TEAM CODE: 039

4TH FIMT MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025

Before

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTA

APPEAL/ PETITION NO. _______/2025

FOR EXCERCISING A PETITION

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVARTA,1950

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

COACHING INSTITUTES ………………………..........................(PETITIONER)

versus

UNION OF ARYAVARTA ……………………………………….. (RESPONDENT)

MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................... 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………. 4-7

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.........................................................................................8

STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................................................9-10

ISSUES RAISED.....................................................................................................................11

Issue 1 WHETHER THE REGULATIONS IN QUESTION ARE VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLE 19(1)(G) AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
ARYAVARTA, IF YES, WHETHER THEY COULD BE SAID TO BE REASONABLE
RESTRICTIONS………………………………………………………………………….

Issue 2 WHETHER THE REGULATION PROVIDING FOR THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COACHING TRIBUNAL AND OUSTING THE
JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND VIOLATED THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION……………

Issue 3 WHETHER ANY DIRECTION/ORDER/WRIT COULD BE ISSUED BY THE

COURT TO THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A COMPREHENSIVE LAW
GOVERNING AND REGULATING THE COACHING INSTITUTIONS……………

Issue 4 WHETHER THE INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY OF PRIVATE

COACHING INSTITUTES, AS PRIVATELY-RUN EDUCATIONAL ENTITIES, ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FROM STATE INTERFERENCE, ENSURING
THEIR FREEDOM TO OPERATE WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE CONTROL…………

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...................................................................................... 12-13

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.............................................................................................14-30

PRAYER……………………………………………………………………….…………….31

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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations Definition

AIR All India Reporter

Hon’ble Honourable

MoE Ministry of Education

No. Number

S. Section

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Art. Article

Anr. Another

S.G. State Government

para paragraph

HC High Court

Govt. Government

v. Versus

SOP Separation of power

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

1. Primary Sources
1.1 Cases
1. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355
2. Excel Wear v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC
3. Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. AIR 1993 SC 2178
4. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355
5. S. Ahmad v. State of Mysore AIR 1975 SC 1443
6. Ram Chandra Palai v. State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 298
7. India Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 515
8. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 1986 AIR 180
9. State of Bihar and others vs. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and others
AIR 2006 SC 535
10. Pharmacy Council Of India v. Rajeev College Of Pharmacy And Ors, 2022 (SC)
768
11. State of M.P. and Another v. Thakur Bharat Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1170
12. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. State of Maharashtra 2024 INSC
692.
13. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789
14. Dhulabhai v. State of M.P AIR 1969 SC 78
15. Rajasthan SRTC v. Bal Mukund Bairwa 2009(2) S.C.T. 244
16. Ramswarup v. Shikarchand A 1966 SC 893
17. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao AIR 2000 SC 2220
18. Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1993 (3) SCC 161
19. Ramesh Gobind Ram v. S.H.M. Waqf AIR 2010 SC 2897
20. Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd. v. Dy. Commr (1968) 1 SCR 260
21. Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani 2003(2) R.C.R.(Civil) 828
22. Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (1968) 3 SCR 662
23. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536
24. State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (2000) 3 SCC 689
25. Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v. Hukam Singh and Ors. 2002(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 690
26. Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala, AIR 2003 SC 2696

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27. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam AIR 1986 SC 794
28. State of U.P. v. Sanjay Kumar, 2012 (6) All LJ 746 (750)
29. Kachchh Jal Sankat Nivaran Samiti v. State of Gujarat, 2013 (9) SCALE 394
30. Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 4 MLJ
734]
31. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagavaru v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461
32. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299
33. State of West Bengal v. The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West
Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 1476
34. State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah 2000 AIR SCW 1180
35. In Re The Delhi Laws Act AIR 1951 SC 332
36. Madras Bar Assn. v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC
37. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC
38. L.Rs v. State of Tamil Nadu 2007 AIR SCW 611
39. L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India 1997 (3) SCC 261
40. S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sardanar (1997) 8 SCC 522
41. Gainda Ram & Ors. V. MCD and Ors.,JT 1993 (3) SC 396
42. Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 713
43. P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578
44. Union of India & Ors v. K. Pushpavanam & Ors., CIVIL APPEAL
NO.5049 ,2023
45. Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 54
46. State of Jammu and Kashmir v. A.R. Zakki, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 548
47. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481
48. Index Medical College, Hospital, & Research Centre v. State of M.P.,(2023) 11
SCC 570

1.2 List of Statutes

1. Constitution of Aryavarta,1950

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2. Civil Procedure Code,1908

3. General Clauses Act,1897

Secondary Sources

1.1.List of Books
 Constitution of Aryakarta,1950
 J.N Pandey-Constitutional Law
 MP Jain & SN Jain: Principle of Administrative Law 6th Edition 2013

1.2.Website and Articles Referred

1) Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com.
2) Lexis Nexis Academica, http://www.lexisnexis.com/academica.
3) Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal.
4) SCC Online, http://www.scconline.co.in.
5) Phiroza Anklesaria: Judicial Law Making-Its Strength and Weaknesses; (2012)
1 SCC J-25
6) https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-hears-case-of-delhi-
coaching-centre deaths/article68778092.ece#:~:text=The%20Supreme
%20Court%20had%20previously,with%20the%20lives%20of
%20students&text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20on%20Monday,students
%20studying%20at%20coaching%20centres
7) V. Sudhish Pai, Separation of Powers and the Judiciary in ‘Constitutional
Supremacy: A Revisit’ pp. 129-146 (Oakbridge; 2019)
8) Luis LÓPEZ GUERRA: The Judiciary and the Separation of Powers; CDL-JU
(2000) 21
9) Kohli, A Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Legitimacy, 5 (2) Comp.
Const. L. & Admin. L.J. 11 (2021)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

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The Petitioner in the matter at hand respectfully submits that the Hon’ble Court has
jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Under Article 1361, Constitution of
Aryavarta,1950

