CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

Outside-In
Operating from Range to Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats
B Y MA R K GUN Z IN G ER
With Chris Dougherty

E -RE A DE R V E RSION

OUTSIDE-IN: OPERATING FROM RANGE TO DEFEAT IRANS ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL THREATS

BY MARK GUNZINGER With Chris Dougherty

2011

Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats

About the Center for Strategic And Budgetary Assessments

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBAs goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security community. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBAs analysis and outreach focus

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on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end.

Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mark Gunzinger is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources. He is the principal author or co-author of multiple Defense Planning Guidance directives, key strategic planning guidance documents that shape DoD force planning. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot with over three thousand flight hours, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. He was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Departments central staff for the 20052006 QDR. Following the 2006 QDR, he was appointed Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on

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the National Security Council staff where he championed defense priorities at the national level and played a major role in shaping the 2007 surge of U.S. forces to Iraq. Mr. Gunzinger holds a Master of Science degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Master of Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy (Class of 1977). He is the recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit Medal.

Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Christopher Dougherty researches, writes and conducts wargames in support of CSBAs strategic studies program. He has contributed extensively to CSBA monographs including: Sustaining Americas Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike; AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept; Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities; The US Navy: Charting a Course for Tomorrows Fleet; and Why AirSea Battle?. He has supported numerous CSBA wargames with a particular focus on developing operational concepts and capabilities for countering anti-access/areadenial threats. Mr. Dougherty graduated Summa Cum Laude with a BA in Security Studies from the Henry M. Jackson

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School of International Studies at the University of Washington and received an MA in Strategic Studies with distinction from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He also served as an airborne infantryman with the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment from 1997 to 2000.

Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank the CSBA staff for their assistance with this report. Special thanks go to Andrew Krepinevich, Jim Thomas, Jan van Tol, and Dakota Wood for their many contributions, Eric Lindsey and Abigail Stewart for their editorial and production support, and Cutting Edge for their design. The analysis and findings presented here are solely the responsibility of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the authors.

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CONTENTS

Executive Summary...............................................xii Introduction .......................................................... 1 Chapter 1. From Rapid Deployment to Permanent Presence ............................................17 Chapter 2. Anti-Access/Area-Denial with Persian Characteristics.................................................... 39 Chapter 3. Elements of an Outside-in Enabling Operational Concept ......................................... 106 Chapter 4. Initiatives to Support an Enabling Operational Concept......................... 166 A Final Note ...................................................... 200 Glossary........................................................... 204

Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats

FIGURES

Figure 1. Strait Of Hormuz ..................................... 7 Figure 2. Evolution Of The U.S. Militarys Posture ... 25 Figure 3. Notional Fighter Coverage Without Persian Gulf Access .......................................... 35 Figure 4. Illustrative Distances ............................. 48 Figure 5. Illustrative Ballistic Missile Flight Times ... 49 Figure 6. Persian Gulf Energy Routes.................... 54 Figure 7. Iranian Air And Missile Systems.............. 69 Figure 8. Dispersing Forward-Based Units............116 Figure 9. Reducing The Threat Ring .................... 124 Figure 10. An Illustrative Joint TheaterEntry Operation....................................149 Figure 11. Reducing The Undersea Strike Magazine Shortfall ...............................172 Figure 12. Creating A Diversified Posture ............ 196

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military has been able to project power overseas with few serious challenges to its freedom of action. This golden era for U.S. power projection may be rapidly drawing to a close. As described in previous analyses by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is developing an anti-access/area-denial (A2/ AD) battle network that could constrain the U.S. militarys ability to maneuver in the air, sea, undersea, space, and cyberspace operating domains. Over the coming years, the spread of advanced military technologies will allow other states to pursue A2/ AD strategies tailored to the unique geographic and geostrategic characteristics of their regions.

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Iran, in particular, has been investing in new capabilities that could be used to deter, delay, or prevent effective U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf. Irans acquisition of weapons which it could use to deny access to the Gulf, control the flow of oil and gas from the region, and conduct acts of aggression or coercion, are of grave concern to the United States and its security partners. As the United States redeploys its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, it has the opportunity to develop a new operational concept for projecting power that could offset Irans growing military might. This will require the Department of Defense to change assumptions it developed some thirty years ago, when the threat of aggression by the Soviet Union drove the U.S. militarys planning for Persian Gulf contingencies. This planning framework presumed that the United States would enjoy unfettered access to closein bases, U.S. battle networks would remain intact and secure, and neither the Soviet Union nor a regional power would pose a serious threat to air or sea lines of communication. Over time, these assumptions led to defense budget decisions that favored short-range

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aircraft, non-stealthy systems, and other capabilities best suited for operations in permissive environments. In light of Irans pursuit of A2/AD capabilities, it seems unlikely that the U.S. militarys legacy planning assumptions will remain valid. Iran has had ample opportunity over the last twenty years to examine the American way of war and to deduce that allowing the United States and its allies to mass overwhelming combat power on its borders is a prescription for defeat. Therefore, Iran is pursuing measures to deny the U.S. military access to close-in basing and make traditional U.S. power-projection operations in the Persian Gulf possible only at a prohibitive cost. A2/AD WITH PERSIAN CHARACTERISTICS The unique characteristics of the Persian Gulf region combined with Irans weakness in a direct military competition with the United States suggest that Iran will pursue an asymmetric hybrid A2/AD strategy that mixes advanced technology with guerilla tactics to deny U.S. forces basing access and maritime freedom of maneuver.

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Wherever possible, Iran will seek to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. military, instead choosing to coerce relatively weaker and possibly less resolute states to deny the United States permission to stage operations from Gulf bases. The populations, governments, and much of the wealth of the region are remarkably concentrated in a handful of urban areas within range of Irans ballistic missiles. Although counter-value strikes against Gulf cities may have little direct military utility, their psychological and political impact on regional governments could be significant, especially if Iran demonstrated the capacity to arm their missiles with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear warheads. Iran could also mobilize its network of predominately Shiite proxy groups located across Southwest Asia to conduct acts of terrorism and foment insurrection in states that remain aligned with the United States. Irans proxies could become far more dangerous should Iran arm them with guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles (G-RAMM). Other groups, like Lebanese Hezbollah, could conduct a terrorism campaign designed to broaden the

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crisis and hold U.S. rear areaseven the U.S. homelandat risk. Given that this indirect approach may not succeed, Iran could use its ballistic missiles and proxy forces to attack U.S. bases and forces in the Persian Gulf directly. Irans hybrid strategy would continue at sea, where its naval forces would engage in swarming hit and run attacks using sophisticated guided munitions in the confined and crowded littorals of the Strait of Hormuz and possibly out into the Gulf of Oman. Iran could coordinate these attacks with salvos of anti-ship cruise missiles and swarms of unmanned aircraft launched either from the Iranian shore or from the islands guarding the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Iran has begun investing in the capabilities necessary to execute this hybrid A2/AD strategy and could continue to improve upon them significantly over the next two decades. In light of this, the U.S. military should develop a new operational concept for future Persian Gulf contingencies, one that assumes that close-in basing may not be available, all operating domains will be contested, and Iran may

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threaten terror and WMD attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons, to deter or prevent a successful U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf. AN OUTSIDE-IN ENABLING OPERATIONAL CONCEPT This paper proposes three lines of operation to prevent the success of an Iranian anti-access and area-denial strategy and regain the U.S. militarys freedom of action:
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Setting conditions to deter or defeat Iranian coercion and aggression, while deploying U.S. forces to support initial operations against Iran from outside the reach of its anti-access threats; Operating from range to reduce the effectiveness of Irans A2/AD complex by degrading its ISR capabilities and decreasing the density of its offensive and defensive systems, including ballistic missiles, maritime exclusion capabilities, and air defense network; and Establishing localized air and maritime superiority when and where needed, including sea control

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through the Strait of Hormuz, to support follow-on force deployments and theater campaign operations. These lines of operation are designed to exploit the U.S. militarys ability to fight from extended ranges to counter Irans emerging A2/AD strategy and maintain access to the Persian [Link], this enabling concept calls for repositioning U.S. air and maritime assets from their present locations near Iran to more distant bases and maritime operating areas out of range of Irans strike assets. From this posture of advantage, the U.S. military could then reduce the density of Irans A2/AD complex and regain the freedom of action necessary to conduct follow-on operations. The U.S. military should also be prepared to conduct other lines of operation as part of a comprehensive theater campaign. These operations could include:
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Deterring Iran from transferring or employing WMD, including nuclear weapons, and, should deterrence fail, preventing their use and diminishing the impact of a nuclear strike; Countering proxy groups equipped with G-RAMM, to include preventing Iran from resupplying terrorist

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groups located throughout Southwest Asia;

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Imposing costs on Tehran by attacking energy infrastructure and other critical targets required to sustain its war effort; and Conducting unconventional warfare that could set the conditions for a regime change from within, should it become necessary.

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CAPABILITY AND FORWARD POSTURE INITIATIVES To implement an enabling operational concept, the Department of Defense (DoD) will need to develop new capabilities and a diversified forward posture that are not currently part of its program of record. Achieving this within an increasingly constrained budget will require defense planners to make difficult decisions; the United States cannot meet the challenges that Iran could pose to its vital interests in the Gulf by simply spending more and adding new capabilities and capacity. In light of current budget realities, DoD may need to rebalance its portfolio by reducing its emphasis on capabilities that are over-optimized for permissive threat environments in order to prioritize

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capabilities needed for a range of operations in environments that will be increasingly non-permissive in nature. Interestingly, capabilities needed to support an AirSea Battle operational concept for the Western Pacific and an Outside-In enabling concept for the Persian Gulf have a remarkable amount of overlap.1 For example, both emphasize the need to develop new long-range systems such as penetrating bombers and carrier-based unmanned aircraft; increase the U.S. Navys undersea magazine of standoff munitions; improve air and missile defenses; and pursue forward posture initiatives that will complicate the operational planning of an enemy force. This report recommends the following initiatives to support an enabling operational concept for the Persian Gulf. SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE CAPABILITIES. The U.S. military should design its new long-range strike family of systems to operate in degraded or denied communications environments, and procure non-kinetic capabilities, including cyber, electronic warfare
1

See Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-ofDeparture Operational Concept (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2010).

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and directed energy systems, to disrupt, disable, or destroy Iranian A2/AD threats. This family of systems should include an Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft that will extend the reach and persistence of the U.S. Navys carrier air wings in high threat operating environments. The U.S. Navy should also integrate payload modules into future Virginia-class attack submarines to partially reverse planned reductions in its capacity to conduct standoff cruise missile attacks, and develop a Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle that could extend its undersea surveillance network. MARITIME CAPABILITIES. To counter Irans maritime exclusion capabilities, DoD should field a shipbased, solid-state laser for defending against swarming boats and salvos of anti-ship cruise missiles, and equip a new Long-Range Strike Bomber to carry anti-ship missiles and mines. To help fulfill future expeditionary requirements, the Department of the Navy should field a new Amphibious Combat Vehicle that is optimized for ground combat missions, and sustain

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sufficient amphibious lift capacity to support a joint theater-entry operation. MISSILE AND G-RAMM DEFENSES. The U.S. military should develop air-launched missiles that can intercept ballistic missiles in their boost phase, as well as invest in promising directed energy technologies that could improve terminal defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles at a negligible cost-per-shot compared to current kinetic interceptors. DoD should also pursue advanced mines and non-lethal capabilities that could create physical barriers to terrorist G-RAMM attacks against U.S. forces and forward operating locations. STRATEGIC LIFT. Prior to the planned closure of the C-17 production line, it may be prudent for DoD to assess its future strategic lift requirements assuming that Iran will be capable of controlling sea lines of communication through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf in the initial stages of conflict. POSTURE REALIGNMENTS. The U.S. military should diversify and harden its Persian Gulf bases to complicate

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Irans ballistic missile targeting, while creating an expanded network of distant shared access locations to support initial U.S. power-projection operations from beyond the reach of Irans anti-access threats. A future close-in Persian Gulf posture should seek to reduce the U.S. militarys overall footprint on the ground while supporting missions such as missile defense, building partner capacity, and counterterrorism that would help regional partners resist aggression by Iran and its proxies. Partner capacity building priorities should include creating counter-A2/AD networks with early warning radars, ballistic missile and air defense capabilities, short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and frigates and corvettes. In summary, the assumptions of the past thirty years may not provide the best planning framework for operations in the Persian Gulf against an adversary whose strategy is designed to counter the American way of war. Irans acquisition of A2/AD weapons and other asymmetric capabilities designed to challenge the U.S. military across all warfighting domains strongly suggests that DoD must develop innovative operational

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concepts for new Persian Gulf contingencies. These operational concepts can also provide the connective tissue between the U.S. militarys strategy, plans, and capability requirements, and help inform decisions on investment priorities in an age of flat or declining defense budgets. AN IMPORTANT CAVEAT Although this assessment uses Irans A2/AD capabilities as a pacing threat to illustrate the impact of asymmetric capabilities against future U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf, there is no intent to imply that conflict between the United States and Iran is inevitable. On the contrary, the intent is to identify initiatives that could help enhance conventional deterrence, improve crisis stability, and avoid conflict. Furthermore, although this assessment postulates one potential conflict scenario, a candidate enabling operational concept for the Persian Gulf should be tested against a representative set of scenarios to determine its robustness under varying circumstances.

Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed an unprecedented ability to project military power with few constraints to its freedom of action in all domainsair, sea, undersea, land, space, and cyberspace. Today, the diffusion of advanced military technologies to potential adversaries, particularly the proliferation of precision-guided munitions and nuclear weapons, combined with the adoption of novel concepts of operation, has enormous implications for Americas future ability to project power abroad. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, a report released by CSBA in 2010, offered a diagnosis of the problem specific to the Western Pacific and proposed a candidate operational concept for projecting military forces to the region despite

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Chinas possession of a robust A2/AD battle network.2 AirSea Battle recommended that a U.S. military operational concept designed to set the conditions at the operational level to sustain a stable, favorable conventional military balance throughout the Western Pacific should account for the regions specific geographic and geostrategic features, including the strengths and weaknesses of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and the capabilities of Americas allies and partners.3 Similarly, this report provides a diagnosis of the shifting military balance in the Persian Gulf, to include the capabilities of Irans military forces, before outlining a point-of-departure operational concept describing how the United States could maintain its ability to project military power into this region of continuing vital interest.

Ibid., henceforth called AirSea Battle for the purposes of this report. Also for the purposes of this paper, anti-access threats are defined as those associated with preventing U.S. forces from deploying to forward bases in a theater of operations, while area-denial threats aim to prevent the U.S. militarys freedom of action in an area of operations. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2010), pp. 811. Thus, operational concepts designed for the characteristics of other regions should not simply be a lesser-included case of a concept tailored specifically for the Western Pacific. AirSea Battle, p. xi.

Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats

BACKGROUND For over seventy years, the Persian Gulf has been a major focus of U.S. military planning. The competition with Germany for access to oil; the threat of a Soviet invasion in the last two decades of the Cold War; the fall of the Shah of Iran and the rise of Khomeinism; and concern over Iraqs hegemonic ambitions during the Saddam Hussein era all drove Americas Persian Gulf policies and military posture. THE U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN THE PERSIAN GULF. The foundation for the Defense Departments current posture in the Gulf can be traced to the following declaration by President Carter in 1980:
An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.4

President Carter made this declaration during his 1980 State of the Union Address. A transcript of the address is accessible online at [Link] 33079#axzz1O4C4bIEu. Three months earlier, President Carter had stated his intent to further enhance the capacity of our rapid deployment forces to protect our own interests and to act in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. A transcript of this speech is accessible online at [Link] edu/ws/[Link]?pid= 33079#axzz1O4C4bIEu.

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To support what became known as the Carter Doctrine, DoD activated a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) Headquarters as a subordinate command to the United States Readiness Command with the mission of preparing for conventional military operations in Southwest Asia. In 1983, the RDJTF became United States Central Command, a separate unified command with an area of responsibility that stretches across the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa.5 Today, Central Command maintains a forward posture that includes a continuous naval presence in the Persian Gulf; forces in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan; Headquarters for the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and Navy 5th Fleet in Bahrain; and a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar.6 This posture is maintained as part of the United States strategy to advance its security interests in the region, which
5

Today, Central Commands area of responsibility includes Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. See the United States Central Commands official website at [Link] The Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/5th Fleet (COMUSNAVCENT/ COMFIFTHFLT) commands over 3,000 personnel ashore, and approximately 25,000 people afloat, most as part of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), and/or an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). See [Link] The CAOC at al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is responsible for orchestrating coalition air operations throughout Central Commands area of responsibility.

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include maintaining access to the Gulfs oil and gas resources and transforming Irans national policies away from its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for terrorism, and threats against its neighbors.7 CONTINUED RELIANCE ON PERSIAN GULF ENERGY RESOURCES. Despite the global search for new sources of hydrocarbon-based energy, the Persian Gulf statesBahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emiratesstill control about 55 percent of the worlds proven oil reserves and produce about 28 percent of the oil consumed annually.8 The United States alone relies on the region for over 14 percent of its annual oil imports.9 In 2009, 77 percent of Japans imported oil and 74 percent of South Koreas oil imports originated in Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.10
7

National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), p. 24, accessible online at [Link] The Department of Energys Energy Information Administration (EIA) classifies Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as Persian Gulf states. See U.S. Imports by Country of Origin, EIA, accessible online at [Link] pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m.htm. See Japan: Country Analysis Brief, EIA, March 2011, p. 5, available online at [Link] EMEU/cabs/Japan/[Link], and South Korea: Country Analysis Brief, EIA, March 2011, p. 2, accessible online at [Link]

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THE WORLDS MOST VULNERABLE MARITIME CHOKEPOINT. In total, over 30 percent of all seaborne traded oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, the worlds most important and vulnerable maritime chokepoint.11 At its narrowest point, the Strait, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea, is only about 34 miles wide.12 Peacetime traffic exiting the Strait, which includes an average of thirteen crude oil tankers each day, is further restricted to using one channel for inbound traffic and a second channel for outbound vessels, each of which is about two miles wide.13 Iran borders the Strait and has claimed sovereignty over several islands, including Abu-Musa, Tunb al Kubra (Greater Tunb), and Tunb al Sughra (Lesser Tunb), which command the Straits western approaches (see Figure 1). IRANS MILITARY COMPLEX. Irans growing military might, which includes a variety of weapons that could
11

According to the EIA: Hormuz is the worlds most important oil chokepoint due to its daily oil flow of 15.5 million barrels in 2009, down from a peak of 17 million bbl/d in 2008. Flows through the Strait in 2009 are 33 percent of all seaborne traded oil (40 percent in 2008), or 17 percent of oil traded worldwide. See World Oil Transit Chokepoints Country Analysis Brief, EIA, February 2011, p. 1, accessible online at [Link] The navigable width for deep draft tankers would be less than 34 miles. For example, the narrowest area of water at least 45 feet deep is only about 23 miles wide. Ibid., p. 2.

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F I G U R E 1 . S T R A I T O F H O R M UZ

be used to deny access to the Persian Gulf, are of grave concern to the United States, its allies, and security partners. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed in late 2007, There can be little doubt that their [Irans] destabilizing foreign policies are a threat to the interests of the United States, to the interests

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of every country in the Middle East, and to the interests of all countries within the range of the ballistic missiles Iran is developing.14 Irans arsenal includes ballistic missiles that can reach targets across the Persian Gulf region. Iranian leaders have repeatedly threatened to use anti-ship cruise missiles, smart mines, fast attack craft, and other advanced weaponry to exert their control over the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf shipping lanes. Moreover, Iran continues to sponsor and arm proxy groups that threaten regional stability.15 Absent a revolutionary change to its internal governance and ambitions, it is highly likely that Iran will continue on its current path toward creating an arsenal of advanced weapons and a network of proxy groups to challenge U.S. interests throughout Southwest Asia. OPPORTUNITY TO SET A NEW COURSE. Clearly, the Persian Gulf security environment has changed substantially since the Carter Doctrine was first
14

Remarks Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Manama Dialogue, Manama, Bahrain, December 9, 2007, accessible online at [Link] Irans sponsorship and use of proxy groups may be the most immediate and serious threat to Iraqi security today. See Frederick W. Kagan, Iraq Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, May 2011), p. 1, accessible online at [Link]

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conceived. The security policies, force posture, and military capabilities that flowed from this doctrine were primarily in response to the threat of conventional military adventurism by the Soviet Union in the Gulf during the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. concerns shifted to Saddam Husseins Iraq and the threat it posed to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Like the Soviet threat, Iraqs has ceased to exist, but new asymmetric challenges, such as those posed by Irans ballistic missiles, proxy forces, and maritime exclusion capabilities, have arisen in their wake. As the United States redeploys its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, it has the opportunity to develop a new operational concept for projecting power to the Persian Gulf region that will offset Irans growing military might and ambitions. This will not be easy. Promulgating a new operational concept for the Persian Gulf, then developing and fielding the capabilities needed to support it will require time and significant resources. A major restructuring of the United States forward posture would likewise require intensive consultations with partners and allies

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and may necessitate a long process of construction of facilities and relocation of forces. Nonetheless, failing to take action to address the changing security environment in the Persian Gulf will likely jeopardize the U.S. militarys ability to sustain assured access to the region. METHODOLOGY This reports assessment begins with the premise that sustaining access to the Persian Gulf, which like access to the South China Sea and other East Asian waters is a vital interest of the United States, presents a unique set of challenges requiring the development of new operational concepts to enable the U.S. military to project military power into the theater. In particular, while AirSea Battle focused on Chinas rapidly increasing military capabilities, the operational concept offered in this paper focuses on how to address Irans growing military threat. The U.S. militarys current operating concepts and forward posture in the Gulf region reflect a passing era when Americas ability to project forces far forward was effectively unchallenged. This paper first

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assesses how Iran may be planning to take advantage of the unique features of the Persian Gulf as well as advanced technologies with military applications to prevent the United States from deploying its forces into the region at acceptable levels of risk. It then proposes elements of an enabling operational concept to maintain the freedom of action needed for the United States to uphold its security commitments and conduct effective operations against an A2/AD battle network with Persian characteristics.16 In so doing it will also create the conditions necessary to conduct other operations that might be part of a comprehensive military campaign for a conflict in the region, such as combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and countering terrorism by proxy. This assessment concludes with thoughts on capabilities and regional posture initiatives that may be needed to implement an enabling operational concept.

16

For the purpose of this assessment, an enabling operational concept consists of integrated, overlapping lines of operation designed to maintain the U.S. militarys freedom of action in a Persian Gulf A2/AD environment.

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WHAT SHOULD AN ENABLING CONCEPT DO? The purpose of the enabling operational concept advanced here is to offer a way to offset Irans development of an A2/AD battle network. It is neither a comprehensive campaign plan for a war, nor does it imply that the United States seeks a conflict with Iran. As was the case with AirSea Battle, the enabling concept proposed in this report is focused primarily on the operational level of war. Thus it is not a war-winning strategy in itself. A coherent enabling operational concept must do the following: STRATEGIC LEVEL. First and foremost, an enabling concept must support the broader U.S. strategy for the Persian Gulf. Although a detailed discussion of strategy is beyond the scope of this report, enduring U.S. strategic objectives will likely include maintaining regional stability; assuring regional partners; protecting sea lines of communication; deterring aggression by regional actors; and countering terrorism and WMD proliferation emanating from this

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region.17 In the event of actual conflict, components of a warfighting strategy could be derived from these broader goals, such as ensuring the free flow of maritime traffic through the Gulf; deterring Iran from using nuclear weapons; defending U.S. and partner forces and supporting infrastructure against attacks; denying Iran access to materials needed to sustain its military effort; and, potentially, conducting unconventional warfare to set the conditions for a change in Irans ruling regime from within. OPERATIONAL LEVEL. To preserve a stable, favorable military balance in the Persian Gulf, an enabling operational concept must address the most critical challenges that Irans emerging A2/AD strategy would present a future U.S. crisis response force. Specifically, it must address how the United States can reduce the growing vulnerability of its forward bases and forces locations from Irans A2/AD threats. The concept must also address how, should deterrence fail, the U.S. military could exploit Irans
17

National Security Strategy, pp. 2427; and Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2010), pp. 61, 67, accessible online at [Link] gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

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weaknesses and offset its strengths to regain the freedom of action needed to enable a comprehensive theater campaign plan. ROADMAP This report uses the following approach in developing a candidate operational concept for enabling effective U.S. forward-presence and crisis response operations in the Persian Gulf in response to ongoing Iranian efforts to shift the regional military balance dramatically in its favor. Chapter One, From Rapid Deployment to Permanent Presence, explains the origins of the U.S. militarys current posture in the Persian Gulf, and how the framework of assumptions developed and used by DoD over the past thirty years has influenced its operational concepts and capabilities for projecting power to the region. Chapter Two, Anti-Access/Area-Denial with Persian Characteristics, summarizes Irans military capabilities, and in particular describes how it is developing an A2/AD strategy with unique national characteristics rather than directly

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emulating Chinas military investments and posture. The chapter then describes how Iran could use these capabilities in a campaign designed to attack U.S. forces already in the region, deny access to forward basing to follow-on U.S. air and ground forces, close off maritime access to the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz, and in so doing buy time to achieve its strategic objectives in the region.18 Chapter Three, Elements of an Outside-In Enabling Operational Concept, proposes a new framework of assumptions to inform the development of operational concepts for future U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf. The elements of a candidate enabling concept are then described. For the purposes of this report, an outside-in enabling operational concept exploits Americas ability to fight from staging locations that are beyond the reach of Irans offensive capabilities to counter its emerging A2/AD complex, and preserve U.S. and partner interests in the Persian Gulf.

