Understanding the

People’s Liberation
Army Rocket Force
Strategy, Armament, and Disposition
Maj. Christopher J. Mihal, PMP

T he People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force

(PLARF), formerly the Second
Artillery Force, is the element
of the Chinese military responsible for
organizing, manning, training, and
equipping the People’s Republic
of China’s (PRC) strategic land-
based nuclear and conventional
missile forces as well as their supporting
elements and bases. Any military plan-
ner involved in operations in the Asia-Pacific
theater must have an understanding of this unique
force as it presents a threat to its neighbors, specifi- as somewhat larger than it publicly claims; several
cally Taiwan, and maintains the ability to influence conventionally armed ballistic missiles allegedly have
local, regional, and global military operations. The nuclear variants that have never been officially con-
PLARF has been rapidly expanding and modernizing firmed.3 However, these proposed nuclear variants
in recent years, concurrent with the PRC’s evolving may be disinformation or speculative.
strategy regarding deterrence. Meanwhile, the conventional arm of the PLARF
China’s nuclear buildup is directly in line with is the largest ground-based missile force in the world,
the PRC’s expanded view of the utility of nuclear with over 2,200 conventionally armed ballistic and
weapons, and China’s nuclear strategy is gradually cruise missiles and with enough antiship missiles
evolving from a policy of minimal deterrence to a to attack every U.S. surface combatant vessel in the
more active posture of limited deterrence.1 While South China Sea with enough firepower to over-
its nuclear arsenal is small compared to that of the come each ship’s missile defense.4 The elevation from
United States, China fielded roughly 320 nucle- Second Artillery Force to PLARF—that is, elevation
ar warheads as of 2020; China’s nuclear arsenal is to a full-service equivalent to the army, navy, and air
constantly upgrading, modernizing, and expanding.2 force—is indicative of China’s increased reliance on
Unconfirmed reports place China’s nuclear arsenal missile forces at the operational and strategic levels.

220 July-August 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE

Identifying the strategy governing the employment The PLARF’s main focus is on Taiwan and the
of the PLARF and demonstrating China’s history of pro- South China Sea, but it also maintains capabilities
liferation will explain how the PLARF fits into China’s against the Korean Peninsula, India, Russia, and the
overall strategic vision. Identifying each of PLARF’s United States. Although growing at a much more
missile systems will chart the location of each of China’s moderate pace compared to its conventional missile
approximately forty missile brigades and their proba- arm, the PLARF’s nuclear forces have been expanding
ble composition to the greatest extent possible. Some in recent decades and are on track to double in size by
recommendations are necessary for planning against the 2030.11 Crucially, China’s nuclear arsenal could now
PLARF; there are weaknesses inherent in its structure survive a first strike from either the United States or
and technology as the formation currently exists. Russia with enough capability remaining to retaliate.12
The PLARF’s capabilities are expanding to counter
Strategy both Taiwanese and U.S. systems; China has focused on
China’s 2019 defense white paper identified that, antiship ballistic missiles
while China has downsized the People’s Liberation Army like the DF-17, DF-21, Maj. Christopher Mihal,
(PLA), it has expanded the PLARF because it “plays a and DF-26 to counter U.S. PMP, is a U.S. Army nuclear
critical role in maintaining China’s national sovereignty carrier groups and deny and counter-weapons
and security.”5 Chinese leadership views the PLARF as U.S. access to the region via of mass destruction
a significant contribution to “strategic balance” between land, air, and sea in order officer serving as the
China and its main strategic competitors.6 The PLARF to inhibit the U.S. ability executive director of the
fulfills several missions for China, including strategic to assist regional allies.13 National Nuclear Security
deterrence, suppression of enemy air defenses, and “not China’s numerous short- Administration Office
allowing any inimical force access to Chinese space: land, and medium-range ballistic of Systems Engineering
air, or sea, and deny the enemy any space to fight a battle missiles are designed to and Integration, NA-18.
near the Chinese territory, including Taiwan and the first overwhelm Taiwan’s air de- He commissioned as an
chain of islands [China’s disputed island claims in the fense, and China currently engineer officer and holds
South China Sea].”7 The PLARF’s near-term objectives spends nearly twenty-four a BS in history from the U.S.
include “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of times what Taiwan does Military Academy, an MS
nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening in- on defense.14 With more in engineering manage-
termediate and long-range precision strike forces, and en- accurate CEP of its missiles, ment from the Missouri
hancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build the PLARF is better able University of Science and
a strong and modernized rocket force.”8 China is achiev- to target “key strategic and Technology, and an MS in
ing these capabilities by simultaneously introducing new, operational targets of the nuclear engineering from
more accurate nuclear missiles while drastically building enemy,” including recon- the Air Force Institute of
up its conventional missile forces. Every year between naissance, intelligence, Technology. He is a certified
2002 and 2009, the PRC deployed approximately fifty to command and control, Project Management
one hundred new ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, with electronic warfare, antiair Professional. His notable
the number of missiles currently arrayed against Taiwan and logistics systems to dis- assignments include J-9
equaling at least one thousand.9 Additionally, China is rupt enemy supply, logistics, (civil-military operations)
making great strides in enhancing the accuracy of its mis- and defenses in preparation liaison to the Department
siles, with the circular error probable (CEP) continuing to for a land invasion.15 of State Economic Policy
shrink. (The CEP is a measure of a weapon’s precision; it The direct impact Section at the U.S. Embassy
is the radius of a circle in which 50 percent of rounds are of China’s missiles is in Baghdad; exchange
expected to hit.) The CEP for China’s first nuclear missile, disturbing enough, but officer with 2 Canadian
the DF-3A, was four thousand meters, while its newest also troubling is China’s Mechanized Brigade Group;
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-41, has willingness to share its and engineering and logis-
a CEP of one hundred to five hundred meters—conser- missile technology with tics advisor to the Maldivian
vatively, an 800 percent improvement.10 other nations. Pakistan in National Defence Force.