The Petitioner humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court of Aryavarta

THE PRESENT MEMORIAL PUTS FORTH THE FACTS , CONTENTIONS AND

ARGUMENTS IN THE PRESENT CASE

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1
136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1)Not withstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to
appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by
any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2)Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

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1. The Republic of Aryavarta is a democratic nation with a constitution designed to uphold

the ideals enshrined in its Preamble. This framework not only provides a foundation for
governance but also aims to guarantee fundamental rights and liberties for its citizens.
2. Aryavarta's Constitution is comprehensive, outlining key principles that guide the state.
Although it does not enforce a strict separation of powers, the branches of government
generally respect each other's functions. Notably, Art.50 calls for the separation of the
judiciary from the executive in public services, ensuring a degree of independence in
judicial matters.
3. The judiciary in Aryavarta operates independently, with the Supreme Court tasked with
interpreting the Constitution. A landmark judgment in 1973 established the "Basic
Structure" doctrine, which includes the principle of Separation of Powers. This doctrine
serves as a safeguard against any legislative or executive actions that may infringe upon
fundamental rights and the core structure of the Constitution.
4. IP Puram, the capital of Aryavarta, features a unique governance model characterized by
an elected Chief Minister and a nominated Lieutenant Governor. This dual leadership
structure has contributed to better infrastructure and has made the city a hub for students
seeking quality education.
5. The Aryavarta Public Service Commission (APSC) conducts highly competitive civil
service exams, attracting millions of applicants for a limited number of positions. This
rigorous selection process underscores the demand for government jobs and the high level
of competition among aspiring civil servants.
6. In response to the competitive nature of civil service exams, numerous coaching institutes
have emerged, particularly in the National Capital Territory of IP Puram (NCTIPP). These
institutions provide specialized training to help students prepare for the demanding
exams, significantly contributing to the influx of students in the region.
7. Despite the opportunities, many students lack a formal structure to support their
educational pursuits. They face challenges such as inadequate housing and poor quality of
education, leading to widespread grievances within the student community.
8. Protests organized by students have often been ineffective due to the absence of a unified
platform. Ongoing concerns about overcrowding and mismanagement in coaching
institutes have fueled discontent, but the lack of organization has hindered their
impact.Tragic incidents during the 2024 monsoon, including the electrocution of a student

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and severe flooding in a coaching center, brought these issues to the forefront, prompting
national outrage. These events highlighted the urgent need for reforms in the education
sector.
9. In the aftermath of these tragedies, student bodies urged the government to enact laws
aimed at preventing future incidents. This advocacy led to the introduction of the
"Coaching (Establishment, Administration and Management) Regulations, 2024," which
aimed to address the systemic issues within coaching institutions. The new regulations
established a "Coaching Tribunal" in each district to address disputes related to coaching
institutes. Furthermore, these regulations barred civil court jurisdiction over matters
concerning coaching institutions, streamlining the process for addressing grievances.
10. Coaching institutes expressed concern regarding the potential impact of these regulations
on their reputation and operations. They requested the government to reconsider the
regulations, emphasizing the need for stakeholder consultation to ensure a balanced
approach.The government maintained that the regulations served the interests of students
and were necessary for their protection. This led to the establishment of a single Coaching
Tribunal for NCTIPP, which began receiving numerous complaints from students and
other stakeholders.
11. In response to the new regulations, coaching institutions challenged their constitutionality
in the HC, arguing that they infringed upon their rights. This legal battle underscored the
ongoing tensions between educational institutions and regulatory bodies.
12. Interestingly, many students supported the regulations, asserting that they represented
reasonable restrictions aimed at safeguarding their rights and ensuring better educational
standards.
13. Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the petitions filed by coaching institutes, prompting
them to appeal to the SC. The SC decided to refer the matter to a Constitution Bench for
further consideration, highlighting the significance of the issues at stake.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1 WHETHER THE REGULATIONS IN QUESTION ARE VIOLATIVE

OF ARTICLE 19(1)(G) AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

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ARYAVARTA, IF YES, WHETHER THEY COULD BE SAID TO BE REASONABLE

RESTRICTIONS.

ISSUE 2 WHETHER THE REGULATION PROVIDING FOR THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COACHING TRIBUNAL AND OUSTING THE
JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND VIOLATED THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

ISSUE 3 WHETHER ANY DIRECTION/ORDER/WRIT COULD BE ISSUED BY

THE COURT TO THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A COMPREHENSIVE LAW
GOVERNING AND REGULATING THE COACHING INSTITUTIONS.?

ISSUE 4 WHETHER THE INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY OF PRIVATE

COACHING INSTITUTES, AS PRIVATELY-RUN EDUCATIONAL ENTITIES, ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FROM STATE INTERFERENCE, ENSURING
THEIR FREEDOM TO OPERATE WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE REGULATIONS IN QUESTION ARE VIOLATIVE

OF ARTICLE 19(1)(G) AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

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ARYAVARTA, IF YES, WHETHER THEY COULD BE SAID TO BE REASONABLE

RESTRICTIONS.

The petitioner contends that the Coaching Regulations, 2024 violate the fundamental right to
practice profession under Article 19(1)(g) by imposing arbitrary and excessive restrictions
without legislative backing. The regulation fails to conform to the Golden Triangle Rule of
the Constitution, infringing Articles 14, 19, and 21. It was enacted through executive fiat
without proper stakeholder consultation and overlooks the Act of God defense for recent
tragedies. The regulations are manifestly arbitrary and lack proportionality, making them
constitutionally unsustainable.

