A Century of Population Change with Regional Disparities in

South Korea: Application of Cohort-Component Analysis

Bumseok Chun

Texas Southern University

Jaebum Jun
Kangwon National University

Research Article

Keywords:

Posted Date: January 13th, 2025

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5790891/v1

License:   This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Read Full License

Additional Declarations: No competing interests reported.

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Abstract
South Korea's population has been experiencing a significant decline, raising concerns about potential changes in its
demographic structure and regional imbalances in the future. While the general trend of population decrease is evident, its
specific impact on spatial population patterns over the long term remains unclear. This study aims to examine the temporal and
spatial variations in population over the next 100 years with 17 regions, providing insights to inform long-term planning. For its
analysis, cohort-component modeling is utilized to forecast future populations with fertility and mortality rates as well as regional
net-migration estimated by Statistics Korea which is one of government organizations. The younger the age group, the faster the
population declines. The so-called 'super-aging era' has not yet been reached; it is projected to begin in earnest in about 20 years.
Additionally, apart from Seoul, the capital of South Korea, and its neighboring administrative region, Gyeonggi-do, regional
extinction is observed to start from areas farther away from these regions. Furthermore, it is predicted that 70 to 80 years from
now, the rate of population decline will decrease, leading to population stabilization. Results emphasize the urgent need for
strategic and practical, long-term regional planning and targeted policies to address the challenges posed by population decline
and regional disparities as highlighting significant demographic and spatial shifts in South Korea's population over the next
century.

1. Introduction
According to a recent World Population Day by United Nations (UN), the global population is steadily rising. It reached nearly
7.9 billion in 2021 and is projected to grow to approximately 8.5 billion by 2030, 9.7 billion by 2050, and 10.9 billion by 2100
(United Nations, 2024). Such an increase in population is influenced by interactive relationships of various factors. Fertility rates,
life expectancy, urban migration, along with health advocacy and environmental factors, all play a crucial role in influencing
population growth across the world. Although the decline in fertility rate is trending towards a lower growth rate due to socio-
economic change, population growth is still occurring.

The population in South Korea is sharply declining against the global trend of population increase. This is not just a current issue
but can be recognized as a unique phenomenon in South Korea that dates back to the past. According to the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a fertility rate of at least 2.1 is required to maintain the current population
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2023). However, Statistics Korea reported the fertility rate has been
below 2.1 since 1983, reaching a level of 2.06 (Statistics Korea, 2020). As its trend has continued, and now the fertility rate is
below 1, indicating a persistent low fertility rate (Oh & Kim, 2020). The government agencies are aware of this crisis and has been
continuously implementing policies such as child allowances, free education, and support for childcare since 2005. However,
these measures have not led to a rebound in the fertility rate. It may be due to various social and structural causes, such as the
increase in the proportion of highly educated individuals, the structure for economic activities, the rise in private education due to
an excessively education-oriented environment, housing structures, and the emergence of a culture of remaining single. These
diverse social issues are combining to rapidly change the population structure, leading to the background of extremely low
fertility rates in South Korea.

Despite diverse policy initiatives implemented by Korea Administration to address declining the fertility rate, most of them were
ineffective to setback it. Even in light of the failed government policies, we must re-evaluate the urgent need to boost our
population. Beyond the overall population decline, Korea is also grappling with severe regional imbalances as well as diverse
social issues. A large portion of the population is migrating to a few major cities, causing a rapid decline in the population of
many smaller cities and creating a significant regional disparity compared to metropolitan areas. It implies that the ongoing
population decline could eventually lead to the catastrophic disappearance of smaller cities and towns.

This study aims to comprehensively project future regional population over the next 100 years. To do so, we used cohort-
component modeling with population characteristics publicly distributed by Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS).
Furthermore, this analysis includes a scenario analysis exploring a potential increase in the fertility rate, assuming that
government policies for increasing the fertility rates are effectively addressing this issue. Our analysis, grounded in numerical
modeling, suggests that while there may be discrepancies between current statistical data and future actual figures due to the
assumptions made, the projection results indicate that South Korea's ongoing population decline will have a far more severe

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impact on society than currently anticipated. As a result, our findings demostrate a total population decrease to approximately
2 million with regional depopulation.

