But do all mental states in fact dis-

play intentionality? That is, do they

have an object they are about?
Many think that sensations don’t
seem to have a content in this way.
Worse, there seem to be genuinely
physical things that do display inten-
tionality. Linguistic objects such as

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words and sentences have it, for
example: the sentences you are
hearing are purely physical objects,
they are sounds, or vibrating air molecules, and yet insofar as they are mean-
ingful there is something they are about.
Intentionality is clearly an important property, but more has to be said—and
will be, in later lectures—before it will serve as a clear way of demarcating the
physical from the mental.
Conclusion
We began by exploring various paradigm examples of physical and mental
[Link] then asked just what it is, exactly, that distinguishes the mental from
the [Link] examined a variety of candidate criteria. Although all are of
some use, none of them are criteria such that all mental things have them, and
no physical things, or vice [Link] remains unclear, in other words, is
whether we can obtain a single, unifying concept of the mental—a single thing
that all mental states share, and all physical things lack.
Nevertheless, what emerges is that what we called “qualia” and “intentionality”
are extremely important phenomena that will provide much of the subject
matter of our course.

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 FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions
1. Are there important examples of “mental” entities or phenomena beyond
those discussed in the lecture?
2. Does the inability to provide “complete” criteria for distinguishing the men-
tal from the physical mean we really don’t have a clear idea of what the
mind is? If so, is that a problem?

Suggested Reading
Ludwig, Kirk. “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview.” The Blackwell Guide to
Philosophy of Mind. Eds. Stephen P. Stich and Ted [Link]. Chapter 1,
pp. 1–46. Oxford:Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2003.

Other Books of Interest

Dennett, Daniel C. Chapter 2:“Explaining Consciousness.” Consciousness Explained.
Boston, MA: Back Bay Books,1992.
Descartes, René. “Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Meditation 2.”
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Ed. David J. Chalmers.
New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.

Websites of Interest
[Link] Scientific American website provides an article entitled “The Mind-Body
Problem:What Does It Feel Like to Have Too Many Arms?” by Moheb
Costandi (April 14, 2009). —
[Link]
identity-disorder
2. The BBC website provides a discussion of the mind-body problem from
their In Our Time program (January 13, 2005). —
[Link]

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 Lecture 2
Dualism
The Suggested Reading for this lecture is René Descartes’s
“Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Meditation 2” in
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited
by David J. Chalmers.

“The senses deceive from time

to time, and it is prudent never
to trust wholly those who
have deceived us even once.”
~René Descartes, 1641

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Introduction
We now begin with our first major theory or doctrine concerning the rela-
tionship between mind and body.
Basic Positions: Dualism and Its Competitors
Dualism: the mind is completely separate from the body or brain, and is
entirely non-physical in nature.
Physicalism (or Materialism): ultimately only physical or material things exist.
Idealism: ultimately only mental things exist.
Idealism has a vigorous history in philosophy, but the major debate these days
is between Dualists and Physicalists.
Two Varieties of Dualism
Substance Dualism: there are two basic types of things or objects in the world.
Property Dualism: there are two basic types of properties in the world.
Property Dualists hold that while mental properties are different than physi-
cal properties, the very same thing or object—say, the physical brain—can
have both. One need not hold that in addition to the brain there also exists
the “mind,” as a substance or thing.
In contrast, Substance Dualism insists that mental properties are different
from physical properties precisely because the things that have mental proper-
ties—minds—are very different from the things that have physical properties,
such as bodies and brains. Minds and bodies are literally very different sub-
stances altogether.

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 Nowadays, most Dualists are Property Dualists, but the traditional form of
Dualism, which still does sway many people today, is Substance [Link] is
the position of the great French thinker René Descartes (1596–1650).
Cartesian Substance Dualism
The basic idea is simple: that minds and bodies, in particular brains, are totally
different sorts of things or [Link] makes them “distinct” is that they
can exist independently of each other, even if, during our lives, they exist
simultaneously and “depend” on each other in various ways. Moreover, they
are characterized by very different properties. According to Descartes, the
defining property of “matter,” or “body,” is its spatiality: everything physical has
properties such as size, shape, and a location. In contrast, minds have no spatial
properties and are not even located anywhere in space; their defining proper-
ty is simply “thought.”
Roughly, a mind is that which is conscious and is subject to having qualia and
intentional states.
Six Arguments for Substance Dualism
Argument from Religion
Any religious believer must take this argument very seriously. All the major
Western religions accept that an individual may continue existing after the
death of his or her body. But then the individual must be more than just his or
her [Link] additional thing is the mind.
Argument from Dreams and Afterimages
We began Lecture 1 by suggesting that afterimages were neither outside nor
inside the physical head, and thus existed “in the mind.” We can now generalize
this to other phenomena, such as dream images. Suppose, in a recent dream,
you were enjoying a cool beverage on a hot sandy beach with the person of
your choice. In reality, we may suppose, you were in your bed alone in the mid-
dle of a freezing winter night, with no sand in sight. Now ask yourself, just what
was it you were perceiving in this dream? Not any physical objects, because
none of those physical objects are there to be
perceived. Nor would a brain surgeon find any
such images in your [Link] dream images,
too, must exist only in the mind—and the mind
must be different from the brain.
Argument from Introspection
Think about something physical, such as your
[Link]’re pretty clear about what it’s like to
be “thinking of” or “aware of” this object. But
now introspect a little—that is, think about
your thoughts themselves, or about your self,
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the you who is doing your [Link] we’re

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 aware of in thinking about the brain is different from what we’re aware of in
thinking about our thoughts or our self—because the brain is itself different
from the latter.
Argument from Defining Properties
According to Descartes, the defining property of a physical body is that it
is spatial in nature, while the defining property of mind is “thought.” But
now if body and mind have different defining properties, they must be two
different things.
Argument from Conceivability
Descartes writes:
First, I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is
capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my
understanding of it. Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctly
understand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certain
that the two things are distinct, since they are capable of being separat-
ed, at least by God . . . [Now] on the one hand I have a clear and dis-
tinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-[spatial]
thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as
this is simply [a spatial], non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain
that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it (“6th
Meditation,” Chalmers, 2002, p. 16).
There’s a lot going on here, but the basic idea is this:Whatever I can clearly
and distinctly conceive of as being separate or separable is in fact capable of
existing independently of each other. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of
mind and body as being separable; therefore they are capable of existing inde-
pendently of each [Link] they are two different things.
And on what basis, exactly, does Descartes think we can conceive of mind
and body as being separable? Answer: our concepts of each of them, as we
saw in argument four (defining properties), are very different concepts.
Argument from Inexplicability
Certain mental phenomena, it is claimed, cannot be adequately explained by
purely physical science; therefore there are irreducible mental entities or
properties. Descartes himself noted two such phenomena: the first was our
mastery of language, the second was our ability to think generally, or use “rea-
son.” It follows, he believed, that there must be more to us than our purely
physical bodies—we must also have minds. Nowadays, proponents of this
argument focus on various aspects of consciousness.
Brief Reflection on the Arguments for Substance Dualism
These arguments come from a lot of different [Link] makes for a lot
of ammunition for Substance Dualism and means that the position must be
taken extremely seriously.
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