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2021 221

 warhead. China has
demonstrated will-
ingness to assist other
nations with both.

Armament
It is important to
understand the varying
missile systems field-
ed by the PLARF in
order to devise adequate
countermeasures. Each
missile described below
will include whether the
missile is confirmed to
be armed with a nuclear
warhead, a convention-
al warhead, or if it is
dual-capable; in other
words, if there are con-
ventional and nuclear
variants of the same
missile. China has an
estimated 2,300–2,400
ballistic missiles in total,
including about ninety
(Figure from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020) ICBMs and approx-
imately 320 nuclear
Figure 1. Short, Medium, and Intermediate Ballistic warheads. More than
half of China’s nuclear
Missile Ranges capability resides in the
PLARF; the rest are
particular has benefited from this stance, with every either stockpiled or launched from submarines, along
Pakistani solid-fueled ballistic missile constructed with with a handful of nuclear gravity bombs for the PLA air
Chinese assistance since the early 1990s.16 In 1981, force, specifically for use by the H-6K bomber.18
China supplied Pakistan with CHIC-4 bombs—a Chinese missile nomenclature is relatively simple to
potential delivery system for Pakistan’s then nascent follow. All ballistic missiles of the PLARF belong to the
nuclear weapons program—and as much as fifty kilo- Dong Feng (East Wind) family of systems and pos-
grams of highly enriched uranium, ten tons of natural sess the prefix “DF” in their designation, while cruise
uranium hexafluoride (a chemical compound that can missiles belong to the Hong Niao/HN (Red Bird) or
be placed in centrifuges to produce highly enriched Chang Jian/CJ (Long Sword) family of missiles. In
uranium for nuclear reactors or weapons), and five keeping with PLA deception tactics, the cruise missile
tons of UF6 enriched to 3 percent, capable of produc- CJ-10 has also been designated the Hong Niao-2/HN-2
ing uranium suitable for nuclear reactors.17 Possessing to confuse intelligence analysis.
a nuclear capability requires two distinct but vital As the largest ground-based missile force in the
programs—a program to construct a nuclear warhead, world, the PLARF fields a wide variety of missile systems.
and a program to design a delivery system for a nuclear Approximately half of these are short-range weapons

222 July-August 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE

intended for use against Taiwan. Ground-based mis- CJ-10 or HN-2. Previously referred to as the DH-
siles fall into several categories based on type and range. 10 until 2011, the CJ-10 is the only cruise missile in
PLARF missiles are organized into six classifications: the PLARF arsenal; other Chinese cruise missiles are
• Ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) under the control of the PLA Navy or PLA Air Force.22
• Hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) As opposed to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles have a
• Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM, range less significantly lower trajectory and remain in the atmo-
than one thousand kilometers) sphere for the duration of their flight time; this makes
• Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM, range cruise missiles difficult to detect and intercept.23 The
between one thousand and three thousand CJ-10 is based off the Russian Kh-55, and purportedly,
kilometers)
• Intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM,
range between three
thousand and 5,500
kilometers)
• Intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM, range
greater than 5,500
kilometers)
For reference, figure 1
(on page 222) and figure 2
demonstrate range bands
of many of China’s mis-
siles.19 China’s longest-range
ICBMs—the DF-5A, DF-
31A, and DF-41—could
strike targets anywhere
in the continental United
States. Note that not all
Chinese missiles belong to
the PLARF; for instance,
the DF-12 SRBM (also
known as the M20 for
the export version) may
be used by the PLA and
not the PLARF, as that
weapon debuted in 2013
but has not been seen with (Figure from Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020)
any known PLARF units
since.20 The DF-12 may be Figure 2. Intermediate and Intercontinental
based off of the B-611, a
weapon system designed
Ballistic Missile Ranges
for the PLA to have integral
long-range precision fires without the need to re- reverse-engineered U.S. Tomahawk technology.24 The
quest theater PLARF forces.21 The following missiles CJ-10 has a range of somewhat over 1,500 kilometers,
will be identified first by their Chinese designation an extremely accurate CEP of five meters, and while
and then by their Western designation, if applicable. conventionally armed, it could potentially carry a

