[ G.R. No.
46437, May 23, 1939 ]
EUFEMIO P. TESORO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
DECISION
MORAN, J.:
On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was
convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
falsification of a public document and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine of one hundred
pesos (P100), or undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. This penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On
November 14, 1935, the then Governor-General Frank Murphy
granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted,
subject to the following conditions:
"1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his
residence without first obtaining the consent of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence;
"2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct
himself in an orderly manner;
"3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the
Executive Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence,
during the first year, once a month, and thereafter, once every
three months.
"Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence
imposed shall again be in full force and effect."
On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of
the peace court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery
alleged to have been committed with one Concordia Dairo, wife
of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the complaint were
attached the affidavits of the complainant Jose Nagar, of Luz
Nagar and of Epimaco Nagar. The case was thereafter forwarded
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the provincial fiscal
filed the corresponding information which, however, was
dismissed for nonappearance of the complainant.
Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar
lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence,
and upon the same facts supporting the criminal action
aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the
conditions of his parole. On February 3, 1938, petitioner was
summoned to appear before the board for a hearing on the
aforecited complaint, but petitioner asked for postponement until
the day following. On February 4, 1938, petitioner addressed a
letter to the board denying the charge of illicit relations with the
complainant's wife and included therewith the supposed
retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the latter had stated in his
former affidavit. On the same date Simeon Figalang, a parole
officer assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to
the board, and, on the strength thereof and the papers
supporting it, the acting chairman of the board addressed a
communication to the President of the Philippines,
recommending the arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner.
And on February 19, 1938, the President issued the following
order:
"To any lawful officer:
"Whereas, Eufemio P. Tesoro, convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of an official
document, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of from 2
years to 3 years, 6 months and 21 days' imprisonment, plus P100
fine, was granted pardon on parole by His Excellency, the
Governor-General, on November 14, 1935, under certain
conditions, one of which provides that he will not commit any
other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner, and
"Whereas, said Eufemio P. Tesoro has violated this condition in
that, in the latter part of September, 1937, and continuously
thereafter, he betrayed the confidence of his brother-in-law, Jose
Nagar, by maintaining adulterous relations with the latter's wife,
under the following circumstances: Upon the death on
September 18, 1937, of parolee Tesoro's wife (sister of Jose
Nagar) and in order to mitigate the grief of the bereaved family
and to help in the keeping of the house and caring of the children
of said parolee, Jose Nagar and his wife came to live with the
parolee in San Juan, Rizal; but taking advantage of the frequent
absences of Jose Nagar from the house, parolee Tesoro made
advances to Jose Nagar's wife, Concordia Dairo, succeeded in
having illicit relations with her and even went to the extent of
taking away the woman from her legitimate husband, after the
couple had moved from his home, and he is now living with her
in adultery.
"Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by
section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, you are hereby ordered
to arrest parolee Eufemio P. Tesoro and to commit him to the
custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila, who is hereby
authorized to confine said person for the service of the unexpired
portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison."
By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and
recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons.
Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against
the Director of Prisons and, upon denial thereof by the trial
court, took the present appeal.
Section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the
petitioner was granted parole, gives the Governor-General the
following powers and duties:
"To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either
plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to suspend
sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge
of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such sondition3
as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-
incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail
to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole,
or suspension of sentence."
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, provides as follows:
"The President shall have the power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon
such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he
may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code,
above quoted, in so far as it confers upon the Chief Executive the
power to grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly repealed
by the aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter omitted to
specify such power in connection with the powers granted
therein to the President of the Philippines. This contention is
untenable. The power to pardon given the President by the
Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions
and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the
power to grant and revoke paroles. (20 R. C. L., 577; 46 C. J.,
1205.) If the omission of the power of parole in the Constitution
is to be construed as a denial thereof to the President, the effect
would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the
adoption of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by
the Chief Executive. That such effect was never intended by the
Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond question.
Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence has no legal authority to investigate the conduct of the
petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the
terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report to the executive
secretary of the board once a month during the first year of his
parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his consent
to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the
supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the
petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the
board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make
recommendations to the President by whose authority it was
acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries
with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of
the parolees, if such power of revocation is to be rational and
intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry and
investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded by
law or by the Constitution from making use, of any agency of the
government, or even of any individual, to secure the necessary
assistance. When, therefore, the President chose to intrust his
power of inquiry upon the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, a
government agency created precisely for the concern of persons
released on parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good
judgment.
Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the
effect that he has committed a crime is necessary before he can
be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he
"will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an
orderly manner." (Underscore, ours.) It was, therefore, the mere
commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that
was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to
have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order
"the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions,
of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." (Underscore
ours,)
Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the
violation of the conditional parole. He claims that, according to
the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the
latter part of September, 1937," as found by the President, but
after October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was supposed
to expire. Be that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the
determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the
courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his
findings. The petitioner herein having consented to place his
liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has
granted it, lie cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment
was ordered.
Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the
parole took place after October 28, 1937, when his maximum
penalty was to have expired, we still find no error in the order of
arrest and recommitment. It is the petitioner's contention that,
upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his
conditional parole also expires, and, therefore, his liberty
becomes absolute subject to no conditions contained in his
parole In other words, he holds the view that the period during
which he was out on parole should be counted as service of his
original sentence. We do not subscribe to this contention.
In People vs. Tapel (35 Off. Gaz., 1603), we said:
"When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in
the same state in which he was at the time the pardon was
granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons
(See V. S. vs. Ignacio [1916], 33 Phil., 202, 204; U. S. vs. Villalon
[1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled that, in
requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment
imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the
time of his release, the court should not consider the time during
which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time
served on the original sentence. (20 R. C. L., p. 570;
State vs. Home [1906], 52 Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7 L. R. A. [N.
S.], 719, 725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], 56 Miss., 282.)"
This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole. (46 C. J.,
1209.)
The foregoing discussion brings us to the last contention of the
appellant as to the duration of the penalty he has yet to serve
after his recommitment. Act No. 1561 provided that a convict
released on parole and who, thereafter, violates its conditions,
shall serve the full sentence of the court as though no parole has
ever been granted him, the time between the parole and the
subsequent arrest not being considered as part of the term of his
sentence in computing the period of his subsequent confinement.
But this Act has been repealed by the Administrative Code, and
section 64 (i) thereof omitted such provision. Act No. 4103,
section 8, provides that any prisoner released on parole who
violates any condition thereof, shall, upon re-arrest and
confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the
maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to
prison. This Act is not, however, applicable to the present case,
as the petitioner was paroled not under the provision thereof, but
by virtue of section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code. There is,
thus, no statutory provision squarely governing the case with
respect to the duration of the petitioner's confinement after his
recommitment. In the absence of such statutory provision, the
terms of the parole shall govern. From the express terms of the
parole that "should any of the conditions stated be violated, the
sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect," it is
evident that the petitioner herein should serve the unexpired
portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concurring in the result.
Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons
A convicted individual's parole is revoked and they are re-imprisoned after violating the conditions of
their release, highlighting the President's power to grant and revoke paroles without the need for a
judicial pronouncement of guilt.
Facts:
Eufemio P. Tesoro was convicted of falsification of a public document on October 10, 1934.
On November 14, 1935, Tesoro was granted parole by Governor-General Frank Murphy, subject to
certain conditions.
The conditions of parole included living in Manila, not committing any other crime, and reporting to the
Executive Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence.
The parole agreement stated that if any of the conditions were violated, the original sentence would be
in full force and effect.
In December 1937, Tesoro was charged with adultery, but the case was dismissed.
The complainant later lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, accusing Tesoro of
violating the conditions of his parole.
The Board conducted an investigation and recommended the revocation of Tesoro's parole.
The President ordered the arrest and recommitment of Tesoro based on the Board's recommendation.
Issue:
Whether the President has the power to grant and revoke paroles.
Whether the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has the authority to investigate parole violations and
recommend revocation.
Whether a judicial pronouncement of guilt is necessary to find a violation of parole.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the revocation of Tesoro's parole.
The Court held that the President has the power to grant and revoke paroles.
The Court affirmed the authority of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence to investigate parole violations
and make recommendations to the President.
The Court ruled that a judicial pronouncement of guilt is not necessary to find a violation of parole.
Ratio:
The power to pardon given to the President by the Constitution includes the power to grant and revoke
paroles.
By agreeing to the conditions of his parole, Tesoro placed himself under the supervision of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence, which has the authority to inquire into his conduct and make
recommendations to the President.
The mere commission, not the conviction, of another crime is sufficient to deem Tesoro to have violated
his parole.
The determination of parole violation rests exclusively on the sound judgment of the Chief Executive,
and the courts will not interfere with his findings.
In the absence of a statutory provision governing the duration of confinement after recommitment, the
terms of the parole agreement will govern.
As the parole agreement stated that the sentence would be in full force and effect if any of the
conditions were violated, Tesoro is required to serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally
imposed by the court.