ISSUE 2. WHETHER THE REGULATION PROVIDING FOR THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COACHING TRIBUNAL AND OUSTING THE
JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND VIOLATED THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

The Petitioner submits that the regulations passed by the Ministry of Education establishing
the Coaching Tribunal and ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts are unconstitutional. Firstly,
complete exclusion of civil court jurisdiction cannot be justified without legislative backing,
as per Articles 323-A, 323-B, and Section 9 of the CPC, which affirm that such exclusion
must be expressly provided by the legislature, not executive regulations. Secondly, executive-
created tribunals with adjudicatory powers infringe upon judicial independence, violating the
principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Basic Structure Doctrine. Thirdly, the
impugned regulations curtail the High Courts' power of judicial review under Articles 226
and 227, which forms an essential feature of the Constitution. Lastly, the regulations
disproportionately burden litigants by limiting access to justice and centralizing dispute
resolution, further undermining the rule of law and constitutional balance. Therefore, the
regulations should be declared void as they violate the Basic Structure of the Constitution of
Aryavarta.

ISSUE 3 WHETHER ANY DIRECTION/ORDER/WRIT COULD BE ISSUED BY

THE COURT TO THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A COMPREHENSIVE LAW
GOVERNING AND REGULATING THE COACHING INSTITUTIONS.?

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It is humbly submitted that the Hon'ble Court cannot direct the legislature to enact laws as it
would violate the principle of separation of powers. Law-making is solely the function of the
legislature, while the judiciary is limited to interpreting and enforcing existing laws. Judicial
intervention in legislative matters would disturb the constitutional balance of power.
Furthermore, the diverse nature of coaching institutes makes uniform regulation impractical,
and any such law must be based on consultation with stakeholders to uphold the principles of
natural justice.

ISSUE 4 WHETHER THE INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY OF PRIVATE

COACHING INSTITUTES, AS PRIVATELY-RUN EDUCATIONAL ENTITIES, ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FROM STATE INTERFERENCE, ENSURING
THEIR FREEDOM TO OPERATE WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.

It is humbly submitted that private coaching institutes should enjoy constitutional protection
from excessive State interference, ensuring their autonomy and independence. The principle
of laissez-faire advocates minimal regulation, allowing these institutions to innovate and cater
to evolving educational needs. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State
of Karnataka,2 upheld the autonomy of private educational institutions. However, any
restrictions imposed by the State must pass the test of proportionality — being necessary,
reasonable, and the least restrictive means to achieve public welfare. Subordinate legislation
failing this test should be declared unconstitutional to uphold fundamental rights under
Article 19(1)(g).

2
(2002) 8 SCC 481

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THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE REGULATIONS IN QUESTION ARE VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLE 19(1)(G) AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
ARYAVARTA, IF YES, WHETHER THEY COULD BE SAID TO BE REASONABLE
RESTRICTIONS.

1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Constitutional Bench that the regulations
passed by the Ministry of Education providing for the regularization of the coaching
institutes are in violation of their fundamental rights to practise any profession, or to
carry on any occupation, trade, or business.

2. The Petitioner hereby submits the following contentions to support its argument-

First, Infringement of the right to practise any profession, occupation, trade or business.
[1.1]. Second, The law passed by the legislative and the law passed by the executive do not
confer the same meaning as per the Art.19(6). [1.2] Third, The establishment of coaching
institutes does not follow the master plan. [1.3]

[1.1] Infringement of the right to practise any profession, occupation, trade or business.

3. Article 19(1)(g) guarantees to all citizens the right to practise any profession or to
carry on any occupation, trade or business.3

4. The coaching institutes have the fundamental right to practice their profession freely
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution without being subjected to arbitrary or
excessive restrictions. While they are sympathetic towards the plight of students and
acknowledge the need to address genuine concerns, they firmly contend that one
isolated incident cannot serve as a pretext to bring the entire industry under suspicion
or regulatory control.

5. In Excel Wear v. Union of India,4 Court emphasized that while there may be greater
emphasis on nationalisation and state ownership of industries, private ownership of
industries is recognised; private enterprise forms an overwhelmingly large proportion

3
Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950
4
AIR 1979 SC at 36

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of India’s economic structure. A private undertaking is run for return to the owner not
only to meet his livelihood or expenses but also for the formation of capital for
growth of the national economy.

6. The Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., 5 commonly known as second
capitation fee case, observed that imparting of education was not and could not be
allowed to become commerce.

7. The Court, however, observed that the right to establish and administer educational
institutions might perhaps fall under the category of occupation provided no
recognition was sought from the State or affiliation from the University was asked on
the basis that it was a fundamental right.

8. Holding for the first time that the right to establish and administer educational
institutions "is occupation", was guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) to all citizens, the
Court ruled that the right could be regulated. But, such regulatory measures, the Court
said, "must in general, be to ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards,
atmosphere and infrastructure (including qualified staff) and the prevention of
maladministration by those in charge of management."6

9. A provision infringing Arts. 3017 and 3048, may, and ordinarily will, infringe Art.
19(1)(g) as well and so it can be challenged under Art. 19(1)(g).9

10. Article 301 is a mandatory provision and a law contravening the same is ultra vires,
but it is not a Fundamental Right and hence is not enforceable under Art. 32. But if
the right under Art. 19(1)(g) is also infringed.10

Any regulation enacted must align with the Golden Triangle of the Constitution.

11. In India Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,11 the Supreme
Court said that a piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of
immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. A

5
AIR 1993 SC 2178, at 2244
6
T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355
7
Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950.
8
Constitution of India,1950.
9
S. Ahmad v. State of Mysore AIR 1975 SC 1443.
10
Ram Chandra Palai v. State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 298
11
AIR 1986 SC 515

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subordinate legislation may be questioned under Article 14 on the ground that it is

unreasonable in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary."

12. The Golden Triangle Rule of the Constitution ensures that any law or regulation must
conform to Article 1412, Article 1913, and Article 2114. These three provisions
collectively act as a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary state action. For a
regulation to be valid, it must fulfill the requirements of equality, reasonableness, and
protection of life and livelihood.

13. The regulation in question infringes Article 14 as it subjects coaching institutes to

excessive and arbitrary control without any reasonable classification. The regulation
applies a blanket policy to all coaching institutes.The absence of intelligible
differentia renders the regulation manifestly arbitrary, as highlighted by the Supreme
Court in India Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,15 where
subordinate legislation was struck down for lacking reasonableness.