18

This illustrative vignette is used to illustrate challenges to potential U.S. power-projection operations in the Persian Gulf region. Obviously the Department of Defense should test an enabling operational concept against a range of plausible scenarios and contingencies.

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Chapter Four, Initiatives to Support an Enabling Operational Concept concludes the assessment by identifying key capabilities and theater-basing initiatives needed to support an enabling operational concept.

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CHAPTER 1 > FROM RAPID DEPLOYMENT TO

PERMANENT PRESENCE

Todays contingency force is not well-suited to many of the problems it is likely to face. From a 1979 DoD study on potential Persian Gulf contingency operations19

Before addressing the challenges that should shape a new enabling concept for projecting military power into the Persian Gulf region, it is important to understand the key assumptions that underlie DoDs current framework for conducting conventional operations in the region. This chapter begins by assessing the origins of the U.S. militarys posture in the Persian Gulf. It reviews the framework for non-nuclear contingency
19

See a declassified DoD report by Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation, Department of Defense, June 15, 1979, p. 2.

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operations developed by DoD planners in the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict, which was premised on the assumption that U.S. forces would be able to deploy rapidly and operate with near impunity from bases in close proximity to a regional aggressor. This assumption drove the development of operational concepts and a forward basing posture that deterred aggression by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and proved successful in two conflicts with Saddam Husseins Iraq. DoDs current Persian Gulf posture and investments in capabilities that are best suited for permissive environments indicate that this framework, despite its Cold War heritage, remains the foundation for potential U.S. power-projection operations in the region. Succeeding chapters will address emerging military challenges that threaten the stability of the Persian Gulf, and propose a new framework of assumptions that could underpin an enabling concept for operating in an environment that will be increasingly non-permissive in nature.

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BREAKING WITH THE PAST In the decade immediately following the Vietnam conflict, there was a growing awareness that DoD had to shift the primary focus of its conventional warfare planning and investments from the requirement for fighting a war centered in Europe toward preparing for a wider range of contingencies in other theaters, including the Persian Gulf.20 A series of crises in Southwest Asiathe 1973 Arab oil embargo, the 1978 Iranian Revolution, the Soviet Unions 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, and the 1980 outbreak of conflict between Iran and Iraqserved to heighten the United States awareness of the regions growing instability and the threat it posed to the global economy. In June 1979, DoD completed an internal assessment of the U.S. militarys ability to deter and respond to crises in the Persian Gulf.21 This assessment and other contemporary analyses sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
20

Fred Charles Ikle, The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on the Strategic Imperatives, Strategic Review, Spring 1982, p. 15, accessible online at [Link] pdf. Ikle was the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy during both Reagan administrations. See Wolfowitz, Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf. This document, declassified on April 23, 2003, summarizes results of an internal DoD analysis completed in 1979 on capabilities and posture initiatives needed to support potential contingency operations in the Persian Gulf. These contingency operations include a Soviet invasion of Iran; lesser contingencies such as a conflict between Iraq and Iran, and attacks against Persian Gulf oil infrastructure and lines of communication.

21

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and the Joint Staff helped establish a strategic rationale for improving DoDs preparedness to project military power rapidly into Southwest Asia.22 Unsurprisingly, recommendations from these assessments reveal that DoDs perspective on the nature of potential contingencies in the Persian Gulf was influenced primarily by Americas Cold War strategic priorities, i.e., protecting and restoring the flow of oil in the event of a Soviet military incursion into the region, minimizing Soviet influence over oil-producing states, and preventing regional conflicts from escalating to superpower confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although other priorities included influencing Arab states to adopt favorable policies toward the West and preventing radical regional powers from coercing or overthrowing more moderate governments, countering a Soviet invasion of Iran was envisaged

22

Dr. Paul K. Davis, the RAND Corporations Strategic Assessment Center Director, observed in 1982 that DoDs progress since the summer of 1979 toward improving preparedness for Persian Gulf contingencies was due to a correlation of forces which included a background of staff studies in DoD developed after years of neglecting contingency capabilities. Combined, these studies were the origin of most of the RDF-related program initiatives in late 1979 and 1980. See Paul K. Davis, Observations on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: Origins, Direction, and Mission, RAND, June 1982 pp. iii, 14, accessible online at [Link] Dr. Davis was a major contributor to the 1979 Persian Gulf analysis led by Dr. Paul Wolfowitz (see footnote 17).

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as the most stressing scenario that might require a large-scale U.S. military response.23 As a first step toward creating a new framework for dealing with crises in the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula region, DoDs assessments strongly recommended abandoning a key assumption that underpinned what was then known as a one-andone-half conventional wars strategy. Since 1969, DoD had deemed it would be adequately prepared for non-nuclear contingency operations if it had the ability to simultaneously support a major war with the Warsaw Pact in Europe and a second minor contingencyor half warin another region.24 As Secretary of Defense Brown reported to Congress in 1980, this strategy assumed that the United States would depend primarily on our allies to man the forward defense lines in peacetime to sustain a credible deterrent posture and, should deterrence fail, create time needed to deploy a decisive military force to a

23 24

Wolfowitz, pp. 610, 1415. Ever since 1969, the United States has defined non-nuclear adequacy as the capability to deal simultaneously with one major and one minor contingency in conjunction with our allies. See Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, January 29, 1980), p. 7.

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theater of operations.25 In light of the loss of Iran as a U.S. security partner in 1979, this was deemed an unreasonable assumption for expeditionary forces preparing to counter a Soviet invasion in the Persian Gulf:
When this study was first planned, several assumptions were made about Iran: it would continue to be an ally of the United States; it would participate in joint defense planning with the United States; it would provide effective host-nation logistic support; and its armed forces would participate effectively if an invasion should occur. The Iranian revolution has drastically altered conditions, and none of these assumptions now appears reasonable.26

Based on their assessments of the emerging threat environment, defense planners recommended creating a more visible and permanent U.S. military presence in Southwest Asia. Major options for this new posture included military equipment and consumables prepositioned to support the rapid deployment of expeditionary forces and a year-round presence of
25

In order to achieve the necessary capability, we have depended primarily on our allies to man the forward defense lines in peacetime. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, January 29, 1980), p. 7. Wolfowitz, p. IV1.

26

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a carrier task group and/or an amphibious readiness group in the region.27 Over the next decade, these recommendations became reality. AMERICAS EVOLVING PERSIAN GULF POSTURE Although the Carter administration acknowledged the need to upgrade the U.S. militarys preparedness to respond to crises in Southwest Asia, it did not significantly alter the balance of forces in the region. Of the 2,802 DoD employees deployed to the Persian Gulf and surrounding states in 1975, approximately 63 percent were stationed in Saudi Arabia and Iran to support a twin pillars strategy that relied on local military forces to maintain regional stability.28 In 1977, President Carter announced his intent to implement a rapid deployment force (RDF) concept to enhance DoDs preparedness to fight a major war in Europe and simultaneously conduct conventional military operations in the Middle East

27 28

Ibid., p. 10. See Defense Manpower Data Center, Deployment of Military Personnel by Country, September 30, 1975, [Link] and Stephan Andrew Kelley, Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, June 2007), p. 13.

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or Korea.29 Despite DoDs subsequent creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters, prior to the start of the Iran-Iraq War, actions to implement the RDF concept did not include significant changes to U.S. forces permanently or rotationally postured in the Middle East. Between 1975 and 1979, Americas presence in the region increased by well less than 1,000 personnel (see Figure 2).30 The United States began to expand its permanent military presence significantly in Southwest Asia following the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. By 1989, DoD had nearly tripled its footprint in the region, with fighter and Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs) aircraft stationed in Saudi Arabia to support air defense missions, and major naval units, including an aircraft carrier, postured to ensure freedom of navigation through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.31

29

Sami Hajjar, US Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), p. 17, accessible online at [Link] mil/pdffiles/[Link]. Including personnel afloat, the Navy provided 79 percent of all U.S. military personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region in 1979. An additional 1,053 Navy personnel were stationed at the Naval Support Facility in Diego Garcia. See Defense Manpower Data Center, accessible online at [Link] [Link]/personnel/ MILITARY/history/[Link]. The AWACs were jointly operated by the U.S. Air Force and Royal Saudi Air Force.

30

31

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F I G U R E 2 . E VO L U T I O N O F T H E U. S. M I L ITA RY S P O S T U R E

The First Gulf War in 1991 and subsequent military operations led to another dramatic increase in DoD personnel continuously deployed to Southwest Asia. Following the success of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. land-based and carrier-based air forces

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continued to operate in the Persian Gulf to enforce no-fly zones north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel in Iraq and conduct maritime interdiction operations (MIO) embargoing selective Iraqi imports.32 In 1998, over 27,000 U.S. service personnel remained afloat in the Persian Gulf and ashore at bases in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.33 By the end of 2010, more than 2,900 U.S. military personnel were supporting missions in the Persian Gulf region, with another 189,000 service members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.34 In 2003, the majority of U.S. military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia moved to bases in Qatar and other regional facilities. Today, the Air Force maintains a CAOC at al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and operates cargo and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft from the bases runway, which at 12,303 feet in length is one of the longest runways in the Persian
32

For more on the Navys presence in the Persian Gulf region, see Peter M. Swartz, Sea Changes: Transforming US Navy Deployment Strategy, 17752002 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, July 31, 2002), p. 54. Defense Manpower Data Center, accessible online at [Link] MILITARY/history/[Link]. Defense Manpower Data Center, [Link] pdf. This does not include 15,000 personnel afloat.

33

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Gulf. The U.S. Navy has co-located the headquarters for its 5th Fleet with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in Manama, Bahrains capital city. On average, the Commander for USNAVCENT/FIFTHFLT commands approximately 15,000 people afloat, 1,500 personnel ashore and up to forty naval vessels configured in Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), and/or Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG).35 DoD has announced a plan to invest $580 million to nearly double the size of this facility by 2015.36 Other U.S. military personnel and aircraft are located at al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates and at facilities in Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.37 A FRAMEWORK FOR PROJECTING POWER Despite the increased focus on Persian Gulf contingencies that began during the Carter administration,
35

For more information on current U.S. active duty military personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf, see Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths By Regional Area And By Country, Department of Defense, March 31, 2011, accessible online at [Link] [Link]. For additional information on 5th Fleet organization and forces, see [Link] [Link]/command/[Link] and [Link] htm#Fleet Organization. Andrew Tilghman, 5-year NSA Bahrain expansion project begins, Navy Times, June 1, 2010, accessible online at [Link] See Defense Manpower Data Center, accessible online at [Link] MILITARY/history/[Link].

36

37

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it is interesting to note that the basic framework for projecting military power outlined by DoDs 1979 Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf study in many ways resembled contemporary doctrine for countering a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. In the first phase of such a conflict, this framework envisaged using forward presence units as an initial fighting force to slow invading enemy forces and create time for U.S. reinforcements to arrive in theater. These in-place units would be augmented by a large contingent of American tactical fighters and bombers that would rapidly deploy to theater bases during the early days of a conflict. As U.S. heavy ground reinforcements arrived in theater by sea and by air, they would close on prepositioned equipment and prepare for offensive operations. Finally, with a decisive force in place, the United States and its partners would initiate a counteroffensive at a time and place of their choosing. This conventional warfare framework, adopted for contingency operations in the Persian Gulf, was underpinned by a number of key assumptions. To protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the

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Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, for example, it was assumed that sufficient close-in forward basing would be available to support air, naval, and logistics operations. It was also believed that aircraft carriers would be able to defend themselves and could conduct effective close-in strike operations in the Persian Gulf, although they would be at some risk due to potential threats from enemy aircraft.38 In the event of a Soviet invasion of a Persian Gulf state, DoD planners determined that the United States would have to rely on its overall advantage in tactical fighters to compensate for early asymmetries in ground forces.39 While not explicitly addressed in Wolfowitzs 1979 assessment, it is also clear that it was assumed that U.S. fighters, operating from Persian Gulf bases, would be capable of quickly achieving the air superiority needed to enable effective joint air, maritime, and ground operations, and would have sufficient rangeaugmented by aerial refueling supportto reach their target areas. The assumption that U.S. close-in bases would enjoy near-sanctuary status from attack evidently extended to U.S. command, control, communications,
38 39

Wolfowitz, p. 9 Ibid., p. 9.

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computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and logistics networks needed to sustain high-tempo combat operations. BACK TO THE FUTURE?
Our analysis showed that we can maintain a capability to fight and win two major regional conflicts and still make prudent reductions in our overall force structureso long as we implement a series of critical force enhancements to improve our strategic mobility and strengthen our early-arriving antiarmor capability, and take other steps to ensure our ability to halt regional aggression quickly. Department of Defense Report on the BottomUp Review, 199340

The 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), DoDs first major post-Cold War strategic review, created a framework for conventional operations that basically repeated concepts outlined by the 1979 Wolfowitz study. In essence, the BUR established priorities to guide DoDs preparation to fight two major regional
40

See Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), p. iii. The entire report, which will be referred to hereafter as the 1993 Bottom-Up Review Report, is accessible online at [Link] Location=U2&doc=[Link].

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conflicts (MRCs) in separate theaters nearly simultaneously.41 The Report on the Bottom-Up Review explained that operations envisioned for MRC scenarios might unfold in four phases. In Phase 1: halt the invasion, U.S. land-based fighters, long-range bombers and carrier strike assets combined with anti-armor ground forces would rapidly deploy to augment forward presence units and help achieve a rapid halt of an invading enemy force. Phase 2: build U.S. combat power in the theater while reducing the enemys, would find the United States employing many of the capabilities from Phase 1 to grind down the enemy while continuing to deploy forces to the area of operations. Once the buildup was completed, Phase 3: decisively defeat the enemy counteroffensive operations would commence. The successful conclusion of Phase 3 would be followed by Phase 4 provide for post-war stability operations to prevent follow-on crises and enforce war termination agreements.42

41

Ibid., p. 14. The BUR focused primarily on two illustrative MRC scenarios: aggression by a remilitarized Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and by North Korea against the Republic of Korea. Ibid., pp. 1517.

42

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With variations, this model described U.S. operations during the First Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 and predicted the basic framework for operations in the Second Gulf War a dozen years later. Both conflicts featured phased operations that deployed major combat units to bases located on the periphery of an enemy state; used land-based and sea-based precision strike to reduce enemy threats before the onset of close-in ground combat; and launched large-scale, combined-arms offensives that prevailed against a technically inferior conventional force. Of course, the two Gulf War campaigns differed in a number of waysthe first evicted Iraqi forces from Kuwait while the second effected a regime change and led to a long-duration stability operation.43 Despite their differences, the basic elements of both campaigns were nicely captured in a 1996 observation made by General Chuck Horner, commander of Coalition air forces during the First Gulf War, that U.S. warfighting strategy hinges on the deployment of short-range fighters and ground forces to foreign bases in the

43

Both contingencies shared another significant characteristic: in neither case did Iraq mount a serious effort to prevent the United States from deploying its forces into the theater.

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theater of conflict that are locatedfigurativelyin the backyard of an opponent.44 Arguably, this template continues to characterize DoDs operational concepts for countering acts of aggression and coercion in the Persian Gulf region. For example, a Strategic Environment Assessment released by the Air Force in March 2011 reported that:
Todays U.S. air operations usually expect: (1) secure permanent or deployed bases in or close to theater, in order to generate sufficient sorties; (2) effective lowobservable (or stealthy) capabilities to penetrate air-defense systems; (3) long force buildups in theater to support maximum sustained operations; (4) secure lines of communication for fuel and other logistics; (5) effective beyond visual range air-to-air missiles; and (6) adequate tanker support.45

Appropriately, the Air Forces assessment questions whether the USAF can depend on any of these key enablers of air power in the future primarily due to growing challenges associated with anti-access
44

General Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret.), What We Should Have Learned in Desert Storm, But Didnt, Air Force Magazine, Vol. 79, No. 12, December 1996, accessible online at [Link] See United States Air Force Strategic Environmental Assessment (Washington, DC: Directorate of Strategic Planning, Headquarters United States Air Force, March 11, 2011), p. 14.

45

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and area-denial (A2/AD) strategies and enabling capabilities. While this is a very relevant question, DoDs future capability priorities indicate that there has been little real movement away from its legacy planning assumptions. For example, of the 95 major acquisition programs included in DoDs most recent Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), which total $1.8 trillion in planned investments, 27 percent of future funding is dedicated to the F/A-18, F-22, and F-35. The F-35 alone accounts for 19 percent of total costs reported in the SARs. Drilling a bit deeper, more than 70 percent of the Air Forces budget for new aircraft over the next decadeincluding a new bomberwill go toward just two programs, the F-35A and a replacement aerial refueling tanker.46 Unquestionably, these investments will lead to a fighter force that, when airborne, is more survivable in non-permissive areas.47 Yet this fighter force will still be highly dependent on close-in bases or aircraft carriers, as well as aerial refueling. Without such base support or the ability to operate carriers in
46

Including all Air Force procurement programs reported in DoDs Aircraft Procurement Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 20122041, Department of Defense, March 2011, pp. 15, 17, 21. Today, about 7 percent of Americas fighter force consists of stealthy 5th generation platforms such as the F-22 and F-35. Current plans call for this share to increase to 33 percent by FY2021 and will reach nearly 100 percent by 2041 as the Military Services retire the last of their legacy fighters. Ibid., pp. 1213.

47

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F I G U R E 3. N OT I O N A L F I G H T E R C OV E R AG E W IT H O U T P E R S I A N G U L F AC C E S S

hazardous waters close to Iran, U.S. fighters may be unable to cover large portions of the battlespace in the Persian Gulf (see Figure 3).48

48

Figure 3 assumes Air Force F-35A Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) fighters with a combat radius of 584 nautical miles (nm) are permitted to stage combat operations from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The F-35As are accompanied by co-located refueling tankers to a point approximately 150 nm from the border of Iran. Figure 3 also assumes the Navys F-35C Aircraft Carrier Variant (CV) with an estimated combat radius of 615 nm complete refueling approximately 300 nm from Irans coastline. Note: the Marine Corps F-35B Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter may have a combat radius of only 469 nm. Combat radius estimates are from DoDs 2010 Selected Acquisition Report for the Joint Strike Fighter, December 31, 2010, p. 10, accessible online at [Link] eprint/[Link].

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A Persian Gulf warfighting environment that is increasingly non-permissive will impose similar operational constraints on other capabilities that DoD intends to procure. Over the last decade, the Defense Department has rapidly expanded its fleet of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for a range of surveillance and light strike missions. The Air Force alone is fielding sufficient MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) to sustain 65 continuous combat air patrols (CAPS) to provide full-motion video and a light strike capability in support of operations that are primarily in Central Commands area of responsibility.49 The Army is procuring the Predatorbased MQ-1C Grey Eagle UAS over the next five years for an estimated $4 billion.50 While the Services shift toward unmanned capabilities was needed to support todays operations, all three unmanned systems are limited to operating in relatively permissive areas. In fact, of the $36.9 billion that the Congressional Budget Office estimates DoD will spend on unmanned aircraft through 2020, the vast majority of funding will
49 50

Typically, four MQ-1s or MQ-9s are needed to sustain one continuous orbit. See Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Congressional Budget Office, June 2011, p. x., accessible online at [Link]

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be dedicated to procuring systems that require relatively benign threat environments.51 LOOKING AHEAD In summary, the conventional wisdom of the past may not provide the best template for future military operations against enemies who do not resemble those the United States has encountered in recent decades. Assumptions and operational concepts for conventional contingencies developed during an era when cross-border ground invasions by heavy armor units represented the greatest threat to peace and stability in the Persian Gulf may not be the best fit for an emerging threat environment replete with guided ballistic and cruise missiles, maritime swarming tactics, proxy forces equipped with G-RAMM, and the threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attacks. Potential adversaries have observed the success of Americas way of war over the last two decades and are developing capabilities to offset the U.S.
51

Ibid., p. vii. There are exceptions. While details for the RQ-170 Sentinel program are classified, the Air Force has acknowledged that the aircraft has low observable characteristics. The Navy is pursuing a new Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike aircraft that may have survivability characteristics suitable for operating in contested airspace.

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militarys strategic and operational advantages. The proliferation of A2/AD weapon systems and other asymmetric capabilities intended to challenge the U.S. militarys freedom of action across all warfighting domains strongly suggests that the U.S. military needs to pace the competition by developing innovative concepts to address new Persian Gulf contingencies. In particular, it should assume that a future aggressor is unlikely to make the same mistake that Saddam Hussein madetwicewhen he allowed a U.S.-led coalition to mass a large, decisive military force on Iraqs borders. In light of these factors, it is clearly time for DoD to reassess the validity of its legacy planning assumptions, operational concepts, and forward military posture for the Persian Gulf.

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CHAPTER 2 > ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL WITH

PERSIAN CHARACTERISTICS

From Desert Storm to the present, the U.S. and its allies have had relatively exclusive access to sophisticated precision-strike technologies. Over the next decade or two, that technology will be increasingly possessed by other nations. The diffusion of precision-strike technology will have a cumulative effect. It will enable anti-access and area denial strategies, thereby creating challenges for our ability to project power to distant parts of the globe. Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, III52

Chapter 1 outlined the recent history of the U.S. militarys posture in the Persian Gulf and how it was shaped by conventional threats from the Soviet
52

Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, III, The Future of War: Keynote Address at the CSIS Global Security Forum 2011, June 08, 2011, accessible online at [Link] [Link]?speechid=1580.

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Union and Iraq. Today, traditional operational concepts and planning assumptions no longer seem particularly relevant. Americas potential enemies have observed the success of its power-projection operations over the last two decades and have learned that attempting to counter the U.S. military symmetrically, or head-on, is a recipe for defeat, particularly if the United States is permitted to deploy overwhelming combat power to a theater of operations. Iran, in particular, is developing an asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf. This strategy may blend irregular tactics and improvised weapons with technologically advanced capabilities to deny or limit the U.S. militarys access to close-in bases and restrict its freedom of maneuver through the Strait of Hormuz. Irans hybrid A2/AD strategy could exploit the geographic and political features of the Persian Gulf region to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. Such an approach may not, in itself, be a war-winning strategy for Iran. Significantly raising the costs or extending the timelines of a U.S. military intervention may,

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however, create a window of opportunity for Iran to conduct acts of aggression or coercion. This chapter assesses Irans emerging military complex as a pacing threat for the Persian Gulf region and how its development of a hybrid A2/AD strategy may invalidate many of DoDs contingency planning assumptions. It begins by briefly highlighting how Irans development of A2/AD capabilities could differ from Chinas. It continues by illustrating key characteristics of the Persian Gulf region that could influence the operations of Iran and the United States in a conflict. Next, it describes Irans current military capabilities as well as plausible systems that it may acquire. Based on these assessments, the chapter then posits how Iran might use a future A2/AD battle network to prevent the United States from effectively intervening in the Persian Gulf. A2/AD WITH PERSIAN CHARACTERISTICS Irans version of an A2/AD weapons complex is perhaps best illustrated by comparing it with the A2/ AD strategy being implemented by the PRC. China is developing sophisticated A2/AD capabilities

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comprising long-range precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and the battle networks to support them for the purpose of preventing the United States from conducting effective power-projection operations in the Western Pacific.53 The PRC is investing heavily in ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, and strike aircraft for the purpose of holding U.S. forward bases in the region at risk. The PRC is also creating a dense, layered, maritime reconnaissancestrike network comprising over-the-horizon sensors, strike aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines armed with ASCMs and advanced torpedoes, and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) capable of hitting moving naval targets at ranges in excess of 1,000 nautical miles. The PRC has blanketed its eastern borders and littorals with a dense integrated air defense system (IADS) comprising advanced surface-to-air missile systems, fourth- and potentially fifth-generation fighter aircraft, and sophisticated, hardened, and dedicated
53

See Andrew Krepinevich, Why Airsea Battle?; Jan van Tol, [Link]., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept; and Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragons Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), accessible online at [Link]

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command and control networks that are designed to resist efforts at penetration, interruption, and exploitation. The PRC is also developing anti-satellite weapons and computer network attack capabilities to degrade the United States ability to sense and communicate over long distancesan essential element of the U.S. militarys battle network. The PRCs long-range A2/AD complex requires significant technical expertise and resources to develop, operate, and maintain. As Barry Watts and Robert Work have noted, advanced PGMs can achieve accuracy independent of range, but range is still heavily dependent on cost.54 Although Iran lacks the means to deploy A2/AD capabilities identical to the PRCs, it might pursue an A2/AD strategy suited to its relatively modest resources and the geographic and geostrategic attributes of the Persian Gulf region. For example, unlike the PRCs long-range maritime reconnaissance and strike complex which must cover huge swaths of the Pacific Ocean, Iran can focus its maritime exclusion
54

See Barry Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects (Washington, DC: CSBA, March 2007), pp. xiv, 14, 15, accessible online at [Link] wp-content/uploads/2011/06/[Link].

