20010517 Vinay V.

Viswanathan

L-CT-0014: Labour Law II (Internal Assessment)

By Vinay V. Viswanathan (ID: 20010517)

REQUISITE DATA

Name: Vinay V. Viswanathan

Student ID: 20010517

Batch: B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) 2020-25

Section: A

WORD COUNTS

Part A: 660 words

Part B:

Note: The “Note” sections are meant to prove my knowledge of the

subject matter, but include information which does not fit into
a naturally flowing answer to the questions. During evaluation,
please exclude these from the word count.

Labour Law II 1
20010517 Vinay V. Viswanathan

PART A

The given factual matrix illustrates multiple procedural and substantial infractions of
the provisions within the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter “IDA”).

The Infractions

The first of the infractions is found within the appointment of the Board of
Conciliation, which while procedurally sound in the Gazette notification, finds itself erroneous
in the appointment of the chairman. According to Section 5(3) of the IDA, while the
requirements for equal parts representation for the first four members are met in the present
case, the chairman has to be an “independent person”.1 In the present case, the chairman
appointed is the leader of the Trade Union WTU, with WTU being one of the parties to the
dispute. This creates a conflict of interest, as the leader of one of the parties cannot be
considered an independent person.

The second infraction lies in the Labour Court stage, wherein the Presiding Officer
appointed was a District Judge with two years of experience. As per Section 7(3)(b) of the IDA,
a person cannot be qualified to be appointed as Presiding Officer unless they have been a
District Judge for three years or more.2 This is a blatant violation of the IDA.

The third infraction comes from a combined reading of Sections 17(1), 18(1) and
18(3) of the IDA. Section 17(1) makes the publication of awards passed by the Labour Courts
mandatory, but Section 18 states that settlements arrived at by parties to an Industrial Dispute
are to be binding on all parties. In Sirsilk v. A. P., the Court interpreted these provisions, and
held that where a settlement is arrived at between parties after the award has been submitted to
the Government but before its publication, there is no dispute left to be resolved, and the award
sent to the government becomes infructuous, so the Government should refrain from publishing
the award.3 The judgment in Sirsilk was contemplated within Remington Rand v. Workmen, but
the discussion in that case was on whether the nature of Section 17(1) was mandatory with a
focus on the time limit of thirty days.4 Therefore, that case is not relevant to this discussion.
Applying Sirsilk to the present facts, it is trite that the Government’s failure to withhold the

1
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, §5(3); See also DR S. K. PURI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL
LAWS 436 (9th ed., 2005).
2
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, §7(3)(b).
3
Sirsilk Ltd. & Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 160, at ¶7.
4
Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224, at ¶3.

Labour Law II 2
20010517 Vinay V. Viswanathan

publication of the award after a settlement was reached and the dispute was resolved, runs
contra to the provisions of Section 17(1) as read with Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the IDA.

Comparative Analysis against Industrial Relations Code

Under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (hereinafter “IRC”), dispute resolution has
been streamlined primarily through the removal of appropriate government intervention, that
being the bureaucratic nightmare that was Section 10 of the IDA. Furthermore, under Chapter
VII of the IRC, the concept of a Labour Code has been replaced by purely Tribunal-based
dispute resolution5—with a tribunal consisting of two members: One administrative and one
judicial, with each bench of the tribunal consisting of either one or the other member, or both.6
If the two members disagree, the appropriate government under Section 47 of the IRC can
appoint an extra judge.7

The primary difference if the new code was in effect comes in the form of the
enforceability of the award. Under IRC Section 55, every arbitration award and every award of
the Industrial or National Tribunal is to be communicated to the concerned parties and
appropriate government, and the award becomes enforceable thirty days after the date of its
communication.8

Note: The second schedule/ third schedule jurisdiction of the

labour courts as opposed to the industrial tribunals has been
considered, but in the present case, due to there being 100
workmen in the establishment, the proviso to Section 10(1) of
the IDA gives the labour court jurisdiction to hear matters
which fall within the Third Schedule despite Section 7(1)
restricting the Labour Court’s jurisdiction to matters within
the Second Schedule.

5
Industrial Relations Code, 2020, §51.
6
Industrial Relations Code, 2020, §44.
7
Industrial Relations Code, 2020, §47.
8
Industrial Relations Code, 2020, §55(2); Industrial Relations Code, 2020, §55(3).

