NUREG/IA-0490

International
Agreement Report

TRACE VVER-1000/V-320 Model Validation

Prepared by:
S. Iegan, A. Mazur, Y. Vorobyov, O. Zhabin, S. Yanovskiy

State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine

and
State Scientific and Technical Center
for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ukraine

9/11 Arsenalna str.

Kyiv, Ukraine 01011

K. Tien, NRC Project Manager

Division of Systems Analysis

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Manuscript Completed: March 2017

Date Published: December 2018

Prepared as part of
The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange
Under the Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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 NUREG/IA-0490

International
Agreement Report

TRACE VVER-1000/V-320 Model Validation

Prepared by:
S. Iegan, A. Mazur, Y. Vorobyov, O. Zhabin, S. Yanovskiy

State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine

and
State Scientific and Technical Center
for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ukraine

9/11 Arsenalna str.

Kyiv, Ukraine 01011

K. Tien, NRC Project Manager

Division of Systems Analysis

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Manuscript Completed: March 2017

Date Published: December 2018

Prepared as part of
The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange
Under the Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 ABSTRACT
This report is developed by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) and
its technical support organization, the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and
Radiation Safety of Ukraine (SSTC NRS), under Implementing Agreement On Thermal-
Hydraulic Code Applications And Maintenance Between The United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (signed in 2014) in
accordance with Article III, Section C, of the Agreement.

The report provides results of the validation calculations conducted with application of SSTC
NRS model of VVER-1000/V-320 unit for TRACE computer code. The calculation scenarios
simulate actual incidents that occurred at Ukrainian NPPs.

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................... xiii
ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................... xv
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1-1
2 MAIN FEATURES OF VVER-1000/V-320 DESIGN ............................................ 2-1
2.1 VVER-1000/V-320 Reactor System ....................................................................... 2-1
2.2 Technological and Safety Systems Connected to the Primary Circuit .................... 2-8
2.2.1 Chemical and Volume Control System ....................................................... 2-8
2.2.2 RCS Overpressure Protection System........................................................ 2-9
2.2.3 Emergency Gas Evacuation System .......................................................... 2-9
2.2.4 Emergency Core Cooling System ............................................................. 2-10
2.3 Technological and Safety Systems of the Secondary Circuit ............................... 2-12
2.3.1 Main Steam Lines System ........................................................................ 2-12
2.3.2 Turbine Bypass to Condenser BRU-K ...................................................... 2-13
2.3.3 Steam Dump Valves to Atmosphere BRU-A ............................................. 2-14
2.3.4 Secondary Circuit Overpressure Protection System ................................. 2-14
2.3.5 Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems .................................................... 2-14
2.3.6 Emergency Feedwater System ................................................................. 2-16
3 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF TRACE MODEL FOR VVER-1000 .......................... 3-1
3.1 Reactor Model ....................................................................................................... 3-1
3.2 RCS Loops Model ................................................................................................. 3-2
3.3 Pressurizer System Model ..................................................................................... 3-3
3.4 Steam Generators Model ...................................................................................... 3-4
3.5 Make-Up and Let-Down Model .............................................................................. 3-4
3.6 Emergency Gas Evacuation System Model ........................................................... 3-5
3.7 Main Steam Lines Model ....................................................................................... 3-6
3.8 Main Steam Header Model .................................................................................... 3-7
3.9 Main, Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Systems ............................................. 3-7
3.10 ECCS Model ......................................................................................................... 3-8
3.11 Safeguards and Control Systems Operation Logic .............................................. 3-10

v
4 CALCULATION OF TRANSIENTS .................................................................... 4-1
4.1 ZNPP Unit 5 MFW-1 Pump Trip ............................................................................ 4-1
4.1.1 Initial Conditions ......................................................................................... 4-1
4.1.2 Boundary Conditions .................................................................................. 4-2
4.1.3 Calculation Results ..................................................................................... 4-4
4.2 ZNPP Unit 6 Inadvertent FASIV Closure ............................................................. 4-33
4.2.1 Initial Conditions ....................................................................................... 4-33
4.2.2 Boundary Conditions ................................................................................ 4-33
4.2.3 Calculation Results ................................................................................... 4-34
4.3 RNPP Unit 3 PRZ PORV Stuck Open During Tests ............................................ 4-66
4.3.1 Initial Conditions ....................................................................................... 4-66
4.3.2 Boundary Conditions ................................................................................ 4-68
4.3.3 Calculation Results ................................................................................... 4-69
5 CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................5-1
6 REFERENCES.................................................................................................... 6-1

vi
 LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1 VVER-1000/V-320 Reactor System Layout ............................................ 2-2
Figure 2-2 VVER-1000/V-320 Reactor System Primary Loops (Top View) .............. 2-2
Figure 2-3 Principal Diagram of VVER-1000/V-320 Reactor Coolant System .......... 2-3
Figure 2-4 VVER-1000 Reactor and Coolant Flow Paths ........................................ 2-4
Figure 2-5 PGV-1000 Longitudinal Section ............................................................. 2-5
Figure 2-6 PGV-1000 Cross Section ....................................................................... 2-6
Figure 2-7 Pressurizer ............................................................................................. 2-7
Figure 2-8 Principal Diagram of the Primary Pressure Control System .................... 2-9
Figure 2-9 Principal Diagram of Emergency Gas Evacuation System ................... 2-10
Figure 2-10 Principal Diagram of HPIS and LPIS (1st train)0 .................................. 2-11
Figure 2-11 Principal Diagram of the Main Steam Lines System ............................. 2-13
Figure 2-12 Principal Diagram of the Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems ......... 2-16
Figure 2-12 Principal Diagram of the Emergency Feedwater System ...................... 2-17
Figure 3-1 Nodalization Diagram of VVER-1000 Reactor ........................................ 3-2
Figure 3-2 Nodalization Diagram of RCS Loop 1 ..................................................... 3-2
Figure 3-3 Nodalization Diagram of Pressurizer, Surge and Relief Pipes ................ 3-3
Figure 3-4 Nodalization Diagram of the Pressurizer Spray Line .............................. 3-3
Figure 3-5 Nodalization Diagram of SG Primary and Secondary Side ..................... 3-4
Figure 3-6 Nodalization Diagram of Makeup and Let-down ..................................... 3-5
Figure 3-7 Nodalization Diagram of Emergency Gas Removal System ................... 3-5
Figure 3-8 Nodalization Diagram of MSL No. 1 ....................................................... 3-6
Figure 3-9 Nodalization Diagram of MSL No. 2 ....................................................... 3-6
Figure 3-10 Nodalization Diagram of MSL No. 3 ....................................................... 3-6
Figure 3-11 Nodalization Diagram of MSL No. 4 ....................................................... 3-7
Figure 3-12 Nodalization Diagram of MSH and BRU-K ............................................. 3-7
Figure 3-13 Nodalization Diagram of the Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems ..... 3-8
Figure 3-14 Nodalization Diagram of the Emergency Feedwater System .................. 3-8
Figure 3-15 Nodalization Diagram of ECCS HA and LPIS Trains .............................. 3-9
Figure 3-16 Nodalization Diagram of HPIS Trains ..................................................... 3-9
Figure 3-17 Logical Diagram of HPIS Operation...................................................... 3-11
Figure 3-18 Logical Diagram of LPIS Operation ...................................................... 3-12
Figure 3-19 Logical Diagram of Control and Protection System (Part 1) .................. 3-13
Figure 3-20 Logical Diagram of Control and Protection System (Part 2) .................. 3-14

vii
Figure 3-21 Logical Diagram of Control and Protection System (Part 3) .................. 3-15
Figure 3-22 Logical Diagram of Control and Protection System (Part 4) .................. 3-16
Figure 3-23 Logical Diagram of PRZ Level Control by Makeup and Let-Down ........ 3-17
Figure 3-24 Logical Diagram of Make-up Pressure Difference Controller ................ 3-18
Figure 3-25 Logical Diagram of MFW Flow Rate Controller (Part 1) ........................ 3-19
Figure 3-26 Logical Diagram of MFW Flow Rate Controller (Part 2) ........................ 3-20
Figure 3-27 Logical Diagram of SG Level Controller ............................................... 3-21
Figure 3-28 Logical Diagram of BRU-A Controller ................................................... 3-22
Figure 3-29 Logical Diagram of Turbine Control System ......................................... 3-23
Figure 4-1 Reactor Power ....................................................................................... 4-7
Figure 4-2 RCS Pressure ........................................................................................ 4-7
Figure 4-3 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.1 .............................................. 4-8
Figure 4-4 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.2 .............................................. 4-8
Figure 4-5 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.3 .............................................. 4-9
Figure 4-6 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.4 .............................................. 4-9
Figure 4-7 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.1 .......................................... 4-10
Figure 4-8 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.2 .......................................... 4-10
Figure 4-9 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.3 .......................................... 4-11
Figure 4-10 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.4 .......................................... 4-11
Figure 4-11 Make-up Temperature .......................................................................... 4-12
Figure 4-12 Make-up Mass Flow Rate ..................................................................... 4-12
Figure 4-13 Let-down Mass Flow Rate .................................................................... 4-13
Figure 4-14 PRZ Level ............................................................................................ 4-13
Figure 4-15 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.1 ......................................................... 4-14
Figure 4-16 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.2 ......................................................... 4-14
Figure 4-17 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.3 ......................................................... 4-15
Figure 4-18 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.4 ......................................................... 4-15
Figure 4-19 Pressure Difference at RCP-1 .............................................................. 4-16
Figure 4-20 Pressure Difference at RCP-2 .............................................................. 4-16
Figure 4-21 Pressure Difference at RCP-3 .............................................................. 4-17
Figure 4-22 Pressure Difference at RCP-4 .............................................................. 4-17
Figure 4-23 MSH Pressure ...................................................................................... 4-18
Figure 4-24 SG-1 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-18
Figure 4-25 SG-2 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-19
Figure 4-26 SG-3 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-19

viii
Figure 4-27 SG-4 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-20
Figure 4-28 Relative Turbine Power ........................................................................ 4-20
Figure 4-29 SG-1 Level (Narrow Range) ................................................................. 4-21
Figure 4-30 SG-2 Level (Narrow Range) ................................................................. 4-21
Figure 4-31 SG-3 Level (Narrow Range) ................................................................. 4-22
Figure 4-32 SG-4 Level (Narrow Range) ................................................................. 4-22
Figure 4-33 SG-1 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-23
Figure 4-34 SG-2 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-23
Figure 4-35 SG-3 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-24
Figure 4-36 SG-4 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-24
Figure 4-37 MFW Pump No.1 Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-25
Figure 4-38 MFW Pump No.2 Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-25
Figure 4-39 AFW Pump No.1 Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-26
Figure 4-40 AFW Pump No.2 Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-26
Figure 4-41 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.1 Stem Position ............................ 4-27
Figure 4-42 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.2 Stem Position ............................ 4-27
Figure 4-43 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.3 Stem Position ............................ 4-28
Figure 4-44 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.4 Stem Position ............................ 4-28
Figure 4-45 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.1 Stem Position ....... 4-29
Figure 4-46 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.2 Stem Position ....... 4-29
Figure 4-47 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.3 Stem Position ....... 4-30
Figure 4-48 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.4 Stem Position ....... 4-30
Figure 4-49 SG-1 Feed Water Flow......................................................................... 4-31
Figure 4-50 SG-2 Feed Water Flow......................................................................... 4-31
Figure 4-51 SG-3 Feed Water Flow......................................................................... 4-32
Figure 4-52 SG-4 Feed Water Flow......................................................................... 4-32
Figure 4-53 Thermal Reactor Power ....................................................................... 4-36
Figure 4-54 RCS Pressure ...................................................................................... 4-36
Figure 4-55 PRZ Level ............................................................................................ 4-37
Figure 4-56 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.1 ............................................ 4-37
Figure 4-57 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.2 ............................................ 4-38
Figure 4-58 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.3 ............................................ 4-38
Figure 4-59 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.4 ............................................ 4-39
Figure 4-60 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.1 .......................................... 4-39
Figure 4-61 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.2 .......................................... 4-40