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capabilities on the far smaller Persian Gulf and the vital chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, in the event of a conflict with the United States, Iran will likely seek to coerce its neighbors to deny the U.S. military access to close-in operating locations as opposed to relying solely on the effectiveness of direct military attacks against U.S. regional bases. There is, however, one very significant similarity between the A2/AD strategies of China and Iran: both seek to impose costs on a U.S. force by using a layered approach that begins with offensive strikes over long ranges and culminates with defenses that increase in intensity as U.S. forces approach the homeland. In the case of Iran, this strategy accords with Irans concept of a mosaic defense:
In defending the homeland in depth and pursuing popular resistance against occupation, Iran would seek to impose a high cost upon an invader (namely, the United States) Iran envisions a mosaic defense and partisan warfare that presents the invader with multiple threats each step of the way to Tehran.55

55

Frederic Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), p. 53.

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IRANS A2/AD OBJECTIVES Tehran has repeatedly proclaimed that a U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf threatens the natural order of the region.56 Such statements reflect Irans long-term effort to expand its influence in the Middle East by presenting itself as the Shiite antipode to Sunni regimes backed by the United States.57 Thus, the likely goal of Irans A2/AD strategy is to overturn the present political order of the Persian Gulf region, and perhaps the broader Middle East, and establish itself as a regional hegemon. Iran would hope to achieve this by deterring or preventing the United States from intervening effectively in a Persian Gulf crisis, thereby increasing Tehrans ability to coerce other regional states to align with Iran once they perceive that security guarantees from the United States are no longer credible.

56

For example, in 1997 Major General Mohsen Rezai, Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, stated, let me send a clear message to the Americans: the Persian Gulf is our region; they have to leave our region. See Sam Peterson, Iran War Games Begin with New Ultra-Fast Speed Boats, Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 2010, accessible online at [Link] Middle-East/2010/0422/Iran-war-games-begin-with-new-ultra-fast-speed-boats. In 2011, General Hassan Firouzabadi, Chief of Staff of Irans Armed Forces, essentially repeated this sentiment, The Persian Gulf has always, and shall always belong to Iran. See Iranian General Denounces Rival Gulf States, Agence France-Presse, April 30, 2011, accessible online at [Link] php?i=6378172. Ibid.

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Should the United States choose to intervene in spite of Irans A2/AD capabilities, Iran would likely hope to inflict significant losses on U.S. forward-deployed forces at the outset of a conflict while preventing the U.S. military from reinforcing those forces by sea and air. This may help create the time and space needed for Iran to consolidate its gains and force the United States to choose between fighting its way into the Persian Gulf at great cost and with little or no support from regional states, or accepting a new regional balance of power that favors Iran. Tehran may hope that the United States, faced with the prospect of a long and costly campaign to reopen the Gulf, may ultimately balk at defending autocratic Gulf regimes that have never been particularly popular with the American public. The next two sections summarize the attributes of the Persian Gulf region and how Iran could exploit them as part of a cost-imposing, coercive A2/AD strategy. KEY GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS Iran could exploit the following geographical features to constrain or impede U.S. forces from carrying out

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many of the traditional tasks and missions that are essential to operational success. Conversely, the U.S. militarys operational planning must seek to offset Irans ability to capitalize on these features:
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Relative to the Western Pacific, the Persian Gulf region is compact, with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) major population centers and military bases well within range of Irans short- and medium-range strike assets; The narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz act as a chokepoint for maritime traffic; The difficult acoustic conditions in the Persian Gulf and its approaches complicate anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations; and Persian Gulf states have highly concentrated populations located in close proximity to Iran, which could increase their vulnerability to coercive actions.

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DISTANCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF The physical dimensions of the Persian Gulf area of operations are an order of magnitude smaller than the geography of the Western Pacific (see Figure

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F I G U R E 4 . I L L U S T R AT I V E D I S TA N C E S

4). These dimensions help mitigate Irans shortfalls in conventional long-range strike capabilities. Moreover, many U.S. forces deployed to the region are supported by bases that are in close proximity to Iran. In addition to the port facilities in Manama, U.S. Navy ships frequent ports at Jebel Ali near Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.58 USCENTAF operates from a number of locations in the region, including al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, and al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. Al Udeid hosts the USCENTAFs CAOC, a critical command and control node for U.S. air and space operations throughout
58

5th Fleet forces rotate into the theater on a regular basis. The Navy operates two Osprey-class coastal mine-hunters and two Avenger-class oceangoing minesweepers from Bahrain. These will be replaced in the next decade by Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). See David S. Cloud and Paul Richter, U.S. walks tightrope in policy toward Bahrain violence, Los Angeles Times, February 17, 2011, accessible online at [Link]

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F I G U R E 5. I L L U S T R AT I V E B A L L I S T I C M I S S I L E F L I G H T T I M E S

Central Command.59 These and other U.S. forward operating locations are well within the reach of numerous strike systems, including short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, that could be launched from Irans coastal areas (see Figure 5).60 Iran would also have the benefit of being able to exploit its interior lines of operation to deploy and
59

Today, the U.S. military runs most of its regional operations out of the base, including patrols to counter any hostile moves by Iran a hundred miles to the north and flights over Afghanistan six hundred miles to the east. Yet U.S. forces do not have carte blanche over al Udeid: the Qatari military jealously guards its sovereign control over access to the facility even though its own small air force does not use it, instead operating from one side of the capitals main international airport. Simon Henderson, Qatars Quest to Become the Leading Arab State, Policy Watch #1789, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 31, 2011, accessible online at [Link] Many of these facilities are unhardened, making them more vulnerable to missile attacks.

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frequently move its mobile ballistic missiles batteries to complicate U.S. counter-strikes, as well as create a distributed resupply network that would be resistant to attack. POPULATION CONCENTRATIONS The populations of most Persian Gulf states are remarkably concentrated and urbanized. Roughly 96 percent of Qatars population is located in urban areas, while the majority of Bahrains citizens live in Manama and its suburbs. Both the UAE and Kuwait have similar settlement patterns, with their populations concentrated (at 84 and 98 percent, respectively) in small, coastal urban areas. Although Saudi Arabia is geographically much larger than Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE, 82 percent of its population is located in Riyadh, Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina.61 These demographics increase the vulnerability of Persian Gulf states to Iranian coercive, countervalue ballistic missile attacks. Although Irans large
61

All figures are from The CIA World Factbook, accessible online at [Link] publications/the-world-factbook/[Link].

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arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles and rockets currently lack the accuracy of modern PGMs, they could still be used as effective terror weapons against urban areas throughout the Persian Gulf region. The coercive potential of these threats would increase greatly should Iran demonstrate the ability to arm them with weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHY ON NAVAL OPERATIONS Unlike the open maritime approaches to Taiwan in the Western Pacific, the Strait of Hormuz provides a very narrow entrance to the Persian Gulf. The Strait is approximately 98 nautical miles (nm) long and is only 30 nm wide at its narrowest point, forming a natural chokepoint that reduces the freedom of maneuver of large U.S. warships. The difficult acoustic conditions in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf present significant challenges for U.S. ASW against Iranian submarines and mini-submarines. ASW would be just as difficult for Iranian submarines, but

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their primary mission is likely to lay mines or sink surface vessels rather than anti-submarine warfare.62 While the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz present the U.S Navy with a difficult set of challenges, the Iranian Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) may be able to exploit their features. First, Tehrans navies would benefit from very short lines of communication, making resupply, rearming, and repair and maintenance less difficult compared to U.S. naval units, which may need to withdraw for significant distances to carry out some of those functions.63 The proximity of the Strait of Hormuz to major Iranian port facilities, such as Bandar Abbas, would permit Irans large inventory of small boats, fast attack craft (FAC), and mine laying vessels to rapidly engage or disengage from maritime exclusion operations. Moreover, the geography of the Strait creates opportunities for Iran to use smart mines, small boat swarming at62

These observations are based on discussions with numerous U.S. Navy officers with operational ASW experience. The U.S. Navy is highly proficient at conducting underway replenishment (UNREP)with the notable exception of rearming VLS cellswhich has given it tremendous operational flexibility. However, ships are highly vulnerable to attack during UNREP operations. Were Iran to acquire extended-range antiship weapons, U.S. UNREP operations will have to adapt accordingly, moving further away from the area of operations.

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tacks, short-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and shore-based ASCMs to deny military and civilian vessels safe passage. Finally, Irans familiarity with the maritime areas and traffic assets such as those preferred by the IRGCN, to hide among civilian vessels and exploit them as non-traditional ISR sources. KEY GEOSTRATEGIC FACTORS The following geostrategic factors could influence Irans A2/AD strategy and military investments:
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Dependency on energy resources that flow through the Strait of Hormuz would affect all actors in a Gulf conflict, including both oil-importing and oilexporting states; and The presence of disadvantaged, primarily Shia, populations in the Middle East creates opportunities for Iran to conduct warfare by proxy.

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F I G U R E 6. P E R S I A N G U L F E N E R GY R O U T E S

PERSIAN GULF ENERGY RESOURCES The global economy depends on Persian Gulf oil and gas resources, and shipping those resources through the Strait of Hormuz is the most efficient way to get them to global markets. Collectively, Persian Gulf states possess over half of the worlds proven reserves of crude oil and slightly over one-third of

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proven reserves of natural gas.64 The Gulf region is the origin for about 35 percent of the worlds exports of crude oil and roughly 88 percent of that total leaves the Gulf on tankers through the Strait of Hormuz.65 Every day, approximately thirteen crude oil tankers transit the Strait carrying around fifteen and a half million barrels of oil, or 33 percent of all seaborne traded oil and 17 percent of all oil traded worldwide.66 If the Strait of Hormuz were to close, active overland pipelines in the region could only carry around one-third of the Straits daily throughput (see Figure 6).67 Planned pipelines, such as the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline across the UAE, or deactivated pipelines like the Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA), could increase this to around 40 percent. The South Pars/North Field gas field, which lies under the Persian Gulf between Qatar and Iran, adds another degree of complexity to the regions
64

All data from is from EIA, International Energy Statistics, accessible online at [Link] cfapps/ipdbproject/[Link]. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Straits, Passages and Chokepoints: A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution, Cahiers de Geographie du Quebec, 48, No. 135, 2004, p. 367. EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, EIA, 2011), p. 1, accessible online at [Link] Ibid.

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energy and security dynamics. The shared natural gas field and the critical role that natural gas plays in Qatars economy give the Qatari government a vested interest in maintaining cordial relations with Iran. Qatar has long had closer relations with Iran than other members of the GCC, and has favored negotiations and engagement with Iran to resolve regional issues.68 Qatars desire to achieve a balance between its security relations with the United States and its commercial relations with Iran may influence its willingness to allow U.S. forces to operate from Qatari bases. As Qatars Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani observed:
We are a small country and we can live with anything around us. We will not be an enemy to anybody, but of course we will not allow anybody to use us against others. We will not, for example, stand with America against IranIran never bothered us, it never created a problem for us... It will be hard

68

Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2010, pp. 78, accessible online at [Link] Justin Dargin, Qatars Gas Revolution, Harvard Belfer Center LNG Review, 2010, pp. 124125, [Link] edu/files/Qatars_Gas_Revolution.pdf; and Janine Zacharia, Qatar Steers Between U.S., Iran, Using Gas to Boost Influence, Bloomberg, March 3, 2008, accessible online at [Link] ws?pid=newsarchive&sid=aPFYilDYIFC0&refer=home.

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for the Gulf countries to be with Iran against the United States. And I believe Iran knows this.69

ENERGY DEPENDENCIES CUT BOTH WAYS. As much as the world continues to depend on imported Persian Gulf oil and gas, Gulf economies are far more dependent on their energy exports. For example, oil production accounts for around 40 percent of Saudi Arabias gross domestic product (GDP) and is the source for 80 to 90 percent of its government revenues. Similarly, Irans oil sector is the source of 10 to 20 percent of its total GDP, 40 to 70 percent of its government revenues, and approximately 80 percent of its export revenues.70 Iran has an additional dependency in that it must rely on imported refined petroleum products, especially gasoline, because its refining capacity has lagged behind domestic consumption. This has led to chronic gasoline shortages that the Iranian government has

69

Qatari Emir Views Foreign Investments, Change in Economic Powers, Mideast Peace, OSC Report EUP20090329499001, March 29, 2009, cited in Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2010, p. 8, accessible online at [Link] crs/mideast/[Link]. United Nations Industrial Development Organization, An Overview of the Economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, accessible online at [Link]

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attempted to mitigate through rationing and other measures.71 These twin dependencies suggest that if energy SLOCs through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz were closed for an extended period of time, Irans economy and its ability to sustain a high tempo of military operations may suffer significantly. IRANS PROXIES Irans ability to tap Shiite populations to develop a wideranging network of client and proxy groups throughout the Middle East is another factor that likely influences Irans A2/AD strategy. In 2009, an erstwhile Iranian diplomat claimed that Iran had developed sleeper cells in Shiite populations across the Middle East.72 Although such statements may be an information operation designed to deter attacks against Iran, it is clear that Irans intelligence agencies, including the IRGCs unconventional warfare wing the Quds Force, have funded and trained terrorist groups that threaten regional peace and stability.
71

EIA, Iran Country Analysis Brief, January 2010, accessible online at [Link] [Link]?fips=IR. Colin Freeman, Iran Poised to Strike in Wealthy Gulf States, The Telegraph, March 4, 2007, accessible online at [Link]

72

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While Lebanese Hezbollah may be the best-known Iranian proxy, Iran has supported similar terrorist groups in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.73 The Government of Bahrain has accused both Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah of involvement in the Shiite protests and uprisings against the Sunni al-Khalifa monarchy in the spring of 2011.74 The Iranian-supported Saudi Hezbollah has been accused of perpetrating the terrorist attack against the Khobar Towers U.S. military housing facility in 1996, which killed 19 and injured 373 U.S. service members.75 Iranian-backed insurgent groups have also been implicated in attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. These groups are increasingly using Iranian-provided explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), which are capable of piercing the

73

For more on the relationship between Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, see Mohamad Bazzi, Hezbollah & Iran: Lebanons Power Couple, Council on Foreign Relations, Oct 14, 2010, accessible online at http:// [Link]/iran/hezbollah-iran-lebanons-power-couple/p23163; and Anthony Cordesman, Irans Support of the Hezbollah in Iran, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 15, 2006, accessible online at [Link] For more on Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollahs support of Bahraini Shiite groups, see Jay Solomon, Bahrain Sees Hezbollah Plot in Protest, Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2011, accessible online at [Link] [Link], and Michael Slackman, The Proxy Battle in Bahrain, New York Times, March 19, 2011, accessible online at [Link] weekinreview/[Link]?pagewanted=all. For more on Irans proxies in Saudi Arabia, see The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia, International Crisis Group, September 19, 2005, pp. 47, accessible online at [Link] Saudi%20Arabia/The%20Shiite%20Question%20in%20Saudi%[Link]. See Solomon, Bahrain Sees Hezbollah Plot in Protest; and Slackman, The Proxy Battle in Bahrain. See Anthony Cordesman, Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on Al Khobar, CSIS, June 2001, p. 2223, accessible online at [Link]

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armor of Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles. According to the Department of Defense:

Fifteen Americans died in Iraq in June [2011], most killed by Iraqi extremists who received weapons and training from Iran The weapons killing these troops are improvised rocket-assisted mortars and explosively formed penetrators that are designed specifically to pierce armor. Both types of weapons have been traced directly to Irans Quds Force.76

Irans proxies outside the Persian Gulf extend beyond Hezbollah. For example, according to many sources Iran provides assistance to the Shiite Houthi rebels of Northern Yemen.77 Although most of its overseas proxies are from the Shia sect of Islam, Iran also has been known to cooperate with non-Shiite groups, including Hamas in the Gaza Strip.78
76

See Jim Garamone, Panetta Vows to Protect U.S. Troops, American Forces Press Service, July 11, 2011, accessible online at [Link] Also see Frederick W. Kagan, Iraq Threat Assessment, American Enterprise Institute, May 2011, pp. 45, accessible online at [Link] Scott Peterson, Does Iran play role in Yemen conflict?, Christian Science Monitor, November 11, 2009, accessible online at [Link] and Sudarsan Raghavan, Yemens fight with rebels a regional concern, Washington Post, November 14, 2009, accessible online at [Link] [Link]. Iranian support for Hezbollahs bombing of the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association (AMIA) in 1994, which killed 85 people and wounded another 300, demonstrates its willingness to use proxies to strike targets far from the Middle East. See Matthew Levitt, Iranian Doublespeak on the Anniversary of the AMIA Bombing, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 20, 2011, accessible online at [Link] Marie Colvin, Hamas wages Irans proxy war on Israel, The Times, March 9, 2008, accessible online at [Link]

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CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPACT OF THE PERSIAN GULFS ATTRIBUTES In summary, the Persian Gulfs geographical and geostrategic characteristics are likely to shape Irans A2/AD strategy and present U.S. forces with a unique set of challenges.
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The constricted waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf limit freedom of maneuver for U.S. vessels and place them within range of Irans short-range maritime exclusion capabilities, such as ASCMs, FACs, mines, and mini-submarines. The Gulfs difficult acoustic conditions may also degrade U.S. ASW operations. The range asymmetry in the Gulfs maritime domain carries over into air operations. U.S. forward bases in the Persian Gulf are well within range of many of Irans ballistic missiles, while potential target areas inside Iran are outside the unrefueled range of U.S. fighter aircraft launched from those bases. The concentration of population and government infrastructure in most Persian Gulf states may make them more susceptible to coercion. Iran

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might threaten to launch salvos of ballistic missiles against major regional cities with the implied threat of potential WMD attacks. Iran could also unleash its proxy forces to commit acts of terror and attack vital infrastructure such as oil, natural gas, and desalination facilities.
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Some Persian Gulf governments may not require a great deal of coercion to deny access to U.S. forces out of fear of alienating a large part of their citizenry.

IRANS A2/AD CAPABILITIES Irans A2/AD capabilities can be grouped into four broad categories: ballistic missiles, some of which could be armed with WMD warheads; unconventional warfare and terrorism by proxy, possibly made more lethal by G-RAMM weapons; maritime exclusion systems such as mines, ASCMs, and fast attack craft; and air defenses. This section will describe each of these in brief. Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Our enemys strategy is based on air and sea operations Their strategy will be aerial operations, be it

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by long-range missiles or fighter planes. In the face of their air raids or missile attack, we have adopted the strategy of utilizing long-range or surface-tosurface missiles. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander 79

Since the Iran-Iraq War, ballistic missiles have been Irans primary conventional means of striking targets at long ranges.80 Although Iran possesses a nominally large air force, it suffers from obsolete systems and a lack of spare parts, munitions, skilled technicians, and pilots.81 Instead of relying on strike aircraft, Iran has invested heavily in acquiring a sizeable arsenal of ballistic missiles and a research and industrial base to support their production.82 This section summarizes Irans ballistic missile systems in order of range from shortest to longest, and concludes with a brief assessment of how Iran may mature its ballistic
79

An anonymous IRGC commander, as quoted in Anthony Cordesman and Martin Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2007), p. 134. Ibid., p. 134; Steven Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), p. 309; and Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 13. Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 41; Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, p. 317. Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, p. 13.

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missile arsenal over time, including the possibility that it may arm them with WMD warheads.83 Irans Ballistic Missiles
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TONDAR-69. Tondar (Thunder)-69 is the Iranian name for CSS-8/M-7 short-range ballistic missiles that Iran purchased from the PRC in the 1990s. The CSS-8 is essentially an SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile (SAM) system modified for use as a surface-to-surface missile. It has a range of around 81 nm with a standard 200 kilogram warhead and has two-stage propulsion consisting of a solid rocket booster and a liquid-fuel main stage. Estimates suggest that Iran may have acquired around 200 of these missiles.84 FATEH-110A. The Fateh (Victorious)-110A is probably an evolution of the Zelzal-2 rocket that Iran may have supplied to Hezbollah.85 By adding a guidance system and stabilizing fins to the
All data from Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment; Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, April 2009, accessible online at [Link] org/programs/ssp/nukes/[Link]; and Steven A. Hildreth, Irans Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview, Congressional Research Service, February 4, 2009, accessible online at [Link] org/sgp/crs/nuke/[Link]. Hildreth, Irans Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview, p. 4. Hezbollahs Rocket Force, BBC News, July 18, 2006, accessible online at [Link] 2/hi/middle_east/[Link].

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otherwise-unguided Zelzal and reducing the size of its warhead, Iran has created a short-range ballistic missile that it can produce domestically. The Fateh-110A uses solid fuel rocket motors and has an approximate range of 108 nm while carrying a 500 kilogram warhead. Estimates of the Fateh110As accuracy vary widely. Some sources claim it could have a potential circular error probable (CEP) of around 100 meters should Iran outfit it with a combination of inertial guidance and Global Positioning System (GPS) data. Other sources, however, claim that one cannot classify the Fateh110A as a guided missile, implying that it is instead more akin to an unguided artillery rocket.86 Should Iran improve the accuracy of the Fateh110A, the agility conferred by its smaller size and solid-fuel motors could make it an effective and relatively survivable short-range strike system.87
86

See Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Miranda Priebe, A Crude Threat: The Limits of an Iranian Missile Campaign Against Saudi Arabian Oil, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011 p. 181; and Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, p. 53. DoD defines CEP as an indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a missiles projectiles are expected to fall. See Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010, p. 53, accessible online at [Link] Solid-fueled missiles may be launched more quickly than liquid-fueled missiles because they do not need to be loaded with fuel prior to launch or accompanied by fueling trucks. This allows systems such as the Fateh-110A to conduct shoot-and-scoot missions with less risk of interdiction by U.S. aircraft and, consequently, less risk to scarce TELs. See Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, p. 64.

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>

SHAHAB-1. The Shahab (Meteor)-1 is the Iranian version of a North Korean copy of the liquid-fueled Soviet Scud-B short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). Carrying a 1,000 kilogram warhead, the Shahab-1 has a range of 162 nm and has a CEP of around 1,000 meters. SHAHAB-2. The Shahab-2 is an Iranian version of a North Korean copy of the liquid-fueled Soviet Scud-C SRBM. The range of the Shahab-2 has been stretched by reducing the weight of the warhead to around 700750 kilograms and by increasing the amount of fuel it carries, as well as the length of time that the missiles fuel burns after launch. The Shahab-2 has a range of around 270 nm, but it is even less accurate than the Shahab-1, with an approximate CEP of 1,500 meters. SHAHAB-3. The Shahab-3 is Irans version of North Koreas No-Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which is itself a heavily modified variant of the Scud. The liquid-fueled Shahab-3 has a range of 540 to 700 nm depending on the size of its warhead. Longer ranges necessitate a warhead of 750 kilograms or smaller while a warhead

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of around 1,000 kilograms would leave the missile with a shorter range.88 The upper boundary of the Shahab-3s range is significant since the absolute minimum distance from Iran to Israel is roughly 520 nm and the distance to Jeddah is 715 nm. Striking targets in Israel using the Shahab-3 would be difficult unless Iran was willing to launch the missile from its border with Iraq. The accuracy of the No-Dong on which the Shahab-3 is based is quite poor, with an estimated CEP of around 2,500 meters. It is possible that Iran could improve on this; Pakistan operates a No-Dong variant called the Ghauri, which may have a guidance system upgraded with assistance from the PRC.89
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GHADR-1. The Ghadr (Powerful)-1 is also frequently referred to as the Shahab-3M. Like the Shahab-3, it is based on North Koreas No-Dong missile. Iran has increased the range of the Ghadr-1 to 850 nm or greater by stretching the Shahab-3s fuselage, using aluminum to decrease the weight of the airframe, and by fitting the missile with a smaller baby bottle
Ibid., pp. 1921. Ibid., p. 20.

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warhead. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the Ghadr-1 is that Iran purportedly developed these modifications indigenously.90 This indicates that Iran possesses the wherewithal to upgrade its existing missiles and even develop new missile technologies, instead of relying solely on foreign suppliers such as North Korea.
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SAJJIL-2. The Sajjil (Baked Clay)-2 is a solid-fueled MRBM with a range of approximately 1,0801,190 nm while carrying a 750 kilogram warhead. The Sajjil-2 appears to be largely an Iranian designed and built missile, including the complex solid fuel motors, although Iran probably received foreign technical assistance from the PRC and possibly North Korea.91 Images of the Sajjil show some design similarities with the Ghadr, including the size and shape of the warhead and the diameter of the missile body, which may allow for the two missiles to use the same transporter erector launchers (TELs).92 As is the case with the Ghadr, the CEP of the Sajjil is unknown and is dependent on Irans
Ibid., p. 26. Ibid., pp. 5464. Ibid., p. 56.