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2021 223

224 July-August 2021 MILITARY REVIEW
 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE

nuclear warhead. These facts are mostly conjectural, and DF-11/CSS-7. The DF-11 road-mobile, solid-fueled
the total number of deployed CJ-10s is a mystery; the SRBM is the most numerous weapon system in the
Department of Defense reported at least three hundred PLARF, with conservatively two hundred launchers and
CJ-10 missiles as of 2020, but previous estimates vary six hundred deployed missiles, and an upper estimate at
from mid-two hundred to over five hundred missiles.25 over 750 missiles, with a range of six hundred kilome-
China has been extremely secretive regarding this ters.30 China also has sold this weapon extensively to
weapons system, using numerous designations as well as external markets as the M-11, with Pakistan, Myanmar,
intentional conflation with the DF-11 ballistic missile and Bangladesh confirmed to have purchased the mis-
in numerous publications to further obfuscate the true sile.31 Over one hundred of China’s DF-11s have been
nature of this system.26 While China is no stranger to upgraded to the DF-11A variant, while a bunker-buster
military deception, the deliberate attempts to hide the variant designated DF-11AZT has also been unveiled.32
CJ-10’s capabilities is unusual. Unconfirmed reports state that the DF-11 can carry
DF-4/CSS-3. A liquid-fueled ICBM carrying a small nuclear warheads of between two and twenty
3.3-megaton nuclear warhead, the DF-4 is an older kilotons, or even a large, 350-kiloton warhead, but these
design that may be phased out in favor of the DF-31 speculations have never been confirmed and are not
or the DF-41. As is typical with older Chinese ICBMs, included in estimates of China’s total nuclear forces.33
it is very inaccurate.27 It is one of only two Chinese DF-15/CSS-6. A solid-fueled, road-mobile SRBM,
weapons systems with a megaton payload. The DF-4 is the DF-15 has three variants: the DF-15A, -15B, and -15C.
silo-based or cave-based, limiting its utility compared The DF-15 is conventionally armed but purportedly the
to the road-mobile ICBMs China has been recently DF-15A can carry a fifty- to 350-kiloton warhead.34 The
fielding like the DF-31. As of 2020, there were only DF-15 is also very numerous, with several hundred missiles
six DF-4s in the Chinese arsenal, further evidence the and at least one hundred launchers in total, although
weapon is retiring.28 As liquid-fueled missiles cannot somewhat fewer total missiles than the DF-11.35 The
store their fuel and thus must be fueled prior to use (a DF-15 has a range of six hundred kilometers, while the DF-
process that can take hours), liquid-fueled missiles are 15A has a range of nine hundred kilometers and the DF-
being retired in favor of solid-fueled missiles that can 15B eight hundred kilometers.36 The DF-15C is an earth
deploy instantly, increasing force readiness. penetrator and has similar range to the -15A and -15B.
DF-5/CSS-4. Another liquid-fueled, silo-based DF-16/CSS-11. The DF-16 is China’s newest
ICBM, the DF-5 has much greater range than both the solid-fueled, road-mobile SRBM and may replace the
older DF-4 and new DF-31. The original DF-5, which older DF-11s and DF-15s in the years to come. It can
is no longer deployed, could only carry a single one- to carry up to three MIRV warheads, though the nucle-
four-megaton warhead, while all three subvariants, the ar variant is unconfirmed as it is with other Chinese
DF-5A, -5B, and -5C, are multiple independently targeta- SRBMs. China had twelve DF-16s as of 2017 and has
ble reentry vehicle (MIRV) capable. The DF-5A can car- added a second brigade since, leading to probably twen-
ry three three-megaton warheads, the DF-5B can carry up ty-four DF-16s as of 2020.37
to eight warheads, and the still-experimental DF-5C can DF-17 and DF-ZF. The DF-17 is a new solid-fueled,
carry up to ten warheads. The CEP of the newest variant road-mobile IRBM. It shares some design aspects with
is purportedly three hundred meters. Approximately ten the DF-16 but is most notable for its unique warhead,
of the DF-5 missiles currently operational are the DF-5A the DF-ZF. The DF-ZF is an HGV, a new type of war-
variant and ten are DF-5B variants.29 The DF-5C is not head that combines elements of ballistic and cruise
currently deployed but may be in the near future. missiles, achieving supersonic speeds and thus immense

Top left: The Dongfeng-17 (DF-17), a hypersonic weapon used for precision strikes against medium and close targets, is displayed to the public
for the first time 1 October 2019 during the National Day Parade in Beijing. (Screenshot of a China Global Television Network YouTube video)
Bottom left: A DF-26 medium-range ballistic missile displayed after a military parade commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the end of
World War II 3 September 2015 in Beijing. (Photo courtesy of IceUnshattered via Wikimedia Commons)

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2021 225

kinetic energy. Powered by a scramjet, the DF-ZF can incredibly difficult and could lead to unwarranted esca-
perform extreme evasive maneuvers to avoid enemy lation and/or tragedy.44
missile defense, unlike ballistic missiles that generally DF-26. Another road-mobile, solid-fueled IRBM,
follow a predictable trajectory. Chinese commentators the DF-26 is another dual-capable missile with both
have stressed that the DF-ZF only will have conventional conventional and nuclear variants. With a range of
armament, but its nearest relative, the Russian Avangard about four thousand meters, the DF-26 is just shy
HGV, carries a two-megaton warhead.38 The DF-ZF also of classification as an ICBM and will carry a similar
has an antiship variant undergoing testing.39 Sixteen DF- 250-kiloton warhead to the DF-21. The DF-26 will
17s appeared at the seventieth anniversary of the PRC likely supplant the older DF-3, with a similar range
military parade in 2019.40 profile but greatly increased accuracy, deployment
DF-21/CSS-5. China’s first road-mobile, solid-fu- time, and the potential benefits of a dual-capable
eled missile, the DF-21, is a medium-range ballistic mis- system.45 There are roughly one hundred launchers
sile with four subvariants: the DF-21A, the DF-21C, and as many missiles for the DF-26, though the ratio
the DF-21D, and the DF-21E. The DF-21 has conven- of nuclear to conventional is not known.
tional and nuclear variants, with the nuclear variants, DF-31/CSS-10. The DF-31 is a silo-based or road-
DF-21A and DF-21E, equipped with a 250-kiloton and rail-mobile, solid-fueled ICBM. It is the most
warhead, and there may also be an electromagnetic common ICBM in the PLARF arsenal. The ICBMs
pulse warhead for the DF-21A.41 The DF-21C is the are solely nuclear-armed, with either a 250-kiloton
conventional variant and is primarily deployed against or a one-megaton warhead. The CEP for the DF-31
India. The DF-21D is designed as a “carrier-killer” with is around three hundred meters, though the Chinese
greatly increased accuracy.42 As of 2020, there are ap- claim greater accuracy.46 The subvariants are the
proximately forty nuclear-equipped DF-21A and DF- DF-31A and the DF-31AG (sometimes called the
21E missiles and slightly more conventionally armed DF-31B), both of which add MIRV capability with
DF-21Cs and DF-21Ds.43 three-to-five twenty- to 150-kiloton warheads each.
Both the DF-21 and DF-26 (and possibly the DF- The PLARF currently possesses six DF-31 launchers,
17) are worrying, because as both have confirmed thirty-six DF-31A launchers, and thirty-six DF-
conventional and nuclear variants, there is significant 31AG launchers for a total of seventy-eight missiles.47
ambiguity when one is launched as to what type of DF-41/CSS-X-10. China’s newest ICBM, the DF-
41, is solid-fueled and has both
silo and road-mobile variants,
with a maximum theoreti-
cal range of fifteen thousand
kilometers. The DF-41 will
WE RECO M M EN D likely replace older ICBMs in
the Chinese arsenal and will
To view the Defense Intelligence Agency’s carry either a single megaton
China Military Power: Modernizing a Force warhead or up to ten MIRV
to Fight and Win, visit https://www.dia.mil/ smaller warheads. The develop-
Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20 ment of the DF-41 in addition
Power%20Publications/China_Military_ to the DF-31 and older ICBMs
Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf. is leading intelligence analysts
to assume China’s ICBM force
could increase to “well over
200 [missiles].”48 Sixteen DF-
warhead it carries and how to counter it. As there is 41s were present at the 2019 military parade, though
little visually to distinguish the variants, especially once there have only been unconfirmed reports of DF-41
they are launched, ascertaining the threat becomes brigades and their locations.49