ix
Figure 4-62 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.3 .......................................... 4-40
Figure 4-63 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.4 .......................................... 4-41
Figure 4-64 Cold and Hot Legs Temperature in Loop No. 1.....................................4-41
Figure 4-65 Cold and Hot Legs Temperature in Loop No. 2 .................................... 4-42
Figure 4-66 Cold and Hot Legs Temperature in Loop No. 3 .................................... 4-42
Figure 4-67 Cold and Hot Legs Temperature in Loop No. 4 .................................... 4-43
Figure 4-68 Make-up Mass Flow Rate ..................................................................... 4-43
Figure 4-69 Let-down Mass Flow Rate .................................................................... 4-44
Figure 4-70 Make-up Temperature .......................................................................... 4-44
Figure 4-71 RCP-1 Mass Flow Rate ........................................................................ 4-45
Figure 4-72 RCP-2 Mass Flow Rate ........................................................................ 4-45
Figure 4-73 RCP-3 Mass Flow Rate ........................................................................ 4-46
Figure 4-74 RCP-4 Mass Flow Rate ........................................................................ 4-46
Figure 4-75 Pressure Difference at RCP No.1 ......................................................... 4-47
Figure 4-76 Pressure Difference at RCP No.2 ......................................................... 4-47
Figure 4-77 Pressure Difference at RCP No.3 ......................................................... 4-48
Figure 4-78 Pressure Difference at RCP No.4 ......................................................... 4-48
Figure 4-79 Pressure Drop at the Reactor ............................................................... 4-49
Figure 4-80 SG-1 Feed Water Flow......................................................................... 4-49
Figure 4-81 SG-2 Feed Water Flow......................................................................... 4-50
Figure 4-82 SG-3 Feed Water Flow......................................................................... 4-50
Figure 4-83 SG-4 Feed Water Flow......................................................................... 4-51
Figure 4-84 MSH Pressure ...................................................................................... 4-51
Figure 4-85 SG-1 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-52
Figure 4-86 SG-2 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-52
Figure 4-87 SG-3 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-53
Figure 4-88 SG-4 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-53
Figure 4-89 Pressure Loss at SG-1 Primary Side .................................................... 4-54
Figure 4-90 Pressure Loss at SG-2 Primary Side .................................................... 4-54
Figure 4-91 Pressure Loss at SG-3 Primary Side .................................................... 4-55
Figure 4-92 Pressure Loss at SG-4 Primary Side .................................................... 4-55
Figure 4-93 SG-1 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-56
Figure 4-94 SG-2 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-56
Figure 4-95 SG-3 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-57
Figure 4-96 SG-4 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-57

x
Figure 4-97 SG-1 Level (Narrow Range) ................................................................. 4-58
Figure 4-98 SG-2 Level (Narrow Range) ................................................................. 4-58
Figure 4-99 SG-3 Level (Narrow Range) ................................................................. 4-59
Figure 4-100 SG-4 Level (Narrow Range) ................................................................. 4-59
Figure 4-101 Turbine Stop Valves Stem Position ...................................................... 4-60
Figure 4-102 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.1 Stem Position ............................ 4-60
Figure 4-103 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.2 Stem Position ............................ 4-61
Figure 4-104 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.3 Stem Position ............................ 4-61
Figure 4-105 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.4 Stem Position ............................ 4-62
Figure 4-106 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.1 Stem Position ....... 4-62
Figure 4-107 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.2 Stem Position ....... 4-63
Figure 4-108 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.3 Stem Position ....... 4-63
Figure 4-109 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.4 Stem Position ....... 4-64
Figure 4-110 MFW Pump No.1 Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-64
Figure 4-111 MFW Pump No.2 Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-65
Figure 4-112 AFW Pump No.1 Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-65
Figure 4-113 AFW Pump No.2 Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-66
Figure 4-114 RCS Pressure ...................................................................................... 4-72
Figure 4-115 PRZ Level ............................................................................................ 4-72
Figure 4-116 Core Exit Temperature ......................................................................... 4-73
Figure 4-117 Peak Cladding Temperature................................................................. 4-73
Figure 4-118 PRZ Coolant Temperature ................................................................... 4-74
Figure 4-119 Coolant Temperature in Hot Leg No.1 and at the Core Exit .................. 4-74
Figure 4-120 Coolant Temperature in Hot Leg No.2 and at the Core Exit .................. 4-75
Figure 4-121 Coolant Temperature in Hot Leg No.3 and at the Core Exit .................. 4-75
Figure 4-122 Coolant Temperature in Hot Leg No.4 and at the Core Exit .................. 4-76
Figure 4-123 Coolant Temperature in Cold Leg No.1 and at the Reactor Inlet .......... 4-76
Figure 4-124 Coolant Temperature in Cold Leg No.2 and at the Reactor Inlet .......... 4-77
Figure 4-125 Coolant Temperature in Cold Leg No.3 and at the Reactor Inlet .......... 4-77
Figure 4-126 Coolant Temperature in Cold Leg No.4 and at the Reactor Inlet .......... 4-78
Figure 4-127 Subcooling ........................................................................................... 4-78
Figure 4-128 Make-up Mass Flow Rate ..................................................................... 4-79
Figure 4-129 Let-down Mass Flow Rate .................................................................... 4-79
Figure 4-130 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.1 ......................................................... 4-80
Figure 4-131 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.2 ......................................................... 4-80

xi
Figure 4-132 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.3 ......................................................... 4-81
Figure 4-133 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.4 ......................................................... 4-81
Figure 4-134 TQ12 LPIS Mass Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-82
Figure 4-135 TQ22 LPIS Mass Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-82
Figure 4-136 TQ32 LPIS Mass Flow Rate ................................................................. 4-83
Figure 4-137 TQ13 HPIS Mass Flow Rate ................................................................ 4-83
Figure 4-138 TQ23 HPIS Mass Flow Rate ................................................................ 4-84
Figure 4-139 TQ33 HPIS Mass Flow Rate ................................................................ 4-84
Figure 4-140 HA-1 Level ........................................................................................... 4-85
Figure 4-141 HA-2 Level ........................................................................................... 4-85
Figure 4-142 HA-3 Level ........................................................................................... 4-86
Figure 4-143 HA-4 Level ........................................................................................... 4-86
Figure 4-144 MSH Pressure ...................................................................................... 4-87
Figure 4-145 SG-1 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-87
Figure 4-146 SG-2 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-88
Figure 4-147 SG-3 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-88
Figure 4-148 SG-4 Pressure ..................................................................................... 4-89
Figure 4-149 SG-1 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-89
Figure 4-150 SG-2 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-90
Figure 4-151 SG-3 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-90
Figure 4-152 SG-4 Level (Wide Range) .................................................................... 4-91
Figure 4-153 Feedwater Temperature ....................................................................... 4-91
Figure 4-154 BRU-A No.4 Stem Position .................................................................. 4-92
Figure 4-155 BRU-K No.1 Stem Position .................................................................. 4-92
Figure 4-156 Coolant Mass Flow Rate from PRZ PORV, HPIS and LPIS ................. 4-93

xii
 LIST OF TABLES
Table 4-1 Initial Conditions for Validation Transient No.1 ............................................. 4-1
Table 4-2 Measured Flow Rate of MFW Pump No.1 .................................................... 4-3
Table 4-3 BRU-SN stem position (S) as a function of time ........................................... 4-3
Table 4-4 Sequence of Events for Validation Transient No.1 ....................................... 4-4
Table 4-5 BRU-SN stem position (S) as a function of time ......................................... 4-33
Table 4-6 Sequence of Events for Validation Transient No.2 ..................................... 4-34
Table 4-7 Initial Conditions for Validation Transient No.3 ........................................... 4-67
Table 4-8 Sequence of Events for Validation Transient No.3 ..................................... 4-69

xiii
 ABBREVIATIONS
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System
ARM Reactor Power Controller, Russian designation
BRU-A Steam Dump Valve to Atmosphere
BRU-K Turbine Bypass to Condenser
BRU-SN House Loads Steam Supply Valve
CAMP Code Maintenance and Assessment Program
CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
EFW Emergency Feedwater System
FASIV Fast-acting Steam Isolation Valve
HA Hydroaccumulators
HC Hydraulic Components
HPIS High Pressure Injection System
HS Heat Structure
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident
LPIS Low Pressure Injection System
MFW Main Feedwater System
MSH Main Steam Header
MSL Main Steam Line
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
PORV Pilot Operated Relief Valve
PRZ Pressurizer
PTU Protective Tubes Unit
PZ-1 Level 1 Reactor Preventive Protection
PZ-2 Level 2 Reactor Preventive Protection
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
RCS Reactor Coolant System
RNPP Rivne Nuclear Power Plant
SG Steam Generator
SNRIU State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine
SPP Submerged Perforated Plate
SRV Safety Relief Valve
SSTC NRS State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety

xv
UPZ Fast Reactor Load Shedding Protection, Russian designation
U.S. NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
VVER Pressurized Water Reactor, Russian design
ZNPP Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant

xvi
 1 INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2014 the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the State
Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) signed Implementing Agreement On
Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications And Maintenance (CAMP). In accordance with Article III,
Section C, of the Agreement, SNRIU shall submit to the USNRC the in-kind contribution reports
providing the code assessment results or other activities results of equivalent value.

In the framework of the Agreement SNRIU and SSTC NRS obtained the state-of the-art TRACE
code which provides advanced capabilities for modeling thermal-hydraulic processes and
components, control systems and allows coupling with PARCS neutron kinetics code. In 2015
SSTC NRS initiated activities on TRACE code application for evaluation of the results of safety
assessments performed for Ukrainian NPPs. The existing SNRIU/SSTC NRS RELAP5 models
for VVER-440 and VVER-1000 were converted to TRACE code.

In order to justify capabilities of VVER-1000 model for TRACE code to simulate adequately the
plant response during transients and accidents, the validation of the model was performed. This
report provides description of validation results.

Section 2 of the report briefly describes main primary and secondary systems of Zaporizhzhya
NPP (ZNPP) unit 5 (of VVER-1000/V-320 design) which are important for development of
thermal-hydraulic model. Description of ZNPP Unit 5 model for TRACE code is provided in
Section 3. The results of TRACE calculations for several scenarios simulating actual incidents
that occurred at Ukrainian NPPs are provided in Section 4 of the report.

The incidents simulated include:

 MFW-1 pump trip;

 inadvertent FASIV closure;
 PRZ PORV stuck open during tests.

For each validation calculation the following information is provided:

 brief description of the incident;

 initial and boundary conditions selected for incident simulation;
 sequence of events;
 description of calculation results;
 plots of the main primary and secondary circuit parameters (including calculated and
measured data).

1-1
 2 MAIN FEATURES OF VVER-1000/V-320 DESIGN
2.1 VVER-1000/V-320 Reactor System

VVER-1000/V-320 is 1000 MWe nuclear power plant with pressurized water reactor designed in
former Soviet Union. The primary circuit of VVER-1000/V-320 unit consists of reactor and four
identical primary circuit loops of Dn 850 mm with horizontal steam generators (SG) PGV-1000M
and reactor coolant pumps (RCP) of GCN-195M type. Main design characteristics of
VVER-1000/V-320 and general layout of the reactor coolant system (based on Zaporizhzhia
NPP Unit 5 data [1]) are provided in Table 2-1 and Figures 2-1, 2-2. Principal diagram of
VVER-1000/V-320 reactor coolant system is shown in 2-3.

Table 2-1 Main characteristics of VVER-1000/V-320

Parameter Value

Reactor thermal power, MWt 3000

Reactor pressure, abs., kgf/cm2 (MPa) 1603 (15.70.3)

Reactor outlet temperature, C 320

Coolant heat-up, C 30.3

Reactor coolant flow, m3/h 84800+4000-4800

SG steam mass flow, t/h 5880

SG pressure, abs., kgf/cm2 (MPa) 642 (6.280.2)

Steam temperature, C 278.52

2205
Feedwater temperature with/without heaters, C
1644
Pressurizer level, mm 8770150

SG level, mm 255050

Grid frequency, Hz 50+0.5-1.0

2-1
Figure 2-1 VVER-1000/V-320 Reactor System Layout

Figure 2-2 VVER-1000/V-320 Reactor System Primary Loops (Top View)

2-2
 TK40S09 YP13S02 YP13S03 YP20B01
~ ~ ~
TK

YP13S01

YP13S04
YP12S01 YP12S02

~
~ ~ YP21S01 YP22S01 YP23S01

YT12B01 YT11B01 YP11S01 YP11S02

YT13B01 YT14B01
~ ~

YP14E01 YP10B01

YT13S01
YT12S01

YT11S01

YT14S01
YB20W01 YB40W01
~

~
~
YT12S02

YT11S02

YT14S02
YT13S02
~

~
~
YD20D01 YD40D01

YT11S03 YT11S04 YT13S04 YT13S03

YT12S03 YT12S04 YT14S04 YT14S03

YB10W01 YD10D01 YD30D01 YB30W01

Figure 2-3 Principal Diagram of VVER-1000/V-320 Reactor Coolant System

VVER-1000 reactor consists of the following elements (Figure 2-4, left):

 reactor pressure vessel (pos.1);

 separation ring (flow divider) (pos.2);
 reactor upper head (pos.3);
 core barrel including perforated cylindrical part (pos.4), perforated elliptical bottom
(pos.5), grid plate (pos.6) and support tubes (pos.7);
 core baffle (pos.8);
 protective tubes unit (PTU) including upper, medium and bottom (support) plates (pos.9,
10, 11), bulge (pos.12), perforated cylindrical shell (pos.13), I&C shroud (pos.14), I&C
and control rods protective tubes (pos.15, 16), thermal and neutron flux detectors shroud
(pos.17, 18), control rods shaft (pos.20) and its protective tube (pos.19);
 reactor core with fuel assemblies (pos.23).