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F I G U R E 7. I R A N I A N A I R A N D M I S S I L E SYS T E M S

access to advanced foreign guidance systems.93 Given the degree of technical cooperation between Iran and China, Iran may be able to improve the Sajjils accuracy over the next two decades. TAKING STOCK OF IRANS BALLISTIC MISSILES. Irans investments in missile technologies have paid dividends in the form of a large arsenal of SRBMs, a growing number of increasingly sophisticated
93

Ibid., pp. 5860, 63, 97.

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MRBMs, and the ability to produce missiles such as the Fateh-110, Ghadr-1 and Sajjil-2 indigenously (see Figure 7). These investments also allowed Iran to place a satellite into orbit in 2009.94 In spite of this progress, Irans ballistic missiles have capability shortcomings that could reduce their operational effectiveness. According to most open sources, Iranian ballistic missiles are inaccurate. With CEPs measured in kilometers for most of its missiles, Iran would likely be unable to conduct direct precision strikes against U.S. or partner bases in the region. A recent assessment has found that Irans inaccurate missiles likewise may pose little threat to the oil infrastructure in the Gulf. According to this assessment, an attack against a major facility, such as the Abqaiq stabilization plant, would require over 1,300 Shahab missiles to have a 75 percent chance of destroying just one of Abqaiqs eighteen stabilization towers.95 In the near-term, the inaccuracy of Irans ballistic missiles may relegate them to being used as coercive terror weapons against population
94 95

Ibid., p. 26. A Safir missile designed and built by Iran was used for the launch. Stabilization plants remove hydrogen sulfide from petroleum, turning it from sour to sweet crude and thereby enabling it to be shipped safely. Abqaiq stabilizes approximately two-thirds of all Saudi Arabian oil. See Shifrinson and Priebe, pp. 174, 184186.

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centers, much as Iran and Iraq did during the War of the Cities.96 Moreover, while Iran is believed to have anywhere from 200 to around 600 Shahab-1/2 missiles, it may possess only around 100 launchers for its entire SRBM arsenal (Tondar-69, Fateh110A, Shahab-1, and Shahab-2).97 The high ratio of SRBMs to launchers could limit Irans ability to conduct effective salvo attacks on multiple targets simultaneously.98 In the near-term, Iran could seek to overcome these shortcomings by arming ballistic missiles with conventional submunitions.99 Replacing a unitary high-explosive warhead with multiple small submunitions that can be released across wide areas increases the probability that a less-accurate missile can achieve effects on a target.100 Submunitions are not without their drawbacks, however. Most are generally effective in open terrain against personnel and
96 97

Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, pp. 316317. Andrew Feickert, Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities, Congressional Research Service, August 23, 2004, p. 1, accessible online at [Link] Although this data is from 2004, given Irans investments in the Fateh-110A and Shahab-3 programs, it is unlikely that they have substantially increased their arsenal of the aging and obsolescent Shahab-1 and 2. Also see Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, p. 13. Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent, pp. 6162. Although analysts disagree on the scope, scale and pace of Irans nuclear weapons, this analysis assumes that Iran has the ability to develop a nuclear weapons capability within the next two decades. Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent, p. 61.

98 99

100

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soft-skinned vehicles such as trucks and aircraft, but are ineffective against hardened or buried targets.101 Irans Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Capabilities Chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) warheads are another means that Iran might choose to compensate for the inaccuracy of its ballistic missiles. Although it is a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, Iran is believed to have the ability to develop and weaponize biological and chemical agents. Furthermore, Irans nuclear programs could produce sufficient materials to build radiological weapons.102 Although precision targeting is not required to achieve significant effects with a WMD warhead, the current inaccuracy of Irans ballistic missiles coupled with their payload and salvo constraints would limit Irans ability to disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents on multiple targets.103 A military force that is capable of assuming a protective posture
101 102 103

Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, p. 125. Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent, p. 62. Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, pp. 126, 128.

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and continuing operationsalbeit at a slower tempo would mitigate the effectiveness of CBR attacks. Against large, unprotected civilian targets, however, ballistic missiles tipped with CBR warheads could be extremely effective terror weapons. The threat alone of such attacks may be enough to coerce some GCC states into denying access to U.S. forces.104 Nuclear Warheads Although often lumped together with CBR weapons, nuclear weapons are much more destructive and deserve to be considered separately. Most Iranian missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, potentially at the expense of somewhat shorter ranges should the warhead design have greater mass than a conventional munition.105 The question remains, however, whether Iran would actually use nuclear weapons in a war with the United States. Iranian military strategists seem to understand the limited utility of nuclear weapons, since press statements, writings in military journals, and other glimpses into Iranian
104 105

Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, p. 314. Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, pp. 130132; Feickert, Irans Ballistic Missile Capabilities, pp. 25.

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thinking on this issue appear to support the conclusion that Tehran regards nuclear weapons as powerful psychological assets but poor warfighting tools.106 Should Iran acquire operational nuclear weapons, it is likely that they would be an addition to, not a replacement for, other capabilities that Iran would use in a coercive campaign.107 Toward the Future To sum up, Irans ballistic missiles give it a strike capability that would be difficult and expensive for U.S. forces to counter, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. Despite their potential as terror weapons, Irans missiles lack precision and sufficient TELs to support multiple simultaneous salvo attacks against military targets. Over the course of the next twenty years, it is possible that Iran will make progress toward addressing these shortfalls. Irans development of the
106 107

Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent, pp. 7475. For additional information on Irans potential to develop nuclear weapons and the potential implications of that decision, see Lynn E. Davis, Jeffrey Martini, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Quinlivan, and Paul Steinberg, Irans Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011); Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2005); Daniel R. Coats, Charles Robb, and Charles F. Wald, Meeting the Challenge: When Time Runs Out (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010); Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, Halting Irans Nuclear Programme: The Military Option, Survival, Vol. 50, Is. 5, 2008; and Scott D. Sagan, How to Keep The Bomb from Iran, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5, 2006.

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Ghadr and Sajjil suggest that it is seeking to extend the range of its missiles. At the same time, these programs demonstrate that Iran is maturing its domestic ability to design, develop, and manufacture systems needed to upgrade its missile arsenal. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE As noted earlier in this chapter, the IRGC and its unconventional warfare wing, the Quds Force, have developed relationships with armed Shiite groups throughout the Middle East. Should Iran provide these groups with G-RAMM, it could have a significant impact on future U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf. In 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated how a guerrilla organization could exploit advanced military technologies when it used anti-tank guided munitions to wreak havoc on Israeli armored formations. Hezbollah also hit an Israeli corvette, the INS Hanit, with an Iranian-supplied C-802 guided anti-ship cruise missile.108

108

Ibid., pp. 9596; and Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 52, 2009, p. 37.

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Proxy warfare would likely be a key element of an Iranian effort to coerce Persian Gulf states to deny U.S. forces access to regional bases. Iran has proven its willingness to use terror attacks against Gulf states that have cooperated with the United States.109 Even the threat of an armed insurrection by Iranianbacked Shiite groups could cause the Bahraini government to deny the United States full use of naval facilities in Manama. The uprisings by Shiites in Bahrain during the spring of 2011 were enough of a threat that Saudi forces crossed the causeway linking the two countries to intervene on behalf of the Sunni al Khalifa monarchy.110 Much of Saudi Arabias Shiite minority lives in its Eastern Province alongside many of its largest oil fields and refineries.111 Although Irans ballistic missiles may be too inaccurate to attack these facilities effectively at present, terror groups armed with G-RAMM or even simple explosives may be able to do so more effectively.
109

For example, Iranian-sponsored terrorists bombed a Pan American Airways office and the Interior Ministry in Kuwait in late 1987. See Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, p. 287. Jay Solomon, Bahrain Sees Hezbollah Plot in Protest, Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2011, accessible online at [Link] and Michael Slackman, The Proxy Battle in Bahrain, New York Times, March 19, 2011, accessible online at [Link] The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia, International Crisis Group, p. 1.

110

111

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Proxy groups armed with G-RAMM could also have a major impact on U.S. forces and forward operating locations. Using commercially obtained overhead imagery, unconventional forces could fix the coordinates of Persian Gulf port facilities, airfields, and fuel depots for guided mortar and rocket attacks. Unconventional forces could also use advanced man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), such as the Russian-made SA-24 to attack U.S. aircraft transiting supposedly friendly airspace, and use ASCMs, antiship mines, or maritime IEDs against ships in the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, and Persian Gulf sea ports of debarkation (SPODs). MARITIME EXCLUSION CAPABILITIES Many military strategists see the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 as the moment when the PRCs leadership decided to pursue an A2/AD strategy centered in part on denying U.S. aircraft carriers the ability to close within range of their air wings.112 The ability of the United States to strike at land-based targets
112

Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?, pp. 13, 1718.

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using seaborne airpower that is virtually independent of theater bases has been an important powerprojection capability for the United States. The intervention of two U.S. carrier strike groups into the Taiwan Strait in 1996 demonstrated this capability rather clearly. Consequently, China has sought to undercut this U.S. advantage by investing heavily in weapons such as the Dong Feng 21D ASBM that are designed to prevent American carriers from deploying close enough to China to employ their fighters effectively. Iran had similar watershed experiences during the Tanker War of 19871988 and Operation Praying Mantis in April 1988. The decisiveness with which the U.S. Navy dispatched Irans conventional naval forces convinced Irans leadership that an asymmetric approach would be the only effective means of countering Americas Navy in the Persian Gulf. As a result, Iran began to acquire large numbers of small fast attack craft, anti-ship missiles, mines, submarines, and UAVs.113 The following paragraphs briefly summarize these capabilities.
113

Fariborz Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008, p. 6., accessible online at [Link] [Link].

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SURFACE COMBATANTS. Iran has acquired numerous small surface vessels over the last twenty years. Many of these vessels, such as the Ashura-class and Tareq-class craft, are small speedboats armed with machine guns or unguided rockets, although some have been modified to conduct minelaying operations.114 Irans smaller vessels typically carry MANPADS to defend against air attacks by rotary wing aircraft. During maneuvers in the Gulf, these smaller ships have fired a large number of rockets in the hopes of overwhelming defenses or distracting them from engaging larger anti-ship cruise missile or ASCM-carrying craft such as the Azarahkhshclass and Tondar-class missile boats or the North Korean-produced IPS-16 missile/torpedo boat.115 UNDERSEA WARFARE. Iran has developed undersea warfare capabilities tailored to deny operational freedom of maneuver to foreign naval forces and civilian shipping in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Iran has purchased three Type 877EKM Kilo-class
114 115

Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 12.

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submarines from Russia. Based at Bandar Abbas, these submarines are the most modern vessels in Irans undersea fleet, and have the ability to carry torpedoes, mines, and possibly ASCMs.116 Iran has exercised its Kilos in the Gulf of Oman, preparing them to act as a first line of defense against the U.S. Navy.117 In addition to the Kilos, Iran maintains a fleet of small and midget submarines, including Ghadir-class and Nahang-class boats. Although these smaller submarines are capable of carrying torpedoes, Iran is more likely to use them for mining or special operations.118 Iran has also acquired a variety of torpedoes for its undersea fleet, including wake-homing torpedoes and possibly an extremely fast supercavitating torpedo called the Hoot, which is purportedly a version of the Russian Shkval.119

116

Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 13; and Talmadge, Closing Time, p. 89. According to [Link], India has modified its Type 877EKM submarines to carry the Novator Klub missile system. SSK Kilo Class (Type 877EKM) Attack Submarine, Russia, [Link], accessible online at [Link] Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 13; Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 128; and Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, p. 316. Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 13. Ibid., p. 14. Supercavitation creates a bubble of air within the water ahead of a torpedo, thereby decreasing drag on the torpedo and allowing it to travel at very high speeds. This would decrease the torpedos run time to a target, but it is a straight-runner, i.e., too fast and noisy to employ a guidance system to home to a maneuvering target.

117

118 119

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MINE WARFARE. Iran has invested heavily in mines and minelaying platforms to deny U.S. naval units freedom of maneuver in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Iran is believed to possess 2,000 to 3,000 mines, though this number could grow over the next twenty years. This arsenal includes simple free-floating and moored contact mines, as well as more sophisticated bottom influence mines such as the Russian-made MDM-6 and the Chinese EM52 rocket-propelled mine.120 Strong currents in the Strait of Hormuz would likely carry all but firmly moored mines out into the Gulf of Oman. Bottom mines such as the MDM-6 and EM-52 (with respective maximum effective depths of 120 meters and 80 meters) may be of limited effectiveness in the deeper parts of the Strait of Hormuz.121 If they became silted over by Gulf currents, those maximum effective depths would be further reduced. Consistent with a maritime guerrilla warfare strategy, Iran
120

Talmadge, Closing Time, pp. 9192; and Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 120. Talmadge, Closing Time, pp. 91; and Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 16. For an analysis of the characteristics of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, see J. Kampf and M. Sadrinasab, The Circulation of the Persian Gulf: A Numerical Study, Ocean Science Discussions, European Geosciences Union, May 12, 2005, pp. 129164, accessible online at [Link] net/2/129/2005/[Link].

121

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has outfitted a myriad of platforms to deploy mines, including many of its surface ships, submarines, and commercial vessels for clandestine minelaying operations.122 Although Iran also possesses three RH53D Sea Stallions which are capable of minelaying, they are unlikely to remain operational over the next two decades.123 ANTI-SHIP MISSILES. In addition to ship-launched ASCMs, Iran has acquired a large number of ASCMs which it deploys in batteries along its coast and on islands such as the Tunbs and Qeshm.124 Irans ASCM arsenal consists of a wide array of missiles, many of which were imported from China or derived from Chinese missiles. Irans Chinese-made ASCMs include the CSS-N-2 Silkworm, CSSC-3 Seersucker (C201), CSS-N-4 Sardine (C-801), and CSS-N-8 Saccade (C-802). Iran builds variants of the Silkworm and Saccade, which it calls the Raad and Noor respectively.125 It also possesses several smaller types of ASCMs:
122 123 124 125

Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 16. Talmadge, Closing Time, p. 89. Talmadge, Closing Time, p. 101. Ibid., p. 102; and Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 15. Cordesman and Klieber disagree and suggest that the Raad may actually be a version of the C-801. See Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 116.

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the Kosar, Sedjil, and Nasr, which are purportedly based on Chinas FL-6 and FL-10 light missiles.126 All of Irans ASCMs are subsonic and relatively short-ranged. The most capable missile, the Saccade/C-802, has a range of 65 nm.127 The maximum effective range of Irans ASCMs may be limited more by their target acquisition radars than their on-board fuel capacity.128 In keeping with its asymmetric maritime strategy, Iran could also use target data from submarines, small military and civilian vessels, and UAVs, provided these platforms have precision navigation and the ability to communicate with shore-based ASCM batteries.129 MARITIME AVIATION. Iran operates a small number of ASCM-armed aircraft such as the Su-24, Su25, Embraer Tucano, and aging F-4 Phantoms.130 Should these aircraft remain operational over the
126

Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 15; and Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, pp. 117118. Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 117; and Talmadge, Closing Time, p. 101. Talmadge, Closing Time, pp. 102103. Ibid., p. 103. Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 17; Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, p. 317; and Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, pp. 8789.

127

128 129 130

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next two decades, they would be unlikely to survive long in a campaign against U.S. forces. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had success using kamikaze UAVs that essentially functioned as remotely piloted ASCMs.131 This experience, combined with proliferation of unmanned aircraft technologies, helped to spur Irans development of the Ababil and Mohadjer UAVs.132 As with Irans obsolescent piloted aircraft, these UAVs would be unlikely to survive engagements with the United States technologically superior air defenses. Should they be fielded in great enough numbers, however, Iran may use them in kamikaze swarms with the aim of overwhelming U.S. shipboard defenses. AIR DEFENSES ACTIVE DEFENSES. Air defense systems are yet another layer in Irans A2/AD complex. Iran operates a mix of Russian-built SA-2, SA-5, and SA-15 (Tor-M1) systems, and may also have Chinese-built or domestically modified SA-2s as well as some
131 132

Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 17. Frederic Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent, p. 61.

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remaining U.S.-built I-HAWK SAMs.133 The most advanced of these systems, the short-range SA-15, is deployed at key nuclear facilities such as the complexes at Isfahan and Bushehr.134 Iran has sought to upgrade its air defenses by purchasing Russias S-300 missile system. Russia has, for the time being, canceled its planned sale of the S-300 to Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1429, which levied sanctions against Iran as punishment for its intransigence during negotiations over its nuclear program.135 Russias sale of S-300s to Venezuela and Turkey suggests that Russia remains interested in exporting the system, and that Iran may be able to acquire it in the future.136 Shortfalls in Irans C4 infrastructure prevent it from combining its disparate air defenses into an

133

Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 9799; and Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, p. 317. Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 100. Glenn Kessler and Keith B. Richburg, Russia halts sale of air defense missiles to Iran, Washington Post, June 12, 2010, accessible online at [Link] [Link]; and Colum Lynch and Glenn Kessler, U.N. imposes another round of sanctions on Iran, Washington Post, June 10, 2010, accessible online at [Link] content/article/2010/06/09/[Link]. Venezuela buys powerful missiles with Russian loan, Reuters, September 13, 2009, http:// [Link]/article/2009/09/14/venezuela-chavez-idUSN1346192820090914; Iran out, but Russia Eyes Turkey for S-300, UPI, June 21, 2010, accessible online at [Link] Business_News/Security-Industr y/2010/06/21/Iran-out-but-Russia-eyes-Turkey-for-S-300/ UPI-72321277143005/#ixzz1UQ3M6eqM.

134 135

136

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IADS.137 Eschewing the C4 networks required to build an IADS would seem to agree with Irans mosaic defense concept, which prizes individual initiative over top-down control.138 In light of Irans development of an extensive civilian fiber optics communications network, however, it would seem likely that Iran will make similar investments in a dedicated, hardened, and buried fiber optics network for military command and control.139 PASSIVE DEFENSES. Passive defense measures such as using decoys, deception, hardening, deeply burying, camouflaging, and deploying mobile weapon systemscould reduce Irans vulnerability to U.S. precision strikes.140 Hardening, deeply burying, or employing mobile weapon systems limits the types of U.S. strike assets that can be used against
137

Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent, pp. 60, 97; Cordesman and Klieber, Irans Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 99; and Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, p. 317. Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent, p. 57. In 2009, representatives of the Telecommunication Company of Iran reported that Iran had completed a national fiber optics network that exceeded 79,000 km of cable. See Mr. M. Sanaie and M. Shirazi, Current Network Architecture And Services, briefing delivered to a United Nations International Telecommunication Union in June 2009, accessible online at [Link] Riad Kahwaji and Barbara Opall-Rome, Fiber-Optic Battle Lines, Defense News, June 2, 2008, accessible online at [Link] Ward, ImmortalA Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, p. 318; and Wehrey, et al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent, pp. 52, 67.

138

139

140

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them. Hardened or deeply buried targets generally require specialized heavy munitions, such as the GBU-28, a 5,000-pound class penetrating laserguided bomb that can only be carried by the U.S. Air Forces F-15E and bombers. Should a target area be outside the range of the F-15E, or should Irans air defenses remain intact, the United States could be limited to using its small inventory of stealthy B-2As to attack the most challenging hardened or deeply buried targets.141 The flight time of standoff munitions such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) reduces their effectiveness against highly mobile SAMs, TELs, and ASCM launchers. The use of decoys and deception can also cause U.S. forces to waste sorties and costly precision-guided munitions on false targets.142

141

This is assuming a conflict would occur before the U.S. military can develop and field its next generation bomber, which should be capable of carrying munitions to attack hardened and deeply buried targets. See Robert Haffa and Michael Isherwood, The 2018 Bomber: the Case for Accelerating the Next Generation Long Strike System, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, August 2008, p. 11, accessible online at [Link] case_for_a.pdf. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report, p. 124.

142

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IRANS FUTURE A2/AD CAPABILITIES The following section illustrates how Iran might to improve its A2/AD capabilities over time. BALLISTIC MISSILES. Iran may upgrade its SRBMs with improved guidance and submunitions for attacking airfields and other large military targets. Despite these improvements, the CEPs of Irans ballistic missiles could continue to limit their effectiveness against military point targets. Iran could also increase its TEL inventory and build pre-sighted firing positions with nearby hardened and buried hide and reload sites, along with a large number of decoy launch sites to complicate U.S. countermissile targeting. Combined, these actions would improve Irans ability to conduct shoot-and-scoot firing missions and preserve its launchers for followon attacks. WMD. Iran could develop weapons of mass destruction, including operational nuclear weapons, and deploy them on ballistic missiles.

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PROXIES. Iran could expand and deepen its network of proxy forces and arm them with G-RAMM. These irregular proxy forces could train with the IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah, planning and rehearsing attacks against U.S. and partner military facilities in the Persian Gulf region. Lebanese Hezbollah or other proxies could prepare to conduct terror attacks in the United States and other NATO nations. Iran may also develop relationships with hackers for hire, giving them an ability to conduct cyber attacks by proxy. MARITIME EXCLUSION CAPABILITIES. To improve its ability to interdict ships entering and operating in the Persian Gulf, Iran could increase the range and integration of its sensors, upgrade its surface warfare platforms, expand the size of its undersea minelaying force and inventory of advanced mines, and acquire more advanced ASCMs. To support attacks against surface vessels at extended ranges, Iran could build over-the-horizon radars facing the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. Iran could also improve its maritime UAVs and their networks, allowing them to serve as

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remote sensors for its land- and sea-based ASCMs. Iran could augment its fast-attack squadrons with Chinese-made Houbei-class catamarans armed with the supersonic YJ-83/C-803 ASCM or a similar type of advanced ASCM-equipped FAC that has proliferated over the last decade.143 Iran could also upgrade sensors on its surface fleetthe effective range of many of their surface-to-surface missiles is limited by the range of their target acquisition radarsand acquire a ship-launched variant of the supersonic Klub ASCM, including the containerized Klub-K system. To improve its mine warfare capabilities, Iran might increase the size of its fleet of mini-submarines for covert minelaying, civilian vessels for clandestine minelaying, and its inventory of advanced influence mines. AIR DEFENSES. Iran could make significant progress toward developing a more robust air defense network. Should the Russian S-300 remain unavailable, Iran could acquire HQ-9 SAM batteriesroughly the
143

For more on the Houbei, see Commander. John Patch U.S. Navy (Retired), A Thoroughbred ShipKiller, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 4, April 2010, pp. 4853, accessible online at [Link]

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Chinese equivalent of the S-300 PMU-2comprising eight launchers with four launch tubes and accompanying radars, vehicles, and spare missiles.144 Iran might also build a hardened and buried fiberoptic network to link its air defenses and provide a common operational picture. In terms of passive defenses, it is likely that Iran will continue to bury and harden high-value assets such as nuclear facilities, missile manufacturing and storage sites, and C2 infrastructure. Iran may also build numerous decoys for key systems such as its ballistic and cruise missile launchers and SAMs. Iran might also choose to co-locate many of its high-value targets in sensitive civilian areas in the hope of deterring U.S. airstrikes. AN ILLUSTRATIVE IRANIAN A2/AD CAMPAIGN The following is an illustration of how Iran might execute an A2/AD strategy in the 20202025 timeframe. The vignette assumes that Iran initiates hostilities with little or no warning. U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region remain similar to those called
144

For more on the HQ-9, see Dr. Carlo Kopp, CPMIEC HQ-9/HHQ-9/FD-200/FT-2000 Self-Propelled Air Defence System, Air Power Australia, August 2010, accessible online at [Link] net/[Link]#mozTocId925694.

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for in the current defense program, with tactical aviation and supporting aircraft at al Udeid and al Dhafra, and U.S. surface vessels operating in the Gulf with Manama and Jebel Ali as supporting bases. ATTRITE U.S. FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF. Iran will likely exploit the element of surprise to subject U.S. forces in the Gulf to a concentrated, combined-arms attack. Using coastal radars, UAVs, and civilian vessels for initial targeting information, Iranian surface vessels could swarm U.S. surface combatants in narrow waters, firing a huge volume of rockets and missiles in an attempt to overwhelm the Navys AEGIS combat system and kinetic defenses like the Close-In Weapons System and Rolling Airframe Missile, and possibly drive U.S. vessels toward prelaid minefields. Shore-based ASCMs and Klub-K missiles launched from civilian vessels may augment these strikes. Irans offensive maritime exclusion platforms could exploit commercial maritime traffic and shore clutter to mask their movement and impede U.S. counter-targeting.

