisfactory.‟401 Commenting on the Durham
station, The Guardian noted that a light music programme was interrupted
to bring news from the magistrates‟ court in Durham where the Chair of the
Bench told four drunken men they were „not welcome in this respectable
city‟. This had more than a hint of the „parish pump‟ about it but then it
conceded „it would be presumptuous of outsiders to criticise such
material.‟402
By the time of the London experiment the BBC was more aware of the
risks of allowing the press too much access. It was thought that journalists
had misrepresented individual items from previous experiments so Gillard

400
BBC WAC Op cit
401
The Times „Mixed results in Potteries radio test: is there enough material?‟ 20 October
1961
402
The Guardian „Dummy run for radio Durham: propaganda and Pilkington‟ 16 January 1962

110
 suggested they be confined to a tour of facilities and the chance to hear
extracts after the trial had finished.403 The BBC may have had cause to be
anxious. The Guardian gave negative coverage, hoping „the government
and the Pilkington Committee [would not] succumb to the brainwashing
they‟re being given by Portland Place.‟404 Meanwhile Marsland Gander in
the Daily Telegraph worried that there would be too much duplication with
the sustaining services. However he did enjoy the energy and bustle of the
London experiment, which reminded him of 2LO forty years earlier. 405
One way of guaranteeing good coverage was to contribute to the debate,
such as a piece Gillard wrote for The Listener on the eve of the London
experiment.406 The article rehearsed many of the arguments that were
becoming familiar about local broadcasting and the interest in local affairs.
He was also honest about the problems of a London station in terms of
coverage and remit and suggested more than one experiment might be
necessary to work out the answers. There was a list of many of the usual
programme ideas with specific emphasis on the merits of municipal
participation and citizenship. He concluded:
„Such a service, friendly, reliable in the closest touch with
people‟s daily lives and interests, run as a genuine partnership
between broadcasters and the community…would surely become a
highly acceptable new element in British broadcasting and greatly
enrich local life wherever it could be introduced.‟407

The sentiments and aspirations were familiar and there was certainly a
public relations dimension to Gillard‟s motives. But it is interesting that
although the BBC was by this point half way through the experiments, it was
not publicly addressing the lessons or sharing its evaluation. So phrases
like „a genuine partnership between broadcasters and the community‟ could
be interpreted as platitudes with no real concrete examples to back them
up.

403
BBC WAC Memo from ADSB to HP Subject: Local Broadcasting Exercises London 11
January 1961 Local Radio Experiments London 1962 R34/1644/1 HOB(s) also secured
permission for a „temporary hospitality cabinet‟ to entertain external visitors.
404
The Guardian „London‟s Own Radio‟ 15 February 1962
405
Daily Telegraph „The Spirit of 2LO Again‟ by Marsland Gander 19 February 1962
406
The Listener „A New Dimension in Radio‟ by Frank Gillard 15 February 1962 pp 299 - 301
407
The Listener op cit

111
 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that during this period, the BBC as an
organisation was marshalling its evidence and putting forward its case to
run local broadcasting with a logical and nuanced approach. The data
demonstrates how the BBC‟s ideas behind local broadcasting evolved, and
how it became aligned to a very public commitment to it. It was able to rely
on concepts of public service broadcasting and the BBC‟s own heritage and
tradition of serving local audiences. The BBC began to write its own
historiography, constructing a narrative to posit the Corporation‟s de facto
right to run local broadcasting. This was used to strengthen the BBC‟s
arguments against allowing commercial operators to run the service but as
press coverage demonstrated, that debate was by no means won.
The Pilkington Committee gave the BBC the perfect vehicle to present its
case, in terms of a discursive, interrogative forum. Gillard‟s idea of playing
the Committee extracts of what the service might sound like was a
masterstroke, and he clearly worked very hard at persuading the members
of the value of local broadcasting. The problem, however, was whether the
reality of the experiments (which will be examined below) actually met with
the theoretical notions that the BBC had based its strategy on.
The closed-circuit experiments were an unprecedented exercise at the
BBC. They involved large numbers of staff and took up significant resources
– not so much in capital terms but in human resources and staff hours. So it
was a sign of the Corporation‟s commitment to the idea of local
broadcasting, both internally and externally. As I have demonstrated from
the evidence, it was genuinely experimental in the way the trial stations
explored as many aspects of the enterprise as was practicable, from
location to scheduling, from staffing to production techniques.
First, from a practical perspective, Gillard‟s evaluations made a very
good job of gathering vast quantities of data, feedback and audio, and
turning these into logical conclusions with recommendations. There was
definitely a tendency to accentuate the positive, but this was in the context
of learning lessons and finding solutions to problems. These were, however,
for internal consumption: the BBC was wary of making their findings public,

112
 except in the context of pressing their case to bodies like the Pilkington
Committee. Secondly, however, there were some key omissions. In terms
of content, the educational programming in the trials was not generally
considered satisfactory and the files show a level of disagreement and
tension between the internal stakeholders at the BBC. Gillard still managed
to produce some positive proposals but there was not sufficient practical
evidence to base this on. Thirdly, it was difficult to assess, accurately, what
the demand might be and whether people could actually listen, if the service
used VHF exclusively. There were doubts creeping in, and Gillard certainly
began to think about MW as a daytime support, in internal documents, but
this was not stated publicly.
Finally, the whole notion of what defined a community was very difficult
to gauge. The experiments generated a broad and useful range of
programmes but these could only be evaluated in terms of production
standards. There was no mechanism to address whether they really met a
demand and how a station could „greatly enrich local life wherever it could
be introduced.‟408 Part of the problem was station size and location: what
kind of area was the optimum in order to achieve sufficiently detailed local
coverage without alienating parts of the audience? The closed-circuit
experiments could not accurately judge this, except in the case of London,
which was readily acknowledged to be too big. Linked to this issue was the
concept of access and representation. The deployment of the radio car and
roving reporters with portable recorders helped to produce immediacy and
connection with the audience, by taking the station out to them. Conversely,
however, there was no means for allowing the audience into the station, to
create their own output and reflect their own interests and ideas, apart from
the education programmes cited above.

408
The Listener „A New Dimension in Radio‟ by Frank Gillard 15 February 1962 pp 299 - 301

113
 CHAPTER SIX: 1962 – 1966:
Pirates and White Papers
The Pilkington Committee’s Report

The period from July 1962 to the end of 1966 marked a key transition.
Within the BBC, policy was formulated and resources were put in place that
meant that the BBC could launch a service of local broadcasting. But it was
reliant on getting permission from the government and on securing a
satisfactory financial provision – and neither of these was certain.
In fact a great deal depended on external factors that the BBC had no
control over. Political ideology and the manifesto intentions of the political
parties played a crucial role. In October 1964 a Labour government came to
power, which changed the political landscape, most notably with the
appointment of Tony Benn as Postmaster General (until July 1966). Benn‟s
thoughts and actions had a considerable impact on discussions around
local broadcasting, to which the BBC had to respond in its own debates and
decisions.
The arguments for a different system of local broadcasting, organized
and financed along commercial lines, re-appeared in this period with a
reinvigorated lobby. Finally there were factors that could not be foreseen,
which had an eventual impact on the evolution of sound broadcasting in the
UK. The arrival of pirate radio stations, transmitting offshore, made a crucial
contribution to public demand and expectation of radio choice. So the key
questions are: when can it be said that local broadcasting became a
certainty? How and when did the BBC become the choice to organize and
run the service? To what degree can the BBC‟s dominance in this field be
seen as a culmination of the work over the previous few years?

Throughout the spring of 1962 there was a growing anticipation about the
Pilkington report. The BBC‟s experimental stations were ongoing, with more
trials planned into the summer. The archival files suggest that preparations
for a positive outcome were being made. For instance there were
discussions about whether the BBC was making enough provision for staff

114
 training, if they got the go-ahead.409 The Local Broadcasting Committee
drew up a list of proposed first stations, in consultation with the Regions.410
Wellington also made it clear that even if the decision was favourable, there
was much work still to be done.411 The report was much delayed and finally
came out on 27 June 1962. Pilkington summarized the proposal they had
received for local broadcasting as providing a transmitting station for „any
community of sufficient size and with a recognizable identity.‟412 This would
be served by VHF, with a range of about 5 miles, making 200 stations in all
for complete UK coverage. However the report did not go into any detail
about defining „community‟ or „local‟, which mirrored the low priority of the
issue from the BBC‟s side too. The Committee accepted that they found
„little evidence of significant, spontaneous public demand‟ for local
broadcasting. But – in a crucial statement –
„if people do not know that they are missing, they cannot be said
not to want it. We have, therefore, to consider what they might be
missing: that is the nature and character of the service
proposed.‟413

The report then weighed up the pros and cons of a BBC local
broadcasting service and one run on commercial lines. If it was the latter,
there would need to be a regulatory body, but there was an „organic defect‟
here, referring to what they perceived as flaws in the relationship between
the Independent Television Authority and the television companies, and so
they did not believe one body could adequately listen to and regulate this
number of stations.414
Given the range of submissions, there was an „overwhelming mass of
disinterested opinion‟ against commercial radio415 and they also concluded
that ending the BBC‟s sound monopoly would just create another one, in
the realm of local broadcasting. Pilkington‟s conclusion was that

409
BBC WAC Report by the Director of Sound Broadcasting January – March 1962 28 March
1962 R1/98/3
410
BBC WAC Report by the Director of Sound Broadcasting April – June 1962 27 June 1962
R1/98/5
411
BBC WAC Op cit
412
Home Office Report of the Committee on Broadcasting 1960 (Cmnd 1753 HMSO 1962) p
221
413
Home Office Op cit
414
Home Office Op cit
415
Home Office Op cit

115
 „one service, and one service only of local sound broadcasting
should be planned; it should be provided by the BBC and it should
be financed by licence fee revenue; and that the frequencies
available should be so deployed as to enable it to be provided for
the largest possible number of distinctive communities.‟ 416

Because of the delay in publication Briggs says that the government had
already drafted its White Paper response.417 The first White Paper came out
a week after Pilkington, on 4 July, and it was described as an „interim‟
document and reserved judgment on many of the issues in the report.
Regarding local broadcasting, it stated „the government will take cognizance
of public reaction before reaching a decision.‟418 This was widely interpreted
as a stalling strategy. The Guardian said that the argument about public
demand was „specious‟: the same could be said about the second BBC
television channel, which the government had accepted.419
The BBC‟s immediate reaction was one of reflection. The Board of
Governors struck a note of cautious optimism when it said publicly that „the
internal Local Broadcasting Committee will be kept in being. There is a
great deal of information that still needs to be digested against the time
when it may be possible to go ahead with the BBC‟s plan.‟420 Internally it
had to be accepted that this was a disappointing set back. The General
Advisory Council was told that the BBC budget made no provision for local
broadcasting as there was no imminent decision from the government.421
The fact that the BBC‟s proposals had been very favourably endorsed by
Pilkington was some consolation and the Board of Management recognized
the hard work that everyone involved in the trials had contributed to the
project.422

416
Home Office Op cit p 232
417
Briggs Vol V ibid Chapter Five
418
Home Office White Paper (Cmnd 1770 HMSO 1962)
419
The Guardian „Sound Radio‟ by Ian Rodger 7 July 1962 Fred Mulley MP for Park Sheffield
wrote in his local paper that whereas the Pilkington Report was 342 pages, the White Paper
only amounted to 12: Pilkington was a well written „social document‟ whereas the White
Paper was not. Sheffield Telegraph „Westminster Commentary: A Disappointing Decision on
Local Broadcasting‟ 9 July 1962
420
BBC WAC Paper G85.2 13 July 1962 Board of Governors Papers R1/98/3
421
BBC WAC Draft General Advisory Council Memo 19 September 1962 Board of Governors
Papers op cit
422
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 23 July 1962 R2/15/1

116
 The only glimmer of hope was the suggestion that the government would
listen to public response on local broadcasting. The BBC duly provided
evidence for this to the Post Office. A letter from the Director-General to Sir
Ronald German at the GPO set out the background to the 16 experimental
stations, and dwelt on the known public response – although it was
acknowledged that the output was not broadcast.423 The kind of evidence
cited here mainly concerned local dignitaries, elected officials,
administrators and so on, who were invited to listen to the trials at each
town. As the experiments had progressed, Hugh Greene noted that more
and more communities had contacted the BBC asking to be included. There
were other examples of public support too: the Extra Mural Department of
Nottingham University organized a conference in November 1962 at which
200 people from a range of organizations heard Frank Gillard speak on
behalf of the BBC. He noted that a resolution in favour of public service
local radio was accepted by an overwhelming majority and this was passed
on to to the PMG and Nottingham MPs.424 However none of this evidence
made an impact on the government.
A further White Paper in December 1962 effectively put paid to any
hopes of local broadcasting in the short term, saying it would „later review
the situation in the light of other developments in broadcasting,‟ although it
did not discount a „possible latent demand for local sound services.‟425 In a
written House of Commons answer the following spring, the Postmaster
General (Bevins) said „I am bound to say that since the publication of the
White Paper there has been precious little evidence of any demand for
these services.‟426
Despite the profile of the issue over the preceding few years, local
broadcasting largely disappeared from the agenda for most of 1963, at least
from the public‟s point of view. One major change occurred within the BBC.
In the summer of 1963, Wellington retired as Director of Sound
Broadcasting and Frank Gillard moved from the West Region to take over,
423
BBC WAC Letter from DG to Sir Ronald German 9 August 1962 Local Broadcasting
Papers 1961 – 1964 R78/607
424
BBC WAC Report by DSB October – December 1962 1 January 1963 Board of Governors
Papers R1/99/1
425
Home Office White Paper (Cmnd 1893 HMSO 1962)
426
Hansard House of Commons Debate 12 March 1963

117
 with R D‟A Marriott continuing at Assistant DSB. Gillard‟s in tray included
various practical implications for sound broadcasting that the government‟s
White Paper had given the go ahead for, such as extending the hours of
network broadcasting.427 But local broadcasting was not far from his
thoughts. The severe winter of 1963 had reinforced the potential that
localized broadcasting might fulfill. The West Region had responded as well
as it could, despite its geographical size, to provide a public service of
information and support and as a means of broadcasting people‟s stories
and calls for help.428 This function would become one of the core attributes
for local radio in the future.

The BBC gets ready

Based on the evidence in the Archive, I would argue that BBC activity
around local broadcasting never entirely ceased. There were periods when
energy subsided and it appeared to fall off the main agenda but it never
disappeared. On becoming Director of Sound Broadcasting, Gillard
prompted a more wide-ranging review of various key aspects of the local
broadcasting plans.429 The financial costs were reassessed, given that the
impact of inflation needed to be added since the Memorandum to
Pilkington. The shift in attitude towards using MW, which was identified
during the experiments, became more pronounced and the Post Office‟s
response to this idea was sought.430 The locations for the first stations were
also re-addressed - with an added emphasis on locations with potential for
educational work.431
There were also two key internal papers in this period, both appearing
towards the end of 1964. The Development of Local Radio dealt with what it
called „local independence under BBC control‟, in other words, how local

427
BBC WAC Report by DSB June – August 1963 17 August 1963 Board of Governors
Papers R1/99/6
428
BBC WAC Report by DSB December 1962 – February 193 12 March 1963 Board of
Governors Papers R/99/1
429
BBC WAC Report from DSB May – July 1964 21 July 1964 Board of Governors Papers
R1/100/6
430
There is no indication of an immediate response but by November 1964 Gillard thinks that
the PO have ruled out MW for local broadcasting BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes
23 November 1964 quoted in Local Radio Policy 1964 – 1968 R102/73/1
431
BBC WAC Minutes of the Board of Management 25 May 1964 R2/17/2

118
 radio could be run by the BBC but at the same time preserving the right
degree of independence.432 The paper outlined the attributes and working
practices for the Station Managers and the autonomy they would have in
scheduling, administration and station operation. However they would still
be required to enlist as much support as possible from their community by
being „courageous in making airtime available to appropriate local
interests.‟433 Editorial control, however, remained with the Station Manager,
and therefore the BBC. The advisory council structure was restated,
although simplified slightly from previous models, with one general output
council and one for educational broadcasting. There was a crucial
difference between the remit for these two councils. The educational council
would play a bigger role in programme making and prescribing the extent
and range of educational output on the station. The general advisory
council‟s remit was harder to define: it certainly would not have executive
powers but it would be a forum to discuss programme issues and
controversies. The report concluded by proposing a broad-based pilot
scheme on VHF, with nine stations in a range of locations, covering
conurbations, medium-sized towns, small cities, rural areas and so on. One
key statement was introduced here which cropped up in public
communications subsequently. Since the stations would not be playing pop
music, they would not attract huge audiences to start with and so „wildfire
success should not be expected.‟434 Minutes of the Board of Governors
show that this paper resulted from discussions between Gillard, the
Director-General, the Chairman of Governors and the new PMG, Tony
Benn and that this document was intended for Ministerial attention.435
Aspects of this and the second paper, The Control of Local Broadcasting,
were familiar and can trace their roots back to earlier documents, such as
the Memorandum sent to Pilkington. But they had also been updated to
take into account new circumstances. For example, The Control of Local
Broadcasting looked at the various different models of how local radio might

432
BBC WAC Paper: The Development of Local Radio 26 November 1964 Board of
Governors Papers R1/100/7
433
BBC WAC Op cit
434
BBC WAC Op cit
435
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 8 December 1964 R1/32/1

119
 be financed and organized.436 But now that pirate radio had arrived, Gillard
could argue that this kind of output would be what commercial stations
would sound like. There were the familiar arguments about costs, and how
commercial stations underestimated the „extras‟, such as administration,
central support services and sustaining output, which the BBC could
provide at no extra burden. Gillard called into question whether these
stations would capture enough listeners to raise sufficient ad revenue. The
next model was familiar too - that of a public authority, non-BBC station.
This arose because some argued that the BBC was too monolithic and too
centralized. So the alternative would be to license independent bodies such
as local authorities or universities or combinations of groups. However the
financial arrangements were not clear. Could the revenue be raised by
advertising, but with a „not for profit‟ objective? It might be possible to raise
funds by subscription or grant but Gillard did not think sufficient moneys
would be available at that time. He called into question how a municipal-run
station could be impartial or independent, which was why the Association of
Municipal Corporations had always supported the BBC‟s plans for local
radio. Stations on the rates, Gillard said „are just as crazy as would be the
thought of a local newspaper supported from a municipal exchequer.‟ 437
Finally he explored the BBC Local Radio model: note that the word
„radio‟ was being used more and more from this point onwards. Here he
incorporated some of the discussion from The Development of Local Radio
by emphasizing how BBC-run stations would not be totally independent but
could have a high degree of autonomy, under the auspices of the Station
Manager and the advisory council structure. Gillard stressed how the use of
local input and support made it „our station‟ not a „BBC station.‟438 He asked
the Board of Management to consider, on reading this paper, whether it
might be possible for a non-BBC station run by a local body to use BBC
material; to revisit the terms that might be needed for the Station Manager‟s
autonomy and what the machinery could be for local participation in running
a station.

436
BBC WAC Paper: The Control of Local Broadcasting 18 November 1964 Local Radio
Policy 1964 – 1968 R102/73/1
437
BBC WAC Op cit
438
BBC WAC Op cit

120
 My interpretation of the documents is that they demonstrated a clear line
of progression from the issues that arose during the closed-circuit
experiments, with Gillard and BBC management further enunciating their
strategy for how local radio might work in practice. The papers were
important because they grappled with concepts surrounding representation,
audience access, finance and the various stakeholders. Yet it was
debatable whether the BBC had found concrete solutions to the problems
these posed.

External interests
As discussed above, there were moments when events and factors
emanating from outside the BBC acted as stimuli to the debate.
One of these was the area of education. This emerged in 1963 through
conversations and correspondence between Harold Wilson, then Leader of
the Opposition, and the Director-General about the potential for local
broadcasting and education.439 Then towards the end of December 1963,
Bevins sounded out in the House of Commons the idea that local
broadcasting could play a role in adult education provision. Gillard
acknowledged this was „as unexpected as it was gratifying‟ 440 and admitted
that the experiments had not given as much prominence to this as they
might but in hindsight there was great potential. He ordered a re-
examination of plans for local broadcasting, including staffing and
equipment to allow for more adult education output; calculations were made
for the cost of equipment and resources, and discussions were arranged
with educational bodies and possible partners, to share the cost.441
Thoughts around how this educational potential could be harnessed were
aired in two articles written for the Yorkshire Post in December of that year,
to coincide with Parliamentary debates about the licence fee and the BBC

439
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 21 October 1963 R2/16/3
440
BBC WAC Report by DSB September – December 1963 1 January 1964 Board of
Governors Papers 1964 R1/100/1 See also Board of Management Minutes 9 December
1963: an informal conversation between DSB and Dennis Lawrence of the Post Office
confirmed that the „current‟ education debate was the most effective argument for local
broadcasting.
441
BBC WAC Op cit

121
 Charter.442 Hugh Greene‟s piece, „Universities of the Air‟, started from the
basis that there had been a shift in educational expectations since
Pilkington, and proposed a rather radical idea, that the government allow
the BBC to have six trial stations in places with higher and adult education
support. During the day, the stations would carry the kinds of output the
BBC had already outlined to Pilkington. By night, the service would carry
educational programmes on behalf of educational trustees, WEA,
universities and so on.443 The following day, the Yorkshire Post carried an
article from Gillard, which expanded more on the local radio aspect of the
enterprise. Considering that the piece was being published in a regional
newspaper, it is interesting that there was a comment about how the service
would not be in competition with local papers but how they would work
together and complement each other.444
These articles were examples of how the BBC – and Gillard in particular
– continued the lobbying process, deftly refining their arguments to
changing circumstances. This lobbying also included appearances at
events and playing the tapes from the experiments. As the Leicester
University Report put it „he [Gillard] developed a familiar reputation from the
assiduity with which he cultivated the conference circuit of educational and
local government bodies.‟445
There was however an alternative voice whose activities gathered
momentum in the mid-1960s. The National Broadcasting Development
Committee [NBDC], which had campaigned for commercial television in the
1950s, started lobbying the Conservative government for permission to
carry out local commercial trials.446 The arrival of pirate radio stations such
as Radios Caroline and London added further weight to this impetus. As the
Observer put it, Radio Caroline re-ignited a debate about commercial radio,
which was seemingly dead and buried.447 The commercial lobby recognized
the popularity of these predominantly pop music stations, which highlighted
that there was a gap in the legitimate, on-shore market. Here was an
442
BBC WAC Op cit
443
Yorkshire Post „Universities of the Air‟ by Hugh Carleton Greene 10 December 1963
444
Yorkshire Post „Radio Station in Every City‟ by Frank Gillard 11 December 1963
445
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Ibid p 16
446
Sunday Times „The rest of the iceberg‟ 17 May 1964
447
Observer „Whose finger on the mike‟ [sic] by John Ardagh and Rudolf Klein 7 June 1964

122
 opportunity for free market enterprise and the press observed how the
opposing cases for local broadcasting had begun to coalesce along party
political lines.448
In fact pirate radio was a double-bind for the NBDC. It was proving very
popular but commercial companies had to be wary of stepping into their
shoes. They were trying to prove the case for an alternative to BBC local
broadcasting – but that did not mean pop music all day: it would not amount
to a local service. And it was also one of the key arguments the BBC had
against them – that pop music was the only way to maximize listeners to
raise advertising revenue – so another reason to distance themselves from
the pirate station model. There were also some who thought that pirate
radio was a good indicator of what local radio would be like. There was, as
Crisell points out, a local angle to the pirate stations: they adopted names
relating to locations, such as Radio Kent and Radio Essex, and publicised
local events and activities.449 Certainly the NBDC thought that Radio
Caroline exposed the metropolitan bias of the BBC.450 What most people
agreed on was that pirate radio proved there was a demand for pop music
among young listeners.451
As the 1964 General Election loomed, the best the BBC and the
commercial companies could get was a hint that a re-elected Conservative
Government might allow some limited trials in local broadcasting.452 At the
same time, the government sidestepped the issue of the pirates, saying
they needed to wait until the end of the year when a draft convention by the
Council of Europe would be ready, to co-ordinate action across international
waters.453 This was seen as prevarication by some commentators: a
„repugnant‟ holding statement, signifying a „clammy dead hand.‟454 On the
eve of the Election, The Times reported that the NBDC tried to establish the
viewpoint of each party on the issue of commercial local radio.455 The

448
Sunday Times „BBC to fight for its own local stations‟ 31 May 1964
449
Crisell A „Local Radio: attuned to the times or filling time with tunes?” in Franklin B and
Murphy D (eds) Local Journalism in Context (London: Routledge 1998) p 25
450
The Times 6 October 1964
451
Op cit
452
Daily Sketch „Bevins gives new hope for Home Town Radio‟ 3 June 1964
453
Op cit
454
The Economist „Unsound‟ 6 June 1964
455
The Times 6 October 1964

123
 Labour Party was firmly opposed, but did favour the rapid expansion of non-
profit making local broadcasting. The Conservative Party seemed
indecisive, preferring to consult all interested bodies on re-election. The
Liberal Party was in favour of local broadcasting, and not all of it
commercial.
An article in the Observer by John Ardagh and Rudolf Klein posed one of
the pivotal questions: „is local broadcasting desirable because it provides a
means of reaching a new mass audience or because it is a way of satisfying
minority interests?‟456 After weighing up the advantages and disadvantages
of the two advocates for local radio, Ardagh and Klein suggested a middle
course, something that would guarantee independence, which the BBC
scored badly on, and guaranteed diversity without commercial pressures.
One option would be a partnership with local authorities and universities,
who could take advertising revenue. Or it might be possible to cap the
amount of dividends paid out to a commercial station, in the same way that
there was a maximum amount payable to shareholders in football teams.
They argued there were various permutations, but the crucial thing was to
exploit this new means of communication to the full.
This follows on from an earlier contribution in the Observer from Richard
Hoggart and Stuart Hall who also wanted to use this powerful tool in
broadcasting to best effect.457 However their view was wholly opposed to
commercial exploitation, put in very vivid terms. „Of course commercial
radio would pour out tripe all day. Most people seem to want tripe. Why
should OUR [their capitals] licence fee be used to provide it?‟458 The
problem as they saw it, was that the best forms of organization for mass
communication had not yet been found.
A radical third alternative from The Economist suggested the BBC carry
a pop music station on a national frequency, which carried advertising. The
revenue would be used for local stations. Commercial rivals would also be
granted licences, along with community services on a subscription basis.
These could be short-term licences and it would soon be clear if there were

456
Observer „Whose finger on the mike‟ [sic] 7 June 1964
457
Observer „Against Commercial Radio‟ letter from Richard Hoggart and Stuart Hall 31 May
1964
458
Op cit

124
 enough support for local radio, either BBC or commercial or community-
run.459

The Labour Governments

Harold Wilson took office in October 1964 and Tony Benn was appointed
Postmaster General. The next few months marked a noticeable rise in
expectation that there might be a breakthrough of some kind in local
broadcasting. Also in October, the NBDC reformed as the Local Radio
Association (LRA). Lewis & Booth argue that this was a tactical move by
supporters of commercial radio to distance themselves from the
Conservative Party, now in opposition, and from any hint of cosying up to
the illegal operations of the pirates. By inserting the word „local‟ into the
name, it reinforced notions of decentralization and neighbourhood.460 The
LRA began to lobby once more, urging the PMG to start a frequency
allocation plan for towns with a population over 50,000. Their submission
stressed that local commercial stations would not have a diet of pop
music.461 In early 1965, Gillard announced he was re-activating the Local
Broadcasting Working Party, headed by R D‟A Marriott. Its first task was to
review all the earlier reports and recommendations and bring them up to
date.462
Much of the new energy in the prospects for local broadcasting came
from Tony Benn. His diaries noted that the BBC was the top priority for
policy decisions that he asked his GPO directorate to look into, and one of
the key issues for the Corporation was local broadcasting.463 Compared to
the previous administration, Benn brought with him a whirlwind of ideas. He
was scathing about Reginald Bevins, his predecessor, who he described as
„part time in the job.‟464 There was certainly an air of stasis surrounding the
Conservative administration regarding local broadcasting. In a conversation
with Gillard in December 1963, Lawrence of the GPO said that local

459
The Economist „Unsound‟ 6 June 1964
460
Lewis & Booth ibid Chapter 6
461
Yorkshire Post „PMG heard case for local radio‟ 22 January 1965
462
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 12 January 1965 R2/18/1
463 Benn T Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963 – 1967 (London: Hutchinson 1967)
464
Benn Op cit p 173

125
 broadcasting had fallen by the wayside because the government could not
face up to the commercial issue.465
While a raised profile and sense of expectancy surrounding local radio
may have been welcomed by the BBC, it soon became clear that Benn had
some radical ideas which would not suit the Corporation. In fact in the next
two years there was a see-saw of fortunes and more than once it looked as
though local radio would be sanctioned as a commercial operation. Benn
saw the BBC finances as the main sticking point and he was keen to
explore alternative ways of raising revenue and ending the BBC‟s sound
monopoly.466 One can spot some of the tensions in exchanges such as
these from the Board of Management minutes. At a seminar in Birmingham,
Dennis Lawrence declined to give the GPO‟s position on local broadcasting,
which worried Gillard and made him think there were things going on behind
the scenes he was unaware of.467
At the heart of the debate was a clash of ideologies: Benn did not have
much respect for the BBC as an institution, which he called „wildly right
wing‟,468 so his interpretation of what a public service broadcaster should do
was at odds with the BBC‟s view of its role. Another diary entry criticised the
BBC for not growing and developing and accused it of letting the „rest of
broadcast outlets …go to crude commercial organizations.‟469 In May 1965
Benn proposed a review of sound broadcasting options. This posed yet
another delay for getting a decision. Gillard was reported in the press as
being disillusioned: „you begin to lose heart‟470 he said. However a hint of
Benn‟s intentions came in a Common‟s statement in May 1965: „If, as I
hope, broadcasting develops with a multiplicity of new channels and
stations, the problem of some form of real accountability will arise. It might
be necessary to create new institutions and authorities to meet this need.‟471

465
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 3 December 1963 R2/16/3
466
Benn ibid p 183; 191; 257
467
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 27 February 1965 R2/18/1 Lawrence
subsequently clarified that his reticence was merely Civil Service protocol, op cit 8 March
1965
468
Benn ibid p 183
469
Benn ibid p 410
470
Yorkshire Post „Setback for local broadcasting: government survey means delay‟ 18 March
1965
471
Daily Mail „Will the town halls tackle local radio?‟ by John Stevenson 17 May 1965

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 Benn was therefore interested by a proposal from Manchester City Council
in May 1965 for permission to run a local station. Gillard‟s reaction was
initially negative, quoted in the press as calling it „very dangerous‟ because
of the ambiguity over who would run the station and how to avoid party
political propaganda.472
But he overcame his reluctance and agreed to join Benn and others at a
meeting in Manchester to discuss it further. The antipathy to the BBC
stemmed from a perception that places like Manchester were not receiving
enough BBC coverage.473 According to the report Gillard gave the Board of
Management, the PMG outlined several scenarios: a BBC-run station, one
run by a commercial company and a third option, a local trust or
corporation. All of these would have been familiar to the Board, but Benn
went further when he talked about raising revenue from multiple sources,
and about the possibility of the BBC acting as a „publisher‟, sub-contracting
broadcasting time to an education authority or another body. He suggested
the BBC might build a station and then hand it over to a trust or local
authority. It was agreed that all parties would work up more details and that
the BBC would co-operate informally.474 Optimism rose again for the
prospect of local radio in the autumn of 1965. The Board of Management
discussed a paper outlining plans for nine experimental stations and talked
confidently of getting a long advance warning period: „an amber stage‟ and
„a green stage‟.475 Unbeknownst to the Board, at the beginning of
November the PMG was hoping to secure support at the Broadcast
Committee in the Cabinet Office for his plan for local broadcasting based on
non-profit making trusts with a special national advisory council.476 A report
in the Daily Express confirmed the speculation that there would be an
announcement on local radio in the New Year but no one knew how it was
to be financed or run.477
So in this period of great uncertainty it was with some justification that
the New Statesman pondered whether Gillard was fighting the wrong
472
Op cit
473
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 24 May 1965 R2/18/3
474
BBC WAC Op cit
475
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 18 October 1965 R2/18/4
476
Benn ibid p 342
477
Daily Express „Benn tunes into town radio plan‟ 17 December 1965

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 battle.478 The article painted a flattering portrait of the Director of Sound
Broadcasting, saying he „has all the charm of a successful and popular
sports master‟, and describing his reputation for executive brilliance and his
passion for local radio. It argued that there were „seismic indications‟ that
the BBC would not get local radio and that Benn would give it to the
commercial competitors. Gillard, it suggested, was not prepared for this
defeat. He should therefore concentrate on planning for national radio,
suggesting a pop station, or more light music programmes by day. The
battle as they saw it was to get „radio self-respect back before the
commercial rivals start.‟479
In the face of renewed supposition that commercial companies might be
awarded local radio in the spring of 1966, Hugh Greene proposed rallying
newspapers and MPs favourable to the BBC cause as in the days of
Pilkington.480 But the key to the solution for the BBC was buried in the New
Statesman piece: the PMG was becoming increasingly concerned with how
to replace pirate radio and looked to the BBC for an answer. If finance was
the problem, then he would push for advertising on BBC networks because
the government would not accept a licence fee increase. According to
Benn‟s diaries, the Director-General came to see him on 25 February and
accepted that the BBC could manage for two years without a licence fee
increase.481 This effectively put a stop to talk of advertising revenue on the
BBC.482 But at the same time, Hugh Greene was still voicing reluctance
about having a pop music station without some extra money to pay for it.
Shortly afterwards, the BBC set out their case for local broadcasting in
the pamphlet Local Radio in the Public Interest.483 There were several
objectives in mind. The first section, titled „Is it wanted?‟ argued that there

478
New Statesman „Have a go, Gillard‟ by Magnus Turnstile 1 January 1966 The author‟s
name was a nom de plume: Gillard responded to the article by asking him for a face-to-face
meeting. Board of Management Minutes 24 January 1966 R2/19/1
479
Op cit
480
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 3 January 1966 R2/19/1
481
Benn ibid p 393
482
Briggs ibid p 541 Briggs suggests that Harold Wilson knew all along that the Labour Party
was very divided over the issue anyway.
483
BBC Local Radio in the Public Interest: the BBC’s plan (London: BBC Publications,1966)
Although the author was anonymous, it was very likely to have been Gillard as it bore a close
resemblance to papers he had previously written. Eg BBC WAC Paper: The Control of Local
Broadcasting 18 November 1964 Local Radio Policy 1964 – 1968 R102/73/1

128
 was a need for local broadcasting. As Briggs points out, there was also a
discernible change in tone here, entrenching local radio more firmly in the
principles of public service broadcasting by emphasising the merits of
building and supporting local democracy.484 The pamphlet cited low
turnouts at elections and how community life could be „flabby and
underdeveloped.‟485 The argument for local radio was placed squarely
within the framework of the BBC‟s international, national and regional
obligations, which it had carried out successfully over the years. However,
with reference to the regions, „long experience of regional and area
broadcasting has convinced the corporation that a station addressing a
plurality of local groupings is continually at a serious disadvantage.‟486 This
document also painted the picture of the BBC‟s history and heritage in local
broadcasting, going back to the 1920s, so the inference was that the
Corporation had experience in this field, which commercial competitors did
not, and that if it was not for the technological problems of wavelength
congestion, the BBC would have continued with a local system rather than
the regional one that developed.
Subsequent sections addressed how the stations would sound, including
educational content, a mixture of speech with music from sustaining
services, public information programmes and those directed at immigrants.
Above all, they would not be „an amplified jukebox.‟487 Local radio could
also best serve the plurality of a diverse audience more effectively than
regional radio: „the basic purpose of a local station is not to reach the
maximum number of listeners regardless of all other considerations but
rather to give the fullest possible service to a community of people holding
the maximum number of interests in common.‟488
Indeed two sections were titled „our station‟ and „local participation‟, and
they underlined the autonomy that a station and its manager would have
from the larger organization and the opportunities for local involvement,
including the advisory council structure. Despite the invitation for

484
Briggs Vol V ibid p 632
485
‘Local Radio in the Public Interest’ ibid p 1
486
Op cit p 4
487
Op cit p 6
488
Op cit p 6

129
 community-made programmes, it was stressed that the station staff would
maintain editorial control over standards. This was a very confident
document, which was vigorous in its belief that the BBC should run local
broadcasting. Since the Pilkington Report had given the BBC its blessing,
the pamphlet spoke of waiting for the BBC to be „authorised‟ to run local
radio.489 The offer to run the nine pilots was similarly stated as an indication
of how confident the BBC was of its plan.
The pamphlet came out in the midst of a maelstrom of speculation,
claims and counter claim. Some press commentators were turning into „nay
sayers,‟ arguing that no one wanted local radio. An article in The Times said
there was little evidence of a need for it. The assumption was that people
were private and preferred to keep their lives to themselves: „they do not
want busybodies and bores busily working the parish pump or the parish
microphone.‟490 A further example of the fractious level of debate came with
a public discussion hosted by TRAC (the Television and Radio Committee)
at Caxton Hall in London on 24 February 1966. Gillard attended on behalf of
the BBC along with Roy Shaw, who was the Director of Extra Mural Studies
at the University of Keele, and Stuart Hall from the University of
Birmingham. John Gorst appeared for the Local Radio Association.
Press accounts of the meeting portrayed a mixed event with both sides
of the argument under fire. According to John Woodeforde in the Sunday
Telegraph, John Gorst did not make a convincing case for the commercial
alternative and the biggest applause came for a lady from the audience who
said there was no demand for local radio. Meanwhile in response to
Gillard‟s quote about the „serial story of everyday life‟, Woodforde wrote: „I
have nothing against serial stories but wonder what chance a civic, true one
would stand against even The Dales and The Archers.‟491 Gillard‟s own
account to the Board of Management was rather different, although he
concurred it was „an unhappy experience‟. From his perspective the
meeting was anti-BBC, packed with LRA supporters.492

489
Op cit p 1
490
The Times „The Parish Mike‟ [sic] 5 March 1966
491
Sunday Telegraph „Who wants local radio?‟ by John Woodeforde 27 February 1966
492
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 28 February 1966 R2/19/1

130
 To add to the uncertainty a General Election was called for 31 March,
which as Benn wrote in his diary, effectively postponed any decision on
local broadcasting.493 However, there was a feeling that local radio would
be introduced at some point, whoever won the election.494 In fact there was
an interesting distinction opening up: the „need‟ or case for local radio
emerged as different from the „demand‟ for the service. Commentators and
proponents could rightly claim that the case was proven, even if the
demand was not. Gillard could always fall back on this assertion that local
broadcasting would not be a „wildfire success,‟495 since it was acceptable for
a public service not to be motivated by earning the biggest audience. For
the LRA, this was more of a problem. An article by John Gorst in the
Financial Times in August 22 tried to steer a middle ground for commercial
local radio, arguing that the alternatives were unworkable.496 He sensed
that there was a groundswell in favour of non-profit making trusts, but these
organizations would still have to appeal to the biggest audience to get
sufficient revenue, which would undermine the whole principle. What was
crucial was setting up local radio on a workable basis, otherwise the
audience would not listen, the stations would fail and that would be the end
of it. As he saw it the biggest danger was „second rate programme
companies [chasing] third rate Station Managers with minority programmes
for non-existent audiences.‟497
There was a flurry of stories about commercial radio being introduced to
replace pirate stations in August498 but by November, a note in the Board of
Management Minutes said that an open meeting for the LRA had „fallen
rather flat.‟499 Several factors had emerged which began to change the
picture. At the end of June, Tony Benn was moved to the Ministry of
Technology and Edward Short became PMG. Towards the end of his

493
Benn ibid p 394
494
Eg The Guardian „White paper on radio‟ by Anne Duchene 5 March 1966
495
BBC WAC Paper: The Development of Local Radio 26 November 1964 Board of
Governors Papers R1/100/7
496
Financial Times „Who should operate local radio?‟ by John Gorst 22 August 1966
497
Op cit
498
Eg The Sun „Britain Gets 200 pop stations‟ 5 August 1966 The rumour was said to have
been started by Hugh Jenkins (MP Putney, Labour) according to Board of Management
Minutes 15 August 1966 R2/19/5
499
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 14 November R2/19/7

131
 tenure, Benn had stalled any decisions on local broadcasting, for example
rejecting the Manchester City Corporation proposals for their own station,
saying it was up to Parliament to decide the principles of local radio first.
The details of organization and finance were the priority.500 Edward Short
also deferred to the government review on broadcasting, but he dropped
hints that the government would certainly maintain the principles of public
service broadcasting in any proposals.501
In July 1966, the BBC was given private assurances that it would be
given permission to proceed with local radio, subject to details. A report
from Hugh Greene of a meeting with the PMG suggested that the exact
scale of the experiment, as it was being called, were to be decided, but
Manchester should be one of the locations, working in some kind of
partnership with the City Council.502 On 29 July, Hugh Greene wrote to the
Chairman, Lord Normanbrook, to inform him that the Ministerial Committee
on Broadcasting had confirmed the experiment, although there was
disagreement about how much control the PMG would have over names
nominated for the local broadcasting councils, as the advisory councils
would be known.503
What is not clear is how the stations would be paid for. The BBC had
publicly pledged in Local Radio in the Public Interest that they could finance
a local radio pilot without increasing the licence fee. From an ideological
point of view, the PMG was keen to involve local authorities as a means of
exploring the permutations of public body partnerships. This could also
extend to universities. So this left room for these authorities to contribute as
much finance as possible to the setting up of the stations. The exact details
would be published in the White Paper, but meanwhile the BBC started to
liaise with the Association of Municipal Councils about possible locations.
By November, the Director-General was able to write to H G Lillicrap,
Director of Radio Services at the GPO, to tell him of the timetable for the

500
The Guardian „Manchester Radio Off‟ 2 July 1966
501
The Times „Public service principles for local broadcasting‟ 7 July 1966 He made a similar
quote in October, according the Financial Times „More hints on local broadcasting‟ 27
October 1966
502
BBC WAC Report from DG on meeting with PMG 19 July 1966 Local Broadcasting Papers
1965-1968 R78/608/1
503
BBC WAC Letter from DG to Chairman 29 July 1966 R78/608/1 ibid

132
 first stations.504 Discussions were underway with the Town Clerk in
Manchester about estimated costs and sources of revenue but he pointed
out that there was a need to match the practicalities of broadcasting with
the financial support available in this and other locations.505 A further memo
to the GPO outlined the current estimates of costs, which stood at a capital
start-up of £30,000 – £35,000, depending on the transmission radius, and
operating costs of £53,000 per station. But the memo also pointed out that
revenue (ie running) costs started before the station went on air, which
spread the burden out, and there were also central charges to be
incorporated, such as music copyright payments, library charges and
training. Despite this, Gillard was confident „money will flow in.‟506
The timing of the White Paper was geared to the Marine Offences Bill,
which would outlaw pirate radio stations. But it was clear that local radio
was not the replacement. Even as far back as March, Tony Benn had
argued in a House of Commons debate that „if it is thought that by towing
Radio Caroline up the Manchester Ship Canal one has somehow met the
deep need for that great conurbation for a sense of communication between
different people in that area it is a mistake.‟507 The replacement for pirate
radio came about as a result of the reorganisation of the BBC‟s radio
networks, into Radios One, Two, Three and Four. The creation of local
radio was a by-product.
What was remarkable at this stage was that these discussions and
preparations are kept out of the public eye. A misleading report in The
Times in late November suggested that the government would propose a
network of 250 local stations run by public bodies which would take
advertising and be run by an independent radio authority, and would also
run a national pop channel.508 There were a few references in the Board of
Governors minutes and the meetings of the Board of Management to local
broadcasting, but these were mainly about further lobbying or gathering of

504
BBC WAC Letter from DG to H G Lillicrap 17 November 1966 R78/608/1 ibid Two stations
would go on air within nine months of the go ahead, and four more within 15 months
505
BBC WAC Letter from DG to H G Lillicrap 17 November 1966 op cit
506
BBC WAC Memo from DSB to H G Lillicrap 28 November 1966 R78/608/1 ibid
507
House of Commons Debate March 3 1966
508
The Times ‘Cabinet Plan for local radio stations‟ 29 November 1966

133
 supporters.509 Certainly the groundwork for local broadcasting was in place
by the time the White Paper was finally published on 20 December 1966.
This was the culmination of five years‟ debate and discussion that finally
made local broadcasting a reality. As a statement of intent, it included a
clear view of some aspects of the service. The government wanted it to be
genuinely „local‟ in character: it even quoted the relevant section from the
July 1962 White Paper, demonstrating a shared viewpoint with the
Conservative government.510 However the government believed that „this
objective is incompatible with commercial broadcasting‟ but they did not rule
out advertising as a way of raising revenue as long as public service
principles came first.511 The ideological concept continued:
„The government believe that local radio organized and
produced as a public service would be most likely to realize those
social purposes to the full and would at its best prove an integrating
and educative force in the life of the local community.‟512

Having authorized the BBC to run the nine station experiment, the
ambiguities arose on a practical level, concerning financial support. The
White Paper, as foreseen, ruled out licence fee money and instead
envisaged „local sources of funding (but not subvention of the rates) from
local authorities and other bodies.‟513 Finally the White Paper made it clear
that the government could change its mind after the end of the experimental
period and that this was neither a permanent service nor a commitment for
the BBC to run it.514
Press reaction was largely negative. The leader in the Evening Standard
was very critical, calling it a „confused and indecisive document‟, especially
with regard to financing the service.515 It pointed out that since local
authorities and other bodies were publicly funded at source, the money
raised for local radio, however this was done, was still effectively public
money. It argued it would have made more sense to have a service run by

509
Eg Board of Management Minutes November 7 1966 DSB reports that the NUJ are
anxious to press the claim for BBC run stations to the PMG BBC WAC R2/19/7
510
Home Office White Paper (Cmnd 3169 HMSO 1966) para 33
511
Home Office Op cit para 34
512
Home Office Op cit para 36
513
Home Office Op cit para 41
514
Home Office Op cit para 42
515
Evening Standard 20 December 1966

134
 private enterprise. The Scotsman pointed out that the terrain of the
Highlands meant VHF was virtually unusable, so a promise by the PMG to
have a Scottish station as one of the first nine was worthless.516 And it
pointed out if this was a genuine experiment, why were not commercial
companies allowed to trial stations too?

Conclusion
In this section, comprising this and the previous two chapters, I have used
archival and other evidence to uncover a number of crucial aspects in the
story of local broadcasting and started to build a picture of the way the
genesis of the stations emerged from the BBC between 1955 and 1966.
I have demonstrated that the motivation for moving into this area came from
several different factors, which combined in varying degrees to move the
project along. As I have argued, it was due in part to the observations of
Frank Gillard and his perceptions of local broadcasting in America, which
gave him ideas of how a similar service might work in the UK. From his
perspective, local broadcasting put right the structural weaknesses of the
BBC‟s regional system, and he harnessed arguments around public service
broadcasting as a way of demonstrating the role it could play.
Approaching the subject from a different perspective, senior
management at the BBC was aware that if commercial operators started
local broadcasting, this would end its monopoly. The files show clearly that
the BBC was aware of the danger and appreciated that they did not want to
be seen to embark on local radio simply as a reactive or defensive
measure. However, it took some time for the strategic implications to be
formulated, and even longer for the practical ones. The threat of commercial
competition was definitely a factor, but as has already been made clear, the
BBC did not have control over its own destiny: all it could do was make a
good case.
By the early 1960s, when the BBC was making a strong public
commitment to local broadcasting, it was gathering more evidence and
ideas about how this would work in practice, to support their case. But

516
The Scotsman ‘Local broadcasting given go ahead‟ 21 December 1966

135
again, despite the approval of the Pilkington Committee, the final decision
rested with the government. The closed-circuit experiments had produced
many different programme ideas but interaction with the audience did not
exist, so it became more of a production exercise. Nor was there a definite
projection of what „community‟ really meant and how the local service would
identify with it, to allow genuine access. However there were many other
valuable lessons, and it is remarkable to see how Gillard managed to draw
so many recommendations together from such a disparate amount of
evidence, and how single-minded he was in his ultimate goal.
In this chapter, I have argued that the vicissitudes of the years following
Pilkington could have caused other organizations to lose heart but the BBC,
with Gillard in a key role, pursued local radio doggedly, by continuing to
steer their arguments to meet current circumstances. If press reports were
to be believed, local radio could well have emerged in a very different
format. I would argue that the fact that the alternative, commercial-based
strategies were not as coherently organised aided the BBC‟s cause. The
BBC‟s claim was backed up by dint of its experience and a pedigree in
public service that it was hard to deny, thus persuading the Labour
government that there was a need for local radio, despite the fact that a
demand was hard to prove. By Spring 1966, it was clear that local radio
would happen, in some format. Again, if press reports were to be believed,
general opinion was on the side of local broadcasting following a public
service ethos rather than being a commercial operation. Certainly the main
debating points, as illustrated by the BBC‟s Local Radio in the Public
Interest, continued to highlight the potential that local radio offered
communities. This negated any suggestion that local radio might be a
replacement for pirate radio. However, it was the need to legislate for the
outlawing of pirate radio that provided the circumstances to introduce
measures that re-organised the BBC networks and to create the local radio
experiment at the same time. By July 1966, the BBC‟s long preparations
and its ability to appear amenable to shifting circumstances secured the
prize of launching local radio.
There were still many unresolved questions and challenges. Not least of
these was the financial settlement, based not on licence fee income but on

136
a model involving local authority subsidy and grants. Having rejected forms
of commercial funding and using the licence fee, the government and the
BBC were forced to adopt this alternative model. The White Paper set the
framework for the experiment and as the next chapter shows, the flaws in
this provision would soon be exposed.

137
 Section Three: Developments

CHAPTER SEVEN: 1967 – 1969: Going on Air

Introduction

This chapter covers the period from the government go ahead to create the
local radio experiment in December 1966, through the launch of the first
eight stations in 1967-68 and the subsequent evaluation which was
concluded with the Minister of Posts and Telecommunication‟s decision in
August 1969 to grant the BBC a permanent local service. The key themes
explored break down into three main areas: preparing for launch; the first
eight stations, and the evaluation process for the experiment. In addition to
reflecting back to questions already raised earlier, in this chapter I will put
forward the arguments about the choice of locations for the first stations, the
efficacy of this selection process and the role of the local authorities and
other bodies. Secondly there is the issue of the financial subsidy for the
stations, how this worked in practice and whether it was judged to be a
success. I will also argue that various factors determined how the stations
sounded on air, influencing the content and how they operated.
I assess the impact of the VHF-only transmission on the available
audience and how listeners responded to the service. In particular, there is
the fundamental question of whether the first stations managed to live up to
their aspirations to engage the local communities and provide genuine
access for interested people to get involved. I will also examine the reaction
of the wider community, in terms of how the stations were received within
the BBC, in the national press, the government and those proposing
alternatives to BBC Local Radio. Finally I will highlight the factors that
determined the government‟s decision to proceed with a permanent service
of local radio run by the BBC, at the same time arguing that the evaluation
process itself was not without limitations.

Who would like a station?