226 July-August 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army

Headquarters

PLA Navy Headquarters

PLA Air Force Headquarters Northern

theater
PLA Rocket Force Base

Beijing

Western
theater Central
theater
C H I N A

Eastern
theater
Southern
theater

T A I W A N

(Figure from Annual Report to Congress: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2017)

Figure 3. Chinese Theater Commands

Disposition fully integrated into Eastern Theater Command plans

Overall PLA forces are divided into five theater for Taiwan. There are five PLA theater commands:
commands, and each command has a distinct mission • Eastern Theater Command—responsible for
(see figure 3).50 There is some confusion as to wheth- Taiwan, Japan, and the East China Sea
er PLARF units in these theater commands report • Southern Theater Command—responsible for the
directly to the theater commander or are directly South China Sea and Southeast Asia
controlled by Chairman Xi Jinping and the Central • Western Theater Command—responsible for India,
Military Commission. Even if PLARF units are under South Asia, Central Asia, and counterterrorism in
direct control of the Chinese Communist Party, they Xinjiang and Tibet
undoubtedly have liaison and advisory relationships • Northern Theater Command—responsible for the
with the theater commands in which they share space, Korean Peninsula and Russia
even if they are nominally independent of the theater • Central Theater Command—responsible for
command structure. For instance, PLARF units at Base capital defense and for providing surge support to
61 in the eastern Anhui Province almost certainly are other theaters51

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2021 227

Table. People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force Bases, Brigades, and Armament

Base Headquarters Nuclear or

Brigade Armament Range Yield Notes
number location conventional

Huangshan, Anhui Eastern Theater Command

Base 61
Province area of resposibility (AOR)

Chizhou 611 DF-21A Nuclear 2,100+ 200-300 kT

Possible DF-21A,
Jingdezhen 612 DF-21 Conventional 1,750+ which would make it
nuclear-armed

Shangrao 613 DF-15B Conventional 750+

Yong'an 614 DF-11A Conventional 600

Possibly replacing
Meizhou 615 DF-11A Conventional 600
with DF-17

Ganzhou 616 DF-15 Conventional 600

Jinhua 617 DF-16 Conventional 800+

Rumored new
UNK 618 UNK UNK
brigade base

Kunming, Yunnan Southern Theater

Base 62
Province Command AOR

Possibly DF-21A,
Yibin 621 DF-21 Conventional 1,750+ which would make it
nuclear-armed

Yuxi 622 DF-31A Nuclear 11,200 200-300 kT

Liuzhou 623 CJ-10 Conventional 1,500

Danzhou 624 DF-21C/D Conventional 1,750+

Jianshui 625 DF-26 Nuclear 4,000 200-300 kT May still use DF-21

Qingyuan 626 DF-26 Nuclear 4,000 200-300 kT May still use DF-21

Jieyang 627 DF-17 Conventional 1750+

(Table by author; modified from Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76, no. 6 [2020]: 449–50)

228 July-August 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE

Table. People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force Bases, Brigades,

and Armament (continued)

Base Headquarters Nuclear or

Brigade Armament Range Yield Notes
number location conventional

Huaihua, Hunan Southern Theater

Base 63
Province Command AOR

5 x 200-300
Jingzhou 631 DF-5B Nuclear 13,000
kT (MIRV)

Shaoyang 632 DF-31AG Nuclear 11,200 200-300 kT

Huitong 633 DF-5A Nuclear 12,000 4-5 MT

Tongdao 634 UNK UNK Possible DF-41 Brigade

Yichun 635 CJ-10 Conventional 1,500

Shaoguan 636 DF-16 Conventional 800+

Rumored new
UNK 637 UNK UNK
brigade base

Lanzhou, Gansu
Base 64 Western Command AOR
Province

Hancheng 641 DF-31A Nuclear 11,200 200-300 kT

Datong 642 DF-31AG Nuclear 11,200 200-300 kT

Tianshui 643 DF-31 Nuclear 7,200 200-300 kT

Hanzhong 644 UNK UNK Possible DF-41 Brigade

Rumored new
Yinchuan 645 UNK UNK
brigade base

Korla 646 DF-26 Nuclear 4,000 200-300 kT

Rumored new
Xining 647 UNK UNK
brigade base

(Table by author; modified from Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76, no. 6 [2020]: 449–50)

