Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, GR No.

92191-92 (1991)
Facts:
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd district of
Northern Samar. His adversaries, which include petitioners Co et al., filed election
protests against him averring that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Phils. and that
he is not a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar and therefore he did not satisfy
the qualification for representatives mandated in Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution. It is
argued that Ong does not even have real properties in that district. Respondent HRET
found for Ong. Ong was born of a natural-born citizen mother and a Chinese father who
was later naturalized while Ong was a minor. Ong was born in the said district of Samar
and grew up there. Their house was twice burned and, in both times, they rebuilt their
residence in the same place. After elementary, he pursued his studies in Manila and
practiced his profession as CPA in the Central Bank of the Phils. Later, he engaged
himself in the management of the family business in Manila. He married a Filipina. In
between, he made periodical journeys back to his home province. However, Ong does
not have property in the district.
Issues:
(1) WON Is Ong a naturally-born Filipino citizen?
(2) WON Ong a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar?
Ruling:
(1) Yes. When Ong’s father was naturalized, Sec 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act
squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Thus,
it was the law itself which elected Philippine citizenship to him when he was only 9.
Election through a sworn statement when he turned 21 (age of majority) would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who is already a Filipino citizen.
Moreover, formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos, when the time to elect came up, there are acts
of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding and, in this case, Ong’s establishment
of his life here are themselves formal manifestations of choice.
(2) Yes. The domicile of origin of Ong, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar (in the district). Although no merit was found in the petitioners’ argument
that Ong does not even have property in the district, the Court nonetheless held, for the
sake of argument, that did it is not required that a person should have a house in order
to establish his residence and domicile because that would tantamount to a property
qualification. It is enough that he should live in the municipality. Although he studied in
Manila and practiced his profession therein, the periodical journeys made to his home
province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, GR No. L-83882 (1989)

The Facts
Willie Yu (Petitioner) is a naturalized Filipino citizen. Petitioner was holder of a
Portuguese passport and despite his naturalization
on February 10, 1978 applied for a renewal of his travel document with the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo and was issued same on July 21, 1981.
Albeit, petitioner has renounced his former allegiance, he continues to revert to the form
er wheneverconvenient i.e. in business dealings and transactions local and overseas.
Herein respondent has detained petitioner for eventual deportation alleging that the
latter is not a citizen by virtue of his acts & evidences adduced. Petitioner filed a petition
for habeas corpus seeking his release from detention.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
Ruling
The court a quo, In Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Gallano, enunciated
that express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly
and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization, resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen by applying for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
represented himself as such in official documents even after becoming a naturalized
Filipino citizen. Such acts is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
Citizenship. Philippine Citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or ware to be
displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. Wherefore, premises
considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is denied. The decision is
immediately executory.
Angat v. Republic, GR No. 132244 (1999)

FACTS:
Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by
naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing in the Philippines, Angat filed on 11
March 1996 before the RTC a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630.
RTC is issued a notice setting the case for initial hearing which, along with the petition and its
annexes, was received by the OSG on 10 May 1996. Angat sought to be allowed to take his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171.
The motion was denied. Another motion filed by petitioner was found to be meritorious by the
court. A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that Angat is entitled to the benefits of the said law
considering that herein Angat is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country.
The petition and motion of the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines likewise show that the Angat possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications under R.A. 8171. After taking his Oath of Allegiance, another order was
issued that Angat is hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. OSG asserted that the petition itself should have
been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the
Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with AO 285. The trial court, thus, the motion
to dismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby granted. Angat filed a motion for
reconsideration, trial judge denied the motion for reconsideration. Angat would insist that the
trial court had jurisdiction over his petition for naturalization, and that he had acquired a vested
right as a repatriated citizen of the Philippines when the court declared him repatriated following
the order, allowing him to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
WON Angat may invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 for repatriation
RULING:
NO. It should also be noteworthy that the petition was for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect
for Angat to initially invoke Republic Act No. 96516 and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws could
only apply to personswho had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the armed forcesof an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United
States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition, Parenthetically, under these
statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to
file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or
where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Bengson III v. Cruz, GR No. 142840 (2001)
FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost
his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly
elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE:
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING:
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of Congress.
R.A. No. 2630, Sec 1.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Tan Co v. Civil Register of Manila, GR No. 138496 (2004)

