Maxmin and Minmax Values
CS535: Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design
Security Value: Maxmin Value
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Nash Equilibrium:
1
Security Value: Maxmin Value
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Nash Equilibrium: (B,R)
1
Security Value: Maxmin Value
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Nash Equilibrium: (B,R)
• But will player 1 play B?
• What happens when player 2 plays L?
1
Security Value: Maxmin Value
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Nash Equilibrium: (B,R)
• But will player 1 play B?
• What happens when player 2 plays L?
• Different Rationality: Guaranteeing the best possible result without
relying on the rationality of other players
• So what can a player guarantee for itself?
1
Maxmin Value: What a Player Can Guarantee
• If player i chooses si , its worst possible utility (payoff) is:
min ui (si , t−i )
t−i ∈S−i
2
Maxmin Value: What a Player Can Guarantee
• If player i chooses si , its worst possible utility (payoff) is:
min ui (si , t−i )
t−i ∈S−i
• Player i will choose a strategy that maximizes this value. That is,
v i = max min ui (si , t−i )
si ∈Si t−i ∈S−i
2
Maxmin Value: What a Player Can Guarantee
• If player i chooses si , its worst possible utility (payoff) is:
min ui (si , t−i )
t−i ∈S−i
• Player i will choose a strategy that maximizes this value. That is,
v i = max min ui (si , t−i )
si ∈Si t−i ∈S−i
• v i : maxmin value or security value of player i
2
Maxmin Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 3,3
• Maxmin value for player 1?
3
Maxmin Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 3,3
• Maxmin value for player 1? 2
3
Maxmin Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 3,3
• Maxmin value for player 1? 2
• Maxmin strategy of player 1?
3
Maxmin Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 3,3
• Maxmin value for player 1? 2
• Maxmin strategy of player 1? T
3
Maxmin Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 3,3
• Maxmin value for player 1? 2
• Maxmin strategy of player 1? T
• Maxmin value for player 2?
3
Maxmin Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 3,3
• Maxmin value for player 1? 2
• Maxmin strategy of player 1? T
• Maxmin value for player 2? 0
3
Maxmin Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 3,3
• Maxmin value for player 1? 2
• Maxmin strategy of player 1? T
• Maxmin value for player 2? 0
• Maxmin strategy of player 2?
3
Maxmin Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 3,3
• Maxmin value for player 1? 2
• Maxmin strategy of player 1? T
• Maxmin value for player 2? 0
• Maxmin strategy of player 2? L
3
Relation Between Maxmin Value and PSNE Utility
If (s1∗ , s2∗ , . . . , sn∗ ) is a PSNE, what can you say about the relation between
ui (si∗ , s−i
∗
) ? vi
4
Relation Between Maxmin Value and PSNE Utility
If (s1∗ , s2∗ , . . . , sn∗ ) is a PSNE, what can you say about the relation between
ui (si∗ , s−i
∗
) ? vi
Result: If (s1∗ , s2∗ , . . . , sn∗ ) is a PSNE, then ui (si∗ , s−i
∗
) ≥ v i , ∀i ∈ N
4
Minmax Value
v i = min max ui (si , s−i )
s−i ∈S−i si ∈Si
5
Minmax Value
v i = min max ui (si , s−i )
s−i ∈S−i si ∈Si
Other players can guarantee that player i will never receive more than the
min-max value
5
Minmax Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Minmax value for player 1?
6
Minmax Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Minmax value for player 1? 3
6
Minmax Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Minmax value for player 1? 3
• Minmax strategy of player 2?
6
Minmax Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Minmax value for player 1? 3
• Minmax strategy of player 2? L
6
Minmax Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Minmax value for player 1? 3
• Minmax strategy of player 2? L
• Minmax value for player 2?
6
Minmax Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Minmax value for player 1? 3
• Minmax strategy of player 2? L
• Minmax value for player 2? 1
6
Minmax Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Minmax value for player 1? 3
• Minmax strategy of player 2? L
• Minmax value for player 2? 1
• Minmax strategy of player 1?
6
Minmax Value: Example
L R
T 2,1 2,-20
M 3,0 -10,1
B -100,2 4,3
• Minmax value for player 1? 3
• Minmax strategy of player 2? L
• Minmax value for player 2? 1
• Minmax strategy of player 1? T or M
6
Relation Between Maxmin Value and Minmax Value
If v i is the maxmin value and v i is the minmax value of player i, what
can you say about the relation between
vi ? vi
7
Relation Between Maxmin Value and Minmax Value
If v i is the maxmin value and v i is the minmax value of player i, what
can you say about the relation between
vi ? vi
Result: v i ≤ v i , ∀i ∈ N
7
Relation Between Minmax Value and PSNE Utility
If (s1∗ , s2∗ , . . . , sn∗ ) is a PSNE, what can you say about the relation between
ui (si∗ , s−i
∗
) ? vi
8
Relation Between Minmax Value and PSNE Utility
If (s1∗ , s2∗ , . . . , sn∗ ) is a PSNE, what can you say about the relation between
ui (si∗ , s−i
∗
) ? vi
Result: If (s1∗ , s2∗ , . . . , sn∗ ) is a PSNE, then ui (si∗ , s−i
∗
) ≥ v i , ∀i ∈ N