14. Further, the regulation violates Article 19(1)(g) by imposing arbitrary restrictions on
the coaching institutes' right to practice their profession. The regulation controls the
fee structure, operational procedures, and other business aspects without any statutory
backing or consultation with stakeholders.

15. Additionally, the regulation violates Article 21 by threatening the right to livelihood
of coaching institute owners. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,16 the
Court held that the right to life includes livelihood. Shutting down institutes without
alternative safeguards undermines the constitutional guarantee of life with dignity.

16. Therefore, the regulation fails the Golden Triangle Rule as it is arbitrary,
unreasonable, and detrimental to livelihood rights, making it constitutionally
unsustainable.

[1.2] The law passed by the legislative and the law passed by the executive do not
confer the same meaning as per the Art.19(6).

17. Art. 19(6) empowers the State to make any law imposing, in the interests of the
12
Constitution of Aryavarta,1950
13
Constitution of Aryavarta,1950
14
Constitution of Aryavarta,1950
15
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 287
16
1986 AIR 180

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general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of this right.17

18. Meaning of law under Art. 19(1)(g) does not include executive orders: Right to carry
on any occupation, trade or business is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) as
such, such restriction could have been imposed by enacting a law under Article 19(6)
of the Constitution of India by Parliament or the State legislature. Such conditions
could not have been imposed by executive fiat in exercise of power under Article
162.18

19. The question is directly answered by this Court in the case of State of Bihar and
others vs. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and others19 in paragraph 69, which
reads thus:

“69. ………. A citizen cannot be deprived of the said right except in accordance with
law. The requirement of law for the purpose of clause (6) of Article 19 of the
Constitution can by no stretch of imagination be achieved by issuing a circular or a
policy decision in terms of Article 162 of the Constitution or otherwise. Such a law, it
is trite, must be one enacted by the legislature.”20

20. The executive power of the State under Article 162 being only an executive power
and not a legislative power, anything done in exercise of executive power under
Article 162 does not become law under the Constitution.21

Act of God

21. The notion of "Act of God" is relevant when examining the unfortunate events that
prompted the establishment of regulations. It is argued that the incidents resulting in
student fatalities were caused by severe weather conditions—circumstances that were
outside the influence of the coaching institutes.The petitioner argues that it is unfair to
impose regulations in light of these occurrences.

22. The heavy rainfall and subsequent waterlogging, which led to the electrocution of
students and flooding of the basement library, were extraordinary natural calamities
beyond the control of the coaching institutes. It is argued that such unprecedented
17
MP Jain & SN Jain: Principle of Administrative Law 6th Edition 2013
18
Union Of India v. Moolchand Khairati Ram Trust, [2018] 7 S.C.R. 939
19
AIR 2006 SC 535
20
Pharmacy Council Of India v. Rajeev College Of Pharmacy And Ors, 2022 (SC) 768
21
State of M.P. and Another v. Thakur Bharat Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1170

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weather conditions were neither foreseeable nor preventable despite the adoption of
reasonable safety measures.

23. The Coaching Regulations, 2024 lack constitutional validity as they are issued
through executive fiat without backing of a parent statute, violating Article 19(6).
Additionally, the tragic incidents were Acts of God, making it unfair to penalize
coaching institutes for events beyond their control.

[1.3] The establishment of coaching institutes does not follow the master plan.

24. As per the Master Plan 202122 of Aryavarta, to open a coaching centre in a plotted
development area, the minimum road width should be 18 meters, while for raw
colonies, unauthorised regularisation (UR), and rural areas, the road width should be 9
meters.

25. The Coaching Regulations, 2024 lack backing from the Master Plan of Aryavarta,
which does not prescribe rules for coaching centres in residential areas. The
executive's interference is excessive as the regulations impose arbitrary restrictions
without aligning with urban planning laws. In mixed land use roads, running coaching
centres requires conversion charges and property tax at commercial rates, along with
compliance to building norms — a condition not accounted for in the impugned
regulations."23

26. The municipal authorities are primarily responsible for enforcing safety and building
regulations. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. State of Maharashtra,24
the Supreme Court held that municipalities must uphold public safety standards. Any
safety lapses, especially in the recent tragedies, should be attributed to the
municipality rather than the coaching institutes.

27. Additionally, It is put forth to the constitution bench of the apex court that the vital
role of stakeholder engagement in the development of regulatory frameworks. In the

22
Master Plan ,2021
https://dda.gov.in/sites/default/files/inlinefiles/Master_Plan_for_Delhi_2021_text_report.pdf
23
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-hears-case-of-delhi-coaching-centre-deaths/
article68778092.ece#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20had%20previously,with%20the%20lives%20of
%20students&text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20on%20Monday,students%20studying%20at%20coaching
%20centres
24
2024 INSC 692.

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case of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India,25 The Supreme Court determined that the
Constitution requires inclusivity and the incorporation of varied perspectives in
governance. The regulations were enacted without any formal consultation with
coaching institutes, resulting in arbitrary and inequitable provisions that fail to address
the actual challenges faced by these entities. This disregard for stakeholder
involvement undermines the principles of democratic governance and accountability.

ISSUE 2 WHETHER THE REGULATION PROVIDING FOR THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COACHING TRIBUNAL AND OUSTING THE
JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND VIOLATED THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

28. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Constitutional Bench that the regulations
passed by the MoE providing for the establishment of a Coaching Tribunal and
ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts was in violation of the principle of Separation
of Powers and hence, violated the Basic Structure of the Constitution of Aryavarta.

29. The Petitioner hereby submits the following contentions to support its argument-

First, complete ousting of civil courts' jurisdiction cannot be justified. [2.1]. Second,
Executive Regulation cannot infringe upon Judicial Independence. [2.2] Third, Certain
fundamental principles of the Constitution should not be altered. [2.3]

[2.1] Complete ousting of civil courts' jurisdiction cannot be justified.