As the previous chapter outlined, the period leading up to the White Paper
in December 1966 involved last minute changes surrounding the framework

138
 within which local radio was to be established. The principles laid out by the
government were intended to be used as working guidelines for the BBC to
interpret and put into practice, as a means of establishing the service, all
under the guise of an experiment. As I will argue, there were flaws and
ambiguities in the rubric, which presented particular challenges to the BBC,
especially in terms of managing the financial aspects. Despite this, it is
important to note the speed with which the Corporation was able to get local
radio on air: the first stations launched less than a year after the publication
of the White Paper, which was a considerable feat. As previous chapters
have made clear, this was due to the efforts of Frank Gillard and his team in
organising various elements within the BBC into a state of preparedness. At
the Board of Governors meeting on 12 January 1967, the Director-General
spoke of the „war book‟ that was ready and the progress of necessary staff
arrangements.517 The phrase „war book‟ captures the sense that this has
been a long-running and tactically-driven campaign.
It is also worth noting another perceptible shift from late 1966 onwards, in
the way that decisions were made. The files show that there was a
considerable amount of consultation and referral to the PMG and his staff
around key areas. The PMG had the final say on three important points: the
locations of the stations, the appointment of the Local Broadcasting
Advisory Councils and the frequencies on which they broadcast. On all
three points there was extensive collaboration with the BBC, particularly in
the first two areas.
The BBC also had to work in partnership with local authorities, which
were, in most cases, providing a large amount of the running costs. The
Corporation‟s independence regarding all other matters, from the
appointment of staff to the content of the output, was maintained. Yet this
was significant as it demonstrated awareness within the BBC that local
broadcasting could only succeed if they were open and willing to explore
working relationships with others, where they were not always the dominant
partner. It is probably fair to speculate that since the BBC had endured so
many years of negotiation and speculation about the very possibility of

517
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 12 January 1967 R1/35/1

139
 getting local radio on air, once the prize was in sight, they were happy to do
whatever they needed to keep their grasp on it. There is an example of this
in a memo from Gillard to the Controllers of the Regions, dated 11
November 1966. He said the „White Paper is swinging violently‟ and the
suggestion was that „we might have to operate in circumstances which none
of us have previously envisaged which would require a very high degree of
cooperation on the part of the entire community‟. Therefore it was
necessary to choose areas where the population would back the BBC
enthusiastically.518 So the necessity for some realpolitik was beginning to
emerge, especially in relation to the choice of locations for the first stations.
As the memo above suggested, the BBC faced some complex dilemmas.
This was after all an experiment, and the BBC had to make this a success
in order to secure a future in local broadcasting. Where the first stations
would be sited was of paramount importance in determining the outcome.
These locations would need to demonstrate genuine enthusiasm for the
project, and an engagement with the ideals of community involvement. The
main channel for gauging potential support was through the local
authorities, and the BBC and the Association of Municipal Councils (AMC)
organised a joint meeting to be held on 27 January 1967 for representatives
to express an interest. As Gillard wrote in a paper for the Board of
Governors: „Certainly no local station could be set up under this scheme
without the strong support of the local authority.‟ 519 However, enthusiasm
was not, on its own, sufficient to get a station. The provisions of the White
Paper called for the stations to be funded by local authority subsidy, so local
authorities had to pledge financial support as well.
This required further clarification, which was one of the main discussion
points at a meeting with the PMG two days before the BBC/AMC
conference. The White Paper said that there would be no „subvention from
the rates‟520 (ie there could be no specific levy as part of the rates that went
towards a local radio station) and the PMG emphasized that this had to be

518
BBC WAC Memo from Frank Gillard to Controllers 11 November 1966 Local Radio Policy
1964-68 R102/73
519
BBC WAC Report by DSB 17 January 1967 G8/67 in Board of Governors Papers R1/103/1
520
Home Office White Paper on Broadcasting (Cmnd 3169 HMSO 1966) para 41

140
 interpreted literally.521 However, if stations were awarded on the basis of the
highest bid, there was a danger that the selection process would become,
effectively, an auction.522 The BBC looked around for ways of deflecting this
impression. Hugh Greene thought one way of mediating this was to put
more emphasis on the ability of local authorities to provide premises. Gillard
broadened this out to include various other factors governing station
selection at the meeting with the PMG on 25 January. The key criteria were
to be „geographic location, definable community, substantial financial
support and local enthusiasm.‟523 Other areas that would be taken into
consideration included the availability of vacant premises and the potential
for news provision from local sources.524 The PMG attempted to weigh up
the relative importance of these factors: „…though the prospect of
substantial local financial support was an important factor in the choice of
localities, the over-riding immediate need was a service which would
convincingly demonstrate the value of local radio.‟525
Later in the same meeting, the PMG again extolled the „value‟ of the
service, firmly predicated in terms of public service: „No doubt there will be
difficulties of detail: but the important thing now is to demonstrate through
the value of local radio organised and produced as a public service.‟ 526 The
difficulty was how to translate this concept into practice for the 200
delegates representing 80 local authorities in England and Wales when they
assembled in Broadcasting House on 27 January 1967. The Conference
was co-chaired by Hugh Greene and Sir Mark Henig, who was Chairman of
the AMC. It was made clear at the outset that the conference was an
exploratory one, to try and address various questions and issues, to set out

521
BBC WAC Minutes of Meeting Held 25 January 1967 between PMG, AMC, BBC Local
Radio Experiments Policy 1966-69 R102/46
522
see for example BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 12 January 1967. The Director-
General admitted selection would depend on who could pay for a station. The Chairman
advised making it clear the decision was shouldered more by the PMG to avoid the BBC
bearing any responsibility for this deduction. R1/35/1
523
BBC WAC Points from Meeting with PMG 25 January 1967 Local Broadcasting Paper
1965-68 R78/608
524
BBC WAC Op cit
525
BBC WAC Minutes of Meeting Held 25 January 1967 between PMG, AMC, BBC Local
Radio Experiments Policy 1966-69 R102/46
526
BBC WAC Op cit

141
 the timetable ahead and to invite expressions of interest in having a station.
It was not, however, a conference to make any decisions.527
Frank Gillard outlined how the stations would operate, using points
drawn mainly from Local Radio in the Public Interest,528 emphasizing that
they would not be pop stations, but rather „a local newspaper of the air,
exploiting the depth, detail and directness of the radio medium.‟ 529
Obviously the most pressing issue for the delegates was that of finance.
The Director-General announced at the conference that the BBC would
meet the capital start-up costs, estimated at £35,000 per site, of all the
stations, and underwrite the running costs for the last months of the
financial year 1967-68, because local authority budgets were already set.
He hoped that the subsequent running costs, £1,000 a week or £56,000 a
year, would come from local authorities.530
Given the ban on raising revenue directly from the rates, how could local
authorities raise funds? Delegates discussed the possibility of programme
sponsorship but the BBC ruled this out as it would compromise editorial
independence. The tone of the minutes suggested that the gauntlet was
thrown down to the local authorities to come up with creative ways of finding
other sources of income if they wanted a station. Michael Barton, who was
later appointed the first Station Manager at Radio Sheffield, recalls Frank
Gillard “working the crowd like Jeffrey Archer running a charity auction” in
an effort to drum up support.531
In terms of the station selection process, Frank Gillard elaborated on the
criteria explored at the meeting with the PMG two days previously, which
included the aspiration to get stations in a variety of different locations, such
as a farming community, a cathedral town, a coastal site, industrial cities
and so on. It was hoped that the first three stations would be chosen by the
end of February and the remainder would be selected by early April. Gillard
stressed that no decisions had been made at this point so it was up to local
authorities to make their applications as soon as possible. The conference
527
BBC WAC Conference on Local Sound Broadcasting 27 January 1967 Local Radio
Evaluation (Interim) Major Policy 1967-69 R102/41
528
Local Radio in the Public Interest: the BBC’s Plan ibid
529
BBC WAC Conference on Local Sound Broadcasting 27 January 1967 ibid
530
BBC WAC Op cit
531
Michael Barton interview with the author 17 December 2007

142
 was certainly an important exercise for the BBC in promoting the legitimacy
of its right to run local radio and as a means of creating an environment for
consultation and partnership. However my research in the files shows an
alternative side to the public pronouncements.
In terms of possible locations, there was continual naming internally of
the potential front-runners. Hugh Greene speculated at various times in
early 1967 on which locations would be successful, suggesting Manchester
and Norwich to the Board of Management and then Manchester, Hull, Stoke
and Bristol to the PMG.532 In fact even before the conference, at least 12
local authorities made enquiries to the BBC and Frank Gillard went so far as
to say Manchester would be the first choice „of all.‟533

‘A three-stage Dutch auction’

Despite the fact that the BBC/AMC conference had succeeded in
galvanizing interest in local radio from the delegates, it was harder for many
of them to persuade their colleagues in town halls across the country to
translate this into definite promises of money. In a handwritten note written
in February 1967, Frank Gillard admitted to feeling „a bit punctured‟ when
the Town Clerk of Hull called to say his Council would not be giving a firm
financial undertaking.534 Another indication of caution came on the same
day. A briefing note from the Head of Secretariat for use around the
forthcoming Parliamentary debate on Broadcasting made it clear that there
were enough firm offers to meet the initial stage for three stations and „it is
already certain that when the additional six localities are chosen they be
chosen from a considerably larger number of applicant communities that
are as keen and optimistic as the BBC is about the experiment.‟ However
the words „it is already certain‟ have been crossed out in ink and replaced

532
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 2 January 1967 & 9 January 1967 R2/20/1;
BBC WAC Minutes of Meeting Held 25 January 1967 between PMG, AMC, BBC Local Radio
Experiments Policy 1966-69 R102/46
533
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 2 January 1967 R2/20/1 Presumably given the
track record of Manchester with the previous attempt at a „municipal‟ radio station under the
aegis of Tony Benn
534
BBC WAC Note from DSB (recipient unknown) 10 February 1967 Local Broadcasting
Papers 1965-68 R78/608

143
 with „there is every expectation‟, in Gillard‟s handwriting. 535 Towards the end
of February, the picture had improved a little and Gillard was able to report
to Hugh Greene that there were eight local authorities willing to provide the
full operating costs of a station: Leeds, Blackburn, Sheffield, Gateshead,
Leicester, Stoke, Liverpool and Pontypridd.536 Leicester had even gone one
step further and offered to pay the capital costs too. Nottingham and
Brighton had undertaken to meet a substantial proportion of the costs and
to help raise the rest locally, while Edinburgh, Manchester and Swansea
had made formal applications without any financial pledges.537 Although
there were other selection criteria, which will be further explored below, I
would make the point here that at this stage no bid got over the first hurdle
unless a firm financial commitment was there.538
The choice of the first three stations was relatively straightforward as far
as the BBC was concerned: (in alphabetical order) Leicester, Liverpool,
Sheffield.539 This was agreed by the PMG on 6 March 1967 and announced
in Parliament the following day.540 However the field for the next six stations
was narrowing. Manchester was still hesitant, Bristol and Norwich had
made no bid, Hull had pulled out, Swansea and Edinburgh were keen but
there was no financial support.541 That barely left enough applicants to
make up the nine stations required. There was some good news with an
offer from Durham, which would cover a population of 1.2million on a
county-basis – an added bonus for the experiment. However the Gateshead
bid began to look untenable as none of the other authorities in the
Tyneside/Wearside area were prepared to participate.542 By the end of
March there were still not enough clear contenders from which to choose

535
BBC WAC Briefing for the Debate on Broadcasting 10 February 1967 Local Broadcasting
Papers 1965-68 R78/608 ibid
536
BBC WAC FG to DG Local Broadcasting: A Progress Report February 22 1967 Local
Broadcasting Papers 1965-68 R78/608Though it was pointed out that Pontypridd was unlikely
to raise the money on its own and could not be taken seriously, and also Pontypridd had not
attended the BBC/AMC Conference.
537
BBC WAC op cit Manchester was fully expected to come up with the money
538
BBC WAC Note from DSB to DG which discounted Edinburgh from consideration due to a
lack of financial support (undated) ibid
539
See Appendix A Key Dates for the PMG‟s announcements of the proposed stations
540
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 9 March 1967 R1/35/1
541
BBC WAC op cit
542
BBC WAC Note of meeting between PMG and BBC 6 March 1967 Local Broadcasting
Papers 1965-68 R78/608

144
 the last six stations, so the PMG could only announce four more, in the
House of Commons: Brighton, Manchester, Nottingham and Stoke.543 The
gloss put on this was that it would allow more applicants to come forward
and that the BBC had plenty to do for now: this was not a delay. 544
The Board of Management were told that it was hoped that one of the
remaining two stations might be Teesside - a newly constituted county
borough which would only come into existence after the local elections in
May; the GLC were lobbying hard for a London station and Leeds and
Blackburn were both in reserve too.545 But the local elections in May
brought a change in the balance of power for several local authorities,
which caused more problems for the stations already chosen. Leicester and
Nottingham both went to a Conservative majority, as did Manchester, and
these threatened to withdraw all offers of support for a local station made
under previous administrations. Blackburn also looked less feasible as it
went to „no overall control‟.546 By the time the PMG met Gillard and Greene
again on 27 June to make the final selection, there was very little choice.
Leeds had re-entered the race, despite having a new Conservative council,
and the second choice fell to either Durham or Lincoln.547
What is crucial here is that the BBC‟s position on funding had begun to
shift. Blackburn was told that if they could pledge £35,000 then they could
get a station, despite the fact that the AMC was very opposed to this site.548
Shortly after, Gillard made it clear that the BBC would underwrite the
running costs as well as the capital costs of the final station – either Durham
or Lincoln – depending on which produced a firm bid first.549 He also
admitted to the Board of Management that while eight stations would be
acceptable to the Government, any fewer than this would not be. It seems

543
BBC WAC Hansard Oral answers columns 1899-1901 23 March 1967 ibid
544
BBC WAC Report from FG 11 April 1967 G38/67 Board of Governors Papers R1/103/2
545
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 3 April 1967 R2/20/3. It seems the PMG had
decided he was keen to see a London station after all, but one based in a borough rather than
a GLC-wide operation. Gillard was less enthusiastic as there was no sign of any financial
support, but nevertheless he agreed to meet representatives, as „they show signs of militancy‟
BBC WAC Report by DSB 11 April 1967 G38/67 Board of Governors Papers R1/103/2
546
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 15 May 1967 R2/20/4
547
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 12 June 1967 R2/20/4
548
BBC WAC Note by FG: Local Radio position 31 May 1967 Local Broadcasting Papers
1956-68 R78/608
549
BBC WAC FG to DG note 9 June 1967 op cit

145
 too that the PMG put extra pressure on the BBC to guarantee enough
stations by paying for one itself.550 Leeds and Durham were formally
announced as the final two stations on 4 July, and shortly after, Manchester
narrowly voted to withdraw their offer of financial support. On the BBC‟s
advice, the PMG made it clear that Manchester would not be replaced and
that the experiment was still perfectly valid with eight instead of nine
stations.551 Internally there were sighs of relief that the BBC could now
concentrate on launching the new stations – indeed the resources from
Manchester were diverted to Durham, including the recently appointed
Station Manager.552
Publicly however, this was not represented in such a positive light. In fact
the financial aspect of the selection process was likened to „an astonishing
three stage Dutch auction‟ in an article by Anthony Cowdy in the Sunday
Times on 9 July.553 Aside from the structural problem of eliciting local
authority contributions without allowing them to use the rates, the main
criticism was leveled at the haste with which the bidding process was
conducted. According to Cowdy, the first three successful bidders all
promised the full amount and were duly awarded their stations. In the
second round, only Stoke had the full amount – Brighton and Nottingham
pledged half the money with promises to find the remainder from other
sources. But Cowdy suggested that Brighton would have got the station at
any price while Nottingham – given the proximity to Leicester – needed to
promise a lot more. The local elections thinned out the remaining
competitors, and Leeds finally got their station, having offered £25,000 over
two years.554 Cowdy‟s piece was by no means wholly negative – he was
hopeful the stations would still be a success and pointed to the brimming
confidence of the new station manager.
It is inescapable, however, that the financial aspect of the selection
process highlighted some of the shortcomings of the experiment. Four
years later, the University of Leicester report called the method of selection

550
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 5 June 1967 R2/20/4
551
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 10 July 1967 R2/20/5
552
BBC WAC op cit
553
Sunday Times „How Home Town Radio was sold short‟ by Anthony Cowdy 9 July 1967
554
Op cit

146
 „confused and frenzied.‟555 I would also argue that the ability to pay was in
danger of eclipsing all other factors, especially the role of proactive and
genuine community-involvement in the chosen locations.

Other factors in the selection process

As I have made clear, there was undoubtedly a rather limited choice of
locations. The enthusiasm of the January BBC/AMC conference had worn
off, when financial and political considerations started to interfere on a local
level. There is a whole file in the BBC Written Archive containing letters of
interest from 83 different local authorities and councils, some received
before and some after the conference.556 The number of serious - as in,
coming with financial backing - bids was then greatly reduced and this in
turn was skewed by a geographic imbalance. Most of the offers came from
the North, such as Lancashire and Yorkshire, and the Midlands; only one
came from southern England and none from Wales and Scotland.
Despite the precarious position of the financial situation, it is clear that
the BBC was wholly committed to the experiment, having dedicated over
100 staff to it, and begun the process of resource allocation.557 What this
section will argue is the degree to which the BBC had to play a fine
balancing act: there was a genuine investigation into a whole range of
factors that affected the potential for running a radio station, yet at the same
time they had to fight a rear guard action just to persuade some applicants
to stay in the race. My conclusion is that by the time the first stations went
on air in November 1967 the BBC was lucky to have kept all eight
participants in the experiment at all.
The care and diligence with which the selection process was treated was
demonstrated by a paper from Donald Edwards in February 1967, who
earlier that month had been appointed the General Manager of Local Radio
Development – part of a small HQ team.558 He visited both Leicester and
Nottingham and drew up an exhaustive list of comparable factors.
555
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167 p 29
556
BBC WAC Local Radio Individual Cases Vol II 1965-70 R102/69/1
557
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 10 July 1967 R2/20/5
558
BBC WAC Memo from Donald Edwards to FG 22 February 1967 Local Broadcasting
Papers 1965-68 R78/608

147
 Presumably this was to try and differentiate between two potential locations,
which were in close geographic proximity. The criteria included the financial
aspects of course, the political make-up of the council, the availability of
VHF, possible premises, news arrangements, the attitude of the local press
and the reception the BBC might receive generally among the community.
What seems to be missing from the list is any attempt to gauge the
potential for community involvement or the identification of interested
groups and societies. Instead, Donald Edwards listed material suitable for
radio content, such as local personalities, sports clubs and universities.559
Edwards concluded that Leicester won in terms of finance, having promised
full running costs and capital costs, news provision and the fact that a BBC
presence here would break new ground.
However, just to illustrate how much volatility there was in the situation,
many of Edward‟s findings turned out to be incorrect. He was confident that
all parties on Leicester and Nottingham City Councils would support a
station, even if the balance of power shifted after the local elections. As I
will show shortly, this was not to be the case. Edwards thought that the local
press, the Leicester Mercury and the Nottingham Journal, would be
supportive – again, not an accurate prediction.
One aspect of the process was that by relying on local authorities to
make so much of the running, there was a key element of self-selection.
The BBC clearly did not want to site a station in a hostile environment and
having a sympathetic local environment would ease the establishment and
help build working relationships. Again, the hand of Gillard was evident in
this, as Michael Barton acknowledged „that was a very deft move…..it got
local authorities engaged from the very beginning. If he was going to seek
support after two years, how better to get them onside from day one.‟ 560
It would be difficult to postulate whether Gillard was actually happy with
this arrangement but he certainly made the best of nurturing partnerships
with anyone who could support local broadcasting into the next stage. Out
of the seven stations that had been announced by May 1967, only two of

559
BBC WAC Op cit
560
Michael Barton quoted in Stoller T Sounds of your life: The History of Independent Radio in
the UK (New Barnet: John Libbey Publishing Ltd, 2010) p 22

148
 the local authorities remained in Labour control: Sheffield and Stoke.
However each locality was subject to variations of political make-up,
personalities and attitudes and it took a while for the BBC to discover how
the changes might affect the commitment to local radio, as Gillard reported
to the Board of Management on 15 May.561
As has already been described, the change in political control eventually
took Manchester out of the bidding for a station. For a short time,
Leicester‟s position looked precarious too.562 The problems here actually
went further back to when the decision was made to submit an application.
Both the Labour and Conservative groups held their meetings in private to
get a quick resolution, possibly to get a head start over a bid from
Nottingham, and did not hold any public consultation. This haste proved to
be the source for the long-running opposition to Radio Leicester
championed by the Leicester Mercury, believing it was a fait accompli that
ignored the wishes of ordinary rate-payers.563 By the time the Board of
Governors met on 15 June, the problems in Leicester had been resolved. 564
A month later it was reported that Nottingham too had nearly pulled out,
but the local council voted by a very narrow margin to continue.565 It is clear
that the BBC had to hold its nerve in this difficult time to maintain the
momentum and recruit enough stations to make the experiment viable.
There were indirect benefits to the selection process as local authorities,
usually in the form of the Town Clerk, got to know their Station Manager
and established good working relationships that would bear fruit two years
hence.

561
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 15 May 1967 R2/20/4 This also seems to have
been a factor in postponing the announcement of the final two stations which had been due at
the end of May.
562
BBC WAC Report by DSB 4 July 1967 G73/67 Board of Governors Papers R1/103/4
563
BBC WAC Op cit; BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio
and the Community 1971 R9/1,167
564
Owen Bentley email correspondence with the author 5 May 2011 Donald Edwards and
Maurice Ennals, Station Manager-designate, paid a quiet visit to the leader of the
Conservative Group to brief him about the steps the BBC had already undertaken to prepare
for local radio and he in turn managed to keep his caucus meeting on side. The clandestine
meeting apparently took place in the old BBC regional studio, a disused mortuary, and was
arranged by Roland Orton, who ran a news agency and went on to supply news and sport for
Radio Leicester
565
BBC WAC Board of Governors minutes 13 July 1967 R1/35/1

149
 But there were still some potentially very serious flaws in the
arrangement. One was the financial provision. Even though local authorities
had pledged money, there were no guarantees that they were able to find it
every year. There were promises to raise money from other sources locally,
but again, nothing was signed and delivered. In a paper to the Board of
Governors, Gillard admitted that „The financial basis for local radio under
the White Paper proposals causes continuing anxiety because it seems to
hold out little long term prospect.‟566 It was a theme that would recur often in
the next two years. Secondly, there was an uneven geographic spread in
the experimental stations, with nothing in the south of England apart from
Brighton. This could have had serious implications for the impact local radio
might have made in the first few years. But it was mitigated to a degree by
the variety that existed within the eight stations: from a seaside town
(Brighton) to a rural county (Durham), from a relatively recent municipal
creation (Stoke-on-Trent) to a conglomerate of communities (Merseyside).
The opening of Radio Leicester on 8 November 1967 provided good
opportunities for publicity and paved the way for a successful launch of the
first stage of the service.567 However the issue of finance was never far from
the agenda. In a pre-recorded interview on World at One on Radio Four, the
PMG said he had not ruled out advertising as a means of revenue for the
BBC. He said the alternative – using the licence fee for local radio – was
unfair as people were paying for a service they could not receive.568 This
was also one of the points that the PMG made in his speech when he
officially opened the station, on air, at 1pm on the same day.
“Frankly I don‟t know whether we can finance a station in the way that
we‟ve suggested. Part of the experiment is to find out. But if it can‟t be
financed in this way, we won‟t hesitate to look at the alternatives.”569

These references to the financial issue were picked up by the press. The
Sun called this a „veiled threat to the BBC‟570 while The Daily Telegraph

566
BBC WAC Report by Director of Radio 12 October 1967 G101/67 Board of Governors
Papers R1/103/6 Note: Gillard‟s title had changed from Director of Sound Broadcasting to
Managing Director of Radio in July 1967
567
Radio Sheffield followed on 15 November and Radio Merseyside on 22 November
568
BBC WAC Transcript of interview with PMG and William Davies, World at One, BBC Radio
Four 8 November 1967 Local Broadcasting Papers 1965-68 R78/608
569
BBC Radio Leicester Opening Day tx 8 November 1967

150
 suggested that Sir Mark Henig (Chairman of the AMC and Lord Mayor of
Leicester) was, embarrassingly for the BBC, personally in favour of
commercials on radio.571 However the PMG‟s speech gave more weight to
the community value attached to the station, in particular the role of the
local broadcasting council which was “widely representative of the local
community including I‟m happy to say some very young people.”572
However there were some moments of drama for the opening day: a few
demonstrators outside the station from the Free Radio Association
protested against the BBC‟s monopoly and someone made an anonymous
bomb threat to the newsroom, which did not succeed in stopping any of the
output.573 None of this dampened the sense of achievement at the BBC.
The Director-General described the opening as having gone „extremely well
and smoothly‟574 while the Chairman, who went to the opening of Radio
Merseyside, later received a letter from the PMG expressing gratitude for
the way the BBC had contributed to the successful launch of the
experiment.575
As this section has demonstrated, the selection process for the first
stations was fraught with some potential problems. The greatest challenge,
that of securing the financial support of local authorities, was a structural
imposition of the legislation, which had to be embraced. Gillard and his
team, to their credit, made the most of this opportunity as a way of
encouraging the support and interest of local authorities, which would prove
a useful relationship once the stations were on air. The problem with the
financial prerequisite was that this effectively limited potential applicants to
the bare minimum, and risked jeopardizing the whole experiment. It was all
very well to claim this funding arrangement was part of the trial, but it was
self-defeating if it actively prevented participation. This was reinforced by
the eventual outcome where the BBC had to subsidize all, or part, of the
running costs for several stations in order to get them on air.

570
The Sun 9 November 1967
571
The Daily Telegraph „Bomb Hoax at Local Radio Debut‟ 9 November 1967 No one else
seems to have picked up on Henig‟s views
572
BBC Radio Leicester Opening Day ibid
573
Daily Express „The first local station tunes in on bomb alarm‟ 9 November 1967
574
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 November 1967 R1/35/1
575
BBC WAC Board of Governors minutes 30 November 1967 op cit

151
 The BBC evidently was conscientious about exploring other criteria that
could have a bearing on whether a locality should get a station, but, apart
from the fact these all took second place to the financial issue, the
chronology shows that these factors often shifted and were not wholly
reliable. Perhaps more revealingly, there is no evidence that the BBC really
managed to do any research about specific groups or associations or
communities that could contribute to make one of the experimental stations
a success. The accelerated timescale was probably one limiting factor,
however the notion of wider consultation does not seem to be addressed at
all in any of the files. So by the end of 1967, with three stations on air and
five more in the advanced stages of preparation, the confidence with which
the BBC has launched the service belies some potentially damaging and
jeopardizing factors.

The first eight stations, 1967 - 1969

Following the successful launch of the first three stations, the remaining five
were all on air by July 1968.576 Practical arrangements for getting the
stations on air were looked after by the Local Radio Committee, which was
reconvened in January 1967, with D‟A Marriott (Assistant Director of Sound
Broadcasting) in the Chair. The main tasks facing the committee included
recruiting and training staff, revising the station handbook, organising
premises and all the technical facilities, including equipping the studios and
sorting out transmitter arrangements, as well as thinking about the provision
of news services. Given the pressing schedule, it is not surprising that D‟A
Marriott reported to the committee that: „to meet this timetable would require
special efforts from all concerned and some of the normal administrative
processes might have to be short-circuited.‟577
As has been covered in previous chapters, the BBC had invested
considerable resources in planning how to create stations from scratch and
much of this information and preparation came in useful, such as using
editorial and policy guidelines already drawn up as a basis for the final

576
Radio Nottingham went „live‟ on 31 January 1968, Radio Brighton on 14 February, Radio
Stoke-on-Trent launched on 14 March, Radio Leeds on 24 June and Radio Durham on 3 July.
577
BBC WAC Committee meeting minutes 2 January 1967 Local Radio Committee Minutes
R102/45

152
 station handbook. Some areas did not go completely to plan. To staff the
stations, initially with 16 per site, would require recruiting around 130
personnel. The 1961-62 exercises had helped to identify, and indeed train,
suitable people, especially for the Station Manager role, but there was
concern that not enough potential managers were coming forward. 578
One of those who had been involved with the earlier exercises and who
was singled out for the Station Manager route was Michael Barton, who
describes himself going to Sheffield as „Frank‟s outrider.‟579 Robert Gunnell
also had previous experience from the London experiment and had been
through the Poole training scheme in 1962. He was asked to apply for
Stoke-on-Trent as their manager but declined as he didn‟t know the area,
but he was selected to run Radio Brighton – which was his hometown.580
That did not mean there were not enough staff to chose from for the
remaining posts: Hugh Pierce reported there were 137 applicants for jobs
on the first three stations,581 and Gillard told the Board of Governors there
were 100 people interested in working on the Manchester station, even
though it did not materialize.582
There is a very useful contemporary study in the Archive from a post
graduate student at the University of Oxford, E Helen Evans, who looked at
the application data and in some cases interviewed successful candidates
for jobs in BBC Local Radio during the experimental period.583 Her analysis
showed that the BBC treated job selection, in effect, as part of the
experimental process. Those from within the Corporation had a variety of
backgrounds: studio managers, secretarial, radio production. One aspect
that emerges from my interviews with long-serving staff was the usefulness
of diverse production skills. Through his experience at the World Service,
Owen Bentley was able to drive a desk and present or announce
programmes. This combination helped him become a Programme Assistant
at Radio Stoke-on-Trent.584 Similarly Robert Gunnell was multi-skilled in

578
BBC WAC Committee meeting minutes 6 April 1967 Op cit
579
Michael Barton interview with the author 17 December 2007
580
Robert Gunnell interview with the author 28 July 2010
581
BBC WAC Committee minutes 6 April op cit
582
BBC WAC Report by DSB Board of Governors minutes 3 July 1967 R1/35/1
583
BBC WAC Personnel Selection in Local Radio R102/49/1
584
Owen Bentley interview with author 19 July 2010

153
 various production capacities, including as a producer of Talks, Features
and as a reporter/presenter too.585 So while it is not feasible to argue that
BBC Local Radio invented multi-skilling as such, it was able to take staff
who were used to operating a range of equipment and put them into new
production practices. It also guaranteed that the new recruits would not
baulk at being asked to perform a variety of tasks.
The majority of new staff were young (under 30) and Evans put much
emphasis on being fit and healthy as the working conditions, with constant
deadlines and long hours, were likely to be tough. A third of the new intake
came from outside the BBC. According to Evans, many applicants were
attracted by the pioneering spirit of the venture, and this enthusiasm may
have made up for what some lacked in experience and maturity. But Evans
applauded the flexibility with which the BBC Board‟s system adapted their
requirements to the available applicants.586
The next step for the new recruits was training. Initially news and sports
material were gathered from local news agencies, with several exceptions.
Radio Merseyside used the „blacks‟587 from the Liverpool News and
employed a Chief News Assistant, Rex Bawden, later to become the Station
Manager, to produce the news.588 Radio Leeds also sourced their own
news with the help of three extra posts. The Local Radio Committee was
told this was due to there being no suitable news agency in the area.589 It is
interesting that the money for these three extra news staff in Leeds could be
found so readily. Leicester, Nottingham, Brighton and Sheffield had
contracts with local agencies and Durham made their „own
arrangements.‟590

585
Robert Gunnell interview with author 28 July 2010
586
BBC WAC Personnel Selection in Local Radio ibid
587
The „blacks‟ were the carbon copies of stories written by the newspaper journalists
588
BBC WAC Personnel Selection in Local Radio ibid
589
BBC WAC Local Radio Committee minutes 21 September 1967 ibid Phil Sidey, the Leeds
Station Manager, offered a different explanation, in his usual pugnacious style, which involved
throwing what he calls „a coldly structured tantrum‟ in front of Gillard and threatening to
resign. His version of the argument centred on whether local newspapers or their agencies
would share stories with the station and give them scoops or breaking news. Sidey ibid pp 15
- 16
590
BBC WAC Report on the Local Radio Experiment 21 March 1969 G41/69 Board of
Governors Papers R1/105/1

154
 The selection of staff obviously had an impact on the types of
programmes that were made. Essentially the schedule was a blank canvas:
the only steer was the necessity to provide local news and information
programmes at breakfast, lunchtime and in the early evenings, with more
specific, community-focused content dotted around. This would add up to
four or five hours a day, with the remaining 12 hours output coming from
one or more of the networks.591 One important influence on what the locally-
produced progammes might sound like was the training course the BBC
sent staff on. Owen Bentley remembers that this tended to teach „old‟ or
traditional BBC skills, such as feature or package making. There was little
about how to run an Outside Broadcast but every station was drilled in a
„breakfast-type‟ show.592
Station schedules began with a breakfast show, which also took some of
the Today programme from Radio Four. Then the station would switch to
Radio Two or Four, and return for a 30-minute programme aimed at women
or housewives. There would be a local lunchtime news progamme, back to
network for most of the afternoon, and then an early evening news
programme, which pre-dated the „drivetime‟ concept. The night time
schedule was then given over to a wide variety of minority programmes,
many of them made by community groups, colleges, WEAs, or individuals.
The schedules for the early years of local radio emerged with a
remarkable degree of homogeneity, despite attitudes like Robert Gunnell‟s
in Brighton, who said he had decided to be “bloody-minded”: “I‟m not going
to look at anybody else‟s schedule until this one opens…..I‟m not going to
be influenced by what went on in Sheffield or Merseyside.”593 Yet as Hugh
Pierce told the researchers from Leicester University: “We train a highly
intellectual group of broadcasters and send them out to run their own
stations and it‟s amazing how many of them come up with the name „Coffee
Break‟ for their women‟s programme.” 594

591
BBC BBC Local Radio: Some Questions Answered (London: BBC Publications, 1967)
592
Owen Bentley ibid
593
Robert Gunnell ibid
594
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167 P 214

155
 Where there was some diversity, it came from specialist programmes like
Down to earth for gardeners; Jazz Quarter; George and Harry (78rpm
records) (all from Leicester) to We’re ordinary Sheffield workmen (a history
programme from Sheffield) and Insight and Outlook (a Christian magazine)
and Bird’s Eye View (for women) for Durham. Owen Bentley recalls a
particular minority programme at Stoke: The Esperanto family Robinson,
which involved a local headmaster recording conversations with his family
in Esperanto, in a soap opera style, in their front room on an old Ferrograph
machine, which Bentley then edited down.595 However, Owen realized that
this wide variety of programmes raised problems for the station and for the
listener: “What we didn‟t realize was that that‟s no way to build an audience,
nothing fed into each other, you had to switch on at a particular time for
something.”596
With so much of the schedule relying on segmented, „built‟ programmes
aimed at quite specific audiences, the initial impetus was to try and build up
better local publicity for each station and its schedule. However this was
one area that had not been thought through adequately, how to promote the
stations. There was only a small financial allocation: prior to the launch,
each station received £500 for local publicity and then, later, a further £500.
But what was given with one hand was effectively taken with the other as
there was a strong directive from Hugh Greene banning anyone at the BBC
from taking out adverts in newspapers and paying for them with licence
payers‟ money. After some heated exchanges between the Station
Managers, Donald Edwards and Frank Gillard, the rule was slightly relaxed
to allow press ads which „familiarise the public with the local station‟s
wavelength.‟597 To this day, Robert Gunnell remembers the BBC‟s publicity
efforts as „a total disgrace.‟598 But he found an ingenious solution with the
creation of an independent „Friends of Radio Brighton‟ supporters‟ club

595
Owen Bentley ibid
596
Owen Bentley ibid
597
BBC WAC Even pleading a special case for Radio Leicester, because of the Mass
Communication Research by the University of Leicester taking place there, to help publicise
the station to improve market research fell on deaf ears. Memo from DR to ADR 20
December 1967 Local Radio Policy 1964-68 R102/73
598
Robert Gunnell ibid SORBA was to play a significant role in future events, most notably
regarding the campaign against the Annan report.

156
 (SORBA) when the station launched, which took on the cheerleading role,
at no cost to the licence payer.599
As the minutes from the Local Radio Committee demonstrated, a limited
structure emerged to support the eight stations once they were on air. The
decision was also taken that this team would be centrally-based, under the
management of the Radio Directorate, rather than fitting into the residual
regional structure.600 This was a key strategic point: even though the Station
Managers were to be given great autonomy, there had to be some
semblance of accountability. But how this relationship was to work in
practice took time to develop. The HQ team was led by Donald Edwards,
who was given the title General Manager, Local Radio Development.
Edwards had already had a long and distinguished career, and was
currently Editor for News and Current Affairs.601 There were three other
posts: Bill Coysh, veteran of the West Region and the previous
experiments, was responsible for training; education co-ordination was
organised by A Langford and Hugh Pierce was the general administrator.
Edwards left in February 1968, to become Managing Editor of ITN. Hugh
Pierce was promoted to take over, but this appointment was unusual as he
was a lawyer by training and had no broadcast experience.602 However, it is
generally agreed that it was an excellent choice as he steered local radio
development and expansion into the mid-1970s with great tact and
diplomacy.603
However there were practical limitations as to what the HQ team could
do. It was only a small team, and since they were based in London, they
could not hear any of the output, except by driving round the country or
requesting tapes. Programme logs and schedules were sent to London, but
more often than not, this was for bureaucratic reasons rather than helping

599
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 18 December 1967 R2/20/6
600
BBC WAC Local Radio Committee minutes 2 February 1967 ibid The Local Radio
Committee disbanded in April 1968, handing over its affairs to the HQ Team, whose members
were all on the Committee anyway.
601
BBC WAC Op cit
602
Owen Bentley interview with author ibid
603
Op cit Ian Trethowan paid him a glowing tribute in his Oral History interview: “one of the
gentlest, nicest, most civilized men I think that I remember in the BBC and he was quite
marvellous in the way that he nourished the staff of the local stations.” BBC WAC Oral History
Interview: Ian Trethowan 2 March 1983

157
 shape the editorial content. This left the stations to work largely on their
own. Neither Robert Gunnell nor Owen Bentley recalls much contact with
the HQ team in the early years. However, one very important direct link was
maintained. Frank Gillard visited all eight of the stations, an occasion which
was very well received by the staff. “He was an incredibly boosting
presence”, recalls Owen Bentley, “He‟d be there, sitting, listening…..if you
could say he was reserved and friendly that sounds like a contradiction, but
that‟s how I remember him.”604
The other aspect of the support and guiding structure that needed to be
established was the Local Radio Councils.605 The relationship between the
LRCs and the BBC also took time to become established and would have a
significant impact on events in the coming years. According to the BBC
publication BBC Local Radio: Some Questions Answered, each council
would have around 12 members, representing all aspects of the community,
including women, education, industry, commerce, religion and sport. The
delegates would not, however be there to represent sectional interests, but
they would „play a fully formative part in the development of the station‟ in
programme policy, content and finance, and have a „maximum voice in the
direction of the station.‟606 There was a fine balance to be achieved in how
the councils operated with their Station Manager, as it was made clear that
the BBC retained complete and final editorial control on the content. It was
hoped the relationship would be based on „commonsense and goodwill‟. 607
There was another element to this, however. The members were all
appointed by the Postmaster General, not the BBC, thus presenting a
sense of neutrality and independence. Although the BBC played quite a
prominent role in helping to suggest and nominate members and chairs,
there was still a strong sense of separation between the LRCs and the
BBC. This changed in 1970 when the Post Office relinquished appointment
rights and the LRCs became a purely BBC operation. It is noticeable how
the staff perceived this distinction: Owen Bentley is very clear about when
604
Owen Bentley ibid
605
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167 Note that the word „advisory‟ which had originally been inserted into the title
was dropped to avoid confusion with the other BBC advisory councils.
606
BBC BBC Local Radio: Some Questions Answered (London: BBC Publications, 1967) p 6
607
BBC Op cit

158
 the LRC (during his time at Radio Stoke-on-Trent) was an external body
and how this had changed when he was at Radio Oxford in the early 70s
and the LRC had become internal to the BBC.608

VHF and relay

One of the biggest concerns for everyone involved in the experiment was
how the audience was supposed to listen. The argument about the lack of
available medium wave frequencies and the necessity of using VHF was
often repeated and the public was encouraged to invest in VHF sets. Initially
the audience responded favourably, with The Sun reporting that electrical
dealers in Leicester had posted an increase of 300% in VHF set sales and
waiting lists for more expensive models.609 This was backed up by the
national picture: the trade journal, Electrical and Radio Trading, said that
VHF sets now accounted for one third of all sets, up from one fifth, and the
total sold would reach 1,000,000 by 1970.610 Despite these encouraging
statistics, there was a large degree of uncertainty about who was listening –
which was limited by the determining factor of access to VHF. In Stoke,
Owen Bentley recalls the window displays in the shops of the VHF sets but
he does not think there were enough people prepared to buy them, despite
the fact that industrial prosperity and employment in the potteries,
steelworks and mines was high.611
There was however another way of hearing the output – via the relay
arrangements with television companies such as Rediffusion, who provided
television and radio output via wired networks. The types of developments
that carried relay services were newly built housing estates and tower
blocks, which tended by definition to be local authority-owned housing. This
put a different emphasis on the type of local radio listener. Owen Bentley
had an early suspicion that “most likely the audience were the council
house audience, they were the ones most likely to listen.”612

608
Owen Bentley ibid
609
The Sun „Local Radio Pioneers Score a Hit‟ 25 January 1968
610
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 10 February 1968 R2/22/1
611
Owen Bentley ibid
612
Op cit

159
 However this diversity in the listenership was not necessarily reflected in
the output, as a Programme Assistant at Radio Leicester opined, in 1971.
She knew there were many council estate listeners to her women‟s
programme but the volunteers who wanted to get involved were from a
different social background. „When I started a listener‟s recipe thing I used
to get fantastic dinner dishes and what I wanted was something cheap and
good and solid for high tea because I felt they were the people really
listening.‟613
One of the most long-lasting legacies of the experiment was the eventual
reversal of the VHF/MW position. The BBC‟s view that MW was not usable
for multiple stations and that only VHF would work was not shared by the
increasingly vocal lobby who had their own ideas for commercially-funded
local radio. There was no doubt that the situation was very complex and
that views tended to be entrenched, based on whose scientific findings one
chose to follow. From the BBC‟s point of view, there was also the
complication of international agreements and administrative proceedings.
Those opposing the status quo and advocating more inventive use of
medium wave had their own reports to back them up, such as the Pye
proposals for 100 stations on MW, as presented to the Pilkington
Committee.614 What seems fairly clear towards the end of the 1960s is that
the lay person could be forgiven for not really being able to disentangle
either viewpoint from reality or conjecture.615
As was the case before the White Paper and at the start of the local radio
experiment, the main proponents arguing for greater use of medium wave
were the Local Radio Association, which had now been joined by the
television presenter, Hughie Green, who had co-founded a company, the
Commercial Broadcasting Consultants in 1966.616 In Spring 1968, Green
began to capture press attention regularly with his conviction that almost
any city could have a medium wave station.617 At about the same time, Paul

613
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167 p 113
614
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167
615
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011
616
Stoller ibid p 20
617
eg Daily Mail 13 March 1968

160
 Bryan, the shadow spokesman responsible for broadcasting, proposed a
plan for 100 commercial stations on medium wave.618 The PMG retaliated in
the House of Commons, arguing that Bryan‟s costing of the stations was
unrealistic and a motion condemning the plan was signed by 100 Labour
MPs.619 The press were also divided on the Tory plans: The Economist was
dubious and thought it was only viable in large towns while New Society
liked the Tory idea that regional and local newspapers would be allowed to
share the running of them.620
The continuing argument in favour of increased use of MW demonstrated
that the arrival of BBC Local Radio on VHF had not put an end to the
debate. Moreover the BBC was beginning to find itself on the back foot: it
had to defend the use of VHF when it was clear there was not enough
research into who and how many could listen. The very fact it was on VHF
also militated against using licence fee money to pay for it, as there was a
clear argument that if not everyone could hear, why should they subsidise
it? And then the BBC was faced with some awkward decisions about how to
develop the service further with more stations, if it could not prove the case
for VHF.
But it is worth noting that slowly there were signs within the BBC that
VHF was not all that they wished it could be. Phil Sidey in a piece for the
BBC in-house journal Ariel wrote frankly about the disadvantages of VHF.621
Within twelve months, the BBC had to make a significant doctrinal shift in its
approach to the use and re-allocation of medium wave for local radio. This
was also bound up, inextricably, with looming financial problems. But as far
as the first stations were concerned, the use of VHF was a decision they
had no choice over and was clearly a handicap to understanding who their
audience was and encouraging people to listen.

618
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 3 March R2/22/1
619
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 17 March ibid
620
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes March 3 ibid There was a nice irony highlighted
by the BBC‟s Head of Publicity who noted that Paul Bryan‟s daughter was doing work
experience at Radio Leeds and she was quoted as saying the BBC stations offered more
variety than a commercial station could. Board of Management minutes 14 April ibid
621
Ariel „A Radio Leeds-type greeting‟ by Phil Sidey 13: 12 12 December 1968 See also
Donald Edwards Daily Mail 13 March 1968

161
 Critical Reaction
This section looks at the various responses to the local radio experiment
while it was under way. This can be gauged from several sources. The role
of the press was significant, particularly the relationship on a local level with
a station, which was an indicator in many ways of the success of the
venture in engaging with the community. The BBC also continued to use its
own mechanisms to present a picture of the service, to illustrate from its
perspective what it was achieving. As I will demonstrate, this tended to fulfill
the BBC‟s need to promulgate their continued right to run local
broadcasting. Then there were some interesting examples of BBC staff
members who promoted their work in local radio, which may have had a
different impact. In particular this involved Phil Sidey in Leeds who was very
adept at getting press attention for his station. However the image that
came across may not have entirely been the same one that the BBC at the
centre was trying to create. The assessment for the experiment will be
explored further on, but it is important to remember that right from the
beginning of the stations, the BBC and the Post Office were keenly aware of
the public commitment they had made to gauge its success. Therefore all
the aspects listed above that contributed to the picture of the public
response and reaction to local radio could prove significant, to some degree
or other, in providing evidence to back the experiment.
Once the eight stations were launched, there were a number of editorial
pieces in the national press that presented „behind the scenes‟ type views
of „a day in the life of a local radio station.‟622 Some of the coverage was
less mainstream: for example The Listener published quite a few pieces on
local radio, which had a more limited distribution than a Fleet Street daily. 623
However there was a useful function to both types of coverage. Because of
the nature of the experiment, the majority of the country could not hear local
radio and had no idea what it was like. So full page spreads with

622
eg The Illustrated London News „A Good Day for Radio‟ by Michael Billington 22 June
1968; The Sun „This birthday baby will grow old gracefully‟ by Allan Hall 8 November 1968
623
eg The Listener „Backing Brighton‟ by Wilfred De‟Ath 29 February 1968; The Listener
„Radio Sheffield‟ by Jack Thompson 4 April 1968

162
 photographs and plenty of quotes and samples of local colour painted a
much-needed picture.
Reading articles such as „Backing Brighton‟ from The Listener or „A Good
Day for Radio‟ in The Illustrated London News serves as a reminder of how
new and different the service was. So there was usually an explanation of
the different staff roles involved, the types of programmes and the style of
news and presentation and how that contrasted with the more familiar BBC
presentation, or „fuddy duddy Auntie‟ as it was called.624 The point was
often also made about the „professionalism and manifest enthusiasm‟ of the
staff625 and their dedication to finding local stories and personalities. On the
other side, the typically negative points about local radio were the problems
of VHF and finding the audience, the issue of funding and finance, and the
degree to which the output was too parochial.626
One of the by-products of this type of coverage at this period was how
the image of local radio began to be cast. Phrases such as „parish pump‟
and „toy town‟ radio had cropped up in the past, when local broadcasting
was more theoretical than real. But now there were actual stations with
programmes that these adjectives could be applied to, it gave them more
reality. Hence the output of Radio Leicester on its first anniversary was
described as „VHF parish pump.‟627 However there was some nuance to
this. This description seemed to be derived from the amount of civic hall
activity and output, which – though „desperately boring‟ at times – seemed
to be justified by raising the awareness of local affairs.628
Getting coverage in newspapers in the locality of a BBC station proved
more problematic. This issue had been a subject of discussion in the period
of station selection, so it was known to be a key factor. The situation in the
late 1960s regarding the position of the local press was very different from
today. As Owen Bentley describes it “[the local press] was the power in the
land, the local newspaper then.”629 Circulation was much higher630 so they

624
The Listener „Backing Brighton‟ by Wilfred De‟Ath 29 February 1968
625
The Illustrated London News „A Good Day for Radio‟ by Michael Billington 22 June 1968
626
eg The Illustrated London News „A Good Day for Radio‟ by Michael Billington 22 June
1968
627
The Sun „This birthday baby will grow old gracefully‟ by Allan Hall 8 November 1968
628
Op cit
629
Owen Bentley ibid

163
 were far more established and had a more loyal audience than the
newcomer stations. There was no immediate financial threat as BBC Local
Radio did not take any of their advertising revenue. The only possible clash
of interest might be over news provision, but as has been illustrated above,
press agencies supplied most stations and in one case, the paper group
worked very closely with the station. Gillard was always at pains to point out
how different the two media were and how one was not a threat to the other
but rather a complement. Local radio, he wrote, is „a source of news and [a]
safety valve. It does not replace the newspaper but supplements it with
something no newspaper can print – the personality of the human voice.‟631
Why then did the local press response vary so much, from co-operation,
such as in Merseyside, to outright hostility, in Leeds and Leicester? John
Tupholme was the editor of the Stoke Sentinel and he provided a useful
barometer of feeling in a BBC television documentary from 1968. He
extended wishes of goodwill towards Radio Stoke and made it clear they
were not in competition for news stories. While he voiced criticism of the
financial funding arrangements for local radio, he made it clear that he was
not in favour of the commercial alternatives.632 Owen Bentley, who was
based at Radio Stoke at the time, has a different recollection: he felt the
support from the Stoke Sentinel was very poor, and laments the wasted
opportunities for exploiting the station output as interesting press copy
rather than the papers merely printing programme listings and nothing
more.633
The poor relationship between Radio Leicester and the Leicester
Mercury was well known and aroused national comment, such as „Only the
high Tory Leicester Mercury wages unqualified war.‟634 The Mercury‟s
hostility came from the way that the decision to fund the station was made
by the City Council. Although the paper eventually agreed to carry listings

630
Bentley estimates the Leicester Mercury and the Stoke Sentinel were probably selling
100,000 copies a week in this period Op cit
631
BBC BBC Local Radio: Some Questions Answered (London: BBC Publications, 1967) p11
632
BBC Television „Home Town Radio‟ tx 8 November 1968
633
Owen Bentley ibid; Robert Gunnell says his station‟s relationship with the Brighton Argus
was „pretty good‟ though he always had a feeling that they just „got away with it‟. Robert
Gunnell ibid
634
Sunday Times 9 July 1967; see also „Home Town Radio‟ BBC Television tx November 8
1968;

164
 information, it stayed generally aloof afterwards and only commented if it
could cause embarrassment over financial and political issues.635 It also
carried letters from readers about the station, including one who suggested
the following programme schedules, in a wry reflection on the station and
what the resident perceived as a cosy relationship with the City Council:
„8am: Songs of Praise from the Leicester City Council chamber
4pm: Traffic Island Discs: each week a ratepayer is asked which eight
City Councillors he would take with him if he were cast away to a traffic
island.
5pm: Going for a Song: a brief history of compulsory purchase.‟636

It is not surprising therefore that the BBC was keen to put across its own
perspective on how the experiments were doing. There were two key
publications. BBC Local Radio – Some Questions Answered, published just
prior to the launch of Radio Leicester in October 1967 served as an
introduction to the service for the general public.637 It rehearsed many of the
familiar arguments, including the BBC‟s long-standing involvement in local
broadcasting, and how the experiment came about following the 1966 White
Paper. It then went on to outline the type of service that would be heard,
how the stations would be run and how one could listen. This was very
much a public information booklet, reaching out to the licence payer in
general, most of whom could not hear local radio.
About a year later, another publication revisited the experimental stations
and documented in some detail their achievements. This is Local Radio:
The BBC Experiment at Work was an even more forthright example of the
BBC promoting the work of the stations to the widest possible audience.638
This time there was a double purpose. In his introduction, Hugh Pierce, by
this time the General Manager of Local Radio Development, made it clear
that the information in the booklet was aimed at those in areas without
stations who might like one, yet there was also clearly more than a nod

635
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167 p 68
636
as quoted in BBC WAC Paper by R R Thornton (Town Clerk of Leicester) to the Annual
Conference of the Society of Town Clerks June 1968 Local Radio Policy 1964-69 R102/73
637
BBC BBC Local Radio: Some Questions Answered (London: BBC Publications 1967)
638
BBC This is Local Radio: The BBC Experiment at Work (London: BBC Publications no
date)

165
 towards the assessment process being led by the government.639 An overtly
positive spin was put on all aspects of the organisation, including the take
up of VHF sets and the method of financing, which Pierce somewhat
disingenuously said „…has not brought with it any unusual pressures and
has created no special problems.‟640 While the spirit of this statement was
accurate, it ignores the fact that local authority subsidies might not continue
to support local radio after the experiment. The ensuing pages listed, station
by station, the accomplishments of the experiment so far. Interestingly the
focus here was less about the programmes the stations produced: it also
included examples of how the stations and their staff went out into the
locality and got involved with communities.
One recurring themed emerged from these two illustrations. This was the
way that the BBC started to write a script for itself that showcased the
benefits to the community of local radio. This included the role the station
was establishing for itself in times of bad weather;641 examples of social
support for listeners who were underprivileged and with special needs;
events where stations welcomed the audience into their „world‟ and got
good responses in return, eg an open day at Radio Nottingham that
attracted 3,000 visitors. The BBC was keen to paint the picture that each
station was uniquely attached to the locality and the focus was about
connecting with communities, although the pamphlet did not use this kind of
terminology.
Apart from press coverage, there was the issue of how best to promote
the work of local radio on the wider BBC radio output. Programmes such as
Woman’s Hour, Today, Home This Afternoon, Roundabout and Late Night
Extra were initially the best outlets for locally produced material.642 The
problem however that then emerged was the type of pieces that were taken.
Samples of local radio packages used by Today during 1969 included
topics such as „vicar turns detective‟; „allergic to chicken‟; „square tomatoes‟;
„talking budgie‟. There were some more serious pieces too, including one
639
BBC Op cit p 1
640
BBC Op cit p 2
641
eg heavy floods in Leicester in July 1968; the snow storms in Brighton in December 1967
and in Merseyside in February 1968
642
BBC WAC Paper: „Use of Local Radio material on network broadcasts‟ 20 December 1967
Local Broadcasting 1964-76 R34/1408

166
 on widowhood for Woman’s Hour and immigration and the miners‟ strike for
Today.643 As Owen Bentley identifies, network radio was more interested in
the „quirky‟ output, and thus local radio got a reputation for dealing with the
bizarre. “The epithet „toy town‟ radio was used a lot in the rest of the BBC
about us” which many in local radio began to resent, says Bentley. 644
There was a more concerted attempt to showcase the work of local radio
on Radio Four with the commissioning of a series of programmes by Gerald
Mansell (Controller of Radio Four) called The Local Sound, to be broadcast
in Spring 1969. His concept was to produce „self-portraits in sound‟,
showing the lives and activities of the staff in local stations, „enabling the
network audience to get a close-up picture of what a local station is all
about.‟645 However, as the Audience Research Reports for the individual
programmes highlighted there was not enough variety. Listeners were
confused about the central concept: for example the Radio Sheffield edition
– was it about the staff or the city or the community?646 Where there was
content about the output itself, audience research was quite dismissive: „it
merely confirmed their worst suspicions that local radio was trivial, parochial
and inward-looking.‟647
After five programmes had been made, with three still to go, CFO Clarke,
the Editor of General Talks, Radio, attempted to summarise the audience
feedback so far, but he could barely contain his own antipathy to the
enterprise. He thought the failure of the listeners to engage in local affairs
was „inevitable‟ and while he tried to compliment the „enthusiasm‟ of the
local producers, he felt the programmes were „too disjointed, with too much
trumpeting of the station‟s own work.‟648 Clarke basically thought the series
was a mistake and said that making any more similar programmes

643
BBC WAC various memos Local Broadcasting 1964-76 ibid
644
Owen Bentley ibid
645
BBC WAC memo from CR4 to Local Radio Development Manager 23 September 1968
Talks Local Radio Stations R51/1,170 1968-69
646
BBC WAC Audience Research Report „The Local Sound‟ BBC Radio Sheffield 13 January
1969 Talks Local Radio Stations ibid
647
BBC WAC Audience Research Report „The Local Sound‟ BBC Radio Leicester 15 January
1969 Talks Local Radio Stations ibid
648
BBC WAC memo from Editor General Talks to MDR 24 February 1969 Talks Local Radio
Stations ibid Each programme was produced locally by the individual station which would
have accounted for great variations in styles and techniques which probably further confused
the Radio Four audience.