Pardon
PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO SALLE, GR No. 103567, 1995-12-04
Facts:
enforceability of the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellant Ricky Mengote during the
pendency in this Court of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and...
destructive arson and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua... appellant
Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal... misimpression that the motion was
merely a bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early... release from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP)
following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on 9 December 1993... appellant Ricky
Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a... conditional pardon and released from confinement, and
that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant
Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional
pardon.
Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
this Court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and considered this case closed and terminated
insofar as he is concerned.
the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should
be dismissed... withdrawal of their appeal considering... that presidential pardon may be extended only
to those serving sentence after final conviction.
Mengote's... carpeta or prison record does not show that he has a pending appeal with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court
Secretariat was not able to advise those concerned to take appropriate steps for the withdrawal of the
appeal before it... recommended to the Committee the grant of conditional pardon in favor of
Mengote... clear misappreciation of facts due to the incomplete records of Mengote
Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is
unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court
of his... appeal.
he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which
resulted in the finality of his conviction.
Issues:
pivotal issue thus raised is the enforceability of a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court.
Ruling:
provided... that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction".
The 1973 Constitution went further by providing that pardon could be granted only after final
conviction... no pardon may be extended before a judgment... of conviction becomes final.
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in
the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the... appellant.
to prevent the President from exercising... executive power in derogation of the judicial power.
before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal
We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the
present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from
the accused that he has not... appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.
Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal up to this date
the conditional pardon extended to him should not have been enforced.
Nonetheless, since he stands on the same footing as the accused-appellants in... the Hinlo case, he may
be freed from the full force, impact, and effect of the rule herein pronounced subject to the condition
set forth below. This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency
of the grantee's appeal.
Principles:
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the
accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing,
except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the... accused applies for
probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal... the acceptance of a pardon amounts to an
abandonment of an appeal, rendering the conviction final
This statement should not be taken as a guiding rule for it is nothing but an obiter dictum
People vs. Salle, Jr. y Gercilla
The case involves the enforceability of a conditional pardon granted to an accused during the pendency
of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court, with the court ruling that a pardon cannot be granted
until the appeal is withdrawn or the conviction becomes final.
Facts:
Accused-appellants Francisco Salle, Jr. y Gercilla and Ricky Mengote y Cuntado were found guilty of
murder and destructive arson by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City and were sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
They filed a Notice of Appeal, but Salle later filed a motion to withdraw his appeal, believing it was a
bureaucratic requirement for his early release from prison following the grant of a conditional pardon by
the President.
Salle's motion was granted, and he was released from prison.
Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw his appeal.
Issue:
Is a conditional pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal enforceable?
Ruling:
A pardon cannot be granted until the appeal is withdrawn or the conviction becomes final.
The power to grant pardons can only be exercised after conviction by final judgment, as stated in
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court must be respected, and a final judgment is necessary
before executive clemency can be granted.
The practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals is in violation of
the law.
Ratio:
The court emphasized the importance of respecting the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court and
the need for a final judgment before executive clemency can be granted.
The court cited Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which states that the power to grant
pardons can only be exercised after conviction by final judgment.
The court noted that the practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending
appeals is in clear violation of the law.
Specific Case of Ricky Mengote:
Since Mengote did not withdraw his appeal, the conditional pardon granted to him should not have
been enforced.
However, the court allowed Mengote to be freed from the full force of the rule, with the condition that
he must withdraw his appeal within 30 days.
Failure to comply with this condition will result in the Director of the Bureau of Corrections taking him
back into custody.
Overall:
The court's ruling establishes that a pardon cannot be granted to an appellant whose appeal is still
pending resolution.
A final judgment is necessary before executive clemency can be granted.
The court calls for a stop to the practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending
appeals.
Probation
PLUTARCO YUSI v. JUDGE LETICIA P. MORALES
Facts:
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for estafa in Criminal Case No. 2260 in a decision of the
respondent court dated May 20, 1982. The court sentenced the petitioners ". . . to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum... to ONE (1) YEAR and SIX
(6) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum, to pay P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan for the value
of the piano, and to pay the costs of the suit."
On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May 20, 1982 was promulgated, the petitioners appeared in
court without their counsel of record. The respondent court appointed a certain Atty. Cesar Villar who
happened to be in court to act as petitioners' counsel de oficio... during the promulgation. On that
occasion, the petitioners through their counsel de oficio manifested that ". . . they are going to avail of
the benefits of the Probation Law and prayed that they be released under the same bond." (Annex "B",
Rollo p. 14) The court... immediately granted the petitioners' prayer ". . . with a condition that the
accused will submit within this day a certification from the bonding company that it is willing to
accommodate the accused under the same bond for a period of five (5) days beginning today."
