G.R. No.

227777 June 15, 2020

OMAR VILLARBA, PETITIONER,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A formal amendment does not change the crime charged or affect the accused's theory or defense.
It adds nothing crucial for a conviction as to deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet the new
information. When an amendment only rectifies something that was already included in the original
information, it is but a formal amendment. A second arraignment, therefore, is no longer necessary.1

Moreover, the information need not reproduce the law verbatim in alleging the acts or omissions that
constitute the offense. If its language is understood, the constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against the accused stands unviolated.2

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Decision4 and Resolution5 of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed Omar Villarba's (Villarba) conviction6 for the violation of
Republic Act No. 8049, otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Act of 1995.

Villarba was among the members7 of the Junior Order of Kalantiao, a fraternity based in the Central
Philippine University in Iloilo City,8 who were all charged in 2003 with violating the Anti-Hazing Act
for their acts against Wilson Dordas III (Dordas).

The accusatory portion of the original Information reads:

That on or about the 15th day of September 2001, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, members and officers of the Junior Order of
Kalantiao, a fraternity, conspiring and confederating with each other, working together and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally subject one Wilson Dordas to
hazing or initiation by placing Wilson Dordas, the recruit, in some embarrassing or humiliating
situation such as forcing him to do physical activity or subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury which resulted to his confinement and operation and prevented him from engaging
in his habitual work for more than ninety (90) days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9 (Emphasis supplied)

All the accused were arraigned under the original Information, and they accordingly pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged.10 Subsequently, the Information was amended11 by adding the suffix
'III' to the name 'Wilson Dordas' to correct his name. Pre-trial and trial ensued without arraignment
on the amended Information.12

During trial, the prosecution presented Dordas as witness. He testified that he learned about the
Junior Order of Kalantiao through Villarba, his classmate and then fraternity chairperson. In August
2001, Villarba recruited Dordas to join the fraternity, assuring him that the membership would help
him in his studies, and that no physical harm would be involved in the application process.13
Dordas agreed. Yet, after attending meetings and taking a written examination,14 Dordas and his
co-applicants were made to perform various tasks in the campus, many of them humiliating and
foolish stunts. They were ordered to act as models, perform yoga and karate, and shout while
running around the flagpole. They were also made to jog around the campus with their feet tied and,
at times, to sing in front of strangers.15

On September 15, 2001, Dordas and his co-applicants were brought to Racrap Beach Resort in
Calaparan, Arevalo, Iloilo City for the final rites. Upon arrival that evening, they were told to eat a mix
of rice, canned goods, and hot peppers. When they failed to finish the meal, Villarba told them to
chew hot peppers as punishment. Dordas ate about five of them.16

Afterward, the applicants passed through a series of stations where they were asked, among others,
to recite the organization's preamble. Whenever they failed to perform the tasks, they suffered
different forms of punishment. Dordas was instructed to jog and crawl around the resort, and cling
and lift himself on scaffoldings. He was made to climb a coconut tree and shout that he was a gecko.
His right hand was used as an ashtray. Hot peppers were squeezed on his lips and left eye. He was
slapped in the face for three to five times.17

After a while, Dordas and his co-applicants were brought inside a big cottage, where the members
blindfolded them. After being asked to turn and walk for a few meters, two members held his hands
while another punched him in his right waist. Startled, Dordas struggled to remove his blindfold and
was able to see some members, including Villarba and another member who then each threw a
punch in his stomach. Dordas was later made to lie face down on a table and recite the preamble
while the members dripped hot wax on his body. Soon after this ordeal, Dordas officially became a
member of the fraternity.18

When Dordas went home the morning after, he complained of an intense pain in his abdomen. His
family then brought him to St. Paul's Hospital, where he underwent surgery due to liver damage.19

For its part, the defense presented several witnesses, among them Villarba. Villarba admitted that he
was a member of the fraternity and that he recruited Dordas. He confirmed that Dordas took a
written test along with psychological and physical examinations, and underwent final rites at the
same beach resort that Dordas identified. However, Villarba testified that their recruits only had to do
sit-ups, push-ups, or jogging,20 insisting that "no physical harm was inflicted on the recruits."21

In its November 14, 2006 Decision,22 the Regional Trial Court found all the accused guilty of the
crime charged. The relevant part of the dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Finding accused OMAR VILLARBA [and co-accused] Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Republic Act No. 8049 and sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum to Twelve (12) Years as
maximum.

....