167
 „might irritate more listeners than it would win over to the cause…..I
think it would be preferable for other programmes to use contributions
but on a truly selective basis so that Local Radio does not get
associated with the mediocre.‟649

The episode very clearly illustrates some of the internal tensions that
existed around local radio. There was a serious lack of appreciation about
what the stations were trying to achieve and who their audience was,
because as Gillard pointed out in his response to Clarke‟s memo, what he
[Gillard] had wanted was a „magazine collection of the best items from the
past quarter or half year…..network is missing some good radio.‟650
Gerald Mansell clearly could not translate what local radio was about for his
audience or station, and dismissed the notion of the magazine format as
„space fillers….a rag bag type of programme.‟651
As Owen Bentley and others have highlighted, the problem of the image
of the local stations and their output was part of the reason that other
elements of the BBC may not have taken it seriously. “We didn‟t mind being
parish pump because people are interested and they gather round their
parish pump. „Toy town‟ makes it sound not very good.”652 Some of the local
content was undoubtedly of a „quirky‟ nature but in many cases this was just
one small component of a schedule that had varying shades of the serious
and entertaining. National exposure for the lighter items probably gave them
undue prominence. This was further underlined by one Station Manager in
particular, Phil Sidey, who proved very adept at getting himself a great deal
of attention for his station, Radio Leeds, by writing articles for the press.
The difficulty was that it tended to be the more frivolous items that caught
the most attention, such as gargling a tune with beer.653 Sidey fostered the
nickname „Radio Irreverent‟ for the station – indeed the first words heard on

649
BBC WAC Op cit
650
BBC WAC memo from MDR to Head of Talks and Current Affairs 28 February 1969 Talks
Local Radio Stations ibid
651
BBC WAC memo from Chairman Policy Study Group to MDR 10 March 1969 Talks Local
Radio Stations ibid Gillard appended a rather forlorn postscript, handwritten, to the bottom of
this memo „I‟m sorry that nobody will really accept my argument.‟ Op cit
652
Robert McLeish ibid
653
The Times „Local Radio Success for BBC‟ 12 May 1969 The beer gargling was not singled
out as a success, but rather as „bordering on sheer lunacy‟.

168
 air were “Radio Leeds? It‟s a bloody waste of time!”654 Underlying the self-
promotion however were some serious points about what Sidey was trying
to achieve in Leeds, with a strong emphasis on community involvement.
Every year, the station handed itself over to the city‟s teenagers to take over
all the programmes for a week (except news), and managed to get over
1,000 young voices on the air.655 Elsewhere Sidey talked about the range of
contributors, from the Lord Mayor to a woman who had had a back street
abortion.656 There was a strong emphasis on news, with Leeds placed
prominently (ie first) in the running order. Hence the programme names
Leeds and the World and Leeds and the World at One.657
However, Sidey was very aware that it was the frivolous items that got
the station noticed: „Radio Leeds gains most publicity from its irreverent
idiocies which inspired the Daily Mail to take a column….to claim we gave
out „pure goonery seven hours a day.‟‟658 Owen recalls that many others in
local radio were less pleased with Sidey‟s antics, feeling they did not help
their cause: “you could take budgerigars too far.”
“Was he a good thing for Local Radio? Probably [he] was, but others
were making better programmes and resented him but local radio
needed someone like him to bang the drum, even if the gong was a bit
tarnished by his silliness sometimes.”659

The combative nature of Sidey‟s personality did not help matters either.
In his article for Ariel, he made it clear that he saw local radio as a fight,
whose opponents are not just outside the BBC, but inside as well – „those
who say that Leeds disrupts the smooth running of the BBC.‟660 This sense
of mutual distrust was never far from the surface, as witnessed in the
incident of the Fabian pamphlet. This was the long article Sidey had written
for the Fabian Society about local radio, which he hoped to publish without
alerting the BBC first. Frank Gillard inevitably found out and referred the

654
BBC This is Local Radio: The BBC Experiment at Work (London: BBC Publications no
date)
655
New Society „Radio Teen‟ by Phil Sidey 20 March 1968
656
Ariel „A Radio-Leeds type greeting‟ by Phil Sidey 12 December 1968 Vol 13 No 12
657
BBC This is Local Radio: The BBC Experiment at Work ibid
658
Ariel ibid
659
Owen Bentley ibid
660
Ariel ibid

169
 matter to the Board of Management for their approval. Eventually a re-
written version of the pamphlet was published in the New Statesman.661
„Your Radio or Theirs‟662 was a very considered and eloquent analysis of
the future for local radio in all its forms. In contrast to the sometimes
celebratory and self-justifying pieces that typified local radio journalism, this
marked an important step forwards in the assessment process that posed
significant questions about funding, relationships between government
(local and national) and the BBC (also local and national), wavelengths and
content. Sidey was still very much opposed to commercial radio, but he
could see that many factors such as needletime and wavelength restrictions
hampered developments on all sides. What was also evident was the sense
that Sidey – through his experience of running the station – had begun to
appreciate just what it meant to work with his local community and how this
could be translated into some kind of ethos.
„We claim to be a „walk-in-and-talk‟ station and it surprises many
callers to find that it is not an empty advertising slogan. We like
involvement. We ran „participation broadcasting‟ before it became a
political cliché.‟663

Sidey set out the choices for the future of local radio, which were the
status quo of local authority funding; taking advertising or using the licence
fee. He favoured the licence fee – but the wider discussion in the article and
the points that Sidey raised were those that would dominate the debate
determining the success or failure of the BBC experiment and what should
happen next.

The Evaluation
In this section I will argue that the evaluation process that took place in
1969 provided the evidence that the government needed to make its

661
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes January 20; March 3; March 31April 21 1969
R2/22/1 and Sidey, P Hello Mrs Butterfield (Claverdon: Kestrel 1994) pp 93-99. Apart from
variations in the chronology of negotiations, the main difference is one of motive, however
nuanced. Sidey suggests he was being gagged by the BBC (although not Gillard, who he said
acted honourably) and the Board who were worried about some aspects of the pamphlet that
might exacerbate relations with the Conservative Party and the commercial radio lobby. Sidey
of course would not submit to any editing of his work.
662
New Statesman „Your Radio or Theirs‟ by Phil Sidey 11 April 1969 reprinted in Sidey, P
Hello Mrs Butterfield (Claverdon: Kestrel 1994)
663
As quoted in Sidey, P Hello Mrs Butterfield (Claverdon: Kestrel 1994) p 111

170
 decision to allow the BBC to continue with local radio. The narrative
becomes complex at this point as running concurrently with the
government‟s investigation into local radio, the BBC was also addressing all
its radio operations as part of the broader review which was to become
published as Broadcasting in the 70s. It had an impact on the local radio
evaluation in terms of financial implications for the BBC and for the broader
strategy of radio expansion.
On Monday 11 November 1968 John Stonehouse, who had become
Postmaster General in August of that year, following the brief tenure of Roy
Mason, replied to a written question about local radio: “I am encouraged to
believe from the results of their work….that local radio [has] a valuable part
to play in promoting public awareness and in consequence public
participation.”664 He would not be drawn on the specifics of the review
process other than to stress the benefits of local radio to the democratic
process, noting that the press tended to ignore the municipal debates.
In fact the BBC and the PO had already drawn up the outline for the review
process in three proposal papers. These included establishing the general
objectives of the review and the information that would be needed in the
form of evidence.665
The BBC had until mid-May 1969 to submit their report to the Post Office
and the PMG hoped to have an interim decision before the summer
recess.666 John Stonehouse promised to visit all the stations667 and in
February 1969 he met all the chairmen of the LRCs.668 Sources of external
evidence included the AMC, who supported the experiment and proposed

664
Hansard Vol 773 No 10 „Broadcasting (Local Stations)‟ 11 November 1968
665
BBC WAC BB/CM/883 The Review of the Experiment in Local Radio: Method and
Measures Local Radio Evaluation (Interim) Major Policy 1967-69 R102/41
666
BBC WAC Letter from Dennis Lawrence, Post Office to Frank Gillard 25 March 1969 Local
Broadcasting Evaluation: Major Policy Aspect 1968-69 R102/54 This had a knock-on effect
on the evidence-gathering process. The BBC was asked to reduce the size of their report to
six pages of foolscap, plus a more detailed breakdown of the financial and programme
information. It also meant the list of organisations to be approached for submissions,
including local authorities, universities, clubs and societies was greatly reduced too.
667
BBC WAC Letter from Denis Lawrence, Post Office to Frank Gillard 25 March 1969 Local
Broadcasting Evaluation: Major Policy Aspect 1968-69 R102/54
668
BBC WAC Minutes of Meeting with LRC Chairmen, PMG, DG, MDR and LRDM February 5
1969 Local Broadcasting Papers 1968-69 R78/609

171
 50 or so stations to be run by the BBC. 669 The general public was invited by
advertisements to send in their comments. The Post Office was surprised
by the response, which numbered several thousands, over 95% of which
were resolutely in favour of retaining BBC Local Radio.670 Other
organisations agreed, including NALGO and the Newspaper Society. The
Musicians Union gave qualified support: they were against commercial
radio but felt their members had been underemployed in local radio.671 The
BBC was very keen to conduct their own audience research to assess how
many listeners the local stations had and what impact they were having.
The research took the form of surveys of 1,000 people in each experimental
area.672 The main objectives were to establish the distribution of listening
facilities (ie how many could hear VHF, either by a set or a radio relay), how
often they heard local radio compared to other services and what they
thought of it.
The preliminary results of this research were pulled together and used for
the BBC‟s submission to the Post Office, while the fuller surveys presented
something of a problem for the BBC. In terms of facilities for listening, the
report established that around 1,665,000 people could hear VHF – the
majority through a VHF set, and the remainder via radio relay (a small
proportion had both). Interestingly the report suggested there was only a
small growth in VHF receiver ownership in the first year, despite stories in
the press from industry sources about VHF set popularity.673
Roughly 25% of the population in an editorial area of the experiment
listened regularly to their station. Another 25% had heard their station at

669
BBC WAC Report from AMC to PMG: Feedback on Local Radio Experiment 19 May 1969
ibid
670
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167
671
BBC WAC Op cit The Leicester University report pointed out that the line up of supporters
was similar to the divisions at the time of the Pilkington Report, the only difference being that
Equity had changed sides and now supported commercial radio
672
BBC WAC An Audience Research Report Local Broadcasting 1967-69 Local Radio
Experiments Policy 1961-62 [sic] R102/47 The first stations (Leicester, Nottingham,
Merseyside and Sheffield) had three surveys each; the newer stations (Leeds, Stoke-on-
Trent, Brighton and Durham) only had one survey with a follow-up postal enquiry of VHF set
owners.
673
BBC WAC Op cit

172
 some time, while 50% had never listened.674 In terms of listener profile,
males were slightly higher than females, with an age profile that was
middle-aged and above, though not necessarily retired. In social terms, the
listeners tended to be in the bottom groups of the three social status scales
(class, education and occupation), although interestingly these groups were
less likely to have access to a VHF set.
The most popular programmes were the breakfast magazines, sports,
record request and pop music shows. The surveys revealed that more than
50% of an area‟s population were interested to some degree in local radio
as an idea, and an even larger proportion rejected the idea that local affairs
were of insufficient interest to warrant a local station. The measure of
performance rating averaged over 60% for „excellent‟ or „quite good‟ in any
given area, with only 12% settling for „poor‟ or local radio as a „failure‟. 675
The report concluded that consensus was perhaps hard to find across the
eight locations, but overall, the „prevailing attitudes are highly favourable.‟
Where there were noticeable problems, these were ascribed to difficulties
with reception (Leeds and Durham especially) and perhaps in a local
reluctance to embrace innovation.676

The BBC’s submission

In May 1969, Frank Gillard put forward the BBC‟s case to the Board of
Management, as it would be presented to the PMG.677 Regarding finance,
the BBC conceded that the running costs had become greater than
anticipated, with Merseyside reaching £65,000 per year. Therefore the
projected budget for future stations might be as much as £80 – 100,000.
The success of the programmes was gauged by strong local news, access
to politicians and coverage of local democracy in particular, and the

674
BBC WAC Op cit In terms of individual stations, Nottingham, Leicester, Stoke-on-Trent and
Merseyside all commanded a regular listenership of between 31-34% of their available
audience. Durham was the lowest, with just 11%.
675
BBC WAC Op cit When asked to list adjectives that might describe their station, the most
common ones were „interesting, entertaining, free and easy, responsible, enterprising and
educational.‟ At the bottom of the list were some pejorative terms, which received far fewer
endorsements, such as „trivial, dull, high-brow, too-serious.‟
676
BBC WAC Op cit
677
BBC WAC The Local Radio Experiment Evaluation G61/69 Local Broadcasting 1969-70
R78/610

173
 abundance of material. Other areas singled out for attention were
education, where the potential was only just beginning to be exploited,
music, drama and religious programmes. The report highlighted the
preliminary audience research results from Leicester, Nottingham, Sheffield
and Merseyside, extracting all the positive statistics about frequency of
listening and programme penetration. The conclusion the BBC reached was
that, not surprisingly, „Local Radio provides a real service to local
democracy and one which gives enrichment to local life.‟ It hoped that it
would be allowed to provide a permanent service, „based on satisfactory
financial arrangements.‟678 It is perhaps an anti-climax that this culmination
of so many years of effort and resources should be reduced to an over-
simplified and overwhelmingly positive document. It has to be remembered
that the BBC were also submitting supplementary evidence too but
alongside this there was also continued lobbying to the government about
how they might expand local radio (and pay for it), which will be looked at in
the next section.
But it is also worth addressing the question of whether the evaluation
was investigating the right questions. Two factors were emerging that
demonstrated that sticking rigidly to the criteria of the White Paper in
making the assessment was disingenuous. The first issue concerned the
realistic impact of the stations‟ community involvement. Much was made
about the putative role of local radio „to make local life more interesting‟ and
how it would become „a missionary instrument…..to build up a better
community feeling‟.679 Note the use of the word „build‟ here, which marked a
transition from the notion of reflecting a community‟s identity. However this
was very hard to assess or quantify as part of the experiment – it was an
aspiration, but could it be genuinely measured? The researchers at the
University of Leicester, in their report, which was only published in 1971,
after the key decisions were made and after a change of government,
highlighted this omission from the evaluation, and attempted their own
assessment based on their research. This involved surveys in Leicester,

678
BBC WAC BBC WAC The Local Radio Experiment Evaluation G61/69 Local Broadcasting
1969-70 R78/610
679
BBC WAC Frank Gillard at the Estimates Sub-Committee, House of Commons 10 March
1969 Local Radio Policy 1969-71 R102/48

174
 Stoke-on-Trent and Brighton with voluntary organisations about their
relationship with local radio.680 There were various angles to this, such as
comparing local press and radio in terms of ease of gaining publicity and
the readiness with which local stations were willing to get involved. The
evidence suggested that organisations were willing to use local radio, and
that it had a more adaptable nature than newspapers. But at the same time,
there was a difference between supplying materials to local stations and
whether the radio staff actually came out of the studio to engage with the
needs of the audience.
It is noticeable that much of the BBC‟s evidence and public
pronouncements championed how the stations had interacted with their
local community organisations, but there was not much from the opposite
perspective. One measure was the active participation of community groups
in actually making programmes. However, the Leicester research found in
their sample that only one in five organisations had got involved in the
programme-making side.681 Another, broader, interpretation might be the
diversity of „new‟ voices heard on air. Again, however, the social benefits
were less clear to the Leicester researchers, who found that local radio
gave disproportionate access to contributors from higher social classes,
which was not breaking new ground.682
The Leicester Report concluded that while local radio had found an
audience, it tended to be more favourably received and used by those
already heavily involved in the community. Radio Leicester was proven to
provide a good means of publicising community activities, but for others, it
became a substitute for participation and involvement.683 The conclusions,
though rather laboured in the report, did accept that the period of evaluation
was too short given that the BBC had created a service from scratch and
was trying to build an audience out of nothing. As Donald Edwards said in a
lunchtime lecture: “Let me be frank. Nobody in Leicester, Sheffield or
anywhere else stormed the town hall to demand a station. They never

680
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 R9/1,167
681
BBC WAC Op cit
682
BBC WAC Op cit
683
BBC WAC Op cit

175
 do.”684 It also acknowledged that the staff themselves could be put in a
difficult position when it came to embracing their community. As one
employee at Radio Leicester told the researchers:
“I certainly feel as a professional broadcaster there should never be a
complete association……I wouldn‟t like there to be a complete joining of
the people so that they knew you personally. I think they‟d lose respect
for you.”685

The attitude of the staff and the relative success, or not, of community
involvement was a recurring topic in the oral history interviews. All four
interviewees, who had held senior positions in the first, experimental
stations attested to the value of working with their community.
Owen Bentley is typical: “One thing we all believed in was that we were the
facilitators for that particular community. We were not there to be top
presenters ourselves. We were there to get local people on air.”686
These views make an interesting complement to the Leicester Report:
here, BBC staff aspired to bringing the community into the station, yet they
did not have any accurate measure of their success, other than the fact that
local radio continued beyond the experiment. It is also worth pointing out
that the work of the stations did not fit neatly into a pre- and post-
experiment timeline. It was continuous, and what was started at one end
bore fruit at the other. In fact Michael Barton recalled that Radio Sheffield‟s
earliest output was not as „local‟ as people perhaps thought, something that
even Gillard noticed.687 The other significant factor that influenced – and
probably overshadowed – the evaluation process was the political
dimension. The future of local radio had become a party political issue.

Local radio and the licence fee

In March 1969, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, condemned
Conservative plans for 100 commercial radio stations as “irresponsible, ill-

684
BBC WAC Local Radio by Donald Edwards BBC Lunchtime Lectures Sixth Series No 4 24
January 1968 P 6 Press Cuttings P90
685
BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the Community
1971 p 115 R9/1,167
686
Owen Bentley ibid
687
Michael Barton ibid

176
 considered and unwise,” declaring this “squalid commercialism” would not
satisfy the community interests in the same way BBC Local Radio could.688
Days later in the House of Commons, he declared that the local radio
experiment was „extremely interesting‟ and that „we must all review it coolly
and without ideological bias‟,689 seemingly forgetting his earlier, more
politicised words. The hopes of conducting a neutral evaluation were fading
fast as the parties adopted stronger ideological lines on the debate.
In May, in an article for the Financial Times,690 David Watt drew up
comparisons between what he called the „New Model‟ Tories who wanted to
allow people what they wanted at no cost, and the Labour/old style Tory
allegiance to public service values with a degree of paternalism. For him,
the ideological questions came down to „should people have to pay for
something they cannot hear?‟: he thought not. He was also dubious about
the audience‟s desire for culturally nurturing radio. Watt concluded that
commercial radio was feasible, but that it would not fulfill doctrinal or social
functions.
The BBC was also keenly aware of where their support lay. In a memo
from Hugh Pierce to the Controller of Information Services, all the MPs who
had appeared on local radio were listed and which were pro- or anti- the
service or pro-commercial radio.691 The response from the Controller was
that MPs were split on party lines in their attitude to local radio.692 With an
election looming, there was increased pressure to reach an early decision
about BBC Local Radio, without making it seem overtly political. While it
was still unclear throughout 1969 whether a Conservative government
would actually remove or close down the existing stations,693 pressure for
more BBC stations increased, both inside and outside the Corporation.

688
The Observer 16 March 1969
689
Hansard House of Commons debate 20 March 1969
690
The Financial Times „A Doctrinaire Issue‟ by David Watt 23 May 1969
691
BBC WAC Memo from LRDM to Controller Information Services 5 March 1969 Local
Broadcasting Papers 1968-69 R78/609 Apparently Eric Heffer, MP for Walton, always
required a fee for an interview on Radio Merseyside and Viscount Lambton, who appeared on
Radio Durham, demonstrated such „aristocratic reserve‟ that it was not clear if he was for or
against local radio.
692
BBC WAC Memo from Controller Information Services to DPA 6 March 1969 Op cit
693
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 5 May 1969 it was noted that Conservative
Central Office were determined to end the BBC‟s radio monopoly at the very least. R2/22

177
 Plans for at least 40 stations began to emerge in the Press,694 which not
surprisingly led to accusations that the BBC‟s main objective was to stop
commercial radio. John Gorst, Secretary of the Local Radio Association,
was quoted as saying this was a plot between the government and the
BBC.695 The BBC took this very seriously and the Secretary to the BBC,
Tony Whitby, prepared a memo for the Director of Public Affairs which set
out six points to rebut the assertion that the BBC were „spiking the
commercial radio guns.‟696 Curiously these were based not around concepts
of public service broadcasting or connecting with communities, nor around
economic viability and serving diverse audiences. The memo relied instead
on the well-worn chronology of the BBC‟s past engagement in the local
broadcasting debate, from the 1920s onwards. This seemed to suggest that
this was not so much an ideological debate any more, rather just a case of
„we were here first.‟
But the one great question mark that hung over the BBC was – if it
wanted to expand its local radio service, how was it going to pay for it?
Six months into the experiment, Gillard prepared papers for the Boards of
Governors and Management, which set out the current funding situation
and the options available to the BBC.697 With only roughly 50% of the
running costs expected from local authorities and other organisations, it was
inescapable that the financial arrangements had been a disappointment.698
Gillard rehearsed the various alternative methods of financing local radio
and concluded that the only option left was that of using the licence fee.699
But how could this be justified when so many people could not hear it?
Gillard argued that subsidising minorities was a well-established part of
democracy. Local radio would probably benefit urban areas first, but

694
eg The Times ‟40 new radio stations may oust regions‟ 9 May 1969
695
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 12 May 1969 R2/22
696
BBC WAC memo from The Secretary to DPA 24 June 1969 Local Broadcasting Papers
1969-70 R78/610
697
BBC WAC The Financing of Local Radio 9 May 1968 G61/68 Board of Governor Papers
R1/104; BM (68) 47 29 April 1968 Local Radio Policy 1964-68 R102/73 At this point, the BBC
had spent £281,614 in non-recurring capital expenditure to establish the stations. The total
running costs were £528,000 of which £273,946 was guaranteed by local sources.
698
BBC WAC The Financing of Local Radio G61.68 op cit Note that the guarantee of revenue
did not necessarily mean the BBC would receive it. Neither Leeds nor Durham were included
in the calculation for expected income either.
699
BBC WAC Op cit

178
 traditionally, city dwellers had already subsidized rural populations over the
years, so there was no harm in reversing the equation. While Gillard won
over the Board of Governors on the principle that the BBC should be
financing local radio, there was no obvious means of achieving this.700
Nevertheless he was tasked with coming up with a plan for creating
£4million worth of savings to raise the necessary funds.
Reluctantly Gillard produced a paper, which went through various
options, including cutting back network hours, axing a national station
altogether (prime candidate: Radio Three), replacing all Regional output
and making large numbers of staff redundant.701 The scenario Gillard
painted was, for him, uncharacteristically bleak, concluding with a
doomsday prophecy, that while the BBC had to make every effort to remain
in charge of local radio „I am sure that the plan examined in this paper, if it
were proceeded with, would create consternation among the staff and the
greatest storm of external criticism the BBC has ever known.‟702
I would argue that what the paper essentially revealed was the extent to
which the local radio project had evolved without actually being fully
integrated into the broader strategy and long-term financial planning of the
BBC. While Gillard was asked to come back in February of the following
year with a firm plan, it was noted by the Governors that the McKinsey
Report might unearth more savings.703 The BBC Chairman, Lord Hill, had
invited McKinsey Consultants to look into the financial efficiency of BBC
Radio. An interim report was produced in September 1968, and the final
one in February 1970. Their conclusions about where savings might be
made became integral to another working party, this time internal, under
Gerald Mansell, who was the Chief of Home Service. The Mansell Policy
Study Group findings formed the basis of the document Broadcasting in the
70s, which set out the pattern for the development of BBC Radio in the
coming decade.704

700
BBC WAC Board of Governors minutes 16 May R1/36
701
BBC WAC Financing Local Radio from Existing Revenue 3 July 1968 G95/68 R1/104
702
BBC WAC Op cit
703
BBC WAC Board of Governors minutes 11 July 1968 R1/36
704
Hendy D Life on Air: A History of Radio Four (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) pp 52
- 53

179
 These studies were undoubtedly the most significant factors for the BBC
in securing a short to medium term financial future for local radio, and re-
positioning the service into the heart of long-term strategic development,
alongside network radio. By late 1968, early 1969, it was Mansell‟s Policy
Study Group, which was formulating the means for local radio expansion,
down to the details of how many stations and where they would be. These
core decisions needed to be made internally and then proffered to the Post
Office, in supplement to the evidence about the evaluation, as a means of
securing the next stage of development. Interestingly, the combination of
the financial and wavelength factors refocused attention onto station area,
as a practical means to the end of getting sufficient national coverage to
justify using licence money. The determining factors around serving
communities again seemed to be losing ground. For example, the interim
McKinsey report concentrated on broadcast size and although it ruled out
large-scale area sites, their concept of 20 to 40 stations still risked
downgrading the sense of community, as Marriott warned Gillard in January
1969.705 The Mansell Policy Study Group developed the McKinsey station
formula, drawing up a list of 32 new stations (making 40 in total). It argued
these should be introduced by 1974, with the first 15 being financed by BBC
sources, through savings etc, and the remainder being paid for by
government money, such as cutting licence fee evasion and looking for
state subsidy of educational programmes.706 The Policy Study Group then
produced a financial plan, which rested on two key planks. First the
reorganization of BBC frequencies brought about by the disappearance of
the regional system. This would improve network services and release
medium wave for local radio for use during daytime. Secondly, the proposal
to develop up to 38 more local stations over a five-year period, by raising
the money from licence fee increases.707
The Board of Management noted that the incorporation of medium wave
for local radio was a „radical departure from previous doctrine‟, so it was
705
BBC WAC memo from ADR to MDR 31 January 1969 Local Radio Policy 1969-91
R102/48
706
BBC WAC Third Progress Report of the Policy Study Group Board of Management
minutes 24 April 1969 R2/22
707
BBC WAC Minutes of Special Meeting 12 & 13 May 1969 to consider the Final Report of
the Policy Study Group Board of Management Minutes R2/22

180
 suggested that it might only be proposed to the PMG as a second choice,
after VHF. These proposals were backed by the Board of Governors on 29
May,708 and less than a week later, a full set of proposals was sent to the
Post Office, outlining the BBC‟s desired development plan, in the hope that
they would be authorized to continue with local radio.709
The paper stressed that the 40 or so stations would not be of the size of
Radio Brighton as this would require over 150 „town stations‟ with a cost of
£12 -15 million. Instead the BBC was looking at stations that covered major
conurbations and some rural areas. The PMG was also asked to allow
daytime medium wave frequencies to supplement the new stations, on the
understanding that these would be redistributed, existing wavelengths, not
new ones. The point was also made that if commercial radio was introduced
in the future, on MW, it was only fair that the BBC could protect its
competitive advantage. This certainly seemed like a pre-emptive move, but
one that would find a sympathetic ear in the government. Finally there was
the question of finance. Given that the current method did not work, the
BBC suggested a „mixed economy‟. The licence fee would pay for the first
four or five hours a day and the local authorities and others could
contribute, in kind or cash, to augment the output. There would be no
question of advertising or sponsorship.710
Although the PMG was not ready to announce his final decision on the
experiment, there were meetings between the Post Office and the BBC
about which stations would be proposed in the first phase and the names
they would take.711 The Board of Management were told that the Post Office
had been impressed with the logic and cohesion of the BBC case, although
Charles Curran warned his colleagues of the amount of work needed to
implement the setting up of new stations.712 The BBC plans for 40 stations
were officially unveiled with the publication of Broadcasting in the 70s on 10
July 1969, along with other proposals concerning the rationalisation of the

708
BBC WAC Board of Governors minutes 29 May 1969 R1/37
709
BBC WAC The BBC‟s Local Radio Proposals 2 June 1969 (sent to PMG with covering
letter from Chairman 6 June 1969) Local Radio Policy 1969-71 R102/48
710
BBC WAC Op cit
711
BBC WAC personal note between MDR and DG 26 June 1969 ibid
712
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 16 June 1969 R2/22

181
 four networks, the regrouping the television regions, the scaling back of the
radio regions, and the disbanding of some BBC orchestras.
Clearly the momentum was moving closer towards a final decision on
local radio, with John Stonehouse (PMG) telling the House of Commons
during the debate on Broadcasting in the 70s on 22 July that “there is no
doubt that the experiment as been a very great success..,,,it has opened up
a new means of communication.”713 Robert McLeish wrote in his diary that
this signaled government approval for „this kind of community
broadcasting.‟714
On August 4, the Chairman, the Director-General, and the PMG met
Harold Wilson who told them of the decision to allow the BBC to develop
local radio „as quickly as was reasonable in the light of financial and other
considerations.‟ He also asked the BBC not to dissolve any of its
orchestras.715 However the Cabinet had not agreed to a licence fee
increase, but after further negotiations, a compromise was struck that saw
the BBC promised a 10/- increase by April 1971, in return for their
commitment to expand local radio: 12 stations immediately and 20 more
over the next seven years. It would also save the orchestras, despite the
fact that the BBC would be in deficit by 1974 to the tune of £4 million.716
On 1 August, the post of PMG was re-designated Minister of Posts and
Telecommunications and on 14 August, John Stonehouse officially
announced his decision on the BBC‟s plans, stating:
„The overwhelming weight of public opinion in the areas of the local
radio experiment has considered that it has been a success and has
confirmed the government‟s expectations that, organised and financed
as a public service, local radio would become a valuable force in the life
of the community.‟717

Frank Gillard wrote to Hugh Pierce, who was on holiday in Ireland,

thanking him for all his work, saying „It might be better, it might be worse.

713
As quoted in BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and
the Community 1971 R9/1,167 p 77
714
Robert McLeish Diary entry 22 July 1969
715
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 5 August 1969 R2/22 1-5
716
Briggs, A Vol V ibid Chapter VIII
717
BBC WAC Press Release: Decision on Radio and Television: Local Radio: Licence Fees;
BBC Plans by PMG Local Radio Policy 1969-71 R102/48

182
 But on the local radio front, it‟s a triumph‟.718 For Robert McLeish – also on
holiday - the news meant quite a dramatic upheaval, as he had already
been offered, and accepted, the role of Local Radio Training Officer should
the new stations get the go ahead.
„A telegramme arrived from Gerald [Northcott]…..PMG announces
success of LR. 20 stations by the end of next year….so if I‟m going to do
the training it‟s going to be high speed action. Where to live, house hunt,
schools for the children, organise courses.‟719

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the BBC realised its long-dreamt ambition
in launching the service of local broadcasting in eight locations. However
the grounds on which local radio itself could be called a success was less
certain. First there was the number of experimental stations: the BBC had to
accept eight rather than nine, and the process of location selection itself
had been fraught with difficulty. Some of the factors were due to external
political problems outside the BBC‟s control. The financial settlement, using
local authority funding, also had the effect of limiting the final choice of
stations, so in the end the BBC was extremely fortunate to have enough
stations to proceed with.
I have also used the archival evidence to demonstrate the strengths and
the weaknesses of the content of the first output. The years of planning and
preparation and the structure that Gillard put in place meant that the new
stations could produce at least the minimum amount of programmes at key
parts of the day. The Station Managers quickly identified the types of
situations most suitable for local broadcasting: daily issues such as news,
travel, civic affairs and emergency conditions caused by bad weather.
However I have also argued that there were structural problems too,
inherent in the system, which would require further attention. For example
the means of reception meant that VHF transmission was not universally
accessible, and so a large part of the audience could not hear its local
station. The schedules themselves were initially created around specialist
programmes, trying to cater for interest, minority and community groups in
718
BBC WAC Letter from Frank Gillard to Hugh Pierce 14 August 1969 Local Radio Policy op
cit
719
Robert McLeish Diary entry 14 August 1969

183
an area. This had the effect of segmenting the audience rather than uniting
it. Furthermore, while this type of output could be described, generically, as
community material, there was a lack of hard evidence to prove that local
radio was actually moving beyond reflecting communities of interest, and
having a proactive effect in building and fostering them too.
I have also discussed how difficult the relationship was between the new
stations and the established radio networks, and how this resulted in an
unflattering portrayal of local output as trivial and „parish pump‟. The roots of
this mutual distrust would have repercussions in future years, but in fact, as
the evaluation process also demonstrated, the BBC had neglected to
incorporate local radio as part of its coordinated financial and strategic
planning for radio as a whole. The realisation that local authority funding
was not sustainable for the status quo, let alone more stations, was one
aspect of this.
It is fair to say that local radio‟s very existence proved the BBC had won
a hard-fought victory but eight stations did not make a complete network.
Even with the go-ahead to launch another twelve, the issues that I have
highlighted above made the future for the service precarious for some years
to come. Furthermore, in agreeing the next stage of expansion, the
stakeholders seemed to have lost sight of the true origins of local radio and
the connection with granular, local communities. The argument was tied up
more and more with numbers vs costs, wavelengths vs coverage, a motif
that would recur in the ensuing decade.

184
 CHAPTER EIGHT: 1970 – 1976: Under Threat

Introduction

As I have shown in the previous chapter, the Postmaster General‟s decision

in August 1969 to grant the BBC a permanent local service resulted in the
BBC being given permission to increase the number of stations from eight
to twenty. Despite this, the future for local radio was far from secure. The
BBC faced considerable financial challenges, and there were the continuing
obstacles presented by frequencies and wavelengths and difficulties with
reception. But the biggest challenge was the election of a Conservative
government in June 1970, who came to power committed to the introduction
of a commercial radio service of some description. As I will show, this posed
a threat to BBC Local Radio, which almost resulted in its demise.
One of the arguments I will put forward in this chapter is the BBC‟s
continuing ability to adapt to changing circumstances, which helped local
radio‟s survival, both in terms of securing governmental acceptance, and in
how it succeeded in differentiating itself from the new commercial rival. The
prevailing themes in the local broadcasting story are witnessed once again,
in terms of government policy, wavelengths and frequencies and the
definition and nature of what the service was intended to provide to its
audience.
Two pivotal government enquiries during the first half of the 1970s
provided the scope for this introspection and analysis. The Crawford
Enquiry (1973-74) was designed to explore the provision of radio and
television services in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and rural England.
This latter area naturally called into question the size and focus of the BBC
Local Radio offering and enabled the BBC to consider how local audiences
could be served in the national regions too. The second committee of
enquiry into broadcasting, chaired by Lord Annan, had a broader remit, but
again the BBC had to provide evidence about the efficacy and validity of
local radio, as well as plans for its future development.
Running parallel to these inquiries, the Managing Director of Radio, Ian
Trethowan, commissioned his own internal appraisal of the future of local

185
radio, under the auspices of Maurice Ennals, who was the Station Manager
at Radio Solent. His weighty and in depth findings, which were circulated in
November 1975, were another opportunity for the BBC to set out the
options for the growth of the service.
As I have previously demonstrated, the future for BBC Local Radio by
the end of the 1960s was increasingly becoming tied to party politics. The
Labour government were happy to secure its future with a further 12
stations, but the end of their term in office meant the introduction of
commercial radio was inevitable. So a key question is how the BBC
responded to this and in particular when the strategy shifted its focus from
dealing with commercial radio if it became a reality, to when. In conjunction
with this are the reasons behind the BBC‟s continued support and
determination to continue the service in the face of significant odds. During
negotiations with Christopher Chataway (the Conservative Minister for
Posts and Telecommunications) in late 1970/early 1971, BBC Local Radio
could have become a bartering tool in the wider broadcasting picture, yet
the BBC team held fast to their conviction for preserving the service – why
was this?
Once the immediate future was secured, the process of review and
strategic positioning continued, so the question is what were the objectives,
and were these driven by political considerations: the need to create
distance from the new commercial stations or the desire to „complete the
chain‟ of BBC stations? With two government inquiries and an extensive
internal review, there is the question of whether the period from 1970-75
were watershed years, which set the tone and agenda for the next five
years, and which settled the question once and for all about local radio‟s
ultimate continuation.

Twelve new stations 1970 - 1972

This section concerns the dramatic events, which saw a swift change in the
fortunes of BBC Local Radio, from planning for expansion one minute to
fighting for survival the next. A key moment in the changing political climate
happened on 3 March 1969, when Paul Bryan, opposition spokesman on
Post Office affairs, told the Conservative Monday Club that a future Tory

186
 government would introduce 100 or more commercial stations, supervised
by a revamped Independent Television Authority. 720 Press reaction and the
feedback from observers were rather lukewarm. For example the director of
the Newspaper Society, William G Ridd, responded that local radio should
be run by the BBC, though he agreed with Bryan that should commercial
radio happen, local papers must be allowed to have a stake.721 There was
scepticism about the inevitable amount of pop music that commercial
stations would broadcast, whether it was technically feasible to have 100
stations on MW and indeed nervousness from backbench Conservative
MPs who feared the American example of local radio where market forces
reduced quality.722
Ian Trethowan723 identified several opportunities in the Bryan plan. The
Conservatives seemed happy for the BBC to remain in the local radio field,
if they could find the money to pay for it. There was also some doubt as to
whether Bryan would force the BBC to give up wavelengths they had
already got for their local stations. Trethowan‟s strategy was to extract
pledges from the Tories to give the BBC some guarantees about the future
of local radio. Next Trethowan wanted to emphasise that the licence fee had
been used for years to subsidise broadcasting in rural areas, so the
concentration of local radio for the time being in urban centres was not
unduly disproportionate.724
Bearing these factors in mind, the subsequent plans and discussions
around the next phase of BBC Local Radio evolution demonstrated the
need to secure stations in centres of high population. This could be
interpreted as a de facto acceptance that commercial radio was an
inevitability, and a pre-emptive strike to make the establishment of
commercial stations in these financially lucrative locations much harder.

720
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 17 March 1969 R2/22/2
721
Sunderland Echo 4 March 1969
722
New Society „Money in the Air‟ 6 March 1969; The Star (Sheffield) 7 March; The Economist
„Pie in the Sky‟ 8 March 1969
723
Managing Director, Radio Designate – due to take over at the end of 1969, on Frank
Gillard‟s retirement
724
BBC WAC Memo from Ian Trethowan to Director, Public Affairs Subject: Paul Bryan‟s
Interview on Radio Leeds 21 April 1969 Local Broadcasting Papers 1968-1969 R78/609

187
 These factors were amplified in the BBC‟s submission to the PMG, which
followed their evaluation report of the local radio experiment. The case was
made, quite explicitly, for the BBC to continue with the expansion of local
radio, with a prime motive of completing coverage of England as quickly as
possible.725 Ian Trethowan underlined the point in his BBC oral history
interview: “The expansion of local radio was quite frankly in order to get as
many stations on the ground before the election.”726 The BBC stated that
the Conservative Party policy for a network of commercial stations on MW
made it necessary for them to „propose protection of the competitive
situation of BBC local stations in advance, by giving them a MW
supplement‟, to complement VHF.727 Provision for these MW frequencies
would be found by re-deploying the Regional opt out wavelengths.
A second expedient was necessitated by the size and scale of the local
stations. It was clear that the original intention for „town radio‟ stations
(along the lines of Radio Brighton) would mean 150 or so stations, costing
around £12-15 million. „…the BBC does not think this type of broadcasting
is in keeping with current and likely future trends in the field of local
government‟.728 The BBC‟s plan, based on such a scenario would create
around 40 stations covering the major conurbations, similar to Radio
Merseyside. This of course also meant that the BBC stations would occupy
the most lucrative sites in terms of advertising revenue. These 40 stations
would yield 90% coverage of the total England population on VHF. 729
Various internal documents listed the permutations of proposed station
locations to achieve the maximum coverage. Names that cropped up
regularly were London, Manchester, Birmingham, Newcastle (or Tyneside),
Hull (or Humberside), Bristol, Southampton, Oxford, Derby, Plymouth and
Chelmsford. Mansell made it clear that in securing these locations „we will

725
BBC WAC Paper „The BBC‟s Local Radio Proposals‟ G74.69 2 June 1969 Board of
Governor‟s Papers R1/105
726
BBC WAC Oral History interview with Ian Trethowan 2 March 1983
727
BBC WAC Paper „The BBC‟s Local Radio Proposals‟ G74.69 2 June 1969 Ibid p 6
728
BBC WAC Op cit p 2 This was a reference to the Redcliffe-Maud Commission on Local
Government, which, though it had not published its final report by this stage, was proposing
the replacement of the borough and county borough system of government with unitary
authorities.
729
BBC WAC Op cit The addition of the MW supplement for these stations would provide a
favourable comparison to the Regional MW system, which covered 98% of the audience
during the day but only 70% at night.

188
 be in occupation of all the “commanding heights”‟. Other sites are „less
tactically sensitive from the point of view of pre-empting a potential
competitor so the list can be altered.‟730
The final decision on the next wave of the stations emerged after the
Postmaster General accepted the BBC‟s case to keep and run the
service.731 The final list for the next 12 stations announced at the end of
November 1969 was: Birmingham, Blackburn, Bristol, Chatham (to serve
the Medway towns), Derby, Hull (to serve Humberside), London,
Manchester, Middlesborough (to serve Teesside), Newcastle (to serve
Tyneside), Oxford and Southampton (to serve Solent). A further 20 stations
would bring the total to 40, and these would be financed by an increase in
the licence fee, due in April 1971.732 Press reaction was mixed. The Hull
Daily Mail quoted Paul Bryan saying that a Conservative government would
close down existing BBC Local Radio stations, except where they were not
economically viable, ie to give commercial radio a clear run.733
Once the question of the locations was settled, there were two
preoccupations remaining. One was the speed with which the new stations
could be opened and the other concerned some internal disquiet about the
size and nature of the 12 additions. There were several factors influencing
the pace of the next roll-out. One was an issue of infra-structure. Under the
proposals laid out in Broadcasting in the 70s, the Regional opt-outs would
be withdrawn by April 1970, which would allow financial savings and staff
re-deployment for the new local radio stations. The first new stations would
then start broadcasting by the end of September that year.734 There was
also the implicit imperative for the BBC that in establishing their new
stations it would be harder for a future Conservative government to
dismantle them. However, delays in the timetable occurred because of

730
eg BBC WAC Memo from G E Mansell to Frank Gillard 1 July 1969 Subject: „Local Radio
Development‟ Local Radio Policy 1969-1971 R102/48 There was a proposal to close Radio
Durham and create a wider Teesside station instead (based at Middlesborough). Frank
Gillard thought the closure of Radio Durham would be too controversial Note by MDR BM
(69) 73 Ibid. However the station was eventually closed in August 1972 and its transmission
area covered by Radio Carlisle, Radio Newcastle and Radio Teesside.
731
See the previous chapter
732
BBC WAC Hansard Parliamentary Debates 24 November 1969 Vol 792 No 21 Local
Broadcasting Papers 1969-1970 R78/610
733
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 1 December 1969 R2/22/5
734
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 29 September 1969 R2/22/5

189
 wrangles over the redeployment of the Regional MW frequencies to
supplement BBC Local Radio.735 By February, it seemed likely that the first
stations would not now open until the end of 1970, and these would be VHF
only to begin with.736 Despite the inconvenience for listeners who would
have an interrupted service between the end of the English Regional opt
outs on MW, scheduled for 29 August 1970, and the start of new local radio
stations, there was some crumb of comfort. The Director of Engineering
thought that the redeployed MW frequencies would make it much harder for
commercial radio to get established.737
The other source of discussion concerned the definition of the new
stations. Despite the assurance with which the BBC conceived of the non-
metropolitan broadcast areas, The Guardian was already noting disquiet in
July 1969. The newspaper pointed out that staff in the original eight stations
were cautious about the expansion as the proposed stations were more
„area‟ than local, with the result of less flexibility.738 The main concern
involved enlarging the editorial areas, which included existing as well as
new stations. In a meeting with Trethowan on 10 September 1969, the
managers of Radios Sheffield and Brighton made it known they were
unhappy with their new editorial areas, which they felt were a step away
from the original local radio concept.739
The issue of station size and focus also became a factor when it came to
naming the new stations. Most were agreed upon, to signify the area that
each station covered. So Radio Solent was agreeable for the Southampton

735
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 15 January 1970 R1/38/1
736
BBC WAC Memo Subject: „Local Radio on MF‟ No Author 2 February 1970 Local Radio
Policy 1969-1971 R102/48
737
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 15 January 1970; 23 April 1970 ibid
738
The Guardian „Tune into the swap shops and stork talk‟ by John Cunningham July 19 1969
As part of the reorganisation outlined in Broadcasting in the 70s, it was proposed that a new
post, Controller English Regions, should be created and this would take responsibility for
managing the local radio stations, while the Managing Director of Radio retained control of
local radio policy. The HQ team remained in London. Pat Beech, Controller of the Midland
Region, was appointed the first Controller, English Regions (ER), but the transition was
uneasy.
739
BBC WAC memo from Local Radio Development Manager (Hugh Pierce) to the Chairman
(through Ian Trethowan) Subject: Local Radio October 8 1969 Local Radio Policy 1969-1971
R102/48 There was also concern that the financial settlement for stations, £80,000 on
average per station per year for programmes, was insufficient and would impede production
of the more creative (and more satisfying) elements of the schedule

190
 station, Medway for Chatham and Teesside for Middlesborough.740 But
Birmingham became emblematic of a deeper struggle. Pat Beech, as
Controller of English Regions, would not sanction the station name Radio
Birmingham as he felt this was too restrictive. For him, the principle of a
„district‟ station was already established, with Solent and Teesside, so he
proposed Radio West Midlands or West Midlands Radio.741
Robert McLeish, who had by this time taken up his appointment as the
Head of Local Radio Training in London, took the opposite view. For him,
the experiment had been a success because it was focussed on small, real
communities. “We wanted them [the stations] to be small. Our phrase was
„where will we broadcast? Where the buses run.‟”742 McLeish‟s view was
that Beech was too entrenched in a regional mindset, as he noted in his
diary entry for January 19 1970: „I agree for Radio Birmingham NOT [his
caps] trying to cover the whole of the Black Country and Coventry. Pat
Beech must be steered away from the area idea‟.743
McLeish made strenuous representations to Beech, who was evidently
very annoyed with McLeish‟s continued intransigence: „we are making the
most of our limited means and he [McLeish] must come to terms with it.‟744
McLeish obviously won the argument, as he recorded:
„And to do battle to call Radio Birmingham that and not Heart of
England or West of England. I think the battle has been won and I think
Pat Beech as been told that Local Radio is city radio and not regional.‟745

Fighting for survival

Despite the technical obstacles and some internal dissent, BBC Local
Radio‟s future looked relatively secure in the Spring of 1970. A licence fee
increase was promised for April the following year, and that would help build
the remaining stations needed to cover England. There were also

740
BBC WAC memo from Hugh Pierce to Controller English Regions Subject: Nomenclature:
New Local Radio stations 11 January 1970 Local Radio Policy 1969-1971 R102/48
741
BBC WAC memo from Pat Beech to Hugh Pierce 16 February 1970 Local Radio Policy
1969-1971 R102/48
742
Robert McLeish interview with author 11 August 2010
743
Robert McLeish Diary entry 19 January 1970
744
BBC WAC memo from Pat Beech to Hugh Pierce 24 February 1970 Local Radio Policy
1969-1971 R102/48 McLeish responded: „regional and area radio be consigned to the bin‟ Op
cit
745
Robert McLeish Diary entry March 6 1970

191
 discussions about how local radio might operate in Scotland and Wales.746
So the BBC could be forgiven for a mood of optimism regarding its services.
On 18 May 1970 Harold Wilson announced a general election, to take place
exactly a month thence, and his Labour government enjoyed a small lead in
the opinion polls, which was expected to grow as the campaign
progressed.747 However, a late surge for the Conservatives, which was not
picked up by the polls, gave them a 30-seat majority. The next surprise in
broadcasting circles was the appointment of the new Minister for Posts and
Telecommunications. The expectation was for Paul Bryan, who had
shadowed the role, to be given the job. 748 Instead it went to Christopher
Chataway, and it fell to him to implement the Conservative pledge to
introduce commercial radio to the UK.749
From the BBC‟s perspective, although it had anticipated the eventual
arrival of commercial radio, it had not expected it so soon – at least, not
until it had had a chance to complete this phase of its local radio plans.
There was immediate press speculation about the speed with which the
Conservative government could implement commercial radio but in
response Charles Curran, the BBC Director-General, told the Board of
Governors that the transition from the regional system to local radio was
half complete and it was impossible to stop now. 750 The BBC‟s initial hope
was that the new administration would respect the agreement reached by
the previous administration over the re-distribution of MW frequencies to the
new stations, but Dennis Lawrence at the Ministry confirmed that these
arrangements were now suspended.751