Labour Law II 3
20010517 Vinay V. Viswanathan

PART B

Academic critiques of the dispute resolution process within the Industrial Disputes
Act can be found within Jan Breman’s article. Breman notes that after India’s independence,
the state took an active role in shaping industrial relations, and was driven by a need to
formalise labour practices—which in turn led to the setup of a massive legal machinery which
handled administration and registration, arbitration and adjudication, and other tasks
exclusively concerned with labour and employment in what would come to be known as the
organised sector of the economy. 9 Breman juxtaposes the magnitude of these policy decisions
against the relatively tiny fraction of the population that actually comprised the industrial
labour force (barely 17% of the workforce), and highlights how this preoccupation with
industrial employment detracted attention not only from the greater segment of urban
population that made its living through other means. Social stratification characteristic of the
early post-colonial era divorced the numerically transcendent agricultural sector from industrial
workers on account of the policymakers’ sociological perspective being tinted by the prejudice
that the rural working class was a homogenous group. Citing Thorner, Breman notes that the
agricultural labourers constituted the largest single section of the labour force, and that they
were neglected in favour of the industrial proletariat.10

Another staunch yet more contemporary critique of the dispute resolution mechanism
can be found in the writings of Mitchell, Mahy, and Gahan (hereinafter “Mitchell et al.”).
Mitchell et al.’s critique is incisive and targets the conciliation mechanism of the IDA, in that
the failure report and referral system in case a settlement through conciliation fails to come
about ends up prolonging the litigation process and burdening the aggrieved workmen with
court and counsel fees in spite of the intent behind conciliation, which is swift dispute
resolution.11 Upon evaluating the evidence, the conclusion on the Labour Law regime under
the IDA is that it engenders industrial conflict, as opposed to promoting industrial peace, in
that the layers upon layers of dispute resolution mechanisms are ultimately harmful to the very
workmen the Act was initially made to protect the interests of. 12 Critiques levelled include: (1)
the socially stratified, hierarchical structure of Indian society along the lines of caste, sect, and

9
Jan Breman, Industrial Labour in Post-Colonial India I: Industrializing the Economy and Formalizing Labour,
44 INT’L REV. SOC. HIST. 249, 251 (1999) [hereinafter Industrial Labour in Post-Colonial India].
10
Id. at 253.
11
Richard Mitchell et al., The Evolution of Labour Law in India: An Overview and Commentary on Regulatory
Objectives and Development, 1(2) Asian J. L. Soc. 413, 456 (2014) [hereinafter The Evolution of Labour law in
India].
12
Id. at 459.

Labour Law II 4
20010517 Vinay V. Viswanathan

religion, which affects both job procurement in the formal sector and wage differentials in the
regulated labour market; (2) Indian Labour Law is limited in application by size of
establishment, type of employment relation and position, and type of economic activity,
resulting in the aforesaid stratifications existing in congruence with Breman’s critique and the
majority of workers engaged in the informal sector being excluded from the ambit of the labour
law; and (3) even when the labour law is applicable in theory, it is easy to evade in practice
owing to the rampant corruption and collusion between inspection agents and employers,
deficiencies in inspector qualities, which easily stamp out the overall weak trade union
movement, which coupled with the poor education of workers stifles the influence of the labour
sector on the unfavourable outcomes that stem from these circumstances. 13

The IRC addresses this by eliminating the multiplicity of fora for dispute resolution
by streamlining all industrial disputes into resolution through Industrial or National Industrial
Tribunals at the post-conciliation stage, thereby abolishing labour courts,14 and placing an
emphasis on timely resolution of proceedings in the arbitration and conciliation phase.15
However,

Note: This answer heavily condenses the substantial critique due

to the word limit. The cited readings contain expansive details
that I am familiar with, but am unable to include due to paucity
of words.

13
Richard Mitchell et al., The Evolution of Labour law in India, supra note 11, at 438-39; See also Jan Breman,
Industrial Labour in Post-Colonial India, supra note 9, at 253.
14
Industrial Relations Code, 2020, §51 (facilitating transfer of all cases pending in Labour Courts).
15
Industrial Relations Code, 2020, §55(2); Industrial Relations Code, 2020, §55(3) (a thirty-day time limit is put
on proceedings after an award is communicated, before the award becomes enforceable, regardless of publication).

Labour Law II 5