Coolant flow paths in the reactor core are shown in Figure 2-4, right. From the reactor inlet
nozzles the coolant flows down in the annular gap between reactor vessel and core barrel, and
passes through the perforated elliptical bottom of the core barrel. Most of the coolant passes
through the orifices in core support tubes and enters the fuel assemblies. Small amount of
coolant flows through channels in the core baffle, and in the gap between core baffle and barrel.
Heated in the reactor core coolant through the orifices in the lower plate of protective tubes unit
and in the protective tubes enters tube space of PTU, and then through the perforation in upper
part of the core barrel and reactor outlet nozzles exits the reactor.

The reactor core consists of 163 hexagonal fuel assemblies, 61 of which contain movable
control rods. The fuel assembly is composed of fuel rods bundle (312 fuel rods), control rods
guide tubes, central tube, top and bottom nozzles. The fuel rods are arranged in a triangular
grid and separated by honeycomb-type spacers.

2-3
 20 21
22
3

9
1095

12

10
19
1392

18
4
17

13
1253

16

15 5 6 7
11
1800

14 2

1
1 10
972

11
9
8

23
4409

3
8
1514

2
5
100

Figure 2-4 VVER-1000 Reactor and Coolant Flow Paths

The main circulating pipeline (Figures 2-1, 2-2) is intended to connect the equipment of the
primary circuit and categorized as a normal operation system. Each of four circulating loops
consists of hot and cold legs Dn 850 mm. The hot leg connects the reactor outlet nozzle with
the steam generator inlet collector. The cold leg connects the SG outlet collector with the
reactor coolant pump, and RCP with the reactor inlet nozzle.

Circulation of the coolant through the primary circuit is provided by operation of reactor coolant
pumps GCN-195M of a centrifugal type with mechanical shaft sealing. A special flywheel is
installed on the pump shaft to provide the desired flow pump coast-down.

PGV-1000 is horizontal steam generator with submerged bundle of horizontal U-shaped tubes
and is designed to remove heat from the primary circuit and to produce dry saturated steam.
Longitudinal and cross-section view of PGV-213 is provided on Figures 2-5 and 2-6.

2-4
 Figure 2-5
Штуцера уровнемеров
с базой 4 м.

Штуцера уровнемеров
с базой 1 м.

PGV-1000 Longitudinal Section

2-5
 6
9x1
?21

Максимальный уровень

Минимальный уровень

Figure 2-6 PGV-1000 Cross Section

PGV-1000 SG consists of the following components:

 SG vessel;
 two vertical primary circuit collectors with collector covers;
 U-shaped horizontal heat exchange tube bundle with support structures;
 steam pipes and manifold;
 main feedwater manifold and distribution pipeline;
 emergency feedwater manifold and distribution pipeline;
 steam separators;
 submerged perforated plate.

2-6
Heat exchange tubes are assembled into two U-shaped tube bundles. The vertical and
horizontal step between tubes is 19 mm and 23 mm, respectively. Each bundle has three
vertical corridors ensuring controlled hydrodynamics of circulating water.

During normal power operation, startup and reactor cooling down the primary circuit pressure is
maintained by primary pressure control system which is categorized as a normal operation
system and comprises of pressurizer YP10B01 (Figure 2-7), relief tank YP20B01, pipelines and
valves. Pressurizer (PRZ) is connected to the hot leg of loop no.4 with surge line (Figure 2-3).

o mb

Figure 2-7 Pressurizer

2-7
To maintain prescribed reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure the pressurizer is equipped with
a spray unit installed at the top of PRZ to inject cold RCS coolant to the steam volume of PRZ
and electrical heaters located at bottom part of PRZ. The PRZ spray unit is connected to the
cold leg of loop no.1 (downstream RCP) by the spray pipeline. The spray flow is controlled by
opening and closure of valves YP11S02, YP12S02 (Figure 2-3). Control valve YP13S02 is
used to maintain coolant temperature difference between PRZ and hot legs during reactor start-
up or shut-down.

2.2 Technological and Safety Systems Connected to the Primary Circuit

Main technological and safety systems of the primary circuit are:

 chemical and volume control system;
 RCS overpressure protection system;
 emergency gas evacuation system;
 emergency core cooling system.

2.2.1 Chemical and Volume Control System

The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) is intended to control the volume, purity and
boric acid content of the reactor coolant during normal operational conditions and transients,
including startup, shutdown and changes of the reactor power level. During normal operation
the CVCS compensates uncontrolled and controlled leaks from the RCS. Adjustments in
coolant volume are made automatically to maintain a predetermined level in the pressurizer.

The design functions of chemical and volume control system are to:

 supply sealing water to RCP seals;

 return purified let-down water to the primary circuit;
 compensate uncontrolled primary coolant leaks;
 control reactivity of the reactor by variation of boron acid concentration;
 provide required chemical content of the primary coolant;
 control primary coolant inventory during loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) compensated
by CVCS;
 control parameters of primary circuit during start-up and shutdown.

The system is categorized as a normal operation system and consists of the following
subsystems:

 primary coolant deaerating subsystem;

 primary make-up subsystem;
 RCP sealing water subsystem;

2-8
  demineralized water supply subsystem;
 primary coolant let-down subsystem.

2.2.2 RCS Overpressure Protection System

RCS overpressure protection system is categorized as a safety system and designed to protect
RCS pipelines and equipment from a pressure increase above the design limits.

The system consists of one control and two main pilot operated relief valves (PORV) YP21S01,
YP22S01, YP23S01 (Figure 2-8) which open automatically at the preset RCS pressure and
dump coolant to the relief tank YP20B01 [2]. Steam from PRZ released by PORV is condensed
in the relief tank, and the condensate is pumped out for maintaining nominal level in the tank. If
the pressure in the relief tank rises above the safety limit, a rupture disk which is installed at the
top of relief tank breaks and coolant is released to the containment.

PORV can be controlled manually to depressurize primary circuit and implement primary feed-
and-bleed procedure.
Æ159
YP23S08 YP23S09

YP22S08 YP22S09

YP21S08 YP21S09
YP23S03 YP23S05 YP23S06 YP23S04 YP22S03 YP22S05 YP22S06 YP22S04 YP21S03 YP21S05 YP21S06 YP21S04
YP23S01

YP22S01

YP21S01
YP23S07

YP23S02

YP22S07

YP22S02

YP21S07

YP21S02
Æ 245

Æ 273

YP20B01

YP10B01

Figure 2-8 Principal Diagram of the Primary Pressure Control System

2.2.3 Emergency Gas Evacuation System

Emergency gas evacuation system is categorized as a safety system and designed to remove
steam-gas mixture from the top points of the primary circuit (from the reactor upper head, steam
generator collectors and PRZ) in accidents leading to the reactor core uncovery and steam-
zirconium oxidation.

Emergency gas evacuation system consists of:

 pipelines from the reactor;
 pipelines from the SG collectors;

2-9
  pipelines connected to the pressurizer relief line;
 valves.

The system is operated manually from the control room. Principal diagram of the system is
shown in Figure 2-9.
from PRZ PORV

Dn60
Dn230

YP20B01 YR61S01

YR62S01

YR63S01
YP24E01
YR60E01
YP24S01 YP24S02

to PRZ TY
PORV Dn60
YR60S01 YR60S02
Dn30 Dn25
YR51S01
Dn30

YR52S01
YR41S01

YR42S01

YR31S01

YR32S01

YR21S01

YR22S01

YR01S01

YR02S01

YR03S01

YR11S01

YR12S01
YR53S01

YP10B01

from SG-4 from SG-3 from SG-2 from reactor from SG-1
collectors collectors collectors collectors

Figure 2-9 Principal Diagram of Emergency Gas Evacuation System

2.2.4 Emergency Core Cooling System

Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) includes:

 4 hydroaccumulators (HA);
 high pressure injection system (HPIS);
 low pressure injection system (LPIS).

The passive part of emergency core cooling system includes 4 HA YT11B01, YT12B01,
YT13B01, YT14B01 (Figure 2-3) with 50 m3 of boric acid each at the pressure of 60 kgf/cm2.
Two of the hydroaccumulators (YT11B01, YT13B01) are connected to the reactor upper
plenum, and two others (YT12B01, YT14B01) are connected to the downcomer. Decrease of
RCS pressure causes opening of the check valves at the pipelines connecting HA and reactor,
and boric acid from HA is injected to the reactor [2].

HPIS is composed of three identical and independent trains which are connected to the cold
legs of RCS loops no.1, 4 and 3 downstream reactor coolant pumps. Principal diagram of the
first HPIS train is shown in Figure 2-10.

Each HPIS train consists of the following main equipment [2]:

 high head safety injection pump (TQ14D01, TQ24D01, TQ34D01);

2-10
  high pressure injection pump (TQ13D01, TQ23D01, TQ33D01);
 high concentration (40 g/kg of H3BO3) boric acid storage tank (TQ14B01, TQ24B01,
TQ34B01);
 HPIS storage tank (TQ13B01, TQ23B01, TQ33B01) with boric acid concentration of
16 g/kg;
 pipelines and valves.

The high head safety injection pump characteristics allow to inject 6.3 m3/h of boron solution at
RCS pressure up to 200 bar. HPIS pumps TQ13D01, TQ23D01, TQ33D01 allow to inject
~100 m3/h of boric acid solution at RCS pressure below 10 MPa. After depletion of HPIS tank
the high pressure injection pump operates from LPIS tank (TQ10B01, TQ20B01, TQ30B01).

YB10W01 YD10D01
TQ13S19

TQ13S13

TQ14S11

TQ14S10
TQ12S11

TQ12S22

TQ12S18

TQ12S09
TQ12S10

TQ12S20

TQ12S16

TQ12S08

TQ13S18

TQ13S10

TQ14S09

TQ14S16

~ ~
TQ13E01

TQ13S07

TQ12S07 TQ12S06
~

TQ13S06
~ ~

TQ13S05
TQ12S04

TQ12E02
~

TQ13B01
TQ12S13
~ ~

TQ12S02
TQ14E02
TQ14S07
TQ12E01

TQ10B01
TQ13E02 TQ14S03
~ ~
TQ10S01
TQ12S01

TQ14S04
TQ13D01
~
TQ10S02

TQ14S01

TQ14B01
TQ12D01

TQ13N01
TQ14S19

TQ10W01
~

~ ~

TQ13S26 TQ13S20 TQ13S01

TQ14D01

TQ13S25

Figure 2-10 Principal Diagram of HPIS and LPIS (1st train)0

LPIS is designed to provide emergency core cooling during large and medium break LOCAs.
LPIS is also used for planned reactor cooling down at low RCS pressure and long term residual
heat removal during a refueling outage.

LPIS is composed of three identical and independent trains. Principal diagram of the first LPIS
train is shown in Figure 2-10.

2-11
Each train includes the following main equipment (Figure 2-10) [2]:

 low pressure injection pump (TQ12D01, TQ22D01, TQ32D01);

 ECCS heat exchanger (TQ10W01, TQ20W01, TQ30W01);
 borated water tank (TQ10B01, TQ20B01, TQ30B01), which contains boric acid of
16 g/kg concentration;
 pipelines and valves.

Charging line of the 1st LPIS train is connected to the hot and cold legs of RCS loop no.1. The
2nd and 3rd LPIS trains are connected to the pipelines of HA-3,4 and HA-1,2, respectively.

2.3 Technological and Safety Systems of the Secondary Circuit

The main technological and safety systems of the secondary circuit include:

 main steam lines system;

 turbine bypass to condenser BRU-K;
 steam dump valve to atmosphere BRU-A;
 secondary circuit overpressure protection system;
 main feedwater system;
 auxiliary feedwater system;
 emergency feedwater system.

2.3.1 Main Steam Lines System

The main steam lines (MSL) system is intended for transportation of steam produced in steam
generators to the turbine. The principal diagram of the MSLs system is shown in Figure 2-11.

The steam from each steam generator is delivered through the separate pipeline to one of four
turbine stop valves. To isolate the steam generators in the case of the steam line breaks the
fast-acting steam isolation valve (FASIV) TX50,60,70,80S06 and check valve
TX50,60,70,80S07 are installed at each of four main steam lines. Downstream these valves the
MSLs are connected to the main steam header (MSH).

2-12
 TX60S05 TX80S05
TX60S03 TX60S04 TX80S03 TX80S04 RA14S02 RA14S03
MSL (Dn 600)

TX80S06

TX80S07
RA12S01

TX60S07
TX60S06
RA14S01

YB10W01

YB20W01

RQ11S01

RQ12S01
RC11S01

RC11S02

RC12S01

RC12S02
YB40W01
Turbine

YB30W01
MSH (Dn 500)

TX70S06

TX70S07
MSL (Dn 600)
RA11S01

RA13S01

TX50S06

TX50S07
RA11S02 RA11S03

TX70S03 TX70S04 TX70S05 TX50S03 TX50S04 TX50S05

Figure 2-11 Principal Diagram of the Main Steam Lines System

2.3.2 Turbine Bypass to Condenser BRU-K

The system consists of four BRU-K RC11S01, RC11S02, RC12S01, RС12S02 (Figure 2-11)
which are connected to the main steam header and intended:

 to maintain the secondary circuit pressure below 68 kgf/cm2; by steam dump to the
turbine condenser;
 to provide the secondary cooling down.