746
for example BBC WAC memo from MDR to Director of Engineering Subject: Local Radio
Future Development April 2 1970 Local Radio Policy 1969-1971 R102/48
747
Sandbrook, D White Heat: A History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties 1964-70 (London:
Little, Brown, 2006) pp 726-741
748
The Report from Leicester University Centre for Communication speculated that Bryan was
too closely identified with some of the lobby groups advocating commercial radio. BBC WAC
Op cit; BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio and the
Community 1971 R9/1,167
749
Chataway had been a Commonwealth gold medal winning athlete, and then a successful
current affairs reporter for both ITN and BBC. In his political career, Chataway was leader of
the Inner London Education Authority, but he declined the position of Sports Minister in the
new Heath government, and was given Posts and Telecommunications instead. Despite his
experience in broadcasting, this was an unexpected move.
750
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 22 June 1970 R2/23/1
751
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 29 June 1970 op cit

192
 The next line of defence was to get agreement that the BBC could at
least proceed with the planned 12 new stations even though Trethowan
would have preferred guarantees on the next 20 stations before ending
Regional opts.752 A formal meeting took place on 1 July 1970, between Lord
Hill (BBC Chairman), Trethowan and the Minister. The BBC was presented
with three scenarios that could occur with the introduction of commercial
radio:
- a completely commercial system for local radio, with the BBC only
running networks
- a mixed system: some places having BBC Local Radio, some having
commercial stations and some having both
- the BBC would be allowed to go ahead with its plans for 40 local
stations and a system of commercial local radio would develop side by
side.753
The Chairman countered that the BBC had already set out their case for
four networks and local radio in Broadcasting in the 70s: plans for the next
12 stations were far advanced, with the recruitment of staff, the
procurement of premises and so on. While he appreciated the government
might wish the pace of growth to be slowed down, he hoped the BBC would
be allowed to proceed as they had planned. The next issue was one of
finance. Trethowan‟s argument was that the majority of the cost of local
radio was really subsumed in the domestic news service.754 But however it
was presented, the BBC still faced a deficit of £7million by April 1971, which
is when they had expected a licence fee increase.755 The government
asked for more details about the financial aspect of local radio expansion.
Meanwhile Chataway began to make visits to the BBC‟s local radio
operation to see for himself how it worked. Robert McLeish recorded
Chataway‟s visit to local radio HQ at the Langham, Portland Place on 10
July.
„I was with him for one and a half hours with Hugh P and Ian T. His
questions were clearly aimed at establishing we had gone in

752
BBC WAC Op cit
753
BBC WAC Note of meeting with Minister 1 July 1970 R78/610
754
BBC WAC Op cit
755
BBC WAC Note of meeting with Minister 1 July 1970 ibid

193
 [deliberately] setting up the new 12 stations. He was very pleasant but
obviously thought that the development would be unpopular with his
government. He has to persuade the government of our view.‟756

On 5 August, a press release from Minpostel (the Ministry) announced

that the BBC could proceed with the next 12 stations, since preparations
were so far advanced. But there were significant caveats: these - and the
original eight stations - would operate on VHF only, and „there can be no
commitment at this time on the future of BBC Local Radio in the longer
term.‟757 So while this gave the BBC some glimmer of hope, it might only be
a temporary reprieve.
Trethowan made it clear in his BBC oral history interview that the stations
were opened “at breakneck speed” and he paid tribute to “the people
concerned [who] did a marvellous job in getting them set up, several of
them within a matter of months.”758 In fact eight of the twelve opened by the
end of 1970.759 But was the de facto presence of these new stations
enough to guarantee BBC Local Radio would survive? Whichever way the
influence lay, I would argue that the ability of senior BBC management to
persuade, negotiate and nurture relationships at a high political level was
once again crucial in putting forward the case for local radio. Michael Barton
suggests that Trethowan himself was a critical factor: his own politics were
Conservative, and he was a former colleague of Chataway. 760 One other
aspect that benefited the BBC was the fact that, despite the manifesto
commitment to introduce commercial radio, there was not actually a
concrete plan. This led to much press speculation about how it might work,
and this uncertainty tended to reflect well on the BBC. The Guardian
advocated genuine community radio as run by the BBC.761 A more
unexpected bonus came with a leader in The Times, criticising decisions
made for the sake of political doctrine and rejecting commercial radio, which

756
Robert McLeish Diary entry 10 July 1970
757
BBC WAC Press Release from Minpostel 5 August 1970 Local Broadcasting Papers 1969-
1970 R78/610
758
BBC WAC Oral History interview with Ian Trethowan 2 March 1983
759
Bristol 4 September; Manchester 10 September; London 6 October; Oxford 29 October;
Birmingham 7 November; Medway 18 December; Solent 31 December; Teeside 31
December
760
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011
761
The Guardian leader comment „Radio for the parish pump‟ 7 August 1970

194
 it said would „provide a staple diet of outdated pop relieved by snippets of
local news‟.762
However there was no room for complacency. Gradually a template for
commercial radio began to emerge. In a speech to the Advertising
Association, the Minister was reported as saying that a community of
around 250,000 was needed for a viable station, which meant around 40 or
50 stations.763 On those sorts of figures, frequency availability for a mixed
BBC and commercial system began to look increasingly unlikely. By the end
of November, press reports were so disturbing about the Minister‟s intention
to hand over the BBC‟s local radio stations to commercial interests that
Trethowan wrote to all Station Managers to get the message across to staff
that it was perfectly possible to run both, competing local radio systems.764
Robert McLeish noted in his diary on 26 November that Chataway had told
TUC delegates of his commercial radio plans, to sell off BBC Local Radio to
private interests. „I just don‟t see it but Hugh said it would be quite easy.‟765
By the beginning of December, it was clear that the BBC would be forced to
defend their position in a frantic bid for the survival not only of local radio,
but also of Radio One: the government wanted its national wavelength too.
The Board of Management was under no illusion that this was a very
grave challenge. What was not clear was the exact motivation. If it was
simply an expedient to enable commercial radio to happen, that was
„disreputable‟. If it was about finance, why not come out and challenge the
BBC‟s own figures?766 Robert McLeish summed up the staff‟s view: „[this is
a] negation of the conservative cry for competition. And we‟re not going to
run them [local radio stations] for two years just to have them taken over in
1972.‟767 There was a lengthy series of discussions about the way forward.
It was a mixture of briefings and official meetings, though as the Financial
Times pointed out, Chataway‟s preferred method of informal conversations
with different groups painted a picture of indecision at the heart of

762
The Times leader: „Parish pump radio‟ 10 September 1970
763
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 26 October 1970 R2/22/5
764
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 7 December 1970 op cit
765
Robert McLeish Diary entry 26 November 1970
766
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 7 December 1970 op cit
767
Robert McLeish Diary entry 30 November 1970

195
 government, as they were often leaked to the press adding to the
confusion.768
Ian Trethowan‟s oral history account of the way negotiations were
conducted gave credence to this ad hoc approach. When Chataway told
Trethowan over lunch that he was planning to take away local radio and
Radio One from the BBC in order to redistribute the frequencies to
commercial radio, Trethowan began his charm offensive. “So after lunch we
went back to his office and pored over maps and everything else and,
indeed, it was proved that the frequencies were not an insuperable
problem.”769 This is, however, rather a truncated version of events, for in
truth the argument went on for several months before it was won. The
Boards of Management and Governors considered various papers that
explored the doomsday scenario of losing either the MW frequencies freed
up by the end of regional opts or an entire MW network. The latter threat
would most likely mean the loss of Radio One, which the BBC was unwilling
to accept, given that the pop music station was a point of entry for young
listeners to the BBC.770
As the arguments progressed, it was clear though that the BBC was
winning the battle for hearts and minds in the outside world, especially in
the provincial press. This indicated a significant turn around, from initial
hostility (or at the very least apathy) towards local radio when it started, to a
situation where most provincial press reports in December 1970 deplored
the threat to remove local radio from the BBC. The Express and Star in
Shropshire was typical, arguing that giving local radio to the commercial
lobby simply created another monopoly. Newspapers, it said, had
developed perfectly well, competing alongside profit free outlets.771
After his meeting with the Minister on 8 December, which Hill reported
involved discussions of „a frank and at times vigorous character‟, immediate

768
The Financial Times „Mr Chataway‟s New Year Resolutions‟ by Arthur Sandles 23
December 1970
769
BBC WAC Oral History interview with Ian Trethowan 2 March 1983
770
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 17 December 1970 R2/23/5
771
Express and Star Leader 18 December 1970; others expressing similar sentiments
Coventry Evening Telegraph „Local Radio Rumour‟ 18 December 1970; Western Mail „Local
radio doubts‟ 22 December 1970; Dursley Gazette 2 January 1971 Trethowan praised the
Press Relations team for the skilful way they handled publicity around the debate. Board of
Management Minutes 4 January 1971 R2/24/1

196
 fears about the removal of BBC Local Radio were allayed, especially as Hill
convinced Chataway that a 10/- increase in the licence fee next April would
be sufficient to carry on.772 What Hill and Trethowan seemed able to do
was separate out Chataway‟s main objectives and tackle them one by one.
Chataway‟s primary concern was to create, somehow, a commercial radio
framework that was technically and financially viable. That was partly why
he had the Radio One‟s MW frequency in his sights, because a national
commercial station would make a quick profit.773 A paper by J Redmond,
BBC Director of Engineering, detailed several ways of sharing spectrum
availability between the BBC and commercial stations. The key to the
BBC‟s negotiations with the Minister was to answer his twin concerns that
there were not enough frequencies to share between the BBC and
commercial stations, allowing for the existing 20 stations (plus a couple of
new ones) and 50 or so commercial ones on MW. This plan would also
guarantee the future of Radio One on MW.774
A crucial meeting between the BBC delegation and the Minister on 21
December 1970 set out the main arguments very clearly.775 For the BBC,
Hill stressed that the current situation created uncertainty that was
damaging to the morale of local radio staff. As far as finance was
concerned, the BBC could manage to support 20 stations with a £7.0.0
licence fee. He said that their research into frequencies proved that it was
possible for the BBC stations and a commercial system of local radio to
exist side by side, in fair competition. On the issue of a national commercial
station, Hill said that any suggestion of removing the Radio One MW
frequencies would upset the 45% of young listeners who came to the BBC
via the pop music station, and reminded the Minister how the BBC already
employed more musicians than they needed because they were not allowed
to close any orchestras.

772
BBC WAC Memo from the Chairman 10 December 1970 Board of Governors Papers
R1/106
773
BBC WAC Op cit
774
BBC WAC BBC and Commercial Local Radio: Feasibilities note by Director of Engineering
17 December 1970 Board of Governors Papers R1/106
775
BBC WAC Note of a meeting held at the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 21
December 1970 Board of Governors Papers R1/107

197
 The Minister responded that uncertainty was inevitable as the
government had yet to reach their decision, but a £7.0.0 licence might be
possible from July 1971. In terms of the structure of commercial radio,
Chataway was considering a national network with a central authority
collecting revenues that might be distributed to local, commercial stations.
He reminded the meeting that Tony Benn, when PMG, had considered
creating a version of Radio One that carried advertising. In terms of
competition, Chataway argued that charging all licence fee payers for 20
local stations was equally unfair. So instead, he preferred the idea of a
commercial network to compete with the BBC at a national level. At the
close of the meeting, the BBC agreed to review the effects of a £7.0.0
licence from next July.776
And where exactly was the commercial lobby during this fraught period?
There were two main interest groups, represented by the Local Radio
Association (headed by John Gorst) and the Commercial Broadcasting
Consultants (Hughie Green). Interestingly neither group wanted Radio One
to close.777 John Gorst argued that this would simply create a commercial
monopoly – a national station supplying material for local stations. There
were no accurate statistics about how much advertising revenue
commercial stations could rely on, nor how they would manage to secure
adequate agreements with the Musicians Union and the Performing Rights
Society.778 And on the issue of frequencies, the Local Radio Association
agreed with the BBC that it was possible to have commercial and BBC
stations side by side, on MW, without any need to forfeit wavebands.779 To
add another fly in the ointment, there was the issue of regulation. The ITA
had said it was happy to take commercial local radio into its remit, but it also
wanted to own and lease out the transmitting facilities too, as it did with
television. This would add another financial burden to any commercial radio

776
BBC WAC Op cit
777
Sunday Times „Advertisers may sponsor local radio shows‟ by John Whale 3 January
1970; The Times letter from John Gorst 2 January 1971
778
Financial Times op cit; Sunday Times 3 January 1971
779
The Times „The Case for Local Radio‟ 4 January 1971

198
 licence, reducing the scope for profitability, discouraging would-be
operators still further.780
Lord Hill‟s memoir, written in 1974 using his own diaries, bears out the
sequence of events which emerges from the Archive. Hill was aware in his
book that the BBC had to counter the broadcasting doctrine that Chataway
was formulating, which relied heavily on what Hill identified as Heath‟s
notion that the BBC should „do dull and serious stuff‟ and leave the
commercial service with light entertainment.781 For Hill, it was important to
gain the upper hand in terms of press coverage, so that the government
and the licence payer understood the point that „Local radio was a logical
extension of the BBC‟s services, not something additional to be removed
without consequences. The move into local radio was an integral part of the
development of non-metropolitan broadcasting.‟782
There was no precise indication at what point the BBC won over the
Minister and persuaded him of their case, but by the end of January 1971
press reports were surfacing quoting reliable sources that the BBC would
be allowed to keep local radio and Radio One in the forthcoming White
Paper.783 In some respects, the respite was only temporary. The White
Paper, in March 1971, promised 60 commercial, local stations alongside the
BBC‟s 20.784 MW would be available to both. The rationale behind allowing
the BBC to continue with local radio was based on the BBC‟s public service
credentials and their ability to serve „minorities‟, which the White Paper
acknowledged commercial radio could not do. The Corporation „will attach
first importance to serving a wide variety of minority audiences, including
local schools and colleges‟, and so success would not be measured purely
in terms of listener numbers, in comparison with commercial radio.785

780
BBC WAC Op cit; BBC WAC Leicester University Centre for Communication Local Radio
and the Community 1971 R9/1,167
781
Hill, Lord Behind the Screen: The Broadcasting Memoirs of Lord Hill of Luton (London
Sidgwick and Jackson 1974) p 167
782
Op cit p 166
783
The Guardian „BBC Local Radio and pop reprieve‟ 17 February 1971
784
The remaining BBC stations opened as follows: Newcastle 2 January; Blackburn 26
January; Humberside 25 February; Derby 29 April 1971.
785
Home Office White Paper An Alternative Service of Radio Broadcasting (Cmnd 4636
HMSO 1971) p 6

199
 The BBC‟s reaction was one of relief, despite the fact that, for the
foreseeable future, the number of BBC stations was restricted to 20. It did
mean that the BBC could enact the principle of Broadcasting in the 70s, by
ceasing regional opts, although some area news and weather broadcasts
would remain on VHF for those areas without local radio.786 At the same
time, the BBC noted the careful words about serving minority groups and
although it would heed this intention, it would not ignore the larger audience
either: „the BBC does not mean to allow itself to be elbowed out of the way
in peak listening hours.‟787 The White Paper made it clear that commercial
radio would start on MW and VHF and that the BBC would „eventually‟ get
60% coverage on MW by daytime. In other words, the IBA came first and
the BBC second.788

The Crawford Enquiry: Rural Affairs

The period from mid-1972 onwards provided several opportunities to review
current achievements and reflect on future growth. The focus came from
three structures of enquiry: those chaired by Crawford and Annan, and one
internal audit led by Maurice Ennals. This section concerns the first
investigation, the Crawford Enquiry. This was significant because the remit
was the provision of broadcasting for rural areas; events in the preceding
years had focussed attention in the opposite direction, towards urban
audiences, many of whom were arguably rather well served by the 20 BBC
local stations. The Crawford Enquiry provided the stimulus for a discussion
about how to expand local radio in the future and address sections of the
audience not currently being served. These debates may well have
occurred anyway, in some form or other, but a committee of enquiry
naturally provided a forum for the BBC to demonstrate their public service
credentials through their achievements and aspirations. There was also the
hope that the government might well act on the recommendations of the
enquiry and provide sufficient resources for the BBC to progress their

786
BBC WAC Board of Governors minutes 22 April 1971 R1/39/1
787
BBC WAC Paper „The BBC and Commercial Radio‟ 17 May 1971 No author („Not for
attribution‟) Local Broadcasting Part Five R78/611
788
BBC WAC Report by Managing Director of Radio July 1970 - June 1971 24 June 1971
G.70/71 Board of Governors Paper R1/107

200
 objectives. The main questions that need addressing here are to identify
how the BBC envisaged local radio evolving in the future, how the service
would exist in a changed radio landscape and what changes might be
necessary to achieve the desired end result.
The Crawford Committee on Broadcasting was set up in May 1973 to
explore several aspects of broadcasting in the UK, including examining
plans from the BBC and IBA concerning television and radio coverage of
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and rural England. The BBC provided
evidence in the form of memoranda and hosted visits from Sir Stewart
Crawford and his committee in the Spring of 1974. Also during this period,
the first two independent stations, Capital and LBC, opened (in October
1973). So Ian Trethowan‟s initial appraisal of the situation facing local radio
was predicated with one eye on Crawford and one on the impending
commercial competition. In a paper he prepared for the Governors,
Trethowan conducted a survey of the current position, looking at
programme policy, station management, competition and staffing.789
Evaluating the success of the stations was, as usual, a tricky assessment.
The two main criteria - audience size and relationships with the community
were difficult to assess but Trethowan was confident enough to suggest that
those stations, which did well in both categories (Sheffield, Leicester,
Nottingham), did so because they served smaller communities. However it
was difficult to achieve more when the number of stations was stalled at 20
rather than 40. And the existing stations were under pressure to increase,
not decrease, their transmission area.790 The Crawford Committee provided
the BBC with an opportunity to address its local radio plans across the UK,
but it had to be guided by several factors. One was cost; and one was the
reaction of the government, which was wedded to the idea, enshrined in the
1971 White Paper, that BBC Local Radio and commercial, independent
radio would co-exist side by side but not, except in a few cases, like
London, overlap in the same locations.791

789
BBC WAC Report on Local Radio by MDR 25 April 1973 G.58/73 Board of Governors
Papers G1/109
790
BBC WAC op cit eg Leeds opening up to Bradford, Solent taking in Bournemouth
791
BBC WAC Draft Paper on the Crawford Enquiry by Ian Trethowan 18 May 1973 Crawford
Study Group R102/42 It was also noted that the other national „regions‟ (Scotland, Wales and

201
 So in order to find more individuality and uniqueness in local radio, this
meant re-discovering the „authenticity‟ of the community voice and
community service and making sure that local radio was different from
either Radio One or Two or a commercial service. To this end, Trethowan
began to employ a different nomenclature. „There is much to be said for
using the phrase „community radio‟‟, Trethowan argued, as
„local radio has come to be associated in the minds of some people
with the town radio of our early stations….community radio describes
our wider purpose: to use radio flexibility and relative cheapness to
provide more broadcasting for smaller communities than could possibly
be achieved by television.‟792

This approach had the twin benefits of improving provision for rural areas
and at the same time steering clear of the urban locations, which would
become populated by ILRs.793 But how many stations would be needed and
what would they cost? Trethowan‟s initial approach was to identify 100 or so
communities who might have a claim to a local station.794 Having
incorporated the financial restrictions, he could then propose a plan for
limited expansion as a step towards the ultimate goal.
One other aspect of his scheme that began to emerge was the idea that
not every station needed to be the same size. For example, while Plymouth
or Exeter might warrant a local station of the traditional pattern, Barnstaple
or Torbay could operate as a small satellite, a single studio producing one
or two hours a day.795 This concept was not entirely new: in many ways it
was the logical progression of „unmanned‟ self-operated studios that many
of the original Station Managers had set up in town halls and neighbouring
outposts.796 So the BBC concluded that their preliminary evidence to

Northern Ireland) would be devising their own proposals to Crawford, which may or may not
be based on the English Local Radio model.
792
BBC WAC op cit
793
BBC WAC op cit areas often cited as being underserved by local radio included Devon,
Cornwall, East Anglia, parts of Kent, the west Marches.
794
BBC WAC Draft Paper on the Crawford Enquiry by Ian Trethowan 18 May 1973 Crawford
Study Group R102/42 ibid In this period, Trethowan (and others at the BBC) used the plan
devised by Derek Senior in his Memorandum of Dissent to the Redcliffe-Maud Report as a
template for possible locations. Senior‟s scheme involved 35 regions and 148 districts.
795
BBC WAC op cit. Trethowan said this idea was not new but had been played down to
prevent commercial operators from using it as they tried to fund 60 new stations.
796
Michael Barton interview with author 17 December 2007; Owen Bentley interview with
author 19 July 2010

202
 Crawford would be based on a proposal for 30 stations (mostly in England
but some in the national regions), some of which might be smaller
operations. This phase would be a step towards the ultimate goal of 100
stations across the whole UK, so that the BBC did not „fall short of the
requirements of an important moment in broadcasting history.‟797 The Board
of Governors agreed this approach, noting Trethowan‟s emphasis on the
point that the line of development lay in community radio [underlined in the
minutes] and his suggestion that if the BBC had to trade in one of the
national networks to achieve this, then this could only be exchanged for
„nothing less than a nationally available service‟. 798 [ditto]
In preparation for the BBC‟s memoranda of evidence, Trethowan and the
Chief Engineer for Radio Broadcasting produced several papers, which
fleshed out ideas about the exact locations for the proposed arrangement of
stations.799 A shorter list of 30 stations800 was produced as the basis to
explore the idea of satellite stations and how possible combinations might
be used, with a main station in the larger town and a small studio in the
outlying neighbourhood.801 These proposals were further elaborated on in
the memorandum that was submitted to Crawford in August 1973. This
gave more detail and examples about how each area of England might be
better served with satellite stations.802
The list now numbered 35 in total, with 12 of them duplicating ILR
proposed sites. However the BBC pointed out that the 1971 White Paper
could be interpreted as allowing this overlap because although both

797
BBC WAC Draft Paper on the Crawford Enquiry by Ian Trethowan 18 May 1973 Crawford
Study Group R102/42 ibid
798
BBC WAC Board of Governors minutes 7 June 1973 R1/41/2
799
BBC WAC „Development of BBC Local Radio and Community Radio‟ Crawford Study
Group R102/42 Interestingly they used the list for 146 stations in England cited in the 1962
Interim Report of the Local Broadcasting Committee as the starting point.
800
The English locations were Ashford; Bournemouth; Cambridge; Chelmsford; Coventry;
Exeter; Gloucester; Guildford; Hereford/Worcester; Ipswich; Lincoln; Northampton; Norwich;
Peterborough; Plymouth; Preston; Reading; Shrewsbury; St Albans; Swindon; Taunton; York.
801
BBC WAC ibid
802
BBC WAC Memorandum No 2: The BBC in the English Regions: Community Radio in
Rural England 1973 Crawford Study Group R102/42 For example in the Vale of York the
main station could be sited at York, with a small satellite in the far north, on the Teesside
border and/or with one at Scarborough. In the very poorly served east of England, the BBC
would like main stations at Lincoln, Cambridge, Peterborough, Norwich, Bedford, Ipswich and
Chelmsford. Smaller stations could operate in Kings Lynn, Lowestoft and possibly Southend.

203
 services provided news coverage for the same areas, the content of the rest
of the output was sufficiently different to constitute choice for the listener.803
Then there was the issue of cost. At 1973 prices, a station cost £140-
150,000 a year to run. A satellite station could be as little as £30,000. The
list of proposed stations the BBC was submitting would cost £4million, but
there was no discussion of where exactly this money might be found, as this
was not within the bounds of the enquiry.
Other important contributions to the Crawford Committee came from the
Chairmen of the English Regional Advisory Councils and from the Local
Radio Councils.804 Their report talked about „white areas‟: rural parts where
there was no MW service (since the end of the regional opts) and minimal
VHF. So their principal aim for radio was to eliminate these „white areas‟ to
give better coverage to the whole of England.805 The next stage in the
development in this region would be for „branch‟ office-type studios in
places like Whitehaven in Cumbria.806
Despite appearing to be in sympathy with the overall aims of the BBC‟s
local radio proposals, a few cracks began to emerge. Michael Swann, the
new Chairman of the BBC wrote to the Regional Advisory Council Chairs
thanking them for their contribution to Crawford, but pointing out that their
belief that the reflection of „life, interests and character of the whole country‟
came primarily from the broadcast networks was based on a
misunderstanding. The BBC‟s aim was to serve the local community first,
precisely to move away from the bias that meant coverage from London
and the South East informed rural populations of their local news. 807
The start of ILR in October 1973 probably preoccupied the press more
than the Crawford Enquiry. For Frank Gillard, now retired, writing in The

803
BBC WAC op cit
804
BBC WAC Memorandum by the Chairmen of the English Regional Councils August 1973
ibid
805
BBC WAC ibid Each of the eight Chairs submitted their own appendix to the report, and
most of them were preoccupied with television coverage. However the Chairman of the North
East Regional Advisory Council commented that the three stations in his area (Newcastle,
Teesside and Carlisle) were correctly located as these were the „base‟ cities used by the rural
population for shopping, sport, entertainment etc.
806
BBC WAC ibid The Whitehaven example was also cited in Memorandum No 2 and would
become a reality in November 1974
807
BBC WAC Response from Chairman of BBC to the Memorandum from the English
Regional Councils 2 October 1973 Crawford Study Group ibid

204
 Listener, the arrival of commercial radio was not a problem, except where it
might affect staff recruitment and retention, especially for those with good
news journalism skills.808 However, it was indirectly the issue of personnel
that troubled him most: the one aspect of local radio that was not working
was the way it made use of the community and got participants and
contributors making programmes and on the air. Despite one or two
successful examples of the „open door‟ concept, such as Radio London‟s
Platform and Radio Bristol‟s Access, more needed to be done, otherwise
local radio could lose touch with the grassroots. But the station as a
„reflector‟ of the local community was not enough for Gillard: for him, it
needed to start being a counsellor: „a missing link in the total aid service
available to the citizen.‟809 Certainly Gillard‟s repeated use of the term
„community‟ and the encouragement for more participation chimes with
Trethowan‟s concepts, even though he did not get involved in the question
of station size or location in this article.
By the Spring of 1974, the Crawford Committee were touring round the
country to hear evidence in person, from Station Managers, LRC chairs and
some Regional Advisory Council members too. Crawford visited sites
ranging from Leeds to Norwich, Plymouth and Bristol, Newcastle and
Carlisle, as well as cities in Scotland and Wales. Records of these meetings
show that the unified approach of the BBC was sometimes difficult to
maintain. The local stations already in existence had a clear idea of how
best to serve their communities. In some cases, this meant that the idea of
satellite studios could work well. The Station Manager of Humberside
demonstrated that his string of small studios in Cleethorpes, Barton,
Grimsby, Scunthorpe and Goole - all modest operations made possible with
some local authority support - had helped build a more granular
audience.810 Granularity – a more immediate and direct connection which
small stations, or their satellite operations, could achieve – was evidently

808
The Listener „Frank Gillard Gives his opinion on BBC Local Radio – which he helped to
create‟ 11 October 1973
809
Op cit
810
BBC WAC Note on Meeting between BBC and the Crawford Committee by GMLR 13
February 1974 Crawford Study Group ibid

205
 proof that the BBC was succeeding in terms of community and some
degree of access.
However in the North West, Crawford seemed keen to enlarge Radio
Carlisle to include the whole of Cumbria, along the lines of the new unitary
authority. The BBC demurred, on the grounds that this would dilute the
community ideal, preferring their solution outlined in the memorandum for a
station in southern Cumbria, perhaps in Lancaster or Kendal, and for
satellite studios for other areas. Crawford, apparently, was not pleased.811
The BBC restated their case to Crawford in an addendum to the original
memorandum in May 1974. The main addition was a request to run 12 or so
experimental stations in remote locations on a small scale. Some of these
could be linked to existing stations, others could re-broadcast material from
the residual regional opts in the Plymouth and Norwich areas. The paper
stressed that these were only short term, intermediary steps towards a
more substantial network of community stations.812
During the Crawford process, the political landscape had changed, with
the general election in February 1974, which saw Harold Wilson returned to
office. The committee continued with their work until it was concluded but
there was already speculation by March that this would be a prelude to a
more far-reaching enquiry into broadcasting in the future.813 In fact, within a
few weeks, Home Secretary Roy Jenkins announced in a written reply to
the House of Commons the inauguration of a committee into the future of
broadcasting, chaired by Lord Annan.814
The Crawford Report was published on 21 November 1974, but its
recommendations regarding the BBC‟s English local radio proposals proved
something of a pyrrhic victory. The Committee said that the BBC should be
allowed to extend their service of local radio stations in order to increase

811
BBC WAC Note by Director of Public Affairs on Visits of the Crawford Committee 4 April
1974 Crawford Study Group ibid
812
BBC WAC Addendum to BBC Memorandum No 2 13 May 1974 Crawford Study Group ibid
The paper included a list of potential sites and costings.
813
BBC WAC Update by Colin Shaw [The Secretary of the BBC] 20 March 1974 Crawford
Study Group ibid
814
Briggs, A The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: Vol V Competition (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995) p 995 This committee had originally been planned under the
previous Labour administration in 1970 but the Heath government scrapped it on coming into
office. The Home Secretary had assumed the powers for broadcasting once enjoyed by the
Minister for Posts and Telecommunications.

206
 coverage for the rural population, using satellite transmitters where
appropriate. It accepted the BBC‟s idea that they should pilot a dozen small
satellite stations, on lower power MW, in rural parts of England. And the
report urged that both the BBC and IBA avoid any duplication of sites when
it came to extending local radio throughout the UK, including revising the
sites of ILRs already announced, if they overlapped with BBC stations.815
Michael Barton (now General Manager of Local Radio) sent a memo to
all local radio managers informing them that the Crawford recommendations
regarding local radio would be passed over to the Annan committee. This
would be a disappointment, especially to staff hoping for career
progression. But Barton was still keen to conduct experiments into satellite
stations and he would be convening a working party shortly. 816
In fact two experiments with satellite stations subsequently took place
from 10 - 17 September 1975 (Barrow) and from 13 September for three
weeks in 1976 (Whitehaven). In the Barrow-in-Furness trial, the studio
originated local material for key parts of the day - early morning, lunchtime
and early evening.817 The output was not broadcast, but played to visitors to
the civic centre and to patients in the local hospital, on a closed circuit.
Feedback from listeners to these trials showed support for the idea of a
local station, which participants said they would listen to. Respondents
commented that the early programme and lunchtime show were better than
anticipated.
The Whitehaven experiment looked at a different concept: a small
community station producing about 30 minutes a day for a low population
area.818 These would be supported by a parent station broadcasting near by
and opting out for the local output once a day. This pilot was also different
in that the output was transmitted live, from 1 – 1.30pm each weekday, and

815
Home Office Report of the Committee on Broadcasting Coverage (Cmnd 5774 HMSO
1974)
816
BBC WAC memo from GMLR to Stations Managers 27 November 1974 Crawford Study
Group ibid In the event, all of Crawford‟s Recommendations were deferred to Annan, with the
exception of the Welsh language television station which went to another working party. See
Briggs Vol V ibid p 996
817
BBC WAC Listening Report: Local Radio : Radio Barrow Experiment R9/883
818
BBC WAC Listening Report: Local Radio: Radio West Cumbria Experiment R9/887 The
transmission area covered Whitehaven and Workington, both remote and isolated locations
on the west coast of Cumbria.

207
 repeated at 4.30pm. There was also a Sunday morning phone-in
programme at 11am. The sorts of items included in the pilot were
discussions on housing for the elderly, orienteering, what‟s on and a talent
competition.819 The audience research was conducted by street interviews.
Those who heard the programmes thought them interesting, informative,
useful and of high value to the community.
Despite the fact that the content might sound rather trivial to the outside
observer, as Gillian Reynolds pointed out in the Daily Telegraph, small-
scale issues were still relevant to local listeners, especially as many local
radio breakfast shows were overtaking the Today programme on Radio
Four.820 Her piece highlighted the way the West Cumbrian experiment had
an „access‟ element to it, which might make this kind of community station
useful in, say, a new housing estate. Trethowan certainly seemed pleased
with the results in Barrow, and told the Board of Governors that he hoped to
mount a similar experiment in Taunton.821
Although it was not to have the same impact on BBC strategy as other
committees of enquiry into broadcasting, I would argue that the Crawford
Report was significant as it provided a focus for the next stage of local radio
expansion, with a list of potential sites and various permutations. This
impetus was to serve rural populations. Politically, this made sense, as it
was a means of differentiation with commercial stations. It also had a
strategic benefit, because satellite and small-scale stations could be located
in remote, under-served communities. It was also something of a U-turn
from the policy of just a few years before of populating urban areas as
quickly as possible.
Crawford took the BBC at its word and recommended that local radio be
expanded in rural areas as a priority. Yet was there a risk that this only had
a short-term benefit? If the BBC had adopted rural expansion as a matter of
principle, it would have had two knock-on effects: the abandonment of
urban sites to commercial stations and the risk that to cover rural
populations, station size in territorial terms would have increased, not

819
BBC WAC Op cit Contributors included Edna Englan who composed a poem a day and
Ron Lithcoe – a virtuoso of the Jewish harp for 40 years – played „Turkey in the Straw‟
820
Daily Telegraph „Getting Local Opinions Aired‟ by Gillian Reynolds 22 September 1976
821
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 22 July 1976 R1/44/2

208
 decreased. Station Managers also commented that they thought small
stations would be an expensive way of broadcasting.822 These were
dilemmas that the BBC returned to within a very short period.

Annan: c1975 - 1976

This section explores the next government enquiry, the Annan Committee,
and its impact on the continuing debate about local radio and its future. The
terms of reference for the Annan Committee were more far reaching than
those given to Crawford. Put simply, this was „to consider the future of
broadcasting services in the United Kingdom.‟823 The BBC‟s evidence was
more detailed than that supplied to Crawford. There was to some degree an
element of repetition in the material supplied to Annan, but a new factor was
taken into consideration: the arrival of independent commercial radio.
In this section I will argue that the Annan enquiry and the launch of
Independent Local Radio both had a significant impact on the BBC‟s
strategy of local radio, particularly when it came to mediating the twin
dilemmas of area covered and community definition.
But the broadcasting landscape had changed in another direction too.
Since the early 1970s there were new lobby groups arguing for more
diversity, openness and democratic access to the means of broadcasting.
The Free Communication Group, the „76 Group and the ACTT all
campaigned for a more accountable system.824 An example of this was
Nicholas Garnham who argued in 1971 that local radio should come from
the grassroots, using local human resources and financed by public
money.825 Part of the Annan committee‟s brief was to assess these
demands for increased public accountability and to recommend a system
that better reflected the political and cultural diversity of the UK.826

822
BBC WAC Minutes Local Radio Management Conference 19 – 21 November 1976 Local
Radio Conferences R78/4185
823
Briggs Vol V ibid p 996
824
O‟Malley, T Closedown? The BBC and Government Broadcasting Policy 1979 – 92
(London: Pluto Press 1994) p 3
825
Local Radio Workshop Nothing Local About it: London’s Local Radio (London: COMEDIA
1983) p 19
826
O‟Malley ibid

209
 Given the breadth of the Annan enquiry and the wide-ranging sources of
evidence, it took place over a much longer timescale than the previous
committee – from late 1974 to 1976. The findings were not published until
1977. Submissions, as usual, took the form of papers and oral evidence
and visits, but the potential significance of Annan‟s findings meant that the
enquiry hung over many strategy and policy debates like a spectre. Station
Managers were told at their conference in October 1974 that the Annan
enquiry would have an impact on broadcasting into the 1980s.827 One
reason for this was the understanding that Annan would be hearing views
from those outside the BBC arguing it should be broken up, to restrict its
creativity and (perceived) political influence. While expressions of loyalty
from managers and their staff were welcome, the delegates were urged not
to „knock‟ commercial competitors unnecessarily, but to find a positive
approach for Annan. „We mustn‟t‟, said Trethowan, „adopt a „we‟re here
because we‟re here‟ attitude.‟828
The Archive files show that the BBC‟s management migrated their
evidence smoothly from one enquiry to the next. On 19 December 1974
Trethowan presented to the Board of Governors a draft Memorandum on
Local Radio, which bore much similarity to the earlier memorandum
prepared for Crawford.829 There were some differences in emphasis that
emerged. Notable was the awareness of local Station Managers that they
needed to be more distinct from both Radio Two and any commercial
stations, and to this end, there was a desire from them to increase the
number of hours of original broadcasting. A nice descriptive turn of phrase
was used to capture the differentiation: local radio was described as „Radio
Four-type content‟ with „Radio Two-type presentation‟.830
There was a continued emphasis on the way the stations served their
local communities. In addition to the now familiar examples of local radio‟s

827
BBC WAC Minutes of Local Radio Station Managers Conference 16 October 1974
R78/2543
828
BBC WAC ibid
829
BBC WAC Draft BBC Memorandum: Local Radio Board of Governors Minutes 19
December 1974 R1/42/2; compared with Report on Local Radio by MDR 25 April 1973
G.58/73 Board of Governors Papers G1/109
830
BBC WAC Draft BBC Memorandum: Local Radio Board of Governors Minutes 19
December 1973 R1/42/2 Op Cit

210
 service during bad weather, there was the recent power-supply crisis,
where stations were able to give warnings of electricity cuts to families,
industry, schools etc.831 However, there was a noticeable shift of focus on
the news gathering aspect of local information, whereby Station Managers
could call on the resources of the central BBC. To this end, a local radio
news desk had been established in the Radio Newsroom in London. And of
course the news „traffic‟ went the other way: local radio had supplied to the
networks coverage of the Lofthouse Colliery disaster (Leeds), the Cod War
(Humberside), the Seaspeed Hovercraft sinking (Solent) and two general
elections in 1974.832 However, this paper still had to address the tricky issue
of how local radio was to develop in the future.
The dilemma was how to interpret the BBC‟s public service remit: did that
mean serving the maximum audience and trying to cover all communities,
or serving those areas that commercial stations would ignore?833 The
revised final section of the paper argued that the BBC should be allowed to
carry out Crawford‟s recommendations for up to 12 smaller stations, costing
around £50,000 each, with a staff of seven, to serve rural areas.834 One
concrete way forward was the creation of an internal BBC working party to
re-draw the local radio map of England, with the various options for
coverage. This became the Ennals Report, which will be covered in a
subsequent section.
A paper presented by Trethowan in March 1975 to the General Advisory
Council provided the opportunity for an update on Annan‟s progress. This
seemed to reflect well on local radio. Asked on the BBC Two programme In
Vision by William Hardcastle, which aspects of the enquiry had surprised
him so far, Lord Annan replied:
“Well one of the things you know which we have become fascinated
by is the development of local radio. This is something which I suspect is

831
BBC WAC Op Cit
832
BBC WAC Op Cit
833
BBC WAC Minutes of Local Radio Station Managers Conference 16 October 1974
R78/2543
834
BBC WAC Addendum to BBC Draft Memorandum: Local Radio 23 December 1974 Board
of Governors Minutes R1/42/2 In fact six months later Trethowan told the Board that he was
planning to implement two closed circuit experiments in Barrow and Whitehaven for minimal
cost, which Annan was welcome to come and watch. Board of Governors Minutes 3 July
1975 R1/43/1

211
 going to boom and is a different kind of animal in the broadcasting world
to anything that we have encountered in the centre.”835

By this stage, Annan had visited several stations outside London, and
noticed how local broadcasting differed, with “much more ad-libbing, much
more done on a shoe-string,” commending local radio as “generally an
extraordinary and exciting development.”836 Although Annan‟s enthusiasm
for local radio was widely noted, this might not be shared by its own staff,
which once again faced being mired in a period of uncertainty.

1975: Taking stock of commercial competition

In his report to the Board in July 1975, Trethowan was able to end on one,
very positive note. BBC Local Radio was given the ultimate accolade: it was
now to be considered equally, as one of the BBC‟s five radio services. This
was in part due to the way that the stations had met the challenge of ILR:
„The local stations‟ ability to stand up to direct commercial competition has
been one of the year‟s landmarks.‟837 It was a fine tribute to pay, yet
meeting the challenge of ILR was not simply based on audience numbers, it
was felt in other ways too. Even before any commercial stations opened,
BBC managers were looking for ways of establishing a clear difference in
the output.
Although the 1971 White Paper stipulated that BBC Local Radio should
give first priority to minority programmes, Trethowan was not going to let
commercial radio have a clear field in pop and entertainment.838 He
envisaged Radios One and Two competing in these areas. Meanwhile, local
radio would concentrate on what it did best: minority programmes, news
and information, and providing a community service which was distinctive
and local: „the courage of our public service convictions‟ as Trethowan put
it.839 Another potential impact for local radio might be on staffing. Trethowan
predicted that commercial radio might encounter the same skills shortages

835
BBC WAC GAC Paper „Local Radio‟ 27 March 1975 Local Broadcasting Part Five R78/611
836
BBC WAC Op cit
837
BBC WAC Report by the Managing Director of Radio, July 1974-June 1975 G.145/75
Board of Governors Minutes 3 July 1975 R1/43/1
838
BBC WAC Report by the Managing Director of Radio, July 1970-June 1971 G.70/71 Board
of Governors Papers R1/107
839
BBC WAC Op cit p 13

212
 that local radio had dealt with, in 1968/69, and 1970/71.840 The BBC of
course was able to rely on internal appointments and attachments - one
third of staff for the 12 „new‟ stations came from the old Regions, for
instance - but the advent of commercial radio gave rise to the possibility of
„poaching‟. The previous year in fact, the Station Manager of Radio
Leicester had resigned to join a commercial group.841 Trethowan also
recognised that local radio staff must be given opportunities to progress
their careers in the other direction: 29 staff moved from local radio to
regional television or network radio between 1971-73.842
Another effect of commercial competition might also have been felt in
terms of contributors. BBC Local Radio relied heavily on the calibre of
„[those] local people [who] feel such an identity with their local stations that
they will help it for nothing or at worst minimal fees.‟843 Also in 1971,
Trethowan had pledged that the BBC „only got involved‟ in the issue of
commercial radio „when it was introduced at the BBC‟s expense.‟844
Otherwise, it stayed out of the debate. Events showed that this was rather a
disingenuous remark. As the first ILR stations (Capital Radio and LBC in
London) prepared to go on air, the preliminary skirmishes with the BBC
concerned publicity. Advertising the BBC‟s local services had long been an
uneasy topic; in 1973 the Vice Chair of the Governors commented that
LBC‟s and Capital‟s poster ads outshone anything produced on behalf of
Radio London.845 The BBC countered with a half page ad in the Evening
Standard, which apparently raised morale with staff at the London
station.846 This was followed by the distribution of a broadsheet to
commuters promoting Radio London.847 Since two out of the first three

840
BBC WAC Report on Local Radio by Managing Director of Radio G.58/73 25 April 1973
Board of Governors Papers R1/109
841
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 13 November 1972 R2/25/4 The minutes
suggested that „special salaries‟ might be given to staff who are made „outside offers‟. This is
difficult to verify as access to personnel files in the Archive is heavily restricted.
842
BBC WAC Report on Local Radio by Managing Director of Radio G.58/73 ibid
843
BBC WAC Report by the Managing Director of Radio, July 1970-June 1971 G.70/71 Board
of Governors Papers R1/107 Trethowan described this as a „rather charming situation.‟
844
BBC WAC Op cit
845
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 18 October 1973 R1/41/3
846
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 29 October 1973 R2/26/4
847
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 10 October 1973 ibid. It was originally targeted
at railway stations, but this was changed to underground stations „so as not to antagonize
commuters‟. Ibid 17 December 1973

213
 commercial stations were in a location with an existing BBC station,848 the
attention fell inevitably on Radio London.
One journalist acknowledged that producing community radio in London
was difficult, given the diversity of the population. However „its [Radio
London‟s] small and athletic staff seem to have acquired a very good sense
indeed of what might be of interest to Londoners.‟849 Sean Day-Lewis,
writing in The Daily Telegraph, observed how under-resourced the BBC
station seemed to be. One staff member told how „the fund of loyalty and
goodwill cannot be tapped very much longer.‟850 Day-Lewis‟ theory was that
„local radio was a political device designed to abort commercial radio and is
now an embarrassment.‟851 The only way to disprove this was to provide
adequate resources for innovative, creative programmes to give it a new
sense of purpose. In comparison, Capital Radio‟s debut was deemed good,
professionally and technically.852 However LBC fared less well, soon
drawing criticism from the press as being less a news station and more a
„chat network.‟853
By the end of 1974, the Managing Director of Radio could report that
BBC local radio listening was slightly higher than the previous year, despite
the fact that there were now nine commercial stations, eight of them
operating with adjacent BBC ones.854 The following year, BBC figures again
showed that commercial radio had not made the expected impact and in
fact the BBC Local Radio audience had reached two million listeners.855
Non-metropolitan centres such as Oxford were showing the biggest

848
The next ILR station was in Glasgow, with no BBC Local Radio presence
849
BBC WAC David Wade in The Times, quoted in Board of Management Minutes 12
November 1973 ibid
850
The Daily Telegraph „When capital is starved of income‟ by Sean Day-Lewis 16 April 1973
851
Op cit
852
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 18 October 1973 R1/41/3
853
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 15 October 1973, citing articles in the Observer
and Sunday Telegraph R2/26/4 The problem with audience measurement at this point was
the fact that the BBC and the IBA used their own methods, so it was difficult to measure „like
with like‟. Hence when the BBC claimed that the weekly patronage of commercial radio in
September 1974 was smaller than that of Radio Three and BBC Local Radio, the IBA issued
an angry denial, accusing the BBC of „cooking‟ their figures. BBC WAC Board of
Management Minutes 23 & 30 September ibid
854
BBC WAC Draft Memorandum: Local Radio G.183/74 19 December 1974 Board of
Governors Minutes R1/42/2
855
BBC WAC Report by Managing Director of Radio G.145/75 3 July 1975 Board of
Governors Minutes R1/43/1

214
 increases, but so too were places like Sheffield, Newcastle and Merseyside,
where commercial competition now existed.856 Trethowan also believed that
BBC stations had improved the quality of their output as a result of
independent radio.

The Ennals Report

This section examines what became known as the Ennals Report. Its
compilation overlapped with the ongoing Annan enquiry and was able to
feed into the BBC‟s subsequent submission, as well as help inform internal
policy on local radio expansion in the future. It also signalled a change in
direction in many ways, especially away from the urgency for rural
expansion. Local radio veteran Maurice Ennals was seconded from his role
as Station Manager, Radio Solent, to write the report that Trethowan had
mooted at the Station Managers conference in October 1974.857
Judging by the correspondence in the files, Ennals took this task very
seriously, and spent more than the allotted six months on it.858 His brief was
to survey the progress of BBC Local Radio so far, to examine the present
boundaries and make recommendations about future development.859 It did
not include examining frequency or technical issues, nor finance. The re-
organisation of local government, the Crawford Report and the current
Committee on the Future of Broadcasting all provided a framework for
Ennals‟ investigation, in terms of recent discussions about boundaries,
communities and strategic goals. Although this was essentially a one-man
task (apart from secretarial support), Ennals called upon members of the
headquarters team for help and advice over the next few months.860

Ennals clearly pursued the project with forensic zeal: he visited all the
existing stations and nearly twenty other sites, which had the potential to

856
BBC WAC Op cit
857
BBC WAC Minutes of Local Radio Station Managers Conference 16 October 1974
R78/2543
858
BBC WAC See file Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion R102/22
859
BBC WAC Memo from Station Manager Solent to General Manager Local Radio 16
January 1975 Subject: Local Radio Project Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion R102/22
860
BBC WAC Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion ibid, especially Robert McLeish (Head
of Local Radio Training) and Peter Redhouse, formerly Station Manager at Radio London and
now Deputy General Manager, Local Radio

215
 host a local station.861 The problem, however, was that there was an
expectation of „absolutes‟: people wanted concrete answers to questions,
specific solutions to the problems. This was illustrated by a contribution
from Robert McLeish, who was pretty dogmatic about the size and definition
of stations. In a memo in April 1975, he declared boldly that the golden rule
should be: „the smaller the station, the better‟, because audience research
proved that they were more closely identified in terms of patronage and
participation.862 At the same time, he conceded there were varying factors
about defining a community, such as social make up and the difference
between rural and urban areas. Then there was the issue of the satellite
station. McLeish warned against the idea that a station with its own
transmitter had to be held accountable to a „parent‟ station. This, said
McLeish, was where the regional system had fallen down. He said stations
were accountable to their own community first, not to the Station Manager
of a bigger station up the road.863
Ennals began to produce drafts of the report from July 1975, highlighting
his main recommendations. Ennals identified three distinct categories of
proposals: the first list of absolute priority was new stations; then a list for
station expansion in the present economic climate and a list of ideal
developments in the future.864 There was also a map, which he and
McLeish drew up, to illustrate how the broadcast locations in the UK would
look.865 In brief, Ennals thought that the early stations had over extended
themselves and produced too much output of low quality. 866 It had been a
mistake to take news from agencies and newspapers at the beginning, and
not develop local newsrooms on station sooner. Now that better relations
861
BBC WAC Memo from Maurice Ennals to GMLR 15 July 1975 Subject: Local Radio Project
Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion ibid; in the final report, Ennals calculated he had
had 200 appointments with 248 people from all walks of life, he‟d visited 98 main centres of
population in 44 counties.
862
BBC WAC Memo from LRTO to Maurice Ennals 1 April 1975 Subject: Local Radio Project
ibid
863
BBC WAC Op cit
864
BBC WAC Memo from Maurice Ennals to GMLR 15 July 1975 Subject: Local Radio Project
Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion ibid
865
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011. According to Michael Barton,
Ennal‟s starting point was in fact the Diocesan map of England. He thought there was a
strong correlation between the Church of England and the relationship between Bishops,
Suffragans and community. Ennals was a committed Christian.
866
BBC WAC A Study Paper by Manager, Radio Solent 25 November 1975 Local
Broadcasting Part Five R78/611

216
 were established with News and Current Affairs centrally, Ennals proposed
expanding the news teams on stations and encouraging attachments with
London.
Ennals found great concern about the lack of a publicity budget on all
stations, and much criticism of the way programmes were billed in the
Radio Times. Similarly, audience research was under funded, and required
more investment, especially in those areas were listenership was growing
and in where new stations might open. One interesting comment concerned
relations between the local staff and management in London. Ennals
described the attitude of some Corporation staff at the beginning of local
radio as „cynical and unhelpful.‟867 It was only when local stations began to
make inroads into network audiences that senior managers took notice,
although local staff still believed there was not full confidence in their work
from London. In the second half of the report, Ennals moved on to the more
contemporary issues that he had picked up on in his research. He
concluded that „there is indisputable evidence that a sizeable proportion of
people living in the present local radio areas (possibly excluding
Birmingham, London and Manchester) feel involved with the station and a
loyalty towards it.‟868 Broadcasting in the 70s had made the new stations
larger than necessary, which was understandable due to the economic
circumstances, but it was now time to return to the early ideals of local
radio.
Then Ennals focussed on the question of definitions. Several names
were being used: satellite stations, community, even mini. He suggested
that they should assume all stations were „community‟, and then he
attempted to clarify the nomenclature. There were small stations, which
could be sited close together, but which were independent of larger
stations. Satellite stations were linked to a main station, carrying their output
for most of the day apart from a few hours of original programming. The
term „mini‟ station was unhelpful and could be dropped. The next issue
concerned whether the BBC and ILR could operate in the same areas.