Regulation enacted by the MoE is not backed by parent statute.

30. Articles 323-A and 323-B26: empower the legislature to create tribunals for specific
purposes, such as administrative disputes or matters related to trade and
commerce.These articles clearly state that such tribunals must be established through
legislation by Parliament or State Legislatures, not through executive regulations. In
this case, the Coaching Tribunal was established under Regulation 4.3, which lacks
legislative backing and is therefore invalid under Articles 323-A and 323-B.

25
AIR 1980 SC 1789
26
Constitution of Arayavarta,1950.

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31. S.9 of CPC, 190827 states that civil courts have the inherent jurisdiction to try all suits
of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred by law.This is based on the
principle ubi jus ibi remedium28.

32. Jurisdiction of the civil court to deal with civil causes can be excluded by the
Legislature by special Acts to deal with special subject-matters; but the statutory
provision must expressly provide for such exclusion, or must necessary and inevitably
lead to that inference.29 Hence, only the legislature can apply the outer clause, and the
executive lacks the authority to enforce such regulations without a parent statute.The
complete and absolute ousting of civil courts’ jurisdiction cannot be granted explicit
approval, as it fundamentally undermines the rule of law and access to justice.

33. This question has exhaustively been dealt with by the Constitution Bench (5 judges)
judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.30, In this
regard Supreme Court enunciated 7 points which were summarized in para. 32 of the
judgment which is quoted:-“The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed
in this Court may be stated as follows :-

(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's
jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil
courts would normally do in a suit.

……(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for
the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are
declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the
scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.

34. Further, in Rajasthan SRTC v. Bal Mukund Bairwa,31 a three-Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court observed: “There is a presumption that a civil court has jurisdiction.
Ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea
contra must establish the same. Even in a case where jurisdiction of a civil court is

27
S.9 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
28
Meaning: Where there is a right, there is a remedy.
29
Ramswarup v. Shikarchand A 1966 SC 893; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao AIR 2000
SC 2220
30
AIR 1969 SC 78; Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1993 (3) SCC 161; Ramesh Gobind
Ram v. S.H.M. Waqf AIR 2010 SC 2897
31
2009(2) S.C.T. 244 : (2), (2009) 4 SCC 299

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sought to be barred under a statute, the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction in
respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or tribunal acts
without jurisdiction.”32

35. Therefore, the imposition of a specialized tribunal with an exclusive jurisdiction

clause severely restricts the coaching institute’s ability to challenge regulatory actions
before established civil courts, curtailing their access to justice.

[2.2] Executive Regulation cannot infringe upon Judicial Independence.

Judicial Review and Independence of Judiciary

36. Article 1333 of the constitution mandates that the “state shall make no law, which
violates, abridges or takes away rights conferred under part III”. Under Article 50 34,
The Constitution implies that both the Legislature and judiciary in the spirit of the
words can make a law, but under the theory of checks and balances, the judiciary is
also vested with the power to keep a check on the laws made by the Legislature.

37. While there may be no strict water tight separation at least as between the legislature
and the executive, the judiciary is separated from the other two. Among the three
organs, the judiciary commands greater credibility and respect. 35 The Ministry of
Education’s decision to establish the Coaching Tribunal, an executive-created body
with adjudicatory powers, directly infringes upon judicial independence.

38. Judicial Review, in its most widely accepted meaning, is the power of courts to
consider the constitutionality of acts of other organs of government where the issue of
constitutionality is germane to the disposition of law-suits properly pending before the
courts.

39. In this context, the Coaching Regulations are being challenged for creating a
Coaching Tribunal that is empowered to exercise judicial functions traditionally held
32
Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd. v. Dy. Commr (1968) 1 SCR 260; Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani 2003(2)
R.C.R.(Civil) 828; Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (1968) 3 SCR 662; Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India,
(1997) 5 SCC 536; State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (2000) 3 SCC 689; Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v.
Hukam Singh and Ors. 2002(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 690 : (2002) 6 SCC 416; Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh
Chandra Agarwala, AIR 2003 SC 2696; State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam AIR 1986 SC 794
33
Constitution of Aryavarta,1950
34
Constitution of Aryavarta,1950
35
V. Sudhish Pai, Separation of Powers and the Judiciary in ‘Constitutional Supremacy: A Revisit’ pp. 129-146
(Oakbridge; 2019)

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by civil courts. These tribunals, established under Regulation 4.3, 36 have the power to
resolve disputes relating to the establishment, management, and functioning of
coaching institutions, with civil court jurisdiction ousted under Regulation 5.2.37

40. The petitioner contends that this delegation of judicial powers to an executive body,
rather than the judiciary, undermines the independence of the judiciary and is a direct
violation of the separation of powers principle, which is part of the Basic Structure of
the Constitution. The separation of powers ensures that the three branches of
government—executive, legislature, and judiciary—operate within their defined
spheres, preventing any one branch from encroaching on the functions of the others.
The creation of such tribunals by executive regulation, without legislative enactment,
is a clear violation of this principle.

Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

41. The creation of the Coaching Tribunal is at the heart of the challenge. These tribunals,
granting civil court powers, are intended to resolve disputes related to coaching
institutes and student grievances. However, by ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts,
the government has violated the separation of powers.