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2021 229

 Table. People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force Bases, Brigades,
and Armament (continued)

Base Headquarters Nuclear or

Brigade Armament Range Yield Notes
number location conventional

Shenyang,
Base 65 Northern Command AOR
Liaoning Province

Dalian 651 DF-21A Nuclear 1,750+ 200-300 kT

Tonghua 652 DF-21C Conventional 1,750+

Laiwu 653 DF-21C/D Conventional 1,750+

Dalian 654 DF-26 Nuclear 4,000 200-300 kT

Rumored new
Tonghua 655 UNK UNK
brigade base

Rumored new brigade

Laiwu/Taian 656 UNK Nuclear
base, possible DF-31AG

Luoyang, Henan
Base 66 Central Command AOR
Province

5 x 200-300
Lingbao 661 DF-5B Nuclear 13,000
kT (MIRV)

Luanchuan 662 DF-4 Nuclear 5,500 3.3 MT Might upgrade to DF-41

Nanyang 663 DF-31A Nuclear 11,200 200-300 kT

Possibly upgrading to
Luoyang 664 DF-31 Nuclear 7,200 200-300 kT
DF-31AG

UNK,
UNK, probably
Wehui 665 probable
nuclear
ICBM

Xinjang 666 DF-26 Nuclear 4,000 200-300 kT

Responsible for nuclear

Baoji, Shaanxi
Base 67 warhead stockpile, Western
Province
Command AOR

40 total 20 nuclear
Total
brigades brigades

(Table by author; modified from Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76, no. 6 [2020]: 449–50)

230 July-August 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE

The PLARF is divided into six “bases,” sometimes and the corresponding primary armament of their sub-
referred to as armies, each corresponding to a geograph- ordinate brigades are presented in the table (on pages
ic area in China. An additional element, the Jinlun 228–230).59 Unconfirmed reports also place a DF-41
(Golden Wheel) Engineering Company, is stationed brigade in the far northwest Heilongjiang Province near
in Saudi Arabia and responsible for operating missiles the city of Daqing; if true, this could be a new brigade
including the obsolete DF-3 and newer DF-21 missiles under Base 65, though it could also be disinformation
and training of the Royal Strategic Rocket Force of Saudi designed to hide true DF-41 deployment.60
Arabia.52 PLARF units are stationed at bases numbered
61 through 66; an additional base, Base 67, is where all of Conclusion and Recommendations
China’s nuclear warheads are stockpiled. Chinese nuclear The PLARF represents a formidable force to
warheads are maintained separately from their missiles enhance China’s military objectives, and one that is
during peacetime and do not leave Base 67. As the size of very foreign to U.S. military planners, as the last U.S.
support units at Base 67 has not varied much in decades, ground-based missile, the Pershing II, was retired in
this may be an indicator that China’s nuclear stockpile 1987 to comply with the INF Treaty with the Soviet
has not greatly increased.53 While the PLARF itself has Union.61 Seeing a capability gap in the forces of its two
expanded drastically, with current personnel strength closest rivals, China seized an opportunity and has de-
hovering around one hundred thousand, this seems to veloped the largest ground-based missile force in the
be primarily focused on the conventional arm of the world. The PLARF is perhaps China’s most valuable
PLARF and not the nuclear so far.54 current military asset as it provides China both offen-
Each base with missile units has between four and sive and defensive capabilities against a wide range of
seven missile brigades. Each brigade consists of a num- opponents as well as the inherent value of deterrence
ber of battalions or independent companies armed with that nuclear weapons provide any nation. The inten-
a specific type of missile. Brigade subordinate units are tional ambiguity of armament in weapons such as the
either conventionally or nuclear armed, and the size of DF-21 and DF-26 enhance China’s deterrence options
the subordinate unit varies greatly based on armament, and force adversary planners to develop a wide range
with some conventional missile brigades containing of contingencies that may never be implemented.
thirty-six launchers with six missiles each, while mobile Despite these factors, there are weaknesses that U.S.
nuclear missile brigades possess between six and twelve planners should exploit in order to mitigate the threat
launchers, and silo-based nuclear missile brigades may posed by the PLARF.
only have six or fewer silos/caves in total with one First and foremost, China is geographically surround-
missile per silo. Furthermore, each brigade and battalion ed by enemies and potential enemies. Strengthening
maintains multiple supporting units for both the mis- ballistic missile defenses in these nations will degrade the
siles and the launchers.55 These supporting units include danger of overwhelming long-range precision fires at the
a technical battalion, a site management battalion, a onset of a conflict that the PLARF is designed to provide.
communications battalion, a technical service battalion, Furthermore, although the PLARF is large, China does
and an electronic countermeasures battalion.56 not possess vast stockpiles of missiles; in a protracted
As China’s exact missile totals and force structure conflict, the utility of the PLARF will diminish rapidly.
are not public knowledge, the size and disposition of This is doubly true for the nuclear arm of the PLARF.
some units is conjectural. What is certain is that the China simply does not have enough nuclear missiles to
majority of China’s missiles are short-range missiles such warrant a nuclear exchange, though Chinese defense
as the DF-11, DF-15, and CJ-10; over one thousand white papers of the last decade have stressed an “escalate
missiles of just these three types are aimed at Taiwan.57 to de-escalate” concept regarding nuclear employment.62
China has a total of 2,200 missiles that fall within the Such a strategy would involve using a very limited
parameters of the now-defunct Intermediate Nuclear number of nuclear weapons, perhaps even only a single
Forces (INF) Treaty, and those missiles make up 95 weapon, to force an opponent into negotiations rather
percent of China’s missile inventory; almost half of than devolve into a general nuclear conflagration. Given
these missiles are aimed directly at Taiwan.58 The bases the apparent lack of tactical nuclear weapons in the