4. Ordering accused OMAR VILLARBA [and co-accused] to jointly and severally pay private
complainant Wilson Dordas III the sum of Seventy Seven Thousand Three Hundred Five Pesos and
Forty-Four Centavos (P77,305.44) as compensatory damages;
5. Ordering accused OMAR VILLARBA [and co-accused] to jointly and severally pay private
complainant Wilson Dordas III the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as moral
damages for the pain and suffering they inflicted upon said complainant;

....

7. Ordering accused OMAR VILLARBA [and the other accused] to jointly and severally pay private
complainant Wilson Dordas III the sum of One Hundred Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Pesos
(P102,280.00[)] as attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.

SO ORDERED.23

The trial court held that the prosecution provided a clear account of the hazing through the credible
testimony of Dordas, who identified all the accused and pinpointed their specific acts.24 It gave little
faith to the accused, whose defense of denial was not substantiated by evidence, and whose
testimonies were conflicting on significant points.25 It further observed that none of them fully
accounted for the activities prior to the final rites, intentionally evading the topic instead.26

The trial court was convinced that the injuries and humiliation suffered by Dordas were caused by
Villarba and the other accused as part of the initiation rites.27 It held that they violated the Anti-
Hazing Act when they punched Dordas and inflicted abdominal injury on him.28

Villarba appealed along with his co-accused, mainly averring that the Information charged against
him was invalid. He argued that the phrase "as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization"29 was an essential element of hazing, which should have been
alleged in the Information. He also found fault in not being arraigned under the amended
Information, which added 'III' to the victim's name.30

Additionally, Villarba alleged that Dordas's sworn statement before the university for administrative
investigation conflicted with the one he gave before the National Bureau of Investigation.31

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals upheld Villarba's conviction. In its December 21, 2012
Decision,32 it disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
16 (sic) November 2006 rendered by Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo finding the
accused-appellants Omar Villarba and [co-accused] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Republic Act No. 8049 and sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years as
maximum is hereby SUSTAINED and AFFIRMED.

Upon finality, let the entire records of this case be remanded to the court a quo for the execution of
the judgment.

Costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.33 (Emphasis in the original)

To the Court of Appeals, the element of initiation activities as a prerequisite for admission to the
fraternity was not an essential part of the Information. Instead, the essential element was the
"infliction of physical or psychological suffering or injury which resulted from the hazing or initiation
rites of the recruit, neophyte or applicant."34 Since initiation activities are required for membership in
the fraternity, they already formed part of the definition of hazing, the Court of Appeals explained. In
any case, the omission did "not make the accused ignorant of the crime they were being charged
with, and what defenses they needed to prepare for trial."35

As to the amendment in the victim's name, the Court of Appeals held that Villarba did not need to be
rearraigned. It explained that the amendment was merely a formal one, which did not change the
nature of the charge, affect the essence of the offense, or deprive the accused of the opportunity to
meet the averment. It also deemed a re-arraignment unnecessary since Villarba, who recruited
Dordas, would have certainly known the victim's identity.36

The Court of Appeals also brushed aside the supposed conflicts in Dordas's sworn statements.37 It
noted that although Dordas did not tell in his statement before the university that Villarba punched
him, he did so during trial anyway. In any event, the Court of Appeals gave respect to the trial court's
finding that Dordas's testimony was credible.38

Villarba moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals' August 30,
2016 Resolution.39 Subsequently, Villarba filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari40 before this
Court.

Similar to his arguments before the Court of Appeals, petitioner mainly assigns fault to the
Information charged, arguing that his right to due process under Article Ill, Section 14 of the
Constitution was violated.41 He avers that his right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him"42 was violated when he was not rearraigned after the Information had been
amended.43

Petitioner insists that the correction of the victim's name is a substantial amendment because it will
alter his defense. He zeroes in on Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, which states that an
Information must contain the offended party's name.44

Citing the same provision, petitioner also claims that the Information's failure to state that "the acts or
omission complained of were committed as pre-requisites to the victim's membership to the
fraternity"45 was fatal to the case. He reasons that without this element, it is possible to argue that
the acts resulting in physical injuries did not violate the Anti-Hazing Act.46

In its Comment,47 the Office of the Solicitor General counters that adding the suffix 'III' in the victim's
name was not a substantial change, because it did not involve a "recital of facts constituting the
offense charged or the jurisdiction of the court"48 and nor would it change petitioner's defense. It
also echoed the Court of Appeals' ruling that a rearraignment was unnecessary because petitioner is
obviously aware of the victim's identity.49

Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that petitioner was "sufficiently informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him."50 It claims that the Information clearly describes
the acts constituting the crime charged—that the accused were members of the fraternity and that
Dordas was a recruit who was subjected to hazing.51 Thus, it asserts, the phrase "the physical or
mental suffering or injury was inflicted as a prerequisite for admission to a fraternity, sorority or
organization" is not necessary in the Information.52

