CASES FOR RULE 65

SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC., vs. HON.
TEODORO T. RIEL – G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015

Facts:
On October 28, 2004, the petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original
copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City
Register of Deeds in the late 80’s. Initially, respondent Judge gave due course to the
petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution
through the first assailed order of September 12, 2006.

On October 11, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal.

On February 5, 2007, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any cogent
or justifiable ground to reconsider.

Hence, on February 22, 2007, the petitioner came directly to the Court alleging that
respondent Judge had “unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon him as a duly [sic] under Rule 7,
Section 8, of the Revised Rules of Court;” that “in finally dismissing the herein subject
Petition for Reconsideration, respondent Honorable Acting Presiding Judge has acted without
and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of discretion to the further damage and
prejudice of the herein petitioner;” and that it had no other remedy in the course of law
except through the present petition for certiorari and mandamus.

The OSG and the UP argued that by directly coming to the Court by petition for certiorari
and mandamus, the petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedies to substitute for its
lost appeal; that the correct recourse for the petitioner was an appeal considering that the
two assailed orders already finally disposed of the case; that the petitioner intended its
petition for certiorari and mandamus to reverse the final orders; that the petitioner further
failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, despite the Court of Appeals (CA)
having concurrent jurisdiction with the Court over special civil actions under Rule 65;

Issue:
Whether the Non-observance by the petitioner of the hierarchy-of-courts rule is justified.

Held:
No, the filing of the instant special civil action directly to the Supreme Court is in disregard
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are
special, extra-ordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the
observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and
impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. There being no special, important or
compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts,
warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
Almagro vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 204803, 12 Sept 2018

Facts:

The case “Almagro v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.” (G.R. No. 204803) was decided on September
12, [Link] involves a labor dispute between the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines
(ALPAP) and Philippine Airlines (PAL).Petitioners Salvador P. Almagro, Basilio M. Cruz,
Francisco M. Juliano, Arturo L. Novenario, and the heirs of Demosthenes V. Caete sought to
nullify the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Amended Decision dated December 7, [Link] dispute
began in the 1990s when ALPAP filed a notice of strike against PAL on December 9, 1997,
citing unfair labor practices and [Link] the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Secretary assuming jurisdiction over the dispute on December 23,
1997, ALPAP commenced a strike on June 5, [Link] Secretary issued a return-to-work
order on June 7, 1998, but the strike continued until June 26, 1998, when ALPAP members
attempted to return to work and signed PAL’s [Link] refused to accept them, leading
ALPAP to file an illegal lockout [Link] Secretary’s June 1, 1999, resolution declared the
loss of employment status for those who defied the return-to-work order and dismissed the
illegal lockout [Link] resolution was upheld by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. [Link]
petitioners, former senior pilots of PAL, filed complaints for illegal dismissal and monetary
[Link] complaints were initially decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter but later
dismissed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) due to PAL’s
[Link] PAL’s rehabilitation was declared successful, the cases resumed, and the
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints, a decision affirmed by the NLRC and later by the CA
in its Amended Decision.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in finding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petitioners’ illegal dismissal cases.

Ruling

No Grave Abuse of Discretion by the NLRC:

– The Supreme Court upheld the Amended Decision by emphasizing that the NLRC’s findings
were based on substantial evidence such as photographs and affidavits. The petitioners’
actions, such as simultaneous application for leaves around the time of the ongoing labor
dispute, indicated concerted actions aligning with the union’s strike strategy.

Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc. vs. PNB General Insurers Co., Inc.

Facts:Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc. (LGDI) is involved in manufacturing, selling, and exporting
handicraft [Link] leased buildings from J.Y. & Sons Realty Co., Inc. in Taguig City for
production and [Link] insured its properties with PNB General Insurers Co., Inc. (PNB
Gen) and UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. (UCPB) for PHP 582,000,000, later increased to
PHP 717,000,[Link] February 19, 2008, a fire destroyed some insured [Link]'s
claim for the loss was denied by the insurers due to alleged policy violations and insufficient
[Link] filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages in the RTC of
Makati [Link] RTC allowed additional documentary exhibits and a supplemental judicial
affidavit during the [Link] objected and filed motions to expunge these
documents, which the RTC [Link] filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, which
initially upheld the RTC's decision but later reversed it upon [Link] filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the introduction of additional documentary

exhibits during trial and the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit

Ruling:

The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of
additional evidence even after trial had already commenced... the submission of evidence
beyond the mandated period in the JA Rule is strictly subject to the conditions that: a) the
court may allow the late submission of evidence only once; b) the party presenting the
evidence proffers a valid reason for the delay; and c) the opposing party will not be
prejudiced thereby.

following the Guidelines on Pre-Trial,[34] the parties are bound by the contents of the Pre-
Trial Order. Records do not disclose that the respondents endeavored to amend the Pre-Trial
Order to withdraw their assent to their reservation. Consequently, they cannot now dispute
the contents of the Pre-Trial Order. The evidence sought to be presented are likewise
undeniably relevant to the issues raised during the pre-trial, which mainly question
petitioner's entitlement to claim the amount of its insurance policy from the respondents
and if it has proved the amount of its loss by substantial evidence.

Finally, no less than UCPB, in its Motion to Correct/Amend Pre-Trial Order, moved that the Pre-
Trial Order be amended to explicitly include the trial court's ruling that it will allow additional
direct testimony of the parties' witnesses to be given in open court so long as they have
already submitted their Judicial Affidavits within the reglementary period required by the JA
Rule. It appears that the motion was made in connection with UCPB's motion to allow its own
witness to give additional direct testimony in open court. Herein, respondents do not dispute
that petitioner was able to submit the Judicial Affidavit and 1st Supplemental Judicial
Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte within the period prescribed by the JA Rule. Respondents,
therefore, cannot be made to selectively apply the provisions of the rules to the petitioner
and then request to be exempted therefrom.

HEIRS OF ELIZA Q. ZOLETA v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 205128, 2017-

08-09

Facts:

Eliza), through Venancio Q. Zoleta, voluntarily offered for sale to the government, under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, a parcel of land. Landbank made a valuation of
the land and determined that only 125.4704 hectares of the property's 136 hectares were
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Eliza rejected Landbank's
valuation. Thus, the matter was endorsed to the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) However, upon Eliza's manifestation that the amount involved was
beyond the jurisdiction of PARAD, the case was transferred to the Office of RARAD.[

Regional Adjudicator Miñas rendered a Decision. Not satisfied with the amount, Landbank
filed a Petition for Just Compensation before the Regional Trial Court. Eliza filed a Motion for
Execution of Judgment. Regional Adjudicator Miñas granted Eliza's motion for execution and
issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of execution, however,
was returned unsatisfied. Thus, Regional Adjudicator Miñas issued an alias writ of execution.
Landbank sought from the Special Agrarian Court the quashal of the alias writ of execution
and, in the interim, the issuance of a temporary restraining order against its implementation.
Landbank, on April 2, 2001, filed before DARAB a "petition for certiorari pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 3, Rule VIII of the [1994] DARAB New Rules of Procedure. It ascribed
"grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction

DARAB granted Land Bank's petition for [Link][ then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Court of
Appeals held that DARAB's actions were sustained by its general "supervisory authority" and
appellate jurisdiction over rulings of RARADs and PARADs.. Court of Appeals denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues:

whether it was proper for respondent DARAB to issue

Ruling:

ARAB possesses no power to issue writs of certiorari.

It noted that there was no law that vested DARAB with jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency

may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to
which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on
the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original
jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied.

In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have
intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast
powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body,
whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the
absence of an express grant

As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial but not consummate judicial power,

DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing writs of certiorari. This is not merely a matter of
statutorily stipulated competence but a question that hearkens to the separation of
government's tripartite powers: executive, legislative, and judicial.
The requisites for the issuance of a writ of certiorari are settled: (a) the petition must be
directed against a tribunal, Board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b)
the tribunal, Board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The second and third requisites remain consistent with the original, Common Law
conception of certiorari as availing when "the inferior court's judgment was rendered without
authority," such that it "exceed[ed] its jurisdiction," and only when "no other remedy [is]
available."

"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as:By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of [Link] abuse of discretion refers not
merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross
misapprehension of facts.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 should not be confused with a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The first is a mode of appeal; the latter is an extraordinary remedy
used to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is through the latter that a writ of certiorari is issued.
Precisely, for the writ to issue, there must be "no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy" available.[... uasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially executive or administrative in nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative
duty entrusted to it.

Falcis III vs Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910 September 3, 2019

Facts

On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. His Petition
sought to “declare article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a
consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.”

Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing Magallona v. Executive
Secretary, Araullo v. Executive Secretary, and the separate opinion of now-retired Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice Brion) in Araullo. Again citing Associate Justice
Brion’s separate opinion, he claims that this Court should follow a “‘fresh’ approach to this
Court’s judicial power” and find that his Petition pertains to a constitutional case attended
by grave abuse of discretion. He also asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code, with
its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, and that the issues
he raised were of such transcendental importance as to warrant the setting aside of
procedural niceties.