Facts:
 Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng and
Lourdes Vihong K. Tan.
 Initially, the parents were Chinese citizens as indicated in the children's birth certificates.
 Co Boon Peng applied for Philippine citizenship under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270
and was granted citizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055.
 He received Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 and took his oath as a Philippine
citizen on February 15, 1977.
 Hubert and Arlene, who were minors at the time, sought to change their father's
citizenship in their birth certificates from "Chinese" to "Filipino" through a petition filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
 The RTC dismissed their petition on September 23, 1998, stating that Co Boon Peng
was naturalized under LOI No. 270 and not Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.
 The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on April 27, 1999.

Issue:
WON they are qualified for the benefit provided for by CA No. 473 which provides that
minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were born in the Philippines shall
likewise be considered citizens thereof.
Ruling:

YES. Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes
in pari materia. Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said
provision should be read into the latter law as an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent
with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the grant of Philippine
citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to
the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.
Go v. Republic, GR No. 202809 (2014)
Labo v. COMELEC, GR No. 86564 (1989)
Facts:
Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. Private respondent Lardizabal, the
losing candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto questioning petitioner’s citizenship. The latter
claims that petitioner is a naturalized Australian citizen, having married an Australian citizen.
Records also showed petitioner’s oath and affirmation of allegiance to the Queen of Australia.
These were not denied; petitioner however claimed that his naturalization in Australia made him
at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship and that his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian
citizen was bigamous.
Issue:
WON the petitioner a Filipino citizen?
Ruling:
NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among
these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3)
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. All
of which are applicable to the petitioner. In connection with this, Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution provides that, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law.”
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled
after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country.
What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship
and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he
may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that: (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved,
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall
be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to
public office.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, GR No. 120295 (1996)
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo, a candidate for Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections, faced
legal challenges due to issues concerning his citizenship. Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed
a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify Frivaldo for not being a
Philippine citizen, leading to COMELEC’s disqualification of Frivaldo. Despite the disqualification
and his pending motion for reconsideration, Frivaldo’s candidacy continued, and he won the
election. However, Lee was proclaimed Governor on June 30, 1995, following a COMELEC
directive. Frivaldo filed a petition on July 6, 1995, seeking the annulment of Lee’s proclamation,
alleging that he had re-acquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation under P.D. 725 prior to
the proclamation. The COMELEC’s First Division later annulled Lee’s proclamation, stating that
Frivaldo fulfilled the citizenship requirement by his repatriation on June 30, 1995, thus was
qualified to hold office. Lee’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc,
leading to the present petitions before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON Frivaldo’s repatriation valid and did it cure his lack of citizenship in time to qualify him for
the gubernatorial post?

Ruling:
The Court found Frivaldo’s repatriation under P.D. 725 to be valid, effectively curing the issue of
his citizenship, and thereby, his eligibility to hold public office. The repatriation was not only valid
but was also granted retroactive effect to the date of his application.
Repatriation under P.D. 725 can have retroactive effect from the date of the application,
affording the applicant the opportunity to cure previous disqualifications due to loss of
citizenship. It also reiterates the authority and broad jurisdiction of the COMELEC over election-
related issues, including the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates, and underscores
the judiciary’s role in upholding the will of the electorate over technical legal objections.

Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, GR No. 198742 (2012)

FACTS:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise
known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.” The application was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has
ceased to be an Australian citizen.
She sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis M.
Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions
for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly
sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a
dual citizen and that she failed to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by
Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225.
ISSUE: WON petitioner still has dual citizenship
RULING: YES
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing
by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering
the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies
to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to
whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino
citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act
that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply therewith in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her
political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.