2. Previous Literatures
In South Korea, the main cause of this population decline is the decrease in the birth rate (Kim et al., 2019). According to the
report issued by National Statistical Portal in 2019, it narratives that the population decline in Korea would occur in 2024, and if
the working-age population decreases by 400,000 people per year and the elderly population aged 65 or older increases by
500,000 people per year, this would increase rapidly from the level in the early 2000s where 10 people in the working-age
population had to support 1 elderly person to the level in the future where 5 people would support 1 person. Despite variations in
the exact figures based on mathematical models, this trend is ongoing. Moreover, this phenomenon is bound to worsen over
time, and the increase in welfare costs for the elderly can lead to a decrease in national finances and a sharp increase in national
debt, which can have a negative impact on the national economy (Hwang, 2018; Lee, et. al, 2018).

The UN sets a total fertility rate of 2.5 or less as the standard for low birth rates, while advanced countries such as Europe and
the United States set a total fertility rate of 2.1. The global total fertility rate averaged 2.47 from 2015 to 2020, down about 44.8%
from 4.47 from 1970 to 1975 (Statistics Korea, 2019). In the case of Korea, the total fertility rate according to the ‘2020
Population Trend Survey Birth and Death Statistics’ is 0.84, the lowest figure since birth statistics were compiled in 1970
(Statistics Korea, 2022). The total fertility rate in Korea had been maintained at 1.17 in 2016, 1.05 in 2017, and then fell below 1
for the first time in 2018, recording 0.98, and has remained in the 0 range for the next three years (Chosun Ilbo, 2021). For this
reason, the Korean government anticipated that the population decline would begin earlier than previously expected. They moved
the projected start date from 2032 to 2029 in their 2019 population projections. This was a three-year shift from the 2032
prediction made in 2016. If the current trend continues, the expected population decline in 2029 might also be brought forward
(Statistics Korea, 2019, Kim, 2020a). Moreover, the Korean government at the time predicted the birth rate to be 0.86 in 2021 due
to the impact of COVID-19 (Kim et al., 2021), which is lower than the average total fertility rate = 1.63 and super-low fertility rate =
1.3 of the 37 OECD member countries, and is significantly lower than Japan (1.42), Greece (1.35), and Spain (1.26), which are
known as representative low-birth rate countries (Kim, 2021).

The government's efforts to encourage childbirth have not been successful, and this is considered a major factor in the declining
birth rate (Park et al., 2018). Since 2018, both federal and local governments in Korea have invested massive financial resources
in the form of expanding childbirth support funds and child allowances to overcome the low birth rate problem, but the
population decline trend has worsened further (Park et al., 2018). In addition, social and economic problems such as delayed
marriage due to excessively high housing prices and difficulty in finding employment are evaluated as the main causes of the low
birth rate. Aging is a phenomenon in which the proportion of the elderly population in the total population increases, and the
global aging phenomenon has occurred along with economic growth and the development of medical and scientific technology
(Kim, 2019).

Although the extension of life expectancy is desirable from an individual perspective, it means a decrease in the working-age
population, and the decrease in the working-age population due to the low birth rate is a threat to the sustainable growth of the
economy (Kim et al., 2021). The UN classifies a society as an “aging society” when the population aged 65 or older accounts for
7% or more of the total population, an “aged society” when it accounts for 14% or more, and a “post-aged society/super aged
society” when it exceeds 20% (Kim, 2020b). Germany and Japan entered a super-aged society in the mid-2000s, and most
developed countries such as France are experiencing an aging society. In the case of Korea, after entering an aging society in
2017, it is expected to enter a super-aged society around 2025. Compared to other countries which took about 30 years to
transition from an aging society to a super-aged society, Korea is entering it in just 8 years, which is very fast. In addition, the
aging process was accelerated as the baby boomers born between 1955 and 1963 entered the elderly population (Son et al.,
2020).