In his Reply,53 petitioner adds that the testimony of Dordas is insufficient to convict him of the crime.
As such, he argues that the prosecution failed to prove that there was a hazing or an initiation rite
that transpired on September 15, 2001.54
He asserts that Dordas's testimony was bare and self-serving, which must fail against the defense's
straightforward and corroborated narration. He cites the testimony of the resort owner who stated
that she did not notice any unusual activity when the fraternity rented the place.55

Moreover, petitioner insists that Dordas's statements were conflicting.56 He points out that while
Dordas renounced his first affidavit and offered a new one that identified more accused, the
investigating prosecutor observed that the earlier one was more detailed and credible.57 He likewise
attempts to destroy Dordas's narration during trial, finding it unbelievable how Dordas was able to
remove his blindfold while his hands were held by two members. Petitioner maintains that this
contradiction affects Dordas's credibility and casts doubt on the truth of his other statements.58

The issues for this Court's resolution are the following:

First, whether or not the amendment to the Information in this case is substantial;

Second, whether or not the Information is considered void for being insufficient; and

Finally, whether or not the prosecution sufficiently proved the guilt of petitioner Omar Villarba for the
violation of the Anti-Hazing Act.

Due process in criminal prosecutions requires that an accused be "informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him,"59 a right enshrined in our very Constitution. This constitutional
mandate is reinforced in the procedural rules instated to safeguard the rights of the accused.

Arraignment is one of these safeguards. Due process requires that the accusation be in due form
and that the accused be given the opportunity to answer the accusation against them. As their liberty
is at stake, the accused should not be left in the dark about why they are being charged, and must
be apprised of the necessary information as to the charges against them.60

Arraignment is the accused's first opportunity to know the precise charge pressed against them.
During the arraignment, they are "informed of the reason for [their] indictment, the specific charges
[they are] bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against
[them]."61

Hence, arraignment is not a mere formality, but a legal imperative to satisfy the constitutional
requirements of due process. In Kummer v. People:62

Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and
cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed. . . . It is only imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime.63 (Citations
omitted)

Arraignment is equally important in rules on amendments of the information. Rule 110, Section 14 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or
in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not
be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance
at the trial.

Under this rule, any amendment—be it formal or substantial—may be made without leave of court
before the arraignment. Once the arraignment is conducted, however, formal amendments may be
made but only if there is leave of court and if such amendment does not prejudice the rights of the
accused. A substantial amendment, on the other hand, is no longer allowed unless it "is beneficial to
the accused."64

Notably, unlike for a substantial amendment, a second arraignment is not required for a formal
amendment. This is so because a formal amendment does not charge a new offense, alter the
prosecution's theory, or adversely affect the accused's substantial rights. In Kummer, this Court
explained:

The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This
however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments
that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original
complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and
affect the line of defense: and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as
an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.

We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the
rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an
arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent
amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the
amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.65 (Emphasis
supplied)

As held in jurisprudence, the following are merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations only
affecting the range of the imposable penalty; (2) amendments that do not change the offense
originally charged; (3) allegations that will not alter the prosecution's theory as to surprise the
accused and affect their form of defense; (4) amendments that do not prejudice an accused's
substantial rights; and (5) amendments that only address the vagueness in the information but does
not "introduce new and material facts" and those which "merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged."66
On the other hand, substantial amendments refer to the "recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court."67

In Ricarze v. Court of Appeals,68 this Court held that the test of determining whether an amendment
is substantial is the effect of the amendment on the defense and evidence. An amendment is
deemed substantial if the accused's defense and evidence will no longer be applicable after the
amendment is made. Thus:

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance.69 (Citation omitted)

Here, petitioner argues that the inclusion of the suffix 'III' to the name of Dordas in the Information
was a substantial amendment, which should have warranted a second arraignment. This Court
disagrees.

The amendment does not change the crime charged and the theory or defense of petitioner. It
added nothing crucial for a conviction of the crime charged. It did not change the essence of the
offense or cause surprise as to deprive petitioner of the opportunity to meet the new information.
Instead, the amendment only states with precision something that was already included in the
original Information. It is, therefore, merely a formal amendment.