During normal power operation the system is in standby mode with all BRU-Ks closed. The
system automatically switches to the pressure maintenance mode at the increase of MSH
pressure above 68 kgf/cm2 and BRU-K controllers start to maintain the pressure in the range of
64 – 68 kgf/cm2.

At the decrease of the turbine load for 10% with the rate of 33 MW/s or higher BRU-K
controllers switch to the load shedding mode with opening of BRU-K valves proportionally to the
load decrease value. BRU-K setpoint for further pressure maintenance corresponds to MSH
pressure at the time of load shedding mode actuation.

Two other BRU-K controller operation modes are used during reactor start-up and cooling-down
and include maintaining of current MSH pressure value and cool-down with a rate of 30C/h or
60C/h.

2-13
2.3.3 Steam Dump Valves to Atmosphere BRU-A

BRU-As ТХ50,60,70,80S05 (Figure 2-11) are connected to the MSLs upstream FASIV (one
BRU-A per SG) and are intended:

 to prevent secondary circuit pressure increase above 73 kgf/cm2;

 to remove decay heat from the primary circuit;
 to perform secondary circuit cool-down.

During normal power operation the system is in standby mode with all BRU-As closed. At the
increase of MSH pressure above 73 kgf/cm2 the system automatically switches to the pressure
maintenance mode and BRU-A controllers start to maintain pressure in the range of 68 – 73
kgf/cm2. At the decrease of secondary circuit pressure down to 64 kgf/cm2 the controller closes
BRU-A and after 100 s switches to the standby mode.

Cool-down mode is intended to remove decay heat if cooling down via BRU-K or technological
condenser is not possible. Cool-down can be performed with a rate of 30C/h or 60C/h. If
cool-down mode is started the automatic interlock for positive BRU-A closure at the opening
percentage less than 6% is deactivated.

2.3.4 Secondary Circuit Overpressure Protection System

Each MSL is equipped with two SG safety relief valves (SRV) ТХ50,60,70,80S03 and
ТХ50,60,70,80S04 (Figure 2-11). SG SRV characteristics are selected so as to avoid an
increase of the secondary circuit pressure for more than 15% of the design value during design
basis transients and accidents. The opening setpoints for the control and main SG SRVs are
84 kgf/cm2 and 86 kgf/cm2, respectively. The setpoint for SG SRVs closure is 70 kgf/cm2. The
valves can also be operated manually from the main or reserve control room.

2.3.5 Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems

The main feedwater system (MFW) is intended to supply feedwater from secondary circuit
deaerators to SGs during normal power operation, start-up and cool-down. The principal
diagram of MFW system is shown in Figure 2-12.

The main equipment of the system includes [2]:

 two secondary circuit deaerators (including the tank RL21,22B01 and deaerating towers
RL21,22W01,02);
 filters RL31,32N01,02;
 two booster pumps RL31,32D01 and turbine driven pumps RL41,42D01;
 high pressure heaters RL11,12,21,22W01;
 SG feed water distribution unit;
 pipelines and valves.

2-14
Upstream SG feed water distribution unit the main feedwater system consists of two identical
trains. Feed water distribution unit consists of 4 trains supplying water to each SG. During
normal power operation the water flow to SGs is controlled by MFW controllers
RL71,72,73,74S02. At the bypasses of the main controllers the start-up/shut-down feed water
controllers RL71,72,73,74S04 are installed to maintain required MFW flow at low flow rates.

Auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is intended for supplying feedwater from deaerators to SGs
during:

 reactor start-up and cooling-down;

 house loads steam supply power (< 5% of nominal power);
 malfunctions of MFW.

The system consists of:

 AFW electric pumps RL51,52D01 (Figure 2-12);

 cut-off, control (RL51,52S06) and check valves;
 suction pipelines from the inset of MFW pipelines to AFW pumps;
 charging pipelines from AFW pumps to the insets of MFW charging lines;
 recirculation pipelines to deaerators for feed water heat-up and deaeration during
start-up.

2-15
 TX43S04 TX43H01
Dn400 Dn400

RL73S01 RL73S02 TX43S02 TX43S01 TX43S03

YB30W01

RL73S03 RL73S04
Dn400 TX41S04 TX41H01
Dn400 Dn400

Dn500 Dn400 Dn500 RL71S01 RL71S02 TX41S02 TX41S01 TX41S03

YB10W01

Dn500

Figure 2-12
Dn300 RL62S05

Dn500
RL62S06 RL62S07
RL62S08,09,10 Dn400 RL71S03 RL71S04
TX44S04 TX44H01
Dn400 Dn400

Dn400 RL74S01 RL74S02 TX44S02 TX44S01 TX44S03

YB40W01

RL62S01 RL62S02 RL62S03 RL62S04

RL62S14 RD22W01 RD12W01 RL74S03 RL74S04

TX42S04 TX42H01
RL61S08,09,10 Dn400 Dn400
RL61S06 RL61S07 RL61S14
RL72S01 RL72S02 TX42S02 TX42S01 TX42S03
YB20W01

RL61S02 RL61S03

RL72S03 RL72S04
RL61S01 RL61S04
RD21W01 RD11W01

Dn300
Dn500 Dn400 Dn500

RL61S05
Dn300

Dn600

2.3.6 Emergency Feedwater System

RL31D01 RL31S05

Dn500
Dn150

Dn150
Dn125

shown in Figure 2-13 (based on data from [2]).

RL21W01
RL31N01
Dn700

2-16
SA51
Dn500

RL51S06
RL52S06
RL41S04
RL41S03
RL41S01 RL31S02 RL31S01
RL21B01

Dn200
Dn700 RL21W02
RL41S02 RL31N02
Dn800

Dn65 RL41D01

RL51S04
RL52S04
Dn800

RL31S04 RL31S03

RL51S05
RL52S05
Dn80
RL50S01
Dn80 Dn80
Dn80

RL51S02
RL52S02
RL42S01
Dn500
Dn800

RL42S02 RL32N01
Dn65

Dn700
RL42S01 RL32S02 RL32S01 RL22W01

RL52S03
RL32N02

RL51S03
SA52
Dn800

RL42S04
RL42S03
RL22B01

Dn80
RL32S04 RL32S03 RL22W01

RL52D01

RL51D01
Dn700
Dn500

Dn125

Dn150
Dn150

RL51S01
RL52S01

Dn100
RL32S01
Dn600

RL32S05

Dn300

Principal Diagram of the Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems

Emergency feedwater system (EFW) is designed to provide feed water supply to SG during
transients and accidents with a loss of MFW and AFW. The principal diagram of EFW system is
 YB10W01 YB40W01 YB20W01 YB30W01

TX14S06 TX14H01
TX12S06 TX12H01

TX13S06 TX13H01
TX11S06 TX11H01

Dn100

TX14S05
TX22S02

TX23S02
TX11S05

TX21S02

TX12S05

TX13S05

TX24S02
Dn100

Dn100
TX11S04

TX21S01

TX22S01

TX12S04

TX13S04

TX31S01

TX32S01

TX14S04
Dn100

TX22S03

TX31S03

Dn100
TX11S02

TX11S01

TX12S01

TX13S01

TX14S01

TX14S02
Dn150

Dn150
Dn100

Dn100

Dn100
Dn100
Dn150 Dn150 Dn150
TX20S05

TX10S05

TX30S05
TX20E02 TX10E02 TX30E02
TX20S04

TX10S04

TX30S04
Dn15

Dn15

Dn15

TX20E04 TX10E04 TX30E04

TX20S02

TX10S02

TX30S02
TX10E03

TX30E03
TX20E03
Dn80

Dn80

Dn80
TX20D01

TX10D01

TX30D01

TX20S08 TX10S08 TX30S08

TX20S01

TX10S01

TX30S01
Dn200

Dn200
Dn200

TX20B01 TX10B01 TX30B01

Dn80

Dn80
TX10S07
TX20S07

Dn100 TX30S07

TX20S14 TX30S13
Dn80

Dn100

TX20S13 TX30S14
Dn100

Dn300
demineralized water
from YA10B01,02

to RT30B01

Figure 2-13 Principal Diagram of the Emergency Feedwater System

The system consists of three trains TX10,20,30 and include the following main equipment [2]:

 EFW tanks (TX10,20,30B01) which are connected by pipelines with normally closed cut-
off valves ТХ20,30S13,14;
 EFW pumps TX10,20,30D01;
 pipelines and valves including EFW control valves ТХ11S05, ТХ21S02, ТХ14S05,
ТХ32S02, ТХ12S05, ТХ22S02, ТХ13S05, ТХ31S02.

EFW pumps TX20D01 and TX30D01 which supply feedwater to SG-1,4 and SG-2,3,
respectively. EFW pump TX10D01 is able to provide EFW supply to any of 4 SGs. But
normally two of them (YB10,30W01) are isolated from TX10D01 by cut-off valves.

2-17
 3 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF TRACE MODEL FOR VVER-1000
Description of the main hydraulic components of TRACE model for VVER-1000 is provided
below.

3.1 Reactor Model

Nodalization diagram of WWER-1000 reactor model for TRACE code is shown in Figure 3-1.
The hydraulic model consists of the following main components:

 downcomer;
 lower plenum;
 core region;
 core bypass;
 upper plenum;
 upper head.

Reactor model is 4-sectoral and has cross-links to simulate crossflows between the sectors.

The area of inlet and outlet nozzles is divided into 8 equal sectors (hydraulic components
5001 – 5004, 5245 – 5248 for inlet nozzles; 5249 – 5256 for outlet nozzles) modeling annular
gap between the core barrel and the reactor pressure vessel. This allows proper flow
distribution in scenarios with partial number of reactor coolant pumps in operation.

Hydraulic components (HC) 450, 470, 690, 650 model four sectors of downcomer part below the
RCS nozzles region, and HC 380, 410, 700, 660 model a gap between reactor bottom and core
barrel.

Lower plenum is modeled by 16 HC (4 sectors, 4 vertical layers) 5013 – 5016; 390, 400, 680,
600; 80, 90, 220, 210; and 420, 440, 570, 500.

The core region is divided into 4 sectors (individual sector for each of 4 reactor coolant system
loops). Radial division of core region is not envisaged. Each sector has two channels: for
"average" fuel assemblies (HC 320, 350, 580, 510) and for "hot" fuel assembly (HC 5033 –
5036).

Core bypasses are presented by HC 5259, 5332 and 5271.

Upper plenum is modeled by two groups of HC 490, 480, 590, 550, simulating volume inside
PTU perforated cylindrical shell and HC 5081, 5242 – 5244, simulating the volume between
PTU shell and perforated cylindrical part of core barrel. The reactor upper head is represented
by HC 5257 and 5260. The latter one simulates annular gap between the cylindrical shell of
PTU (above the medium PTU plate) and reactor upper head.

Heat structures (HS) in the reactor core are modeled by “Fuel Rod” type and have cylindrical
geometry with the height of 354 cm. Eight heat structures are modeled in the core, and each
heat structure has an appropriate surface multiplier according to the subdivision of reactor core
into hydraulic components.

3-1
HS of the reactor pressure vessel simulates the heat transfer from the coolant to the
containment air through the vessel wall.

HS of reactor internals such as core barrel and baffle model the heat exchange between coolant
and these reactor components.

Figure 3-1 Nodalization Diagram of VVER-1000 Reactor

3.2 RCS Loops Model

All four RCS loops are simulated in the model separately. Nodalization diagram of RCS loop
no.1 including hot and cold legs, RCPs, as well as SG collectors is shown in Figure 3-2. Other
loops are modeled similar to loop no.1.

Figure 3-2 Nodalization Diagram of RCS Loop 1

3-2
3.3 Pressurizer System Model

Pressurizer model is implemented by HC 421 of PRIZER type and connected to the model of
loop 4 hot leg by hydraulic components 200 and 790 that represent PRZ surge line (Figure 3-3).
Steam discharge pipe (PIPE HC 50002 and 50003) is connected to the pressurizer top part.
HC 605 and 607 of the VALVE type simulate PRZ control and the main PORV, respectively.
Operation of these valves is implemented according to opening/closure setpoints of the main
and control PORVs. The setpoints are changed at the station blackout after discharge of
batteries to simulate spring-controlled PORV operation.

Figure 3-3 Nodalization Diagram of Pressurizer, Surge and Relief Pipes

Nodalization diagram of the pressurizer spray line is shown in Figure 3-4.

Figure 3-4 Nodalization Diagram of the Pressurizer Spray Line

3-3
3.4 Steam Generators Model

SG primary side model (Figure 3-5, left) includes hydraulic components that simulate SG
collectors and a tube bundle. In accordance with nodalization of SG secondary side
(Figure 3-5, right) the tube bundle is subdivided into five layers. Each layer includes two HC
representing U-shaped tubes.