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2021 231

PLARF, this seems illogical. Utilizing a nuclear weapon will also be vitally important for mission command
of several hundred kiloton or higher yield will only serve and logistics nodes, necessitating robust construction
to escalate a conflict, and those are the preponderance of engineer units to harden these locations and electronic
Chinese nuclear warheads. warfare units to conceal locations. Commanders should
Any U.S. military plan, whether on the Korean use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
Peninsula, Taiwan, the South China Sea, or elsewhere, capabilities to identify PLARF assets and use either
must factor the PLARF in its calculations. U.S. Army special operations forces or long-range precision fires,
nuclear and counter-weapons of mass destruction offi- either integral or air support, to neutralize the threat
cers would be invaluable at the operational level in the these missile systems pose. ISR can also identify if a
event of a conflict with a nuclear power such as China. PLARF unit is a conventional or nuclear unit to permit
Although typically assigned at the strategic level, these the commander to react accordingly; the United States
officers possess intimate knowledge of nuclear targeting and Russia demonstrated technology using neutron
and damage assessment that would greatly enhance the detectors on helicopters to find nuclear weapons as
situational awareness of operational commanders. They early as the 1980s, and these could be modified for use
would be able to assist operational Army commanders in current ISR assets.65 Finally, deception operations
in preparing to operate in a nuclear environment and to fool Chinese targeters into striking false targets will
reacting to dual-use weapons. yield immense benefits, because as noted above, the
Joint planners should refer to the Department of PLARF has a very limited reserve of missiles to draw
Defense’s Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept from, and thus every wasted missile offers significant
and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which both ability to degrade PLARF capabilities.
provide guidance on how to counter an adversary’s By fully integrating enablers, Army and joint com-
nuclear and dual-capable forces.63 Plans must integrate manders can mitigate the risk posed by PLARF units in
robust air and missile defense options at all levels to the event of a conflict. The PLARF is a formidable but
protect the force and degrade Chinese deterrence. U.S. not invincible element of the Chinese military. As China
home-based strategic missile defense is planned to continues to flex its muscles regionally, the United States
increase from forty-four ground-based interceptors to must, at the strategic level, counter malign influences
sixty-four within the next ten years, while tactical and and strengthen legitimate ties. Should strategic deter-
operational-level Patriot, Terminal High-Altitude Air rence fail and the United States enter into open conflict
Defense, and Aegis SM-3 air defense systems are re- with China, combatant commanders must be prepared
ceiving upgrades and will be procured in greater num- to counter the force-multiplying nature of the PLARF to
bers per the 2019 Missile Defense Review.64 Protection ensure success in the operating environment.

Notes
1. Susan Turner Haynes, Chinese Nuclear Proliferation: How Glob- The National Interest (website), 6 June 2020, accessed 12 March
al Politics is Transforming China’s Weapons Buildup and Modernization 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/fact-95-chinas-
(Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2016), 90. cruise-and-ballistic-missile-inventory-would-violate-inf-trea-
2. “Nuclear Weapon Modernization Continues but the Outlook ty-161426; Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton, Taking Back
for Arms Control Is Bleak: New SIPRI Yearbook Out Now,” Stockholm the Seas: Transforming the U.S. Surface Fleet for Decision-Centric
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 15 June 2020, accessed Warfare (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
15 March 2021, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/ Assessments, 2019), 6.
nuclear-weapon-modernization-continues-outlook-arms-con- 5. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic
trol-bleak-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now. of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing: Foreign
3. Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Languages Press, 2019), accessed 12 March 2021, https://www.
Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chi-
DC: The Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources nas-national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/.
Defense Council, November 2006), 98, accessed 24 March 2021, 6. Bates Gill and Adam Ni, “The People’s Liberation Army Rocket
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf. Force: Reshaping China’s Approach to Strategic Deterrence,” Austra-
4. Daniel R. DePetris, “Fact: 95% of China’s Cruise and Ballistic lian Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 2 (2019): 160–80, https://
Missile Inventory Would Violate INF Treaty,” The Skeptics (blog), doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2018.1545831.