Since the amendment was only of form, and not of substance, an arraignment under the amended
Information is therefore unnecessary.70

II

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused
further requires a sufficient complaint or information. It is deeply rooted in one's constitutional rights
to due process and the presumption of innocence.71

Due process dictates that an accused be fully informed of the reason and basis for their indictment.
This would allow an accused to properly form a theory and to prepare their defense, because they
are "presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have
purportedly committed."72

In Andaya v. People,73 this Court explained that the purpose of a written accusation is to enable the
accused to make their defense, to protect themselves against double jeopardy, and for the court to
determine whether the facts alleged are sufficient in law to support a conviction.74 Hence, a
complaint or information must set forth a "specific allegation of every fact and circumstances
necessary to constitute the crime charged."75

Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides the allegations fundamental to an information,
namely: (1) the accused's name; (2) the statute's designation of the offense; (3) the acts or
omissions complained of that constitute the offense; (4) the offended party's name; (5) the
approximate date of the offense's commission; and (6) the place where the offense was
committed.76
It is critical that all of these elements are alleged in the infom1ation. Full compliance with this rule is
essential to satisfy the constitutional rights of the accused; conversely, any deviation that prejudices
the accused's substantial rights is fatal to the case. In Enrile v. People:77

A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide the
accused with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an
intelligent plea and prepare a defense. Moreover, the Information must provide some means of
ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which he was
charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the prosecution in light of subsequently
discovered evidence. Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes an accused is being tried
for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the same crime or crimes. In other words,
the Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only
on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform
the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.

Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime
charged. If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the
ground that it fails to charge an offense....78 (Citations omitted)

Factual allegations that constitute the offense are substantial matters. Moreover, an accused's right
to question a conviction based on facts not alleged in the Information cannot be waived.79 Thus,
even if the prosecution satisfies the burden of proof, but if the offense is not charged or necessarily
included in the information, conviction cannot ensue:

The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and an accused's
right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No
matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted
of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included
therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the
ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the
allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is
material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.80 (Citations
omitted)

The allegations in the information are vital because they determine "the real nature and cause of the
accusation against an accused[.]"81 They are given more weight than a prosecutor's designation of
the offense in the caption. In Quimvel v. People:82

Indeed, the Court has consistently put more premium on the facts embodied in the Information as
constituting the offense rather than on the designation of the offense in the caption. In fact, an
investigating prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its
formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or
preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, being
conclusions of law. It then behooves this Court to place the text of the Information under
scrutiny.83 (Citation omitted)

Nevertheless, the wording of the information does not need to be a verbatim reproduction of the law
in alleging the acts or omissions that constitute the offense. Rule 110, Section 9 of the Rules of
Court is clear that the information does not need to use the exact language of the statute:
SECTION 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

Hence, to successfully state the acts or omissions that constitute the offense, they must be
"'described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable
certainty, of the offense charged.' Furthermore, '[t]he use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of
basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient."84

Here, petitioner claims that the Information is insufficient for failing to state that the acts or omissions
complained of were committed as a prerequisite to the victim's membership to the fraternity.85 He
reasons that the definition of hazing under the Anti-Hazing Act requires that the "initiation rite or
practice was used as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization."86 Absent this requisite, he asserts that the acts done cannot be penalized under the
law.87

The question, therefore, is whether the phrase in the Information, "did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally subject one Wilson Dordas III to hazing or initiation by placing Wilson
Dordas III, the recruit, in some embarrassing or humiliating situation such as forcing him to do
physical activity or subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury," sufficiently
apprised petitioner of the elements of the offense charged.

This Court affirms the Court of Appeals' ruling.

Petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
was not violated. A plain reading of the Information shows that the allegations stated there
sufficiently apprised petitioner that the crime charged against him was hazing.

The pertinent portion of the assailed Information states:

That on or about the 15th day of September 2001, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused, members and officers of the Junior Order of
Kalantiao, a fraternity, conspiring and confederating with each other, working together and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally subject one Wilson Dordas III to
hazing or initiation by placing Wilson Dordas III, the recruit, in some embarrassing or humiliating
situation such as forcing him to do physical activity or subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury which resulted to his confinement and operation and prevented him from engaging
in his habitual work for more than ninety (90) days.88 (Emphasis supplied)

The lack of the phrase "prerequisite to admission" does not make the Information invalid. Even with
its absence, the alleged facts, which include the controlling words 'fraternity,' 'initiation,' 'hazing,' and
'recruit, ' would have reasonably informed petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

Petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
is upheld as long as the crime, as described, is reasonably adequate to apprise him of the offense
charged. This mandate does not require a verbatim reiteration of the law. The use of derivatives,
synonyms, and allegations of basic facts constituting the crime will suffice.89
Moreover, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner was able to prepare his
defense and evidence based on the Information. There is no showing that petitioner was caught by
surprise during trial or that he was oblivious to the crime charged.90 In People v. Wilson Lab-eo:91

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to

know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. . . . The purpose is to allow
the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. Significantly, the
appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of the
charges against him because of the style or form adopted in the Information.92 (Citations omitted)

The assailed Information here sufficiently enables a layperson to understand the crime charged.
There is no ambiguity in the allegations that prevented petitioner to prepare his defense. As long as
this purpose is attained, the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
is satisfied.