Issues

Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is warranted;

Ruling

No. Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the

doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear
threats to constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. This was clarified in Gios-
Samar. There, this Court emphasized that transcendental importance-originally cited to relax
rules on legal standing and not as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts-applies
only to cases with purely legal issues. We explained that the decisive factor in whether this
Court should permit the invocation of transcendental importance is not merely the presence
of “special and important reasons[,]” but the nature of the question presented by the
parties. This Court declared that there must be no disputed facts, and the issues raised
should only be questions of law:

[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable
to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of
the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount
importance of the case. Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or
the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.

Lila Gail Corpuz-Alfiler v. Spouses Cayabyab, G.R. No. 217111, March 13, 2023

FACTS

In March 2010, respondent-spouses John and Geraldine Cayabyab (respondents), represent

by their attorney-in-fact, Jose Vasallo, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) a
complaint for ejectment against the petitioner (Lilah) and all persons claiming rights under
them (Garduce, et al.) alleging that they are the owners of the property having acquired it
through a Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS) executed by Quintin on August 20, 1997 through his
attorney-in-fact, Norman Santiago (Norman). Respondents further claimed that Garduce, et
al. have in possession of the property, illegally building their houses without paying rent
since 1997. They issued their final demand on May 8, 2009 for Garduce, et al. to vacate the
premises, but to no avail. In their Answer, petitioner Lilah and Meda (sister of petitioner)
denied respondents’ claim of ownership and possession over the property alleging that the
DOAS is null and void because Norman was not authorized by an SPA to sell the property;
and that Garduce, et al. have a better right to possess the property by virtue of the contract
of sale between Linglingay, et al. and Quintin. Furthermore, that MeTC has no jurisdiction
over the case because it was filed one year from the time respondents were dispossessed of
the property, hence, the action must be one for accion publiciana, to be filed with the RTC.
The MeTC ruled in favor of the respondents stating that Garduce, et al. were not able to
prove their right over the property. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the
MeTC. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari by the petitioner on the ground that it was
the wrong mode of judicial review. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the CA deviated from the settled jurisprudence when it dismissed her petition
for certiorari on the ground of being the wrong mode of appeal, notwithstanding the
presence of persuasive and compelling reasons to apply the liberal construction of the rules
in the interest of substantial justice

RULING

The petition has merit.

Evidently, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy before the CA by filing a special civil action
for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the judgment of the RTC.
When the RTC issued its January 9, 2013 Decision and denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in its October 17, 2013 Order, it did so in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. In this case, the remedy of appeal under Sec. 1, Rule 42 was available to
petitioner. Thus, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for review from the
RTC to the CA under Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. a A party desiring to appeal from a decision of
the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, x x x. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the
denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.
x x [Link], instead of resorting to a petition for review under Rule 42, which should have
been filed within 15 days from petitioner's receipt of the order denying her motion
reconsideration, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the CA. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari on November 22, 2013,[43] or
31 days from the notice of the order denying her motion for reconsideration. Consequently,
the period to file an appeal had already lapsed due to her negligence.

Association of Medical Clinic for Overseas Workers Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Center Association, GR 207132, 6 December 2016

FACTS:

DOH issued Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2001 which directed the decking or equal
distribution of migrant workers among the several clinics who are members of GAMCA.
Subsequently, RA No. 10022 lapsed into law without the President's [Link] 16 of
RA No. 10022, the DOH, directed GAMCA to cease and desist from implementing the referral
decking system and to wrap up their operations within three (3) days from receipt
[Link] filed a petition before the RTC for grave abuse of discretion on the part of
DOH and praying to declare Section 16 of RA No. 10022 as unconstitutional. It noted that the
referral decking system is part of the application procedure in obtaining visas to enter the
GCC States, a procedure made in the exercise of the sovereign power of the GCC States to
protect their nationals from health hazards, and of their diplomatic power to regulate and
screen entrants to their territories.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC legally erred in entertaining GAMCA’s petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the DOH’s cease and desist orders.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petitions, reversing and setting aside the RTC’s decisions. It
held that the RTC erred in giving due course to GAMCA’s petitions initially filed as certiorari
and prohibition claims. The Court differentiated between traditional certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court and the expanded certiorari jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution. It
determined that the DOH’s cease and desist orders were quasi-judicial in nature, which
should have been appealed to the Court of Appeals, not initially filed with the RTC.