This generation played an important role in Korea's economic growth, and at the same time, they experienced an increase in life
expectancy due to medical technology, health and welfare benefits, and increased income levels. As of 2018, Korea's life
expectancy was 82.7 years, which is higher than the OECD average of 80.6 years (Seon, 2017), and the average life expectancy of

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the top 20% of income earners in 2014 was 83.7 years, which was 6.1 years longer than the bottom 20% (Kim et al., 2021). In
addition, the aging rate of Korea in the past 10 years (2011–2020) is about 1.7 times the OECD average, which is the fastest
among member countries, and the elderly poverty rate due to this is also 43.3% as of 2018, which is 3 times the OECD average of
14.8%. This is much higher than the United States (23.1%), Japan (19.6%), the United Kingdom (14.9%), Germany (10.2%), and
France (4.1%), showing a very serious elderly poverty rate (Korea Economic Research Institute, 2021).

According to Dent (2014) he argued that a decrease in the working-age population, 15–64 years old, and the core working-age
population, 25–49 years old, among the total population could cause a decrease in consumption and an economic crisis (Dent,
2014; Park, 2015). In the case of South Korea, the working-age population peaked at 37,596,000 in 2016 and has been decreasing
since then, while the core working-age population has been continuously decreasing since recording 21,011,000 in 2008
(National Statistical Portal, 2019). When the working-age population capable of economic activity decreases, consumption
naturally decreases, resulting in a ‘consumption cliff’ and a very high possibility of a ‘demographic onus’ in which economic
growth slows down. In other words, due to the decrease in the working-age population and the increase in the elderly population,
the labor force and productivity decrease, and the ability to consume and save also decreases. If the previous economy was
beneficial from the growth of the working-age population, now the population decline is emerging as the cause of economic
crisis and serious social problems (Seon, 2017). When the population decline begins, it will enter a structural low-growth phase
due to economic problems such as production, consumption, employment, and investment.

Since population is the basis for providing labor and product consumption, the decrease in the productive population due to low
birth rate and aging affects macroeconomic variables such as GDP, total factor productivity, labor, and investment, which has a
negative impact on economic growth (Lee, 2012; Kim & Hwang, 2017). In other words, the decrease in the working-age
population increases the proportion of capital and lowers marginal productivity, thereby reducing investment. In addition, the
decrease in the number of workers reduces earned income and lowers the savings rate, which in turn causes a decrease in
capital income, resulting consumption, and GDP (Modigliani F, 1986). At the national level, it also causes a rise in the debt ratio
and interest rates, which reduces finances, savings, private investment, and capital accumulation, and raises tax rates, which has
a negative impact on economic growth. In this way, population decline causes economically weakened national competitiveness,
a decrease in GDP, slowdown in growth, and decreased consumption, and socially, it will cause generational conflict, pension
depletion, school closures, a decrease in defense resources, the disappearance of local cities, a sharp drop in real estate prices,
and a labor shortage. Therefore, social and economic problems caused by population decline are real issues that we are
currently facing, and systematic preparations are needed to proactively respond to them.

In sum, while there has been ample research on short-term population decline and policy directions, there is a significant gap in
understanding the long-term implications of continued population decrease. Specifically, there is a need for more research on
how population distribution will change under current trends and how this will exacerbate existing social issues, such as regional
disparities. Such research would undoubtedly serve as a stark reminder of the severity of population decline and highlight the
inadequacies of current population growth policies.

3. Research Methodology
For population forecasting, this study used the cohort-component model. As one of projection techniques for population change
in the future, the cohort-component model can be applied to project populations disaggregated by gender and age groups with a
specific time interval (Klosterman, 1990). In the model, three components, −fertility rate, survival rate, and net-migration−, are
required to explore population change from the baseline population. With them, this model can project the numbers of fertility,
mortality, and net-migration trends as well. In addition, the cohort-component model has been widely used to project future
population in different geographical areas at a time. By incorporating three components with net-migration information publicly
distributed by Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), this study extrapolated future population changes, especially over
the next 100 years.

To do so, two cohort matrices, one for male population and the other for female population, were developed with 17 age groups
based on five-year age intervals. The first age group included population between 0 and 4, and the 17th age group included the

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population aged 80 and above. In the case of geographical boundaries, 17 different administrative districts in South Korea were
adopted to project local population change. See Figure (1).