867
BBC WAC Op cit
868
BBC WAC Op cit Allan Shaw, Station Manager at Radio Manchester, challenged this
comment and asked that it should never be published. Memo to GMLR 2 January 1976
Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion R102/22

217
 Although there was a mood that welcomed competition with the IBA, 869
there was a school of thought that said the BBC stood a better chance if
they suggested locations not being used for commercial radio.
Ennals was quite adamant that BBC Local Radio should not just appeal
to minorities but should reach as many listeners as possible. These views
obviously influenced his thinking about future developments. Ennals was
clear about the main aim of BBC Local Radio up until now: „to give the
fullest possible service to a community of people holding the maximum
number of interests in common and to be an integral part of that
community.‟870 Obviously there were economies of scale at work that would
determine how small a viable station could be, but for Ennals there needed
to be a definable area with a sizable population, and a significant proportion
of those inhabitants enjoying „common interests and loyalties and
aspirations.‟871 In answer to the question „what do you mean by a local
station?‟, Ennals posed his own question: „If the station covering such and
such an area gave a list of the chemists open late this evening would it
really mean something and be of help to the audience? If the answer is yes,
then it‟s a local station.‟872
That sounded fine in theory, but should the BBC be focussing on existing
communities or building new ones, and would rural areas have priority over
urban places? Again, Ennals managed to come up with a definitive answer.
He rejected Crawford‟s recommendations about serving wider rural areas –
arguing that county-wide stations would be too diluted. He was clear that
serving established communities was better, particularly as there was a
higher audience appreciation rating.873 However he did accept there was a
case for some small station experiments in areas where there was no pre-
existing community, such as a new town.
Finally, Ennals thought the BBC should not decide future locations solely
on rural or urban criteria. First and foremost, it was about merit, and this
would definitely include urban areas. Furthermore, he added that it would
869
BBC WAC A Study Paper by Manager, Radio Solent ibid „let the IBA keep up with the
BBC, not the other way round‟
870
BBC WAC Op cit para 57
871
BBC WAC Op cit
872
BBC WAC Op cit
873
BBC WAC Op cit para 75

218
 be a mistake to abandon the conurbations to the IBA as a matter of
principle. In drawing up his list of new stations, Ennals wrote that he took a
number of further factors into consideration, including areas which lost
Regional radio and still had no local service; locations that were not planned
to get a commercial station; places just outside the editorial area of an
existing station; locations where there was a real desire for local radio;
areas seriously affected by local government reorganisation. In total, he
recommended opening seven new main stations, twenty-one smaller ones,
nineteen satellite stations and 35 studios (some staffed, some not).874 In
addition, Ennals made a number of proposals to alter existing stations, 875
and his report, if executed in full, would have brought the total of BBC local
stations to 66, covering 97% of England.
The response to Ennals report was largely enthusiastic from within local
radio staff. Alan Holden (Station Manager at Radio London) saw a draft and
wrote to Michael Barton saying it would „answer the abolitionists and the
mindless expansion brigade and left room for advance if the financial
situation permits.‟876 The comments about stand-alone satellite stations
were well received: George Sigsworth at Radio Derby agreed they would be
in danger of becoming little more than remote studios if attached to a main
station.877 Potentially the most divisive issue was the post-Crawford change
in direction away from automatically favouring rural areas. Again, this found
favour with many station managers. Rex Bawden, from Merseyside, firmly
supported new stations for large and often deprived urban communities
before remote rural ones. Bawden reported that Ennals‟ own private
expression of this policy was succinctly put: „people before cows.‟ 878

874
See appendices for full list
875
BBC WAC Op cit, such as closing Radio Blackburn (to be replaced by a new station at
Preston); enlarging the transmission area of Brighton to include Lewes and the southern half
of mid-Sussex; renaming Medway as West Kent, to cover the districts of Dartford, Gillingham
through to Sevenoaks and creating a Radio East Kent at Canterbury for the Thanet and south
coast areas.
876
BBC WAC Handwritten letter from Station Manager Radio London to GMLR 15 July 1975
Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion R102/22
877
BBC WAC Memo from Station Manager Radio Derby to GMLR and Maurice Ennals 2
January 1976 Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion R102/22
878
BBC WAC Memo from Station Manager Radio Merseyside to GMLR 15 January 1976
Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion R102/22

219
 So what would the BBC do with Maurice Ennals‟ exhaustive study? In
February 1976, Howard Newby, the new Managing Director of Radio,
proposed the following course of action. The Ennals lists needed to be
assessed by the engineering department to see how much could be
implemented. The recommendations would also be costed and re-
presented to the Annan committee. However, also prior to submission to
Annan, it appeared that the categorisations of proposed stations would be
re-prioritised taking into consideration commercial competition and the
BBC‟s commitment to provide broadcasting services to rural England in the
light of the Crawford report.879 So it seemed that some of the proposals
were being effectively „watered down‟, an example of political triangulation.
Ennals‟ optimism also received a further blow when the engineering staff
had had a chance to read the report. The initial, rather grumpy response,
began by stating some „facts of life‟ about transmitter coverage.880 Ennals‟
proposals to increase current transmission areas were not feasible because
increasing the power of MW transmitters did not extend audibility or
coverage. It was possible to increase the power of VHF transmitters, but
that was not the proposal. Secondly, the map Ennals had produced was for
editorial areas, whereas transmitter patches did not always correspond,
especially as night-time coverage was often reduced on MW. Despite this,
the Ennals Report and the map for expansion provided a much-needed
template for the remainder of the decade in the next stages of local radio
development.

Conclusion
I have argued that the period covered by this chapter marked a critical
moment for the BBC and its plans for local radio. As I have demonstrated, a
central plank of the BBC‟s radio strategy, Broadcasting in the 70s was

879
BBC WAC Memo from MDR to CER, CERB, GMLR, DGMLR, Maurice Ennals 25 February
1976 Subject: The Extension of BBC Local Radio Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion
R102/22
880
BBC WAC Memo from D E Todd (Deputy Director of Engineering) to CERB, MDR, GMLR
4 March 1976 Ennals Report on Local Radio Expansion R102/22 His irritation stemmed from
the fact the Ennals Report was over an inch thick and he had only been given six days to
read it and comment: he needed several weeks. The fact that no BBC engineers took part in
Ennals‟ research may also have been a factor.

220
 predicated on replacing the regional structure with a network of local radio
stations. The prospect of commercial stations, brought forward by an
unexpected change in government, made the enactment and completion of
this scheme all the more vital. While the expansion of BBC Local Radio into
the most desirable geographical areas would not necessarily stop
commercial radio, it was a brazen attempt to make it less attractive.
The BBC was forced to defend both its local stations and Radio One in the
face of considerable political will. Its success in seeing off the threat came
down to several factors. First, Broadcasting in the 70s and the strategy it
was based on was robust and well-rehearsed. The experience of the first
eight local stations, the way they operated, the production structure and the
evaluation process had been enough to convince the BBC and outside
observers that this was a viable system to be continued and expanded. The
government‟s plans for commercial radio did not have a comparable
structure or identity, relying on political dogma rather than broadcasting
experience.
Secondly, the BBC waged a very successful counter-offensive. Led by
the persuasive and determined triumvirate of Hill, Curran and Trethowan,
each argument put forward by Chataway was rebutted and countered with
an alternative. The files show that the BBC team were clear about
identifying the Minister‟s motives and dealing with each one precisely.
Although the script about the BBC‟s traditional involvement in the area of
local broadcasting was revived from time to time881, the narrative here was
now more contemporary. But it was not just the upper echelons of BBC
management who helped secure the victory. The local radio service
continued to operate throughout this turbulent time, despite the uncertainty
about job security and the future. Dedicated teams opened new stations
and built on the success of the old ones. A testament to this achievement
was the positive press coverage the BBC received during the crisis, which
reflected how the stations and the whole enterprise were being received.

881
eg BBC WAC Note of a meeting held at the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 21
December 1970 Board of Governors Papers R1/107

221
 Indeed, the New Statesman and the Economist praised on the way the BBC
handled the whole affair with the government.882
There was a price to the BBC‟s resolve. In seeing off the government‟s
demands, it had to accept a less than satisfactory licence fee settlement
and the reorganisation of frequencies that went further than Broadcasting in
the 70s.883 Even though an additional twelve stations became the limit of
expansion for the time being, BBC Local Radio continued on the process of
strategic and conceptual evolution in the light of political enquiries and
internal audits. The report from Leicester University into local radio (quoted
elsewhere in this thesis) was published in February 1971. Some sections of
the press chose to dwell on the negative aspects, while others extracted the
positives.884 One result that was inescapable however was the report‟s
conclusion that the BBC did not have a clear idea of what constituted
„community radio‟ in relation to local radio, nor how to measure its success.
Though it is not possible to see any link between the report and
subsequent events, this chapter has shown that in the mid-1970s,
Trethowan and his staff began to try and engage more fully with what
community radio might be defined as, and how this could inform the next
wave of expansion. Interestingly, the word „community‟ barely registered
during the Broadcasting in the 70s debates, but during the periods of
Crawford and Annan, it acquired new significance and would become more
prominent as the decade progressed. By the mid-1970s, there was still no
settled view of what „community‟ meant to local radio, but there were
consistent, strategic and practical attempts to engage with the idea,
mirrored by discussions going on in the wider broadcasting world. The
ultimate goal was to achieve full coverage of England: the dilemma was
identifying a model for local radio that was technically and financially viable
and still remained true to the principles of serving local communities.
Submissions to the Annan Committee continued into Spring 1976. In
February, Michael Barton and colleagues made a presentation to the
882
BBC WAC Board of Governors minutes 8 February 1970 ibid
883
The BBC was willing to accept these consequences but it was aware that critics thought
that the BBC had conveniently „found‟ extra frequencies which it otherwise would not want to
yield up. BBC WAC op cit
884
The Daily Telegraph „Local Radio success an illusion say researchers‟ 25 February 1971;
The Guardian „Good start by local radio says report‟ February 25 1971

222
 committee, which was well received. Annan was apparently particularly
impressed with the visual elements comparing Radio Sheffield‟s output with
that of Radio Hallam.885 However rumours were beginning to circulate that
some members of the Annan Committee had a question mark over BBC
Local Radio‟s future. Removing it from the BBC would, in one stroke, solve
the BBC‟s financial problems.886 By July, these stories were gaining enough
credence to start affecting morale on the stations.887 The outcome of the
Annan Report is the starting point for the next chapter of the thesis, which
heralded yet another turbulent period in the story of BBC Local Radio.

885
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 1 March 1976 R2/29/1
886
BBC WAC Op cit
887
BBC WAC Report by Managing Director of Radio G.146/76 Board of Governors Minutes
22 July 1976 R1/44

223
 CHAPTER NINE: 1977 – 1980:
Completing the Chain

Introduction

This chapter analyses the period of local radio development, from 1977 to
1980. I will argue that these years brought intense struggles and debates
about the ethos of the service into the forefront, and set the parameters for
the next phase of local radio growth in the coming decade. The first hurdle
was the report of the Annan Committee, which once again threatened the
very existence of BBC Local Radio. The determination with which the
stations fought back was very reminiscent of the battles with the
Conservative government in the early 1970s. Although the resulting White
Paper on Broadcasting allayed the BBC‟s worst fears, and established a
more orderly and transparent way of dealing with the future deployment of
frequencies and the siting of new stations, in conjunction with the IBA, it still
left the problem of how to pay for future growth – in other words, how to
complete the chain.
The last few years of the 1970s witnessed an almost frenetic compilation
of reports and consultations within the Radio directorate to determine the
future path of local radio and the networks. Underpinning all of these was
the belief that there was not enough revenue to pay for all four networks
and more local stations. A complex series of scenarios was rehearsed and
debated, most of them predicated on the idea that one network would be
used (or sacrificed in the opinion of some) as a sustaining service for local
radio. As one can imagine, this was not a popular idea. This also brought
into sharp relief the content of the existing stations and how it should
interpret its role. Aubrey Singer, the Managing Director of Radio,888 made it
very clear that he expected local radio to cut its cloth much more closely,
and to reduce the hours of its output in order to improve quality. As will be
illustrated, this produced significant opposition from the Local Radio
Councils, and others. Finally, a strategy emerged by the close of 1979 that

888
Aubrey Singer succeeded Ian Trethowan in June 1978

224
established the principles by which the local radio chain of stations was to
be completed. This did not produce the number of stations originally
anticipated but it did at least achieve a respectable coverage of the English
population.
The crucial points I will argue in this chapter are first that the BBC
succeeded in seeing off the threat posed by Annan‟s recommendations by a
combination of grassroots protest and higher level lobbying. Having secured
a future for local radio, the next issue for the BBC was how to complete the
chain. As previous chapters have illustrated, it is possible to trace through
the 1970s the way in which the BBC began to incorporate local radio more
closely to its central planning strategy. So one of the key arguments of this
chapter will be that this was to be achieved by an intricate set of internal
policy documents and a struggle to identify, at last, just what constituted a
local station, the optimum size and how it could reflect its own community. I
will argue that the outcome was the best possible result in the
circumstances, but also that internal divisions and erratic management were
just as damaging as the external factors in determining the result. In
addition to this, there were two potentially damaging confrontations with
BBC management at this time, one involving Station Managers and the
other, the LRC Chairs. One of the purposes of this chapter is to look at how
these came about and weigh up the relative importance of them and the
impact these events may have had on future policy and the relationship
between local radio and the corporate centre.
Finally, it is important to address how and why the BBC settled on the
eventual pattern of local radio, which allowed it to achieve the long-held
goal of completing more stations. The Third Home Office Local Radio
Working Party Report in December 1980 brought about the conclusion to
the first phase of the local radio project. I will argue that this represented a
compromise on the original intentions, but at the same time, it constituted a
realistic outcome as local and community radio embarked in the new
decade.

225
 Annan and the BBC’s response
As early as 1976, there were rumours about the outcome of Annan, and a
suspicion that the Committee might recommend the removal of control of
local radio from the BBC. At a Station Managers‟ conference in November,
Charles Curran, the Director General, gave a pre-emptive speech that
called such a proposal „incomprehensible.‟889 The proposals that the BBC
had made to Annan for new stations would only cost 50 pence per licence:
„a relative fleabite in our total economy.‟890 Losing local radio, Curran went
on, would only make a small net saving in financial terms, but the damage
from the loss of the peripheral positives, such as local newsgathering and
grassroots community connections, would be incalculable.
Interestingly, managers urged Curran to go public with this defence of
local radio, but Curran preferred to keep his powder dry until the report was
published. But he was able to reassure the staff that the BBC would fight
any attempt to remove local radio from the Corporation, and he felt their
chances of success were high. Great emphasis was placed on the potential
support of MPs, whose relationship with their local stations had been
nurtured over recent years and who appreciated the value of this almost
unfettered access to their constituents. However, Howard Newby, the
Managing Director of Radio, pointed out that although MPs might
appreciate how local radio was „an instrument of citizenship in a
parliamentary democracy‟, the public at large might not be interested who
actually owned it.891
There was a useful exercise during the conference where Station
Managers, in small breakout groups, discussed various pressing issues.
These included operational questions, such as programme content and
staffing. But several groups addressed more fundamental points, such as
„Strategy and Tactics for 1977‟, and „Arguments against removing Local
Radio from the BBC‟. The kinds of points that these groups raised would
help form the groundwork for any future campaign. None of the key
strengths of BBC Local Radio that they identified were particularly new.

889
BBC WAC Minutes of a Local Radio Station Managers‟ Conference 19 – 21 November
1976 in Local Radio Conferences R78/4185
890
BBC WAC Op cit
891
BBC WAC Op cit

226
 There were the usual factors relating to the efficiencies the BBC offered, the
autonomy of local radio, how it was cheaper to run than commercial
operations, the independence of the BBC and how it matched the mood for
devolution in contemporary society.892 More debatable was the way that
these arguments should be deployed, and in what sequence. For the time
being, Station Managers were urged not to harass their local MPs just yet,
nor knock commercial competitors. However, there would be some
„discreet‟ publicity and promotion to remind the public of the benefits of local
radio.893
In February 1977, just a month before publication, stories about the
demise of BBC Local Radio were once again circulating.894 Meanwhile, the
BBC prepared the „discreet‟ publicity mentioned the previous year at the
Station Managers‟ Conference. This was the publication of a glossy, 66-
page booklet, Serving Neighbourhood and Nations,895 which retailed for 30
pence. In a contrast to previous BBC publications concerning local radio,
this pamphlet was attractively presented, with lots of colourful illustrations
and images. However, like the forerunners, there was nothing especially
covert about its intentions. Divided up into sections outlining the history of
the BBC‟s association with local radio, the benefits it brought to the public,
and the day-to-day work of each station, this was a public relations
exercise.
However, it must be said that it was rather repetitious,896 and notably,
from page 28 onwards, local radio was suddenly termed „community radio‟.
From this point, the text focused on the BBC‟s proposals to the Annan
Committee for future expansion. The book showed a map of the current 20
stations, calling it „Community Broadcasting‟ and listed an additional 26
locations, which their engineers said would be technically feasible.897

892
BBC WAC Op cit
893
BBC WAC Op cit
894
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 17 February 1977 R1/45/1 Commenting on one
story in the Sunday Times, predicting the removal of local radio from BBC and IBA control,
the Chairman of Governors rejected this as „politically unacceptable.‟
895
BBC Serving Neighbourhood and Nations (London: BBC Publications 1977)
896
The example of Radio Humberside‟s breaking of the Flixborough factory explosion in 1974
was featured several times BBC Op cit
897
These were: Alnwick; Aylesbury; Barnstaple; Barrow; Basingstoke; Cambridge;
Canterbury; Chelmsford; Coventry; Dorchester; Exeter; Gloucester; Guildford; Ipswich;

227
 The use of the term community radio was an example of confused
thinking by the BBC. On the one hand, it was a genuine attempt to define
clearly what the function of local radio was. And on the other, it was
perhaps aimed at stealing the clothes of the emerging, external lobby
campaigning for non-BBC community radio. But the BBC had a well-
established brand identity in local radio, and interchanging the two terms
blurred the distinctions.
The arguments that the BBC deployed about the financial efficiency of
local radio in the booklet were not accepted at face value by commentators.
The BBC‟s claim that the current service cost just 35 pence from each
licence, less than the price of a pint, was picked up by The Economist.898
Given the rumours about the Annan Report, surely the BBC would not mind
losing such a drain on their resources?899 Howard Newby replied to The
Economist saying that the BBC „would mind a great deal. The existing 20
BBC stations had successfully demonstrated the part they could play in the
communities they served; without this grassroots radio the networks
themselves would be poorer.‟900
But the article did have one point that the BBC was not in a position to
respond to. It was true that the BBC had not applied to the Home Office for
more radio wavelengths, despite identifying potential locations. It appeared
that work on the frequency plan, emanating from the Ennals Report, had
stalled in July 1976, ostensibly because the transmitter ranges did not
match the social needs of the areas. It was not clear when a new set of
proposals would be ready.901
The Annan Report, published on 25 March, did indeed confirm the BBC‟s
worst fears. The first line of Chapter 14 stated bluntly „At present local radio

Lincoln; Luton; Norwich; Northampton; Peterborough; Plymouth; Shrewsbury; Swindon;

Taunton; Truro; Warwickshire; York. BBC Op cit
898
The Economist „Beeb wants more‟ 5 March 1977
899
The Economist Op cit
900
The Economist 8 March 1977
901
BBC WAC Minutes of a Local Radio Station Managers‟ Conference 19 – 21 November
1976 in Local Radio Conferences R78/4185; also Memo from J Redmond (Chief Engineer) to
MDR saying that although it was technically feasible to provide wavelengths for more than 60
stations each for the BBC and IBA on MF, night coverage would be poor; there could be no
more than 40 stations each on VHF 23 February 1977

228
 is in a mess.‟902 Annan argued that there were not enough frequencies for
both the BBC and commercial radio to reach more than 90% of the
population, and under the current systems, urban areas were over-served
and rural populations deprived.903 He also criticised some aspects of
commercial radio, for what he called „pop and prattle‟, which were needed
for ILR to get established quickly.904 Annan‟s solution, as predicted by
many, was to remove local radio from both the BBC and the IBA, and
instead create a separate local radio broadcasting authority, with
advertising as the main source of funding, but working with some non-profit
trusts too. But not all of Annan‟s committee agreed with him. Two members,
Tom Jackson and Marghanita Laski, penned separate minority notes,
Jackson arguing for the status quo, and Laski preferring non-profit-making
organisations to run local radio.905
Although the Annan Report was published on 25 March, it was not until
14 April that the BBC held a press conference, which focussed on their
objections to the proposals around local radio, followed by a keynote
speech by the Director-General designate (Trethowan) two days later to
newspaper editors in Cambridge.906 In the interim, there had been much
press comment, a good deal of it favourable, at least in part, to the BBC.
One piece of note was a leader in The Times, which represented something
of a U-turn on their previous stance.907 Arguing that commercial radio was
still too financially unstable to rely on ad revenue, their conclusion was that
local radio should just be left alone. However the delay that occurred in
getting the BBC‟s main objections in front of the public – and opinion
formers - was an unfortunate one. At a local level, stations and their
councils marshalled their forces quickly and effectively, but a suspicion
arose that at a higher level, the BBC was dragging its heels. This would
have negative consequences shortly. In his diary, Robert McLeish noted his
contribution, involving a meeting with the Broadcasting Panel at Church

902
Home Office Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting (Cmnd 6753 HMSO
1977) Chapter 14
903
Home Office Op cit
904
Home Office Op cit
905
Home Office Op cit
906
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 4 April 1977 R2/30
907
The Times „Future of Local Broadcasting‟ 15 April 1977

229
 House, on 31 March. „They almost welcome the Annan proposal on LR….If
I have done nothing more than reverse the Church of England‟s party line in
local radio … it will have been a worthwhile day.‟ 908
BBC management concentrated on several key elements of the Annan
Report, to rebut the main proposal. The press release of 14 April highlighted
the first of these, Annan‟s assertion that there were not enough
frequencies.909 The BBC argued that its research proved there was room for
85 stations on lower power MF (65 of these in England), as well as the 60
stations that the IBA proposed. Between 45 and 55 of these 65 could be
operated on VHF as well. The press release went on to list the 26 locations
already identified in Serving Neighbourhood and Nations, as well as a
further nineteen.910
BBC management was confident that Annan was weak about his grasp
of frequencies and finance.911 This was highlighted when Annan was the
Fleming Lecturer at the Royal Institution on 28 April. His performance was
described in the minutes of the Board of Management meeting, rather
scathingly, as „a second rate polemic; an ego-trip, a mountebank‟s piece,
mean-spirited in its attack on named individuals.‟912 Despite the underlying
animosity here, in putting together its response to the Report, the BBC
decided it was best to congratulate Annan on points of agreement, such as
his espousal of public service broadcasting, but to attack the detail.913
Submissions from all interested parties to the post-Annan consultation
were given a deadline of 1 July.914 The BBC put forward three papers.915

908
Robert McLeish diary entry 31 March 1977
909
BBC WAC BBC Press Release 14 April 1977 in Local and Community Radio Development
Policy Part One R92/33
910
BBC WAC Op cit. The 19 were: Blackpool; Bournemouth; Bradford; Burnley; Chester;
Crawley; Doncaster; Eastbourne; Hereford; Huddersfield; Isle of Wight; Lancaster;
Portsmouth; Reading; Salisbury; Sunderland; Tonbridge/Tunbridge Wells; Whitehaven;
Wigan
911
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 25 April 1977 ibid
912
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 2 May 1977 ibid The quote is attributed to „DG
and others‟ so the exact origin of the words is not clear
913
BBC WAC Op cit
914
BBC WAC Conference of Local Radio Managers to Discuss the Annan Report in Local
Broadcasting R78/1385
915
BBC WAC Committee on the Future of Broadcasting Papers G.121, 127, 123/77 in Board
of Governors Minutes 23 June 1977 R1/45 and Radio Management Registry Annan Report –
Local Radio R92/30. The papers underwent various drafts; much repetition was removed
from earlier versions and criticism of Annan himself toned down. The Governors commended

230
 The first paper highlighted areas where Annan displayed empathy with the
principles of public service broadcasting and the Corporation‟s interpretation
of editorial independence. It did, however, reject Annan‟s view that plurality
of services on a national, regional and local level could be administered by
different regulatory authorities.916
The second paper dealt exclusively with local radio, and rebutted
Annan‟s arguments one by one.917 The paper made it clear that Annan had
not appreciated the nuances and differences in the BBC‟s approach to
community broadcasting. Nor had he understood the system of autonomy
that allowed local decisions to be made and the way in which minority
interest programmes, and educational output could sit side-by-side with
popular request shows.918 The key proposal for an independent local radio
broadcasting authority was carefully unpicked. The BBC argued that it was
not clear how non-profit trusts could be financed, and how it would be
possible to avoid the pressures of high advertising revenues in heavily-
populated urban areas. The appendices also covered other aspects of local
broadcasting that Annan had not fully understood, such as educational
programmes, which would end under his proposals, and the differences in
audience demographics between the BBC and ILR.
Many similar arguments were played out in public. There was an
exchange of articles in The Listener between John Thompson of the IBA
and Michael Barton. The former wrote a panegyric to the Annan report,
commending it as „surely one of the most elegant, luculent documents to be
produced under official colours in this generation.‟919 Thompson extracted
from the Report all the examples of praise that Annan paid to the IBA and
ILR. What appealed to Thompson was the free market endorsement for
local radio, which would not regulate on size or content. He rather

the final version of paper two in particular for the way it rejected Annan‟s case against Local
Radio.
916
BBC WAC Op cit Annan used the phrase „local broadcasting is a different animal from
network broadcasting and needs a different sort of keeper. Home Office ibid
917
BBC WAC ibid
918
Annan was also critical that the BBC seemed to be ignoring the National Regions in the
proposals it made for the expansion of local radio, using the Ennals report as the template.
The BBC countered that it was necessary to complete coverage of England first, to replace
the loss of regional broadcasting, but that it had plans for Scotland, Northern Ireland and
Wales.
919
The Listener 7 April 1977

231
 sidestepped the issue of the new authority, which of course would replace
the IBA as regulator of ILR, looking forward instead to something exciting
and new, „radio in jeans as it were…..informality combined with style,
purpose and talent.‟920 Barton‟s riposte focussed on several key specifics.
Referencing Jackson‟s note of dissent, Barton re-iterated the point that
public service broadcasting would not have to maximise its audience just to
secure revenue.921 While diversity of ownership was possible, and
welcome, this could be achieved locally, rather than nationally, and this
plurality was the best way to secure equal access for all to the airwaves.
Another lobby group had entered into the debate by this point, the
Community Communications Group (COMCOM), which launched in
February 1977, to campaign for a change in broadcasting policy, allowing
greater access for community organisations to the methods of production
and transmission. COMCOM had submitted evidence to the Enquiry and
they were broadly in favour of the report, except they would go further in
ensuring accountability and they were against any profit-raising aspects of
public broadcasting.922 In 1976, the Labour government had set up several
small-scale cable radio stations, in Swindon, Basildon and Thamesmead,
amongst others. The presence of these operations, and the work of
COMCOM and similar groups could be seen to have had an influence on
the BBC, such as its espousal of the term „community radio‟ in Serving
Neighbourhood and Nations, and in the small-scale broadcasting trials in
Whitehaven and Barrow.
Meanwhile the BBC‟s campaign to counter the Report‟s proposals
progressed during the Spring of 1977 at various levels. Aside from public
pronouncements to encourage debate and raise awareness, there was the
lobbying of MPs. Even before the Annan Report was published, Station
Managers were drawing up lists of which MPs to target.923 An example of

920
The Listener Op cit Interestingly not everyone in ILR shared Thompson‟s enthusiasm for
Annan. Capital‟s John Whitney was particularly stung by the „pop and prattle‟ comment and
rejected the LRBA idea as „pie in the sky‟. Daily Telegraph „Local Point of View‟ 11 April 1977
921
The Listener 21 April 1977
922
Lewis P Whose Media? The Annan Report and After: A Citizen’s Guise to Radio and
Television (London: Consumers‟ Association 1978) pp 80 - 81
923
eg BBC WAC Memo from Peter Redhouse identifying groups of Conservative MPs
grouped around the stations 11 November 1977 in Radio Management Registry Annan
Report – Local Radio R92/30

232
 this was the cross-party meeting held for Staffordshire and South Cheshire
members at the House of Commons on 19 May.924
Possibly the most influential voices of support were heard in the
Broadcasting Debate in the Commons, on 23 May 1977. Willie Whitelaw,
speaking as Shadow Home Secretary, strongly repudiated the Annan local
radio authority.925 He used his own BBC local station, Radio Carlisle, as an
example of a successful relationship between the community, the BBC and
Members of Parliament. He concluded that his constituents would be
furious if they lost this form of local radio. As far as Whitelaw was
concerned, a commercial service would pursue the biggest audiences to
secure advertisers as their priority. His view was that there was room for
both sectors to expand under the current structure, as and when the
necessary resources were available. Michael Barton is clear that the weight
of Whitelaw‟s intervention, and that of other MPs, cannot be
underestimated.926 Their support at this critical time was a validation of one
important concept of local radio, that of improving the democratic dialogue
between electors and their representatives. At a higher level, it once again
proved the long-term success of the charm offensive and old-boy network
as nurtured by Trethowan and others.
But what about the progress of the campaign on a local level? It is
evident from the files that the stations mobilised quickly. The staff was, after
all, fighting for its livelihood. Centrally the BBC management gave credit to
the speed of the reaction and praised their morale.927 An example of the
kind of fight back being planned came from Radio Brighton, or rather
SORBA, the „Friends of Radio Brighton‟ supporters club. Station Manager
Robert Gunnell sent a draft of a leaflet to Newby and Barton, which asked
„What is the future for local radio?‟928 The document attempted to be non-

924
BBC WAC Memo from Station Manager Radio Stoke to MDR and GMLR May 1977 in
Radio Management Registry Annan Report – Local Radio R92/30
925
BBC WAC House of Commons Debate on Broadcasting Hansard Cols 1037-1040 23 May
1977 quoted in Radio Management Registry Annan Report – Local Radio R92/30
926
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011
927
BBC WAC memo from GMLR to all Station Managers 31 March 1977 in Radio
Management Registry Annan Report – Local Radio ibid; Conference of Local Radio Station
Managers to discuss the Annan Report 6 April 1977 Local Broadcasting ibid
928
BBC WAC Memo from Station Manager Radio Brighton to MDR and GMLR 29 March 1977
in Radio Management Registry op cit

233
 partisan, setting out all of the pro and anti Annan arguments, including the
issues of frequencies and funding. However the text made much of Tom
Jackson‟s minority report, quoting from it how „a BBC bereft it its regional
and local services is like a tree without roots.‟929 Similar leaflets were
produced up and down the country, but soon, however, dissent emerged
from local staff and the LRCs about the way that the BBC was seen to be
handling the crisis.
A staff meeting at Radio Merseyside heard speakers who thought that the
BBC‟s evidence to Annan had not been properly represented, showing that
executives in London were still ignorant of what local radio did.930
Then there were the views of the LRCs. The Chair Elect of Radio
Leicester‟s Council, Rachel Root, engaged in a correspondence with the
BBC Chair, Michael Swann, arguing that the BBC did not do enough to
counter Annan and promote the work of local radio on its own television
channels and elsewhere.931 Swann‟s reply defended the BBC‟s actions to
date, arguing that they had deliberately delayed the April press conference
to make it more effective and that the most useful responses were coming
from local sources, not the centre, which could be seen as counter-
productive.932 Clearly there was a paucity of clear communication,
producing an atmosphere of mutual distrust between BBC management
and the local stations. As Michael Barton points out, compared to the
forthright defence from Willie Whitelaw and other voices outside the BBC,
the lack of a clear commitment from within, to save and expand local radio,
was deeply un-nerving to staff across the country.933 This came to a head
on 29 June, during a 45-minute telephone „hook-up‟ between Newby and
the 20 Station Managers. During the conversation, Newby re-iterated that in
the future money would be tight, given the uncertainty about the level of the

929
BBC WAC Op cit
930
BBC WAC Memo from Station Manager Radio Merseyside to MDR and CC‟d to GMLR and
all Station Managers 29 March 1977 in Radio Management Registry ibid
931
BBC WAC Letter from Rachel Root to Sir Michael Swann 27 May 1977 in Radio
Management Registry ibid
932
BBC WAC Letter from Michael Swann to Rachel Root 1 June 1977 in Radio Management
Registry ibid
933
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011 To balance this out, McLeish records
in his diary a visit to Radio Humberside by Swann who „talks about Annan in a very relaxed
and friendly way…..reassuring everyone about the BBC fighting Annan. A very successful
visit.‟ Robert McLeish diary entry 29 April 1977

234
 next licence fee settlement. If the rise was only of a small level, there would
have to be what Newby called „a holding operation‟. This was interpreted by
five managers as meaning a halt to expansion.934 According to an account
of events in The Observer, eight of the Station Managers subsequently met
at a hotel in Coventry and drafted a letter to Sir Charles Curran, which ten
others also put their names to.935 The resulting letter brought out into the
open the unease the managers evidently felt about the BBC‟s intentions for
local radio, which they called an „equivocal attitude.‟936 The interpretation
they gave to Newby‟s remarks was that even if the government gave the
go-head for local radio expansion, after the Annan consultation, the BBC
might still choose not to do so. In a grandiose statement, the signatories
described themselves as „we, who have created local radio‟, and as such,
they had the right to demand local radio expansion, which it said the BBC
could afford from re-allocating other funds.937
The letter was met with varying degrees of admonishment. The
Managing Director of Radio wrote to the Station Managers and to the
Chairs of the LRCs saying that there was a misunderstanding in the
telephone conversation. Although finances were difficult to predict, the
BBC‟s commitment to local radio was firm, as publicly stated by the
Director- General and the Chairman.938 Douglas Muggeridge, who replied
first on Curran‟s behalf (as he was on leave at the time), expressed
astonishment, and told them that if the note went public it would „destroy‟ all
hopes of local radio expansion.939
He spoke too soon. The Observer picked up the story on 7 August („BBC
local radio men threaten revolt‟), and the spin they put on the issue was that

934
BBC WAC Minutes from the MDR‟s Management Group Meeting 9 August 1977 in Local
and Community Radio Development Policy Part One R92/33
935
The Observer „BBC local radio men threaten revolt‟ 7 August 1977 The two Station
Managers who did not sign the letter were from Blackburn and Stoke – the reason is not clear
but possibly they were on leave at the time.
936
BBC WAC letter to the DG from the Station Managers 22 July 1977 in Local and
Community Radio Development Policy ibid
937
BBC WAC Op cit This paragraph has an exclamation mark in pencil next to it, in the file
copy.
938
BBC WAC letter from MDR to all Station Managers 8 August 1977 in Local Broadcasting
Part Six R78/1385; letter from MDR to LRC Chairs 8 August 1977 in Local and Community
Radio Development ibid
939
BBC WAC letter from Director of Programmes Radio to all Local Radio Station Managers
27 July 1977 in Local Broadcasting Part Six ibid

235
 the 20 Station Managers would consider coming out in favour of Annan‟s
independent local radio authority.940 „This amounts to sedition within the
Corporation‟, said the article, quoting a BBC source. Apparently a further
conference was planned at the Post House Hotel in Coventry for the next
stage of the intrigue. Newby‟s hasty intervention, calling a meeting for 17
August, and an address by Trethowan, as Director-General designate,
calmed the situation and the subsequent rendezvous was cancelled.
The crisis aired some deep-seated grievances among the managers, but
I would argue it also forced Newby to come up with a strategy for the next
stages in local radio expansion, should the government reject Annan‟s
arguments. A press release from the BBC after the 18 August meeting
announced that a new working party would be established under Michael
Barton to investigate the way forward, and Management and Station
Managers were once again united in their opposition to any attempt to
remove local radio from the BBC.941

The Way Forward

Despite the internal turmoil, there was a temporary respite for the BBC in
that the spectre of a new independent authority for local radio, a key
proposal of the Annan Report, was beginning to recede from view. On 25
August, Newby and Michael Barton had a meeting with Home Office
minister Lord Harris.942 Harris made it clear that the government would not
be formulating its post-Annan policy until after the party conference season,
but that his main consideration was the licence fee. He stressed that the
BBC could not count on a „reasonable increase‟ and that the expansion of
BBC Local Radio would be questioned by all political parties. However, this
was based more on pressures to keep the licence fee low rather than
animosity at the size of the BBC in general. The net result might be the
freezing of BBC expansion and a rise in ILR numbers. Whatever the
outcome was, said Barton, the important thing was to plan coherently and
consistently for the future, not just the BBC but the IBA as well. Newby and

940
The Observer ibid
941
BBC WAC Press release on Local Radio 18 August in Local Broadcasting Part Six ibid
942
BBC WAC Account of a meeting with Lord Harris by Howard Newby 25 August 1977 in
Local and Community Radio Development Policy Part 1 1974-1977 R92/33

236
 Barton came away from the meeting convinced that the idea of Annan‟s
Local Radio Broadcasting Authority „has become rather ghostly.‟ 943
This hiatus in the political decision-making progress gave Newby and
Barton a chance to engage in the next round of planning, report-writing and
consultation. As had been promised to the Station Managers, the BBC
Local Radio Development Group was set up by Newby in late August. 944
The group was tasked with deciding on the location of the next 10 stations,
using the Ennals Report as the starting point, but also bearing in mind the
Crawford Report recommendations so that the stations were geographically
dispersed around England. The group would make recommendations about
equipment, studios, a timetable for training and recruitment and produce a
short list of which stations would be launched first.945
One other factor was introduced into the mix. There was the question of
whether it was tenable for the BBC and the IBA to continue to avoid
duplication in the siting of new stations. If Annan‟s new broadcasting
authority was dropped, how might the allocation of frequencies be
supervised? This was the issue that Trethowan put to Home Secretary
Merlyn Rees in July, suggesting some kind of joint committee, which
included representatives from the BBC and the IBA under the auspices of a
respected civil servant such as Sir Stewart Crawford or Peter Lillicrap.946
Evidently this idea began to carry some credence as the BBC Local Radio
Development Group bore in mind during their deliberations that there was
the possibility of consensus, rather than competition, in the choice of
locations.
The resulting report from the Development Group was in fact a sizable
piece of work (170 pages), which contained a lot of detail and probably went
much further than the original concept intended. A summary of the report
was put together and this was evaluated by a further working party, before

943
BBC WAC op cit
944
BBC WAC Memo from MDR to all Station Managers 26 August 1977 Subject: BBC Local
Radio Development Group ibid Members included Maurice Ennals (as Chair), John Saunders
and Robert McLeish from the HQ Team, Tom Beeley, Station Manager of Nottingham as well
as operational and management representatives.
945
BBC WAC Op cit
946
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 18 July 1977 R2/30/2

237
 going to the Board of Management in February 1978.947 The final version
that Newby put together for the Board of Governors became known as The
Way Forward.948
The key differences between the Local Radio Development Group‟s
Report and The Way Forward concerned the scale of ambition. The former
envisaged 37 new stations, mainly of what they termed „type B‟.949 The
authors also recommended that local radio should be known in future as
Community Radio. This was a significant step, allied to the use of the title in
Serving Neighbourhood and Nations. However, there was not a clear
rationale in the report as to why the name change was necessary. In terms
of frequency planning, the report embraced the notion of joint allocation with
the IBA, to help complete coverage more quickly. 950 In terms of the priority
for the next wave of station locations, the Development Group made two
sets of recommendations, depending on how many the government might
authorise and what the BBC could afford.951
The resulting deliberations might have seemed to be obsessed with
detail, but at the heart of the discussion was the central concept of what
local radio stood for and how stations were to be defined. There was also a
new dimension – the relationship with network radio, with the increasing
importance being given to the idea of a sustaining service, which the local
stations could opt into. This could mean using one of the existing networks
as the sustaining service, which would in reality result in its extinction in the
current form. Not surprisingly, the respective Controllers had strong
opinions on the subject.

947
BBC WAC Summary of the Report of the Local Radio Development Group 29 November
1977 in Local Broadcasting Part Six R78/1385/2; also Board of Management Minutes
February 13 1978 R2/31/1
948
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 March 1978 Paper: Local Radio Development –
The Way Forward G.59/78 R1/241/1
949
BBC WAC A Station = 40 staff broadcasting 12 hours a day, 7 days a week; B = 20/6/7‟ C
= 8/2/7; D = 3/30mins/5 Summary of the Report of the Local Radio Development Group ibid
950
BBC WAC Op cit The group also suggested that the Home Office could set a population
target, so the BBC and IBA could distribute their stations more evenly. eg the IBA could
launch five stations in urban areas, the BBC ten stations in low population, high priority areas
951
BBC WAC The first five stations would be in Lincoln, Shrewsbury, Norwich, Exeter and
Northampton, with alternatives drawn from Swindon, Gloucester, York, Truro, Canterbury,
Peterborough and Cambridge Op cit

238
 Commenting on the report in January 1978, the Chief Engineer, Radio
Broadcasting, J D MacEwan, cast doubt on the key philosophies in play.952
The problem as he saw it was that the local stations suffered from „grade
inflation‟. In theory, they all began as B types in 1967/8, but quickly
expanded their output and augmented their staff, so that they resembled B+
or even A types. MacEwan argued it was time to „control, limit or even
restrict‟ the stations, especially when it came to their ability to opt in at
will.953 A group headed by the Director of Programme, Radio evaluated the
paper, suggesting that the first six stations should be (in order of priority):
Lincoln, Shrewsbury, Truro, York, Taunton and Northampton. Station
premises should be in main shopping areas or precincts. On the subject of
the sustaining service, the group suggested some kind of area syndication,
whereby neighbouring stations could share programmes at key parts of the
day.
The group‟s deliberations shaped much of The Way Forward, which
Newby presented to the Board of Management on 27 February954 and to the
Board of Governors on 16 March.955 The Board of Management broadly
accepted the recommendations (see below) although Barton voiced
reservations about what he saw as an interpretation of local radio that was
more regional than local. To the Board of Governors, Newby went through
the recent chronology which led the BBC to the pressing problem of
determining the rate and timing of new local radio stations, if the
government‟s expected White Paper gave the go ahead.
The first issue was finance: the Local Radio Development Group
proposed 37 new stations but there was no inclusion in the current budget
for any expansion.956 Muggeridge‟s fallback position was two type B
stations, (Shrewsbury and Lincoln) but even these would cost £1m in capital

952
BBC WAC Report from CERB to DPR 9 January 1978 Subject: Local Radio Development
Group in Local and Community Radio Development Policy Part Two January – August 1978
R92/34
953
BBC WAC Op cit
954
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 27 February 1978 R2/31/1
955
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 March 1978 R1/241/1
956
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes ibid: Fifty pence on the new licence would pay for
the 37 new stations; a 20 pence increase would allow the 12 stations identified by the DPR‟s
group as priority: the six stations cited above, plus Cambridge, Exeter, Swindon, Gloucester,
Barnstaple and Guildford

239
 costs, which might not be politically acceptable. So Newby came up with a
cheaper option: small stations in the south west at Barnstaple, Truro and
Exeter (which were type C); turn Radio Blackburn into Radio Lancashire;
launch a small station in Taunton as an opt out for Radio Bristol and
possibly start Radios Shrewsbury and Lincoln as 14 man (sic) stations as a
prelude to a full type B service.957
Newby also accepted the Evaluation Group‟s endorsement/amendment
to the Development Group‟s various other recommendations. His way
forward, as it were, was to announce this short-term plan, if the White Paper
was favourable. At the same time, he recognised that it was important both
in terms of public commitment and staff morale to be seen to have a more
substantial plan for development beyond this stage. This strategic position
based on realpolitik was accepted by the Board, who proposed a sub-group
of their own number to assess the recommendations, and to report back.
Their material would also be used for a response to the White Paper. 958
The crucial point at this juncture was that while BBC management were
dealing with the practical problems of how to expand the service, it was not
tackling the more intrinsic issues, which MacEwan had raised about the
aggrandisement of the existing stations and concerns relating to the quality
and quantity of the output. In other words, there was a need for consistency
across the original 20 stations and the next wave of development, both in
terms of size and scheduling, which were still not being addressed. A
potential struggle over autonomy and independence had been exacerbated
by the confrontation over the way the BBC dealt with the Annan Report in
the summer of 1977. This had demonstrated the gulf that existed between
management‟s perception of how local radio operated and how this was
being effectively communicated and appreciated across the country. The
test would come when the Development Group succeeded in producing a
concrete plan.

957
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes ibid
958
BBC WAC Board of Governors ibid The sub group comprised of George Howard; Stella
Clarke and Lord Allen. Lord Allen withdrew shortly after the group started; Howard and Clarke
completed the task alone.

240
 The Governors’ Sub-group
As this phase of local radio expansion planning drew to a close, there was a
significant change in personnel at the helm. Howard Newby retired from the
Corporation in June 1978, and was replaced by Aubrey Singer. The
appointment of Singer as Managing Director of Radio was likely to cause
some concern, given that his previous role was Controller of BBC Two
Television. Nevertheless, there are examples of memos in the files
demonstrating how keen he was to grasp the fundamental issues in local
radio, as well as visiting sites to meet staff and see for himself how it
worked.959 However, as I will argue in this chapter, Singer‟s management
style and indeed temperament were quite different from those of his
predecessors, which resulted in some notable confrontations and a less
coherent strategy to local radio‟s problems. The BBC expected the
government‟s White Paper in June or July,960 so meanwhile the Governors‟
Sub-group set to work interviewing senior staff, LRC chairs, visiting every
local radio station and compiling their evidence.961
The resulting paper was, rather like the Local Radio Development
Group‟s report, very extensive in its conclusions, and in fact disagreed with
some of the first group‟s recommendations.962 The most fundamental
conclusion for the sub-group was that the BBC must either continue to
expand local radio, or think about closing it down. For Clarke and Howard,
the service was core to the BBC‟s philosophy and co-dependent on other
forms of broadcasting: „[local radio] is complementary to network radio;
neither can achieve its full potential without the other.‟963 Taking a lead from
the LRC chairs, and contradicting the earlier Development Group Report,
this paper preferred the service to retain the name „local radio‟, rather than
be re-named community radio, arguing that the original title was now more
recognisable and a strong BBC brand identity.

959
BBC WAC eg Memo from MDR designate to CLR Subject: Radio Wearside 19 April 1978
in Local and Community Radio Development Policy Part Two 1978 R92/34
960
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 10 April 1978 R2/31/1
961
BBC WAC File: Local Radio: Board of Governors‟ Sub-group R78/1388 The meetings with
LRC chairs and senior radio management have been documented in previous chapters.
962
BBC WAC Report of the Local Radio Group of Governors G.145/78 July 1978 R78/1388
963
BBC WAC op cit

241
 The two Governors suggested that the rate of expansion should be five
stations per year until the coverage of England was complete, in the late
1980s. However they counselled against naming exact locations too far in
advance or even a final total, as this would be restrictive. Whilst not
commenting on the exact order of stations, the report said priority should be
given to virgin territories, such as East Anglia and the South West. In terms
of station types, they should all aim to be type B, although some could start
as smaller, type C satellite stations. In terms of output, the stations should
be heard 24 hours a day, with six hours being locally produced for type B,
twelve for A and two for C. Part of the extra content could be generated by
a „Newsfax‟ service, available continuously from 2pm to 6am each day. 964
The cost would only be the same as one type A station. In effect, this was
the Governors‟ version of a sustaining service.
In terms of monitoring local radio quality, the Governors were aware that
there was a need for greater supervision, particularly the use of access
programmes. However they did not want to restrict Station Managers‟
autonomy in any way. The financial provision for this expansion was quite
vague but the report reckoned capital costs could range from £2 - £3million
a year for five years, but they were convinced that total growth could be
paid for with 30 pence per licence. In conclusion, Clarke and Howard
restated their view that „for the BBC to survive in the next ten years, a
strong local service must be allied to a strong network presence.‟965 The
Board of Governors broadly endorsed the report, although there were some
dissenting voices questioning the need to commit £27million to future
expansion.966 Howard and Clarke also agreed that there was room for more
control from the centre, to keep managers producing a fixed number of
hours.967
The White Paper was published on 26 July and, to all round relief at the
BBC, it did not suggest creating a separate independent local radio
authority. Instead, the Home Office proposed a working party with BBC and
964
This was akin to Radio London‟s Rush Hour programme: a presenter-led sequence
covering news, traffic, sport, interviews. This could be widened to include material from all the
local stations. BBC WAC Op cit
965
BBC WAC Op cit
966
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 20 July 1978 R2/241/3
967
BBC WAC Op cit

242
 IBA representatives to allocate frequencies in future. This effectively gave
them a free hand in deciding how many stations they wanted, depending on
what they could afford.968 Unfortunately for the BBC, the White Paper said
nothing about the future prospects for the licence fee, which made it difficult
to make firm development plans.969 Nonetheless, the BBC welcomed the
White Paper as an opportunity to fill in the large gaps left when
development had been halted at 20 stations.970 A press release on 27 July
listed the eighteen sites where the BBC hoped to launch local stations, in
alphabetical order.971 An accompanying quote from Michael Barton raised
the hope that this would be completed by the late 1980s, although the rate
of progress would be determined by the availability of resources.

The First Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report

There were three Home Office Reports, beginning in late 1978 and ending
in 1980. These effectively set the pattern for the immediate growth of local
radio, both for the BBC and the IBA. Running parallel to these discussions
was yet another round of working parties and papers, to try and solve the
issues of paying for the service, where the stations would be situated and
how to make them more efficient in terms of hours of output and whether a
sustaining service should be used. This was somewhat ironic: after several
years of being frozen at twenty stations, the BBC now had the green light to
expand, but it did not necessarily have the means to do so.
The terms of reference for the Working Party were to make an efficient
use of the frequencies available, to cover as much of the population as
possible – with priority given to those areas not currently served and those
deprived of social amenities. It was also hoped that it would be feasible to
experiment with associate or twinned stations, perhaps on a non-profit
making basis, an idea that bore a strong resemblance to one of Annan‟s

968
Broadcast „Local Radio – the big boom starts now‟ 31 July 1978
969
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 10 August 1978 R1/241/3
970
BBC WAC Paper: Response to the White Paper on the Future of Broadcasting 26 July
1978 Board of Governors ibid
971
BBC WAC BBC Press Release 27 July 1978 in Local and Community Radio Development
Part Two 1978 R92/34. The stations listed were: Alnwick; Barnstaple; Barrow; Cambridge;
Canterbury; Dorchester; Exeter; Gloucester; Guildford; Lincoln; Northampton; Norwich;
Plymouth; Shrewsbury; Swindon; Taunton; Truro; York

243
 recommendations.972 Lord Harris, speaking after the first meeting of the
Working Party, picked up this theme of duality, which he contrasted to the
monopolistic way that the local press operated. Ultimately, Harris said, he
would like to see areas with both a commercial and a BBC station.973
Michael Barton comments on the speed with which the first Working
Party operated: they held meetings through August and September and
were able to produce the first report by the end of October.974 Part of the
reason for the alacrity in the decision-making was the fact that the BBC and
the IBA had already got their shortlists of new stations ready.975 There were
only two duplicates on the IBA list – Norwich and Exeter, which it seemed
plausible to come to an agreement over.976 Strategically, the BBC was
interested in larger editorial areas than the IBA, so they could cover more of
the population. The IBA was more concerned with smaller stations in
densely populated towns and cities, to make them attractive to commercial
consortia bidding for licences.977
Despite these differences, Michael Barton recalls that this period
witnessed a period of much closer working relations with the IBA.978 For
example, the issue of both parties wanting stations in Exeter and Norwich
was settled amicably – the IBA took the former, where it hoped to arrange a
twinning operation with Torbay, and the BBC accepted the latter.979

972
BBC WAC News Release from Home Office: Extension of Local Radio 8 September 1978
in Home Office Local Radio Working Party General R102/19 The Working Party was chaired
by Shirley Littler, the Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Home Office Broadcasting
Department. The BBC was represented variously by the Managing Director of Radio, his
deputy, the Controller of Local Radio and the Director of Engineering. The IBA contingent
consisted of John Thompson, Director of Radio, and their heads of engineering and planning
973
The Times 9 September 1978
974
BBC WAC Memo from CLR to All Managers Subject: Home Office Working Party 15
August 1978 ibid One reason may have been that a General Election was expected so the
BBC and the IBA wanted to get some decisions made quickly in case there was a change of
government. The BBC‟s extensive preparations and planning also helped. Michael Barton
interview with the author 8 June 2011
975
BBC WAC Op cit. The BBC‟s list was Barnstaple; Lincoln; Shrewsbury; Truro; Taunton;
York; Northampton; Cambridge; Barrow; Norwich; Exeter; Swindon
976
BBC WAC Note from Director of Engineering 7 September 1978 ibid However, the IBA
objected to the BBC proposing Cambridge, Northampton and Swindon as they (the IBA)
hoped to launch commercial stations there at a later date.
977
BBC WAC Notes on a meeting of the Home Office Local Radio Working Party by Michael
Barton 6 September 1978 ibid
978
Michael Barton interview with the author 17 December 2007
979
BBC WAC Notes on a meeting of the Home Office Local Radio Working Party by Michael
Barton 6 September 1978 ibid. The official version in the files credits this compromise to

244
 The first report was published on 24 October 1978, announcing nine
stations each for the BBC and the IBA.980 In accordance with the criteria
established when the Working Party was set up, the Report stated that
these stations were the most efficient use of the frequencies, to get as
much population coverage as possible (obviously a nod in the BBC‟s
direction), prioritising areas not currently served and with high social
deprivation.981 The Report also made clear that it was intended to avoid any
direct duplication – consequently the IBA‟s proposed station at Preston was
omitted from the list.982 At a news conference a few days later, Singer
confirmed four of these stations would go ahead: Barrow, Lincoln, Norwich
and Taunton. The remainder would depend on any future licence fee
settlement.983
The focus shifted once again to a series of consultations and working
parties within the BBC. There was, however, a noticeable change in the
purpose of this stage in the strategic planning. Whereas Newby had been
preoccupied with listing and prioritising the stations he hoped to open,
Singer was more concerned with being realistic about local radio‟s long-
term prospects. In other words, he did not want to start on a wave of
expansion only to discover the money was running out, the chain left
uncompleted and commercial radio outpacing the BBC.984
He therefore shifted the emphasis in two crucial directions. First onto the
potential of the sustaining service, as a means of reducing the amount of
original, local output and making it possible to develop new stations. This

Singer; off the record, Barton says that he [Barton] tossed a coin for the stations. Barton
Interview with author ibid
980
BBC WAC Home Office Press Release Subject: Home Secretary Announces Locations for
18 Additional Local Radio Stations 24 October 1978 ibid. The BBC‟s nine stations were:
Barrow; Cambridge; Lincoln; Northampton; Norwich; Shrewsbury; Taunton; Truro; York. The
IBA‟s list comprised: Aberdeen/Inverness*; Bournemouth; Cardiff; Chelmsford/Southend*;
Coventry; Dundee/Perth*; Exeter/Torbay*; Gloucester; Peterborough *sites suitable for
twinned or associate stations.
981
BBC WAC Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report on Local Radio October 1978 in
Local and Community Radio Development Policy Part Three September 1978-May 1979
R92/35
982
BBC WAC Op cit The Report accepted that there would inevitably be some overlap on the
margins, such as the IBA‟s Bournemouth station, which sat on the fringes of BBC Radio
Solent; ditto with Coventry (IBA) and Birmingham (BBC).
983
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 30 October 1978 R2/31/3
984
BBC WAC Note from the Managing Director of Radio 30 November 1978 in Radio
Services Policy Part Two R78/1170

245
 would mean, however, that instead of local radio maintaining its autonomy
to opt in whenever it chose, it would become an opt out service – a crucial
development. Secondly, he addressed the quality, and quantity of existing
local radio output. Both moves raised the prospect for another serious
confrontation between the stations and the management.