Figure 3-5 Nodalization Diagram of SG Primary and Secondary Side

SG secondary side is modeled using quasi-3D approach. Such approximation was chosen for
correct distribution of thermal load between SG secondary side volumes.

HC 563, 561 and HC 562, 584 model SG secondary side volumes of the tube bundle region
corresponding to the straight and bended (U-shaped) parts of SG-tubes, respectively. HC 575,
567 (up to the 4th volume) model the secondary side volumes between SG tube bundle and SG
vessel, and between external and internal tube bundle packs corresponding to the straight
portions of SG tubes. 5th volume of these HC is somewhat smaller and is bounded by
submerged perforated plate (SPP) side walls. HC 586 and 548 model similar SG secondary
side volumes which correspond to the bended portion of SG tubes. HC 549 represents the
central part of SG secondary side between SG tubes packs. HC 540, 571, 582, 573 model the
secondary side volume between SPP side walls and SG vessel. The steam volume of SG
secondary side and of SG steam header are represented by HC 594, 920, 930, 940, 980 and
HC 282, respectively.

3.5 Make-Up and Let-Down Model

The make-up and let-down subsystems of CVCS are modeled at a functional level. Makeup
charging lines are connected to the cold legs of all four loops between SG cold collector and
RCP. Let-down pipelines are connected to the cold legs of loop 2 and 3 downstream RCP
outlet nozzle.

3-4
Nodalization diagram of the makeup and let-down is shown in Figure 3-6.

Figure 3-6 Nodalization Diagram of Makeup and Let-down

3.6 Emergency Gas Evacuation System Model

The emergency gas evacuation system is intended to remove steam-gas mixture from the
primary system during accidents. The system consists of connecting pipes with cut-off valves
installed, which connect reactor coolant system elements with relief tank (Figure 2-9).

Nodalization diagram of the emergency gas removal system is presented on Figure 3-7.

Figure 3-7 Nodalization Diagram of Emergency Gas Removal System

3-5
3.7 Main Steam Lines Model

Nodalization diagrams of MSLs are shown in Figures 3-8 – 3-11. Each steam line model
includes steam dump valves to the atmosphere BRU-A, SG steam relief valves, main steam
isolation valves, turbine stop and control valves.

BRU-As are simulated by VALVE HC 706, 736, 786, 876. Hydraulic components (1-4)60 of the
BREAK type model atmospheric conditions downstream BRU-A. BRU-A flow rate is 900 t/h.
Time for full opening/closure of BRU-A is 18 sec. The control and the main SG SRVs are
modeled similarly to BRU-А.

Turbine is modeled by boundary conditions (downstream turbine stop valves) and represented
by HC 574 of the BREAK type. Turbine stop valves are modeled by HC 566, 666, 756, 856 with
identical boundary conditions.

Figure 3-8 Nodalization Diagram of MSL No. 1

Figure 3-9 Nodalization Diagram of MSL No. 2

Figure 3-10 Nodalization Diagram of MSL No. 3

3-6
Figure 3-11 Nodalization Diagram of MSL No. 4

3.8 Main Steam Header Model

Main steam header includes two semi-headers, connection lines between them and steam
dump valves to the condenser BRU-К (Figure 2-11).

MSH is modeled by PIPE HC 901, 903. HC 906, 907, 926, 927, 908, 918 model connection
lines to BRU-K. VALVE HC 911, 921 model BRU-K. One model valve represents two BRU-Ks
with equivalent cross section. BREAK HC 558, 589 model turbine condenser. Nodalization
diagram of MSH and BRU-K is presented in Figure 3-12.

Figure 3-12 Nodalization Diagram of MSH and BRU-K

3.9 Main, Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Systems

The nodalization diagrams of the main, auxiliary and emergency feedwater systems are
presented in Figures 3-13 and 3-14.

3-7
Figure 3-13 Nodalization Diagram of the Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems

Figure 3-14 Nodalization Diagram of the Emergency Feedwater System

3.10 ECCS Model

Four hydroaccumulators are simulated by PIPE hydraulic components 610, 620, 630, 640 (with
Accumulator option). Two of them (HC 610 and 630) are connected to the reactor upper
plenum HC 5081 and 5243 (Figure 3-1) via HC 611 – 613, 631 – 633 simulating HA pipelines,
and two others (HC 620 and 640) are connected to the downcomer HC 5246 and 5248 via HC
621 – 623, 641 – 643.

LPIS and HPIS models are implemented at the functional level. The charging lines of LPIS
trains no.2, 3 are simulated with HC 821 – 824, 831 – 834, respectively and are connected to
hydraulic components simulating HA pipelines. The charging lines of the first LPIS train (HC
811 – 814) are connected to the model of hot and cold legs of loop no.1. Hydraulic components
812, 822, 832 of FILL type simulate LPIS pumps.

Each HPIS train is modeled identically and is represented by FILL hydraulic components (HC
913, 914 – 1st train; HC 923, 924 – 2nd train; HC 933, 934 – 3rd train) simulating high head safety
injection and high pressure injection pumps, and VALVE components (HC 915, 916; HC 925,
926; HC 935, 936) modelling HPIS charging pipelines.

The nodalization diagrams of ECCS passive part, LPIS and HPIS trains are shown in Figures
3-15, 3-16. Logic diagrams of HPIS and LPIS operation are shown in Figures 3-17 and 218,
respectively.

3-8
Figure 3-15 Nodalization Diagram of ECCS HA and LPIS Trains

Figure 3-16 Nodalization Diagram of HPIS Trains

3-9
3.11 Safeguards and Control Systems Operation Logic

Figures 3-17 – 3-29 present logical diagrams for the main safeguards and control systems. The
operation logic for the following systems and elements is provided:

 HPIS and LPIS (Figures 3-17, 218);

 reactor control and protection system (Figures 3-19, 3-22);
 PRZ level control (Figure 3-23);
 make-up pressure difference control (Figure 3-24);
 MFW flow rate controller (Figures 3-25, 3-26);
 SG level controller (Figure 3-27);
 BRU-A controller (Figure 3-28);
 turbine control system (Figure 3-29).

3-10
Figure 3-17 Logical Diagram of HPIS Operation

3-11
Figure 3-18 Logical Diagram of LPIS Operation

3-12
Figure 3-19 Logical Diagram of Control and Protection System (Part 1)

3-13
Figure 3-20 Logical Diagram of Control and Protection System (Part 2)

3-14
Figure 3-21 Logical Diagram of Control and Protection System (Part 3)

3-15
Figure 3-22 Logical Diagram of Control and Protection System (Part 4)

3-16
Figure 3-23 Logical Diagram of PRZ Level Control by Makeup and Let-Down

3-17
Figure 3-24 Logical Diagram of Make-up Pressure Difference Controller

3-18
Figure 3-25 Logical Diagram of MFW Flow Rate Controller (Part 1)

3-19
Figure 3-26 Logical Diagram of MFW Flow Rate Controller (Part 2)

3-20
Figure 3-27 Logical Diagram of SG Level Controller
3-21
Figure 3-28 Logical Diagram of BRU-A Controller

3-22
Figure 3-29 Logical Diagram of Turbine Control System

3-23
 4 CALCULATION OF TRANSIENTS
The following incidents were selected for validation calculations:

 ZNPP Unit 5 MFW-1 pump trip;

 ZNPP Unit 6 inadvertent FASIV closure;
 RNPP Unit 3 PRZ PORV stuck open during tests.

4.1 ZNPP Unit 5 MFW-1 Pump Trip

This incident occurred at ZNPP Unit 5 on November 25, 1998, and was caused by a human
error during the regular maintenance of MFW-1 pump steam drive stop valves. Erroneous
closure of the stop valve resulted in a trip of MFW-1 pump with subsequent reactor power
decrease by operation of fast reactor load shedding protection and reactor power limiter [3].

4.1.1 Initial Conditions

Before the incident the following main equipment was in operation at ZNPP Unit 5: 4 RCPs, 2
MFW pumps, electro-hydraulic turbine control system, MFW flow controllers to individual SGs,
MFW pump flow controller, RCS pressure and PRZ level controllers.

Table 4-1 presents the measured and calculated values of the main primary and secondary
circuit parameters before the transient.

Table 4-1 Initial Conditions for Validation Transient No.1

Parameter Units Nominal Calculated
value value
Reactor thermal power MW 3028 3000
Generator electric power WW 1017 –
Reactor outlet pressure kgf/cm2 158.6 158.3
2
MSH pressure kgf/cm 60.2 60.3
2
Pressure downstream turbine stop valves kgf/cm 55.6 54.7
PRZ level m 8.85 8.87
Make-up flow rate t/h 21.9 23.2
Let-down flow rate t/h 23.8 23.0
Make-up temperature С 242.2 238.0
Hot legs coolant temperature С
loop no.1 321.0 319.3
loop no.2 324.0 319.4
loop no.3 322.7 319.3
loop no.4 322.0 319.2

4-1
 Parameter Units Nominal Calculated
value value
Cold legs coolant temperature С
loop no.1 287.5 289.1
loop no.2 288.1 289.2
loop no.3 287.6 289.1
loop no.4 287.8 289.0
SG pressure kgf/cm2
SG-1 62.3 62.3
SG-2 62.6 62.2
SG-3 62.5 62.3
SG-4 61.8 62.3
SG level (narrow range measurement) m
SG-1 0.331 0.316
SG-2 0.307 0.297
SG-3 0.313 0.315
SG-4 0.338 0.312
SG level (wide range measurement) m
SG-1 2.31 2.32
SG-2 2.33 2.33
SG-3 2.24 2.22
SG-4 2.31 2.30
MFW pumps flow rate t/h
MFW pump 1 2859 2928
MFW pump 2 2997 2928
SG feed water flow rate t/h
SG-1 1427 1461
SG-2 1463 1464
SG-3 1502 1463
SG-4 1464 1468
Main feedwater temperature С 216.8 220.0

The calculated initial state at RCS pressure of 158.3 kgf/cm2 with the 1st PRZ heaters group in
operation is slightly different from the actual plant state were operation of two PRZ heaters
groups was observed at RCS pressure of 158.6 kgf/cm2.

4.1.2 Boundary Conditions

The main assumptions on normal and safety systems operation applied in validation calculation
are described below.

1. The flow rate of the main feedwater pump no.1 is defined as a function of time based on
actual measured data provided in Table 4-2.

4-2
Table 4-2 Measured Flow Rate of MFW Pump No.1
Time, s Flow rate, t/h
0 2460
11 1621
15 30
20 10
40 0
2. Termination of level 2 preventive protection signal at 253 s of incident is modeled as
operator action.
3. Malfunction of SG-4 main feedwater controller (RL74C02) in the course of incident was
caused by incorrect and delayed measurement YA40T10 of SG-4 hot and cold legs
temperature difference. As the results, RL74C02 controller could not maintain SG-4 level
within the prescribed band and the signal for closure of RL74S02 control valve was
actuated. In calculation this was modeled by RL74S02 positive closure signal at 39 s
(controller malfunction time).
4. Operation of house loads steam supply valve (BRU-SN) is simulated as an additional steam
release from MSH. Steam release flow rate is derived from BRU-SN characteristics defined
in [4]. BRU-SN stem position as a function of time was set according to plant measured
data and specified in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3 BRU-SN stem position (S) as a function of time

Time, s S, % Time, s S, % Time, s S, % Time, s S, %
0 0 196 14,1 352 35,1 500 51,0
20 0 200 16,0 356 41,1 504 56,3
24 14,7 204 18,0 360 46,5 512 56,3
28 19,3 216 18,0 372 46,5 516 45,4
32 0 220 15,1 376 42,0 520 45,4
36 2,4 232 15,1 380 41,9 524 48,9
40 53,3 236 18,1 384 49,7 528 55,7
44 45,2 252 18,1 388 52,8 540 55,7
48 25,5 256 21,8 412 52,8 544 48,9
52 16,4 260 30,0 416 54,9 548 46,0
56 16,4 272 30,0 420 57,5 552 46,0
60 18,5 276 32,3 432 57,5 556 50,3
64 22,7 280 38,4 436 44,1 560 50,4
80 22,7 288 38,4 440 44,1 568 50,4
84 18,3 292 41,2 444 51,1 572 43,8
88 15,0 304 41,2 448 57,8 596 43,8
96 15,0 308 45,1 456 57,8 600 45,8

4-3
 Time, s S, % Time, s S, % Time, s S, % Time, s S, %
100 22,1 316 45,1 460 47,8 612 45,8
104 25,0 320 41,5 472 47,8 616 41,6
116 25,0 324 38,9 476 51,7 620 38,9
120 16,9 328 38,9 480 57,1 624 44,2
132 16,9 332 42,9 484 57,1 1280 44,2
136 6,4 336 45,3 488 49,5
144 6,4 344 45,3 492 46,0
148 14,1 348 35,1 496 46,0
5. Control rods effectiveness and reactivity coefficients applied in calculation correspond to
the end of ZNPP Unit 5 10th fuel cycle (248.5 [Link]) due to unavailability of data for
actual incident date (105.1 [Link]).