Suyat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 251978-80, 24 Jan 2023

Facts

Petitioners Anecita C. Suyat, Asano E. Aban, and Marcelino P. Endi were dismissed for grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and serious dishonesty in
a procurement [Link] December 1, 2003, Mayor Apolinario T. Camsol of Buguias, Benguet,
formed the municipality's Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) under R.A. No. 9184, the
Government Procurement Reform [Link] BAC's functions were suspended due to a lack of
necessary forms and annexes, and the old BAC was [Link] February 3, 2004, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued a Special Allotment Release Order for
P728 million, with P1,050,000 allocated to Buguias for the "Farm Inputs and Farm
Implements Program" (FIFIP).A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was executed on June 25,
2004, between the Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit (DA-RFU) and the
Municipality of Buguias for the program's [Link] Aban prepared a
purchase request for insecticides and fungicides, which was approved by Mayor
[Link] Suyat conducted a personal canvass of suppliers, resulting in three bids,
with PMB Agro-Goods & Services having the lowest bid.A disbursement voucher and a
Landbank check were issued to PMB Agro-Goods & Services, completing the [Link]
Commission on Audit (COA) issued an Audit Observation Memorandum and a Notice of
Disallowance, declaring the disbursement [Link] Force Abono of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Field Investigation Office filed a complaint against the petitioners for violations
of R.A. No. 9184 and other [Link] Office of the Ombudsman found the petitioners
guilty and ordered their dismissal from [Link] Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
Ombudsman's decision with [Link] petitioners filed a Joint Petition for Certiorari
before the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether or not Petitioners elevated the case to the Court via the correct mode of review

Ruling

The instant Joint Petition must be dismissed.

Going first to the procedural issues, the OSG is correct to bring up the issue of the propriety
of the mode of review invoked by petitioners relative to the present case. Indeed, petitioners
elevated the case from the CA via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of Rule 45, of which
Section 1 states that judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the CA are appealable to the
Court via a petition for review on certiorari. Section 2 of Rule 45 mandates that the petition
shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of said judgment, order, or resolution
appealed from, or from the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration.
The Court may, for justifiable reasons, extend for thirty (30) days the period within which the
petition may be filed, premised upon a motion for the said extension duly filed and served,
as well as the full payment of docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before
the expiration of the original reglementary period.

Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, 2014

Facts:

For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and
related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the
DAP.

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a
provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

Used constitutional powers under Sec. 25(5) as a guise to use money out of the treasury
without an appropriation made by law... indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by
allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed and
unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his...
constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of
savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the
Government.

Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada... had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program,[1] explaining that the
funds released to the Senators had been part of... the DAP, a program designed by the DBM
to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.

He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of
request for funding

He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased
appropriations under

Personnel Services;[2] (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased

from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been
realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website[3] that the DAP releases had been sourced
from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the
savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like...
unreleased Personnel Services[4] appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year,
unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero-based
budgeting findings;[5] and (2) the withdrawal of... unobligated allotments also for slow-
moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National
Government.

The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP's use of savings,[

Why DAP is legal according to DBM

(1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the
authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations... law; (2) Section
49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of
Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012
and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and
augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.

Issues:

whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of
petitioners.

Ruling

The petitions under Rule 65 are... proper remedies

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the... part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

b) Requisites for the exercise of the power... of judicial review were complied with

(1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court; (2) the question
before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be
a... proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case

Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient
interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442

Facts:

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew
for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their
curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of
"Oplan Rody."

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents:

Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an

association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in
particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness
doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel
without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right
in rearing the youth without substantive due process.

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
[16] and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper,
considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances,
which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the
public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.

Issues:

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The petition is partly granted.

Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies
involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable

They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts
with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status
offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias."[31] In light of the foregoing,
petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-
ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the
[Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition[.]"[32] This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or
regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"[33] as in this case. Hence, petitioners'
direct resort to the Court is justified.

DENREU v. SECRETARY ABAD, GR No. 204152, 2021-01-19

Facts:

On June 1, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino enacted Executive Order (EO) No. 180
which provided for guidelines on the exercise of government employees' right to organize
and created a Public Sector Labor-Management Council (PSLMC) tasked to implement and
administer the provisions thereof.