42. The concept of SOP creates a system of checks and balances by reason of which,
powers are so distributed that none of the three organs set up can become so pre-
dominant, so as to disable the others from exercising and discharging the powers and
functions entrusted to them.38

43. Separation of powers does not only mean that judges are independent; it also means
that the judiciary would effectively wield the power to review the legality, and
eventually the constitutionality of the acts of other public (and private) powers. 39

44. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah 40 reiterated that the judiciary
must remain independent from executive influence to uphold the rule of law. Any
36
p.12, 4TH FIMT MOOT COURT COMPETITION Moot Proposition.
37
p.13, 4TH FIMT MOOT COURT COMPETITION Moot Proposition.
38
State of U.P. v. Sanjay Kumar, 2012 (6) All LJ 746 (750) ;Kachchh Jal Sankat Nivaran Samiti v. State of
Gujarat, 2013 (9) SCALE 394; Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 4 MLJ
734] ; Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagavaru v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 ; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj
Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. ; State of West Bengal v. The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West
Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 1476.
39
Luis LÓPEZ GUERRA: The Judiciary and the Separation of Powers; CDL-JU (2000) 21
40
2000 AIR SCW 1180

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attempt by the executive to regulate the functioning of courts is an infringement on

the judiciary's autonomy and violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

45. The Supreme Court has the power to declare void the laws passed by the legislature
and the actions taken by the executive if they violate any provision of the Constitution
or the law passed by the legislature in case of executive actions.

46. The doctrine of separation of powers is not adopted in its absolute rigidity, but the
‘essence’ of that doctrine with the doctrine of constitutional limitation and trust
implicit in the scheme was duly recognized in the In Re The Delhi Laws Act.41

47. By establishing a tribunal to hear disputes involving coaching institutes, the

government has overstepped its executive role, thereby undermining judicial
independence. This could potentially create a precedent where the executive is
allowed to usurp judicial functions, undermining the fairness and impartiality of the
legal system.

48. The doctrine of Separation of Powers prevents any organ of the State from usurping
the function of another.Therefore, the tribunal constituted by the Regulation 4.3 42 and
Regulation 5.243 is ultra vires with the constitution and with the doctrine of separation
of power contained therein.

[2.3] Certain fundamental principles of the Constitution should not be altered.

Overview of the Doctrine of Basic Structure

49. The basic structure doctrine has arguably been the most important constitutional
development since the adoption of the Constitution of Aryavarta in 1950. The
doctrine postulates that certain basic features of the Constitution must prevail over
constitutional amendments, thereby rendering some features of the Constitution
unamendable. Conceptualising the basic structure doctrine as a tool for maintaining
constitutional legitimacy, therefore, becomes important. 44Later, in Minerva Mills v.
Union of India45It was expressly declared by the SC, that judicial review was part of
the basic structure.
41
AIR 1951 SC 332.
42
p.12, 4TH FIMT MOOT COURT COMPETITION Moot Proposition.
43
p.13, 4TH FIMT MOOT COURT COMPETITION Moot Proposition.
44
Kohli, A Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Legitimacy, 5 (2) Comp. Const. L. & Admin. L.J. 11 (2021)
45
AIR 1980 SC 1789.

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50. The Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,46 had laid down the
basic structure doctrine, whereafter any amendment made to the Constitution can be
struck down by the court on violation of the basic structure of the Constitution.
Further, it was observed that the “Separation of powers between the legislature,
executive and the judiciary is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, this
structure cannot be destroyed by any form of amendment.”

51. The doctrine of separation of powers was elevated to the status of a basic feature of
the Constitution in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain,47 “Basic structure is not a part of the
fundamental rights nor indeed a provision of the Constitution. The theory of basic
structure is woven out of the conspectus of the Constitution, and the amending power
is subjected to it because it is a constituent power.”48

52. The “basic features”, which were declared to be part of “basic structure”, inter alia,
are— (1) Supremacy of the Constitution; (2) sovereignty; (3) republican and
democratic form of Government; (3) federalism; (4) secularism; (5) separation of
powers; (6) independence of judiciary; and (7) judicial review, etc49

53. In the cases Madras Bar Assn. v. Union of India,50 and Supreme Court Advocates-on-
Record Assn. v. Union of India,51 it was held that “if a challenge is raised to an
ordinary legislation based on one of the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution, it would
be valid to do so”.52

54. IR Coelho (dead) by L.Rs v. State of Tamil Nadu,53 in which the nine-judge
constitutional bench have attempted to lay down the concrete criteria for the
application of the basic structure principle.54

46
(1973) 4 SCC 225
47
AIR 1975 SC 2299
48
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1 at para 691
49
Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 at para 116
50
(2014) 10 SCC 1. In this case of 5-Judge Bench, Justice J. S. Khehar, who authored the leading judgment,
held this view (see at para 109), while Justice Rohinton F. Nariman did not express any opinion on this point.
51
(2016) 5 SCC 1. It is to be noted that in this case of 5-Judge Bench, only Justice J. S. Khehar held this view
(see at para 381), while Justice Madan B. Lokur disagreed with this view (see at para 857). And Justice Kurian
Joseph and Justice J. Chelameswar did not express any opinion on this point.
52
Ibid. at para 381.
53
2007 AIR SCW 611
54
Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution: Doctrine of Constitutionally Controlled Governance: [From
Kesavananda Bharati to I.R. Coelho] by Virendra Kumar 49 JILI (2007) 365

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(3) The fourth rationale of the core concern of the basic structure doctrine is the ‘Judicial
Review’, which is its integral or inseparable part. In this sense, without judicial review, the
basic structure doctrine is simply inoperable or non-functional. One perspective of judicial
review operates as a part of the principle of separation of powers, effectuating the
mechanism of checks and balances.55

Violation of the basic structure by the Ministry of Education

55. Under the General Clauses Act, 1897, the definition of High Court is stated as:

“S.3 Definitions.—In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the
commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,
—........

(25):“High Court”, used with reference to civil proceedings, shall mean the highest Civil
Court of appeal (not including the Supreme Court) in the part of India in which the Act or
Regulation containing the expression operates;, deriving from the same, it can be concluded
that High Courts are Civil Courts.”

56. Therefore, it can be said that High Courts are civil courts. However, the Regulation
4.3 of the “The Coaching (Establishment, Administration and Management)
Regulations, 2024” bars the jurisdiction of all civil courts which can directly be
inferred with respect to putting a bar on the jurisdiction of the High Court and thus
violating its judicial independence.