Below shows how to set up the cohort-component model for this analysis. CM,i and CF,i in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) represent matrices
to separately project the male and female population sizes at an administrative district, i, per fertility rate, f, and survival rate, s,
which is estimated by 1− mortality rate. As each administrative region has its own corresponding CM,i and CF,i, there are
essentially 17 pairs of matrices in existence. CM,i and CF,i are applied to first predict the population per gender, and then the
results are adjusted using net-migration with Eq. (3) and Eq. (4). Lastly, as summing them up, total population can be projected
with Eq. (5).

0 0 ⋯ 0 0
⎡ ⎤

⎢ s1 0 ⋯ 0 0 ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ 0 s2 ⋯ 0 0 ⎥
CM ,i = ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ 0 0 ⎥
0 0 ⋱
⎣ sc−1 sc ⎦
0 0 0

C M,i =cohort matrix for male at a district, i,; s = survival rate, c = age cohort (in this study, c = 17)

f f ⋯ f f
⎡ 1 2 c−1 c ⎤

⎢ s1 0 ⋯ 0 0 ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
0 s2 ⋯ 0 0
CF , = ⎢ ⎥
i ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ 0 0 ⎥
⎢ 0 0 ⋱ ⎥

⎣ sc−1 sc ⎦
0 0 0

C F, i =cohort matrix for female; f = fertility rate

PM = CM PM 0 + N MM

P M =male population; PM0=male population in base year; NMM=net migration for male population

PF = CF PF 0 + N MF

P F =female population; PF0=female population in base year; NMF=net migration for female population

P = PM + PF

Furthermore, this study projects the population trend over the next 100 year to build up a foundation for appropriate responses to
many issues, such as policy making, economic strategies, environmental assessment. To do so, we expand Eq. (5) as the bases
with year 2022 to predict population changes by age and district over a 100-year period until 2122, repeating Eq. (6) at 5-year
intervals. For example, assuming P0 is the population in the base year, P1 is the predicted population 5 years after P0, and P2 is
the population 10 years after P0, or 5 years after P1. Eq. (7) generalizing Eq. (6) is used to project future population for long-term
trends. To apply for this approach, we used Python scripts.

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 P1 = CP0 + N M

P2 = CP1 + N M

2
= C P0 + (C + I ) ∙ N M

n n−1 n−2
Pn = C P0 + (C + C + … + C + I) ∙ N M

n = nth interval later, based on a unit of years. For example, the population is projected in 5-year intervals, so to predict 100 years
into the future, n = 20.

4. Data
Data inventory distributed by Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) was used to build cohort-component matrix and
obtain net-migration data. KOSIS provides a service that gathers all statistical data in one place, making it easy to find statistics
regarding all types of population characteristics. As expected, this service offers essential data for cohort models, such as
fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration rates, categorized into various entities, age or geographical location. We employed
data in 2022, based on the male and female population organized into 5-year age intervals and divided into 17 regions. The
reason we used 2022 as the base year is that it provided the most recent data released after the COVID-19 pandemic, which may
have unexpectedly impacted population trends. Thus, our assumption is that population data from 2022 were less affected by
the pandemic, making them more suitable for generalization.

Maps in Fig. 1 illustrates the spatial pattern of each component to implement a cohort-component matrix. It is easy to
understand that both male and female populations are concentrated in Seoul, a capital of South Korea, and Gyeonggi-do,
surrounding Seoul, approximately 45% out of total population in South Korea, through Fig. 1(a) and 1(e). This proves that South
Korea is currently facing regional imbalance. This is based on the total population rather than population density, so if analyzed
by population density, it would predict that a higher population is concentrated in Seoul which is smaller than Gyeonggi-do.
Interestingly, despite Seoul's total population being very high compared to other regions, the fertility rate for newborns in Fig. 1(b)
is relatively very low. Seoul offers diverse economic and cultural activities, leading high population density; however, the high
living expense and high population density lead to intense competition among residents, which may put pressure on them to
delay having children, even having no children under the pressure of such environments (Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani, 2019).
Figure 1(c) and 1(f) present low mortality rates for both female and male population, respectively. Net-migrations in 2022 are
illustrated in Fig. 1. Remarkably, the number of people migrating into Seoul is significantly higher than the number of people
migrating into other areas. Especially, female population show a higher rate of inflow into Seoul compared to male population.