On June 28, 1982, or seven (7) days from the date of promulgation of the decision and within the
reglementary period to file an appeal, the petitioners filed with the respondent court their Notice of
Appeal (Annex "E", Rollo, p. 19).
On July 6, 1982, the respondent court issued an Order denying the notice of appeal on the ground that
the petitioners waived their right to appeal the decision when they filed their application for probation
Issues:
The only issue is whether or not the petitioners whose application for probation was granted after
conviction of the crime of estafa may still withdraw such application for probation and within the
reglementary period appeal the judgment of conviction.
Ruling:
In not giving due course to the petitioners' notice of appeal the respondent court relied on paragraph 3,
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) as amended which considers an application... for probation of a
convicted accused to be a waiver of his right to appeal or an automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
And now, the question before us is whether or not such a waiver or withdrawal is irrevocable.
We rule that it is not. We find the strict and unyielding application of the "waiver rule" under the
Probation Law unwarranted.
Under the factual circumstances of the instant case, the respondent court in granting the application for
probation and denying the prayer to withdraw, failed to take into account the fact that the petitioners'
counsel of record was not present when the petitioners applied... for probation. True, they were
represented by a counsel de oficio appointed by the court on the spot but the counsel de oficio was not
fully acquainted with their case. He could not have considered fully the strength of a possible appeal
when he advised them... about the effects of the application for probation. More so when we consider
the thin line that divides a criminal case for estafa and a civil case for collection of a debt.
Considering that the application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the
crime which led to the judgment of conviction and that the application for probation is considered a
waiver upon his part to file an appeal, it is in the best interests... of justice that the court should take the
necessary steps to insure that the accused has been fully apprised of the full import of his application
before the court acts on it.
In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily granted the manifestation and application for probation
on June 22, 1982, the same day that the decision was promulgated and approved the formal application
the following day without taking steps to be informed that the... petitioners were aware of the full
import of their application.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which established the Probation System was envisioned
among other things, "to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might
be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence" (
Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be considered "penitent offenders." They appeared
to have improvidently filed their application for probation and should be allowed to withdraw it and to
appeal the decision.
The underlying philosophy of probation is indeed one of liberality towards the accused. It is not served
by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. Probation is a major step taken by
our Government towards the deterrence and minimizing of crime and... the humanization of criminal
justice. In line with the public policy behind probation, the right of appeal should not be irrevocably lost
from the moment a convicted accused files an application for probation. Appeal and probation spring
from the same policy considerations of... justice, humanity, and compassion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated June 23,
1982, July 6, 1982 and August 19, 1982 of the respondent court are nullified and set aside. The
respondent court is directed to give due course to the... petitioners' notice of appeal.
Yusi vs. Morales
Plutarco and Daisy Yusi, convicted of estafa, seek to withdraw their application for probation and appeal
their judgment of conviction, challenging the strict application of the "waiver rule" under the Probation
Law.
Facts:
Plutarco Yusi and Daisy Yusi were convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 2260.
The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered the decision on May 20, 1982.
The petitioners were sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of four months of arresto mayor as a
minimum and one year and six months of prision correccional as a maximum.
They were also ordered to pay P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan for the value of a piano and to pay the
costs of the suit.
On June 22, 1982, the petitioners appeared in court without their counsel of record.
The court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent them during the promulgation.
The petitioners manifested that they would avail themselves of the benefits of probation.
On June 23, 1982, they filed an application for probation.
The respondent court granted the application for probation and denied the petitioners' request to
withdraw it.
The court also denied the petitioners' notice of appeal, stating that they had waived their right to appeal
when they filed the application for probation.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was also denied.
Issue:
Can the petitioners, who had their application for probation granted after being convicted of estafa, still
withdraw their application and appeal the judgment of conviction within the reglementary period?
Ruling:
The petitioners can withdraw their application for probation and appeal the judgment of conviction.
The strict application of the "waiver rule" under the Probation Law is not appropriate in this case.
Ratio:
The court should ensure that the accused has been fully apprised of the full import of their application
for probation before granting it.
The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused, and a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions is not appropriate.
The right of appeal should not be irrevocably lost from the moment a convicted accused files an
application for probation.
The petitioners' counsel of record was not present when they applied for probation, and the counsel de
oficio appointed by the court was not fully acquainted with their case.
The petitioners should be allowed to withdraw their application for probation and pursue their right to
appeal.