57. The nature and extent of the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court and the
High Courts particularly in the context of the basic structure doctrine propounded by
the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati case56, the Supreme Court held in
L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India,57 is as follows:

“(1) The power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under
article 226 and in this court under article 32 of the Constitution was an integral and
essential feature of the Constitution consisting part of its basic structure.

….(8) The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the above approach would, while
protecting the power of judicial review of the High Courts under articles 226 and 227, also
55
I.R. Coelho
56
1973 4 SCC 225
57
1997 (3) SCC 261

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preserve jurisdiction of the tribunals not only to decide the service matters before them, but
also their power of judicial review in striking down ultra vires subordinate legislation and
unconstitutional legislative enactments.”

58. The Supreme Court in L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India,58 held that tribunals were
not equal to High Courts. It further held that decisions of tribunal should be
appealable before a bench of two judges in High Courts under whose jurisdiction the
tribunal falls. The theory that the tribunals could be a substitute for a High Court was
overruled in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India.59

59. In L. Chandra Kumar case60 The Supreme Court recognized the need for tribunals as
distinct from courts, but reiterated that no tribunal could really be a substitute of a
High Court. The MoE regulations, by ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts,
particularly High Courts, have a far-reaching impact on the constitutional fabric and
the accessibility of justice.

60. Further Complications: There are some far-reaching implications that if the
regulations is held to be constitutional the issue it sought to create:

(1) For a diverse country with vast geographical distances, requiring individuals to
approach the Supreme Court in Delhi imposes an immense physical and economic
burden, particularly for those from remote areas. This not only deters individuals from
seeking justice but also disproportionately affects the marginalized and economically
weaker sections of society.

(2) By bypassing the High Courts, the Supreme Court may be inundated with Special
Leave Petitions (SLPs) against tribunal decisions. This congestion would strain the
already overburdened calendar of the apex court, causing delays in the adjudication of
other crucial matters and affecting the overall efficiency of the judiciary.

(3) The High Courts’ power of superintendence under Article 227 61, a cornerstone of their
judicial authority, has been curtailed by these regulations. Before the 42nd
Amendment, Article 22762 granted High Courts supervisory jurisdiction over all

58
1997 (3) SCC 261
59
id
60
id
61
Constituion of Aryavarta,1950
62
Id. 37

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courts and tribunals within their territory. Stripping High Courts of this power not
only disrupts the constitutional balance but also deprives litigants of an accessible and
effective forum for addressing their grievances.

61. In conclusion, The complete exclusion of civil courts curtails access to justice and
violates the Basic Structure of the Constitution of Aryavarta. Therefore, the impugned
regulations should be struck down as void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE 3 WHETHER ANY DIRECTION/ORDER/WRIT COULD BE ISSUED BY

THE COURT TO THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A COMPREHENSIVE LAW
GOVERNING AND REGULATING THE COACHING INSTITUTIONS.

62. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Constitutional Bench that the court cannot
issue any direction/order/writ to the legislature to enact a comprehensive law
governing and regulating coaching institutions.

Framing laws is a complex process involving consultations, stakeholder engagement, and

policy formulation, which is beyond the judiciary’s institutional capacity.

63. Judicial law-making is not expected to interfere with legislation which is

enacted/framed by a vast body constitutionally constituted, having its own peculiar
problems of administration. It stands to reason that exercise of judicial law-making
liberally would amount to interference in administration, which would possibly
provoke frequent amendments to the Constitution and may even adversely affect the
stability of the Constitution and the day-to-day administration of the country. The very
best example of judicial review and judicial law-making by interpretation which
protected the Constitution and its basic features.63

64. Although enacting a law is the function of Parliament and state legislatures and even
if the Court were to address the correct authority, Courts in India have no authority to
direct the legislature to frame a law, let alone specify a time-period. This violates the
basic principle of “separation of powers”. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
and the High Courts have the power to protect fundamental rights and to interpret law.
The Constitution does not give power to Courts to direct the framing of a law.64

63
S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sardanar (1997) 8 SCC 522,Ramaswamy, J.
64
Gainda Ram & Ors. V. MCD and Ors.,JT 1993 (3) SC 396

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65. The power to legislate is given to the legislature and not to the judiciary. The judiciary
has only to ensure that the legislature does not exceed its bounds or limits and that the
legislation is largely in consonance with and certainly not contrary to or violative of
the provisions of the Constitution and its basic features and tenets.

66. Article 14165 of The Constitution of Aryavarta states that the law declared by the
Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of Aryavarta.
However, it does not grant the judiciary the power to legislate or mandate the
legislature to enact laws.

67. Additionally, Article 14266 of the Constitution of Aryavarta states that the Supreme
Court’s intervention should be limited to the interpretation and enforcement of
existing laws rather than compelling the legislature to enact a specific law.

68. Article 142(1) does not confer a fresh source of power to the Supreme Court for
creating new law nor does it create an independent basis of jurisdiction. The primary
function of Article 142(1) is to help effectuate Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution
of Aryavarta.

69. Aryavarta is ruled by legislation enacted by the legislature 67 and not by judicial law-
making, which is a power essentially to oversee the validity of the legislation and not
to substitute it. This view is borne out by the fact that the judges take oath that they
"will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of Aryavarta as by law
established". Judicial review is therefore an instrument intended to protect and
safeguard the Constitution and judges for that reason are aptly called "the watchdogs
of the Constitution.68

70. In Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India,69 the Supreme Court refused to issue a writ
directing the Government to frame a common civil code including Muslims or to give
directions regarding rights of Muslim women.

65
Constitution of Aryavarta,1950
66
Constitution of Aryavarta,1950
67
Constitution of Aryavarta,1950: Articles 245-246 r/w the Seventh Schedule
68
Phiroza Anklesaria: Judicial Law Making-Its Strength and Weaknesses; (2012) 1 SCC J-25
69
1994 Supp (1) SCC 713

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71. A seven-judge bench in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka,70observed that

“Courts can declare the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious
lacunae and fill the gaps but they cannot entrench upon the field of legislation,
properly meant for the legislature.”

