Stereo.
H C J D A-38
JUDGMENT SHEET
IN THE PUNJAB SUBORDINATE JUDICIARY
SERVICE TRIBUNAL LAHORE
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Service Appeal No.06 of 2022
Dr. Syed Ali Sana Bokhari
Versus
Chief Justice and Judges of the Lahore High Court /
Authority through the Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore
JUDGMENT
Date of hearing: 14.03.2025.
Appellant by: M/s. Taffazul Haider Rizvi, Haider
Ali Khan and Beenish Sikander,
Advocates.
Respondent by: Mr. Zubda-tul-Hussain, Advocate.
MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J./CHAIRMAN:-
Through instant appeal, appellant has assailed vires of order
dated 22.01.2022, passed by the respondent, whereby appellant’s
request for reinstatement in service w.e.f. the date of dismissal;
retirement w.e.f. the date of superannuation with all back benefits
including promotions; and release of pension, was rejected.
2. Succinctly, the facts of the case are that appellant was
appointed as Civil Judge in the year 1978. In the year 1991, while
being posted in the Lahore High Court, Lahore as Incharge of the
newly created Computer Cell, appellant was issued a charge
sheet on 25.11.1991 containing allegations of misconduct,
inefficiency and non-performance of duties. However, the
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant were ultimately
dropped. But, those were followed by initiation of suo moto
contempt proceedings against the appellant, which were
culminated in conviction of the appellant by the learned Single
Judge vide judgment dated 28.11.1993 (announced in open Court
on 08.12.1993). Feeling discontent, appellant filed Crl. Appeal
No.764 of 1993 before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court,
which was dismissed vide judgment dated 03.06.2000
2
Service Appeal No.06 of 2022
(announced in open Court on 28.06.2000), which was further
challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan by way
of filing Crl. Appeal No.261 of 2000, which was also dismissed
vide judgment dated 05.10.2000 (announced in open Court on
06.12.2000). Nevertheless, the sentence awarded to the appellant
was reduced to one month S.I., with the same amount of fine
along with one month S.I. in case of default of its payment. In
consequence to his conviction and sentence, the appellant was
dismissed from service vide notification dated 28.09.2001. The
appellant filed departmental appeal followed by Service Appeal
before this Tribunal, however, during the pendency of said
appeal, appellant reached the age of superannuation on
01.04.2004. Through judgment dated 20.06.2004, said service
appeal was decided 20.06.2014 in the manner that order of
dismissal from service was set aside and matter was remanded
for decision afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to
the appellant. Both the parties assailed the aforesaid judgment by
way of filing Civil Petition No.333-L of 2015 & Civil Petition
No.532-L of 2015 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which
were disposed of vide judgment dated 18.05.2020 while
upholding the said judgment dated 20.06.2014. In post-remand
proceedings, the appellant was granted hearing before the
Administrative Committee followed by issuance of notification
dated 05.05.2021, whereby the disciplinary proceedings against
appellant were abated on the ground that he had already been
superannuated. Afterwards, the appellant, through letter dated
24.05.2021, approached the Registrar for the release of his
pension and other service benefits. However, the request was
rejected vide notification dated 22.01.2022. Hence, instant
Service Appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that once
disciplinary proceedings were abated by the competent
authority due to superannuation of the appellant, he stood
retired after attaining the age of superannuation. He argues that
3
Service Appeal No.06 of 2022
appellant is required to be treated like all other superannuated
civil servants, as such it is his fundamental right that his pension
and all back benefits including promotions, earned during
service, are awarded to him. He maintains that appellant has
been discriminated in terms of the Article 25 of the Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 as other judicial
officers who stood retired after abatement of disciplinary
proceedings were also awarded pension and all other back
benefits. He adds that impugned order, being absolutely non-
speaking, is unsustainable in the eyes of law. In support, he has
placed reliance upon Haji Muhammad Ismail Memon
Advocate Complainant's case (PLD 2007 Supreme Court
35), Muhammad Zaheer Khan v. Government of Pakistan
through Secretary, Establishment and others (2010 SCMR
1554) and Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust
(PTET) through M.D., Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Arif
and others (2015 SCMR 1472).