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While these attacks are underway, Iran could use its SRBMs and proxy forces to strike U.S. airfields, bases, and ports. Iran will likely seek to overwhelm U.S. and partner missile defenses with salvos of less accurate missiles before using more accurate SRBMs armed with submunitions to destroy unsheltered aircraft and other military systems. Proxy groups could attack forward bases using pre-sighted guided mortars and rockets, and radiation-seeking munitions to destroy radars and C4 nodes. These groups could also provide Iran with on-scene bomb damage assessments (BDA) to determine whether follow-up strikes are necessary. DENY SAFE TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. After initial attacks to attrite U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, Iran will likely use its maritime exclusion systems to control passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Mine warfare should feature prominently in Iranian attempts to close the Strait. As with many of its A2/AD systems, Iran could employ a combination of smart influence mines along with large

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quantities of less capable weapons such as surface contact mines.145 Iran may deploy many of its less sophisticated mines from a variety of surface vessels, while it reserves its submarine force to lay influence mines covertly. Though Iran may wish to sink or incapacitate a U.S. warship with a mine, its primary goal is probably to deny passage and force the U.S. Navy to engage in prolonged mine countermeasure (MCM) operations while under threat from Iranian shore-based attacks. U.S. MCM ships, which typically lack the armor and self-defenses of larger warships, would be unlikely to survive in the Strait until these threats are suppressed. Iran could deploy its land-based ASCMs from camouflaged and hardened sites to firing positions along its coastline and on Iranian-occupied islands in the Strait of Hormuz while placing decoys at false firing positions to complicate U.S. counterstrikes. Hundreds of ASCMs may cover the Strait, awaiting target cueing data from coastal radars, UAVs, surface vessels, and submarines. Salvo and multiple-axis attacks could enable these ASCMs to
145

Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, p. 16; and Talmadge, Closing Time, pp. 9192.

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saturate U.S. defenses. Similar to the way in which Iran structured its ballistic missile attacks, salvos of less capable ASCMs might be used to exhaust U.S. defenses, paving the way for attacks by more advanced missiles. Iran could disperse its FAC among the many small harbors and inlets opening onto the Strait, while smaller vessels, such as Boghammars, could hide amidst local commercial traffic. Smaller vessels could then sortie to conduct coordinated swarming attacks against vessels entering the Strait or attempting to clear mines. PREVENT OR IMPEDE THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES. While attempting to deny U.S. naval forces passage through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran will likely attempt to prevent or at least impede the deployment of other U.S. forces to the region. Iran may use proxy forces to attack or hold at risk key air and sea ports of debarkation, logistics nodes, and staging bases with the objective of interrupting or preventing their use. Iran could also launch missile and terrorist strikes against population centers and economic targets, and

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foment unrest among local Shia populations to deter Persian Gulf states from aiding the U.S. military. DISRUPT U.S. MILITARY NETWORKS. In addition to its kinetic efforts to disrupt the flow of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf, Iran may use indigenous cyber capabilities or mercenary hackers for hire to interfere with the U.S. militarys networks, including the logistics networks that are critical to orchestrating force deployments and that currently rely on the Internet as opposed to a secure network (e.g., the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, or SIPRNET). ATTACK PERSIAN GULF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE. As part of a coercive campaign, Iran could choose to launch ballistic missile attacks against the oil and gas production infrastructure of its neighbors. This might be a difficult task considering that most energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf is dispersed, redundant, and capable of being repaired quickly. More concentrated installations, such as petroleum stabilization facilities, may present more lucrative targets. Iran could also use G-RAMM equipped

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proxies to attack oil and gas production infrastructure, although their effectiveness would depend on the ability of their munitions to destroy robustly built facilities. EXPAND THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT. Undoubtedly aware that the United States ability to bring military power to bear is influenced by the demand for forces in other regions, Iran may seek to expand the geographical scope of a conflict in order to divert U.S. attention and resources elsewhere. Irans terrorist proxies, perhaps aided by Quds Force operatives, could be employed to threaten U.S. interests in other theaters. Iran could conceivably leverage its relationship with Hezbollah to attempt to draw Israel into the conflict or tap Hezbollahs clandestine networks to carry out attacks in other regions. THE ROLE OF TIME. Both sides in a putative Persian Gulf conflict would likely prefer a rapid conclusion to hostilities. Iran, however, may be more vulnerable to the consequences of a prolonged conflict. While the

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United States, its partners, and the global economy would surely undergo hardships as the result of disruptions to the export of oil and gas from the Gulf, Irans dependency on its energy exports and dearth of refining capacity are vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the United States. MAJOR AREAS OF COMPETITION The preceding assessment highlights several key operational challenges or competitions that may shape future U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf.146 Consistent with Irans A2/AD strategy, these areas of competition are primarily asymmetric in nature. Network versus Counter-Network Competition Counter-network and counter-counter-network operations would likely be one of the key areas of competition in a Western Pacific A2/AD scenario. Iran, unlike the PRC, may not be able to match the United States in a symmetric competition involving long-range sensors and PGMs. Iran may tailor its A2/
146

AirSea Battle used a similar construct. See Jan van Tol, et al., AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept, pp. 3247.

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AD operations to sidestep that competition to a large degree by conducting coercive strikes against known fixed targets; attacking in swarms; leveraging passive measures such as hardening and deeply burying; and mobilizing key military systems to thwart U.S. precision targeting. Iran could also attack U.S. C4ISR infrastructure asymmetrically using cyber attacks or proxy terrorist strikes against critical network facilities such as satellite ground control stations. Rather than relying solely on kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against U.S. C4ISR battle networks, Iran will likely use deception and large numbers of decoys in the hope that U.S. forces will expend large numbers of its PGMs against false targets. In the maritime domain, this will include operating vessels and UAVs from cluttered littoral launching points to reduce the probability of being detected. Iran will also likely make use of civilian ships as minelayers, ISR assets and perhaps even as clandestine missile platforms. This may further confound U.S. targeting efforts given the United States militarys desire to minimize collateral damage.

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Missile Offense versus Missile Defense Competition At present, ballistic missiles have a distinct advantage over kinetic missile interceptors in terms of their effectiveness and cost. In an AirSea Battle scenario in the Western Pacific, PLA ballistic and cruise missiles that are capable of striking fixed and mobile targets with precision may be the most pressing threat facing a U.S. military defending a handful of forward bases with kinetic interceptors. In contrast, while Iran may target U.S. bases and military forces with ballistic missiles, they may be more likely to use them to coerce Persian Gulf states to deny the United States the ability to use close-in bases. This emphasis on coercion would place different stresses on U.S. forces than a campaign based primarily on defending against direct missile attacks on its bases. Defending the population centers and critical oil infrastructure of key Persian Gulf partners like Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE would likely be prohibitively expensive for Central Command to do alone, given the large areas needing coverage and the high cost of ballistic missile interceptors. Should Iran succeed in upgrading the accuracy of its ballistic missiles

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in the timeframe of this assessment, the U.S. military would have the dual challenge of defending point targets as well as large area targets. Furthermore, the threat of a WMD ballistic missile strike, especially if Iran fields an operational nuclear warhead, suggests that Central Command will need to conduct a concerted offensive counter-missile campaign to suppress Irans missiles before they could be launched. This could force Iran into a classic use them or lose them dilemma, which would pose a dilemma of a different kind for the United States. The problem for U.S. planners becomes more acute as Iran is likely to have far more missiles than nuclear warheads. This means that the U.S. military would have to treat every Iranian missile launched as potentially carrying a nuclear payload. This would stress, and perhaps exhaust U.S. missile defenses. The only way to prevent this would be for the U.S. to destroy as many Iranian missiles as possible before they can be launched. Of course, the U.S. military could also use ballistic missiles to its advantage. As a signatory to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States is legally prevented from possessing

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ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles ranging between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (270 and 2,970 nm, respectively).147 Tactical surface-to-surface missile systems such as the Armys MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) are below the 270 nm threshold. Deployed in a distributed posture throughout the Gulf regionoperated either by U.S. or a regional partnerthe ATACMS could strike Iranian TELs and ASCM launchers that are within range to prevent them from launching their payloads or reloading after a launch. U.S. partners, unconstrained by the INF treaty, could operate longer ranged ballistic missiles. Sea Control versus Localized Sea Denial In an AirSea Battle scenario, the PLA would seek to deny the U.S. naval units operational freedom of maneuver across wide areas of the Western Pacific. In contrast, Iran would likely seek to deny the U.S. Navys freedom to maneuver in the much more constricted waters of the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian
147

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, United States Department of State, accessible online at [Link]

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Gulf, and possibly the Gulf of Oman. This competition has two subordinate competitions: mine warfare versus counter-mine warfare, and U.S. fleet defense versus Iranian swarming attacks. Given the U.S. militarys limited MCM capabilities, this might be the one area of competition where Iran could have a clear-cut advantage. Unlike the Western Pacific, where the large areas involved help mitigate the effectiveness of mining, the close confines of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz magnify the channelizing effect of mines. Iran could use mines to exert control over shipping, sever the SLOCs between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and enhance the effectiveness of its swarming ASCM, UAV, and FAC attacks. The dearth of U.S. mine-clearance assets and their vulnerability to missile strikes in the close confines of the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with Irans ability to continue re-seeding its minefields from shore or using clandestine platforms, could stretch Central Commands operational timelines for opening the Strait. To overcome the capability limitations of its maritime exclusion capabilities, Iran might seek to

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exploit the narrow and shallow waters of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz by using the element of surprise, attacking in swarms at close range, and by attacking in or from cluttered littoral areas. These tactics would help erode the effectiveness of U.S. sensors while taking advantage of the willingness of Iranian naval forces to accept some attrition in order to inflict an icon kill of a major U.S. naval combatant.148 Unlike the PLAs advanced ASBMs which could be launched at long ranges and use speed and maneuver to counter U.S. kinetic defenses, Iran could employ swarms of missiles launched from multiple points in close proximity to U.S. forces to surprise and overwhelm their defensive systems. SUMMARY The Iranian stratagems and capabilities described in this chapter seek to exploit the geographic and geostrategic features of the Persian Gulf to pose serious challenges to the United States ability to project power into the region. Assuming the U.S. military has not
148

In other words, damaging or destroying a major U.S. combatant to demonstrate the U.S. militarys vulnerability.

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changed its regional posture, operational concepts, and program of record capabilities, Iran could use its A2/ AD complex to deny U.S. forces access to basing and freedom of maneuver in the Persian Gulf. In so doing, Iran may hope to delay U.S. military intervention long enough for Tehran to conduct acts of aggression or coercion, or raise the costs of intervention high enough to dissuade U.S. policymakers from taking action. If, however, the United States were to make prudent and affordable changes to its Persian Gulf force posture and develop capabilities to support an enabling operational concept, it could shift the balance in favor of U.S. power-projection forces. The nature and purpose of these changes are the subjects of Chapters 3 and 4.

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CHAPTER 3 > ELEMENTS OF AN OUTSIDE-IN

ENABLING OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

Chapter 1 described an enabling concept as a set of integrated, overlapping lines of operation designed to ensure the U.S. militarys freedom of action and create the conditions necessary to prevail against an A2/AD complex in the Persian Gulf region. Chapter 2 described principal components of projected Iranian anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Chapter 3 begins by defining key assumptions to help bound the character of a potential conflict between the United States and Iran. It then outlines three major U.S lines of operation designed to overcome Irans emerging A2/AD strategy. The chapter concludes by briefly summarizing operations that could be constituent parts of a broader campaign against Iran if an enabling concept is successfully

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executed. This broader campaign could include operations to destroy Irans WMD complex; neutralize proxies that have been trained and equipped to commit acts of terror; and unconventional warfare to help set the conditions for toppling the Iranian regime. KEY ASSUMPTIONS Before describing candidate lines of operation that address the challenges summarized in Chapter 2, it is necessary to define key assumptions regarding the possible character of a future conflict between the United States and Iran. Given the differences between the geographic and strategic features of the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf, several of these assumptions necessarily differ from those outlined in CSBAs AirSea Battle report. Perhaps the most significant differences involve assumptions regarding Irans more limited ability to degrade and disrupt U.S. C4ISR battle networks and the potential that Iran would threaten to employ WMD following a U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf. PRIOR INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING (I&W) WILL BE LIMITED. This paper assumes that the United States

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will be responding to a contingency where Irans military acts with little or no warning. Although it is logical to assume this constitutes the most stressing I&W case for testing an enabling operational concept, DoD cannot rule out the possibility that it may become involved in scenarios where others may act first to prevent Iran from threatening regional stability.149 Thus, it will be important for DoD to test an enabling concept against a range of road to war cases. IRAN WILL THREATEN TO USE WMD. In a future conflict with Iran, U.S. commanders must assume that Iran will threaten to use WMD. These threats may be focused on deterring a U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf, or preventing U.S. regional allies and security partners to provide basing and assistance to U.S. forces. For the purposes of this report, operations to counter Irans WMD, including nuclear weapons and their critical infrastructure, are parts of a broader U.S. theater campaign and are not addressed as elements of an enabling concept.

149

This could include actions by a U.S. ally or partner to prevent Iran from developing operational nuclear weapons.

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NEITHER U.S. NOR IRANIAN TERRITORY WILL BE ACCORDED SANCTUARY STATUS. Although it must be assumed that U.S. sovereign territory will not be accorded sanctuary status during a conflict with Iran, it would be an overreach to assume that Irans military will have the capability, at least in the near-term, to directly strike the U.S. homeland using conventional weapons with intercontinental ranges. Rather, it should be assumed that Iran will use indirect means such as terrorist attacks and offensive cyberspace operations to attempt to delay and disrupt U.S. military operations or threaten the U.S. population. ALL OPERATING DOMAINS WILL BE CONTESTED. The United States must assume that Iran will seek to degrade and disrupt U.S. military operations in all domains, including space and cyberspace, and across the electromagnetic spectrum. Although Irans cyberspace and counter-space capabilities are not as advanced as those fielded by the PLA, it is prudent to assume that U.S. theater battle networks, including communications, surveillance, and

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precision navigation and timing systems (PNT), will be disrupted or temporarily unavailable. U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION DURING INITIAL OPERATIONS WILL BE CONSTRAINED. This paper assumes that Iran will continue to mature an A2/ AD strategy like the one described in Chapter 2, and that in the event of a conflict with the United States, Iran will employ a variety of A2/AD capabilities to delay or prevent effective U.S. military operations. Thus, an enabling concept must assume that U.S. forces deploying to the Persian Gulf in support of a contingency operation against Iran will need to fight to gain entry to the region and maintain their freedom of action. CLOSE-IN OPERATING LOCATIONS WILL BE AT RISK. From a political perspective, Central Command cannot assume that Persian Gulf states will permit U.S. forces to deploy to operating locations on their sovereign territory during the opening stages of a conflict with Iran. On the contrary, it is prudent to assume that Iran will succeed, if only partially or

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temporarily, to coerce its neighbors to deny access to U.S. forces. Moreover, it is plausible that domestic pressures will prevent some regional governments from directly supporting U.S. military operations. It should be assumed that Iran will seek to increase these pressures by conducting an aggressive propaganda campaign supported by acts of subversion to create popular opposition to U.S. military deployments. From a threat perspective, it can be expected that Iran will use its regular and irregular military capabilities to attack U.S. forces already postured in the Persian Gulf. In other words, it must be assumed that U.S. forces will be at risk if positioned inside the reach of Irans A2/AD threat ring at the start of a conflict.150 AN ENABLING OPERATIONAL CONCEPT IS NOT A SUBSET OF AIRSEA BATTLE. While this is not an assumption, it is important to stress that an enabling concept for the Persian Gulf should not be considered as a lesser-included case of an operational concept
150

If available, dispersal bases located in the interior of the greater Arabian Peninsula may offer some measure of strategic depth for U.S. forward presence units.

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designed for a Western Pacific scenario. Operational concepts such as AirSea Battle and Outside-In must be tailored to the specific geographical and geostrategic characteristics of a region, the specific advantages a potential adversary could gain from its anti-access and area-denial operations, and the likely objectives of an adversarys leadership. A CANDIDATE ENABLING OPERATIONAL CONCEPT This section proposes three lines of operation to prevent the success of an Iranian anti-access and area-denial strategy and regain the U.S. militarys freedom of action. They center on:
>

Setting conditions to effectively deter or defeat Iranian coercion and aggression, while deploying U.S. forces to support initial operations against Iran from outside the reach of its anti-access threats; Operating from range to reduce the effectiveness of Irans A2/AD complex by degrading its ISR capabilities and decreasing the density of its offensive and defensive systems, including ballistic missiles, maritime exclusion capabilities, and air defense network; and

>

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>

Establishing localized air and maritime superiority when and where needed, including sea control through the Strait of Hormuz, to support follow-on force deployments and theater campaign operations.

The objective of the first line of operation is to establish a forward-deployed force posture that will reduce the U.S. militarys exposure to Irans anti-access capabilities and enable U.S. offensive and defensive operations from a posture of advantage. The second line prioritizes long-range operations to shrink the reach and density of Irans A2/AD complex by destroying or neutralizing its key components, thereby increasing maneuver room for U.S. forces and decreasing Irans ability to continue acts of aggression. In the last line, U.S. air, cyberspace, special operations, and maritime forcesincluding expeditionary amphibious units would regain air and maritime superiority and conduct a theater-entry operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, thereby paving the way to achieve the strategic objectives of a broader warfighting campaign.151

151

For example, these objectives could include enabling the flow of oil from the Gulf; preventing Iran from using WMD, including nuclear weapons; denying Iran access to materials needed to sustain military acts of aggression or coercion; and supporting through unconventional warfare operations a change in Irans ruling regime.

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Similar to CSBAs AirSea Battle concept for the Western Pacific, the lines of operation of an enabling concept for the Persian Gulf would have different execution timelines. The first and second lines may occur simultaneously with some offensive strikes against Iran beginning at the commencement of hostilities as opposed to delaying a counteroffensive until a lengthy force deployment phase is completed. Both lines would help set the conditions for successfully achieving the objectives of the third line of operation. Positioning to Operate from Extended Range
The proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles means that our current strategy of pouring thousands of fighters and hundreds of thousands of troops into our enemys back yard is no longer viable. The best hedge against the emerging threat is to shift as much of the power-projection burden as we canas fast as we canto long-range systems able to fight effectively from beyond WMD range. General Horner152

152

Horner, What We Should Have Learned in Desert Storm, But Didnt.

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Rather than immediately deploying a massive combined-arms force to bases that would be within the reach of many of Irans anti-access systems, this assessment proposes that DoD should create a posture that would reduce the threat to U.S. forces, extend the battlespace beyond the effective reach of Irans offensive systems, and support operations from range to counter Irans A2/AD complex, including its ISR elements. Dispersing and Hardening Forward Presence Forces Dispersing high-value forward presence units in the Persian Gulf to locations that would reduce their vulnerability to Iranian strikes and complicate Irans planning is essential for creating an outsidein conventional deterrence posture. For example, high-value naval units such as a CSG or an ESG could reposition to areas in the Arabian Sea and other operating locations that are beyond the effective reach of most of Irans land-based maritime sensors, coastal ASCMs, and fast attack craft. Similarly, it may be desirable for some U.S. units forward-based in Persian Gulf littoral states to disperse to alternate

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F I G U R E 8 . D I S P E R S I N G F O R WA R D - B A S E D U N IT S

locations across the Arabian Peninsula, if possible, in order to reduce their vulnerability to ballistic missile and proxy attacks (see Figure 8). Maintaining a large number of suitable airfields from which U.S. aircraft could operate would also greatly complicate Irans targeting problem and force Iran to spread its limited missile force over a larger number of targets. Host nation hardening of key base facilities could also reduce the operational impact of ballistic missile or G-RAMM attacks and enable some U.S. combat

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aircraft to be based forward.153 Adding kinetic and non-kinetic missile defenses to hardened bases would further reduce the effectiveness of Iranian missile strikes. Additional U.S. and partner missile defenses postured to defend critical population centers and oil infrastructure could also harden Persian Gulf states to coercive acts and improve the potential that U.S. forces will receive regional support in the event of a conflict. Evacuating large fixed installations during a developing crisis, or worse after hostilities have broken out, could lead to disaster. Such an evacuation during a crisis could severely undermine partner confidence in the United States willingness and ability to defend them. Evacuating under fire would also be a hazardous undertaking. Assuming the United States does not intend to initiate hostilities with Iran (and thus gain the advantage of striking first), it seems advisable to relocate and disperse as many of these forward-based units and their critical functions as

153

See John Stillion and Scott Perdue, Air Combat Past, Present and Future, RAND PowerPoint presentation, August, 2008, pp. 913, accessible online at [Link] RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf.

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possible in peacetime to operating locations that are out of range of many of Irans first-strike capabilities. Thus, in the long run, Central Command should reconsider the value of maintaining large fixed installations in the Persian Gulf in peacetime, such as the CAOC in Qatar and USNAVCENT Headquarters in Bahrain. Faced with the threat of Iranian ballistic missile attacks, in a crisis or conflict situation, host nations such as Qatar and Bahrain may refuse U.S. forces the use of their bases or facilities as staging locations for operations against Iran. These installations would also be lucrative targets for Iran. Similarly, an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault ship in the Persian Gulf would be high-value targets for Iranian forces seeking to demonstrate the U.S. militarys vulnerability. While it would be challenging for Iran to sink large naval combatants, U.S. naval forces could be forced into a defensive crouch whereby they are preoccupied with their self-defense rather than effectively conducting strike operations. Of course, reducing Irans targeting opportunities does not mean that the United States should

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completely remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf either before or during a developing crisis. Rather, an enabling concept of operations should include actions to augment the United States deterrent and warfighting posture by deploying, where possible, forces possessing a small footprint and that are difficult to target, such as special operations forces, ATACMS batteries, mobile missile defense batteries, UUVs, and possibly Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Such deployments could both enhance U.S. combat capability and also reassure regional allies and partners. Deploying To Achieve Positional Advantage To address the risk of introducing U.S. forces inside Irans anti-access envelope prematurely, this operational concept exploits the United States advantage in conducting operations over extended ranges. For example, DoDs new long-range strike family of systems, when fielded, could deploy to staging locations around periphery of the Middle East, such as the Horn of Africa, Indian Ocean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and perhaps even

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the Black Sea/Caucasus region.154 In addition to Air Force long-range surveillance and strike capabilities, Navy aircraft carriers equipped with low observable UCLASS with a combat radius of more than 1,200 nm could operate from the Arabian Sea to strike elusive mobile targets.155 Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) and Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) armed with land attack cruise missiles could complement carrier strikes against fixed targets. Operational Implications of an Outside-In Posture As with any new concept for projecting military power abroad, the U.S. military should assess the potential advantages and disadvantages of shifting toward an outside-in posture compared to DoDs legacy force deployment framework for the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the most important benefit is the potential to leverage the U.S. comparative advantage in longrange strike capabilities to reduce risk to U.S. forces. This is assuming, of course, that the U.S. military
154

DoD has described its next long-range strike family of systems as an integrated set of penetrating strike, standoff strike, ISR, and airborne electronic attack capabilities. See, for example, Mitch Gettle, Air Force, Navy team up for 21st Century fight, Air Force Public Affairs Agency, July 22, 2011, accessible online at [Link] For an assessment of the Navys proposed UCLASS, see Mark Gunzinger, Sustaining Americas Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2010), pp. 6870.

155

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invests in sufficient surveillance and strike systems, and munitions to accomplish enabling concept missions effectively and within a reasonable period of time. Second, deploying to fight from extended range could greatly complicate Irans operational planning. Specifically, shifting the U.S. theater footprint from forward bases well within Irans A2/AD threat ring to a peripheral posture would reduce Irans ability to achieve a clear picture of the battlespace, and could induce Iran to develop expensive and highly vulnerable extended ISR capabilities. Third, ideally an expanded U.S. basing posture (to include naval forces capable of conducting ISR and strike operations at extended ranges) would enable attacks across the breadth and depth of Iran along multiple axes of attack. Employed in this manner, U.S. forces would further complicate Irans planning and compel it to reduce its heavy concentration of defensive systems along the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, lest it leave other key assets undefended. On the negative side, a force posture that requires land- and sea-based surveillance and strike

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capabilities to operate over longer ranges would reduce aircraft sortie rates and increase strains on the aerial refueling force. Increasing the use of advanced, survivable, manned and unmanned systems with greater mission persistence (in terms of both survivability and fuel capacity) for strike, surveillance, and airborne electronic attack could help mitigate these negative consequences. Increased emphasis on non-kinetic electronic warfare, directed energy, and offensive cyber capabilities that could disrupt, degrade, damage, or destroy Irans A2/AD systems may help reduce strains on U.S. logistics networks and, in so doing, help reduce the cost associated with this new operational concept.156 In summary, instead of deploying a large force into the Persian Gulf as occurred in the two Gulf Wars, an approach that would almost certainly lead to significant U.S. casualties in the event of an Iranian surprise attack, the United States could
156

For example, a high power microwave (HPM) directed energy weapon installed on an aircraft or a cruise missile could create effects that range from temporarily disrupting electronic systems such as computers to physically burning out systems that are not shielded against the high voltages generated by a HPM pulse. See Robert J. Capozzella, Lieutenant Colonel, High Power Microwaves on the Future Battlefield: Implications for U.S. Defense (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, February 17, 2010), accessible online at [Link] aspx?rs=enginespage.