Figure 2 shows the cohort patterns of components in 2022 for population projection. The population of individuals aged 40–60 is
relatively higher compared to other age groups. It implies that the elderly population is expected to increase in the next 20 to 40
years. For the averaged fertility rate, fertility rates are high among people in their 30s. In general, the age group with the highest
fertility rate is typically from the late 20s to the early 30s. South Korea's fertility rate has been steadily declining, and it is now at a
very low level, with only 0.78 live fertility per woman. (Roser, 2024). In addition, assuming that half of the total fertility rate of 0.78
represents female births, it is projected that the fertility rate will continue to decline in the future. While mortality rates typically
show a higher proportion among the elderly, improvements in medical and welfare systems have been reducing this proportion
(Reynaud & Miccoli, 2019).

5. Results
Figure 3 represents the total population projection for each 5-year age group, without regional classification. The younger the age
group, the faster the population decreased, approaching and stabilizing around a specific population number. For example, the

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0–4 age group was projected to decrease rapidly, with its population expected to be around 17% of the current level,
approximately 251,970, in 5 years and about 1% of the current level in 70 years, that was 16,860. Its projection drove a significant
impact not only on this age group but also on the population of other age groups. The decrease in the population of the 0–4 age
group was evident immediately based on current trends, whereas the decline in populations of older age groups appeared to be
delayed. Interestingly, a population increase was projected for the 70–74 age group over the next 5–10 years, for the 75–79 age
group over the next 15 years, and for those aged 80 and above over the next approximately 30 years. It implied that as the age
group increased, the stabilization of the population decline appeared to be delayed. The continuous increase in the population of
individuals aged 80 and above over the next 40 years suggests the need for new social welfare and social structural changes to
address and mitigate the anticipated challenges. While issues related to the aging society, we currently face are being raised, Fig.
3 demonstrates that we will confront an even more severe aging society in the future.

Figure 4 shows that population decline has a significant impact on the population structure. In 2012, the population distribution
by age is based on a bell-shaped curve, indicating a high concentration of working-age individuals, aged 20 to 60. However, the
decline in birth rates has shown a significant impact on the population structure over time. The elderly population has increased
markedly, while the younger population is rapidly decreasing. These changes in population structure could pose significant
challenges for the various social welfare policies currently in place. For example, this distribution is well-suited for policies that
ensure retirement security referred to as pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems that the pensions for current retirees are
financed by the taxes or contributions made by today's workers. For example, social security fund in the United States, National
Pension System in South Korea, Europe Pension System have been under such system (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development. (2023); National Pension Service. (n.d.).; Social Security Administration. (n.d.)). Such changes in population
structure may later lead to a shortage in pension funds, which can also cause various issues due to the lack of funds. This
creates potential problems for the sustainability of current policies.

Figure 5 shows the results of population projection by each district. Gyeonggi-do and Seoul had significantly higher populations
than other regions. In 2022, Gyeonggi-do represented about 26% of the total population and Seoul held an 18% share of the total
population, respectively. This figure indicates that a large portion of the population is currently concentrated in these two regions.
Such a fact has historically influenced various social environments, providing a cause of regional imbalance (Won & Lee, 2020).
According to cohort modeling, the population in Gyeonggi-do was showing a decreasing trend. Its result indicates that Gyeonggi-
do's population is gradually decreasing. Despite Gyeonggi-do having a larger population than Seoul at present, it was projected to
fall below Seoul's population by 2102, resulting in a shift. While further research is needed to understand why this trend is
inferred, it could be attributed to the fact that Seoul, as the capital of South Korea, will continue to play a central role in
economics, culture, and education in the future, under the assumption that Seoul will keep current status in all aspects.