4.1.3 Calculation Results

Table 4-4 provides comparison of calculated and actual timing of events occurred in the course
of the incident.

Table 4-4 Sequence of Events for Validation Transient No.1

Time, sec
Event
Incident Calculation
0 0 Start of calculation
3 3 Trip of MFW pump no.1
4 4 Actuation of fast reactor load shedding protection (UPZ) signal
5 5 Actuation of level 1 preventive reactor protection (PZ-1) signal
7 7 Actuation of level 2 preventive reactor protection (PZ-2) signal
8 11 PRZ heaters group no.3 is on
8 17 PRZ heaters group no.4 is on
39-80 39-79 Start of SG-4 MFW control valve closure
85 105 Termination of PZ-1 signal
93 93 RCP-4 trip
106 123 Start of SG-4 start-up/shutdown feedwater control valve operation
253 253 Termination of PZ-2 signal
307 297 Actuation of PZ-1 signal
312 427 PRZ heaters group no.4 is off
315 307 Termination of PZ-1 signal
332 499 PRZ heaters group no.3 is off
588 605 PRZ heaters group no.2 is off
– 1000 End of calculation

4-4
Trip of MFW pump no.1 caused an actuation of UPZ signal with a drop of selected control rods
group and further decrease of reactor power (Figure 4-1) by PZ-1 (sequential insertion of control
rods groups into the reactor core with a rate of 20 mm/s).

Operation of PZ-1 in calculation lasts longer (5-105 s) than in the incident (5-85 s), that can be
explained by redistribution of assemblies power in the reactor core which cannot be modeled
with point kinetics. Differences in coolant temperature reactivity feedback and power reactivity
feedback during power decrease are compensated in calculation by control group of control
rods.

After decrease the reactor power is stabilized at 46.4% according to plant measurement data
and at 46.3% in calculation.

Measured and calculated relative turbine power (Figure 4-28) maintained by the turbine control
system in MSH pressure maintenance mode are in good agreement. Faster decrease of turbine
steam flow at the beginning of incident is explained by higher reactor power decrease rate
following a drop of UPZ control rods group. After decrease the turbine power is stabilized at
41.6% of nominal value, while correspondent value in calculation is equal to 39.6%.

Initial RCS pressure drop at 4 s (Figure 4-2) is also caused by UPZ and PZ-1 operation. During
decrease of reactor power the RCS pressure is determined by the following factors:

 reactor power decrease rate;

 operation of PRZ heaters groups;
 decrease of heat removal by the secondary side during increase of MSH pressure and
decrease of SG levels.

After decrease of reactor power at the time interval from 100s to 300 s higher calculated RCS
pressure can be explained by:

 stabilization of reactor power in calculation while measured power continues to

decrease;
 termination of PZ-2 signal (prohibition of reactor power increase) at 253 s of calculation
that causes an increase of reactor power from 43.2% to 47.8% by the reactor power
controller (ARM) operation.

Minimal RCS pressure reached during decrease of reactor power is 150.2 kgf/cm2 in calculation
and 149.4 kgf/cm2 as measured at the plant.

PRZ level (Figure 4-14) is controlled by the changes in make-up and let-down flow. Minimal
calculated collapsed PRZ level is 6.79 m which is in good agreement with the measured data
(6.80 m).

Higher calculated make-up flow (Figure 4-12) results in slightly faster restoration of PRZ level
and RCS pressure than it is observed in the incident. Maximal calculated make-up flow of 38.6
t/h is reached at 205 s, while measured value at this moment is 33.4 t/h.

Decrease in make-up temperature (Figure 4-11) is determined by difference between make-up

and let-down flow and changes in make-up heating due to the decrease of cold legs

4-5
temperatures (Figures 4-7 – 4-10). Incorporation of make-up/let-down heat exchanger into the
VVER-1000/V-320 model for TRACE code allowed to track changes in make-up temperature
during the incident. Minimal calculated make-up temperature is 184.2C while the measured
value is 188.3C.

After RCP-4 trip at 93 s of incident and its coast-down the coolant flow in loop 4 reverses and
hot leg temperature in this loop decreases down to 277C (Figure 4-6). Calculated and
measured difference in temperatures of hot and cold legs of loops 2 and 3 (which are opposite
to loop 4) decreases to 11.2, 12.0C and 11.1, 12.8C, respectively. Correspondent difference
in loop 1 (adjacent to loop 4) decreases for 15.7C in calculation and for 16.8C according to
measured data, which is higher than for loops 2, 3 and caused by less intense coolant mixing
between loops 2, 3 and loop 4 comparing to mixing between loops 1 and 4.

Cold legs temperature (at the reactor inlet) in loops 1 – 4 decreases to 283.2, 285.6, 284.9,
283.9 C in calculation and to 282.0, 284.3, 283.8, 282.8 C according to the plant
measurements (Figures 4-7 – 4-10).

Comparison of calculated and measured pressure differences at RCPs (Figures 4-19 – 26-22)
before the incident (6,28 – 6,30 kgf/cm2 vs 5.59 – 5.71 kgf/cm2) and lower measured coolant
heat-up (34.7C vs calculated and nominal values of 30.2C and 30.3C) suggest that reactor
coolant flow at the plant was lower than the design flow and can be explained by lower grid
frequency. Calculated RCP-4 pressure difference decrease rate after RCP-4 trip is in
agreement with measured data that confirms correct modelling of RCP coast-down time.

Actuation of the load shedding signal at the beginning of incident causes switching of the turbine
control system to the MSH pressure maintenance mode. Following initial decrease of MSH
pressure caused by decrease of reactor power by UPZ the maximal calculated and measured
MSH pressure values (Figure 4-23) are 61.2 and 61.3 kgf/cm2, respectively, that corresponds to
the turbine control system target value of 61.0±0.5 kgf/cm2.

Trip of MFW pump no.1 at 3 s resulted in the increase of pump no.2 flow from 2980 t/h to 4300
t/h (Figure 4-38) with following decrease due to decrease of reactor power. This process is
adequately reproduced by MFW pump model. Average calculated MFW pump no.2 flow after
decrease of reactor power is 2570 t/h, and the measured value is 2500 t/h.

The main feedwater flow to SG-1, 2, 3 is maintained by correspondent MFW controllers.

Malfunction of SG-4 MFW controller and closure of RL74S02 valve results in significant
decrease of SG level (Figure 4-36) and operation of start-up/shutdown feedwater controller
RL74S04.

Calculated and measured SG levels behavior (Figures 4-29 – 4-36) corresponds to the changes
in feedwater flow. Minimal values of calculated SG1–4 levels (narrow range) are 0.107, 0.116,
0.107, 0.008 m (Figures 4-29 – 36-32). Correspondent measured values are 0.153, 0.087,
0.055 and 0.006 m. Maximal SG level values after the reactor power decrease are 0.372,
0.374, 0.373, 0.315 m in calculation and 0.353, 0.436, 0.447, 0.349 m according to
measurement data.

4-6
Figure 4-1 Reactor Power

Figure 4-2 RCS Pressure

4-7
Figure 4-3 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.1

Figure 4-4 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.2

4-8
Figure 4-5 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.3

Figure 4-6 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.4

4-9
Figure 4-7 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.1

Figure 4-8 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.2

4-10
Figure 4-9 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.3

Figure 4-10 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.4

4-11
Figure 4-11 Make-up Temperature

Figure 4-12 Make-up Mass Flow Rate

4-12
Figure 4-13 Let-down Mass Flow Rate

Figure 4-14 PRZ Level

4-13
Figure 4-15 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.1

Figure 4-16 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.2

4-14
Figure 4-17 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.3

Figure 4-18 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.4

4-15
Figure 4-19 Pressure Difference at RCP-1

Figure 4-20 Pressure Difference at RCP-2

4-16
Figure 4-21 Pressure Difference at RCP-3

Figure 4-22 Pressure Difference at RCP-4

4-17
Figure 4-23 MSH Pressure

Figure 4-24 SG-1 Pressure

4-18
Figure 4-25 SG-2 Pressure

Figure 4-26 SG-3 Pressure

4-19
Figure 4-27 SG-4 Pressure

Figure 4-28 Relative Turbine Power

4-20
Figure 4-29 SG-1 Level (Narrow Range)

Figure 4-30 SG-2 Level (Narrow Range)

4-21
Figure 4-31 SG-3 Level (Narrow Range)

Figure 4-32 SG-4 Level (Narrow Range)

4-22
Figure 4-33 SG-1 Level (Wide Range)

Figure 4-34 SG-2 Level (Wide Range)

4-23
Figure 4-35 SG-3 Level (Wide Range)

Figure 4-36 SG-4 Level (Wide Range)

4-24
Figure 4-37 MFW Pump No.1 Flow Rate

Figure 4-38 MFW Pump No.2 Flow Rate

4-25
Figure 4-39 AFW Pump No.1 Flow Rate

Figure 4-40 AFW Pump No.2 Flow Rate

4-26
Figure 4-41 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.1 Stem Position

Figure 4-42 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.2 Stem Position

4-27
Figure 4-43 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.3 Stem Position

Figure 4-44 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.4 Stem Position

4-28
Figure 4-45 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.1 Stem Position

Figure 4-46 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.2 Stem Position

4-29
Figure 4-47 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.3 Stem Position

Figure 4-48 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.4 Stem Position

4-30
Figure 4-49 SG-1 Feed Water Flow

Figure 4-50 SG-2 Feed Water Flow

4-31
Figure 4-51 SG-3 Feed Water Flow

Figure 4-52 SG-4 Feed Water Flow

4-32
4.2 ZNPP Unit 6 Inadvertent FASIV Closure

This incident occurred at ZNPP Unit 6 on November 08, 2015, and was caused by inadvertent
closure of FASIV at nominal power operation [5]. Closure of FASIV at the main steam line
(MSL) No.1 resulted in automatic trip of reactor coolant pump at correspondent RCS loop and in
increase of MSL pressure with actuation of steam dump to atmosphere. At MSL-1 pressure
above 80 kgf/cm2 reactor scram was actuated at 14 sec of incident. Turbine and MFW-1 pump
trip was initiated by operator at 27 sec and 355 sec of transient, respectively.

4.2.1 Initial Conditions

Before the incident the following main equipment was in operation at ZNPP Unit 6: 4 RCPs, 2
MFW pumps, electro-hydraulic turbine control system, MFW flow controllers to individual SGs,
MFW pump flow controller, RCS pressure and PRZ level controllers.

The initial conditions selected for transient calculation correspond to those specified in
Table 4-1.

4.2.2 Boundary Conditions

The boundary conditions applied in validation calculation are described below.

1. As the initiating event the closure of FASIV is modeled.

2. Closure of turbine stop valves is performed by operator 27 s after actuation of reactor
scram. Correspondent action is simulated in calculation.
3. From plant measurement data it can be seen that during the incident only one out of two
AFW pumps (pump no.2) was in operation. Therefore trip of AFW pump no.1 is modeled in
calculation.
4. At 355 s after incident occurrence operator switches off MFW pump no.1. Same action is
modeled in calculation.
5. Operation of BRU-SN is simulated as an additional steam release from MSH. Steam
release flow rate is derived from BRU-SN characteristics defined in [4]. BRU-SN stem
position as a function of time was set according to plant measured data and specified in
Table 4-3.

Table 4-5 BRU-SN stem position (S) as a function of time

Time, s S, % Time, s S, % Time, s S, % Time, s S, %
0,0 0,0 44,0 65,1 124,0 62,9 192,0 15,2
20,0 5,3 48,0 60,2 132,0 51,7 196,0 4,5
24,0 19,7 56,0 56,3 140,0 49,4 200,0 1,4
28,0 40,6 64,0 48,6 152,0 41,0 276,0 1,4
32,0 55,3 76,0 46,2 156,0 26,6 456,0 1,4
36,0 63,9 96,0 46,2 160,0 24,5 636,0 0,0
40,0 68,1 120,0 55,5 164,0 18,4 996,0 0,0

4-33
4.2.3 Calculation Results

Table 4-6 provides comparison of calculated and actual timing of events occurred in the course
of the incident. Plots of calculated and measured parameter values during the incident are
shown in Figures 4-53 – 4-113.

Table 4-6 Sequence of Events for Validation Transient No.2

Time, sec
Event
Incident Calculation
0 0 SG-1 MSL FASIV closure
3 3 RCP-1 trip by interlock YBF15
4 4 Actuation of UPZ signal
11 11 BRU-A opening due to increase of MSL pressure up to 73 kgf/cm2
12 14 Reactor scram
30 20 Start of AFW operation
27 27 Closure of turbine stop valves
50 45 Start of NRU-K operation
355 355 Trip of MFW pumps
– 1000 End of calculation

After reactor scram due to increase of secondary circuit pressure the reactor power decreases
down to decay heat (Figure 4-53). Sharp decrease of reactor power results in a decrease of
RCS pressure at 30 s (Figure 4-54). Further RCS pressure behavior is determined by the
following factors:

 operation of PRZ heaters groups;

 decrease of heat removal by the secondary side during increase of MSH pressure and
decrease of SG levels.