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adopt a new deployment framework that enables its forces to avoid major damage from Irans initial strikes, or at least greatly mitigate their effects. Of course, a deployment plan that expands the theater hinges on the availability of sufficient bases, and the development of forces capable of operating from greater ranges. It will also depend, in some cases, on the willingness of other states to grant overflight permission to U.S. forces operating from those bases to strike at Iran. This expanded posture is further addressed in Chapter 4. Reducing Irans A2/AD Threat Ring Operating from a posture of advantage, U.S. forces could seize the initiative and conduct sustained operations from all axes of attack to suppress, degrade, and destroy Irans anti-access capabilities (see Figure 9). The principal objective of these actions is to enable U.S. forces to operate at lower levels of risk from land and sea bases located closer to potential target areas, thereby increasing aircraft sortie rates, improving the ability of surveillance, strike, and airborne electronic attack systems to penetrate

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F I G U R E 9. R E D U C I N G T H E T H R E AT R I N G

deep into Iran, and setting the conditions for naval operations in Irans littoral regions. Winning the C4ISR Network/CounterNetwork Competition Although it seems likely that Irans military will remain less dependent on long-range C4ISR capabilities compared to the United States, prevailing in the network versus counter-network competition should be a key part of this line of operations. Doing

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so would have a significant effect against Irans missile campaign. Although Irans missile batteries may still be able to target known fixed locations, without the means to gain an accurate picture of the battlespace, they would not know with certitude if targets of value were actually present at these locations. Denying Iran the ability to conduct battle damage assessments (BDA) would also help prevent it from determining the effectiveness of its missile salvos, especially if U.S. and coalition forces were operating in remote areas that could not be easily monitored by Iranian agents living among the local population. Combined, these factors could greatly complicate Irans targeting efforts and possibly force it to expend missiles against targets with little or no value. In other words, effective counter-network operations coupled with a dynamic U.S. force dispersal plan could help shift the missile competition in favor of the U.S. military. PREPARATORY ACTIONS. U.S. efforts to win the network/counter-network competition should begin well before the onset of hostilities with Iran.

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Peacetime intelligence preparation of the battlespace centered on efforts to map Irans C4ISR architecture will be critical to defining U.S. targeting priorities in the first days of conflict. Given sufficient warning, U.S. commanders could also increase the depth of their ISR capabilities in theater, e.g., by positioning surveillance assets to hardened or distributed bases in Southwest Asia; deploying additional undersea sensors at key locations in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman; and possibly seeding small, inexpensive sensors that are capable of detecting ground units deploying to Irans coastal areas. A BLINDING CAMPAIGN. At the start of hostilities, U.S. forces should move aggressively to degrade, disrupt, and destroy Irans C4ISR networks. U.S. counter-network operations should integrate long-range strikes, undersea warfare, electronic warfare, and offensive cyberspace operations against Irans early warning radars, maritime surveillance systems, and C2 facilities.157 Toward this end, bombers operating out of re157

DoD defines electronic warfare as operations to secure and maintain freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare is subdivided into electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support. Electronic attack includes the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capabilities. See Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, January 27, 2007, pp. vvi and I-2I-4, accessible online at [Link]

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mote or peripheral bases and SSNs and SSGNs in the Arabian Sea would launch a first wave of kinetic strikes using precision-guided standoff weapons against Irans fixed sensors and C2 nodes. U.S. special operations forces inserted into Iran could augment these strikes by disabling known C4ISR assets that are difficult to kill with standoff weapons, such as nodes in fiber optics networks. Degrading Irans C4ISR networks and air defenses will help pave the way for U.S. Air Force and Navy penetrating aircraft to attack Irans mobile radars, and command and control systems. The U.S. militarys counter-network operations should also exploit its comparative advantage in advanced systems capable of dominating the electronic spectrum. Conducting cyber strikes to degrade enemy C4ISR networks could reduce the effectiveness of Irans offensive operations and reduce the threat to U.S. long-range systems penetrating hostile airspace. Long-range strike capabilities configured to counter early warning and target acquisition systems could prove crucial to the success of a blinding

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campaign.158 Electronic jamming could also prevent civilian vessels from providing information about the location and disposition of U.S. Navy surface vessels and legitimate commercial cargo ships. Future directed-energy capabilities such as high powered microwave (HPM) weapons that damage, disrupt, or destroy electronic systems would provide U.S. commanders with a potentially game-changing weapon for crippling Irans use of the electromagnetic spectrum.159 COUNTERING IRANS COUNTER-NETWORK OPERATIONS. Neutralizing Irans ability to degrade the U.S. militarys use of space and cyberspace will almost certainly be another important aspect of the network/counter-network competition. Although it is unlikely that Irans counter-space capabilities will
158

Although EC-130Hs have played a key role in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade, using this cargo aircraft-based weapons system for airborne electronic attack missions in high threat areas would likely result in high attrition levels. The Navys EA-18G Growlers are more survivable than EC-130Hs, but may lack the range and persistence needed to operate in the northern part of the Persian Gulf, especially if they are operating from aircraft carriers that are located hundreds of miles from Irans coastline. The term directed energy is used by the Department of Defense to describe a wide range of non-kinetic capabilities that produce a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles to damage or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel in the air, sea, space and land domains. DE devices are defined as systems using directed energy primarily for a purpose other than as a weapon that may include laser rangefinders and designators used against sensors that are sensitive to light. Finally, directed energy warfare includes actions taken to protect friendly equipment, facilities, and personnel and retain friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. See Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010, pp. 108109, accessible online at [Link]

159

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pose nearly as significant a threat to U.S. satellites as capabilities fielded by the PLA, it will be important to protect the U.S. militarys space architectureincluding vulnerable ground stations in the United States and abroadfrom possible attacks, including attacks by Irans terrorist proxies.160 Iran could use groundbased jammers to disrupt GPS and space-based and airborne C4ISR, particularly around high-value targets. Since these jammers could affect GPS-guided munitions, their neutralization would be important in winning the network/counter-network competition. Similarly, it should be anticipated that Iran and its proxies will conduct offensive cyber attacks. to exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade networks needed to orchestrate U.S. force deployments and operations.161 If successful, these attacks could extend Central Commands operational timelines significantly.162 Moreover, Iran might attempt to employ cyber strikes to disrupt the control systems or data underpinning U.S. civilian power grids and telecom160 161

For a description of the PLAs counter-network capabilities, see AirSea Battle, pp. 2729. These proxies could include states that decide to covertly support Iran by conducting cyberspace attacks against U.S. networks. Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 2011), p. 3.

162

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munications networks. These attacks could come in the form of false information, or they may be direct actions to disrupt or corrupt the flow of information. Thus, computer network defense (CND) operations that are integrated across the U.S. militarys networks may be needed to prevent Iran from using cyberspace as part of a broader strategy to impose costs on the United States. An integrated defense against Iranian counter-network operations should begin well before the onset of an actual conflict. Developing a detailed understanding of Irans counter-network capabilities, especially its ability to create effects in cyberspace that may be difficult to attribute, would help U.S. commanders to develop an appropriate network defense battle plan. More tangibly, fielding an integrated, multi-layered network of space-based, airborne and terrestrial information capabilities would reduce U.S. vulnerability to counter-network attacks. This architecture could include high-altitude, very long endurance unmanned aircraft to act as airborne C2 nodes and conduct wide area surveillance in support of other systems penetrating deep into Iran. To reduce overall demand on

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U.S. C4ISR networks and improve early operations in communications-degraded areas, Central Command could use advanced manned platforms that have the independent ability to find, fix, track, and strike mobile targets.163 Central Command will need to sustain its counternetwork operations at an appropriate level of effort throughout a campaign to prevent Iran from regenerating its C4ISR capabilities and adopting nontraditional work-arounds, such as relying on cellular telephone networks, reports from local populations, or using information collected through the Internet and from international commercial broadcasts. Similarly, the U.S. military should anticipate that Irans efforts to degrade U.S. C4ISR capabilities will continue throughout the campaign. U.S. forces penetrating Iranian airspace should expect to operate under conditions of localized degradation of communications and PNT information from GPS.

163

Capabilities with this degree of autonomy have yet to be developed by DoD.

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Winning the Missile Competition Reducing the enemys capacity to launch missile attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, bases, and sensitive civilian infrastructure should be a major objective of an enabling operational concept. Given the difficulty of defending against missile salvosespecially if the United States is unable to reinforce its BMD posture before the start of hostilitiesCentral Command should weight its early efforts toward offensive operations to destroy or suppress ASCMs and ballistic missiles before they are launched; i.e., focus on killing the archer rather than the arrows. Initiating offensive counter-missile strikes as early as possible will help Central Command to seize the initiative, as compared to a defense-dominant operational concept that could cede the initiative to the enemy. Central Command should expect to sustain countermissile operations throughout the conflict, especially since enemy commanders may choose to husband their most capable ASCMs and ballistic missiles for the most lucrative targeting opportunities, or fire them only when it is reasonably certain that their

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launchers will not be destroyed in the process.164 Given the difficulty in finding and targeting mobile TELs and ASCM launchers deployed by an enemy with excellent decoy and deception tactics, it is possible that an offensive counter-missile campaign may become more of a missile-suppression rather than missile-destruction effort. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. Early offensive operations to degrade the missile threat at its origins would require reconnaissance and strike systems capable of operating at extended ranges and persisting in enemy airspace. Staging from generally secure locations, a future long-range strike family of systemsincluding stealth bombers, a low-observable and persistent UCLASS, air- and sea-launched standoff munitions, and airborne electronic attack capabilitiesshould accord priority to finding, fixing, tracking, and destroying Irans missile forces and their supporting infrastructure. If available in theater, land-based systems such as the Armys
164

It should also be expected that Iran will likely employ aggressive camouflage, concealment, and deception tactics to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. precision targeting against Irans missile launchers and missile infrastructure.

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air transportable and mobile Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) armed with extended-range ATACMS could provide supporting counter-battery fires in all weather conditions.165 Since many Iranian missile launchers and their supporting capabilities will be mounted on mobile platforms, U.S. air, sea, and land-based countermissile strikes will need timely, precise targeting information. Acquiring this information in nonpermissive areas will be a major challenge for the U.S. military. In fact, the most difficult element of a counter-missile offensive against Iran may well be locating TELs and mobile ASCM launchers that have the capability to shoot and scoot quickly or are masked by the use of deception, camouflage and other concealment tactics. Targeting information could be self-generated by highly persistent, penetrating strike platforms equipped with on-board ground moving target indicator (GMTI) systems, or provided by manned or unmanned stealthy surveillance aircraft with
165

The Army Tactical Missile System ATACMS Block I unitary warhead variant can reach targets out to 300 kilometers. See Lockheed Martin Successfully Validates ATACMS Missile Long-Term Reliability, February 26, 2009, accessible online at [Link] MFC_022609_Lockheed [Link].

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sensor-to-shooter data links that compress the kill chain.166 Special operations forces inserted into Iran using stealthy air and sea platforms capable of operating over extended distances could also help locate and designate high-value targets for airstrikes.167 These capabilities, however, are either not a part of the U.S. militarys current force, or are not numerous enough to sustain a counter-missile campaign over long distances against many hundreds, if not thousands of aimpoints in high-threat areas. MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS. Although a successful counter-missile offensive would decrease Irans coercive power, it is highly unlikely that offensive operations alone will prevent Iran from launching ballistic and cruise attacks, especially if Iran initiates hostilities. Thus, a layered defense that can intercept ballistic missiles at all stages of their flightboost/ascent, mid-course, and terminalwould be an important aspect of dealing with Irans missile threat.
166

The kill chain is described by the U.S. Air Force as a six-stage cycle: find, fix, track, target, engage and assess, or F2T2EA. Creating such machine-to-machine interfaces could reduce kill chain timing. A new stealthy platform would be required to insert SOF by air into denied areas (see Chapter 4).

167

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A ballistic missile may be most vulnerable when it is in its boost/ascent phase of flight, given its relatively low speed and high heat signature during that phase. According to General Robert C. Kehler, former Commander of the Air Forces Space Command, killing missiles in their boost/ascent phase would be a high priority, as it precludes the missiles from deploying countermeasures such as chaff and other decoys. It would also reduce the number of very expensive kinetic interceptors that would be needed to defeat enemy missile warheads during their terminal phase of flight and avoid unwanted collateral damage created by missile interceptions over friendly territory.168 Toward this end, the U.S. military has expressed interest in developing air launched hit-to-kill (ALHK) weapons that could be carried by air platforms capable of penetrating medium-threat and

168

General Kehler is now the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. See Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing on Budget Request for National Security Space and Missile Defense Program, May 29, 2009, p. 10, accessible online at [Link] [Link].

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high-threat areas.169 Assuming recent progress in directed energy research continues, in the next decade directed energy weapons mounted on platforms with sufficient power and cooling capacity to generate a sufficiently lethal beam of energy could provide another means of defeating ballistic missiles as they ascend into their ballistic trajectory. Although land- and sea-based kinetic missile defenses will be a critical part of a U.S. counter-missile operation against Iran, given their close to prohibitive cost it is highly unlikely there will be enough of them in the Persian Gulf at the start of a conflict to defend against multiple missile salvos with a high degree of effectiveness. This will be especially true if threat conditions curtail resupply operations or if resupply is limited to strategic airlift. Moreover, current BMD systems and their interceptor missiles remain extremely expensive, creating the opportunity
169

The Air Force has expressed interest in an ALHK missile that could be carried on a fighter or bomber. ALHK could be a derivative of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile for intercepting ballistic missiles high in the atmosphere, or it could be a modified version of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) for low atmosphere inflight intercepts. The Network Centric Airborne Defense Element (NCADE), a second concept proposed by industry, would marry an AMRAAM with an existing IR seeker head to create a ballistic missile interceptor that could cost approximately $1 million each. See [Link] and [Link] [Link]/ncade-an-abm-amraam-03305/. DoD has cancelled two programs over the last three yearsthe Airborne Laser, and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor programsthat were intended to develop systems to defeat ballistic missiles in their boost/ ascent phase.

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for Iran to use salvos of short-range and mediumrange ballistic missiles to impose disproportionate costs on the United States. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile costs $3.3 million per copy, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile $9 million each, and a single future Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) may cost $1015 million.170 At these prices, defending against a single salvo of twenty or thirty inbound missiles could cost well over $100 million, assuming two interceptors are fired at each incoming threat as indicated by the U.S. militarys current missile defense doctrine.171 Iran could increase this unfavorable cost-exchange ratio by launching inaccurate dumb missiles to force U.S. defenders to waste their expensive interceptors, opening the door for follow-on salvos of newer, more accurate weapons, or by using ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable
170

See DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Gen. Cartwright, September 17, 2009, accessible at [Link] During a news conference to explain DoDs European missile-defense system, General Cartwright explained that a PAC-3 costs about $3.3 million per missile; a SM-3 Block I, Mod A about $9.510 million; a SM-3 Block IB about $1315 million; and a THAAD missile about $9 million per unit. These costs exclude the price of the missiles launch platforms and supporting infrastructure. It is standard operating procedure to use multiple interceptors to achieve a high probability of kill against an incoming ballistic missile. See General Patrick OReilly, statement before the House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee, April 2, 2009, accessible online at [Link] [Link]/images/stories/pdf/def/Patrick_OReilly_04_02_09.pdf.

171

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reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads should it develop the technology to do so. In the future, U.S. forces may be able to use a mix of kinetic interceptors and directed energy weapons to create a layered defense capable of interdicting swarms of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as G-RAMM. Directed energy weapons that are capable of self-generating a nearly infinite number of rounds for the cost of the fuel needed to create the requisite directed energy (e.g., electric solid-state lasers) could help shift the missile competition in favor of the United States. They would also help relieve the strain on the U.S. militarys expeditionary logistics network and reduce the need for ships with a BMD mission to leave station for extended periods of time to rearm with kinetic interceptors. In other words, new directed energy missile defenses may give future commanders the means to kill the arrows as well as the archer, and do so with a costexchange ratio that favors the U.S. military far more than is currently the case.

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Establishing Localized Air and Maritime Superiority Creating Pockets of Air Superiority During the opening stages of an air campaign against Iran, it would be important to establish pockets of air superiority sufficient to enable operations conducted within range of Irans air defenses. This could be a particularly challenging task if the U.S. Air Force lacks sufficient close-in fighter bases and the Navy is unable to operate its carriers within a few hundred miles of Iran. Moreover, future U.S. counter-air operations against an Iranian IADS may not constitute a roll-back campaign in the traditional sense. Even though it is doubtful that Iran will field an IADS that approaches the sophistication of the PLAs air defense network in the near-term, it should be assumed that Iran will seek to husband its most capable mobile SAMs so they can be used against U.S. aircraft later in a campaign, in a manner similar to that employed by the Serbian forces during the 1999 Kosovo War. Rather than conduct a determined defense of all potential high-value target

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areas, Iranian SAM operators could control their radar emissions, frequently change their locations, and use decoys and camouflage to avoid detection and create pop-up SAM ambushes.172 Similarly, Iran may choose to hide some of its fighters in hardened shelters located deep in its interior to prevent their early destruction. To counter Irans air defense network in being tactics, the U.S. military could employ stealth platforms that are capable of avoiding detection, and use decoys and electronic warfare systems to spoof and goad enemy SAM operators into activating their radars and thus revealing their locations. DoDs new Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD) would seem to be particularly well-suited for this mission.173 Even with these capability enhancements, the U.S. military should plan for a sustained effort to suppress air defense threats that may pop-up without warning throughout the course of an air campaign against Iran.
172 173

It is not publicly known the extent to which Iranian SAM crews have been trained in these tactics. MALDs, which could be deployed on a variety of current and future aircraft, can penetrate approximately 500 nautical miles and replicate a false aircraft signature to confuse enemy air defenses. The MALD-Jammer (MALD-J), a variant of MALD, is designed to provide a loitering capability that will jam enemy air defenses.

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Achieving Maritime Superiority: A Joint Theater Entry Operation Tasks critical to reestablishing sea lines of communication in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf are likely to include suppressing undersea threats, defending against ASCMs and swarming fast attack craft, and clearing mines. This assessment finds that U.S. operations to clear mines should not entail deploying MCM assets into the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf until Irans A2/AD systems have been suppressed. Rather, U.S. and coalition forces should adopt an approach that establishes localized control of the airspace, suppresses Irans FAC, coastal ASCM batteries and G-RAMM forces, and only then proceeds with MCM operations to reopen the Strait. Instead of looking at each of these tasks individually, the following section addresses them as part of a joint theaterentry operation designed to seize Iranian territory along the Strait of Hormuzs northern coast, key islands around the Strait, and the Gulf of Oman. These lodgments would be focused on suppressing threats against ships operating in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, rather than to create forward operating bases preparatory to a full-scale land invasion of Iran.

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ARE FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS IN A2/ AD ENVIRONMENTS FEASIBLE? Some Defense Department leaders have publicly questioned the feasibility of conducting amphibious forcible entry operations in light of the proliferation of ASCMs and other precision-guided munitions. In August 2010, Secretary Gates challenged the Marine Corps to examine its doctrine and composition of its force while taking into consideration the emergence of these threats:
Looking ahead, I do think it is proper to ask whether large-scale amphibious assault landings along the lines of Inchon are feasible. New anti-ship missiles with long range and high accuracy may make it necessary to debark from ships 25, 40 or 60 or more miles at sea.174

Robert Work and Frank Hoffman have observed that future amphibious assaults will necessarily be different from those conducted in the pastprimarily because the virtual monopoly the United States has
174

See Robert M. Gates, George P. Shultz Lecture, August 12, 2010, accessible online at [Link] In January 2011, Gates announced the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a system that many considered as essential to future amphibious operations. As he did so, however, Gates was careful to note that the decision does not call into question the Marines amphibious assault mission. See [Link] aspx? speechid=1527.

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long enjoyed in guided weapon battle networks is going away.175 The article then outlined the basic elements of a joint theater-entry operation to gain and secure lodgments ashore and enable the deployment of follow-on forces into an area of operations:
>

Achieve air, sea, undersea, and battle-network superiority in an objective area; Neutralize an enemys anti-ship capabilities and reduce G-RAMM threats ashore; and After sufficient preparation of the battlespace, conduct an amphibious landing, possibly supported by airborne troops, to create a lodgment ashore.176

>

>

Work and Hoffman explained that their use of the term theater-entry operations is intended to offer a more appropriate context and argument for exploiting the contributions of amphibious warfare in this century, as compared to forcible entry that recalls amphibious forces storming a contested

175

Robert O. Work and Frank G. Hoffman, Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century, Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 11, November 2010, accessible online at [Link] 2010-11/hitting-beach-21st-century. Robert Work is the Undersecretary of the Navy. Ibid.

176

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shoreline a la Tarawa or Iwo Jima during the Second World War.177 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS. Based on this framework, a joint theater-entry operation to gain control over the Strait of Hormuz and open the door to the Persian Gulf would first suppress longer-range anti-access threatsballistic missiles, ASCMs, UAVs, FACs, and diesel submarinesthat could be used against U.S. expeditionary forces in the approaches to an amphibious objective area. Other preparatory operations could include airstrikes to destroy IRGCN military facilities and forces located along the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, especially its large air station, headquarters, and port facilities at Bandar Abbas. Likely targeting priorities would include navy vessels in port, piers, fuel and munitions storage, and C4ISR networks used to coordinate Irans sea denial operations. U.S. long-range aircraft could also conduct offensive counter-mining
177

Ibid. Work and Hoffman also note that is not the model the NavyMarine Corps team should prepare for or the mission the Department of the Navy should invest in. DoDs definition for forcible entry operations can be found in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010, p. 144, accessible online at [Link] pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

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missions against Iranian ports and harbors to severely hamper Iranian naval operations and help prepare the battlespace for an amphibious landing. As joint air forces suppress Iranian extendedrange systems that could threaten amphibious landing operations, Marine Corps expeditionary units along with Army airborne and air assault units and their supporting logistics infrastructure could deploy to suitable forward staging locationsif availablesuch as ports in Oman or even Djibouti. These preparatory actions may require weeks, not days to complete.178 Considering that it may take somewhere between 45 and 60 days to assemble the ships179 needed to support a large amphibious assault force, there should be sufficient time to prepare the battlespace and enable an expeditionary fleet to close within twenty or thirty nautical miles
178

See comments by Undersecretary Robert Work in Small Wars Journal, August 10, 2010, accessible online at [Link] In an antiaccess environment where the enemy has a battle network capable of firing salvos of guided weapons, the initial phase of any theater entry operation will require achieving air, sea, undersea, and overall battle network superiority. This will mean this type of operation will be deliberate and take some time to develop. This does not mean damn the G-RAMM, full speed ahead. It means, take your time, roll the G-RAMM threat back, and then land at a time and place of your own choosing. No 10-day landings in this environment. See remarks by Lieutenant General George J. Flynn, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, at a June 9, 2011 roundtable discussion on The Future of Amphibious Operations and the Role of the U.S. Marine Corps, audio accessible online at [Link] org/multimedia/audio-future-amphibious-operations-and-role-us-marine-corps.

179

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of an objective landing area along Irans sparsely populated southern coastline (see Figure 10).180 EXECUTING A JOINT AMPHIBIOUS LANDING. With preparatory actions completed, a force of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), supported by SOF and possibly Army airborne and air assault units, could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central Commands choosing.181 An objective area for an amphibious landing should be located where enemy A2/AD threats have been suppressed, and may not be in proximity to existing ports, airfields, and logistics infrastructure.182 Immediately after landing, SOF, Marine Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within range to use G-RAMM weapons. Non-lethal capabilities and mobile high-energy laser weapons could help deny hostile forces access to key areas and create a defensive barrier against
180

The actual location of an amphibious objective area would be driven by a number of factors, including threat density, coastal terrain features, availability of a suitable natural or man-made harbor, tidal factors, etc. For illustrative purposes only, Figure 10 depicts an amphibious landing at a harbor on Irans coast that is roughly across the Gulf of Oman from Muscat. Two MEBs are used as an example landing force, not to suggest or recommend a specific requirement. Work and Hoffman, Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century.