Table 1 summarizes population change per each district in both 2022 and 2122. In 2122, Seoul's population was projected to be
approximately 45% of the total population, while Gyeonggi-do was expected to have around 26% of the total population residing
there. However, comparing the populations of 2022 and 2122, a significant decrease was expected as we already discussed in
Fig. 4. It is projected that Seoul will experience a population decrease of approximately 89%, while Gyeonggi-do will see a
decrease of about 96%. In addition, population in all regions was projected to decrease by more than 85%. In particular, the
modeling projections suggest that a few cities might be nearly abandoned. From the % change rate, it can be inferred that
regions with a population decrease of more than 99% are located far from Seoul and Gyeonggi-do. This highlights the potential
for serious challenges in sustaining local communities in the future and strongly suggests the need to develop proactive
solutions to address this issue.

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 Table 1
Summary of population change per each district
District Population 2022 (%) Projected population Change rate

2122 (%)

Seoul 9,421,415.00 (18) 995,603.01 (45) -89%

Busan 3,303,196.00 (6) 41,038.69 (2) -99%

Daegu 2,371,593.00 (5) 15,673.54 (1) -99%

Incheon 2,975,225.00 (6) 126,812.27 (6) -96%

Gwangju 1,469,502.00 (3) 16,240.11 (1) -99%

Daejeon 1,472,473.00 (3) 51,003.32 (2) -97%

Ulsan 1,113,508.00 (2) 5,810.15 (0) -99%

Sejong 380,410.00 (1) 52,795.44 (2) -86%

Gyeonggi-do 13,689,761.00 (26) 568,664.69 (26) -96%

Gangwon-do 1,527,211.00 (3) 52,384.45 (2) -97%

Chungcheongbuk-do 1,623,079.00 (3) 59,744.78 (3) -96%

Chungcheongnam-do 2,185,996.00 (4) 105,886.64 (5) -95%

Jeollabuk-do 1,777,197.00(3) 17,312.19 (1) -99%

Jellanam-do 1,775,012.00 (3) 30,099.19 (1) -98%

Gyeongsangbuk-do 2,625,507.00 (5) 30,194.18 (1) -99%

Gyeongsangnam-do 3,286,961.00 (6) 18,101.47 (1) -99%

Jeju-do 674,523.00 (1) 27,155.16 (1) -96%

Total Population 51,672,569.00 (100) 2,214,519.28 (100) -96%

Finally, Fig. 6 illustrates population projection by district with age cohorts. Each block shows the population changes for that
area, with the top of the block representing the youngest age cohort (0–4) and the bottom of the block representing the oldest
age cohort (80+). Black represents higher population, while white represents lower population. It visually supports that the
population of Seoul and Gyeonggi-do is higher than that of other regions, and it predicts that the proportion of elderly people will
start to quickly increase around 2040, continuing this trend for approximately 40–50 years. This is predictable given the current
population pyramid structure, where declining birth rates are reducing the number of children. As the age group occupying the
middle of the pyramid shifts towards the elderly, it is natural that the elderly population will rapidly increase in the future, leading
real super-aged society.

6. What-if scenario analysis

As mentioned earlier, the government is implementing many policies to compensate for the declining population. This study
asked how the future population decline predicted by the cohort model would change if certain policies affected the population
structure. Among three components of the cohort-component modeling, we assume that the component that can be addressed
through policy is the fertility rate. The mortality rate is not easily managed through policy as it heavily depends on individual
health conditions and various social environments. Domestic migration rates can influence balanced development by addressing
regional imbalances, but they do not determine the total population because their total sum is always zero. Of course, the fertility
rate is also significantly influenced by socio-economic factors, making them difficult to control. However, it is the only one that
has a potential for control if social and environmental conditions are shaped and changed. Thus, this study simulated how the
population would change if the current fertility rate increased by 20% until it doubled, reaching 100%.

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Figure 6 visually illustrates the result of the what-if scenario analysis. All five scenario results have the S-shaped pattern close to
the original data. Although there is a slight increase in the population as the fertility rate rises, the change is not significant.
Table 2 shows the changes in projected population based on scenarios of fertility rate changes in the year 2122. A 20% increase
in the fertility rate resulted in a 12% increase in population, 40% led to a 25% increase in population, 60% resulted in a 40%
increase, 80% caused a 55% increase, and a 100% increase in the fertility rate corresponds to a 72% projected increase in the
population for 2122. This demonstrates that the population does not necessarily increase proportionally to the increase in
fertility rate in the future because its current rate is extremely low. This study analyzes population trends arithmetically, so there
may be errors present. However, it is not expected that these errors will significantly impact the changes in the population.