232 July-August 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE

7. Nitin Gadkari, “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force: last modified 26 November 2019, accessed 15 March 2021, https://
The Decisive Instrument,” BharatShakti, 31 January 2021, accessed 12 missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hong-niao/.
March 2021, https://bharatshakti.in/chinese-peoples-liberation-ar- 25. Joseph Trevithick, “The War Zone: How China’s Ballis-
my-rocket-force-the-decisive-instrument/. tic Missile and Nuclear Arsenal Is Ballooning According to the
8. Ibid. Pentagon,” The Drive, 3 September 2020, accessed 15 March
9. Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Prolifer- 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36149/how-chi-
ation and the Threat to International Security (Annapolis, MD: Naval nas-ballistic-missile-and-nuclear-arsenal-is-ballooning-accord-
Institute Press, 2008), 74. ing-to-the-pentagon.
10. Haynes, Chinese Nuclear Proliferation, 85. 26. Ian Easton, “The Assassin under the Radar: China’s DH-10
11. C. Todd Lopez, “China Pursues Own Nuclear Triad, Doubling Cruise Missile Program,” Project 2049 Institute, 1 October 2009,
of Nuclear Capability,” U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) News, 1 accessed 15 March 2021, https://project2049.net/2009/10/01/
September 2020, accessed 12 March 2021, https://www.defense. the-assassin-under-the-radar-chinas-dh-10-cruise-missile-program/.
gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2333018/china-pursues-own-nu- 27. “Design Characteristics of China’s Ballistic and Cruise Missile
clear-triad-doubling-of-nuclear-capability/. Inventory,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated November 2014,
12. Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China accessed 15 March 2021, https://media.nti.org/pdfs/design_charac-
Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (Boston: Mariner Books, 2018), 164. teristics_of_chinas_ballistic_cruise_missiles_3.pdf.
13. Christopher Mihal, “A Cruel Wind from the East: China’s 28. Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces,
DF-17 and DF-ZF,” Countering WMD Journal, no. 21 (Summer/Fall 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76, no. 6 (2020): 444, https://
2020): 90–93; Eric Talmadge, “Chinese Missile Could Shift Pacific doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432.
Power Balance,” NBC News, 5 August 2010, accessed 12 March 2021, 29. “DF-5 (Dong Feng-5/CSS-4),” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile De-
https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna38580745; Defense Intelligence fense Project, last modified 18 November 2019, accessed 15 March
Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, 2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-5-ab/.
Threat (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: National Aerospace 30. OSD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Intelligence Center, June 2017), 3. Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 59; Eric
14. Could Taiwan Hold Off a Chinese Invasion?, YouTube video, Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geog-
14:39, posted by “The Infographics Show,” 16 December 2020, raphy, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017 (Santa Monica,
accessed 15 March 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z- CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 48.
s1ahNtj498. 31. Andrew Selth, “Pariah Partners in Arms,” The Irrawaddy 12,
15. Adam Ni and Bates Gill, “China’s New Missile Force: New Am- no. 3 (website), March 2004, accessed 15 March 2021, https://www2.
bitions, New Challenges (Part 1),” China Brief 18, no. 14 (10 August irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=933&page=2.
2018), accessed 12 March 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/ 32. Ethan Meick, China’s Reported Ballistic Missile Sale to Sau-
chinas-new-missile-force-new-ambitions-new-challenges-part-1/. di Arabia: Background and Potential Implications (Washington,
16. Gormley, Missile Contagion, 37. DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 16
17. Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb June 2014, accessed 24 March 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
(New Delhi: Dev Publishers and Distributors, 2018), 188, citing a default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China’s%20Reported%20
2004 letter from infamous Pakistani nuclear proliferator A. Q. Khan Ballistic%20Missile%20Sale%20to%20Saudi%20Arabia_0.pdf;
to his wife. for the two- to twenty-kiloton yield estimate, see “DF-11 (Dong
18. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmaments and Feng-11/M-11/CSS-7),” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Proj-
National Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020), ect, 29 January 2018, last modified 23 June 2020, accessed 24
355–58. March 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-11/;
19. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Annual Report to for the 350-kiloton reference, see M. V. Rappai, “China’s Nuclear
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Arsenal and Missile Defence,” Strategic Analysis 26, no. 1 (2002),
Republic of China 2020 (Washington, DC: U.S. DOD, 2020), 57–58. accessed 24 March 2021, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/
20. J. Michael Cole, “China’s Second Artillery has a New Mis- sa_jan02ram01.html.
sile,” The Diplomat (website), 7 August 2013, accessed 12 March 33. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six:
2021, https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/chinas-second-artillery- Asia,” The Military Balance 2017 117, no. 1 (2017): 279; Henri
has-a-new-missile/. Kehnmann, “DF-11AZT: Une Variante Anti-Bunker Finalement Pas
21. Martin Andrew, “Theater Ballistic Missiles and China’s Si Nouvelle” [A not-so-new anti-bunker variant], East Pendulum, 16
Doctrine of ‘Active Defense,’” China Brief 6, no. 6 (15 March May 2017, accessed 15 March 2021, http://www.eastpendulum.com/
2006), accessed 12 March 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/ df-11azt-variante-finalement-nouvelle.
theater-ballistic-missiles-and-chinas-doctrine-of-active-defense/. 34. “DF-15 Operational-Tactical Missile System,” Misselry, ac-
22. OSD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Devel- cessed 15 March 2021, https://en.missilery.info/missile/df-15.
opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011 (Washington, 35. David C. Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” in
DC: U.S. DOD, 2011), 2. Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, ed.
23. “Fact Sheet: Ballistic vs. Cruise Missiles,” Center for Arms Con- Philip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense Universi-
trol and Non-Proliferation, 27 April 2017, accessed 15 March 2021, ty Press, 2019), 402.
https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-ballistic-vs-cruise-missiles/. 36. Ahn Sung Kyoo, Choi Kang, and Kweon Eun Yul, “Implica-
24. “Hong Niao Series (HN-1/-2/-3),” Missile Threat, Center for tions of China’s Ballistic Missiles for Korean National Security,” Asan
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defense Project, Institute for Policy Studies, 10 November 2015, accessed 15 March

MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2021 233

2021, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/implications-of-chinas-ballis- J. Bolt, China’s Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine and Systems
tic-missiles-for-korean-national-security/. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, April 2021), 169.
37. “DF-16 (Dong Feng-16/CSS-11),” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile 53. Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” 401–2.
Defense Project, 16 November 2017, last modified 23 June 2020, 54. Gill and Ni, “The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force:
accessed 15 March 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ Reshaping China’s Approach to Strategic Deterrence,” 160–80.
dong-feng-16-css-11/. 55. Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” 401–2.
38. Ian Williams and Masao Dahlgren, “More Than Missiles: China 56. Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infra-
Previews Its New Way of War,” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense structure Opposite Taiwan,” Project 2049 Institute, 18 April 2011,
Project, 16 October 2019, accessed 15 March 2021, https://missileth- accessed 15 March 2021, https://project2049.net/2011/04/18/
reat.csis.org/more-than-missiles-china-previews-its-new-way-of-war/. expansion-of-chinas-ballistic-missile-infrastructure-opposite-taiwan/.
39. Mihal, “A Cruel Wind from the East,” 92. 57. Luis Ayala, People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (Charlotte,
40. Joseph Trevithick, “The War Zone: Four of the Biggest NC: 4th Watch Publishing Group, 2020), 4, citing the Centre for
Revelations from China’s Massive 70th Anniversary Military Parade,” Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
The Drive, 1 October 2019, accessed 15 March 2021, https://www. 58. DePetris, “Fact: 95% of China’s Cruise and Ballistic Missile
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/30119/four-of-the-biggest-revela- Inventory Would Violate INF Treaty.”
tions-from-chinas-massive-70th-anniversary-military-parade. 59. Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” 444;
41. Sean O’Connor, “PLA Ballistic Missiles, Technical Report APA- Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” 402–3; “Missiles of
TR-2010-0802,” Air Power Australia, updated August 2012, accessed China,” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Project, last modified
15 March 2021, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Ballistic-Mis- 16 July 2020, accessed 15 March 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.
siles.html#mozTocId8319. org/country/china/; Ma Xiu (@conanwhatisbest), “Another tidbit
42. “DF-21 (Dong Feng-21/CSS-5),” Missile Threat, CSIS Mis- on the new PLARF 665 Brigade (MUCD 96765) has emerged: it is
sile Defense Project, 13 April 2016, last modified 2 January 2020, apparently located in the county-level city of Weihui (卫辉市) just
accessed 15 March 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ outside Xinxiang. Good hunting!,” Twitter, 5 August 2020, 10:54 a.m.,
df-21/. accessed 15 March 2021, https://twitter.com/conanwhatisbest/sta-
43. Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” 444; tus/1291039914306539527; “DF-31AG,” Military Today, accessed 15
Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” 402. March 2021, http://www.military-today.com/missiles/df_31ag.htm.
44. James M. Acton, “The Evolution of Ambiguous Weapons,” in 60. Gregory Kulacki, “Fake News about Chinese Nuclear Weap-
Is It A Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation (Wash- ons,” All Things Nuclear (blog), Union of Concerned Scientists, 13
ington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 April February 2017, accessed 15 March 2021, https://allthingsnuclear.org/
2020), 17–24, accessed 15 March 2021, https://carnegieendowment. gkulacki/fake-news-about-chinese-nuclear-weapons.
org/files/Acton_NukeorNot_final.pdf. 61. “The Pershing Missile: Peace through Strength,” Lockheed
45. Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Martin, accessed 15 March 2021, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/
Major Drivers and Issues for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: en-us/news/features/history/pershing.html.
RAND Corporation, 2017), 116. 62. Paul L. Bernstein, “The Emerging Nuclear Landscape,” in On
46. “DF-31 (Dong Feng-31/CSS-10),” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, ed. Jeffrey Larsen and Kerry
Defense Project, 12 August 2016, last modified 8 October 2019, M. Kartchner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 112.
accessed 15 March 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-31/. 63. U.S. Strategic Command, Deterrence Operations Joint Operat-
47. Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” 444. ing Concept (Washington, DC: U.S. DOD, December 2006), accessed
48. OSD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Devel- 15 March 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/
opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 94. concepts/joc_deterrence.pdf; OSD, Nuclear Posture Review (Wash-
49. Gabriel Dominguez, “China to Field More Nuclear Weapons ington, DC: U.S. DOD, 2018), accessed 15 March 2021, https://media.
That Can Target the United States, Says Report,” Janes Defence News, defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-
20 January 2021, accessed 15 March 2021, https://www.janes.com/ POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
defence-news/news-detail/china-to-field-more-nuclear-weapons- 64. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Missile Defense ‘Arms Race’
that-can-target-the-united-states-says-report. Myth,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Spring 2021): 3–9, ac-
50. “For the Chinese, a Modern Command System,” Stratfor Worl- cessed 15 March 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/
dview, 16 February 2016, accessed 15 March 2021, https://world- SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-1/Costlow.pdf; OSD, 2019
view.stratfor.com/article/chinese-military-modern-command-system. Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: U.S. DOD, 2019), xiii,
51. Michael Martina, “China Showcases Fearsome New Missiles to accessed 15 March 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Inter-
Counter U.S. at Military Parade,” Reuters, 1 October 2019, accessed active/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20
15 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-anniversa- MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
ry-military/china-showcases-fearsome-new-missiles-to-counter-u-s- 65. Justin Anderson and James R. McCue, “Deterring, Countering,
at-military-parade-idUSKBN1WG342. and Defeating Conventional-Nuclear Integration,” Strategic Studies
52. “Saudi Arabia: Missile,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Spring 2021): 28–60, accessed 15 March 2021,
August 2015, accessed 15 March 2021, https://www.nti.org/learn/ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Vol-
countries/saudi-arabia/delivery-systems/; James M. Smith and Paul ume-15_Issue-1/Anderson.pdf.

234 July-August 2021 MILITARY REVIEW