181 182

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G-RAMM attacks. U.S. forces could then use this secure lodgment as a jumping-off point for followon assaults up the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, including vulnerable U.S. MCM forces.183 Throughout a theater-entry operation, Air Force and Navy surveillance and strike aircraft, along with Army ATACMS stationed in the UAE or Oman, if available, could help suppress Irans long-range ballistic missile and ASCM threats, provide close air support to expeditionary forces, and prevent enemy ground forces from massing to execute counterattacks. SEIZING ISLANDS AT STRATEGIC LOCATIONS. In addition to creating lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just inside the Gulfincluding AbuMusa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunbshould be targeted by precision strikes and occupied by U.S. expeditionary forces as required (see item 7 in Figure
183

U.S. forces may be able to use Road 98 and Road 91 linking settlements located along Irans southeastern coastline. Road 91 connects with Road 94 which leads sixty kilometers directly to Bandar Abbas, location of the IRGCNs main operating base on the Strait of Hormuz. As the crow flies, it is approximately 460 kilometers between Konarak and Bandar Abbas.

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F I G U R E 1 0. A N I L L U S T R AT I V E J O I N T T H E AT E R - E N T RY O P E R AT I O N

10).184 If permitted to remain under the command of the IRGCN, these islands could be staging locations for operations to re-seed minefields and harass U.S. forces and civilian shipping transiting the Strait. CLEARING THE PATH INTO THE PERSIAN GULF. Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs, rotary wing aircraft, and supporting
184

Iran has created a network of underground tunnels and missile bunkers on many of these islands, turning them into static warships. See Fariboz Haghshenass, Irans Asymmetric Naval Warfare, Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), Policy Focus #87, September 2008, p. 18, accessible online at[Link]

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sensors. To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy commercial vessels capable of dispensing mines. Although it is unknown to what extent Iran will expand its inventory of smart mines in the future, history has shown that even a small number of mines placed in shipping lanes have been able to halt surface traffic when their presence was known.185 Moreover, as mine countermeasure operations in 1991 and 2003 suggest, clearing large areas in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf of mines could require a month or even longer.186

OTHER POTENTIAL CAMPAIGN OPERATIONS Although a full assessment of other lines of operation that may comprise a comprehensive Persian Gulf campaign plan is beyond the scope of this assessment, it is likely that they could include eliminating
185 186

Talmadge, Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, p. 90. Ibid., p. 97.

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Irans WMD capabilities, countering proxy groups equipped with G-RAMM, imposing costs on Iran, and conducting unconventional warfare. In terms of timing, these lines of operations might commence at the beginning of the conflict, as Irans G-RAMM armed proxies and nuclear weapons would influence the way the United States thinks about projecting power to the Persian Gulf. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Barring an unforeseen change in the trajectory of its nuclear program, it should be assumed that Iran will possess a small number of operational nuclear weapons within the timeframe of this assessment, and may be prepared to use them in a variety of direct and indirect ways to bolster its A2/AD strategy.187 The threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation or expansion of U.S. war objectives to include regime change in Tehran may render direct Iranian nuclear strikes, especially against U.S. forces, unlikely. However, should the Iranian regime feel sufficiently threatened, or if it should devolve control of its nuclear
187

Scott D. Sagan, How to Keep the Bomb from Iran, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5, ([Link]., 2006), p. 45; and James. M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, After Iran Gets the Bomb, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2, ([Link]. 2010), p. 33.

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forces to subordinate commanders capable of employing these weapons on their own, it is possible that U.S. forces and forward installations may come under nuclear attack. Iran could also choose to supply one of its proxies with the means to conduct nuclear terrorism, or detonate a nuclear weapon in the upper atmosphere to create a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) to degrade or destroy unprotected electronic equipment and disrupt radio-frequency communications over a wide area. Although the effects of such a detonation could damage some Iranian systems operating within the HEMP field, the effects are likely to be far more detrimental to U.S. forces, which rely heavily on electronic systems and near-constant access to C4ISR networks. Since a HEMP detonation over the Gulf of Oman or Arabian Sea may not result in a large number of casualties, Iran may believe that it could conduct such an attack at less risk of a nuclear response from the United States.188

188

Clay Wilson, High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Powered Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat Assessments, Congressional Research Service, July 21, 2008, pp. 911, 1416, accessible online at [Link]

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Iran may also be inclined to use the threat of its nuclear weapons indirectly as a shield, behind which it may believe it could successfully pursue its hegemonic objectives. For example, if Iran possessed even a small number of nuclear weapons it might be tempted to challenge its neighbors in the Persian Gulf to reduce their oil production and limit the presence of U.S. troops on their territories.189 A nuclear-armed Iran may also feel emboldened to pursue a more concerted coercive campaign against its neighbors, or to support more aggressive actions by its network of proxies.190 Regardless of the likelihood of Iran using nuclear weapons during a future conflict, or the manner in which these weapons might be used, the consequences of their use would be so grave that they cannot be discounted by U.S. planning. Toward this end, the United States should take steps to deter an Iranian nuclear attack, prepare to deny it the ability to employ or transfer nuclear weapons to another state or proxy terrorist group, defend against nuclear-armed
189 190

Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets the Bomb, p. 36. Eric Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery, The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 1, Jan./Feb. 2011, p. 67; and Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets the Bomb, pp. 34, 36.

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missile attacks should deterrence fail, prepare to manage the effects of nuclear attacks, and maintain a sufficiently robust portfolio of conventional and nuclear response options. Extended Deterrence Deterring an Iranian nuclear strike against states in the Persian Gulf could be considerably more difficult than deterring an attack against U.S. forces operating in the region. Implementing an extended deterrence regime in the Middle East akin to that which the United States used to deter aggression against its European and Asian allies during the Cold War may be an appropriate U.S. response should Iran develop or obtain nuclear weapons.191 However, the lack of a formal regional security institution in the Persian Gulf analogous to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), combined with questions over how far the United States would be willing to go to unilaterally defend non-democratic Arab regimes, could undermine the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence.
191

Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery, The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran, p. 67.

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The United States may be able to create a more credible deterrent posture and solidify its access to forward basing by tying its extended deterrence guarantees to the direct participation of Gulf powers in a conflict with Iran, to include the provision of basing access and the employment of their armed forces. In effect, this would make these states U.S. allies in the event of a war with a nuclear-armed Iran. Making the umbrella of extended deterrence contingent on such actions, rather than simply a one-sided guarantee, may increase American public support for a policy of extended deterrence. The possibility of losing this deterrent guarantee may also reduce the susceptibility of some Gulf states to Iranian coercion. WMD Elimination Despite these measures, nuclear deterrence may not hold during a future conflict with Iran. Given the opacity of the decision making process in Tehran, it may be difficult for U.S. commanders to avoid crossing the Iranian regimes red lines and unwittingly eliciting a nuclear response. Alternatively,

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should the regime devolve operational control of its weapons to subordinate commanders, the possibility exists that a rogue individual or small group of Iranian military personnel could launch a nuclear attack.192 Such a scenario is far from fanciful since the IRGC would likely retain control of Irans nuclear arsenal and the ranks of the IRGC contain a sizeable population of ideologically indoctrinated true believers.193 Given that deterrence measures alone may not succeed, Central Command should be prepared to undertake efforts to deny Iran the ability to transfer or employ nuclear weapons. These efforts would likely be in conjunction with an ongoing U.S. line of operation to suppress Iranian ballistic missiles. Efforts to deny Iran the ability to use its nuclear weapons should be balanced against the desire to not force the Iranian regime into an unstable use them or lose them position that may make a nuclear attack more likely. To that end, Central Command may wish to focus its initial counter-WMD efforts on destroying
Ibid., pp. 7374; Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets the Bomb, p. 34; and Sagan, How to Keep the Bomb from Iran, p. 53. Sagan, How to Keep the Bomb from Iran, p. 53.

192

193

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Irans operational nuclear weapons and preventing weapons transfers, rather than on attacking Irans nuclear weapons command and control links. Defending Against WMD Attacks A WMD elimination campaign would likely be hampered by a lack of adequate intelligence on the disposition of Irans nuclear forces. Central Command should therefore consider establishing layered missile defenses around major U.S. installations and force concentrations, as well as key partner population centers within range of Irans nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. These layered defenses could consist of airborne and seaborne systems such as Network Centric Airborne Defense Element (NCADE) and SM-3 missiles, respectively, as well as ground-based terminal defenses such as THAAD, PAC-3 and (if they prove feasible) future directed-energy systems. Mitigating the Effects of a Nuclear Attack Even though a multi-layered ballistic missile defense architecture could be more effective than a defensive

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network that relies on only one or two types of kinetic interceptors, it should not be assumed that it will be possible to interdict successfully every incoming missile. Iran could fire multiple salvos of missiles with conventional warheads against a given target to deplete its defenses before launching a follow-up attack with one or more nuclear-armed missiles. Iran may also resort to unconventional means of nuclear weapons delivery if it believes U.S. missile defenses to be sufficiently effective. Given the improbability of defending against every attack, Central Command should seek to diminish the potential effects of a nuclear detonation by relocating critical theater assets to locations that are out of range of Irans ballistic missiles and dispersing forces remaining in the Persian Gulf to complicate missile targeting.194 In addition, Central Command should develop the ability to reconstitute its command and control networks in the event of a nuclear HEMP attack, and prepare to sustain operations, although at reduced tempo, in irradiated environments.

194

Potential U.S. military posture initiatives in the Persian Gulf region are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

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Together, steps taken to deter, deny, defend against, and diminish the effects of an Iranian nuclear strike could convince Irans leaders that the use of nuclear weapons would not be worth the devastating consequences of a U.S. response. Regardless of the nature of a war with Iran, the United States will maintain its escalatory strategic advantage. Nevertheless, there would remain the possibility that Irans regime or a rogue commander may choose to use a nuclear weapon against the United States or its regional partners regardless of the consequences. Given these considerations, the best course of action may therefore be to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons altogether. Countering Proxy Groups Equipped With G-RAMM Proxy warfare that combines advanced weapons with guerrilla tactics would be a key challenge for U.S. forces and host governments in the Persian Gulf. If employed in significant quantities, G-RAMM weapons could inflict high and potentially prohibitive costs on U.S. forces and infrastructure needed to sustain military operations in the Persian Gulf.

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A line of operation to counter this threat would likely include three sub-missions: degrading and defending against the G-RAMM capabilities of Irans proxies, preventing Iran from resupplying its proxies with advanced weapons, disrupting Irans command and control links with its proxy groups, and supporting partners counter G-RAMM efforts. Attriting proxy leadership and Iranian intelligence assets in partner states would likely be a follow-on mission, given the time and resource intensive nature of manhunting operations. Defending Against G-RAMM Attacks U.S. electronic warfare assets might be able to degrade the guidance systems that G-RAMM weapons depend on, while a mixture of directed energy and kinetic capabilities could provide active terminal defenses. U.S. manned and unmanned aircraft could establish hunter-killer air patrols to attrite and harry proxy forces, thereby preventing or disrupting G-RAMM attacks. These hunter-killer patrols could use a mixture of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons to interrupt attacks. Equipping aircraft with directed energy

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systems capable of destroying or degrading the electronics and sensors that G-RAMM systems rely on would be useful, especially in densely populated areas where kinetic weapons could create unwanted collateral damage. These counter-G-RAMM missions could be conducted by short-range, nonstealthy aircraft that deploy into the theater following the success of a joint theater entry operation, which would free up long-range, stealthy platforms to focus on other missions that require their capabilities. On the ground, unattended sensors and antipersonnel weapons could prevent proxy forces from approaching U.S. operating locations. Partner forces, perhaps aided or advised by small U.S. SOF teams, could patrol base perimeters to further suppress G-RAMM attacks. Hardening forward bases, and particularly vulnerable assets such as aircraft and key single points of failure such as petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) storage and handling facilities would also help protect against both G-RAMM and ballistic missile attacks. Countering the G-RAMM capabilities of Irans proxies should include operations to prevent Iran

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from providing them with material support. This has proven quite difficult in Iraq, especially since Iraq and Iran share a long border. It may be easier for the U.S. to use its air and sea control capabilities to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to more distant places such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Disrupting Command and Control Enhancing the active and passive defenses of bases within range of G-RAMM threats is a necessary but insufficient response to countering proxy attacks. A more comprehensive approach would find U.S. and partner forces disrupting and degrading the ability of Iran and its agents to communicate with proxy groups and orchestrate their actions. Crucially, it should not be assumed that Irans proxies are simply extensions of the Iranian state. Rather, Irans proxies are likely to have their own goals and needs. Understanding these goals, and conducting operations to penetrate and exploit the communications links between Iran and its proxies could help U.S. forces to prevent coordinated attacks and break the cohesion between proxy groups and their sponsors in Tehran.

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Building Partner Capacity Augmenting the counterterrorism capacity of the United States Persian Gulf partners in peacetime would be another means of reducing the potential for Irans proxies to threaten regional stability. Should partner counterterrorism capacity be insufficient to combat Irans proxies, Central Command may need to deploy selected SOF units to target these groups as well as Iranian agents supporting them. These missions are time and resource-intensive, however, and the U.S. SOF units and C4ISR assets needed to conduct them may be otherwise occupied supporting higher priority operations. Given the local political sensitivities involved with deploying a large U.S. force to many Gulf states, the principal form of U.S. cooperation may have to be in the form of intelligence support to partner forces. Imposing Costs on Iran As part of a broader campaign plan, Central Command could implement operations that would impose costs on Tehran and deny it the sustenance its wartime economy needs. Iran would be highly dependent on

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external sources to replace equipment and munitions consumed used during a large and/or protracted military operation against the United States and its coalition partners. Iran also relies on revenue generated by its oil and gas imports, which in turn are dependent upon access to the Persian Gulf and open seas. Thus, operations to prevent Iran from importing war supplies and exporting oil and gas would likely, over time, create pressures in the form of declining military capabilities and rising internal opposition that may prove unbearable to the regime. If necessary, the United States would have the option to directly impose costs as part of a strategy to punish Iran by attacking its industrial base, energy infrastructure, and other targets that could cripple the Iranian state. Setting Conditions for Unconventional Regime Change Throughout a conflict, the United States could choose to implement a course of action designed to destabilize Irans regime and set the conditions for a regime change from within. Perhaps coupled with actions to impose costs on Iran, U.S. special operations and air

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forces could conduct unconventional warfare (UW) supporting internal Iranian partisans to overthrow the regime.195 Such an internal insurgency could have the added benefit of forcing Irans leadership to divert military resources toward internal defense. The effectiveness of an unconventional warfare campaign would be highly dependent on leveraging existing internal opposition movements as occurred during operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.

195

Doctrinally, unconventional warfare is defined as those activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. The United States may engage in UW across the spectrum of armed conflict from major campaigns to limited contingency operations. See Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, April 11, 2001, p. II9, accessible online at [Link]

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CHAPTER 4 > INITIATIVES TO SUPPORT

AN ENABLING OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

This report concludes by recommending changes to DoDs program of record that are needed to sustain the U.S. militarys freedom of action against Irans emerging A2/AD complex. Chapter 4 begins by addressing capability initiatives, and is roughly organized to parallel the discussion in Chapter 3. It proceeds to describe options for developing a forward basing posture to support an enabling operational concept. These recommendations represent a first cut at shifting U.S. defense priorities. They should be refined through more detailed analysis that includes war games, diplomatic engagement with partners in the region to determine what they can contribute and in what time frame, and enhanced intelligence regarding the Iranian militarys long-term projected strengths and weaknesses.

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RECOMMENDED CAPABILITY INITIATIVES The items discussed below are not intended to be an exhaustive listing of all the capabilities that could be needed for future Persian Gulf power-projection operations. Instead, recommendations focus on major new capabilities that may have significant potential to help achieve the operational objectives described in Chapter 3. Some of these capabilities are under development, and should be augmented. Others are also part of the defense program, and need to be accorded priority in the face of major cuts to the defense budget. Still others are new capabilities that would need to become part of the Defense Departments program of record. Given the current dire fiscal environment, this assessment also identifies, where possible, capabilities that might be accorded reduced emphasis. CAPABILITIES TO REDUCE IRANS A2/AD THREATS Long-Range Penetrating Surveillance and Strike The U.S. military should rebalance its thirty-year aircraft procurement plan to place greater emphasis

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on multi-mission capabilities with increased range, persistence, and survivability. Without new longrange penetrating surveillance and strike aircraft, namely an optionally manned bomber for the Air Force and a penetrating UCLASS for the Navy, it would be extremely difficult to conduct an enabling operational concept as envisioned by this report. NEW LONG-RANGE STRIKE BOMBER. The Department of Defense has announced that it will procure 80 to 100 new penetrating bombers, with an initial capability scheduled to be on the ramp in the mid-2020s. The decision to procure a significant number of new bombers is a welcome step toward halting DoDs slide toward a future force that is heavily weighted toward short-range aircraft that emerging A2/AD threats will render progressively less effective. Given projected resource constraints, the U.S. military should explore additional options for reducing its reliance on short-range surveillance and strike capabilities in favor of systems able to fight from extended range against A2/AD battle networks.196
196

For an assessment of the desired capabilities and potential cost of a new optionally manned bomber, see Gunzinger, Sustaining Americas Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike.

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FUTURE SEA-BASED UNMANNED SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKES. As DoD considers how it should prioritize resources for future unmanned aircraft, it will be important to strike the right balance between UAS capable of operating in permissive and non-permissive threat areas. Today, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority DoDs unmanned aircraft lack the attributes needed to survive in contested airspace, debate continues over where the U.S. military should place its emphasis. For example, the Navy intends to field a UCLASS that could extend the reach and persistence of its aircraft carrier airwings. There are lingering questions, however, over UCLASS requirements and whether it should be more like a non-stealthy Reaper UAS than a surveillance and strike capability with low observable attributes needed to penetrate and persist in emerging A2/AD operational environments.197 The
197

DoDs Deputy Director for Unmanned Warfare has stated, The specifics of the vehicle piece of that, I think to a large extent, will be driven by what the Navy and the OSD define for the initial capability set of UCLASS. For example, is it more like a Reaper capabilitysomewhat slower, straight wing, not very survivable? Or more like UCAS, [Unmanned Combat Air System] which is a much more survivable shape? See Amy Butler, Interview With DoD Unmanned Warfare Deputy, Aviation Week, August 26, 2010, accessible online at [Link] aw/gener ic/stor [Link]?cha nnel=unma nned& id=news/awst/2010/08/23/AW_08 _ 23 _ 2010_ p 6 2 - 2 4 6 9 3 7. x m l & h e a d l i n e =I n t e r v i e w % 2 0W i t h % 2 0 D o D % 2 0Un m a n n e d % 2 0Wa r f a r e % 20Deputy&next=0. For a description of all-aspect, broad-band stealth, see Gunzinger, Sustaining Americas Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike, pp. 3031.

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Navy is already planning to develop the MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS to provide maritime ISR from land bases, and a sea-based, rotary-wing MQ-8B Fire Scout UAS that could operate for up to twelve continuous hours. Moreover, the Fiscal Year 2012 defense budget includes a funding request for a third UAS called the Medium-Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System (MRMUAS) to provide sea-based ISR and strike in permissive and/or semi-permissive environments.198 These three unmanned systems will complement the 65 CAPS of non-stealthy Predators and Reapers that the Air Force is fielding. In light of program of record UAS investments and the emerging gap in unmanned aircraft that are able to support operations in non-permissive threat environments, the Navy should develop a stealthy UCLASS with sufficient range and persistence to support operational concepts envisaged by AirSea Battle and this report.199
198

DoDs Budget Item Justification for the MRUAS is accessible online at [Link] mil/descriptivesum/Y2012/Navy/0305237N_7_PB_2012.pdf. See the Navys MRMUAS Request For Information to industry accessible online at [Link] mode=form&id=55ab6d1c 4b7069f2b43778234739125d&tab=core&_cview=0. For additional analysis on the need for a low observable aircraft carrier-based unmanned platform, see Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System (Washington DC: CSBA, 2008); and Gunzinger, Sustaining Americas Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike, pp.6870.

199

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Standoff Precision Strike Capabilities As part of a balanced mix of precision strike capabilities, DoD should prioritize increasing the U.S. militarys ability to conduct standoff strikes early in a campaign against Iran without the need to depend on land bases located in the immediate theater of operations. CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE (CPGS). Capabilities that can support the conventional prompt global strike mission could be highly effective in attacking extremely high-value and timesensitive targets from launch locations that are well outside Irans A2/AD threat ring. For example, CPGS weapons could provide a useful niche capability to strike a limited number of very high-value, fleeting targets such as a nuclear weapon in transport or a ballistic missile battery preparing to launch a WMD warhead. Unfortunately, a prompt global strike ballistic missile or a hypersonic boost-glide conventional weapon with intercontinental range is likely to cost tens and potentially hundreds of millions of dollars apiece, making procuring a large number

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F I G U R E 1 1 . R E D U C I N G T H E U N D E R S E A S T R I K E M AG A Z I N E S H O R T FA L L

of them cost prohibitive.200 Furthermore, using these kinds of CPGS weapons against time-sensitive but comparatively inexpensive targets such as TELs carrying conventional missiles would result in a cost-exchange ratio that would be extremely unfavorable to the U.S. military. That said, there are some standoff precision strike capabilities that merit greater emphasis. UNDERSEA PRECISION STRIKE CAPABILITIES. The Navy should address the emerging shortfall in standoff strike weapons that can be delivered by its
200

For an excellent summary on CPGS alternatives, see Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2011), accessible online at [Link]

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undersea fleet (see Figure 11). All four of the Navys SSGNs, which can carry up to 154 TLAMs each, will be decommissioned by 2028.201 By 2030, these SSGN retirements, plus a planned decrease in the overall size of the SSN fleet, will shrink the Navys undersea strike magazine by 60 percent.202 To reduce this projected shortfall, the Navy could integrate Virginia Payload Modules (VPMs) into twenty planned Virginia-class SSNs starting with the procurement of Block V hulls in 2019. VPMs with four large-diameter launch tubes each would more than triple the TLAM capacity of a single Virginiaclass SSN from 12 to 40 missiles. Twenty VPMmodified SSNs would reduce the Navys projected undersea strike shortfall by more than 75 percent, and provide commanders with greater operational flexibility and more distributed strike capacity compared to todays SSN and SSGN fleet. The Navy could

201 202

A typical payload for an SSGN is 105 TLAMs. See Rear Admiral (RADM) Michael J. Connor, Investing in the Undersea Future, Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 137/6/1,300, June 2011, accessible online at [Link] RADM Connor is Director of the U.S. Navys Submarine Warfare Division. Of note, the Navys SSN fleet will fall below its target force level of forty-eight boats in 2024 and will decrease to thirty-nine boats by 2030. See Ronald ORourke, Navy Virginia (SSN774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 28, 2010, p. 6, accessible online at [Link] RL32418_20100928.pdf.

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modify ten Virginia-class SSNs with VPM modules for the cost of one new Ohio-like SSGN.203 Developing and fielding a Towed Payload Module (TPM) could be another option to increase the Navys undersea strike capability at less cost than procuring additional SSGNs. In theory, a TPM could be towed to an operating area and left on station to provide standoff fires on demand. The U.S. Navy will need to address a number of operational and technological issues before such a capability could be fielded, such as the creation of a suitable energy system to support long-duration missions; technologies to support autonomous operations; security of the platform and its payloads when disconnected from its tow vehicle; endurance and equipment reliability; and secure command and control systems. C4ISR Network and Counter-Network Capabilities AIRBORNE BATTLE MANAGEMENT AND C2. The U.S. military should develop a resilient airborne network to provide command and control for manned and
203

A VPM will increase a Virginia-class SSNs payload from twelve to forty TLAMs. According to RADM Connor: adding a payload module is a significant investment, adding about 20 percent to the cost of each ship. However, it is possible to stretch ten Virginia SSNs for the cost of a single new Ohio-like SSGN. RADM Michael J. Connor, Investing in the Undersea Future, Proceedings, Vol.136, June 2011.

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unmanned systems operating in communicationsdenied environments. Specifically, DoD should field high-altitude, very long endurance stealthy unmanned aircraft that could act as airborne C2 nodes and provide targeting and enemy threat information to systems penetrating deep into Iran. The Navy and Air Force should also assess the feasibility of using secure line-of-sight data links between an optionally manned bomber, UCLASS, and other long-range strike capabilities to sustain human control of deepstrike operations. DESIGN FOR INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS. To reduce an enemys ability to disrupt the U.S. militarys air campaign early in a conflict, DoD should design its new long-range strike family of systems to be capable of operating in communications degraded or denied environments with less need for information provided by off-board battle management networks. DIRECTED ENERGY CAPABILITIES. The Air Force and Navy should develop and field new non-kinetic capabilities, including offensive cyber, directed

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energy, electronic warfare, and high power microwave applications, to disrupt, degrade, damage, or destroy the electronics-based systems that underpin enemy A2/AD battle networks. Offensive and Defensive Counter-Missile Capabilities DoD should prioritize the development and fielding of offensive and defensive capabilities that could change the unfavorable missile salvo cost-exchange ratio in the United States favor. OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. To support strikes against TELs and other mobile targets in high-threat areas, the Air Force and Navy should field low observable, highly persistent unmanned surveillance aircraft with secure data links to penetrating strike systems to compress the find-fix-track-target-engage-assess kill chain cycle. The Air Force and Navy should also jointly pursue joint air-launched kinetic weapons to interdict ballistic missiles in their boost/ascent phase of flight. Air Launched Hit-to-Kill or Net-Centric Air Defense Element capabilities carried by long-range platforms such as the Air Forces new bomber and the Navys

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UCLASS could provide Central Command with a persistent boost-phase missile defense over Iranian missile launch areas. NON-KINETIC MISSILE DEFENSES. The U.S. military should develop directed energy weapons with the potential to complement kinetic defenses against missile attacks. For example, it may be feasible to adapt existing chemical laser technologies developed for the nowcancelled Airborne Laser and Theater High Energy Laser programs to create ground-based, megawattclass weapons to defend high-value forward operating locations such as airfields and sea ports of debarkation, and establish a missile defense cost exchange ratio that favors the U.S. military.204 Capabilities to Achieve Air and Maritime Superiority Achieve Localized Air Superiority Although it is hard to argue that DoDs planned fifthgeneration fighter force will not sustain Americas
204

Although these systems would not be mobile, it is possible that they could be packaged into transport containers that could be deployed by air or sea.