Pursuant thereto, the PSLMC issued Resolution No. 4, series of 2002 on November 14, 2002,
allowing the grant of the CNA incentive to National Government Agencies (NGAs), State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs), and Local Government Units (LGUs

Pursuant thereto, the PSLMC issued Resolution No. 4, series of 2002 on November 14, 2002,
allowing the grant of the CNA incentive to National Government Agencies (NGAs), State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs), and Local Government Units (LGUs) in recognition of the
joint efforts of labor and management to achieve all planned targets which shall be taken
from savings generated after the signing of the CNA that are no longer intended for specific
purposes.

Issues

WHETHER OR NOT DBM BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 2011-5 DATED DECEMBER 26, 2011 IS
CONSTITUTIONAL, AND THUS, VALID AND BINDING FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011.

Ruling

The Court partially granted the petition.

At the outset, the Court takes notice of the fact that the COA had already issued Notices of
Finality of Decision and the corresponding Orders of Execution as a result of the dismissal of
petitioners' appeal for being filed beyond the six (6)-month reglementary period. As a
general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by
law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. As such, it has been held that the
availability of an appeal is fatal to a special civil action for certiorari, for the same is not a
substitute for a lost appeal.

But while it is doctrinally entrenched that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, the
Court has allowed the resort to a petition for certiorari despite the existence of or prior
availability of an appeal, such as: (1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and
adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without
jurisdiction; (3) for certain special considerations, as public welfare or public policy; (4)
where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case
of acquittal, there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent nullity; and (6) where
the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations.
We find the present case to fall under the exception rather than the general rule. As will be
discussed below, there exists urgent, meritorious considerations which the Court must pass
upon lest there be an unwarranted denial of justice. We have recently ruled in Confederation
for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), et. al. v.
Abad, that the challenged Budget Circular No. 2011-5 affects all government employees with
existing valid CNAs allowing the grant of CNA Incentives. Since there are no facts, moreover,
that would necessitate burdening the Court with the task of exhaustive examination of
evidentiary matters, We shall consider the merits of the present case in the interest of
judicial economy and to prevent further delay in its disposition.

Pangilinan, et al. v. Cayetano, et al. G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021

Facts:

This case revolves around the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute, the treaty
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). In March 2018, President Rodrigo
Duterte's administration formally transmitted a notice of withdrawal from the ICC to the
United Nations, without obtaining Senate concurrence. This action came after the ICC began
preliminary examinations into crimes against humanity related to Duterte’s controversial
war on drugs. Petitioners,including senators and advocacy groups, challenged the legality of
the withdrawal, asserting that the President cannot unilaterally abrogate treaties without the
Senate's concurrence, as treaties ratified by the Senate hold the same status as laws.

Issues:

whether the President's unilateral withdrawal was an abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and thus subject to correction via certiorari. They contended that
under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties and international agreements
require Senate concurrence both for ratification and withdrawal.

Ruling on Certiorari:

The Supreme Court held that while the certiorari petition is an appropriate vehicle to
question the withdrawal due to its constitutional implications, the case was ultimately
dismissed on procedural grounddue to mootness. This is because the Philippines had
effectively withdrawn from the Rome Statute a year after submitting the notice of
withdrawal to the United Nations, and the ICC had already acknowledged the withdrawal.

Despite this, the Court emphasized that executive actions involving foreign relations,
particularly treaty withdrawals, could be reviewed under certiorari if there is evidence of
grave abuse of discretion. The ruling also highlighted the Court's expanded judicial power to
review governmental acts for compliance with the Constitution, which includes certiorari
petitions aimed at correcting actions that go beyond legal bounds.

A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy under Rule 65, used to address acts that
involve a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of [Link] expanded
judicial power under the Constitution (Article VIII, Section 1) allows the Court to review
executive actions, including those related to foreign policy, when these are challenged for
violating constitutional principles or rights.

Syjuco, Jr. vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 215650, 28 Mar 2023

Facts:

In 2014, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) issued Department Order No. 2014-014, which increased the fare
rates for the MRT and LRT systems. Petitioners led by Augusto Syjuco, Jr. filed a petition
challenging the fare hikes, claiming they were implemented without proper public
consultations and that they amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.

The government justified the fare increase as part of a fiscal policy to reduce government
subsidies for the mass transit system, reallocating resources to other infrastructure and
social services projects.

Issue:

Whether the fare increase for the MRT and LRT systems amounted to grave abuse of
discretion and can be challenged through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, ruling that the fare adjustments
were a policy decision within the authority of the DOTC and LRTA. The Court found that the
government had conducted adequate public consultations, satisfying procedural due process
requirements under the law.