Minimal RCS pressure during the incident is 138.0 kgf/cm2 vs 140.0 kgf/cm2 according to
measured data.

Decrease of average coolant temperature (Figures 4-64 – 4-67) causes decrease of PRZ level
setpoint. PRZ level (Figure 4-55) is controlled by the changes in make-up and let-down flow
(Figures 4-68, 4-69). Minimal calculated collapsed PRZ level is 5.2 m which is in good
agreement with the measured data (5.4 m).

Maximal calculated make-up flow of 40.0 t/h (Figure 4-68) is reached at 100 s, while measured
value at this moment is 45.4 t/h.

Cold and hot legs temperatures are shown in Figures 4-56 – 4-67. After RCP-1 trip at 3 s of
incident and its coast-down the coolant flow in loop 1 reverses and hot leg temperature in this
loop decreases down to 273.3C (Figure 4-56). Calculated and measured difference between
temperatures of hot and cold legs of loops 2 – 4 decreases to 0.73, 0.76 and 0.64C (Figures
4-64 – 4-67).

4-34
The turbine stop valves are closed by operator at 27 s of incident. However the expected
increase of MSH pressure is prevented by BRU-SN operation. Maximal calculated and
measured MSH pressure values (Figure 4-84) are 60.5 and 58.8 kgf/cm2, respectively.
Maintenance of MSH pressure is performed by BRU-K controller at 60.1±0.5 kgf/cm2 (according
to controller operation logic the target value is set to MSH measured pressure at the moment of
controller actuation).

Closure of FASIV at MSL-1 and subsequent increase of SG-1 pressure above 73 kgf/cm2
(Figure 4-85) results in opening of BRU-A. Further behavior of SG-1 pressure is determined by
heat transfer from the primary circuit and heat losses from SG vessel. SG-2,3,4 pressure
(Figures 4-86 – 4-88) corresponds to MSH pressure which is controlled by BRU-K and BRU-SN
operation.

After reactor scram and closure of turbine stop valves the steam production in SGs decreases
and MFW flow to SGs is decreased by closing of MFW control valves (Figures 4-102 – 4-105).
At 30 s operation of AFW pump no.2 begins resulting in an increase of MFW collector pressure.
Operator switches off MFW pump no.1, while MFW pump no.2 starts to operate through the
minimal bypass flow line.

After closure of MFW control valves the feedwater flow to SGs is maintained by operation of
start-up/shutdown control valves RL71-74S04 (Figures 4-104 – 4-109).

Calculated and measured SG levels behavior (Figures 4-93 – 4-100) corresponds to the
changes in feedwater flow. Minimal calculated SG1–4 level (narrow range) is 0.0 m (Figures
4-47 – 4-100) and 0.04 m according to the measured data. Maximal calculated and measured
SG level is 0.4 m and 0.47 m, respectively.

Correspondent minimal/maximal SG–1 level values according to wide level meter (Figure 4-93)
are 2.1/2.7 m in calculation and 2.3/2.65 m as measured at the plant.

4-35
Figure 4-53 Thermal Reactor Power

Figure 4-54 RCS Pressure

4-36
Figure 4-55 PRZ Level

Figure 4-56 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.1

4-37
Figure 4-57 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.2

Figure 4-58 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.3

4-38
Figure 4-59 Hot Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.4

Figure 4-60 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.1

4-39
Figure 4-61 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.2

Figure 4-62 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.3

4-40
Figure 4-63 Cold Leg Coolant Temperature, Loop No.4

Figure 4-64 Cold and Hot Legs Temperature in Loop No.1

4-41
Figure 4-65 Cold and Hot Legs Temperature in Loop No. 2

Figure 4-66 Cold and Hot Legs Temperature in Loop No. 3

4-42
Figure 4-67 Cold and Hot Legs Temperature in Loop No. 4

Figure 4-68 Make-up Mass Flow Rate

4-43
Figure 4-69 Let-down Mass Flow Rate

Figure 4-70 Make-up Temperature

4-44
Figure 4-71 RCP-1 Mass Flow Rate

Figure 4-72 RCP-2 Mass Flow Rate

4-45
Figure 4-73 RCP-3 Mass Flow Rate

Figure 4-74 RCP-4 Mass Flow Rate

4-46
Figure 4-75 Pressure Difference at RCP No.1

Figure 4-76 Pressure Difference at RCP No.2

4-47
Figure 4-77 Pressure Difference at RCP No.3

Figure 4-78 Pressure Difference at RCP No.4

4-48
Figure 4-79 Pressure Drop at the Reactor

Figure 4-80 SG-1 Feed Water Flow

4-49
Figure 4-81 SG-2 Feed Water Flow

Figure 4-82 SG-3 Feed Water Flow

4-50
Figure 4-83 SG-4 Feed Water Flow

Figure 4-84 MSH Pressure

4-51
Figure 4-85 SG-1 Pressure

Figure 4-86 SG-2 Pressure

4-52
Figure 4-87 SG-3 Pressure

Figure 4-88 SG-4 Pressure

4-53
Figure 4-89 Pressure Loss at SG-1 Primary Side

Figure 4-90 Pressure Loss at SG-2 Primary Side

4-54
Figure 4-91 Pressure Loss at SG-3 Primary Side

Figure 4-92 Pressure Loss at SG-4 Primary Side

4-55
Figure 4-93 SG-1 Level (Wide Range)

Figure 4-94 SG-2 Level (Wide Range)

4-56
Figure 4-95 SG-3 Level (Wide Range)

Figure 4-96 SG-4 Level (Wide Range)

4-57
Figure 4-97 SG-1 Level (Narrow Range)

Figure 4-98 SG-2 Level (Narrow Range)

4-58
Figure 4-99 SG-3 Level (Narrow Range)

Figure 4-100 SG-4 Level (Narrow Range)

4-59
Figure 4-101 Turbine Stop Valves Stem Position

Figure 4-102 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.1 Stem Position

4-60
Figure 4-103 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.2 Stem Position

Figure 4-104 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.3 Stem Position

4-61
Figure 4-105 Main Feed Water Control Valve No.4 Stem Position

Figure 4-106 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.1 Stem Position

4-62
Figure 4-107 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.2 Stem Position

Figure 4-108 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.3 Stem Position

4-63
Figure 4-109 Start-up/Shutdown Feed Water Control Valve No.4 Stem Position

Figure 4-110 MFW Pump No.1 Flow Rate

4-64
Figure 4-111 MFW Pump No.2 Flow Rate

Figure 4-112 AFW Pump No.1 Flow Rate

4-65
Figure 4-113 AFW Pump No.2 Flow Rate

4.3 RNPP Unit 3 PRZ PORV Stuck Open During Tests

This incident occurred at RNPP Unit 3 in 2009 during regular testing of PRZ PORV operation by
RCS pressure increase before unit start-up [6]. Malfunction of the pilot valve after PRZ PORV
opening resulted in continuous loss of RCS coolant with actuation of high pressure and low
pressure injection pumps, and depletion of hydroaccumulators. Main operator actions during
transient were to control safety injection pumps operation and to cool-down the secondary
circuit.

4.3.1 Initial Conditions

PRZ PORV opening is selected as the beginning of incident (0 s of problem time). To reach the
required initial state the following events are modeled at the steady state calculation:

 trip of all RCPs;

 reactor scram;
 reactor power is set to 1.67 MW [6];
 MFW trip and start of AFW pumps;
 PRZ pressure is increased up to 186.5 kgf/cm2 by changing of pressurizer operation
options and switching PRZ heaters on;
 operation of control PRZ PORV is blocked;
 "subcooling < 10C" signal is deactivated in ECCS safeguards operation logic;

4-66
  feedwater temperature is set equal to 167.1C according to plant data;
 MSH drains (Dn 20 mm) are modeled to simulate SG pressure decrease during the
incident. The drain remains open during the transient simulation;
 PRZ level setpoint is set to 5.28 m;
 HA temperature is set according to plant data, nominal HA pressure (60 kgf/cm2) is
assumed;
 HA geometry and elevation are changed for this calculation in accordance with RNPP
Unit 4 data [2].
Measured and calculated parameter values before the incident are provided in Table 4-7.

Table 4-7 Initial Conditions for Validation Transient No.3

Parameter Units Measured Calculated
value [6] value
Reactor thermal power MW 1.67 1.67
2
Reactor outlet pressure kgf/cm 186.5 186.7
Reactor inlet temperature (cold legs) С
loop no.1 268.0 268.7
loop no.2 267.0 268.7
loop no.3 267.0 268.7
loop no.4 267.5 268.7
Reactor outlet temperature (hot legs) С
loop no.1 271.0 272.5
loop no.2 271.0 272.5
loop no.3 271.0 272.5
loop no.4 271.0 272.5
Average coolant heat-up in the reactor C 3.6 3.8
core
PRZ level (YP10L06) m 5.28 5.26
2
SG pressure kgf/cm
SG-1 56.2 55.8
SG-2 56.0 55.8
SG-3 56.0 55.8
SG-4 56.1 55.8
SG level (narrow range measurement) m –
SG-1 0.298
SG-2 0.321
SG-3 0.318
SG-4 0.305

4-67
 Parameter Units Measured Calculated
value [6] value
SG level (wide range measurement) m
SG-1 2.47 2.54
SG-2 2.51 2.56
SG-3 2.63 2.56
SG-4 2.53 2.55
Main feedwater temperature С 167.1 167.1
SG feed water flow rate t/h
SG-1 1427 1461
SG-2 1463 1464
SG-3 1502 1463
SG-4 1464 1468
Make-up flow rate m3/h 28.1 28.4
3
Let-down flow rate m /h 18.1 18.1
Make-up temperature С 170.0 176.0
HA temperature C 61.2 61.2
57.4 57.4
51.6 51.6
62.6 62.6

4.3.2 Boundary Conditions

The boundary conditions applied in validation calculation are described below.

1. Opening of PRZ PORV is modeled at 0 s of calculation. PRZ PORV steam discharge factor
is adjusted in accordance with plant data. For two-phase steam-water mixture and
superheated steam the discharge factor of 0.81 is used.
2. Relief tank pressure as a function of time is defined based on plant measured data.
3. PRZ heaters are switched on for steady state calculation. In transient calculation PRZ
heaters operate according to design logic. Interlock for blocking the PRZ heaters operation
after restoration of PRZ level above 4.2 m is implemented in the model.
4. Make-up control valves position is fixed after beginning of transient. Let-down flow is
constant up to closure of let-down valves at 120 s.
5. BRU-K-1 stem position is defined as a function of time according to plant measured data.
Cross sectional area of BRU-K depending on stem position is adjusted to match secondary
circuit pressure measured data.
6. BRU-A-4 stem position is defined as a function of time according to plant measured data.
Cross sectional area of BRU-A-4 depending on stem position is adjusted to match SG-4
pressure measured data.
7. High head safety injection pumps TQ14,24,34D01 are switched on/off at 385/2115 s.
8. HPIS pumps flow characteristics as the functions of RCS pressure are defined according to
data measured during the incident. Initial HPIS tanks temperature is set to 31.3, 30.7 and

4-68
 31.4C for TQ13, 23, 33 trains, respectively. Correspondent temperatures during operation
from containment sump are 35.0, 43.3 and 29.2C. Mass injected by pumps from HPIS
tanks is estimated based on tank dimensions from [2] and is equal to 8 m3, 9.2 m3 and 8.7
m3 for TQ13, 23, 33 trains, respectively.
9. LPIS pumps characteristics of base VVER-1000/V-320 model for TRACE code were
corrected in the range of 21 – 24 kgf/cm2 in accordance with measured data. Pump head
values were adjusted to account hydrostatic pressure losses due to the differences in
elevation of pump outlet and RCS connection points. LPIS tanks (sump) temperatures are
selected based on incident measured data.
10. Start-up/shutdown feedwater control valves stem positions are defined as a function of time
to simulate operator actions on SG level increase up to 3.8 m.
11. High containment pressure (> 0.3 kgf/cm2 gauge) ECCS signal is actuated at 2068 s
according to incident data.

4.3.3 Calculation Results

Table 4-8 provides comparison of calculated and actual timing of events occurred in the course
of the incident.