In any case, if the Information was indeed insufficient and did not conform to the substantially
prescribed form, petitioner should have moved to quash it.93 Yet, he did no such thing. This means
that he had already acquiesced to the validity and sufficiency of the Information.

III

Finally, petitioner questions how the lower courts found Dordas's testimony credible, when it is
supposedly bare and self-serving, and therefore unconvincing. Petitioner's argument, however, is
untenable.

It is settled that the factual findings of the trial court, more so when affirmed by the appellate court,
are entitled to great weight and respect. Particularly, the evaluation of witnesses' credibility is "best
left to the trial court because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor
during the trial."94 In People v. Quijada:95

For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or
the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. The appellant has miserably failed to
convince us that we must depart from this rule.96 (Citations omitted)

The trial court's findings on witness credibility are binding upon this Court, unless substantial facts
were shown to have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted. In People v. Daramay, Jr.
:97

Time and time again, this Court has said that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by a trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand; and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under examination. Its
findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted...98 (Citation omitted)

The rule will hold sway in this case as well. Without a showing that the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals have overlooked or misinterpreted the victim's testimony, this Court sees no reason
to overturn their factual findings.
To recall, petitioner contends that the lower courts erred in appreciating the victim's testimony,
claiming that it was self-serving and uncorroborated by any other witness. He further faults the
victim's testimony for being inconsistent and unbelievable.99

Petitioner's assertion lacks basis. As held by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the victim
was able to provide a detailed and categorical narration of his ordeal during the initiation. 100
Dordas identified petitioner as one of the members who punched him in the abdomen. Thus:

ATTY[.] MARANON:

Mr. Dordas, last December 8, 2003, you testified before the Honorable Court that you are blindfolded
and guided to the elevated portion of the big cottage and thereafter, they held your both two hands
[sic] and you were boxed and hit on the right portion of your body. My question now is: After you
were hit, can you please tell us what happened next?

xxx

After you have struggled and said you tried to free yourself from the hold of three persons holding
your hands, can you please tell us what happened next?

WITNESS:

I was able to remove my blindfold.

ATTY. MARANON:

Because you were able to remove ... your blindfold, can you please tell us whether you were able to
identify those persons who were holding your hands?

WITNESS:

When I faced front again somebody suddenly boxed me.

ATTY[.] MARANON:

And were [you] able to identify who was that person who boxed you?

WITNESS:

Yes sir.

ATTY. MARANON:

Who was he?

WITNESS:

Omar Villarba.

ATTY. MARANON:
Were you hit?

WITNESS:

Yes sir.

ATTY. MARANON:

Where?

WITNESS:

Here at my stomach.101

The lower courts deemed Dordas's testimony as direct and straightforward. He identified petitioner
during trial and clearly narrated the acts that petitioner and the other accused had done to him.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the testimony of a single witness may suffice to attain conviction if it is
deemed credible. The prosecution has no obligation to present a certain number of witnesses; after
1âшphi1

all, testimonies are weighed, not numbered.102 It is inconsequential that only the victim testified on
the events that transpired during the hazing. If the trial court found the sole testimony of the victim
credible, conviction may ensue.

This is not unusual in prosecutions of hazing cases, where the reluctance of fraternity members to
speak about the initiation rites persists. In Dungo v. People:103

Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially
the Greek organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any
information regarding initiation rites. The silence is only broken after someone has been injured so
severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the secret is revealed and the
activities become public....104 (Citations omitted)

Against Dordas's candid testimony, petitioner's defense of denial utterly fails. This Court has settled
that "mere denial ... is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters."105 Petitioner's denial is no exception.

Indeed, not one of petitioner's assertions has withstood the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
The lower courts have given full faith to the testimony of Dordas, and this Court finds no reason to
differ. Thus, petitioner's conviction is sustained. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, guilty of the crime
of hazing.

Hazing is a form of deplorable violence that has no place in any civil society, more so in an
association that calls itself a brotherhood. It is unthinkable that admissions to such organizations are
marred by ceremonies of psychological and physical trauma, all shrouded in the name of fraternity.
This practice of violence, regardless of its gravity and context, can never be justified. This culture of
impunity must come to an end.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The December 21, 2012 Decision
and August 30, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR. No. 00557
are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Omar Villarba is found GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Republic Act No. 8049. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 10 years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, as maximum. Petitioner
shall also pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.