Town and Country Radio

At the end of 1978 a paper was put together for the General Advisory
Council, which attempted to put a more positive gloss on the achievements
of BBC radio and the plans for the coming decade.985 According to the
paper, radio was entering something of a renaissance, flourishing in the
renewed interest in British culture and the arts. Meanwhile, local radio
would continue to put the emphasis on involvement in community affairs
and access programmes, promoting interaction with listeners, groups and
organisations. It was hoped the new stations would open by 1980/81. As
proposed earlier, these new stations would broadcast for shorter periods,
taking output from a sustaining service or perhaps a neighbouring station.
The paper then postulated various ways a sustaining service might operate,
broadcasting news, drama and music, perhaps taking contributions from
London departments and regional centres. Above all, said the paper, „it
must be more relevant and attractive than Radio Two.‟986
However, it also argued that an element of quality control needed to be
applied to local radio output as well. There was room for the production to
be improved, the style of presentation to be polished and more attention
paid to the weekends. In terms of costs, setting up the sustaining service,
along with more local radio stations might prove uneconomic. So Singer
suggested a more viable plan: creating a sustaining service that was in fact
already a network, which the local stations would opt out of for their own
programmes. And his proposal for this was Radio Two.
Singer launched a planning exercise with Radio Management so they
would know what the options were by the time the licence fee was known,

985
BBC WAC Radio Programme Policy Paper GAC Paper 556 7 December 1978 in Radio
Services Policy Part Two R78/1170
986
BBC WAC Op cit

246
 perhaps by the end of 1979.987 This signalled one of those periods when
there were several different strands of policy-making all producing
documents which related to one another. Some of the ideas being floated
would get taken up and pursued further, others would not.
There were three strands to the discussions. The Radio Consultancy
Report explored the long-term prospects for BBC radio based on various
scenarios of licence fee growth.988 Meanwhile, Michael Starks, the Chief
Assistant, Radio Management, was drawing up his own report, which would
go to the Board of Management, along with the Radio Consultancy Study.
Starks‟ paper, Radio Programme Policy, attempted to set some priorities for
radio as a whole. These included augmenting network transmitter capacity,
replacing and refurbishing existing equipment, creating a sustaining service
for local radio for 16-18 hours a day and launching between 40 and 60 new
stations, at a rate of five a year.989 Since the picture of radio was being
appraised holistically, it was clear that some senior managers and
programme makers were not keen for local radio to command so many
resources. The Controller of Radio Four, Monica Sims, questioned the role
of local radio, arguing her network had lost listeners to it.990 In addition,
Singer and his deputy, Muggeridge, persisted with their view that local
radio‟s autonomy needed to be reined in, despite Barton‟s warnings that this
would cut it off from its roots. Starks‟ paper was redrafted and submitted to
the Board of Management, along with the Consultancy Study.991
Just three days later, a new administration was swept to power, a
Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher. While the political and
economic uncertainty continued, there was yet more hiatus in making any
firm decisions. The new Home Secretary, Willie Whitelaw, was a known

987
BBC WAC Note from the Managing Director of Radio 30 November 1978 in Radio
Services Policy Part Two R78/1170
988
BBC WAC Minutes of the Radio Development Group 3 April 1978 in Radio Services Policy
April 1979-July 1979 R92/70; also Board of Management Minutes 9 April R2/32 eg If there
was 5% growth in real terms, then the BBC could achieve all its desired developments,
including the increase in local radio, during the 1980s. If there were only 2%, then radio would
decline or at best stagnate, unless a better licence fee settlement, and a greater
apportionment for radio, was achieved.
989
BBC WAC Minutes of the Radio Development Group 3 April 1978 in Radio Services Policy
April 1979-July 1979 R92/70 ibid
990
BBC WAC Op cit
991
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 9 April R2/32

247
 friend to local radio and keen for both BBC and ILR expansion. Mrs
Thatcher on the other hand was also on record voicing her opposition to
more BBC stations.992
Meanwhile, a third paper entered the forum for debate. This was the
Future of Radio, commissioned by the Managing Director of Radio from a
working party called the Future Policy Group. This was presented purely as
an advisory document but it advanced one key aspect of the discussion, the
sustaining service, to the next level.993 The report proposed the radical
alternative, based apparently on a Swedish model. Radio Two would
remain in its own right, not as a sustaining service, and local radio would
broadcast in what it called „windows‟ of six hours within this. The name of
this would be Town and Country Radio (TCR).994 The authors of the report
acknowledged there would be opposition from the local stations to this
proposal. But the report‟s sympathies clearly lay elsewhere:
„richer fare involves the recognition that the inward-looking tendencies
of the British….could be irretrievably accentuated by an over-
concentration on parish pump matters and a neglect of subjects and
feelings that made and make Britain a great nation.‟995

In other words, forget local, think national. Singer obviously seemed taken
with this idea, and circulated a paper based on The Future Of Radio for
further consultation later that month.996 One small detail emerged more
prominently in this version – the assumption that Radio Four would gain
listeners from local radio under the TCR arrangement. However, somewhat
contradicting this, Singer then apparently gave brief consideration to using
Radio Four as the sustaining service for TCR, as opposed to Radio Two. 997

992
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 14 May 1979 R2/32
993
BBC WAC Board of Management Paper The Future of Radio BM (79) 100 June 1979 in
Radio Services Policy April 1979-July 1979 R92/70
994
In a sample schedule for Radio Warwick, local programmes would go out at 7.20 –
8.30am in the morning, between 12noon and 1pm and 4.50pm – 6pm for Drivetime. There
would be an hour for „Minority Time‟ at 8pm and then a late show at 10pm.
The remainder of the output would consist of Radio Two material, with the possibility of a
MW/VHF split at times, to allow ball-by-ball sports commentary for example. BBC WAC Op cit
995
BBC WAC Op cit
996
BBC WAC Paper Radio in the Late Eighties 12 June 1979 in Radio Services Policy April
1979 – July 1979 R92/70
997
BBC WAC Memo from MDR to Controller Radio Four 22 June 1979 Radio Services Policy
op cit

248
 Although, as shall be explored in a later section, the concept of TCR was
largely just one in a long series of schemes that did not progress from the
drawing board,998 I would argue that it did help to cement several key
developments. One was the realisation that more audience research was
needed, to work out exactly the relationship between local radio listening
patterns and the networks and ILR.999 Secondly, it became increasingly
clear that any progression in local radio development needed to consider
the National Regions, to allow sufficient resources to create some kind of
local radio programme there and maintain equity across the UK.1000 Finally,
as the next sub-section explores, Singer began to act on the critical
implication of a sustaining service (if it ever came about), that the balance of
power held by local radio as an opt in operation had to change. In other
words, he made a move to reassert his authority and curb the stations‟
autonomy.

The cut in hours: ‘for most people, reality is local’

The following episode reveals quite a lot of the character of Aubrey Singer,
and demonstrates once again how significant the personalities of BBC
management were to the way that key decisions were made and policy was
formulated. If it can be said that local radio was fashioned in the shape of its
avuncular and charming founder Frank Gillard, then it is not surprising that
Singer‟s antithetical approach produced a more confrontational atmosphere.
Michael Barton recalls that Singer took some time to convert to the ideals of
local radio and even when he accepted – and defended – the need for it, he
found it difficult to stick to a consistent policy, tending to vacillate from one
course to another.1001 This meant that when he did determine to pursue a
course of action, it was handled in a rather abrasive and direct way, as the

998
For example Starks, Barton and J Dutot (Head of Planning and Development Radio)
compiled a response to the TCR plan but a memo from Starks suggested they were trying to
stall the idea by going through the scheme in forensic detail, reassuring Singer that they were
genuinely considering it, but at the same time looking for obvious flaws. BBC WAC Memo
from CARM to CLR and HPDR [no date] op cit
999
BBC WAC Paper: Radio Listening Patterns 17 July 1979 op cit
1000
Michael Barton says that the BBC‟s inability to persuade the Nations to use some kind of
local radio model hindered the argument for more resources for local radio across the whole
UK. Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011
1001
Michael Barton interview with the author 17 December 2007 and 8 June 2011

249
 cut in hours demonstrated, even though the concept underpinning it might
have been justified.
As I have argued in the previous section, there were good managerial
grounds for steering local radio away from some of its excessive hours of
output and improving content. Even Michael Barton acknowledges this. 1002
The problem was the manner in which this was to be achieved. In Spring
1979, relations between Singer and his local Station Managers were
certainly frosty. Sandra Chalmers (Radio Stoke) had written a memo to
Singer (copied to all managers) about a meeting the North West managers
had held in March.1003 They had voiced their disappointment with the
slowing down of local radio development, questioned the need for a
sustaining service, and produced some alternative areas for investment
instead, including the development of an Audio Service and extending the
Regional News Service.
Singer‟s reply was stinging. He rebuked the North West managers for
making decisions „in ignorance of the present situation.‟1004 He restated the
Board of Governors‟ policy, for five new stations a year, pending the
identification of financial resources: „lobbying from Sandbach [the location of
the meeting] is definitely counter-productive‟. Singer went further, outlining
what would become his agenda for forcing change on the Station
Managers. He said their real fear was the use of a sustaining service, with
mandatory windows and no control over scheduling. He reminded them that
managers had simply extended their hours of output, and as a result „local
radio programming had indeed been stretched and much programming had
become time-filling and banal.‟1005 Although he conceded they were no
further forward with the sustaining service, he still believed it would add
value by allowing managers the opportunity to improve the quality of a
reduced local output.1006

1002
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011
1003
BBC WAC Memo from Station Manager Radio Stoke to MDR April 10 1979 in Local and
Community Radio Development Policy Part Three September 1978 – May 1979 R92/35
1004
BBC WAC Memo from MDR to all station managers 17 April 1979 Local and Community
Radio Development Policy Part Three September 1978 – May 1979 ibid
1005
BBC WAC Op cit
1006
BBC WAC Op cit Finally, they were reminded not to hold meetings without first informing
him and ideally offering Singer (or his deputy Muggeridge) an invitation, otherwise they would

250
 Singer‟s mind was made up. On 1 May, he wrote to Trethowan outlining
his plan to tell Station Managers that he wanted them to cut their output and
improve the quality.1007 While he ultimately still wanted a sustaining service
„I do see this as the first stage of making this an opt-out rather than opt-in
service.‟1008 The Station Managers were told of the cuts on 6 June and the
Chairs of the LRCs were given a presentation by Singer at their conference
at Brandon Hall, Warwickshire two days later. The session at the LRC
conference at which Singer unveiled his plans was, by all accounts,
lively.1009 Singer‟s main proposal was to reduce the output by 25% for each
station, by restricting the hours of local output to between 6.30am to
6.30pm. There would be no savings made in programme budgets, as
Singer intended to invest just as much as before.1010 After pressure from the
Chairs, Singer made some exemptions for Radios Merseyside, Birmingham,
Manchester and London, and accepted that each manager could argue for
slight variations based on local needs for special events.1011
Whilst the Station Managers were reported to have accepted the
proposals,1012 the Chairs met Singer‟s presentation with dismay. They were
particularly upset with the claim that programmes were „banal and
underproduced‟, and they viewed this as an attack on the stations, not an
attempt to strengthen them.1013 Rachel Root, Chair of Radio Leicester‟s

invite themselves „if nobody else has the courtesy to do so.‟ He also suggested that any
regional meetings be held in London, so the HQ team could attend: „after all, it is the isolation
of a Local Radio manager that brings about the intense insecurity of local radio.‟
1007
BBC WAC Memo from MDR to DG May 1 1979 Local and Community Radio
Development Policy Part Three September 1978 – May 1979 ibid
1008
BBC WAC Op cit Interestingly, there‟s a suggestion in the files that Michael Barton might
have voiced some hesitation about the way this was being proposed. A memo from Singer
reiterated the reasons for the cut in hours (again he called the programmes „infilling and
banal‟, reaching „geriatric audiences‟), and suggested going for a 25-30% cut to start with, but
settling for the lower figure if there was any resistance. The memo ended bluntly, asking
Barton to „make this a priority.‟ Memo from MDR to CLR May 15 1979 ibid
1009
BBC WAC see accounts of the meeting in Local Radio Conferences R78/4185; Local
Broadcasting 1979 R78/1165
1010
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 14 June 1979 R1/46/3 According to McLeish‟s
diary, Singer‟s original proposal was for mandatory cuts between 2-4pm, taking Radio Two or
Radio London. But after the hostile reaction, Singer backtracked the next day and proposed
the 6.30am-6.30pm limit. Robert McLeish diary entries 7 – 9 June 1978
1011
BBC WAC Notes for LRC Chairs 7 June 1979 in Local Broadcasting 1979 R78/1165
Robert McLeish diary entry 8 June: „Why penalize success leaving the expensive „biggies‟
untouched?‟
1012
BBC WAC Op cit; Board of Governors Minutes 14 June ibid
1013
BBC WAC Outline response by the Chairmen of the BBC LRCs 9 June 1979 in Local
Broadcasting 1979 R78/1165

251
 LRC, wrote to Michael Swann asking what criteria Singer would use to
judge whether the cut in hours was a success, and requesting a meeting
between the Chairs and the Governors.1014
Although Singer had warned the Board of Management about the
proposed cut in hours,1015 the Board of Governors found themselves
dragged into the whole affair once they had received letters from the LRC
Chairs post-Brandon Hall.1016 Singer was called to account, and produced a
paper on the subject. Whilst the Board supported the plan in principle, they
were critical of the manner in which Singer had communicated this,
describing it as „a little provocative.‟1017 The word „banal‟ in particular was
recognised to have upset the LRC Chairs, which, as has been illustrated,
Singer used frequently. Even the Director-General declared he would not
have used the word either, despite accepting the need for forthright
language.1018
The Station Managers were more accommodating towards the reduction
in hours, but they resented Singer‟s style of management. McLeish
described the reduction in hours as „a piece of crass timing and bad
management.‟1019 Owen Bentley recalls that many Station Managers
resented Singer‟s way of doing things: Singer got upset if people did not do
what they were told, and the world of local radio was not used to being told
what to do.1020 As for the quality of the programmes, Michael Barton thinks
the issue was more to do with “underfunding, or the lack of creative vigour
from a manager….the problem was Singer was listening as an outsider.”1021
Regarding the cut in hours, Bentley says “We hated it [but] we did part of it,
anyhow.”1022
There was an ironic illustration of the impact of the cuts in the minutes of
the Weekly Programme Review Board. On 27 June, Singer praised Jazz
Review, from Radio Humberside, but Station Manager David Challis pointed

1014
BBC WAC Letter from Rachel Root to Michael Swann 11 June 1979 Op cit
1015
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 4 June 1979 R2/32/2
1016
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 14 June 1979 R1/46/3
1017
BBC Op cit
1018
BBC Op cit Singer said in his defence he was being „tactful‟.
1019
Robert McLeish diary entry 7 June 1978
1020
Owen Bentley interview with the author 19 July 2010 “[Singer] was quite centralist”
1021
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011
1022
Op cit

252
 out this programme would be axed under the cuts.1023 A similar example
occurred in August, this time with Radio Bristol‟s Jazz Tempo: good critical
feedback from the Board, but dropped due to the restriction in hours.1024
The correspondence from the LRCs objecting to the cut in hours
continued through to the end of the year. The main thrust of the resistance
came from defending minority and community programmes, which were
broadcast in the evenings, and so were most at risk from the 6.30pm cut-
off. Janet Kitchin from Humberside argued that the winter was a particularly
bad time to sacrifice these types of programmes, since so many elderly,
housebound and handicapped [sic] listeners relied on local radio in the
evenings.1025 The Chair of Radio Brighton‟s LRC pointed out that the cuts
put at risk those programmes which were most closely linked to the
listeners, ie access output and co-produced shows, made with universities
or other partners.1026
The stakes were raised even higher when petitions began to be
gathered. Rachel Root sent one to Michael Swann containing 4,164
signatures from listeners in the Radio Leicester area protesting against the
cuts. She quoted GK Chesterton, in defiance, „For most people, reality is
local.‟1027 In December, the Radio Leeds LRC had gathered a petition of
15,575 signatures, explicitly supporting the notion of autonomy, and
rejecting any suggestion of a centrally-imposed sustaining service.1028 This
letter, and others like it, demonstrated the sense of betrayal they felt by the
BBC over Annan. Local radio supporters argued that they had united in
opposition to Annan at the BBC‟s behest: „we did as we were bid and
Annan was overwhelmingly defeated.‟1029 Moreover, this treachery was
multiplied by the hypocrisy of the BBC in the LRC‟s eyes by reneging on
everything they had told Annan about the BBC‟s commitment to preserving

1023
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board Minutes 27 June 1979
1024
BBC WAC Op cit 15 August 1979
1025
BBC WAC Letter from Janet Kitchin, Humberside LRC to Michael Swann 12 June 1979 in
Local Broadcasting 1979 R78/1165
1026
BBC WAC Letter from R Hinton to Michael Swann 4 July 1979 ibid He used the word
„decimate‟ to describe the impact
1027
BBC WAC Letter from Rachel Root to Michael Swann 6 September 1979 ibid
1028
BBC WAC Letter from Graham Cook to Michael Swann 28 December 1979 ibid
1029
BBC WAC Letter from Radio Carlisle NUJ/ABA Joint Ctte [unsigned] to Michael Swann 31
July 1979 ibid

253
 autonomy and independence for their stations.1030 The best the BBC could
offer in response were slightly patronising statements about „the loyalty and
dedication to local radio by the station staff and members of the LRC and by
listeners.‟1031

The Second Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report

Disagreement about the exact number of stations the BBC should be
publicly aiming for continued to rumble on. Singer was content to accept 45
stations on MW, with the potential for a further 20 on VHF, but only if
necessary.1032 Writing to Michael Swann, George Howard made it clear he
totally opposed limiting the stations to 45. As his and Clarke‟s report the
previous year had identified, there were at least 65 communities in England
that merited a station.1033 He urged Swann to seek a postponement of the
next Home Office Working Party meeting, partly because of the imminent
General Election, but also because he was worried that the BBC was being
forced to make irrevocable decisions. There was, however, another element
to the division in opinion. Howard sensed that Singer and other managers
were anxious about having a large number of stations, because they did not
want to have to deal with 65 Station Managers and 65 LRC Chairs „ganging
up on the BBC.‟1034 In fact, Singer said as much when he wrote to Howard
and Clarke on 29 May.1035 He again stressed his view that much of the
output was „banal and serving the elderly‟, and warned that more stations
would mean the Board would become a regulatory authority keeping track
of 150,000 hours of output. Singer‟s view was clearly that a more modest
scheme of around 45 stations was the only way forward, even if it was
editorially less satisfying. It would allow relatively early coverage of

1030
BBC WAC Letter from Graham Cook to Michael Swann ibid
1031
BBC WAC Letter from JF Wilkinson (on behalf of the BBC Chair) to Mrs Fleming, Sheffield
LRC 9 August 1979 ibid
1032
45 stations would secure 95% coverage of England. These would be type B stations
ideally, which would be most effective in combating ILR competition. As has already been
noted, some of the Governors (notably Howard and Clarke) were pushing for the 65+ plan.
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 30 April 1979 R2/32
1033
BBC WAC Letter from George Howard to Michael Swann 1 May 1979 in Local
Broadcasting 1979 R78/1165
1034
BBC WAC Op cit
1035
BBC WAC Letter from MDR to George Howard and Stella Clarke 29 May 1979 in Local
and Community Radio Development Policy Part Three September 1978 – May 1979 R92/35

254
 England, help maintain the networks and keep in touch with the grassroots.
He concluded with a typically blunt appraisal. In his professional view, „too
grandiose a plan would jeopardise the whole structure.‟1036
A further element to the second Report was the problem of London. The
Working Party asked the BBC and the IBA to submit proposals for the way
they might consider using frequencies in the capital and plan for further
station expansion there.1037 The issue of London had already been noted
and discussed by the Governor‟s Sub-Group, who suggested using the
London station as a „Newsfax‟ sustaining service.1038 The Pitt Mansfield
Report recommended ways for engaging more closely with London‟s
population through the use of mobile studios and establishing an ethnic
station.1039
Both these studies demonstrated support for local radio in London but in
contrasting ways. So what were the problems? The Board of Governors
considered that although Radio London produced some good material, in a
mix of news, music, information and community output, listening penetration
was unlikely to get any higher than the current 1.3%.1040 The main issue as
they saw it was competition from other stations and the fact that London
was so large, compared to the standard local radio transmission area.1041
The Board heard that Singer‟s Radio Management team believed a
sustaining service might be possible using network material to supplement
it, but discussions centred on whether local radio could ever effectively
serve London, and whether it would be better catered for with smaller
community stations. But then there was disagreement about whether these
were communities of interest or of geography: the idea that London consists
of small villages. In essence, these debates were a microcosm of the
central conundrum facing local radio: what was the right size and definition
for a community? It was obvious that consensus on the London issue was

1036
BBC WAC Op cit
1037
BBC WAC Board of Management Paper BM (79) 86 BBC Local Radio in London 17 May
1979 in Local Broadcasting 1979 R78/1165; also Board of Governors Paper G.141/79 in
R1/46/3
1038
BBC WAC Report of the Local Radio Group of Governors G.145/78 July 1978 R78/1388
1039
See Chapter Ten
1040
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 31 May 1979 R1/46/3
1041
This included not just the two commercial stations and the BBC networks but also more
than 20 unlicensed stations.

255
 unlikely to be reached either, so the Board proposed making some general
requests to the Home Office which would not amount to a firm commitment.
These included raising the future potential for four or five localised services
in London at some unspecified time in the future, and therefore to apply for
two new MW and VHF frequencies.1042
The change in government had created a delay in the proceedings in the
Working Party, but it turned out to be only brief. On 11 June, Shirley Littler
wrote from the Home Office to Singer to circulate the new Home Secretary‟s
thoughts on the process.1043 Willie Whitelaw agreed to continue the second
report, planning for the further expansion of local radio. He further proposed
publishing the report to allow for public consultation before he made his final
decision. However, the Home Secretary anticipated a „marked disparity‟
between the development of BBC and ILR stations in this and future
stages.1044 Littler went on:
„Douglas Muggeridge and I agreed on Thursday that there seems to
be no point arousing expectations which the BBC is not certain of being
able to fulfil……A dignified note of financial realism will, I am sure, be
welcomed by the public.‟1045

So Singer was in effect being told that given the financial uncertainty, and
the fact that progress on the next nine stations was very slow, there was no
expectation for more BBC local stations in the report. Furthermore, there
was a shift away from the policy of the previous government, which had
hoped, eventually, for two local radio stations per area. Whitelaw‟s terms of
reference were revised to so that the priority was covering the UK as soon
as possible, accepting duplication with existing stations only if it was
inevitable. This must have been troubling for the BBC: the government was
basically going to allow the IBA to continue with its local radio expansion
plans and the BBC, unable to afford to participate, had to sit by and watch.
The Second Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report was
published the following month, and contained few surprises in the light of

1042
BBC WAC ibid in addition to 720 MW, which was intended to boost Radio Four in London
1043
BBC WAC Letter from Shirley Littler to Aubrey Singer 11 June 1979 in Local Broadcasting
1979 R78/1165
1044
BBC WAC Op cit
1045
BBC WAC Op cit

256
 recent discussions.1046 While acknowledging there was still work to be done
on frequency planning, the Working Party decided to proceed with making
recommendations for more stations, to keep the momentum going and in
line with public feeling. A recap on the progress of those stations
announced by the first report revealed that, although the BBC hoped to
open stations in Norwich and Lincoln sometime in 1980, work on the other
seven was delayed by discussions about finance. By comparison, the IBA
had advertised contracts for eight of their nine stations, and received over
50 applications for seven of them.1047
On an optimistic note, the report was able to confirm the BBC‟s ultimate
intention of completing the transition from regional to local as set out in
Broadcasting in the 70s. In terms of the core recommendations, the BBC‟s
proposals were very limited. They asked for a MW opt out for services in
Aberdeen and Londonderry and for the necessary frequencies to turn
regional radio in Plymouth into a full local service, using existing stations.
The Report acknowledged that the BBC might want to add to this list in the
future when the financial situation was clearer. The IBA produced a list of
15 stations for approval; three of these (Leicester, Leeds and Bristol) were
in existing BBC locations, but the report accepted the duplication.1048
The publication of the report was an unfortunate acknowledgement that
the BBC could not go any further with local radio, and this further fanned the
flames of passion already aroused over the cut in hours debacle. The
General Secretary of the ABS union wrote to the Secretary of the Working
Party that he was „horrified‟ by the report and the abdication of the BBC to
the future of local radio.1049 He said it was „laughable‟ that the BBC
Governors supposedly decided the priority for new stations, but actually
they could not determine anything until the licence fee was settled.

1046
BBC WAC Home Office Local Radio Working Party Second Report July 1979 in Local
Broadcasting 1979 R78/1165
1047
BBC WAC Op cit
1048
BBC WAC Op cit the IBA list was: Ayr, Barnsley, Bristol, Bury St Edmunds,
Canterbury/Dover, Guildford, Leeds, Leicester, Londonderry, Luton/Bedford, Newport,
Preston/Blackpool, Swindon. Worcester/Hereford and Wrexham/Deeside.
1049
BBC WAC Letter from D A Hearn to Mr Matthews 6 August 1979 Local Broadcasting 1979
ibid

257
 In November, Whitelaw confirmed the new stations, which had been
proposed in the report1050, including the BBC‟s Plymouth operation. A few
days later, Whitelaw announced the next licence fee increase, a rise of £9,
to £34 for a colour television. This was set to last for at least two years.1051
The BBC had hoped for an increase to more than £40 in order to implement
all their planned developments, including new local radio stations.1052

Lane End and the Green Paper

By the time the Second Home Office report was published, there were
already some doubts over the Town and Country concept. This was due in
part to a report on listening patterns, commissioned by Aubrey Singer. This
new information heralded the next wave of working parties, plans and
strategies, as Radio Management edged, very slowly, towards some kind of
consensus. These came together at a weekend conference for Controllers
and senior managers in Lane End, High Wycombe, at the end of September
1979, which attempted to set a course for the Third Home Office report.
A report on listening patterns, produced by Granville Williams and Derek
Anderson, of the Radio Consultancy, showed that BBC Local Radio
listeners tuned in for two hours a day, compared to 2.5 hours for Radio Two
and 1.5 hours for Radio Four.1053 While it was not possible to say exactly
how many listeners ILR had taken from BBC Local Radio, it appeared that 1
– 2% of the audience switched from Radio Two to BBC Local Radio, and
about the same from Radio Four. Perhaps more significantly, local radio
brought in new listeners to the BBC. BBC Local Radio had gained by 1 or
2% every three or four years; so another ten new stations might add 4% in
total by the mid-eighties. So the report‟s authors suggested that completing
the local radio chain in England would add a significant new audience. The
risk was creating too many new services (such as TCR), which would

1050
BBC WAC Home Office Press Release 15 November 1979 in Home Office Local Radio
Working Party General R102/19 All the ILR stations were given the go ahead, except
Canterbury/Dover, which required further consultation
1051
The Times „BBC raises TV colour licences to £34 with promise of two-year limit‟ 24
November 1979
1052
The Times „£40 licence was needed for BBC‟s development plans‟ 28 November 1979
1053
BBC WAC Presentation to Radio Management Meeting 17 July 1979 in Radio Services
Policy April 1979 – July 1979 R92/70

258
 effectively sub-divide the audience and cause internal competition, rather
than add new listeners.
Singer, at the presentation of the report, expressed satisfaction with the
findings, and summarised a choice of proposals.1054 These were keeping
the status quo for the networks and expanding local radio to a total of 45
stations; the affiliation of smaller stations to their nearest larger one and
reducing the total from 45 to 35, with some regional opt outs to cover the
south west, east Anglia and perhaps the south east too. In terms of the
sustaining service, this could be created from existing material and
broadcast throughout the UK, with English local radio opting out for their
services and the National Regions doing likewise.
Singer then asked all the Controllers to write a paper with their views on
these proposals or any alternatives they could suggest.1055 These papers
were to be presented at the upcoming conference at Lane End. Meanwhile,
at least one participant at the Radio Management meeting came away with
the impression that although a reconfiguration of the networks might be a
possibility, TCR was receding from view, and local radio were emerging
much stronger.1056 To lay the ground for debate at Lane End, Michael
Starks also prepared a paper called Radio’s Development Plans: An
Alternative Approach.1057
This paper cemented local radio‟s position still further. It accepted that
there was no question of withdrawing altogether from local radio and that
priority had to be given to augmenting it, and improving reception, to stop
ILR from becoming the „first‟ local radio service. Even more importantly, the
paper said that funding for the networks was not sacrosanct if it meant
postponing the completion of the chain by 1990.1058 The paper then went on
elaborate on the key platforms for the next stage in local radio growth,
which were the number of stations and the size; the number of hours they

1054
BBC WAC Minutes of MDR‟s Radio Management Meeting 17 July 1979 in Radio Services
Policy Part Two 1978 – 1979 R78/1170
1055
BBC WAC Op cit
1056
BBC WAC Memo from the Assistant Head of the Secretariat to the Secretary 20 July 1979
in ibid
1057
BBC WAC Paper: Radio‟s Development Plans: An Alternative Approach in Radio Services
Policy August 1979 – December 1979 R92/71
1058
BBC WAC Op cit

259
 would broadcast and the options for the sustaining service and how to
define the networks. After months of debate (and more to come), these
were important steps forward in helping to conceptualise how local radio
would look in the future. Most importantly, there was an acceptance that
some stations would cover whole counties, and therefore there would be
fewer than originally intended.
There were several arguments the BBC could use to counter the
impression that local radio was moving away from, rather than closer to, the
audience. Stations could be called after the county, but actually based in a
major town or city, such as Radio Suffolk, based in Ipswich, rather than
Radio Ipswich. These created more points of difference with ILR and helped
the problem of duplication. It also proved the BBC was just as committed to
rural areas, as well as urban ones. The paper welcomed other agencies,
organisations or community groups who wanted to get involved in local
broadcasting alongside the BBC. In terms of output hours, the paper
proposed making the cut in hours permanent, on the grounds of cost,
especially when it came to starting new stations. However this left the
problem of how to fill the gaps in the schedule. Having established that
using network material from elsewhere on the dial did not suit the audience,
this meant it was necessary to produce purpose-made work. The paper
weighed up the relevant advantages and disadvantages of creating
regional-type networks of stations to share material but the cost seemed to
rule this out. The other option was to transform a network into a local radio
sustaining service, but this had to be done as part of a reconfiguration of all
four networks, rather than just a merger with one and leaving the others
untouched. This paper was presented to the assembled network controllers
and other senior management figures at the beginning of the Lane End
conference, along with Granville William‟s analysis of listening habits. 1059
After presentations of the other long-term options available, the
conference was steered towards making decisions about those items closer
in the timescale, over which there was some control. The priorities they

1059
BBC WAC Notes on a weekend conference held at Lane End Conference Centre High
Wycombe 28 – 30 September 1979 in Radio Services Policy August – December 1979
R92/71

260
 established were: a list of local radio stations which the BBC hoped to open
in the 1980s, with some restriction of hours and a sustaining service; a bid
for Radio Four on VHF in the National Regions; and the transition of local
radio onto VHF stereo.1060
Singer summarised the conference‟s key decisions as agreeing that
change would be gradual and evolutionary, that the experiment to reduce
local radio hours would continue. Local managers would be briefed
accordingly and ad hoc working groups would concentrate on the finer
points of detail. Within a month, Singer had written up the Lane End
decisions and discussions into a policy document, which would ultimately
go to both Boards. He called this A Radio Management Green Paper.1061
Singer stressed that this should not been seen as Broadcasting in the 80s:
it was not intended to signal a major transformation but rather a step-by-
step approach. The timescale of this document was April 1980 to April
1984, and came under four headings: Local Radio in England; National
Regional Radio; Network Radio and Educational Programmes. What was
significant in this paper was the degree to which several important factors
had changed and the emphasis had moved since Lane End.
For example, while using Radio Four as the sustaining service was ruled
out completely, because Singer acknowledged how important the network
was in terms of national broadcasting and news and current affairs, the
paper still accepted that local radio could build its audience at the expense
of Radio Four. Secondly, the number of daily broadcast hours for local
stations, especially the larger ones, seemed to have been pared down to
ten. In addition, the rate of growth appeared to have slowed, under Singer‟s
estimation, to nine new stations over the next four years, none of which
would be allowed to broadcast more than six hours a day. He calculated
that with some alteration to the boundaries of existing stations, the BBC

1060
BBC WAC Ibid. Michael Starks‟ list for the next wave of local radio stations was: (1980)
Lincoln, Norwich; (1981) Barrow, Cambridge, Taunton; (1982) Northampton, Shrewsbury,
York; (1983) Truro, Plymouth, London – re-structuring; (1984) Dorchester; Ipswich;
Worcester; (1985) Coventry, Gloucester, Luton; (1986) Canterbury, Exeter, Swindon; (1987)
Chelmsford, Guildford. Thereafter: Basingstoke and other, unidentified stations. Discussions
about Radio London‟s future centred on providing a nine-hour-a-day basic service followed by
a daily three hour ethnic station.
1061
BBC WAC Paper: A Radio Management Green Paper 26 October 1979 in Radio Services
Policy August – December 1979 R92/71

261
 could claim to have achieved 90% coverage by the mid-1980s. In terms of
the sustaining service, Radio Two looked like the most likely option as the
main source of material. To supplement this, there would be syndicated
output from the other network production departments. Once Radio Two
ceased to be a network, Radio London, Singer proposed, would close and
merge with it, and the redundant staff would be re-deployed. There was a
clear indication in the paper that local radio‟s previous autonomy would be
reduced and that it was expected to work much more closely, and
efficiently, with network radio.
However, despite the paper‟s air of decisiveness, Michael Barton was
alarmed. Writing to Starks, Barton complained that the arguments had been
moved considerably since the Lane End conference, to the detriment of
local radio.1062 The sustaining service, Barton argued, looked like a „dress
rehearsal for Town and Country Radio‟ after all, because if Radio Two were
to provide syndicated programmes in the way Singer proposed, local
stations would end up simultaneously broadcasting them and this would
require the aforementioned „windows.‟1063 In other words, Town and
Country Radio. Meanwhile, the financial economies in the Green Paper had
shifted away from the networks and back onto local radio, and the size of
the new stations would cover larger population areas, making fewer hours
untenable.
The Green Paper then formed the basis of a report for both Boards. This
contained even more details on the key policy decisions.1064 In particular,
the report addressed how the BBC could afford to achieve 90% coverage of
England. Still to be opened were the nine stations authorised by the first
Home Office report, along with the Plymouth opt. The paper also proposed
extending the transmission areas of existing stations, which, the report
acknowledged, would be „county‟ stations.1065 To help make local radio

1062
BBC WAC Memo from CLR to CARM (Programmes) 26 October 1979 Subject: Green
Paper in Radio Services Policy August – December 1979 R92/71
1063
BBC WAC Op cit
1064
BBC WAC Paper G.295/79 Radio Programme Policy 12 December 1979 in Radio
Services Policy August – December 1979 R92/71
1065
BBC WAC Op cit Expansions would include Medway (to cover Canterbury and south east
Kent), Brighton (to include Eastbourne and Hastings), Blackburn (to become a Lancashire
station) and Newcastle (to take in more of Northumberland).

262
 expansion „self-financing‟, the experiment to reduce local radio hours would
continue, with greater cuts, although these would be negotiated on a case-
by-case basis with the Controller. There would also be savings from finally
closing down regional broadcasts in East Anglia and the South West when
the new stations in Norwich, Cambridge, Truro and Plymouth opened.
However, when asked whether local radio might be renamed „County
Radio‟, Singer replied in the negative.1066

The Third Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report

In 1979, as local radio finally stood on the verge of achieving the long-
desired completion, the BBC published another promotional pamphlet. This
time, it took the name Local Radio: Action Stations,1067 signifying a sense of
dynamism and energy, moving forward into the new decade. In his
foreword, Singer conjured up an image of 2.5 million daily listeners who
were connected not just to the station, but to a wider community:
„as neighbour speaks to neighbour, grasping the challenge of home
town broadcasting, BBC Local Radio had become one of the
family……the thriving roots of an expanding network of radio, offering an
increasingly diverse service to the nation as a whole.‟1068

Unlike its predecessor, Serving Neighbourhood and Nations, this booklet

was more focussed, concentrating in particular on the virtues of connecting
rural communities, where communications were elusive and transport links
under threat. It backed this up with extracts from a report by the National
Council for Social Services, The Right To Know, which underlined the
disenfranchisement of those living in the countryside and the benefits
provided by local radio.1069 These included providing practical information
and support, where they could receive help and advice and as a focal point
for people without any other means of contact. A paragraph from Maurice
Ennals reiterated the point and cited the Crawford Report to further support
the BBC‟s work. It was an interesting switch in focus because of course the

1066
BBC WAC Minutes of a meeting of the Radio Programme Policy Committee 20 December
1979 in Radio Services Policy August – December 1979 R92/71
1067
BBC Local Radio: Action Stations (London: BBC Publications 1979)
1068
BBC Op cit p 2
1069
BBC Op cit

263
 new county stations would be the priority area for future growth, to complete
the chain, and so the BBC was making a virtue out of necessity.
Elsewhere the pamphlet made the usual points about the way stations
operated, the LRCs, minority programmes and so on. No mention was
made of the recent battles about reduced hours and there was no confusion
over the name of the service: the words „local radio‟ were used throughout.
Each station had a section to promote their own highlights, and again there
was a more forward-looking optimism in many of the entries, such as Radio
Merseyside, where work was starting on their new premises. A ten-minute
promotional film also called BBC Local Radio: Action Stations was
produced shortly afterwards, further promoting the work of local radio.1070
The examples used here had a visual element to them, such as the way
local radio covered fast-moving events like the Toxteth riots or those that
brought different elements of BBC services together, for instance the
opening of the Humber Bridge by the Queen. The film concluded by talking
confidently about the imminent completion of local radio development to
cover 90% of England. As the narrator said, „Community means something
when you tune into your BBC action stations.‟1071
The move towards county radio was formalised by the third Home Office
Working Party report, which was published in December 1980. In the
interim, there had been some modification to the proposals of the Second
Report, again along the lines of county-wide provision, with the South West
service becoming Radio Devon, based in Plymouth.1072 Interestingly, the
working party faced some paradoxes. While the report reminded interested
parties that their remit concerned frequency allocation and not the editorial
policy or staffing implications of new stations, it devoted a substantial
section to the community radio lobby. After discussing various aspects of
the evidence presented to them, mainly from COMCOM, the working party
decided not to deploy frequencies away from the IBA or the BBC on the
grounds that there was no proven demand for the kind of community
services COMCOM proposed. Although they conceded they were open to

1070
BBC Local Radio: Action Stations film (BBC Local Radio Publicity 1981)
1071
BBC Op cit
1072
Home Office Local Radio Working Party – Third Report (HMSO 1980) This BBC proposal
was approved by Whitelaw on 7 August.

264
 future developments in the area, it sounded like a decision made on
regulatory, rather than technical, grounds.
However, as far as the BBC and IBA were concerned, the working party
made it clear that once their approval was given, it was the respective
broadcasting authorities‟ responsibility to create their own stations. This was
the mechanism that allowed the BBC to achieve its goal of comprehensive
coverage of England, but at the same time re-define some of the
boundaries of local radio, both technically and editorially. By the time the
report was published, two new stations had finally opened – Radio Norfolk
in September of that year, and Radio Lincolnshire in November.1073 As
Singer‟s Green Paper the previous year had outlined, the BBC‟s priority for
the next stage of local radio expansion was those stations covering
Northamptonshire, Cambridgeshire, Devon and Cornwall. The report
recognised, and accepted, that this represented a modification on the
BBC‟s earlier aspirations, as submitted to the working party for the first
report. Accordingly, the BBC submitted their aim to open new services
which would take their total to 38.1074 In addition, the BBC requested that
the frequency plan should allow possible developments in Swindon,
Dorchester and the Thames Valley and some modifications to existing
coverage.1075
According to the report, the BBC was committed to spending £8 million
over the next three years for the refurbishment and opening of new local
radio stations, some of which was derived by the cut in hours: ten hours for
existing stations, new stations limited to six. Although the ultimate goal for
the BBC was 38 stations by the mid -1980s, there was no firm commitment
to a timetable due to financial planning limitations under the current two-
year fixed licence fee. The IBA proposed 25 more areas for licensing,
including some in the National Regions, which would take them to 75%
coverage of the whole UK, by 1987.

1073
Home Office Op cit
1074
Home Office Op cit New stations were proposed in Chelmsford (serving Essex), Coventry
(for Nuneaton, Rugby and Warwick), Gloucester (Gloucestershire), Guildford (parts of
Surrey), Hereford and Worcester, Ipswich (Suffolk) and Luton (Bedfordshire).
1075
Home Office Op cit These included a VHF relay for north Northumberland, and a MW
extension for Derby and Leicester, and satellite stations for south east Kent and east Sussex.

265
 The working party, on behalf of the government, approved the requests
from both authorities. Their main issue, as they saw it, was whether the new
stations should be given both MW and VHF frequencies, given continued
limitations on availability. Whilst there was no problem with meeting MW
frequency requests, following the most recent international conference on
radio wavelengths in Geneva in 1979, VHF usage needed further
consideration because of spectrum restrictions. However this was an area
for international, and UK government, discussion and decision.
Until further notice, the working party proposed continuing with joint MW
and VHF allocation. They also noted that the proposed new stations
avoided duplication but this would not be the case in the future. Finally the
working party assumed they would continue their work on frequency
planning and pursue the topic of London local radio further, which was still
unresolved.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that in order for BBC Local Radio to achieve
90% coverage of England, it had to overcome several crucial obstacles as
well as re-address some fundamental principles underpinning the concept
of local broadcasting. The campaign by the BBC to marshal the forces of
persuasion and lobbying successfully rejected the proposal in the Annan
Report to remove local radio from their, and IBA, control. The operation
owed a debt in no small measure to the ability of local stations and the
LRCs to mobilise their supporters and listeners in defence of the service.
Ironically this period witnessed tensions in this relationship, which came to a
head shortly afterwards.
Crucially, two key attributes of local radio were changed in the process.
In order to secure financial savings and improve the output, restrictions
were imposed on the hours of broadcast for locally produced material. This
was a direct revision of the principle of autonomy, which had previously
operated without hindrance. While the Station Managers eventually
accepted this, the LRCs did not, which brought confrontation out into the
open, and merely served to convince Singer and his management team this
was the right course of action.

266
 I would argue these were watershed moments for the course of local
radio development. Even though the debate about a sustaining service was
no further forward, and therefore the degree to which local radio output
could be centrally determined was still unclear, getting the Station
Managers to accept the principle of reduced hours shifted the balance of
power in the relationship. Moreover, this suggested a willingness to
compromise local radio‟s community aspirations. Imposing a night-time cull
on local output hit minority programmes hardest; presumably Singer‟s
willingness to sacrifice evening shows also meant to his ears these were
the ones most likely to be „banal‟ and to appeal to the „geriatric‟
audience.1076 Station Managers still retained the ability to re-shape their
remaining schedules to accommodate minority programmes where they
could, and they would never admit publicly to down-grading their
importance, yet it was an important shift in perceptions that local radio could
not sustain its original ambitions and still hope to achieve complete
expansion.
The challenge by the LRC chairs, which happened in the full glare of the
listening public, emphasised how awkward the BBC‟s position was. They
did not have the finances to progress any further with growth, and when
they did attempt to make decisions, the local radio lobby, empowered by the
Annan episode, was only too willing to cross swords. It exposed the
paradox at the heart of the local radio enterprise: stakeholders who believed
they had more claim to ownership than the broadcasters. If there was to be
any kind of future growth, the BBC had to ensure that subsequent stations
owed more loyalty to the centre than to elsewhere.
Once the Annan recommendations had been rejected, the creation of the
Home Office Local Radio Working Party provided the forum and the means
by which the BBC and the IBA could agree frequency allocation for the next
wave of stations. This was the opportunity to achieve comprehensive
coverage. However the BBC was hampered by other, internal factors. There
was no financial provision for expansion; the exact editorial areas and size
of the stations needed further discussion; the relationship between the

BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 9 April 1979 DG: „Ten minutes of Radio Solent
1076

on a Saturday morning is all I can bear.‟ MDR: „What do you expect for £12 an hour?‟ R2/32/1

267
station staffs and central management needed clarification, and that
between local radio and network radio. As I have argued, through a series
of complex policy documents and discussion papers, running parallel to the
three Home Office Reports, the BBC‟s position became clearer and a
strategy emerged. In conjunction with this, various schemes were drawn up
for a sustaining service, which would have had the effect of unifying local
radio and again exerting more central influence in the pattern of
broadcasting. While this sustaining service idea was never launched, the
debate forced local radio to recognise its responsibilities in terms of how it
operated with network radio and to take a more holistic view of the service.
Moreover, the final group of stations agreed in the third Home Office
report were defined by their coverage of a county-size area, rather than the
originally intended town or community focus. While this effectively enabled
coverage of the English population, it was a dilution of one of the founding
principles of local radio. Given the number of interested parties involved
within the BBC and the many conflicting views and opinions, the course of
action followed was probably the most realistic given the financial
circumstances. The BBC was committed to completing the chain somehow,
and this was the best solution on offer, though by no means ideal. Yet
paradoxically, the Annan debacle had demonstrated the strength of
connection that grassroots supporters and listeners felt to their local station:
a validation in fact of the original focus on smaller transmission areas.

268
 Section Four

CHAPTER TEN: The Station

Introduction

This section contains one chapter, in which I will examine the development
of the station itself, identifying key elements of the organisation. The first
part of the chapter focuses on the Station Manager and the staff, exploring
in particular the role that the manager played in developing the station, the
importance of individual dynamism and personality and the collective weight
they could wield as a group. The next section addresses the output of the
stations, which continued to evolve since the initial attempts at scheduling
during the experimental phase. It is possible to trace the development from
the traditional „built‟ programme format to more „sequence‟ based output, as
stations tried to produce more hours of locally-made content. This also
included programmes aimed at minorities and specialist audiences
(including minority ethnic groups), and the role of education programmes.
The Local Radio Councils formed a key component of the local radio
organisation, as one of the main safeguards that monitored stations‟
autonomy and benchmarked community involvement. The membership and
composition of the councils was an issue that generated interest and
concern throughout the 1970s and the Chairs of the LRCs became
particularly embroiled at crucial points in the local radio story, which in turn
raised questions about their role. The relationship between the station and
the wider BBC is another integral element to the equation. At the heart of
the local radio structure was the HQ team. Although this was small, it
played a vital part in steering the strategic development of the service,
acting as a conduit between the Managing Director of Radio and the wider
radio management. The relationship with this latter group, dominated by the
Controllers and the senior managers of the networks, was of fundamental
importance, as a barometer of the empathy or otherwise which was felt
towards local radio and its objectives by the BBC as an organisation.
So in this chapter, I will argue first that the multiplication of stations
challenged the limits of the idea that the model could be replicated in every

269
 location, on the same basis. The first eight stations were intended to be
relatively simple operations with a small number of output hours, yet by the
time the twentieth station was opened, staff levels and programme hours
had risen. As the methods of production developed, and the audience
expectations matured and changed, the original assumptions about the type
of content that local radio would produce had to be modified. I will argue,
using examples from the range of output, including phone-ins, educational
programmes and minority and specialist shows, that one consequence of
expansion was an increasingly homogenised, routine product. Secondly, I
will argue that the structure and hierarchy of the expanding local radio
„family‟ also had an impact on the way it operated. The concept of
autonomy, enshrined in the experiment, created pressures and tensions
when multiplied by more Station Managers, who combined to create a
formidable lobby. This, I will argue, brought it ultimately into conflict with
other parts of the BBC, most notably network radio. I will also make the
point that this tension brought into focus the role of the HQ team: were
these managers intended to exert influence over the stations, to create
consistency, or did they see their job as preserving independence?