The Court further emphasized that the decision to increase fares was based on sound fiscal
policies, which are not subject to judicial review unless there is clear and unequivocal
evidence of grave abuse of discretion. In this case, no such abuse was found. The Court
stated that policy matters like fare adjustments fall under the discretion of the executive
branch and are not within the scope of judicial intervention unless there is clear proof of
excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Certiorari is available to correct acts that involve grave abuse of discretion. However, policy
decisions, such as fare increases, made by the executive branch in line with its authority, do
not generally fall under the scope of judicial review unless there is clear proof that such acts
violate the law or the Constitution.

Manuel Ong vs. Spouses Rowelito and Amelita Villorente, G.R. No. 255264, November 15,
2022

Facts:Manuel Ong filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
the Spouses Rowelito and Amelita [Link] dispute arose from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) that favored the Villorentes concerning a property that was subject
to a mortgage agreement.

Ong contended that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision, particularly
in the interpretation and application of the mortgage [Link] RTC ruled that the
mortgage on the property was valid and enforceable, rejecting Ong's claims of improper
execution and the lack of authority from the [Link]:Whether the Regional Trial
Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling on the validity of the mortgage agreement and in its interpretation of the applicable
laws concerning the rights of the parties involved.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari. It ruled that the RTC indeed
committed grave abuse of discretion in its [Link] Court highlighted that the RTC failed
to adequately consider the evidence presented by Ong regarding the alleged defects in the
mortgage [Link] Supreme Court emphasized that a thorough review of the
documents and circumstances surrounding the mortgage was necessary to ensure a fair
resolution.

As a result, the Court ordered the RTC to reevaluate the case in light of its findings, thus
underscoring the importance of due process and the proper application of the law in
mortgage agreements.

Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan (2014)

Facts

the case revolves around the legality of Executive Order No. 10, which ordered the
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel built in a "no-build zone." The petitioner,
Crisostomo Aquino, sought a petition for certiorari, arguing that the order was issued with
grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

The main legal issue was whether the mayor's issuance of the executive order fell within
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, thus making certiorari the proper remedy.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court clarified that for certiorari under Rule 65 to be valid, the challenged act
must involve a tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The Court
held that although the mayor is an executive officer, his act of issuing EO 10 involved quasi-
judicial functions, as it required finding facts and determining legality. Therefore, the
certiorari petition was deemed appropriate.

The Court further ruled that the hotel was a nuisance per accidens (due to its location, not
its inherent nature), and despite being a nuisance per accidens, the municipality had the
power to demolish it under its police power. However, such actions required proper
procedures, including due process.

Candelaria vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, City of San Fernando

Facts:

The petitioner, Candelaria, filed a case against the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42 of San
Fernando after the latter issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner for a crime
allegedly committed.
The petitioner contended that the warrant was issued without probable cause and that the
proceedings leading to the warrant were marked by irregularities.

Candelaria argued that he was not given due process and that the lower court failed to
consider exculpatory evidence which could have absolved him of the charges.

Issue

The primary issue in this case is whether the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, acted with
jurisdiction and due process in issuing the arrest warrant against Candelaria.

Ruling:

The court ruled in favor of Candelaria, stating that the lower court’s issuance of the arrest
warrant was premature due to lack of probable cause and violation of due process rights.

The ruling emphasized that warrants must be based on a clear demonstration of probable
cause, and the court must thoroughly evaluate all evidence before taking such actions.

As a result, the warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court was declared null and void, and
Candelaria's rights to due process were upheld.

Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, 2015

Facts:

The case arose from administrative complaints filed against several individuals, which
included charges for grave misconduct and serious [Link] Conchita Carpio-
Morales conducted preliminary investigations regarding these [Link] respondents
filed a motion to dismiss based on a lack of sufficient evidence, which the Ombudsman
[Link] respondents then sought relief through the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
Ombudsman’s refusal constituted a denial of their right to a speedy and adequate remedy,
and that their constitutional rights were being violated by the prolonged administrative
process.

Issue:

The primary issue in this case is whether the respondents were denied their right to a
speedy and adequate remedy in light of the ongoing administrative proceedings against
them.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents, establishing that the prolonged delay
in administrative proceedings can constitute a violation of the right to due process and the
right to a speedy remedy.

The Court emphasized that government agencies, including the Ombudsman, are required to
resolve cases expeditiously in order to uphold the constitutional guarantee of due
[Link] delay in the resolution of the complaints was deemed unjustifiable, which
violated the respondents' rights to a speedy disposition of their cases.