Table 2
Population variation in 2122 based on fertility change rate
Fertility change rate Projected population in 2122 Population change

No Change 2,214,519 −

20% increase 2,481,503 + 12%

40% increase 2,773,653 + 25%

60% increase 3,091,154 + 40%

80% increase 3,436,704 + 55%

100% increase 3,813,745 + 72%

7. Discussion
The purpose of this study is to analyze how the population will change in the future and how it will affect different regions,
assuming that the long-term trend of low birth rates and its worsening conditions will continue arithmetically similar to the
current situation. The Korea government has proposed and discussed numerous policies regarding population decline, but has
yet to find any practical solutions. Of course, childbirth is a highly personal matter, and it is not something that a third party can
interfere with. We should focus on creating a social atmosphere that emphasizes that childbirth is not a problem in individuals'
lives, rather than encouraging childbirth through policy measures. However, we can also consider whether low fertility rates are
necessarily a negative thing (Lee & Mason, 2014). Lee and Mason explained that a decrease in population could lead to a higher
standard of living in terms of quality of life. In the point of fiscal support ratio, high fertility rates may induce paying little in taxes
and receiving more beneficiaries such as education and child care supports, leading low fiscal support ratio.

Additionally, this study also predicts how severely the aging population, along with low birth rates, will impact the future.
According to Statistics Korea (2022), As of 2022, the proportion of the population aged 65 and older in South Korea is 17.5%.
This proportion is expected to continue to rise, reaching 20.6% by 2025, thus transitioning into a super-aged society. By 2035, it is
projected to be 30.1%, and by 2050, it is expected to exceed 43%. An even more serious issue is that this situation is expected to
continue for about 50 more years beyond 2050, and it will become even more severe due to the low birth rate. Of course, if the
birth rate increases, there is potential for improvement, but given the current trends, it is difficult to make positive predictions with
Fig. 6 and Table 2.

8. Conclusion
This study discussed population decline in South Korea, which is one of serious social challenges, going against global trends.
By the cohort-component modeling with an assumption that its three components, −fertility rate, survival rate estimated by
morality rate, and net-migration−, had no significant changes, we forecasted that population would continuously decline over next
100 years, driven by persistently low fertility rates. In addition, such a trend accompanied worsening regional imbalances.
Despite government efforts at both federal and regional levels, the current short-term policy approach has not succeeded in
reversing these trends. In particular, South Korea consistently ranks among the countries with the lowest fertility rate over the
world. We should also consider alternative economic and social strategies to mitigate the effects of population aging led by low

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fertility rate. Furthermore, we revealed that the decline in population would drive more severe regional imbalances. Our research
underscored the importance of integrating its long-term trends into policy-making to address the complexities of population
dynamics. Ultimately, it is noteworthy that these demographic shifts should be prepared for sustaining South Korea’s economic
and social well-being for future generation.

Declarations
Author Contribution
Bumseok Chun wrote the main manuscript and conducted demographic and geographic analysis and both Jaebum Jun and
Bumseok Chun designed research methodology.

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Figures

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Figure 1

Spatial patterns of components for population projection:

(a) total female population; (b) averaged fertility rate with female; (c) averaged female mortality rate; (d) total number of female
net-migration; (e) total male population; (f) averaged male mortality rate; (e) total number of male net-migration

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Figure 2

Cohort patterns of components in 2022 for population projection:

(a) total population (millions), (b) averaged fertility rate, (c) averaged mortality rate

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Figure 3

Population projection by cohort over the next 100 years (unit: millions)

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Figure 4

Age distribution over time: (a) Year 2022, (b) Year 2072, (c) Year 2122

Figure 5

Population projection by each district over the next 100 years (unit: millions)

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Figure 6

Heatmap for population projection by district with age cohorts over the next 100 years

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Figure 7

Figure 6. Results of the what-if scenario analysis by fertility change rate

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