The Station Manager and the Staff

In April 1973, Trethowan was able to reflect on the current state of the
stations. The number had increased to twenty and the audience had
doubled since local radio had been broadcast on medium wave in the past
twelve months.1077 Statistically, it was an impressive development over the
past five years: there were now 600 staff working across the stations,
producing 1,200 hours of output a week, with a budget of £3.3m.1078 This
was all the more noteworthy given the recent past, with a period of deep
uncertainty, a restriction on resources and the impact this had on the quality
of some programmes. Inevitably this had taken its toll: „their present must
hold something of their recent past.‟ he wrote.1079 But, Trethowan went on
to say, the enthusiasm of the staff helped to compensate for some of the

1077
BBC WAC Report on Local Radio by Managing Director of Radio G.58/73 25 April 1973
Board of Governors Papers R1/109
1078
BBC WAC Op cit
1079
BBC WAC Op cit

270
 amateurism on air, and good relations with local communities were still the
foundation of each station. Numerically, the station staff had definitely
grown. By 1973/4, the average number of staff per station was 30.25, with
some significantly higher, such as London with 53, Birmingham with 41.1080
The most important post, in terms of seniority, was the Station Manager,
whose key duties involved programme organisation, staff and administration
management, public relations and publicity. 1081 Obviously individual
managers were able to interpret their role as they saw fit, in the context of
their own station and, as the example of Phil Sidey at Radio Leeds has
already illustrated, they wielded considerable influence.1082 Owen Bentley
says “Stations reflected their managers.”1083 For him, autonomy meant that
he could take risks and be experimental. The example Bentley gives is the
Asian Network, which he started at Radio Leicester, initially as a „stripped‟
five nights a week news and information programme. There were cost
implications, but he decided not to seek permission from Michael Barton
(then Controller of Local Radio) beforehand: “You did things first…..you
didn‟t always wait for the money. Because if you waited for the money,
you‟d wait forever.” But Bentley‟s enterprising spirit was not shared by all
his colleagues. He suggests that resources and opportunities were
available but some managers preferred to be cautious and frugal and this
had an impact on their station. Consequently when Bentley arrived at Radio
Leicester, as Station Manager in December 1975, he found the station in a
poor state: “atrophied” as he puts it.1084 Previous managers had not made
bids for extra funds or equipment or staff, unlike Oxford, Nottingham and
Sheffield, which were looking very healthy.
The central hypothesis about the extent of the Station Manager‟s
influence was the correlation between the imprint of his/her personality and
the socio-ethnographic composition of the locality. Bentley accepts that

1080
BBC WAC Op cit appendix
1081
BBC WAC BBC Local Radio Handbook R102/53/1 (Although no author is credited, it is
likely this was a task carried out by the HQ team.) June 1970
1082
Interestingly Radio Leeds was still being described as „the house that Sidey built‟ within
the higher echelons of the BBC nearly ten years after his departure. This was a reference to
the station‟s continued reputation for its community work. BBC WAC Weekly Programme
Review Board minutes 5 July 1978
1083
Owen Bentley interview with the author 19 July 2010
1084
Bentley Op cit

271
 “locality and community determined that it would be different in different
areas.” But “I think the stations were different more because the managers
were different rather than the areas.”1085 The underlying issue was one of
autonomy, the principle that was a cornerstone of the local radio foundation,
and how this was interpreted by the managers. For many, this was a modus
operandi, a way of interpreting the guidance of how to run a station and fulfil
the objectives of local radio. There were countless innovations and
developments in programme-making, such as Bentley‟s example of the
Asian Network, and the impression this created was that it was the
independent decisions of managers that helped produce much of the
vibrancy and creativity of local radio output. As I have illustrated, by the end
of the 1970s, the issue of autonomy became an increasing source of
disagreement. By the time Aubrey Singer told the Station Managers that
they would have to reduce their output by 25% in 1979,1086 there had been
a notable shift in the balance of power: most managers were not so naïve
that they could not see the reality of their situation. They realised they could
apply the cut in hours flexibly, depending on their audience needs and
accepted that, in Singer‟s words, „the time of open-ended local radio was
over.‟1087 Bentley sums this up: “the history of local radio and the managers
is the BBC gradually pulling them back into the fold, all the way through into
the 1980s really.”1088
Other job roles on the station included the programme organiser, who
had principal responsibility for the day-to-day operation and maintaining
programme standards, and the education producer, who initiated, devised
and produced programmes of an educational nature, but also contributed to
other parts of the station.1089 There was the general programmes producer
and the news editor, who oversaw all news output and current affairs. As
well as organising news coverage within the station, there was also a duty

1085
Bentley Op cit
1086
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 11 June 1979 R2/32/1
1087
BBC WAC Board of Management minutes 16 July 1979 MDR said there were some less
sympathetic managers, who he called „electronic almoners‟: the meaning here is rather
opaque.
1088
Owen Bentley interview with the author ibid. Bentley opines that in his day, it was a great
period to be a manager and that today, the Managing Editors as they are called are really
micro-managed.
1089
BBC WAC BBC Local Radio Handbook ibid

272
 to serve the area and network news desks with any relevant material. The
station assistant helped in the preparation of programmes and could be
called on to deputise for a producer. Other posts included two engineers, an
administrative assistant, programme secretaries and a receptionist.
Despite this clear delineation of roles and the structure that supported
the staff within the station, the first years of the 1970s were dominated more
by external influences, which had the potential to undermine the smooth
running of the stations. References to low staff morale during the Chataway
crisis period were frequent in the minutes of the Boards of Management and
Governors.1090 The mood among the staff in local radio noticeably improved
when their long-term future was secured after the White Paper in 1971.
Trethowan described how they were „pretty buoyant by beating off the
government‟ and how impressed he was, at a recent meeting, by the range
of ages and backgrounds among the staff, and by their professional self-
confidence.1091
The creation of the next twelve stations had contributed to this new
sense of optimism as it had opened up the opportunities for career
development, which BBC Governor Dame Mary Green enquired about on a
visit to Radio Brighton.1092 Staff from the original eight stations were able to
apply for jobs, at higher grades, in the new stations, bringing with them their
experience and ideas. In fact this become a noticeable issue as the number
of staff moving on amounted to what was called „an exodus.‟1093 Owen
Bentley was one such beneficiary, promoted from Radio Stoke-on-Trent to
help launch Radio Oxford. His experience at the previous station helped
enormously, although Oxford presented a different set of challenges and
needs.1094 The staff at Oxford was more highly trained, with a greater
variety of skills and interests. More noticeable was the availability of

1090
eg BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes February 11 1971; September 23 1971 ibid
1091
BBC WAC Report by the Managing Director of Radio 24 June 1971 G.70/71 Board of
Governors Papers R1/107
1092
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 24 September 1970 ibid
1093
BBC WAC Board of Governors Papers Report by the Managing Director of Radio 24 June
1970 G.71/70 R1/106
1094
Owen Bentley interview with author ibid

273
 freelancers and contributors. At Stoke, it had been a struggle to find them;
now at Oxford, it was hard to keep them away.1095
This was one of the constant dilemmas about pushing for the further
expansion of local radio: the question of recruitment and the supply of
skilled staff. A report in 1977 calculated that the next wave of growth would
require 250 producers, so it was suggested that a training scheme should
be devised with the BBC Journalism Training Unit.1096 However, many
managers were unsympathetic, saying the JTU course tended to recruit
graduates whose main focus was Panorama rather than local radio.1097 In
June 1978, the Station Manager of Radio Bristol said he had eight
vacancies for editorial staff, out of a workforce of 34.1098
One of the problems was the perceived inflexibility of the BBC‟s pay
structure, which the commercial sector was not bound by. This also affected
the „on air‟ talent too. For example, Radio Merseyside‟s presenter Billy
Butler was poached by Radio City, which opened in Liverpool in 1974, for
£8,500 per year, plus a car and personal appearance fees. Aubrey Singer
said he was distressed about Merseyside‟s loss and asked to be personally
informed in future, in case the London management could help.1099 Another
acknowledged issue was the way that BBC local stations preferred those
with „all round‟ skills rather than personality presenters to work on the
stations. There was a perennial debate about whether local radio should be
fostering more celebrity DJs, like commercial radio.1100

The programmes
In May 1972 Hugh Pierce sent a memo to all the managers of the local
stations. He had been on an 800-mile car journey around England in order

1095
BBC WAC Op cit
1096
BBC WAC Summary of the Report of the Local Radio Development Group 29 November
1977 Local Broadcasting Part Six R78/1385
1097
BBC WAC Minutes from the Local Radio Management Conference November 1976 Local
Radio Conferences R78/4185
1098
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board 21 June 1978 ibid
1099
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board 29 November 1978 ibid
1100
BBC WAC Minutes from the Local Radio Management Conference November 1976 Local
Radio Conferences R78/4185

274
 to listen to as much of the output as possible, which he recorded,1101 and
his observations were being circulated.1102 His first impression was the
improvement in technical standards, although there were some errors still
occurring, which were often magnified by „prolix apologies.‟1103
The local elements were particularly good, such as news, information,
local election coverage, even the softer pieces. However, there was still
room to be more „compassionate and human‟ in places, and he was
anxious about the constant invitations to „telephone in‟ when many listeners
did not have phones.1104 Pierce was obviously aware of the potential
disparity in the audience: there was a tendency for stations to employ what
he called „your young presenters‟ but he was worried that they did not do
enough to address older listeners.1105 Presentation was also a bugbear in
Pierce‟s feedback. One presenter kept referring to how tired he was. Many
music and request shows tended to „sag‟: „The worse DJs have elsewhere
been described as apes with a pile of discs….we have just a few fellows in
local radio who are trying to ape the apes!‟1106 He was pleased to hear
some good female voices on air „clear, authoritative, pleasant and still
feminine.‟ But „I also heard some record programmes being presented as if
by diffident waitresses.‟1107 The most remarkable and compelling
programme Pierce heard on his road trip was one aimed at blind listeners,
but he worried that the general audience would miss this as so many
specialist shows went out at off peak times.
Pierce‟s findings were a useful benchmark of the achievements and
challenges felt by local stations by the early 1970s. This section explores
these in more detail, looking at general programming, the development of
minority output and the role of education producers.

1101
HQ Staff were all issued with a Blaupunkt radio cassette recorder for the car which
enabled them to record programmes while on the road. Robert McLeish interview with the
author 11 August 2010
1102
BBC WAC Memo from Hugh Pierce to All Managers Subject: A Listening Trip 19 May
1972 He notes the experience was „very exhausting‟. Management: Local Radio Programmes
General R102/76
1103
BBC WAC Op cit
1104
BBC WAC Op cit
1105
BBC WAC Op cit
1106
BBC WAC Op cit
1107
BBC WAC Op cit

275
 As earlier chapters have identified, one of the main problems for local
radio was the fact that the stations tended to produce more output than
originally intended, on limited resources. So the question here is how this
was addressed or solved. Also, many local radio programmes during the
experimental period tended to be „compartmentalised‟: specialist, „built‟
programmes featuring large amounts of pre-recorded material. This was
resource-intensive, so how did the schedules adapt to ease the burden?
Another issue relates to the core objective of the service: the involvement of
the community and active listener participation. Did the stations manage to
achieve this goal and how was this reflected on the airwaves? And finally
what did the audience think of the programmes they heard? Were they
having an impact on the local population, especially as the means of
reception took on a dramatic improvement once local radio could be heard
on medium wave?

The shift to sequence programmes

Those working for local stations in the early to mid-1970s talk about one of
their principal preoccupations: „filling in the schedule‟.1108 For example,
when Radio Oxford was set up in 1970, it took just two years to “fill in the
mid morning” according to Own Bentley: in other words, produce enough
local material to replace most of the sustaining service. Sheffield was
another station, which had grown successfully, broadcasting in both the
morning and afternoon.1109 Yet when Owen Bentley arrived at Radio
Leicester in 1975, he discovered that it had not developed as the other
stations had. “It was stuck in a time warp of the first two years.”1110 A
startling example of this was the fact that Leicester had not started to
produce its own programmes in the mid-mornings and afternoons. Bentley‟s
explanation for this was the lack of managerial entrepreneurship in bidding
for extra funds to get more staff and resources. This disparity illustrated one
of the downsides of autonomy: a lack of consistency across stations. As
Trethowan pointed out to the Governors in 1973, the minimum requirement

1108
Owen; McLeish ibid
1109
Michael Barton interview with author 17 December 2007
1110
Owen Bentley interview with author ibid

276
 for local output was originally only four hours a day, but now it was
important to establish local radio‟s own identity and presence, especially as
the market place was becoming more crowded.1111 London and
Manchester, he noted, were producing 15 to 16 hours a day.1112
The relationship between the quantity of the output and its quality was
already being discussed and would become a source of contention in
subsequent years. One issue with expanding the number of programmes
was of course what they would consist of and how they would be produced.
„Built‟ or pre-recorded programmes relied on considerable production costs.
They also led to a schedule that was segmented and difficult for the listener
to navigate. The solution was the development of sequence programmes:
these were shows that were presented live, though they could include pre-
recorded elements, such as packages or interviews, anchored by named
presenters and lasting at least an hour, usually longer. Robert McLeish
recalls his introduction to the concept of the sequence: “The first person I
ever heard use the phrase „we‟re not going to do [built] programmes‟ was
John Musgrave in 1970 when he opened Radio Blackburn.”1113 McLeish
also noticed an interesting correlation between the type of premises a
station occupied and the output. For example, Radio Blackburn was housed
in a former car showroom, with a vast area of open space. This was
converted into open plan offices, which McLeish thinks helped foster new
production techniques, such as pooling ideas and central planning, which in
turn helped to create successful sequence programmes.1114
By contrast, stations that occupied buildings where they were spread
over separate floors and individual offices tended to rely more on old
fashioned built programmes, as the staff were engaged in their own output,
segregated from each other. Robert Gunnell corroborates this impression.
Radio Brighton was originally housed in a tall, Regency building in the town
centre, a warren of offices and stairs. And Gunnell‟s interpretation of what
local radio should be was a reflection of the Home Service pattern, “not

1111
BBC WAC Report from The Managing Director of Radio 25 April 1973 G.58/73 Board of
Governors Papers R1/109
1112
BBC WAC Op cit
1113
Robert McLeish interview with the author 11 August 2010
1114
Robert McLeish ibid

277
 programmes that run for three hours”. So he concentrated on individual
programmes made by producers who were working in their separate
offices.1115 McLeish gives credit to John Musgrave for creating the
sequence station: “he had open-plan offices and an open schedule – [there
was] something very similar about the two.”1116
The Weekly Programme Review Board minutes from the late 1970s
provide an illustration of the difficulties of moving from traditional built
programmes to sequence output.1117 Examples from sequence
programmes, heard in isolation, did not hold the attention of the Review
Board, despite the fact that they were topical, often news-driven shows,
trying to demonstrate what local radio was about. Owen Bentley recalls
from his appearances at the Board, representing Radio Leicester, that
sequence programmes „meant nothing to network people – who were
largely feature-makers.‟1118 On the other hand, features and documentaries
did not always appeal either: they were criticised for bad presentation and
being too parochial.1119 So it was a fine line for the Station Managers to
tread, but the sample was a useful snapshot of the direction programmes
were heading.
For example, Sheffield‟s contribution from the morning sequence was
generally well received by the Board, although some felt that the news
could be more up-to-date and the item on a mediaeval loo was
unintentionally funny.1120 In terms of news and current affairs, Station
Managers were appreciative of the newly formed Regional News Service
from London, which greatly supported the early bulletins. However, trying to
weave national, regional and local news together was not easy, especially
in the morning programme. Radio Oxford‟s attempt at local news, with the

1115
Robert Gunnell interview with the author 28 July 2010 Robert McLeish says that Radio
Brighton was the last of the early stations to finally move to sequence programmes.
1116
Robert McLeish ibid
1117
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board Minutes May 1978 – December 1979 In
May 1978, the Managing Director of Radio Aubrey Singer decided to invite managers from
local radio stations (two at a time) to the Weekly Programme Review Board, which up until
then had only discussed network programmes.
1118
Owen Bentley interview with author ibid
1119
eg BBC WAC Radio Birmingham‟s submission about folk music, which was deplored by
the Controller of Radio Three for the „ghastly‟ local accent and „council house English‟ of the
speakers Weekly Programme Board of Review Minutes 7 June 1978 ibid
1120
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board Minutes 2 August 1978 ibid

278
 programme Oxford AM, was dubbed „thin gruel‟ by the MDR, in comparison
to Radio Four‟s Today.1121
One of the staples of local radio sequence programming was the phone-
in, which became increasingly popular from the early 1970s. One important
factor that helped promote it was the arrival of medium wave, which had a
massive impact on the audience‟s ability to hear their local station at
last.1122 Owen Bentley recalls the day that Radio Oxford began transmitting
on MW: the mid-morning phone-in was suddenly inundated with calls.1123
The phone-in, however, was not universally popular, and BBC was
conscious that it needed to be treated carefully. Programme organisers
from local stations weighed up the value of them at a conference in April
1975.1124 Originally, the appeal for listeners to call in was for fairly
innocuous means: to request a disc or perhaps offer an item for a swap.
Gradually phone-in programmes were used more for listeners to vent a
grievance or to hold a local decision-maker to account. The programme
organisers discussed whether the phone-in could genuinely be considered
a „catalyst for change.‟1125 One format that had the potential for making an
impact was the so-called „agony call‟, where people phoned in with their
problems. Programmes that were thought not to be successful were those
involving quasi-professional people running „obscure community help
schemes‟, who used language that put off listeners from calling in. 1126
Phone-ins often caught the attention of the press, usually with a negative
reaction. The most frequent complaint was that phone-ins were a „cheap
and easy way of filling air time.‟1127 Peter Fiddick in The Guardian wrote:
„We‟re just getting the populace to make their own programmes at the

1121
BBC WAC 13 December 1978 op cit
1122
Trethowan suggested that across the then 19 stations, this had doubled the audience
BBC WAC Report by the Managing Director of Radio 25 April 1973 ibid
1123
Owen Bentley ibid
1124
BBC WAC Paper: Community and Access Programmes on BBC Local Radio [no author]
April 1975 Programmes for Minorities 1972-1979 R102/78
1125
BBC WAC Op cit
1126
BBC WAC Op cit Words such as „motivation‟, „incentives‟, „facilities‟ and „concepts‟ were
cited as deterrents to participation.
1127
The Times „Diary‟ 23 October 1973

279
 expense of their own phone bills and if they listen to the rubbish it‟s their
own stupid faults.‟1128
One example was Radio London‟s daily lunchtime show, Call In, which
usually featured a news-driven agenda. Since it went out in London, it was
listened to by journalists and commentators and often found itself at the
centre of controversy. In November 1974, Ronald Butt wrote in The Times
drawing attention to a recent edition featuring a consultant psychologist
from King‟s College Hospital discussing sexual matters. He dismissed the
programme as „sexual prurience‟, arguing the callers‟ „real problem is a kind
of public exhibitionism‟.1129 In a riposte in The Times, Dame Mary Green
defended the phone-in: „listeners puzzled by the intricacies of the law,
unsure of their rights as consumers, bewildered by their personal problems
have found the advice practical and helpful.‟1130
Some stations submitted phone-in programmes for the Programme
Review Board. Sunday Cross Talk from Radio Leicester was criticised for
its lack of structure and character, although the Deputy General Manager of
Local Radio defended it.1131 Radio London‟s Robbie Vincent, the presenter
of Call-In, was praised for being an asset to the station: classless,
distinctive, [with a] great rapport‟, although this time the DMLR confessed to
„a slight sense of unease‟ whenever he heard him.1132
These examples demonstrated the dilemma for sequence programmes
like these. Despite the apparent ease with which the phone-in could fill air-
time, it still required good production skills to avoid the pitfalls of libel,
unintentional advertising, attracting accusations of bias or just being plain
boring.1133 The BBC Local Radio Handbook contained some advice on how
to run a phone-in programme, but it tended to be more interested in the

1128
quoted in BBC WAC Paper: Community and Access Programmes on BBC Local Radio
ibid
1129
The Times 28 November 1974
1130
The Times letter from Dame Mary Green November 16 1974 Interestingly, the paper
made no mention of her BBC connection. Privately, Trethowan did advise the management at
Radio London to steer clear of sexual matters at lunchtime.
1131
BBC WAC 13 September 1978 op cit
1132
BBC WAC 25 April 1979 op cit
1133
According to BBC lawyer Glen Del Medico, former Conservative Cabinet Minister
Reginald Maudling was awarded damages after a Radio London phone-in BBC WAC Minutes
from the Local Radio Management Conference November 1976 Local Radio Conferences
R78/4185

280
 mechanical than editorial aspects. For example, it pointed out that
telephone conversations could not be broadcast without the consent of
participants and speakers were encouraged to enunciate clearly and keep
the mouthpiece above the level of the chin .1134 Apart from these useful bits
of advice, there was no further guidance on how to construct a phone-in in
this edition of the handbook, dated 1970.
So I would argue that the phone-in was a paradoxical programme device.
On the one hand it had the potential to be democratise the audience and
allow genuine and immediate interaction. It was a good example of an
instrument of the access that the BBC often asserted local radio was trying
to achieve. Yet at the same time, the BBC was wary of the true potential of
the format. The BBC seemed susceptible to press criticism, and more
comfortable with the phone-in as a means of giving advice by a BBC-
selected contributor or expert and the presenter kept the role of arbiter.
There was also a reluctance to devise or learn about the production skills
necessary to produce a good phone-in.
Another snapshot of local radio output from a Station Manager
Conference in 1976 provided an interesting, though rather downbeat,
assessment of how it was facing up the challenge of more ILR stations.1135
The feeling of the managers was that their commercial neighbours had
better presenters, with a „brighter, younger, modern sound.‟1136 There was
some community content but it was usually surrounded by music and of
course it was aimed at a younger audience, 15 – 35 year olds. The
impression the conference gave was that the managers felt insecure: they
were concentrating on older listeners, following their minority programmes
brief, but not attracting new listeners. Although news and sport on local
radio had been strengthened of late, there was a feeling that the output had
not really adjusted to meet the arrival of commercial radio. So by the mid-
1970s, in terms of its mainstream, daytime output, BBC Local Radio was
struggling to find its identity. It did not seem entirely comfortable with
pursuing vigorously the older, C2-D listener.

1134
BBC WAC BBC Local Radio Handbook Controller Local Radio R102/53
1135
BBC WAC Minutes from the Local Radio Management Conference November 1976 Local
Radio Conferences R78/4185
1136
BBC WAC Op cit

281
 Two audience surveys from the 1970s, from Radios Leeds and London,
further highlighted the paradox faced by the BBC in positioning itself next to
ILR.1137 The type of listener to both stations was similar: older rather than
younger, although in Radio Leeds‟ case, there were occasional listeners
from the younger demographic who tuned in for specific programmes, such
as sports coverage. The older listeners complained if there was too much
pop music, whereas the younger audience wanted more. In London, there
was appreciation for Capital Radio‟s „cheerfulness, friendliness and pop
music‟ as a key attraction.1138 Record requests and music shows on Radio
London were judged the most popular, along with phone-ins, news, quiz
shows and panel games.
Local radio struggled with an indecisiveness about fully embracing its
natural audience, the older demographic. On the one hand, it was worried
that it would never find newer, younger listeners unless it competed with the
pop music and glamour of commercial radio. On the other, local radio was
vulnerable to criticism from within the BBC that the types of programmes
that they did make for their audience were not of a good enough standard.
Station Managers would argue that this diverse approach was precisely
what their autonomy allowed them to do: to understand and serve their own
local audience with an appropriate schedule. First, the danger with this
strategy, I would argue, was over-ambition: the risk of spreading the
programmes too thinly, producing too much content and not satisfying
everyone. Secondly, it was obviously difficult to persuade senior
management and network staff that local radio was attaining a high enough
standard.

Minority programmes
The BBC Local Radio Handbook contained some guidance for how the
local station should address community and access programmes. Provided
there was no attempt to promote a political party, any group, association or
organisation could be offered airtime. There were other safeguards too,

1137
BBC WAC Local Radio: Radio London August 1975 Listening Report LR/75/395 R9/881;
Local Radio: Radio Leeds October 1979 Listening Report R9/906
1138
BBC WAC Local Radio: Radio London August 1975 op cit

282
 such as a ban on stirring up racialism [sic], or broadcasting obscenity or
indecent material.1139 These guidelines amounted to one side, double-
spaced, of A4 paper, compared to more than twice that given over to
instructions in the same handbook on how to use the telephone. This is
either an indication of the considerable autonomy given to community
broadcasting or a lack of engagement with what it entailed. This section will
explore two aspects of minority programmes, those that can be grouped in
terms of an ethnic minority audience and those pertinent to other, definable
communities.
The original stations tended to serve easily identifiable groups, notably
blind listeners, in their first attempts at minority programmes. An audit in
1970 listed programmes for „the blind‟ on Radios Birmingham (Foresight),
Leeds (Contact), Leicester (Sound Guide), Nottingham (Wednesday Club),
Oxford and Stoke (Your View) and Bristol (Insight).1140 A parallel
development was in programmes compiled by outside organisations. These
tended to be either enthusiasts (keen amateurs), or external bodies and
organisations. An example of the first category was Radio London‟s
Platform programme, where local interest groups could take to the
airwaves. This often provided good press coverage. In 1972, a naturist
group from Kent took over the programme. This made a good story for the
Evening Standard, which heralded „the first nude radio show‟. Station
Manager Peter Redhouse was quoted as saying that if they were extolling
the virtues of naturism, then they should certainly take their clothes off in
the studio.1141 While this group may have been viewed as harmless fun,
another Platform programme, featuring the Campaign for Homosexual
Equality, produced a less light-hearted response. There was still some
nervousness at allowing unfettered access to the airwaves. Replying to the
Daily Mail‟s condemnation of their appearance, Platform‟s producer Jeremy
Eccles provided a complete apologia in advance: „Obviously these kinds of

1139
BBC WAC BBC Local Radio Handbook Section dated June 1973 R102/53
1140
BBC WAC Memo for MDR 3 December 1970 Management: Local Radio Programmes
General R102/76
1141
Evening Standard „First Nude Radio Show‟ 24 August 1972 It was also one of the first
programmes due to go out on the newly installed MW, thus gaining the station even more
valuable publicity.

283
 programmes are bound to offend some listeners. But this is a serious
programme and there is no question of trying to recruit homosexuals.‟1142
Another aspect of editorial control concerned the quality of access
programmes. At the Weekly Programme Review Board in March 1979,
Radio Medway‟s Periscope, which had been made by a committee of
dockyard union members, was criticised for its „appalling presenter.‟1143 The
Deputy General Manager of Local Radio defended it, saying the informality
and lack of a professional approach was a strength. The Head of Further
Education Radio said the programme needed a producer. The following
week, a discussion programme by the volunteer bureau in Brighton heard
by the Board, was deemed by some members to suffer from a lack of focus:
was it about the ethics of volunteering or a call to get involved? Aubrey
Singer wanted more professional input, whereas Robert Gunnell argued
then it would not be genuine access programming. The Managing Director
countered that it was not sufficient for the BBC just to serve a community, it
needed to serve it with the best of broadcasting.1144
I would argue that these examples show the limits of BBC Local Radio‟s
ability to fully engage with the principles of community access broadcasting.
The BBC‟s mechanism for exerting final editorial control seemed to be in
conflict with its desire to allow access. This was exacerbated by the lack of
any clear policy or programme guidelines to facilitate genuine audience-
made programmes. Nor were there any specific criteria aimed at achieving
comprehensive representation, hence this comment from Marghanita Laski,
the prominent journalist and broadcaster. As a member of the Annan
Committee, she was on a visit to the training facilities at the BBC premises
at the Langham, Great Portland Street and heard about the work of local
radio and community groups. Turning to Robert McLeish, the Local Radio
Training Officer, she observed: “You say you provide something for
everyone. What do you do for the upper classes?”1145
On the other hand, given the strain that available resources were under,
this volunteer workforce was very useful, and the BBC exploited it on their

1142
Daily Mail „Homosexuals get own BBC programme‟ 25 August 1972
1143
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board Minutes 14 March 1979
1144
BBC WAC 28 March 1979 ibid
1145
Robert McLeish interview with the author 11 August 2010

284
 own terms. Radio London enjoyed the benefits of having outside groups
staff the station marquee at publicity events such as the City Show. 1146
There were also plentiful examples of successful partnerships with external
bodies, such as Radio Nottingham‟s Union Scene and About Your
Business, made by trades unions and the Chamber of Commerce,
respectively.1147 Perhaps an even greater handicap was the lack of
resources to enable external bodies to make good quality programmes,
which yet again made local radio vulnerable to accusations of low standards
from others within the organisation.

‘Pure amateursville’: ethnic programmes

The second category of minority programmes concerned the provision for
the ethnic minority populations in the local radio areas. By the time local
radio got started, there was already a few years‟ experience in making
programmes for an Asian audience on network radio.1148 This did not stop
local stations from making their own programmes, but by 1970, it was clear
that network radio would quite like to hand over responsibility for their
output to local radio. As Pat Beech, Controller of English Regions, pointed
out, this was not without significant problems. First, it was counter to the
local radio concept to ask stations to broadcast a centrally-produced
programme in a mandatory way. Secondly, the main ethnic minority
programme in question, Radio Four‟s Make Yourself At Home, was a
request show, and this would not fit into local schedules, given the
variations in dialect and language, the problems with finding the records
and the risk of duplicating existing shows on local radio.1149 Hugh Pierce, in

1146
BBC WAC Paper: Community and Access Programmes on BBC Local Radio [no author]
April 1975 Programmes for Minorities 1972-1979 R102/78
1147
BBC WAC Op cit
1148
BBC WAC Paper: Community and Access Programmes on BBC Local Radio [no author]
April 1975 Programmes for Minorities 1972-1979 R102/38 In July 1965, 161 representatives
from these communities had come to a BBC conference designed to hear their views on
broadcasting and to establish what were known as „race relations.‟ The BBC decided to
produce specific programmes aimed at an Asian audience, and to help this, established an
Immigrant Programmes Advisory Committee, which subsequently became the Asian
Programmes Advisory Committee in 1974 The BBC decided in 1965 not to produce special
programmes for the West Indian community.
1149
BBC WAC Memo from CER to DPR Subject: Make Yourself at Home 11 May 1970
Programmes for Minorities 1972-1979 R102/38 MYH was broadcast on a Sunday morning
and network chiefs obviously wanted to move it.

285
 handwritten comments on Beech‟s memo, made his position even more
forthright. He was totally against centrally-produced programmes and in any
case it would eat into the needletime allowance.1150 However the ongoing
debate had a useful outcome as it prompted regular and detailed audits of
the kinds of programmes each station was producing for ethnic minorities.
These were very useful as they began to show the attitudes of the stations
towards the diverse populations in their areas. And the files also
demonstrated how the disparate elements of minority broadcasting began
to coalesce into a coherent service that catered for large numbers of
listeners.
For those stations that catered for their minority populations, there were
several types of programme in the first list compiled in 1970. Some were
aimed at recent immigrants, to help them integrate and understand British
life and culture. Typical of these was Radio London‟s New Londoners,
produced by a Jamaican, Louis Marriott but aimed at Asians, Caribbeans,
Africans and those from eastern Europe.1151 Radio Sheffield had a
programme made by the local community relations officer, along similar
lines, for Asians. This was partly in Urdu and Bengali, and was broadcast at
6.30pm on a Saturday, when apparently groups of listeners would enjoy the
programme on a communal basis, sometimes up to 100 at a time.1152
Then there were programmes that were more explicitly educative or
instructive. Some of these used material made by English by Radio – often
a ten or fifteen-minute segment of a longer programme which included
some English language work. Nawrang was one such programme on Radio
Nottingham, and on Radio Leicester, Tony and his friends, aimed at primary
school children. Radio London had a variation on this theme, with University
of Brixton, centred around a West Indian family in Brixton called the
Plummers whose friends and neighbours would drop in for advice and
information. What was important to the stations was being able to target
output to the needs of their respective audiences.

1150
BBC WAC Op cit
1151
BBC WAC List of programmes for Immigrants and reactions of managers compiled by
Harold Williams, Assistant Head Local Radio Development 12 December 1970 ibid
1152
BBC WAC Op cit

286
 It was not just programmes for the larger minority groups that aroused
interest. In 1973, an MP asked the BBC Chairman what local radio was
doing for eastern Europeans, such as Ukrainians, Latvians and Estonians.
Hugh Pierce was able to reply that Radios Birmingham, Blackburn, Derby,
Leicester, Manchester and Stoke catered for their east European
communities, but broadcasting in their own languages was not viable.1153
By the mid 1970s, Radio Leeds had a show for its Jewish listeners (Jacob’s
Ladder), there were many more programmes broadcast in Asian languages
and there was more syndication of programmes. Most notable was the
Radio London series, University of Brixton, which was heard in Oxford,
Manchester and three other areas.1154 This concept of sharing was
formalised with an experiment from the newly-formed Asian Programmes
Unit in Birmingham, who made two pilot programmes, specifically aimed at
Asian women with children, to help with English language needs and social
awareness.1155 The intention was that they could be used by stations either
as stand-alone programmes or integrated into existing output.
Despite these innovations, local programme organisers began to report
some of the tensions they were experiencing as they worked with their local
communities. For example in Nottingham, there was jealousy between the
West Indian group and the Asian one, each making their own programmes.
The latter had some wealthy supporters who managed to pay their
presenter a fee. By contrast, the West Indian programme just had free use
of the facilities.1156 Reports that local programme organisers had to sort out
factional disputes were common and their feelings of insecurity in not
understanding what was being said in foreign languages was a frequent
concern.1157
Provision for ethnic audiences was all very well but what about the white
audience, did they feel left out? Radio Leeds reported that they had piloted

1153
BBC WAC Memo from GMLR to MDR Subject: Broadcasting in Ukrainian 31 July 1973
ibid
1154
BBC WAC Programmes for Immigrants on Local Radio October 18 1972 ibid
1155
BBC WAC Aide-memoire of meeting Subject: Asian Programmes and Local Radio 5
September 1974 ibid
1156
BBC WAC Programmes for West Indian Audiences and thoughts on Immigrant Provision
from Local Radio Education and Programme Services Organiser [John Saunders] to GMLR 8
June 1976 ibid
1157
BBC WAC Op cit

287
 their new programme, Calypso, six times in order to prove it would „not
damage race relations by being too fiery or black powerish in a way that
would alienate the native Yorkshireman.‟1158 Then there were those stations
which did not produce any output for immigrant listeners. Robert Gunnell in
Brighton argued that „integration is the word‟, adding there were few
immigrants in the town, apart from in colleges and restaurants.1159 Radio
Merseyside submitted that there were no racial problems in their area and
that they had never done, nor planned to do special programmes.1160
So provision of output for ethnic minorities was another example of how
the local radio structure was flexible enough, through individual autonomy,
to allow a range of interpretations of responsibility. From 1976 onwards,
there was an annual conference to discuss racial minorities, with
representatives from the stations and from the Asian Advisory Council. This
was an indication that centrally the BBC was attempting to co-ordinate its
provision to make sure it accurately reflected local needs and demands and
not just the prejudices of the Station Manager. By this point too, there was a
shift towards more integration across the output, so that stories relevant to
different communities could be covered in news bulletins. This would solve
what was perceived as the problem of „ghettoised‟ programmes: built output
that required extra resources and brought issues of accountability and inter-
group conflicts.1161
However, this raised the need to recruit more staff from immigrant
communities. Such candidates required more training, especially in
journalism skills, and again, where would the money come from? The point
was further underlined in the Asian Programmes Advisory Council‟s
evidence to Annan, when they spoke of freelance Asian presenters who

1158
BBC WAC op cit
1159
BBC WAC Memo from Station Manager Radio Brighton Subject: General Advisory
Council Meeting 29 September 1970 ibid
1160
BBC WAC List of programmes for Immigrants and reactions of managers compiled by
Harold Williams, Assistant HLRD 12 December 1970 ibid Station Manager Rex Bawden
added: „I see no joy at all about doing a programme in any foreign tongue – except Welsh
possibly.‟
1161
BBC WAC Memo from DGMLR to DPA Subject: Broadcasting to Racial Minorities 5 July
1976 ibid

288
 were prone to „slant‟ or bias the content of their broadcasts.1162 The
allegation was rejected by the BBC, but the potential problem was clearly
there, unless more was done to encourage and train potential staff from
ethnic backgrounds. There was a danger of course that the BBC could have
been perceived as being white liberal, or even imperialist in the way it
conducted its broadcast policies for communities. Statements such as this,
regarding recruiting from ethnic minorities, did not help: „It may be that
journalism is not a profession that holds many attractions for Asians and
black people.‟1163 Indeed, the paper this quote is drawn from has as its title
The broadcasting problems associated with black and Asian minorities, ie it
posits difficulties to be overcome rather than the accomplishment of
achievements so far.
A report by the Commission for Racial Equality in 1978 further praised
BBC Local Radio for its strategy on minority programmes, especially in
reaching Asian listeners. But there was still work to be done: they
recommended that there be greater diversity of representation on the LRCs,
that the location of any new stations reflected the concentration of ethnic
populations and that English language teaching programmes like Take
Away English were monitored for their effectiveness.1164 This last point had
already been taken up by Owen Bentley at Radio Leicester. In his view,
English-teaching programmes were a means of drawing Asian listeners into
a station, but once they were listening to the general output, these kinds of
broadcasts could be phased out. He had statistics to back this up. Of the
72% of Asians who listened to Leicester‟s Asian programmes, 12% moved
on to mainstream output. The survey also showed an appetite for more
news from the Asian sub-continent.1165 Bentley put his ideas into practice in
Leicester when he launched the Asian Network, which started as a nightly
news and information programme in 1977.1166

1162
BBC WAC GAC Paper 518 The Broadcasting Problems Associated with Asian and Black
Minorities in the UK 6 April 1977 Programmes for Minorities 1972-1979 ibid
1163
BBC WAC Op cit
1164
BBC WAC Recommendations of the Report on Ethnic Minority Broadcasting by the CRE
May 1978 ibid
1165
BBC WAC Local Radio Ethnic Minority Programmes Conference 28 September 1977 ibid
1166
Owen Bentley interview with the author ibid

289
 When he appeared at the Weekly Programme Review Board in 1978, he
was able to show that 83% of the local Asian audience listened to their
Asian Network programmes.1167 The Board were less impressed when they
heard an extract of the 6.30pm programme. The Head of School
Broadcasting (Radio) could not follow the interviews as there were too
many „would-be‟ contributors; the Head of Recording Services (Radio)
thought it would irritate the local English population. MDR summed it up as
„pure amateursville.‟1168 Faint praise came from the Presentation Editor of
Radio Four, who thought the Asian music was better than anything
produced on the Network, which „sounded like it had been recorded on
chapattis.‟1169 On the other hand, Black Londoners on Radio London,
presented by Alex Pascall was something of a success. The Editor of News
and Current Affairs (Radio) said it sounded „charming, amiable and friendly‟.
It was taken seriously by the Black community and was the only evening
programme to show up in Audience Research reports.1170 Today, Bentley is
sanguine about the response he received. He calls the Programme Review
Boards „a poser‟s paradise‟, consisting of heavy-weight intellectuals such as
George Fischer. „A lot of us felt patronised, but Local Radio gave as good
as it got.‟1171
There was a logical extension to the point about the concentration of
ethnic minority populations in certain areas, drawing on the CRE‟s report
and the success of programmes like Black Londoners. The next step would
be a station focussed solely on its ethnic audience. This was one proposal
put forward for the future of Radio London by Tim Pitt and Frank Mansfield
in their report: London Radio Community Study.1172 Their remit in drawing
up the study, in 1978, was to establish a map of London that identified key

1167
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board Minutes 19 July 1978 He also told the
Board that links between the BBC and the Asian community were consolidated after the
National Front started to win 20% of the vote in local elections.
1168
BBC Op cit Bentley recalls „Pure amateursville‟ coming from Jenny Abramsky, as Head of
News and Current Affairs, but says that it sounded like something Aubrey Singer would say.
Owen Bentley ibid The minutes credit the phrase to Singer.
1169
BBC WAC Op cit
1170
BBC WAC Op cit 21 February 1979 On 12 September, another Radio London
programme, „You don‟t have to be Jewish‟ was discussed. MDR felt that the Jewish
community was fully integrated and did not need its own programmes. Ibid
1171
Owen Bentley interview with the author ibid
1172
BBC WAC London Radio Community Study December 1978 Local Broadcasting 1979
R78/1165 The report is also referred to in BBC files as the Pitt Mansfield Report.

290
 communities, work out how these could best be served by local radio,
including setting up new or additional stations, and the relationship this
might have to Radio London as it currently existed. It is important to
remember that their research was as a direct result of the Annan Enquiry
and also formed part of the BBC‟s contribution to the Home Office Local
Radio Working Party.
Pitt and Mansfield had three main recommendations, some elements of
which seem remarkably prescient in hindsight. First they suggested that the
BBC embark on a tour of small communities in London, broadcasting from a
mobile caravan, or what they called a radio circus. Secondly, there should
be an experimental ethnic station for all of London, both black and brown,
as they put it. It would broadcast in native languages by day (for Asian
listeners) and in English by night, for black Londoners. Other minorities
could be catered for at weekends. The proposed station would also make
use of the bases established under the mobile broadcasting scheme, so
there were links in geographic as well ethnic communities. Finally, Pitt and
Mansfield proposed the long-term development of non-profit making
community radio stations, evolving from the radio circus idea, under BBC
patronage.1173 This was inspired by the arguments put forward by the
Community Communications Group and others. There were two existing
experiments of cable broadcasting, Radio Basildon and Radio
Thamesmead, which impressed Pitt and Mansfield and they envisaged
such stations as following a quasi-BBC local model.1174
These ideas could be seen as the apotheosis of local radio‟s aspirations
to reflect and engage with their communities of interest, geography and
ethnicity. Yet at the same time I would argue that the Plan did not deal with
the problems encountered by stations as they tried to cater for their ethnic
minority audience. As I have demonstrated with the examples in this
section, local radio could not resolve several challenges. The BBC‟s
approach, historically, had been to homogenise ethnic minority
programming under one concept, which was not consistent with how local
radio approached the different audiences on an individual station basis.

1173
BBC WAC Op Cit
1174
Indeed Radio Thamesmead took Radio Medway as its sustaining service.

291
 What worked in one area would not necessarily translate to another,
although the syndication of some programmes was successful. Secondly
there was the issue of what these programmes were intended to achieve.
Some stations interpreted their role as the facilitators of assimilation: to
quote Annan, to „introduce newcomers to the life and morals of this country
which reflect their own cultures and which enable others to understand and
appreciate their cultures.‟1175 Others preferred to keep ethnic minority
programmes in separate parts of the schedule, often linked to English
language teaching, and above all, not interfering with the listening habits of
the indigenous audience. I would argue that the BBC lacked a consistent
approach to ethnic minority programmes, just as it did to shows for other
specialist groups. There were undoubtedly pockets of excellence but again,
the lack of resources and criticisms about the quality of the output further
inhibited a concerted approach. Ironically the Pitt Mansfield report showed
remarkable forward thinking in suggesting ideas such as more focussed-
community radio, stations emerging from ethnic minority groups and mobile
broadcasting units, which would all emerge in subsequent decades.

‘Flatulence and jam-making’: education programmes

Education programming, like ethnic minority output, had its roots with other
areas of the BBC. Yet it differed in the way it was organised, with a clearer
structure of staffing and resources, established at the outset. However, as I
will argue in this section, that did not mean education was immune to the
same issues that affected the minority output. The goals and aspirations for
educational output still had an uneasy relationship, in the long-term, with the
day-to-day function of the station. As I have outlined in Chapter Six, when
local radio started, the Schools Broadcasting Council delegated their
responsibility for education output to the Local Education Advisory Panels,
who took on the commissioning role.1176 Each station had an Education
Organiser or Producer, who liaised with their panel and helped make
programmes, and organised secondments for teachers. The material
produced was intended both for schools and aimed at adults and those in

1175
BBC WAC quoted in London Radio Community Study ibid p 15
1176
BBC WAC BBC Local Radio Handbook R102/53

292
 further education. FE provision came under the remit of the BBC‟s Further
Education Advisory Council (FEAC).
Looking back at the start of local radio in 1967, Hal Bethell, the BBC
Local Radio Organiser, working as part of the HQ team, wrote „words such
as participation, access, involvement…came to have a new certainty and
stature in our speculations and beliefs.‟1177 So the theory at least was that
educational programming had emerged from the same conceptual
framework as minority and specialist output, and initially it was treated in the
same way, as a separate part of the schedule aimed at a dedicated
audience. For example, the Spring Term output for education programmes
(for schools and FE) produced by the twenty stations in 1972 involved 164
series.1178 Subjects ranged from the Development of Pop Music (Radio
Birmingham) to the problems of pollution (Locusts on the Earth made by the
University of Sussex for Radio Brighton). There were quizzes (We Are the
Champions, Radio Leicester), Saturday morning children‟s shows (Shindig,
Radio London; Calico Pie, Radio Bristol), and more rigorous expositions,
such as The Beaver of Wirksworth from Radio Derby, about DH Lawrence.
In terms of further enabling the ideals of access and participation, to use
Bethell‟s terms, there were regular secondment arrangements established
with local education authorities. According to lists in the files, most
producers had at least one full-time or part-time teacher working with them
each term.1179 Hal Bethell promoted the work of local radio in education, to
the Controller of Education Broadcasting in 1972.1180 He felt that local
radio‟s strengths lay in a range of subjects: history, geography, economics,
social conditions; and these were not restricted by the boundaries of the
stations, they embraced national interests too.
Local stations were also pooling resources, to produce a syndicated
series each year, for which they all contributed one programme.1181 Bethell

1177
Bethell H Education and BBC Local Radio: A Combined Operation (BBC Publication
1972) p 4
1178
BBC WAC Local Radio Education Output Spring Term 1972 Educational Programmes
General 1964-1981 R102/7
1179
BBC WAC Op cit
1180
BBC WAC Note by Hal Bethell to Controller Education Broadcasting 25 April 1972 Local
Radio Policy Part Four 1969 R103/93
1181
BBC WAC Local Radio Education Output Spring Term 1972 Educational Programmes
General 1964-1981 R102/7 ibid

293
 went so far as to claim that local radio could even be viewed as an
educational venture in its entirety, as it concerned a great deal of output
aimed at minority audiences.1182 This was an ambitious statement, but
statistically, education on local radio was responsible for a sizeable part of
the daily output, it brought in a significant audience and it was a practical
example of working with the varied communities in a station location, in
many cases.1183
However, I would argue that Bethell‟s grand statement also exposed a
weakness: was it desirable to create such a large part of the output
dedicated solely to education, which appealed only to a segmented
audience? In 1973, Bethell was clearly having concerns about this area of
broadcasting. He felt too much emphasis had been placed on traditional
forms of adult education, represented perhaps by organisations such as the
Workers Education Association.1184 Bethell proposed to broaden the
definition of what might be considered adult education programmes, so that
it could be spread throughout the schedule. The examples he chose
included some that demonstrated the type of partnership he wanted to
foster with outside organisations, such as Vote Metropolitan from Radio
Leeds, made by the extra mural department at the University of Leeds
about the reform of local government. There were also less obvious, more
tangential interpretations of education, what he termed might be in
„unconventional guises‟,1185 such as I wanna hold your hand (Radio
Birmingham), about intermediate bridge playing; Prelude (Radio Brighton),
classical concert previews and the ubiquitous University of Brixton, which
was now being exploited for its educational value.1186
The achievements of the education producers, within just a few years,
were undoubtedly remarkable: in 1973 alone, 180 series, 100 weekly hours
of output and over 80 secondments.1187 This brought with it, however,

1182
BBC WAC Op cit
1183
For example: in Radio Merseyside, 700 schools listened regularly; over 200 teachers had
received radio production training; 500 educational programmes were broadcast in one
school year. Taken from Bethell ibid
1184
BBC WAC Paper by Hal Bethell The Further Education Role of Local Radio 2 April 1973
ibid
1185
BBC WAC Op cit
1186
BBC WAC Op cit
1187
BBC WAC Untitled paper by Hal Bethell 30 March 1973 ibid

294
 greater risks. There was a sense that there was too much emphasis on the
number of programmes being made, as a quantity, and not enough thought
going into the process and what the objectives were. Bethell therefore
proposed a reduced pace, so that the output could be more targeted. He
wanted to concentrate on more integration and partnerships with the
community, and to do this, the station had to live up to four key criteria. It
needed to be „accessible, approachable, amenable, attainable.‟1188 I would
argue that by the mid-1970s, Bethell was trying to re-position local radio‟s
educational role, to distance it from the rigours of curricula-driven demands
associated with the SBC, and to broaden the definition as a means of
underpinning local radio‟s community aspirations. As he wrote „local radio
has a social purpose and we [ie educational producers] have a fitness for
that purpose.‟1189
This proved a difficult balance to get right, as illustrated in 1978 when
Robert Gunnell took one of his educational series to the Weekly
Programme Review Board. It included items such as a feature by a 78-year
old producer about boy chimney sweeps and a package on music teaching
in schools.1190 While the Controller Radio Three liked the programme,
Network Editor (Radio) Bristol could not see the educational value. Gunnell
pointed out that Brighton was no longer syllabus based, but concerned
more with broad themes, which might be appropriate to Further Education.
Peter Redhouse, for the HQ team, concurred that only 5% of stations were
now producing material for the schools curriculum.
The decline in the distinctiveness of education programmes continued
towards the end of the 1970s, when perhaps the balance was going too far
in the other direction. Stations were under increasing pressure to make
savings, and one common solution was to redeploy the education
producer‟s effort to other parts of the schedule. This is illustrated by an
exchange of correspondence between John Saunders, who had taken over
from Hal Bethell in the HQ team, and now had the title Local Radio
Education and Programme Services Organiser, and Ted Gorton (Station

1188
BBC WAC Op cit
1189
BBC WAC Op cit
1190
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board Minutes 12 July 1978

295
 Manager, Radio Oxford), whom he suspected of such a manoeuvre. 1191
Saunders felt the BBC had been publicly embarrassed at two conferences
recently, when it was stated that Radio Oxford did nothing educational any
longer. On telephoning Radio Oxford, Saunders was told they had not had
an educational producer for two years! Saunders reminded Gorton that
each station did have an education post, and asked „if the daily presentation
of a mixture of topical and useful hints is the way we ought to be using our
educational producers?‟1192
Gorton reminded Saunders of the Weekly Programme Review Board‟s
comments on Oxford‟s morning programme (which Hugh Phillips, their
education producer, worked on) as „excellent‟, especially their radio doctor
diagnosing ailments for listeners. As far as Gorton was concerned, this
range of output („everything from serious illness to jam-making‟) was all
educational programming.1193 Saunders reiterated that it was his job „in co-
ordinating the educational output of the local radio stations ensuring that
standards are maintained.‟1194 While he accepted that what constituted
educational output had a wide interpretation, „diagnosing flatulence and the
reasons for jam not setting are not educational programmes, regardless of
how loudly you may shout they are.‟1195 Presumably Gorton was not the
only Station Manager who was interpreting educational deployment in very
liberal way. Despite these affirmations on an internal level, Saunders was
aware that local radio had to adapt to changing circumstances.
In a paper for the Chairmen of the Local Radio Councils, he looked at
prospects for education on local radio in the 1980s.1196 Saunders again
stressed the need for education producers to get out of the studios and
meet people, particularly in community areas with most needs. But there
was a dilemma here. One of the must urgent problems was growing

1191
BBC WAC Educational Programmes General 1964-1981 R102/7
1192
BBC WAC Memo from John Saunders to Ted Gorton (cc Controller Local Radio) 29
August 1979 ibid
1193
BBC WAC Memo from Ted Gorton to John Saunders (cc CLR) 2 October 1979 ibid
1194
BBC WAC Memo from John Saunders to Ted Gorton (cc CLR) 9 October 1979 ibid „May I
say in passing that I am not used to remarks as insulting as those contained in your reply and
don‟t take them personally.‟
1195
BBC WAC Op cit
1196
BBC WAC Minutes of a Meeting of a Conference for LRC Chairs 8-9 June 1979 Local
Radio Conferences R78/4185

296
 unemployment among young people. However, they were not BBC Local
Radio‟s target audience and tended to listen to ILR instead. The Chairs
suggested facilitating programmes made by young people for young
people.1197 But there was an even more fundamental problem, as illustrated
by the Radio Oxford debacle. How was it possible to recognise educational
material when it was integrated into daytime output? As Saunders saw it,
the answer was to make educational programmes more popular to a wider
audience. What was the point of spending a lot of money on them if no one
listened?1198 Plus of course there was the argument that future stations
were likely to be smaller and unable to sustain output on a similar scale, so
education needed to be re-appraised.

