PART A

The following discussion focuses on potential ownership difficulties, taking into

account both legal and equitable interests in the property purchased.
The first question is whether there is co-ownership in the given scenario.
Co-ownership is a legal setup where the key requirement is "unity of possession,"
ensuring that each owner has the right to possess and use the property.
In this scenario, the term "joint tenants in equity" indicates joint tenancy,
ensuring equal rights for all owners to use the entire property. This confirms co-
ownership in given scenario since unity of possession exist.
In legal terms, co-ownership is limited to joint tenancy; tenancy in common is
prohibited by law.1 Therefore, given co-ownership in the scenario, the law permits
only joint tenancy.
Since there is joint tenancy at law in given scenario, the first legal ownership issue
to evaluate is that there are five co-owners, which exceeds the statutory limit.
According to s. 34(2) of the LPA 1925, a parcel of land can have a maximum of
four legal co-owners. If more than four, only the first four named individuals of
full age in the conveyance will be registered as legal co-owners also known as
trustees. Moreover, only trustees will have the right to sell, mortgage, or lease
the property.
In this scenario, Epilson and gamma being 18 are qualified to be trustees since
other three are under the full age. Therefore, only these trustees will have legal
rights and others will be restricted from it.
The next consideration is determining type of co-ownership in equity.

In equity, there are two forms of tenancy: joint tenancy and tenancy in common.
For joint tenancy to exist, four unities must be present; otherwise, it defaults to
tenancy in common. However, the case of Goodman v Gallant establishes that
when a conveyance explicitly states an express declaration of trust, it is
conclusive. This principle is reaffirmed in Pankhania v Chandegra.

1
In this scenario, there is uncertainty about the presence of four unities as there is
no clear information provided in facts. Therefore it might default to tenancy in
common. However, the clear statement "joint tenants in equity" in the
conveyance aligns with the principles in Goodman v Gallent, indicating a joint
tenancy in equity among the friends.
In equitable joint tenancy, trusts play a role where one holds legal title but
manages the property for beneficiaries' benefit. Equitable co-ownership has no
limit on the number of co-owners, and age doesn't restrict participation. The right
of survivorship is a key feature, meaning that if one joint tenant dies, their share
automatically passes to the surviving joint tenant(s).

In the given scenario, all five members, regardless of age, can be co-owners with
equal rights. Trustees, Epsilon and Gamma, are responsible for managing benefits
for those without legal title, ensuring shared benefits. If a joint tenant dies, their
rights pass to the remaining four joint tenants, preventing separate shares or
transfers according to an individual's will due to the right of survivorship in joint
tenancy.
The second issue to address is that even though five friends contributed different
amounts to the purchase they will have equal benefit from the future sale. As
joint tenancy in equity distributes benefits equally despite unequal contribution.
If the conveyance specifies tenancy in common, co-owners can hold separate,
undivided shares reflecting their initial contributions. However, in given scenario
the conveyance mentions joint tenants in equity, which grants equal benefits to
all members regardless of their unequal contributions. This situation may lead to
perceived unfairness.
PART B
The first issue is to determine the status of the objects taken away by the seller.
Holland and Hodgson (1871) utilized a two-factor test, evaluating the degree and
purpose of annexation, to categorize items as chattels or fixtures. Initially, courts
emphasized annexation degree, but Leigh v Taylor (1902) and Hamp v
Bygrave [1983] highlighted the modern approach, which prioritizes the purpose
of annexation to determine if it's a fixture or chattel.
Appling the two-factor test to the scenario used in Berkley v Poulett (1977 and
Leigh v Taylor (1902).

The first stage, the degree of annexation assesses attachment permanence.

Fittings are attached to real property, while chattel is movable personal property.

The scenario does not specify how permanently the ornate fireplace, glass
chandeliers, stained glass windows, statues, plant pots, gym equipment, and
Jacuzzi are attached to the property. If easily removable without property
damage, they lean towards chattel according to Hellawell v Eastwood (1851).
However, if permanently attached, Holland and Hodgson's (1871) approach
suggests considering them as fixtures.

The purpose of annexation evaluates the reason for attachment. If attached for
enhanced enjoyment, the item may remain chattel; however, if affixed for land
improvement, it is likely a fixture.

In accordance with D'Eyncourt v Gregory (1866), the legal principle highlights that
items are fixtures if they form a part of the architectural design, and "Re Lord
Chesterfield's Settled Estates (1911)" further emphasizes that items integral to
the original decoration of a mansion house are fixtures.
In this scenario, it is mentioned that this is an old-fashioned-style house. The
students thought that the ornamental fireplaces, glass chandeliers, and stained
glass windows contribute to the building's character. Moreover the ornate garden
including statues and plant pot made a nice place to relax. Therefore it could be
argued that these items make an integral part to the overall architectural design,
it can be deemed as fixtures, akin to the principles established in D'Eyncourt v
Gregory (1866).

However, in Leigh v. Taylor (1902), ornamental objects are deemed as chattle,

Moreover, established significance of the purpose of annexation and intention.
The ornamental descriptions of the fireplace, glass chandeliers, stained glass
windows, statues, and plant pots in the scenario suggest their attachment was
primarily for ornamental purposes rather than integration into the structure.
Additionally, the seller's removal of these items indicates an intention for
enjoyment as ornamentals, not as integral parts of the property, supporting their
classification as chattels. However, the purpose of annexation must be judged
objectively (Dean v Andrews [1986]), although subjective intentions of the person
who annexed the object may be persuasive.

Moreover, In Berkley v Poulett (1977), the court ruled that the statue, by its own
weight, was not integral to the land. Similarly, in Tower Hamlets LBC v Bromley
LBC (2015), a sculpture was not considered part of an artistic or architectural
design scheme for the housing estate. Applying these principles to the scenario,
the statue is likely to be classified as a chattel, given its ornate nature and the fact
that it was removable and didn’t form integral part of the design.

Roch LJ in Botham v TSB (1996), provided criteria for identifying the status of an
item. Items that are ornamental, attached for enjoyment, easily movable, or have
a limited lifespan are likely chattels. In the given scenario, the gym equipment,
plant pots and Jacuzzi are likely chattels as they are for enjoyment, easily
movable, and not integral to the property.

The second issue is to determine whether the seller could take away the objects.

Under s. 62 of the LPA 1925, fixtures automatically pass with the land upon sale,
while chattels do not. In this scenario, all items are likely chattels, granting the
seller the right to take them away.