Table 4-8 Sequence of Events for Validation Transient No.3

Time, sec
Event
Incident Calculation
0 0 Start of incident, opening of PRZ PORV
62-65 60 All PRZ heaters groups are on (decrease of RCS pressure down
to 158.5-153.0 kgf/cm2)
120 120 Closure of RCS let-down
135 125 All PRZ heaters groups are switched off due to decrease of PRZ
level below 4.2 m
300 315 Minimal subcooling is less than 10C
315 330 Opening of HA check valves, start of HA injection (RCS pressure
is less than 60 kgf/cm2)
385 385 Start of TQ14-34D01 injection. HPIS pumps are aligned for
operation through the minimal bypass flow line
845 845 Start of TQ13D01 injection, operator action
915 915 Start of SG filling in
971 980 Start of TQ13D01 operation from containment sump (TQ10B01)
1045 1045 Termination of TQ13D01 injection
1205 1205 Start of TQ23D01 injection, operator action
1347 1360 Start of TQ23D01 operation from containment sump (TQ20B01)
1669 1669 Start of BRU-K-1 opening
1765 1765 Start of TQ33D01 injection, operator action
1899 1910 Start of TQ33D01 operation from containment sump (TQ30B01)

4-69
 Time, sec
Event
Incident Calculation
2068 2068 Containment pressure increase above 0.3 kgf/cm2 gauge.
Containment isolation. Start of LPIS operation via minimal
bypass flow line, start of containment spray pumps injection,
termination of primary circuit make-up
2085 2085 Start of TQ13D01 injection (ECCS safeguards)
2115 2115 Termination of TQ14-34D01 injection (operator action)
2160 2160 Termination of TQ33D01 injection (operator action)
2440 2440 Termination of TQ23D01 injection (operator action)
3525 3525 Termination of TQ13D01 injection (operator action)
4485 3900 Start of LPIS pumps TQ12,22,32D01 injection
4019 4019 BRU-K-1 closure
4505 4505 BRU-K-1 opening
4935 4935 Termination of TQ22D01 injection (operator action)
5055 5055 Termination of TQ32D01 injection (operator action)
5475 5800 SG levels are 3.8 m
6375 - Hot legs temperature decrease down to 70C
– 7200 End of calculation.
Minimal reactor inlet temperature is 40C, reactor outlet
temperature is 63C, RCS pressure is 23 kgf/cm2

After PRZ PORV opening the initial steam flow is ~50 kgf/cm2 (Figure 4-156). Loss of the
primary coolant causes RCS pressure decrease (Figure 4-114) and start of PRZ heaters
operation at 60 s. After decrease of PRZ level (Figure 4-115) below 4.2 m at 125 s all PRZ
heaters groups are switched off with prohibition for operation.

Operator isolates let-down at 120 s (Figure 4-129) and at 195 s establishes boron supply from
TB10 tanks to the suction line of make-up pumps. Since let-down is terminated, the make-up
temperature reaches 62C at 300 s and continues to decrease.

Since RCS temperature decreases faster than the secondary circuit temperature, starting from
400 s SGs start to heat the primary circuit. At 315 s of calculation (300 s of actual incident) the
ECCS setpoint "Subcooling < 10C" is reached (Figure 4-127) that has to result in containment
isolation and start of ECCS pumps. However this setpoint is deactivated in accordance with
PRZ PORV testing program.

At 330 s the primary circuit pressure decreases below 60 kgf/cm2 and HAs start to inject boric
acid solution to the primary circuit. At 385 s the high head safety injection pumps TQ14-34D01
operation to the primary circuit starts while HPIS pumps TQ13-33D01 operate through the
minimal bypass flow lines.

At ~400 s the saturation temperature is reached in the primary circuit (Figure 4-127) that leads
to SG collector tops voiding and formation of the upper head bubble. The latter results in

4-70
significant increase of PRZ level (Figure 4-115) and starting from 480 s two-phase mixture
discharge from PORV begins. RCS pressure is stabilized at ~53 kgf/cm2 (Figure 4-114).

At 845 s operator realigns TQ13D01 for RCS injection (Figure 4-137). Filling in of SGs is
initiated at 915 s (simulated by changing of feed water flow controllers setpoints). At 1045 s
operator terminates TQ13D01 injection to the primary circuit and arranges injection from
TQ23D01 pump at 1205 s (Figure 4-138).

To speed-up secondary circuit pressure decrease operator opens BRU-K-1 at 1669 s (Figure
4-155). However this does not affect RCS parameters since the core exit temperature at this
moment is ~196C (Figure 4-116) which corresponds to saturation pressure of ~14.5 kgf/cm2
abs. that is lower than the secondary circuit pressure (Figures 4-144 – 4-148).

At 1765 s operator initiates injection to the primary circuit from TQ33D01 and at 1950 s RCS
pressure starts to increase. Starting from 2000 s the discharge of subcooled water from PRZ
PORV begins and continues till the end of incident.

ECCS safeguard "Containment pressure > 0.3 kgf/cm2 gauge" is actuated at 2068 s resulting in
containment isolation, termination of primary circuit make-up, start of LPIS operation via minimal
bypass flow lines and start of containment spray pumps injection. This safeguard also causes
restart of TQ13D01 pump in addition to operating TQ23,33D01 pumps and RCS pressure
increases up to 74 kgf/cm2 (Figure 4-114).

After that operator sequentially trips HPIS pumps TQ33D01 (at 2160 s), TQ23D01 (at 2440 s)
and TQ13D01 (at 3525 s). Calculated core exit temperature after trip of the last operating HPIS
pump is 105C, while measured value is ~90C (Figure 4-116).

In calculation the cold leg coolant temperatures (by thermocouples model) decrease to the
measured values at ~3000, 4800, 3000 and 4300 s for loops no.1-4 (Figures 4-123 – 4-126).
The difference between calculated and measured values is explained by one-dimensional
representation of the cold legs with averaging of parameters in hydraulic components, while in
the actual incident the thermal stratification is observed.

Due to continuous loss of coolant at terminated HPIS injection RCS pressure decreases to LPIS
shut-off head (at 3900 s in calculation and at 4485 s in the incident) and LPIS operation
stabilizes RCS pressure at 22-23 kgf/cm2 (Figure 4-114). It shall be noted that measured LPIS
flow in Figures 138 – 140 indicates the flow upstream the minimal bypass flow line (i.e. includes
flow through bypass line and flow to the primary circuit). Trip of LPIS pumps TQ22D01 and
TQ32D01 at 4935 s and 5055 s, respectively, does not affect significantly RCS pressure or core
exit temperature, that continues to decrease slowly (Figure 4-116). Starting from 6200 s the
calculated loss of coolant via PRZ PORV is compensated by LPIS operation (Figure 4-156).

Since BRU-K remains open (Figure 4-155) SG pressure reaches ~25 kgf/cm2 at 7200 s.

4-71
Figure 4-114 RCS Pressure

Figure 4-115 PRZ Level

4-72
Figure 4-116 Core Exit Temperature

Figure 4-117 Peak Cladding Temperature

4-73
Figure 4-118 PRZ Coolant Temperature

Figure 4-119 Coolant Temperature in Hot Leg No.1 and at the Core Exit

4-74
Figure 4-120 Coolant Temperature in Hot Leg No.2 and at the Core Exit

Figure 4-121 Coolant Temperature in Hot Leg No.3 and at the Core Exit

4-75
Figure 4-122 Coolant Temperature in Hot Leg No.4 and at the Core Exit

Figure 4-123 Coolant Temperature in Cold Leg No.1 and at the Reactor Inlet

4-76
Figure 4-124 Coolant Temperature in Cold Leg No.2 and at the Reactor Inlet

Figure 4-125 Coolant Temperature in Cold Leg No.3 and at the Reactor Inlet

4-77
Figure 4-126 Coolant Temperature in Cold Leg No.4 and at the Reactor Inlet

Figure 4-127 Subcooling

4-78
Figure 4-128 Make-up Mass Flow Rate

Figure 4-129 Let-down Mass Flow Rate

4-79
Figure 4-130 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.1

Figure 4-131 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.2

4-80
Figure 4-132 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.3

Figure 4-133 RCP Mass Flow Rate, Loop No.4

4-81
Figure 4-134 TQ12 LPIS Mass Flow Rate

Figure 4-135 TQ22 LPIS Mass Flow Rate

4-82
Figure 4-136 TQ32 LPIS Mass Flow Rate

Figure 4-137 TQ13 HPIS Mass Flow Rate

4-83
Figure 4-138 TQ23 HPIS Mass Flow Rate

Figure 4-139 TQ33 HPIS Mass Flow Rate

4-84
Figure 4-140 HA-1 Level

Figure 4-141 HA-2 Level

4-85
Figure 4-142 HA-3 Level

Figure 4-143 HA-4 Level

4-86
Figure 4-144 MSH Pressure

Figure 4-145 SG-1 Pressure

4-87
Figure 4-146 SG-2 Pressure

Figure 4-147 SG-3 Pressure

4-88
Figure 4-148 SG-4 Pressure

Figure 4-149 SG-1 Level (Wide Range)

4-89
Figure 4-150 SG-2 Level (Wide Range)

Figure 4-151 SG-3 Level (Wide Range)

4-90
Figure 4-152 SG-4 Level (Wide Range)

Figure 4-153 Feedwater Temperature

4-91
Figure 4-154 BRU-A No.4 Stem Position

Figure 4-155 BRU-K No.1 Stem Position

4-92
Figure 4-156 Coolant Mass Flow Rate from PRZ PORV, HPIS and LPIS

4-93
 5 CONCLUSIONS
After development of VVER-1000/V-320 thermal-hydraulic model for TRACE code the validation
calculations of several incidents which occurred at Ukrainian NPPs were performed in order to
justify capabilities of this model to simulate adequately the plant response during transients and
accidents.

The incidents simulated include:

 Zaporizhzhya NPP Unit 5 MFW-1 pump trip;

 Zaporizhzhya NPP Unit 6 inadvertent FASIV closure;
 Rivne NPP Unit 3 PRZ PORV stuck open during tests.

The results of validation calculations demonstrate that developed WWER 1000/V 320 thermal
hydraulic model for TRACE code is able to reproduce adequately NPP transient response. For
the majority of plant parameters good correspondence between calculated and measured data
is obtained in transient scenarios evaluated.

It shall be noted that in RNPP-3 PRZ PORV stuck open transient the noticeable deviations in
calculated response of coolant temperature in RCS legs comparing to the measurement data
can be observed after start of safety injection. Such deviations are caused by thermal
stratification of coolant in RCS loops which cannot be reproduced in one-dimensional model
representation. Nevertheless even in this scenario the overall transient response is adequately
reproduced by TRACE model.

Based on the results of validation it can be concluded that WWER-1000/V-320 thermal hydraulic
model for TRACE computer code which was developed by SSTC NRS can be used for
calculations of transients and accidents in support of regulatory review of safety analyses
documentation.

5-1
 6 REFERENCES
Zaporizhzhya NPP Unit 5 In-depth Safety Assessment Project. Limited Scope Design Basis
Accident Analysis. Nuclear Steam Supply System Data Base (NSSS DB). 20021DL11E-DBA,
2001.

Nuclear Steam Supply System Data Base for Beyond Design Basis Accident Analysis. Rivne
NPP Unit 4. Final Safety Analysis Report. [Link].01–09.

Report on Event Investigation No.5ZAP-P08-25.11.98: "ZNPP Unit 5 Power Decrease by Fast

Reactor Load Shedding Protection and Reactor Power Limiter Due to MFW Pump Trip During
Planned Maintenance of Turbine Stop Valve of MFW Pump no.1 Drive", 1998.

Nuclear Steam Supply System Data Base for Beyond Design Basis Accident Analysis.
Zaporizhzhya NPP Unit 5. Final Safety Analysis Report. [Link].1, 2007.

Report on Event Investigation No.6ZAP-P05/1-08-11-15: "ZNPP Unit 6 Reactor Trip by

"Secondary Circuit Pressure > 80 kgf/cm2" Signal due to FASIV TX50S06 Closure", 2015.

Report on RNPP Event Investigation No.3 ROV-P07-002-09-09D "PRZ PORV Stuck Open
During Planned Tests by Primary Circuit Pressure Increase Before Unit 3 Start-up", 2009.

6-1
 NUREG-IA-0490

TRACE VVER-1000/V-320 Model Validation

December 2018

S. Iegan, A. Mazur, Y. Vorobyov, O. Zhabin, S. Yanovskiy Technical

State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine and

State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ukraine

9/11 Arsenalna str. Kyiv, Ukraine 01011

Division of Systems Analysis

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Washington,
K. Tien, NRCD.C. 20555-0001
Project Manager

This report is developed by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) and its technical support
organization, the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ukraine (SSTC NRS), under
Implementing Agreement On Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications And Maintenance Between The United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (signed in 2014) in accordance
with Article III, Section C, of the Agreement.

The report provides results of the validation calculations conducted with application of SSTC NRS model of VVER-
1000/V-320 unit for TRACE computer code. The calculation scenarios simulate actual incidents that occurred at
Ukrainian NPPs.

Pressurized Water Reactor, Russian Design (VVER)

TRACE
Reactor Power Controller, Russian designation(ARM)
Fast-acting Steam Isolation Valve(FASIV)
Hydroaccumulators (HA)
Steam Dump Valve to Atmosphere(BRU-A)
Steam Dump Valve to the Turbine Condenser(BRU-K)
Fast Reactor Load Shedding Protection, Russian designation(UPZ)
Protective Tubes Unit(PTU)
Submerged Perforated Plate(SPP)
NUREG/IA-0490 TRACE VVER-1000/V-320 Model Validation December 2018