The Local Radio Councils

The role of the Local Radio Councils, established in 1967, was integral to
the BBC‟s concept of local radio: a conduit to encourage maximum
community involvement, a sounding board for different groups, and a
means of consultation between the station staff and listener
representatives. The key questions to be addressed here are how effective
this role was and whether the reality matched the theory. Several
ingredients were fundamental to the equation: whether the councils‟
interpretation of their function coincided with the BBC‟s original intention;
the effectiveness of the relationship with the station, and the corresponding
affiliation with the community they were intended to represent. Therefore
the issue of membership composition became a significant factor.
As an earlier chapter explored, the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications wrote to the Secretary of the BBC in November 1970
asking if they would take over the appointments process for the LRCs. 1199
The Government‟s rationale was that this brought the LRCs into line with
the other BBC advisory councils, which were appointed by the BBC without
any external input.1200 Interestingly, the Minister wanted to preserve some

1197
BBC WAC Op cit
1198
BBC WAC Op cit
1199
BBC WAC Board of Management Minutes 16 November 1970 R2/23/5
1200
BBC WAC Appointment of BBC Local Radio Councils G.133/70 November 1970 Board of
Governors Papers R1/106

297
 suggestion of autonomy, and so was keen to avoid a scenario where a
Station Manager could „fix‟ his own council. The solution was for the BBC
Board of Governors to have final approval of council members.1201 From a
procedural perspective, the change in the process was noticeable in the
minutes of the Board of Governors, when, from January 1971 onwards,
papers began appearing with „appointments for membership of LRCs‟
requiring their approval.1202 An audit from 1972 illustrated the activity of the
LRCs, which included the twelve new stations.1203 Two major concerns
tended to arise: the composition of the Councils and how they interacted
with their local station. The latter problem was identified as a remnant of the
Ministerial appointment system, where one or two LRC Chairs thought they
had executive powers to run the stations.1204 Interestingly Trethowan told
the Board of one instance where a Chair advised him of a Station Manager
who was being overbearing with his staff and local community. Further
evidence supported this, and the manager was moved.1205 Generally Chairs
were meant to meet their manager once every two months. They would also
see the senior Radio directorate team four times a year, as access to the
Managing Director was enshrined early on.1206
As a means of communication between the manager and listeners, the
LRC structure was largely felt to be successful. There were numerous
examples of consultations, playback sessions, and listener panels. Many
stations also used their LRCs as a way of accessing other groups in the
community, such as music practitioners for Radio Durham and consumer
groups for Radio Leicester and local support services in Nottingham. There
were, however, some grumbles about the mechanics of participation. Radio
Brighton reported that LRC members would not listen to programmes when
asked, nor visit the station when invited. Radio Humberside thought LRC

1201
BBC WAC Op cit The impact of this change has already been observed elsewhere, as
Owen Bentley distinguishes between the period when the LRCs were government appointed
and then when they became „ours‟. Owen Bentley interview with the author ibid
1202
BBC WAC Local Radio Councils, Appointments to Membership G.118/71 17 October
1971 Board of Governors Papers R1/107
1203
BBC WAC BBC Local Radio Councils: Summary of Activities 1972 G3/73 Board of
Governors Papers R1/109
1204
BBC WAC Report on Local Radio by Managing Director of Radio 25 April 1973 G.58/73
Board of Governors Papers R1/109
1205
BBC WAC Op cit
1206
BBC WAC Op cit

298
 meetings were too „cosy‟ and Radio Medway observed that younger
members felt intimidated by older ones.1207 The issue at the heart of this
was often membership composition. The Director of Public Affairs told the
Board of Governors that since the BBC had taken over responsibility for
appointments, efforts had been made to achieve a balance in the range of
nominees. Generally vacancies were publicised locally, to allow self-
nomination; in addition a Station Manager would liaise with institutions and
organisations for their own recommendations, to fill an ad hoc quota. This
system, it was hoped, would achieve a balance.1208 To prove this, it was
noted that when Leeds advertised for members they had 60 applications
and now their LRC had a bus driver and a housewife.1209 Elsewhere, other
examples of successful minority representation on an LRC included „a blind
student at Sheffield University – David Blunkett.‟1210
I would argue that this was a rather reductive assessment of the diversity
of representation. The Board of Governors were in a good position to reflect
on the composition of the Councils, as they ratified the appointments, but
their observations, as recorded in the minutes, betray a non-scientific form
of equal opportunities monitoring. For example, in September 1973, the
Governors started to pursue their theme for widening the membership of the
LRCs to include „more educated bus conductors and perhaps fewer
educationalists.‟1211 A few months later, the presence of a bus driver on the
Radio Leeds LRC (presumably the one already mentioned earlier that year)
„did not go unnoticed or unappreciated.‟1212 This theme became something
of a running joke in the minutes. In 1974 „the Vice-Chair particularly
welcomed the inclusion of a driver (though of ambulances not buses)‟;1213
and the following year, new members for Radio Nottingham‟s LRC included
„if not a bus driver, at least the wife of a bus driver.‟ 1214

1207
BBC WAC Op cit
1208
BBC WAC Op cit
1209
BBC WAC Op cit
1210
BBC WAC Local Radio Councils, Appointments to Membership G.118/71 17 October
1971 Board of Governors Papers R1/107
1211
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 20 September 1973 R1/41/2
1212
BBC WAC ibid 13 December R1/41/3
1213
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 4 April 1974 R1/42/1 Which LRC this referred to
was not recorded.
1214
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 24 April 1975 R1/43/1

299
 At the risk of exhausting the point, it is clear from the minutes that this
„bus driver‟ became a metaphor for the Governors of their quest for wider
representation. When Michael Barton appeared before them in 1978, they
again reminded him of the need for Local Radio Council appointments to
reflect more bus drivers and fewer educationalists.1215 Other groups were
mentioned too of course. The ratio of male to female members was noted
and the Board made it clear they expected equal numbers to be achieved
across all Councils within a few years.1216 The Governors also made
frequent, specific recommendations, such as to look for a Sikh in
Medway,1217 and more agricultural (ie non-urban) representation in
Brighton.1218 Although from time to time it was noted that the right quota of
members was being achieved,1219 the problem was that appointments
generally lasted three years, so there was a continuous cycle and the
balance was offset again. Hence by the late 1970s, the minutes still
recorded reminders for Michael Barton to find more women, Asians and
West Indians.1220
I would argue that this issue highlights another central tension for the
local radio structure. The LRCs were intended, among other things, to foster
wider representation of the communities in the output. Yet there was no
guarantee that their own membership could be identified with the broad
diversity of the audience, or was representative of a particular locality. The
Board of Governors took it upon itself to try and monitor the composition of
the Councils, but it was difficult to balance formal guidelines or strict criteria
with the requirements of each individual location.
From the perspective of the Station Manager, the LRC could prove very
useful, as a conduit for feedback and support and to boost morale. Robert
McLeish witnessed this as part of the HQ Team. Generally the LRCs were
supportive of the stations – critical where necessary but also strong

1215
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 February 1978 R1/241/1
1216
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 June 1974 R1/42/2
1217
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 6 October 1977 R1/45/3
1218
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 February 1978 R1/241/1
1219
BBC WAC Governors noted with „pleasure and some mock apprehension‟ more and more
women being appointed to LRCs. Board of Governors Minutes 24 October 1974 R1/42/2
1220
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 16 November 1978 R1/241/4

300
 champions for them on important issues.1221 Owen Bentley concurs. When
he ran Radio Leicester, they were “a tremendous support….they were a
useful tool…..they work like a drip on a stone.”1222 The advisory panels
were also very useful in securing extra funds and attachments – Bentley
cites his Religious Advisory Panel as an example, which set up
secondments with young curates. There was, however, a more incendiary
use for the LRCs, who were not afraid to turn their fire-power onto Senior
Managers at the BBC. Michael Barton‟s description of them as “a tinder box
waiting to be struck”1223 was especially apt with the episode concerning the
proposal to reduce the hours of output in 1979. For the LRCs, the issue
came down to two substantial points of disagreement. Aubrey Singer
explained to the Chairs that a reduction in hours was necessary to maintain
and improve the current standard of programmes.1224 Some Chairs
interpreted this as a rebuke, since the LRCs had been one of the main
arbiters of quality on behalf of their stations. Mrs Fleming, Sheffield‟s Chair,
asked Singer to explain to her how she should go back to her Council to tell
them „their taste in programmes was not high enough and why the station‟s
output would be obliged to give them less of what they very much liked.‟1225
Secondly, besides being the defenders of quality, the Councils also
thought they were standing up for their manager‟s autonomy. Their
definition of this was the manager‟s prerogative to decide the content and
duration of their output depending on their budget.1226 As Singer told the
Board of Governors „clearly one or two Chairmen did not understand that
the limits within which managers make decisions have existed since the
beginning of local radio.‟1227 He further accused them of behaving like „a

1221
Robert McLeish interview with the author ibid
1222
Owen Bentley interview with the author ibid
1223
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011
1224
BBC WAC Minutes of a Meeting with LRC Chairs 8-9 June 1978 Local Radio Conferences
R78/4185
1225
BBC WAC Op cit
1226
In fact the LRC Chairs had submitted evidence to Annan suggesting that the autonomy of
local radio should be increased rather than reversed, without separating from the BBC. BBC
WAC Local Radio: The BBC‟s Response to the Government White Paper: A Note Prepared
by Local Radio Council Chairmen [no date] in Local Radio: Board of Governors Sub-Group
R78/1388 In response, Annan proposed abolishing LRCs altogether.
1227
BBC WAC Minutes of the Board of Governors 14 June 1979 R1/46/3

301
 second Board of Governors‟, of misunderstanding the nature of autonomy
and not appreciating the political pressure the BBC was under.1228
It took some time to pour balm on troubled waters. In July, Singer
undertook a week-long tour of the stations, to explain the situation to each
of them. But Singer was determined that they should not act like „a powerful
advisory committee‟. Individually, he called them „charming‟; collectively
they were „formidable.‟1229 His solution was to divide the stations into
regional groups. That way, the LRCs would only operate in small clusters,
not as one big group. The Chairman of the BBC Governors used the
analogy of a university to explain the current structure. Autonomous
faculties proliferated new courses and indulged in expensive empire
building until the Vice-Chancellor insisted on centralising new projects in the
interests of quality and cost.1230 Singer picked up this parallel the following
month, July 1979, when he talked, optimistically, about having re-asserted
central authority over the LRCs.1231
I would argue there were inherent paradoxes in the LRC structure and
organisation. Their usefulness to the BBC rested largely on an effective
working relationship with the local station, as a means of gauging listener
opinion and supporting the Station Manager with external relations. In times
of crisis, as the post-Annan Report episode demonstrated, they could
produce a powerful and vocal lobby group. Their effective reach was
tempered, however, by the degree to which the Councils accurately
reflected the diversity of their local community, something that the Board of
Governors monitored, as part of their approval role. The LRCs were also
kept at arms length by the wider BBC. They existed to support local radio
and give it credibility with communities and the audience. The LRCs were
consulted about strategy and policy, on a need to know basis, but when
they attempted to become more involved in decision-making, their influence
was judged to be destabilising. At this, higher level, of BBC politics, there
was a strict acceptance of what „advisory‟ meant in practice.

1228
BBC WAC Op cit
1229
BBC WAC Op cit
1230
BBC WAC Board of Governors Minutes 14 June 1979 R1/46/3
1231
The relationship between Singer and the LRCs was never repaired. „Aubrey hated them‟
says Michael Barton ibid

302
 The wider BBC
This section considers the relationship between the local stations and the
HQ team based in London, and the engagement with other areas of the
BBC, most notably with the radio networks. My purpose here is to explore
the difficult balance between autonomy on the one hand, and the degree to
which it was possible, and desirable, to manage the stations from the
centre.
Regarding the HQ team, the task facing Hugh Pierce and his small staff,
once the go ahead was given for a permanent service, was to prepare and
launch the next wave of stations. Primarily responsible for the training of
staff was Robert McLeish, transferred from his role as Programme
Organiser at Radio Nottingham. His role, from 1970, was to prepare the
teams who were launching the next 12 stations with the necessary radio
skills. He recorded in his diary how frustrating this was at times, especially
at the beginning.
„Today [January 19 1970] was to have been the start of training in my
original forecast…but we have not even advertised for the PAs
[programme assistants] or SAs [station assistants]. One trouble is that
there is no one in overall charge. Hugh does marvellously but building
department, planning and installation are responsible to senior
engineers who control the expenditure. The most junior person who can
control the whole project is the DG!‟1232

The key point that McLeish noted at the time was how the expansion and
development of local radio were being driven more by the mechanics of the
infrastructure rather than the needs of programme makers:
„The control of information is poor in the BBC….in the present
expansion of local radio – the information on which decisions are based
is almost entirely engineering and financial. Programmes hardly come
into it. What a pity that managers were not in on the planning for the next
stage, only engineers.‟1233

The training course was structured with one team doing practical work in
the mornings, both stations having theory lectures in the afternoon and then

1232
Robert McLeish Diary entry 19 January 1970
1233
Robert McLeish ibid 12 March 1970 McLeish organised the training courses in pairs, so
two stations teams were taught at once. The order was determined by the sequence of
station launch.

303
 the second group doing their practice in the evenings. Examples of
theoretical classes included an induction into the BBC as an organisation,
with information on the Charter, the licence fee, various departments and
the resources available to local radio.1234 There were practical sessions
where equipment operation was taught, such as using the studio desk or
panel, the portable Uher recorder, patching jack fields and so on. McLeish
and his trainers also played lots of examples of output from around the
world, to illustrate production values and to initiate a discussion about the
„local radio sound.‟:
„Local radio examples on the Queen‟s visit, the Brisbane link-up and
so on. I‟ve always known they were thought to be too cloying and over
emotional – this is by network people listening to them. I‟ve always been
of the view that you shouldn‟t listen to local radio too objectively. It‟s
essentially subjective.‟1235

This is an important area as the training was really the only opportunity
for many of the new local radio personnel to learn about what made local
radio so different and the mentality necessary to produce it, what McLeish
called „a different kind of humanity.‟1236
The work of McLeish and his team was one crucial way that links were
maintained with the centre. The training process established the formats
and genre of local output and the production techniques available to the
staff, and taught them how the equipment was to be used. There was an
element of uniformity in this: all stations were using the same technical
facilities and following similar programme formulae. The unknown quantity
was the quality of the output. As has already been illustrated, efforts by
Hugh Pierce, Hal Bethell and others were made to keep monitoring this.
There was still, however, another relationship that required further
mediation. As a previous chapter demonstrated, the method for sharing
content between local radio and the networks had not exactly been a
success. Network output was still carried by the stations as a quasi-
sustaining service, even though there were strenuous efforts to „fill in‟ the

1234
Robert McLeish interview with the author 11 August 1970
1235
Robert McLeish Diary entry 6 March 1970 It is not clear who exactly McLeish was playing
these extracts to as this entry precedes the training period.
1236
Robert McLeish Op cit

304
 schedule with more locally-made programmes. For most stations, Radio
Two or Four (and sometimes One) was the output of choice, since it
seemed most in keeping with their listeners.1237 In 1978, there was a very
frank assessment of the relationship from the network executives when they
met the Howard/Clarke sub-committee of the Governors who were looking
into the role of local radio.1238 What was interesting at this point were the
attitudes that came across, which betrayed some deep seated prejudice.
The executives present included the Controllers of the networks, and also
Donald Muggeridge, Aubrey Singer‟s deputy. The suspicions about local
radio stemmed from the fear that it would lay claim to resources that
rightfully belonged to network radio. Executives such as David Hatch,
George Fischer and Ian McIntyre would only support local radio continuing
provided it was not at the expense of reducing funding for network
stations.1239 Coupled with this was an obvious resentment about the
freedoms that local radio operated under. This was expressed by David
Hatch, who wanted to reduce the managers‟ autonomy, a sentiment that
was very popular with the meeting. There was talk about local radio „aping‟
network, and being over ambitious. At this point, Muggeridge said that he,
too, agreed, and that their autonomy was about to be restricted with the
proposed cut in hours.1240 He also said that it would be „politically
disastrous‟ to lose a network in order to develop local radio.
There were some allies for local radio from the radio directorate. Ronald
Mason was an advocate, arguing that it was dangerous for the BBC not to
be in local broadcasting, a point echoed by Charles McLelland (Controller of
Radio One and Two). However, the issue was how to progress the service
when there was no money available. Peter Woon suggested concentrating
on small satellite stations, perhaps using cheap local authority premises or

1237
In 1972 Stephen Hearst, Controller of Radio Three, wrote to Hugh Pierce: „Far, far be it
from me to wish to undermine the independence of Station Managers but their almost total
boycott of Radio Three‟s output other than news bulletins smacks of a philistinism that we
should not view with detached calm. There are one or two quite decent tunes we play from
time to time you know, that one could whistle quite easily.‟ BBC WAC Memo from Controller
Radio Three to GMRD (cc‟d MDR, C 1 & 2, C 4) Subject: Network Usage by Local Radio 29
September 1971 in Management Local Radio General R102/76
1238
BBC WAC Minutes of a meeting of the Local Radio Group of the Board of Governors 22
June 1978 in Local Radio: Board of Governors Sub Group R78/1388
1239
BBC WAC Op cit
1240
BBC WAC Op cit

305
 even Portakabins to get new stations opened.1241 It was also pointed out
that Radio One and local radio should work more closely in tandem, as
together this combination was a more effective competition to ILR. At the
close of the meeting, Stella Clarke observed in a conciliatory tone that the
views of the networks about local radio were shifting, from one of opposition
to acceptance.1242
The views expressed at the Weekly Programme Review Board at about
the same time, as I have already demonstrated above, showed a similar
robust approach.1243 However by 1979, each station had had at least one
opportunity for their programmes to be played and there was a gradual
sense from the minutes that network staff were becoming more familiar with
the kind of local radio output being made.1244 Discussions tended to
broaden away from specific examples to a wider concept of local radio‟s
role. In January 1979, Aubrey Singer stressed to the Board that he wanted
to make sure local radio did not become „homogenised‟, but retained its
distinctive programme mix.1245 Later that month he elaborated on the
theme, stressing that local radio was essential to the BBC‟s public service
standards, as a counter-balance to network radio‟s role in music, drama,
news and information.1246 Yet there was still a misapprehension about the
local radio ecology. The Channel Assistant, Radio Four‟s assumption that
BBC Local Radio should compete with ILR was soundly rejected by Singer.
This was not financially or politically desirable, and in any case, Radio One
or Two were ahead in audience terms in most ILR areas. ENCAR and the
Editor of Radio News both assumed Radio Four benefited when there was
bad weather, but again, MDR was emphatic: „Radio Four does not have the
best reports, local radio does.‟1247

1241
BBC WAC Op cit
1242
BBC WAC Op cit
1243
BBC WAC Weekly Programme Review Board Minutes ibid
1244
Michael Barton, Controller of Local Radio, took responsibility for selecting the
programmes, to get a more „random‟ approach.
1245
BBC WAC ibid 3 January 1979
1246
BBC WAC ibid 31 January 1979
1247
BBC WAC Op cit

306
 Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that one major element of local radio‟s
infrastructure, the workforce, had begun to adapt to the changing
circumstances that came with expansion. With this growth came new
demands on the conceptual framework that underpinned the original
stations. On the one hand, there were more Station Managers, who
combined to create a significant voice within BBC radio. The principle of
autonomy had a useful function by allowing managers a degree of
innovation and independence in the way they ran their stations and created
the output. The problem arose when this collective lobby appeared to be an
oppositional force within the BBC. The only course was to divide and rule
the Station Managers and gradually erode their autonomy.
I would also argue that the pioneering spirit of the staff on the original
stations exploited the creative freedoms that autonomy brought them,
especially when this was backed up by sufficient resources. The period of
growth, particularly under astute Station Managers, was profitable for many,
in that there were opportunities for promotion and exploring new territories.
However, autonomy also brought with it a lack of consistency, with some
managers failing to capitalise on the available opportunities. In terms of
output, a balance had to be struck between individual expressions of radio
pertinent to that community and limits on resources and time.
The impetus towards increasing the hours of output to fill the schedules
was unsustainable using the resource-heavy „built‟ formats, so new
approaches to programme-making emerged. Meanwhile programmes for
education, ethnic minority and specialist groups were intended to remain a
core part of the output: they were regarded as a raison d’etre for the whole
enterprise. So local radio could definitely demonstrate that their output
served their communities, by giving them news programmes, minority and
special interest output and work of an educational level. They also provided
opportunities for listener interaction, such as the phone-in.
But I would argue that challenges remained. Paradoxically, educational
programmes achieved many of the objectives of local radio: they were
clearly targeted to an audience, there were plentiful opportunities for

307
 partnerships,1248 they enabled strong listener participation and interaction
and even audience-made programmes. Yet it was not sustainable, for two
reasons. First, local radio was in danger of becoming a schools service,
broadcasting curricula-driven material to a narrow audience. Further and
adult education output was less distinct, and the quality more variable. So
there had to be a more refined approach at balancing the needs of
education within the schedule as a whole. Secondly, local radio and the way
the stations operated tended to be driven more by resources, especially
during the economically-turbulent 1970s. The same applied to the
educational authorities, polytechnics and colleges. Having dedicated
education-producing staff became a luxury, which Station Managers had to
exploit in other ways. Local radio was struggling to be all things to all
people, and the role of education output was one element that could be
sacrificed.1249
BBC Local Radio reached an important landmark when it was recognised
as one of the de facto networks, when Michael Barton was given the title
Controller of Local Radio in September 1977. However, as I have argued,
the attitudes of the respective staff in both network and local radio were at
times entrenched and acceptance of the mutual benefits of each other was
a more long-term project. It took some time for the mutual suspicion to
subside. Part of the problem came from the lack of empathy for local radio
output, which I have argued was influenced by a number of factors,
including the shift from built to sequence programmes, the production
values attached to education and specialist material and the deployment of
available resources.
But as McLeish‟s quote illustrates, that local radio was largely subjective,
I would argue it goes deeper than this, and becomes an issue of how one
can objectify what local radio was set up to do. And a large part of this was
due to structural determinants, such as the questions of autonomy, staff

1248
eg Radio Manchester‟s Job Week when partnerships with a range of organisations
uncovered 268 previously unknown vacancies and resulted in 848 enquiries from the public.
BBC WAC Report by the Managing Director of Radio Board of Governors Minutes 22 July
1976 R1/44/1
1249
The next wave of stations in the early 1980s, such as Radios Norfolk and Lincolnshire,
launched without a dedicated Education Producer post. Owen Bentley correspondence with
the author 18 July 2011

308
 management and governance. Most of these were established in the early
period of local radio development, and the subsequent expansion of the
1970s revealed that these attributes needed to be redefined. It is
understandable that the tensions which I have outlined in this chapter
resulted in a fair degree of frustration, as McLeish recorded in June 1978,
just after the struggle over the Annan report:
„The vision of local radio‟s future fades as there‟s talk of operating
stations for two or three hours a day from „Portakabins‟ in a garden of
suburban houses, the programmes being sustained by a „rolling news‟
service from Radio London. That‟s not what I joined for.‟1250

As I have argued in the early chapters in this thesis, the BBC managed
to create the right environment and structure that meant it was ready to
move into local radio once the various external factors (over which it had no
control) were favourable. By the end of the period covered by my research,
the political and technical context (Annan aside) readily facilitated the
completion of the local radio project, but it was factors within the BBC that
almost derailed it, as Michael Barton observed: “the internal stresses were
much greater than the external ones.”1251 This forms a key part of my
concluding arguments in the Conclusion.

1250
Robert McLeish diary entry 6 June 1978
1251
Michael Barton interview with the author 17 December 2007

309
 CONCLUSION

This history of BBC Local Radio in England between 1960 and 1980 has
produced a rich and thought-provoking picture of one aspect of
broadcasting that has previously been neglected in media historiography. In
the course of these chapters I have elaborated on the arguments
surrounding the gestation and birth of the service, its struggle for survival
and the various permutations that were explored to achieve completion of
coverage. This thesis makes a significant contribution to media
historiography in setting out a history of BBC Local Radio in England, based
on primary sources, which has so far been missing from the canon. I have
also presented arguments about the tensions that existed within local radio
– how it was defined, structured and operated - and between it and the
wider culture of the BBC and beyond. In addition, I have presented
evidence to show that BBC Local Radio achieved a great deal, in terms of
the art of radio and as a valuable service for licence fee payers, which has
not always been given due recognition. In this chapter I will discuss my
findings in more detail and elaborate on the contribution to knowledge that
this thesis puts forward.

My first contribution is to show that BBC Local Radio came about

because of a concatenation of factors, events and changing ideology, which
the BBC was able to influence, shape and ultimately benefit from. It was
therefore a more complex scenario, in contrast to the previous deductions
that the BBC started local radio purely as a response to the threat of
commercial competition or as a result of the prohibition of offshore pirate
radio. Frank Gillard identified a set of circumstances, which posed a
dilemma: society was becoming more interested and engaged in its
surroundings, its political, cultural and social lives on a local level, but it
lacked the means for turning this into a meaningful dialogue. As the BBC
proposed in 1966 „Local Radio would provide this missing link of
communication.‟1252 Network radio was not equipped to achieve this, but the

1252
BBC Local Radio in the Public Interest: the BBC’s plan (London: BBC
Publications,1966) p 2

310
 BBC, in this very period, was also engaged in a root and branch discussion
about the nature of public service broadcasting.1253 Gillard‟s solution to the
problem was a service of local broadcasting. As I have argued, this marked
a shift in the cultural landscape of broadcasting in post-war Britain, from
paternalism towards populism, still engaged in nurturing the greater good of
the audience but less „top-down‟ and more empowering.
The argument is often advanced that the BBC initiated local radio to
prevent commercial operators from doing so, but as I have demonstrated
this was too simplistic an analysis of cause and effect. Developments in
technology enabled more targeted and localised broadcasting; there was
the political will to allow greater participation in smaller units of media and a
realisation that there was a tendency for the metropolitan centre in London
to dominate. The BBC could not start local radio solely to stymie
commercial opposition because it did not have the political power to do so
and it relied on the government to come up with a funding solution. Nor was
the local radio conveniently introduced, as Lewis & Booth suggest, to help
detract from the purging of pirate radio.1254

In the course of the thesis, I have argued that the BBC engaged in a
concerted and coordinated operation for local radio, despite the fact it was
not guaranteed to succeed. This is part of the contribution to knowledge: I
have established an understanding of the way the BBC operated as an
institution in the 1960s as it devised and developed a viable structure from
scratch. The experimental, closed-circuit stations, 1961 – 1962, provided
vital material and information about the staff, the equipment and the
programmes. Under Gillard‟s leadership, the BBC was in a position of
readiness, when the political circumstances fell into place, to launch the
service. The BBC could lobby and influence but had no direct control over
various external factors, notably the political desire to eradicate pirate radio,
which enabled the shake-up of BBC radio, and the government‟s rejection

1253
Tracey M The Decline and Fall of Public Service Broadcasting (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 1998) Chapter Four
1254
Lewis P & Booth J The Invisible Medium: Public, Commercial and Community Radio
(London: Macmillan 1989) p 86

311
of the business sector‟s preference to start commercial radio instead. But
the BBC had successfully honed and refined its plans, claiming a
provenance in local broadcasting dating back to the 1920s, which their
would-be competitors lacked and marshalling an impressive, supporting
lobby group.
The BBC‟s next task was to ensure the success of the first eight
experimental stations, between 1967-1969. I have argued that the role of
the personnel and staff was pivotal. Gillard was rightfully regarded as the
„godfather‟ of local radio: it was his passion and grasp of the potential,
which helped keep the momentum going through to the end of the 1960s.
But more than that, the staff members I have interviewed all bear witness to
Gillard‟s emollient style of management and the way he encouraged and
nurtured them and fostered local radio‟s development. The staff on the
original stations personified Gillard‟s pioneering spirit, yet at the same time
there was an ambiguity that was inherent in the whole local radio enterprise
within the BBC. This constitutes my next contribution to knowledge,
explaining the contradictions and tensions that existed within BBC Local
Radio and the BBC in general.

On the one hand, the Corporation believed itself to be big enough to

allow freedom within its many parts. Yet on the other, there were limits to
this autonomy, which meant the Reithian DNA of the BBC was reluctant to
accommodate the shift towards a less-centralised, freethinking structure. If
Gillard represented the nexus between the twin ideologies of paternalism
and populism, then Singer was the technocrat, more confrontational in style
and less inclined towards diversity. Yet this paradox was enshrined in local
radio‟s framework, in the shape of the Station Manager‟s autonomy,
designed to give the stations the notion of independence. I have argued that
this concept benefited the first eight stations and allowed the pioneering
spirit to flourish. The programmes reflected the creative possibilities that
opened up with stations designed to serve different groups and sections of
a local population. This process was helped by innovative production
techniques and new approaches to programme styles. The problem arose
when the first eight stations grew to 20, and beyond. It is fair to argue that

312
 the local radio model was not replicable in every sense. One reason was
managerial. Eight autonomous Station Managers were containable, 20 or
more were not, as witnessed by the collective strength emboldened in the
post-Annan debacle. Singer made sure that central control was gradually
re-asserted. Another reason was a balance between the demands of quality
and quantity in the on-air content. The Station Managers pursued quantity –
filling-in the schedules - at the expense, in many cases, of standards.
Quality suffered because resources were over-stretched. Singer was able to
use this as a means of further restricting autonomy by imposing the cut in
hours. The repeated use of the term „banal‟ by Singer, I would argue, was a
blatant denunciation designed to assert his stamp and authority.
In drawing out the deeper implications of this, we can incorporate
Henders‟ work on cantonisation, ie the practice of asymmetrical
decentralisation, along territorial and/or cultural lines.1255 Her theory that
territorial autonomy arrangements can release tensions in culturally plural
states is applicable to the structure of local radio. Each station was in effect
a canton of the BBC, with its own autonomy. The problem for the BBC was
being comfortable with the resulting plurality, as the multiplication of the
original model began to produce more variations and differences than
initially anticipated. As Henders points out, cantonisation settlements are
not „static constitutional configurations‟:1256 local radio in this context was a
profound iteration for the BBC which connected it more securely than ever
to its roots, in terms of audience, and to its historical origins. Medhurst
provides another comparison with his arguments that the BBC had difficulty
recognising the national and cultural identity of Wales, as a national region,
in its broadcasting provision.1257 His research shows the tensions that
existed between a territorial minority, who were exploring expressions of an
emerging political and cultural nationhood, and the reluctance of the BBC to
cede control. The contrast with local radio lies in the fact that there were no

1255
Henders J „Cantonisation: Historical Paths to Territorial Autonomy for Regional Cultural
Communities‟ in Nation and Nationalism 2004 3: 4
1256
Henders Op cit p 536
1257
Medhurst J „Minorities with a message: the Beveridge Report on Broadcasting (1949-51)
and Wales‟ Twentieth Century British History 2008 19: 2 pp 217-233

313
language differences at stake, and there were no broader issues
concerning national identity.
My conclusion is, therefore, that the first 20 local stations succeeded,
through their output and the work of the staff, in persuading enough people
within and outside the BBC that local radio was a worthwhile endeavour and
merited expansion. In fact my research shows that the ability of the BBC to
negotiate with its political allies and finesse opinion, in the press and the
Establishment, proved crucial in securing local radio‟s survival when it was
under threat.

Despite this, the problem the BBC faced was how to pay for the
completion of the chain, once the ideological battle was won. The licence
fee established the principle of universality, ie if everyone paid for a service
they should be entitled to receive it. But financial constraints, especially at
crucial times throughout the 1970s set a limit on how much revenue the
BBC could expect and therefore on the number of stations they could
launch. One of Frank Gillard‟s main objectives for local radio was to foster
genuine relationships with the various communities and encourage local
voices to participate on air, even to the extent of making their own
programmes. My research has shown that this was a valid aspiration but
one that was difficult to translate into practice, and the clarification of these
definitions of „local‟ and „community‟ is my next contribution. The first eight
stations, unfettered by too many restrictions, achieved a range of
programmes that represented the diversity of the audience. However, the
concept of access programmes, ie those made by the listeners themselves,
was harder to translate into practice. Again, I would conclude that this was
another example of the ambiguities that the BBC struggled with: how to
engage external bodies and groups without exploiting them, but at the same
time without handing over editorial control. My research shows that there
was a paucity of guidance for the stations in how to operate with their local
communities and the result of this was the difficulty in accurately assessing
whether the relationship was producing something worthwhile.
The challenge was amplified by the expansion of local radio: I have
shown that the eventual pattern of local radio development, determined

314
 largely by the available resources, resulted in fewer stations covering larger
geographical areas than originally intended. This was the dilemma local
radio faced: how to stay connected when it was spread over a wider area.
Furthermore, the evidence in the Archive shows there was a
„routinisation‟ of many aspects of the specialist and ethnic minority output,
whereby they risked becoming homogenised and losing their local, defining
characteristics. I argue that the BBC‟s own uncertainty about how to define
its community aspirations was reflected in the way the term itself was
deployed. Trethowan tried to re-label local radio as „community radio‟ in the
early 1970s, but the lack of clarity and clear understanding of the phrase
made it difficult to apply. Ironically, it was the emergence of an external
grassroots community media lobby during the 1970s that helped coalesce
the BBC‟s thinking more accurately. The BBC made attempts to engage
with more practical iterations of granular local broadcasting, such as the
Whitehaven and Barrow experiments and exploring some attributes of the
Pitt Mansfield Report. This was also reflected in the plans for completing the
chain, by using satellite stations attached to main stations and so on. The
BBC made the right choice in keeping „Local Radio‟ as a brand, yet the
tension remained going into the 1980s of wanting to maximise the audience
while staying true to the public service remit, exacerbated by the next wave
of stations being based more on county boundaries. However, I have also
demonstrated that in the 1970s, stations were able to produce a wide range
of programmes that succeeded in reflecting their audiences, and enabled
participation to some degree. The results of audience research and the
loyalty of listeners in times of crisis proved that the „need‟ for local radio had
indeed been turned into a „demand‟. Taking the above points into
consideration, I argue that to judge BBC Local Radio purely on its
community aspirations, as Lewis & Booth would like, is only a selective
approach.1258 The relationship between local radio, the audience and their
communities is a much more complex story. Just as local radio has many
iterations and differences across the country, so too does whatever concept
underlies „community radio.‟ I would argue that BBC Local Radio deserves

1258
Lewis P & Booth J ibid p 95 - 96

315
 to be considered on its own terms and definitions rather than compared to
something it is not. The irony here is that the BBC trumpeted its own
pedigree in local broadcasting, going back to the relay stations of the
1920s. But in many ways, as Scannell argues, these first stations
succeeded more in becoming an integral part of the local community,
working with civic authorities, businesses, cultural groups and so on.
Scannell has a point when he writes „Broadcasting, in its beginnings, was in
many ways more genuinely local than BBC local radio is today.‟1259 Of
course these relay stations operated on much smaller areas, but arguably
the BBC‟s own aspirations, in 1966, contained the seeds of its failure to
provide community radio: „the basic purpose of a local station is ……to give
the fullest possible service to a community of people holding the maximum
number of interests in common.‟1260 That may have been possible with 150
stations, but not with 40.

My next contribution is to assert that there is an aesthetic of BBC Local

Radio. One of the challenges that local radio had to face was its image. As I
have illustrated, local broadcasting was easily lampooned for dealing with
the trivial and mundane. The most frequent adjective that was used to
describe it was „parish pump,‟ yet I have demonstrated that this was not a
wholly negative term. It simply meant that local radio was doing its job,
reporting on local affairs and issues. The problem was more one of
representation to a wider audience: the diversity and breadth of content
rendered it difficult to objectify and the types of examples that were selected
and heard by a wider audience, or picked up the headline writers, tended to
be the quirky and amusing and seemingly trivial. Added to this was the
question of quality: given the amount of output that was produced by the
late 1970s, it is understandable that technically and editorially programmes
were sometimes less than excellent. McLeish wrote in a memorable phrase
„I‟ve always been of the view that you shouldn‟t listen to local radio too

1259
Scannell P „The Origins of BBC Regional Policy‟ in Harvey S and Robins K (ed) The
Regions, the Nations and the BBC (London: bfi Publishing 1993) p 29
1260
BBC Local Radio in the Public Interest: the BBC’s plan (London: BBC Publications 1966)
p6

316
 objectively. It‟s essentially subjective.‟1261 Local radio should not be judged
against a set of centrally determined criteria but instead on the grounds of
what it meant to the listener, hearing the output in their own home or
neighbourhood. Other formulae attempted to capture this, talking about
where the buses run,1262 hearing chemist opening times,1263 and the serial
story of local life.1264 The problem that the BBC encountered centrally was
the difficulty in translating the concept into reality. So local radio, on so
many levels, could claim its own aesthetic, which was different from other
parts of the BBC‟s output. This aesthetic was created out of production
practices, whereby staff performed a range of tasks and skills not found in
the same combination elsewhere. There was a hybrid mix of programmes in
the schedule, incorporating sequence and built output, designed to meet
different needs of a cross-section of the community. And it was packaged in
a unique way: the phrase „Radio Four type content with Radio Two type
presentation‟1265 seemed apt. I would argue that this aesthetic has been
largely overlooked, and supplanted instead by a mythology of local radio.
This mythology relied on the image of local stations as promoted by the
likes of Phil Sidey, which is part-worthy, part self-mythologising and also
further fuelled the national impression of local radio‟s quirks and
idiosyncrasies.
Furthermore, applying Scannell‟s „phenomenology of broadcasting‟1266
we can see that local radio‟s output became an integral part of the listener‟s
daily routine, reinforced by the principal concern of the listener: hearing
programmes that were local or more immediate to their needs. This was an
intrinsic part to the local radio dialogue, or „conversation‟ to use Scannell‟s
term,1267 because of the circularity that existed, at least in theory, allowing

1261
Robert McLeish Diary entry 6 March 1970
1262
Robert McLeish interview with the author 11 August 2010
1263
BBC WAC A Study Paper by Manager, Radio Solent November 25 1975 Local
Broadcasting Part Five R78/611
1264
The Listener Frank Gillard gives his opinion of BBC Local Radio – which he helped to
create by Frank Gillard 11 October 1973
1265
BBC WAC Draft BBC Memorandum: Local Radio Board of Governors Minutes 19
December 1973 R1/42/2
1266
Scannell P Radio, Television & Modern Life (Oxford: Blackwell 1996) pp 169 - 171
1267
Scannell, P „The Brains Trust: A Historical Study of the Management of Liveness on
Radio‟ in Simon Cottle (ed) Media Organization and Production (London: Sage 2003) pp 103
- 107

317
 listeners and the audience to get directly involved in responding to the
output and contributing to it too. The different types of production
techniques, the new kinds of programmes, and the direct approach
encouraging audience involvement all became part of the local radio
aesthetic.
Ironically there was a further dichotomy at the heart of local radio for the
BBC. As I have argued, it was grounded in the principles of public service
broadcasting; in Reith‟s words „the formation of an informed and reasoned
public opinion as an essential part of the political process in a mass
democratic society.‟1268 As Scannell points out, the BBC‟s monopoly was
based on the belief that its mandate came from a shared social, cultural and
political consensus for the moral uplift of the masses.1269 But local radio
challenged this – it was more democratic than top-down in its theoretical
consensus, appealing directly to the audience to participate, to abandon the
paternalism of the past. No wonder the BBC found it hard to put this into
practice.

So do Curran‟s narratives of media theory, which I outlined in Chapter

Two, help interpret local radio? Curran‟s narratives in fact embody the
conceptual tension at the heart of local radio.1270 On the one hand, the BBC
promoted the empowerment of the audience, as an example of the liberal
narrative, while on the other, it was reluctant to cede its editorial monopoly
by allowing complete community access to programmes, which is in the
tradition of the radical narrative. Obviously none of the narratives
conveniently explains the relationship between local radio and the BBC and
the wider broadcasting landscape. This goes to prove, in a sense, how
significant and mould-breaking the service was and is, as it has
transcended so many aspects of the traditional thinking about media theory.
What the local radio story tells us, I would argue, is how the BBC was able
to respond to a different set of critical arguments and new social and
cultural circumstances, which is in keeping with Curran‟s view that the

1268
Lord Reith quoted in Scannell, P „Public Service Broadcasting: The History of a Concept‟
in Edward Buscombe (ed) British Television: A Reader (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) p 48
1269
Scannell (2000) ibid
1270
Curran J Media and Power (London: Routledge 2002) Chapter One

318
 narratives can be revised under the scrutiny of new research findings.1271
One of the nearest equivalents to local radio might be the development of
national regional broadcasting, which Medhurst, using the history of
television in Wales, argues falls into Curran‟s anthropological narrative.1272
Despite the fact that local radio was attempting to define and build identity
and a sense of place, it did not operate as a cultural construct of national
identity when it was being established. Of all the narratives, the liberal one
would appear to offer the best fit, in terms of aiming to reduce the gap
between the broadcasting elite and the general public and promote greater
inclusiveness by the tone and style of the output. Yet the end result fails to
match, completely, with the theory, so there is a flaw with the liberal
narrative interpretation in that it does not allow for audience reaction.
Curran would argue that consumer satisfaction is not the central criterion
because it does not take into account issues of quality and ignores the
broadcasters‟ role in promoting equality in the first place.1273 So instead, I
would argue it is a question of degree rather than absolutes.

To conclude therefore, I would argue that local radio at the end of the
1970s was truthful to the original intentions of the founding fathers even if
the compromises caused by financial, structural and administrative issues
meant the final outcome was less satisfactory. If local radio at the
beginning, in Gillard‟s vision, was designed to respond to a problem posed
by society, the process of completing the chain produced a different set of
challenges. This thesis has put the case that BBC Local Radio has made a
significant contribution to the life of the country and to the BBC itself. In
terms of an organisation, the organic structure that evolved from the
different stations, the networks of staff, partners and stakeholders and
significantly the audience created a lasting impact, which was manifold
throughout the country. The programmes that local radio produced,
covering a wide range of subjects, and reflecting the needs of democracy,

1271
Curran J „Narratives of Media History Revisited‟ in Bailey M ed Narrating Media History
(London: Routledge 2009)
1272
Medhurst J „Television in Wales c 1950-70‟ in Bailey M (ed) Narrating Media History
(London & New York: Routledge 2009)
1273
Curran „Narrative of Media History Revisited‟ ibid p 12

319
 society and culture, geography, minority interest, education, not to mention
day-to-day news and information, were rooted firmly in the public service
broadcasting tradition. Owen Bentley, after a year or two at Radio Stoke-on-
Trent addressed the function of local radio “What motivated me was that I
was helping in the creation of an educated, informed, strong local
democracy. That‟s what I thought BBC Local Radio was there for.”1274
This was a complex area for local radio, fulfilling the aspiration to build,
or unify or somehow change communities, and the one that is most difficult
to quantify. Michael Barton says, “a good station will build and define
community,”1275 because society is mobile and the audience is looking for
some sense of belonging and endorsement. Elements of this can be found
in the work of the original stations but it is a nebulous concept that lacks
concrete evidence and is something that merits further research. As such,
there is evidence to suggest that Lewis & Booth had grounds for asserting
the „selective traditions‟ by which media institutions constructed their own
histories.1276 In this context, the narrative that local radio created
communities can be viewed as part of the mythology that comes from the
memories of those who worked in it. However the net result of BBC Local
Radio, as this thesis demonstrates, was that the social, public service
broadcasting and institutional gains outweighed the deficits.

1274
Owen Bentley interview with the author 19 July 2010
1275
Michael Barton interview with the author 8 June 2011
1276
Lewis & Booth ibid p 4

320
APPENDIX A
Key Dates relevant to the thesis

Spring 1954: Frank Gillard‟s two-month study visit to the United States

1955: Frank Gillard seconded as Chief Assistant to the Director of Sound

Broadcasting. BBC Report: An Extension of Regional Broadcasting

1956: Frank Gillard appointed Controller of the West Region

1957: BBC Paper The Future of Sound Broadcasting in the Domestic Services

Spring 1958: Frank Gillard visits the United States

1959: BBC Working Party chaired by Richard D‟A Marriott; BBC Paper Area and
Local Broadcasting

January 1960: Hugh Carlton-Greene becomes Director-General of the BBC; BBC

Governors agree that the BBC should experiment in local broadcasting

November 1960: BBC Report: The Future of Sound Broadcasting: Local

Broadcasting

1961 – 1962: Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting

April 1961 – May 1962: BBC organizes closed-circuit experiments:

1961: 22 March, Bristol; 10 May, Portsmouth; 20 June, Norwich; 18 July, Hull; 24

August, Dundee; 5 – 11 September, Bournemouth, Poole and Christchurch; 19 –
21 October, Swansea; 21 November, Wrexham; 29 November & 12 December,
Portsmouth (as part of a BBC exhibition)
1962: 15 – 18 January, Durham; 15 – 17 February, London; 20 – 22 March,
Dumfries; 5 – 7 April, Isle of Wight; 11 – 14 April, Vale of Evesham; 30 April, 1 – 2
May, Llyn Ac Afrom.

January 1962: BBC starts a training course for local broadcasting production
techniques in Poole

30 March 1962: Bristol closed-circuit experiment by South Western Broadcasting

Ltd

27 June 1962: Publication of the Pilkington Committee‟s Report on Broadcasting

July 1962: Government White Paper (Cmnd 1770)

December 1962: Government White Paper (Cmnd 1893)

Summer 1963: Frank Gillard becomes Director of Sound Broadcasting

1964: Radio Caroline starts broadcasting from the North Sea. The Local Radio
Association is formed campaigning for local commercial radio.

321
October 1964: Labour Government elected; Tony Benn appointed Postmaster
General

November 1964: BBC Papers The Development of Local Radio; The Control of
Local Broadcasting

1966: BBC Publication Local Radio in the Public Interest

June 1966: Edward Short becomes Postmaster General

December 1966: Government White Paper (Cmnd 3169)

27 January 1967: Joint meeting chaired by BBC and Association of Municipal

Councils for local authorities and public bodies interested in running a local station
held at Broadcasting House, London

February 1967: Donald Edwards appointed General Manager, Local Radio

Development

7 March 1967: Postmaster General announces names of the first three BBC Local
Radio stations: Leicester, Liverpool, Sheffield

23 March 1967: Postmaster General announces names of the next four BBC
Local Radio stations: Brighton, Manchester, Nottingham, Stoke (Manchester
subsequently withdrew)

4 July 1967: Postmaster General announces the last two BBC Local Radio
stations: Durham and Leeds

September 1967: Lord Hill appointed BBC Chairman

8 November 1967: Radio Leicester goes on air

15 November 1967: Radio Sheffield goes on air

22 November 1967: Radio Merseyside goes on air

31 January 1968: Radio Nottingham goes on air

1968: Roy Mason appointed Postmaster General; followed by John Stonehouse

later the same year

February 1968: Hugh Pierce appointed General Manager, Local Radio

Development

14 February 1968: Radio Brighton goes on air

14 March 1968: Radio Stoke-on-Trent goes on air

24 June 1968: Radio Leeds goes on air

3 July 1968: Radio Durham goes on air

July 1968: Frank Gillard re-designated as Managing Director of Radio

322
October 1968: BBC pamphlet published: BBC Local Radio – Some Questions
Answered

1969: BBC pamphlet published: This is Local Radio: The BBC Experiment at Work

April 1969: Charles Curran appointed Director-General

10 July 1969: BBC published Broadcasting in the 70s

1 August 1969: Postmaster General re-designated Minister of Posts and

Telecommunications

14 August 1969: John Stonehouse, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications,

authorises expansion of BBC Local Radio

November 1969: A further 12 BBC Local Radio stations announced: Birmingham,

Blackburn, Bristol, Chatham/Medway, Derby, Hull/Humberside, London,
Manchester, Middlesboro/Teeside, Newcastle, Oxford and Southampton/Solent

1970: Frank Gillard retires from the BBC; Ian Trethowan appointed Managing
Director of Radio

June 1970: Conservative Government elected. Christopher Chataway appointed

Minister of Posts and Telecommunications

5 August 1970: Chataway allows BBC to continue with expansion of local radio to
20 stations but no guarantees for future growth

4 September 1970: Radio Bristol goes on air

10 September 1970: Radio Manchester goes on air

6 October 1970: Radio London goes on air

29 October 1970: Radio Oxford goes on air

7 November 1970: Radio Birmingham goes on air

18 December 1970: Radio Medway goes on air

31 December 1970: Radio Solent goes on air

31 December 1970: Radio Teeside goes on air

2 January 1971: Radio Newcastle goes on air

26 January 1971: Radio Blackburn goes on air

25 February 1971: Radio Humberside goes on air

March 1971: Government White Paper proposing 60 local commercial stations

alongside the BBC‟s 20 stations. MW to be available to both.

29 April 1971: Radio Derby goes on air

323
1972: Radio Durham closed

May 1973: Crawford Committee on Broadcasting set up

October 1973: First commercial stations go on air: Capital and LBC

24 November 1973: Radio Carlisle goes on air

February 1974: Labour Government elected; Roy Jenkins appointed Home

Secretary (assuming powers of broadcasting policy)

21 November 1974: Crawford Report published

Autumn 1974 - Autumn 1976: Annan Enquiry into Broadcasting

January – November 1975: Maurice Ennals (Radio Solent) compiles the Ennals
Report

1975: Michael Barton appointed General Manager Local Radio

10 – 17 September 1975: Barrow-in-Furness experiment in small scale local radio

January 1976: Howard Newby appointed Managing Director of Radio

13 – 20 September 1976: Whitehaven experiment

25 March 1977: Annan Report published, recommending the creation of a Local

Radio Broadcasting Authority to run both BBC and commercial local radio

22 July 1977: Letter from 18 Station Managers to the Director-General criticizing

the BBC‟s response to Annan

September 1977: Michael Barton re-designated Controller of Local Radio

October 1977: Ian Trethowan appointed Director-General

June 1978: Aubrey Singer appointed Managing Director of Radio

July 1978: White Paper published which includes the creation of the Home Office
Local Radio Working Party (Cmnd 7294)

October 1978: First Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report: nine stations
each for BBC and IBA

June 1979: Aubrey Singer announces the cut in Local Radio hours

July 1979: Second Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report: 14 stations for
the IBA, one for BBC

September 1980: Radio Norfolk goes on air

November1980: Radio Lincolnshire goes on air

December 1980: Third Home Office Local Radio Working Party Report: 11 more
stations for the BBC; 25 for the IBA

324
APPENDIX B
The Ennals Report: List of Recommended Stations

Priority List One:

New Station Type

Alnwick Satellite
Aylesbury Small independent
Barrow Satellite
Cambridge Small independent
Canterbury Main
Chelmsford Main
Coventry Satellite
Exeter Small independent
Gloucester Small independent
Guildford Main
Hereford Small independent
Ipswich Small independent
Lincoln Small independent
Luton Small independent
Northampton Main
Norwich Main
Plymouth Small independent
Preston (to replace Radio Blackburn) Main
Shrewsbury Small independent
Swindon Small independent
Truro Small independent
Worcester Small independent
York Small independent

Priority List Two:

New Station Type

Barnstaple Small independent
Basingstoke Small independent
Bradford Satellite
Burnley Satellite
Chester Satellite
Crawley Small independent
Dorchester Small independent
Eastbourne (or Hastings) Satellite
Huddersfield Small independent
Isle of Wight Satellite
King‟s Lynn Satellite
Lancaster Satellite
Peterborough Small independent
Reading Main
Salisbury Small independent
Taunton Satellite
Wigan Satellite

325
 Priority List Three:

Station Type
Blackpool Satellite
Bournemouth Satellite
Doncaster Satellite
Portsmouth Satellite
Sunderland Satellite
Tonbridge / Tunbridge Wells Satellite
Whitehaven Satellite

Reserve List:

Station Type
Milton Keynes Satellite
Colchester Satellite
Southend Satellite
Barnard Castle Satellite
Bedford Satellite
Bolton / Bury Satellite
Oldham / Rochdale Satellite
Chesterfield Satellite
Chichester Small independent
Scarborough Satellite

Taken from BBC WAC A Study Paper by Manager, Radio Solent 25 November 1975
Local Broadcasting Part Five R78/611

326
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BBC WRITTEN ARCHIVE CENTRE, CAVERSHAM, READING

A range of documents from the files has been examined, and referenced, from
these File Categories:

R1: Board of Governors Minutes and Papers

R2: Board of Management Minutes
R3: Weekly Programme Review Board
R9: Audience Research
R15: Further Education
R32: Parliamentary Questions
R34: Policy
R51: Talks
R53: Technical General
R78: Management Registry (incl Board of Management Papers)
R92: Radio Management Registry
R99: Educational Broadcasting Registry
R101: Central Registry Management
R102: Controller Local Radio
R103: Education
P: Press Cuttings

BBC Handbooks: 1954 – 1980

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BBC Broadcasting in the 70s (London: BBC Publications 1969)

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BBC Serving Neighbourhood and Nations (London: BBC Publications 1977)

BBC Local Radio in the Public Interest: the BBC’s plan (London: BBC
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BBC BBC Local Radio: Some Questions Answered (London: BBC Publications
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327
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National Sound Archive, British Library

Local Broadcasting ST 29018

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Local Radio Experiments T 37230

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BBC Local Radio: 30th Anniversary Programme tx various 1997

BBC Radio Four: Archive Hour „Close to Home‟ 10 November 2007

BBC Broadcasts (Television):

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Michael Barton: 17 December 2007, London; 8 June 2011, London

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