4. Conversely, learned counsel for respondent-authority
defends the impugned order.
5. Arguments heard. Available record perused.
6. Record shows that pursuant to the contempt proceedings,
the appellant was convicted and sentenced to one month S.I., a
fine of Rs.5000/- & in default of fine, further S.I. for one
month, as per decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The
appellant was then dismissed from service vide notification
dated 28.09.2001, however, by virtue of judgment dated
20.06.2014, passed by this Tribunal, notification qua his
dismissal from service was set aside and matter was remanded
for decision afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to
him, which was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide
judgment dated 18.05.2020, with specific observations qua the
element of ‘moral turpitude’, which are reproduced as under:-
“4. ….. Having considered the submission by the
learned counsel for the parties, we note that the impugned
4
Service Appeal No.06 of 2022
judgment requires that a jurisdictional fact for imposing
penalty upon the petitioner in disciplinary proceedings be
determined by the competent authority. That adjudication
would settle if the conviction for contempt of court by a
judicial officer involves the misdemeanor of moral turpitude
for the purposes of disciplinary action. Without determination
of the said elemental point, the superstructure of a service
penalty erected on the said conviction, is doubtful and weak.
Presently, we notice that six years have passed after the
impugned judgment solely because the same is also
challenged in a counter petition No.532-L of 2015 filed by the
competent authority. That petition does not cite any legal
authority for claiming that a conviction for contempt of court
is tantamount to commission of moral turpitude. The
equation can be drawn on the basis of the law after hearing
the parties. Consequently we consider that the direction
given in impugned judgment has merit. It would be
appreciated if the competent authority took up the matter for
early consideration and decided the same within a period of
three months. With these observations both the petitions are
disposed off.”
In post-remand proceedings, the respondent-authority issued
notification dated 05.05.2021 qua abatement of the disciplinary
proceedings, which reads as under:-
“In view of the instructions issued by Government of
the Punjab, Services & General Administration Department,
Lahore through Circulation No.SORI(S&GAD)4-32/2004,
dated 29.09.2004, the Hon’ble Chief Justice and Judges are
pleased to abate the disciplinary proceedings against Dr.
Syed Ali Sana Bokhari, ex-Civil Judge having already
crossed the age of superannuation.”
It is obvious from the above that no adverse order existed
against the appellant as order of his dismissal from service had
already been set aside and the disciplinary proceedings to
determine the question of ‘moral turpitude’ were also abated by
the competent authority as noted above when during the course
of proceedings, the appellant reached the age of superannuation
on 01.04.2004. Therefore, the respondent-authority was
obligated to pass the further order by notionally permitting
the appellant to retire from service on date he had attained the
age of superannuation i.e. 01.04.2004 besides considering to
release the retiral benefits to him, treating the disciplinary
5
Service Appeal No.06 of 2022
proceedings abated as if no punishment was ever awarded to
the appellant. Even otherwise, in terms of office
memorandum dated 26.02.1976, it was incumbent upon the
respondent-authority to notify the retirement of its officers to
all concerned for recovery of dues from them, if any, and to
facilitate the payment of pension and other dues to them.
7. It is settled law that an employee cannot be penalized
for any action, which was subject-matter of an inquiry that
was not completed before his superannuation/retirement.
Upon reaching the age of superannuation, the unfinished
disciplinary proceedings automatically cease to have effect by
operation of law. This legal extinction of proceedings vests in
the civil servant an indefeasible right to receive their full
complement of pensionary benefits without deduction or
diminution. The Superior Courts of the country has consistently
upheld this principle as a fundamental safeguard against the
perpetual pendency of disciplinary action, recognizing that the
retirement creates a vested right that cannot be retroactively
disturbed by inconclusive inquiries. In Province of Punjab
through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad and others v. Javed
Iqbal (2021 SCMR 328), the Supreme Court by alluding to Rule
54-A of the Fundamental Rules and Muhammad Zaheer Khan v.
Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment
and others [2010 PLC (C.S.) 559], reaffirmed the
aforementioned principle in the following words:-
“9. It is also important to highlight that closure of departmental
proceedings after retirement of an employee under the Act is not
a new concept and finds historical support and reference in
Fundamental Rules (FR), the Civil Service Regulations (CSR),
Punjab Civil Service Pension Rules, 1955 and Civil Establishment
Code (ESTA CODE) in the following manner:
FR 54-A states:
54A. If a Government servant, who has been suspended
pending inquiry into his conduct attains the age of
superannuation before the completion of inquiry, the
disciplinary proceedings against him shall abate and such
government servant shall retire with full pensionary
benefits and the period of suspension shall be treated as
period spend on duty.
6
Service Appeal No.06 of 2022
This Court in Muhammed Zaheer Khan held that the plain reading
of F.R.54-A is clear that the disciplinary proceedings against an
officer abate if the latter attains the age of superannuation. The
Rule entitles such officer to retire with full pensionary benefits and
period of suspension is bound to be treated as period spent on
duty. It was held that the fundamental principle laid down in
FR.54-A postulates that the case of the appellant cannot be
remanded to the authority for holding de novo proceedings, after
eleven years of his superannuation. (footnote omitted) …..”
In this regard, reference could also be made to Muhammad
Anwar Bajwa, Executive Director, Agricultural Development
Bank of Pakistan, 1-Faisal Avenue, Zero Point, Islamabad v.
Chairman, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan,
Faisal Avenue, Zero Point, Islamabad [2001 PLC (C.S.)
336], Bilquis Nargis v. Secretary to Government of the
Punjab, Education Department [1983 PLC (C.S.) 1141],
Syed Abdus Salam Kazmi v. Managing Director WASA,
Multan and another [2005 PLC (C.S.) 244] and Haji
Muhammad Ismail Memon Advocate Complainant's case
(PLD 2007 Supreme Court 35).
8. The appellant had served the Judiciary for a period of
about 23-years. So in all fairness, when the pending disciplinary
proceedings were abated and dismissal order was no more in the
field, there was no justification in halting the retirement
notification in favour of the appellant and withholding the
payable pensionary benefits to him; therefore, the inaction on
the part of respondent-authority in this regard appears to be
totally unjustified and unwarranted. In this regard, reliance
could be placed upon Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh
and others (2024 SCMR 1689), wherein it has been held that
the pension is a vested right and not charity, alms or donation
by the employer but a compensation of services rendered
assiduously by giving blood, sweat, toil and tears.
9. In somewhat similar circumstances, Mr. Muhsin
Tirmizey, the then District & Sessions Judge, Dera Ghazi
Khan, was sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the
Court and a fine of Rs.2,000/- in judgment reported as The
7
Service Appeal No.06 of 2022
State v. Musin Tirmizey (PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lahore 434),
however, after conviction, he continued to serve as District &
Sessions Judge and retired with full pensionary benefits.
In India, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
pension is not a bounty, charity, or gratuitous payment
dependent on the employer's discretion, but rather a vested legal
right of the employee that constitutes deferred compensation for
the services rendered in the past and it is a property to which
retired employees are legally entitled. The Court ruled that
pension was a right and the payment of it depended upon the
discretion of the Government but was governed by the rules and
a Government servant coming within those rules was entitled to
claim pension. Reference can be made to Deokinandan Prasad
v. State Of Bihar & Ors [AIR 1971 SC 1409], State Of Punjab
v. K. R. Erry & Sobhag Rai Mehta [1973 SCR (2) 405], D.S.
Nakara & Others v. Union of India [1983 SCR (2) 165] and All
India Reserve Bank Retired Officers v. Union of India And
Others (AIR 1992 SC 767).
10. Resultantly, instant appeal is allowed, consequently the
impugned order dated 22.01.2022 is set aside being illegal
and without lawful authority. The respondent-authority is
directed to issue retirement notification of appellant and
release the retiral benefits in favour of appellant.
(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi)
Chairman
(Abid Husain Chattha) (Rasaal Hasan Syed)
Member Member
APPROVED FOR REPORTING
Chairman
Member Member
*Sultan / A.H.S.*
