Cite as: 596 U. S.
____ (2022) 17
Opinion of the Court
(1956).
D
As a last resort, Patel and the Government insist that the
statute is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption
that Congress did not intend to foreclose judicial review.
We disagree.
Because “ ‘executive determinations generally are subject
to judicial review,’ ” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 6), we presume that review is available when a
statute is silent. See Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.,
509 U. S. 43, 56 (1993). But that presumption “may be over-
come by specific language” in a provision or evidence
“drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.” Block v.
Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349 (1984).
And as we have explained in detail, the text and context of
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)—which is, after all, a jurisdiction-strip-
ping statute—clearly indicate that judicial review of fact de-
terminations is precluded in the discretionary-relief con-
text. The plain meaning of that provision, not any
interpretative presumption, drives our conclusion today.
Because the statute is clear, we have no reason to resort to
the presumption of reviewability.
* * *
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as
part of discretionary-relief proceedings under §1255 and
the other provisions enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 20–979
_________________
PANKAJKUMAR S. PATEL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May 16, 2022]
JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
It is no secret that when processing applications, licenses,
and permits the government sometimes makes mistakes.
Often, they are small ones—a misspelled name, a misplaced
application. But sometimes a bureaucratic mistake can
have life-changing consequences. Our case is such a case.
An immigrant to this country applied for legal residency.
The government rejected his application. Allegedly, the
government did so based on a glaring factual error. In cir-
cumstances like that, our law has long permitted individu-
als to petition a court to consider the question and correct
any mistake.
Not anymore. Today, the Court holds that a federal bu-
reaucracy can make an obvious factual error, one that will
result in an individual’s removal from this country, and
nothing can be done about it. No court may even hear the
case. It is a bold claim promising dire consequences for
countless lawful immigrants. And it is such an unlikely as-
sertion of raw administrative power that not even the
agency that allegedly erred, nor any other arm of the Exec-
utive Branch, endorses it. Today’s majority acts on its own
to shield the government from the embarrassment of hav-
ing to correct even its most obvious errors. Respectfully, I
dissent.