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edge against projected air defense threats in the Persian Gulf, there is a case to be made that shortrange fighters, absent the availability of close-in bases early in a conflict, will lack sufficient range and persistence to support U.S. forces operating deep inside Iran. There are several options for addressing this capability shortfall. In the near-term, the U.S. military should integrate passive and active defensive systems on long-range aircraft to improve their survivability and reduce or eliminate the need for supporting fighter escorts. For the long-term, DoDs most recent thirty-year aircraft procurement plan reports it is anticipated that a family of systemsmixes of manned and unmanned aircraft with varying stealth characteristics and advanced standoff weapons will shape the future fighter/attack inventory.205 As part of this family of systems, the Air Force and Navy should assess alternatives for new air dominance capabilities that would be less dependent on close-in theater bases and aerial refueling. Future air dominance systems may very well include a large
205

The plan also reports the Navy has initiated an analysis to define a Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft to replace the F/A-18E/F. See Aircraft Procurement Plan Fiscal Years (FY) 2012 2041, pp. 13, 16.

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aircraft more akin to a true fighter-bomber that possesses the capability to operate over longer ranges and carry significant payloads of air-to-air missiles, anti-radiation air-to-surface missiles, ALHK, and possibly directed energy weapons. Although it is highly unlikely that a sixth-generation aircraft will become available within the next twenty years, the Air Force and Navy have both expressed interest in exploring its potential attributes.206 Achieve Maritime Superiority UNDERSEA SURVEILLANCE. The Navy should assess the potential for Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (LDUUV) to extend its undersea surveillance capabilities, improve intelligence preparation of the undersea battlespace, and reduce task loading on manned undersea systems.207 LDUUV
206

The U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center has announced its intention to assess concepts and technologies for a Next Generation Tactical Aircraft that could reach an initial operational capability around 2030: the envisioned system may possess enhanced capabilities in areas such as reach, persistence, survivability, net-centricity, situational awareness, human-system integration, and weapons effects, and should be able to operate in the anti-access/area-denial environment that will exist in the 20302050 timeframe. See Next Generation Tactical Aircraft (Next Gen TACAIR) Materiel and Technology Concepts Search, November 3, 2010, accessible online at [Link] a5679657b9297fe1871ed239e190c62. According to the Office of Naval Research, new technologies may be able to extend unmanned undersea vehicles endurance into months of operation time. See Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, accessible online at [Link]

207

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is envisioned by the Navy as an unmanned vehicle that could be launched and recovered from a pier or various naval platforms including submarines.208 Though it will be too big to be launched from a torpedo tube, LDUUVs could fit in a submarine dry-deck shelter and the large vertical payload tubes on SSGNs and VPMs. A LDUUV could have significant potential as a cost effective means of increasing the U.S. militarys situational awareness in the hazardous waters off the coast of Iran. According to Admiral Roughead:
I believe that unmanned underwater systems become extensions to the submarine, can become extensions to aviation, manned or unmanned, as far as sensing the battle space. So if you were to ask me if you can extend your sensing area with unmanned systems my initial reaction is we can get there more cheaply than if I have to buy many of the more manned systems. That also reduces the risk to personnel. And it also reduces the cost of those personnel that we may have to have out who have limited

208

A large UUV has a displacement of approximately 20,000 pounds and a diameter greater than thirty six inches. See The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, November 9, 2004), p. 67, accessible online at [Link] [Link].

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duration, unlike unmanned systems do, that can be more persistent in the battle space.209

A number of critical technologies must be developed to enable LDUUVs to operate and survive in the littorals for the extended periods (greater than 70 days) desired by the Navy. Energy systems capacity must be improved by many orders of magnitude over the capabilities that exist today. Without the continuous communications other unmanned vehicles depend on, LDUUVs will require significantly more autonomy, including autonomous systems capable of operating in the complex ocean environment near harbors, shore, and high surface traffic locations. Additionally, endurance technologies must be pursued including those that reduce power usage, reduce biological growth, and improve component and systems reliability. NON-KINETIC SHIP-BASED DEFENSES. The Navy should develop and field a ship-based, electric (solid-state) laser weapon to enhance fleet defense. The
209

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead delivers remarks at 2011 AUVSI Unmanned Systems Symposium and Exhibition, August 19, 2011, p. 7, accessible online at [Link] people/cno/Roughead/Speech/110819%[Link].

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threats described in this assessment suggest that U.S. naval forces may not be able to operate in close proximity to Iran if challenged with salvos of ASCMS, swarming fast attack craft, and UAVs that could overwhelm current kinetic defensives. Apportioning additional surface units to defend the fleet and procuring additional ship-based kinetic defenses are not likely to provide cost-effective approaches to countering these challenges. Dedicating a greater share of the surface fleet to defensive missions will reduce its ability to support other critical missions, including precision strike. Therefore, the U.S. Navy needs to develop and field a deep magazine of low cost-per-shot capabilities for surface ships as part of a layered defense against both swarming small boats and ASCMs. A leading candidate for such a capability is a ship-based solidstate laser weapon system. Recent technology breakthroughs and demonstrations establish that such a capability could be weaponized and fielded over the next decade.210 Introducing a ship laser would dramatically improve the affordability of a layered
210

The Navy has funded two solid-state laser technology development initiatives, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS) and the Maritime Laser Demonstrator (MLD).

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counter-swarm, counter-ASCM defense, and reduce the average cost-per-shot and total cost of acquiring a full suite of kinetic and laser defensive systems. In terms of cost-per-shot, a ship-based laser would be almost free to operate, with no expendables and only the maintenance associated with solid-state optical systems. Moreover, fewer kinetic missiles would need to be acquired, used in training, and transported to replenish forward-deployed magazines. AIR FORCE ASW AND ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW) CAPABILITIES. To complement U.S. Navy capabilities, the Air Force should reconstitute its ability to support ASW and ASuW by equipping the next bomber to deliver anti-ship missiles and mines.211 Expeditionary Surveillance and Strike FUTURE EXPEDITIONARY UNMANNED CAPABILITIES. The Marine Corps plans to procure a Group 4-class expeditionary unmanned system capable of being

211

The Air Force has experience in such operations, as it once configured a small number of B-52s to deliver Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

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operated and maintained from austere locations.212 Similar to the Navys stated need for a UCLASS that will enhance the versatility provided by an aircraft carrier, a UAS could provide Marine Corps expeditionary units with an organic expeditionary surveillance and strike capability with significantly greater range and persistence than the F-35B.213 The Marine Corps should consider the potential to reduce the cost of a new Group 4-class UAS by leveraging technologies developed for the UCLASS and other unmanned aircraft programs. EXPEDITIONARY SHORT TAKE OFF AND VERTICAL LANDING (STOVL) CAPABILITIES. The Marine Corps should assess its future expeditionary strike requirements in light of emerging operational concepts for joint theater-entry operations. As operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and most recently Libya have demonstrated, multi-mission STOVL aircraft
212

See Aircraft Procurement Plan Fiscal Years (FY) 20122041, p. 10. DoD describes a Group 4 UAS as an unmanned aircraft that exceeds 1,320 pounds and operates below Flight Level 180. Current UAS in this Group include the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-8B Fire Scout, and the Navys Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) demonstration aircraft. See the Naval Air Systems Commands UCLASS description accessible online at http:// w w [Link] i [Link] y.m i l/i ndex.c f m? f use ac t ion=home.d isplay& key=A 1DA 3766 -1 A6D -4 A E AB462-F91FE43181AF.

213

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on amphibious decks provide theater commanders with an alternative to employing a Navy aircraft carrier, especially in limited operations that do not call for the capabilities of a full-size aircraft carrier and its air wing.214 The question remains, however, as to whether future amphibious operations will require stealthy F-35B STOVL fighters, especially given the F-35Bs high unit cost. This would be especially true in the context of the operational concept presented in this paper, where A2/AD threatsincluding enemy air defenses and extended-range strike systemsare suppressed to permit amphibious landing operations.215 While it is true that stealthy STOVL fighters could operate from expeditionary airfields in support of theater-entry operations, it is difficult to envision a case where a threat environment that requires the use of stealth would not also drive a
214

For a description of AV-8B operations off the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn, see Tom Kington, Harrier Ops Making Case for F-35B, Defense News, March 28, 2011, accessible online at [Link] DoDs latest Selected Acquisition Report projects the F-35s Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) as $132 million in Then Year (TY) dollars and $90 million in 2002 Base Year (BY) dollars. APUC is calculated by dividing the total procurement cost for the F-35 program by the number of units to be produced. These APUC estimates include procurement costs for the Air Forces F-35A as well as the Department of the Navys F-35B and F-35C. Excluding the Air Force, the APUC for a Department of the Navy F-35 is approximately $152 million. Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) for the F-35 is projected to be TY $154 million and BY $110 million. PAUC is calculated by dividing the total cost of the F-35 program by the number of units to be produced. See F-35 Selected Acquisition Report, Department of Defense, December 31, 2010, pp. 26, 38.

215

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need for strike aircraft with much greater combat radii than the F-35B.216 Amphibious Landing Operations AMPHIBIOUS LIFT. The Department of the Navy should sustain sufficient expeditionary lift to support a joint theater-entry operation in the Persian Gulf. According to the Marine Corps, thirty amphibious ships are needed to provide operational lift for two MEBs, including equipment and consumables to sustain their operations for thirty days. Since three amphibious ships may be unavailable on average due to maintenance, the Marine Corps maintains a requirement for a fleet of thirty-three amphibious ships.217 The Navy is currently on a path toward twenty-nine amphibious decks, which would result in an operational lift deficit of four ships. It may be possible to partially mitigate this shortfall by ensuring future LHA Replacement ships are

216 217

The Marine Corps intends to operate five F-35C squadrons aboard Navy aircraft carriers. Amphibious Ship Programs, p. 3.

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equipped with well decks to accommodate amphibious landing vehicles.218 AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT VEHICLE. The Marine Corps should develop and field a new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) to replace its nearly forty-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicles. The ACV should be optimized for ground combat in a G-RAMM environment. One alternative for a future ACV might combine a ground combat vehicle with a separate transport vessel that would carry it ashore, as suggested by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.219 This two-system approach may increase the standoff range of an amphibious landing force, decrease the time needed to deliver expeditionary forces ashore, and reduce the need to encumber a future ACV with the demanding requirements that plagued the EFVs development, such as combining the armor needed to survive IED attacks in a platform that
218

The first two LHA(R)s, the LHA-6 and LHA-7, will not have well decks in order to better accommodate F-35B operations. Future LHA(R)s may be equipped with well decks. See Robert Work, Defense News, April 10, 2011, accessible online at [Link] General James Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, suggested considering such a two-part capability to replace the AAV and EFV. See Amos: EFV Replacement Could Have Two Parts: Transporter And Vehicle, Inside Defense, August 2, 2011, accessible online at [Link] newsweek/2009/04/10/[Link].

219

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could swim across the water over long distances at high speeds. Counter-G-RAMM Capabilities In addition to ground-based directed energy defense for fixed bases, the U.S. Army should prioritize the development of mobile solid-state laser defenses that could complement kinetic defenses against G-RAMM. Directed energy defenses may provide a more costeffective means of defending against inexpensive G-RAMM threats than kinetic defenses, and could provide a forward-based, deep counter-G-RAMM magazine without the need for frequent resupply.220 The Army and Marine Corps should pursue airdelivered and ground-deployed capabilities such as advanced mines and other non-lethal systems that could create barriers to unconventional enemy forces attempting to employ G-RAMM against U.S. bases, surface vessels operating in littoral areas, and forces

220

The Army is planning to demonstrate a static solid-state laser system in 2012.

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supporting theater-entry operations.221 Such capabilities may have significant potential to help create operational sanctuaries for U.S. expeditionary units tasked with creating lodgments during joint theater entry operations. OTHER CAPABILITY INITIATIVES Strategic Air Mobility DoD should assess the impact of an emerging A2/AD threats in the Persian Gulf on its future strategic lift requirements. According to the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the Defense Departments latest Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS) concluded that the Air Force could reduce its strategic airlift fleet from the Congressionally-mandated 316 aircraft to a combination of 300 C-17s and modernized C-5s.222
221

DoD defines a non-lethal weapon as A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. See Joint Publication 1-02, p. 260. DoDs NonLethal Weapons Program is developing several promising directed energy technologies to complement the kinetic weapons inventory. For more information on non-lethal weapons technologies, see http:// [Link]/. Doing so would result in a savings of $1.2 billon. See Statement of General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF Commander, United States Transportation Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower On The Strategic Airlift Fleet, July 13, 2011, pp. 12, accessible online at [Link]

222

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Although it is not publicly known if the scenarios assessed by the MCRS included cases where strategic airlift capabilities would be required to compensate for the loss of sea lines of communication though the Strait of Hormuz, it may be prudent to consider the implications of such a scenario before the C-17 production line is closed in 2014.223 SOF Insertion and Extraction DoD should prioritize developing a stealthy aircraft capable of inserting and extracting SOF forces into denied areas to support unconventional warfare operations and precision strike missions against highpriority targets.224 An assessment of such a system should include the risk involved in continuing to rely on rotary-wing and C-130-based capabilities to provide long-range SOF lift in a range of future operating environments.

223 224

India has ordered ten C-17s, which will keep the C-17 production open until 2014. In 2010, Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael G. Vickers called for the development and fielding of a more survivable, long-range SOF air mobility platform that exploits advances in signature reduction and electronic attack, pointing out that current C-130 SOF insertion/extraction aircraft will not survive in high threat areas. See John T. Bennett, DoD: U.S. Needs Stealthy Airlifter, Defense News, March 8, 2010, accessible online at [Link]

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CREATING A POSTURE OF ADVANTAGE

You may be surprised to know that the U.S. military presence near us is not power for the United States because this power may, under certain circumstances, become a hostage in our hands. Former Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkani 225

DoD has developed a posture in the Persian Gulf to support the rapid deployment of a large joint force to defeat major acts of aggression envisaged by analyses such as the one led by Dr. Wolfowitz in 1979. Although Americas Persian Gulf posture served well as the foundation for Central Commands operations over the last thirty years, it may be ill-suited for the emerging security environment. Considering the panoply of threats that could be posed by a hostile Iranian regime, including weapons of mass destruction, this paper argues that the U.S. posture in the Persian Gulf, as currently constituted, may become more of a liability than an asset.

225

Sagan, How to Keep the Bomb from Iran, p. 54.

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The Department of Defense should reassess Americas military posture in light of these emerging threats. This assessment should consider the likelihood that Iran will use asymmetric approaches to hamper U.S. power-projection operations and coerce its neighbors, rather than conduct conventional large-scale acts of aggression similar to Iraqs invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It must also seek to create a posture that would assure continued U.S. access to the Persian Gulf and its energy resources in both peace and war, and enhance regional stability by reducing the incentives for Iran to launch a first strike. Finally, this assessment must consider posture initiatives that would support an enabling operational concept that will maintain the U.S. militarys freedom of action in the region should deterrence fail. The following initiatives are intended to support these objectives. Reducing the Vulnerability of U.S. Forces in the Gulf Tailoring Americas posture in the Persian Gulf to address emerging threat realities does not mean denuding the region of U.S. forces needed to support

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critical deterrence and assurance missions. On the contrary, it suggests that Central Command should continue to permanently station or rotationally deploy a small number of land-based forces to the region to act as a hedge against aggression or as a rapid-reaction force to support partner states. A future close-in posture should, however, seek to reduce the U.S. militarys overall footprint on the ground while supporting missions such as missile defense, partner capacity building, and counterterrorism that would help regional partners to resist aggression by Iran and its proxies. Hardening (particularly partner hardening) of close-in bases and missile facilities against missile or G-RAMM attacks could help protect U.S. and partner personnel and equipment in the event of an Iranian first strike. Additionally, base hardening could help dissuade Iran or its proxies from conducting acts of aggression by reducing their confidence in the likelihood of achieving a knockout blow. Toward this end, the DoD should work with host states and prospective host states to increase the number and quality of hardened shelters and support facilities

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at their bases. New missile defense sites could be constructed to withstand attacks by ballistic missiles or G-RAMM, and assets that are difficult to harden, such as radars, should be capable of rapidly relocating to complicate Irans targeting. DoD should also pursue host-state agreements to create a network of shared operating locations across the Arabian Peninsula that could be used to disperse units deployed to the Persian Gulf during a crisis. Playing a shell game by frequently moving U.S. forces between these expeditionary land bases, if they are available, would further complicate Irans missile targeting. Similarly, DoD should begin to shift its steady-state naval posture in the Persian Gulf. Today, expensive AEGIS ships execute presence missions out of necessity, since the Navy lacks significant numbers of smaller ships. By contrast, a future naval posture could emphasize the use of LCS, unmanned aircraft and surface and undersea systems as well as special operations forces to maintain a regional deterrence posture. Larger vessels such as AEGIS cruisers and destroyers would have a significant role to play during a conflict with Iran, but the increasing density of Irans maritime

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exclusion capabilities may prevent them from deploying into the Persian Gulf at the outset of a conflict. Developing a Posture to Fight from Extended Ranges U.S. operational concepts for Persian Gulf contingencies over the last twenty years have relied upon deploying short-range tactical aviation and supporting assets to close-in air bases to establish air superiority and help achieve a rapid halt of enemy forces. In the future, Irans A2/AD network could render large close-in air bases unusable at acceptable levels of risk, particularly in the first days of a conflict when Irans capabilities will be at their zenith. Moreover, in an age of networked operations and the ability to reach-back to facilities that are located well outside a theater of operations, there may be less need to maintain critical command and control units close to Iran. Creating a Diversified Posture Instead of planning to deploy units to close-in bases that may bear the brunt of Irans early strikes or

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F I G U R E 1 2 . C R E AT I N G A D I V E R S I F I E D P O S T U R E

may not be available in a crisis due to political reasons, DoD should create a more diversified posture that would allow the majority of its initial forces to stage operations from areas that lie outside Irans anti-access threat ring. There are hundreds of candidates for such staging bases, including existing civil and military airfields in Southern Europe, the Caucasus and Black Sea region, Central Asia, East Africa, Socotra, and the Seychelles (see Figure 12).

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These operating locations could be smaller sites that are shared with U.S. allies and partners, rather than permanent, large overseas garrisons that are expensive to maintain. Moreover, these forward operating locations may not need the same degree of hardening and rapid-repair capabilities that would be required for bases that would be subject to Iranian ballistic missile, G-RAMM, and WMD attacks. This diversified posture will require a concomitant focus on investments in systems capable of sustaining operations over long ranges, as well as supporting capabilities such as aerial refueling and survivable communications and logistics networks. For example, the Department of the Navy and Central Command should consider alternative locations for the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet Headquarters. Similarly, the Air Force, Navy and Central Command should assess alternatives to the CAOC which presently resides at al Udeid Air Base. These alternatives should include a sea-based operations center capable of rapidly relocating from the immediate Persian Gulf area to more secure distant operating locations.

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Developing Regional Counter-A2/AD Networks Creating a more diversified posture to fight from range could be perceived as a reduction in the United States commitment to the Persian Gulf. The Department of Defense could offset this by building partner capabilities such as advanced target tracking radars; ballistic missile and air defense systems; short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles; and frigates and corvettes for SLOC defense that could help maintain a favorable military balance in the Gulf. Reinvigorating Alliances and Partnerships The United States may be able to leverage a shift toward a new posture to strengthen its ties to states located outside the immediate Persian Gulf region. For example, moving to the periphery could help strengthen strategic relationships with states such as Djibouti, Georgia and the Ukraine, while also reinvigorating NATO by exploring additional contingency basing opportunities with countries such as Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. Crucially, this could serve as a bridge between NATOs past as an Atlantic security organization and future security concerns.

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Before withdrawing additional military units from Americas bases in NATO countries, it would seem wise to assess how they could support an enabling operational concept for the Persian Gulf as recommended by this paper.

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A FINAL NOTE

Americas current military posture and traditional operational concepts for projecting power to the Persian Gulf are based on decades-old assumptions that are becoming progressively less relevant in the face of emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities that could challenge the U.S. military at sea, on land, in the air, and in cyberspace. Iran is developing and fielding such capabilities, including ballistic missiles, maritime exclusion systems, and WMD, which threaten U.S. vital interests: the stability of the Persian Gulf region and the security of its energy trade. This assessment argues for the development of a new enabling operational conceptOutsideInthat exploits the U.S. militarys ability to fight

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from extended ranges to counter Irans emerging capabilities and preserve U.S. and partner interests in the Persian Gulf. The concept centers on deploying U.S. air and maritime crisis response forces to operating areas that are beyond the reach of most of Irans anti-access systems. From this posture of advantage, the U.S. military could reduce the density of Irans A2/AD forces and regain their freedom of action. To implement this enabling concept, DoD will need to develop new capabilities and a diversified forward posture, neither of which are part of its program of record. Achieving this in an age of austerity will require defense planners to make difficult decisions; the U.S. military cannot meet the challenges that Iran could pose to Americas vital interests in the Gulf by simply spending more to procure new capabilities. Operational concepts such as AirSea Battle and Outside-In can help inform these difficult decisions by providing the connective tissue between the Defense Departments strategic objectives on the one hand, and resource priorities on the other. Individually, these concepts can

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identify specific capability shortfalls and regional posture imbalances. In combination, they might also highlight broader areas where the U.S. military may have insufficient or excess capabilities. Capabilities needed to support AirSea Battle and Outside-In have a remarkable amount of overlap. Both concepts emphasize the need to develop new long-range systems such as penetrating bombers and carrier-based unmanned aircraft; increase the U.S. Navys undersea magazine of standoff munitions; and improve joint air and missile defenses. Capabilities to protect U.S. and partner C4ISR networks while denying or degrading an enemys networks are crucial to warfighting operations in both the Western Pacific and Southwest Asia. The threat posed by ballistic missiles in both theaters underlines the requirement for new missile defense systems, such as land- and sea-based directed energy weapons, that may help create a more favorable cost-exchange ratio. Operational concepts such as AirSea Battle and Outside-In could also help identify areas where the U.S. military might reduce its investments over time.

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For example, forces that require very large close-in theater footprints, are only suitable for operations in permissive and semi-permissive areas, or are limited to performing niche missions, may all be candidates for reduced funding. In summary, as the Department of Defense considers initiatives to rebalance its program of record while continuing to address existing and emerging security challenges, it should place greater emphasis on versatile systems that are capable of performing a range of missions in all threat environments, while reducing its emphasis on capabilities that are best suited for operations in permissive areas.

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GLOSSARY

A2/AD AEA ASAT ASBM ASCM ASW ASuW BAMS BMD C4ISR

Anti-access/area-denial Airborne electronic attack Anti-satellite (capabilities) Anti-ship ballistic missile Anti-ship cruise missile Anti-submarine warfare Anti-surface warfare Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Ballistic missile defense Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance Combined air operations center Combat air patrol Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear Circular error probable

CAOC CAP CBRN CEP

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CPGS GMTI

Conventional prompt global strike Ground moving target indicator missiles

G-RAMM Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, IADS ICBM IRGCN ISR LACM LCS LDUUV MCM MLRS MRBM PGM PLA Integrated air defense system Intercontinental ballistic missile Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance Land attack cruise missile Littoral Combat Ship Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Mine countermeasures Multiple Launch Rocket System Medium range ballistic missile Precision-guided munitions Peoples Liberation Army

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PNT RPA SAM SLOC SRBM SSGN SSN TEL TLAM UAS UCAS

Precision navigation and timing Remotely piloted aircraft Surface-to-air missile Sea lanes of communication Short-range ballistic missile Guided-missile submarine Attack submarine Transporter erector launcher Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile Unmanned aircraft systems Unmanned Combat Air System

UCLASS Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System UUV WMD Unmanned underwater vehicle Weapons of mass destruction