72. In the recent case of Vidya Baliram Singh v. Sona Devi & Ors.71 The Supreme Court
said that "The Parliament, after considering every aspect, has come out with a new
enactment. In a writ jurisdiction, neither the high courts nor the Supreme Court can
direct the legislature to enact a law in a particular manner”.

73. Law regarding power of the writ court to issue a mandate to the legislature to legislate
is well settled. No Constitutional Court can issue a writ of mandamus to a legislature
to enact a law on a particular subject in a particular manner.72

74. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India,73 The question before the Bench was whether the court
could issue a writ of mandamus. It was observed that “It is not open to the Court to
issue writs in the nature of mandamus to the Central Government to bring a statute or
a statutory provision into force when according to the said statute, the date on which
it should be brought into force is left to the discretion of the Central Government.”
which was further reiterated in the case of Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India.74

75. The SC does not have the power to make laws. Primarily, the SC interprets and
applies existing laws, including the Constitution. It can declare a law unconstitutional
if it violates the provisions of the Constitution. However, the power to make laws lies
with the legislative branch of the government. The judiciary ensures that these laws
are interpreted and applied correctly and fairly.

76. It is also contended that no coaching institute is the same. They vary significantly in
size, scale, and nature of operation. Hence, imposing uniform standards through
regulations or a comprehensive law would fail to account for this diversity and create
practical difficulties. Small coaching institutes or individual tutors cannot reasonably
comply with the requirements envisioned by the regulation.

70
(2002) 4 SCC 578
71
(TRANSFER PETITION(S) (CRIMINAL) NO(S). 1026/2024
72
Union of India & Ors v. K. Pushpavanam & Ors., CIVIL APPEAL NO.5049 ,2023
73
Para 6, (1982) 1 SCC 271
74
(1988) 4 SCC 54; State of Jammu and Kashmir v. A.R. Zakki, para 11, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 548

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77. In Conclusion, The SC does not have the power to make laws. Any regulation or law
that imposes substantial restrictions on an industry must be based on consultation and
consensus, which was not done in this case. The government issued the regulation
without consulting key stakeholders, thereby violating principles of natural justice.

ISSUE 4 WHETHER THE INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY OF PRIVATE

COACHING INSTITUTES, AS PRIVATELY-RUN EDUCATIONAL ENTITIES, ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FROM STATE INTERFERENCE, ENSURING
THEIR FREEDOM TO OPERATE WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.

78. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Constitutional Bench that the independence
and autonomy of private coaching institutes should be constitutionally protected from
State interference and they should have a freedom to operate without legislative
control.

79. Laissez-faire refers to an economic philosophy that advocates for minimal

government interference in the economy.75 It suggests that private enterprises,
including coaching institutes, should operate freely. This allows institutions to adapt
their teaching methods and curricula to meet students' evolving needs, fostering
innovation and enhancing the quality of education. Competition among coaching
institutes can drive them to continually improve their services, leading to more
diverse and affordable educational offerings.

80. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 76, the Supreme Court recognized the
autonomy of private educational institutions to manage their affairs without excessive
State interference and that their independence is vital to educational excellence and
diversity.

81. The Supreme Court has ruled in Unni Krishnan,77 that establishing educational
institutions cannot be regarded as trade or commerce falling under Art. 19(1)(g).
Imparting education cannot be allowed to become commerce. Trade or business
normally connotes an activity carried on for a profit motive. Imparting of education
has never been regarded as commerce in the nation.

75
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/laissez-faire
76
(2002) 8 SCC 481
77
Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1993 SC 2178, at 2244

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82. Any challenge to restrictions imposed by the Government under Articles 19(2) to
19(6) are tested by Courts on the principle of proportionality. When legislation is
challenged on the ground that restrictions placed on the fundamental right is
disproportionate, the Court conducts a primary review where the State has to justify
the necessity of restricting the fundamental rights. Any challenge to restrictions
imposed by the Government under Articles 19(2) to 19(6) are tested by Courts on the
principle of proportionality. When legislation is challenged on the ground that
restrictions placed on the fundamental right is disproportionate, the Court conducts a
primary review where the State has to justify the necessity of restricting the
fundamental rights.78

83. Further, Subordinate legislation can be declared as unconstitutional on the principle of

proportionality. Proportionality involves balancing test and necessity test. The
"balancing test" relates to scrutiny of excessive onerous penalties or infringement of
rights or interest and a manifest imbalance of relevant considerations. Whereas, the
"necessity test" requires infringement of the fundamental rights in question to be by
the least restrictive alternative.79

84. In conclusion, private coaching institutes should be constitutionally safeguarded to

operate with autonomy, free from unnecessary State interference. Any restrictions
imposed by the State must adhere to the principles of proportionality, ensuring that
they are necessary, reasonable, and the least restrictive means to achieve a legitimate
public interest, thereby preserving the independence of these institutions while
balancing public welfare.

PRAYER

Therefore, in light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed and implode that the Hon‘ble Supreme Court of Indiana
may be pleased to:

78
Index Medical College, Hospital, & Research Centre v. State of M.P.,(2023) 11 SCC 570
79
ibid

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MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
 4th FIMT MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025

1. SAGAR SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR MURDER, GRIEVOUS, HURT AND

HURT UNDER SECTION 302, 324 AND 326 OF IPC.
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UDAY SHETTY AND SAGAR QUALIFIES AS
A MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP, MAKING VICARIOUS LIABILITY
APPLICABLE .
3. ARYAN AND LUCKY FOR THEIR ACTS SHOULD BE TRIED AS ADULTS
4. THE MISTAKEN BELIEF OF THE RESPONDENTS REGARDING THE
PRESENCE OF SUPERNATURAL ENTITIES DOES NOT PROVIDES GROUNDS
FOR IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 79 OF THE
IPC.

THE AND/OR

Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Place: S/d_____________
Date: XX/XX/XXXX PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

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MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER