N. S.

J U N A N K A R

THE MIM,~M. S~, CONCEPT OF D H A R M A

The Mfm~.msa concept of dharma which I propose to discuss in this paper

is entirely based upon the aphorisms i of Jaimini and the commentary of
Sabara. I use the term 'Mr.m,qrm_saka
- '2 to refer to both Jaimini and Sabara.
The [Link] accepts the following four basic propositions:
(I) Human beings desire happiness (nih.~reyasa).
(II) They take action to implement that desire.
(III) As a result of this action they obtain pleasure.
(IV) What is conducive to happiness is dharma and what is not so
conducive is adharma.

This straightforward doctrine creates certain difficulties when it is

presented in the Vedic context. I propose to discuss some of these difficulties
in this paper.
The Mim~.msaka's theory of cognition consists of two kinds of pram~nas
(means of cognition) based upon two kinds of objects: 3
(A) Empirical: Perception, inference, analogy, presumption and
abhdva (absence of pram~n.,as), These are concerned with
experiential objects ([Link]).
(B) Word (~abda): This deals with non-experiential objects (adr..[Link])

The objects of both these kinds are real and independent of our mind. The
objects of the empirical pram~.nas are already in existence (bhatdrtha) and
can therefore be presented to our sense-organs. The objects of the ~abda
[Link] are yet to come into existence (bhavydrtha) and cannot therefore
be presented to our sense-organs.
The foundation of empirical knowledge is perception and our perceptual
knowledge does not require corroboration by other empirical pram~inas. The
~abda pram~.na also does not require corroboration by any other prarn~.na.
Thus perception and the .~abda pram[.na have parity of status as pram~na.
The empirical p r a Y . as guarantee only experiential objects. Since
those pram[.nas cannot guarantee non-experiential objects, in view of the

Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982) 51-60. 0022-1791/82/0101-0051 $01.00.

Copyright © 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
52 N. S. J U N A N K A R

unavailability (i.e. absence = ablu~va) of these pramS, as we need a separate

pram-. ~ to account for the existence of such non-experiential objects; for the
existence of an object can only be guaranteed by a pram-.a~.
Apart from these two kinds of pramS, a, the Mfm~.msaka has another kind
of prams.,a which may be roughly characterized as exegetic. Its function is
to enable us to determine which of various Vedic actions can be treated as
subordinate (~[Link]) to principal actions.4 Under this kind we have the following
pray: ~rut/(direct assertion or statement), lifiga (implication), vdkya
(syntactical connection), [Link] (context), krama (sequence) and samdkhyd
(name). What precedes in this list prevails over what follows and this means
that the first pramS, a, .~rut/, is paramount, s In a sense this is similar to the
role of perception in the scheme of empirical knowledge.
In the theory of cognition the [Link] is primarily concerned with
the ~abda prams, a 6 because his main theme is action in conformity with the
Veda. According to him words are the basic units of language. They have an
inherent capacity to express meanings (objects) and also discharge the
essential function of communicating those meanings to others. Sentences are
composed of words governed by syntax and grammar. Like words, sentences
also express meanings (objects), but every sentence is characterized by a unity
of meaning ( ek4rthatd). 7
In this theory of words and meanings (objects) it is not necessary to certify
whether or not the words have discharged their allotted function. We cannot
establish any correspondence between words and their objects in the sense in
which empirical knowledge can correspond to experiential objects for the
simple reason that such objects have yet to come into existence. Nor can we
visualize any procedure for verification of the meanings of these words. The
important objects of the ~abda pramS.,a are of a kind different from ordinary
objects. But the Mfm~33saka needs both experiential objects and the resources
of empirical knowledge even more than the non~xperiential objects and the
~abda pramS, a. The Vedic programme of action can only be implemented
by human beings in a work-a-day world.
The Mfm~u~saka is concerned with the theory of meaning in so far as it
enables him to instal the authority of the Veda on a pedestal where no foibles
of human beings or their language can reach but which guarantees all the
merits that human ingenuity can offer. It is not therefore surprising that his
arguments to establish unquestioned and unquestionable authority of the
Veda are not convincing.
 THE MiMAM..S,/~ CONCEPT OF DHARMA 53

The first argument is from the non-eternality of the word-object relation-

ship, and has two parts. First, this relationship cannot be like any ordinary
relation such as contact. Second, we learn meanings of words from our elders,
these elders learn from their elders, and so on and so forth. Howsoever we
might carry on this process into the past, we cannot locate any human being
who could have created the relation.
This argument is concerned with the spoken and heard word and our
learning experience. Although we cannot yet establish any definite theory
about the origins of language, there is no valid reason for saying that words,
meanings or language have nothing to do with human beings or their capacities.
The [Link] is trying to establish the logical or a priori character of
the word-object relationship and his factual arguments cannot prove such
character. Besides it is hardly appropriate to ask whether or not language has
a creator. Language is a social institution and it could not have been created
by any single individual.
This argument is meant to demonstrate the non-human character of the
Veda ([Link]). 8 Even if the word-object relationship were logical, this
would not serve the function which the [Link] has assigned to the
Veda. The Vedic authority is meant to activate the human apparatus of
understanding and communication so that human beings are induced to
perform certain actions in the hope of obtaining certain results. Moreover, the
Vedic authority and the instructions backed by that authority have to be
conveyed by authorized persons to other authorized persons. In the last
resort the Vedic authority means the authority of such authorized persons.
Since these persons are human, albeit very exalted, the problem of the Vedic
authority becomes the problem of human authority.
The second argument of the M f m ~ a is: To err is human; the Veda is
not human; therefore the Veda cannot err) This argument is a corollary of
the f'~rst argument. If this argument were pressed to its logical conclusion this
would destroy the very possibility of knowledge.
The third argument of the M f ~ is: When one hears the Vedic
words or sentences one understands their meanings directly and immediately;
no evidence is therefore necessary for the confirmation of what is so under-
stood. ~° This amounts to saying that in this sphere the empirical pram~as
have no/ocus standi. This is the well-known doctrine of '[Link]'.
This argument really means that those who are authorized to study the
Veda have direct and immediate apprehension of meanings on hearing Vedic
54 N. S. JUNANKAR

words and therefore do not feel the need for further evidence. As this is a
factual statement, we need not dispute it. But the difficulty is that there were
other Vedic students who had a different interpretation of the Veda from
that of the Mfm~[Link]. We therefore need a criterion to determine which
of the interpretations is authentic. The Mfm~[Link] has himself used the
resources of empirical knowledge to refute the views opposed to his own and
has even devised an elaborate exegetic to support his version.
In assessing the nature and significance of the Vedic authority it is
worthwhile remembering certain obvious facts. It is indeed something of a
paradox that a scripture which the Mfn~ .msaka believes to be neither human
nor divine in conception or inspiration should be so deeply involved in the
affairs of men. As is known, there has been no Consensus regarding the scope
of the authority. They are four Vedas, but the [Link] seems to have
accepted only three (trayO. ~1 In extending this authority to the [Link] on the
ground that they are based on ~rut/the principle of absolute Vedic authority
has been diluted. The principle on which such derivation is accepted is not
capable of rigorous application. Within the framework of the Veda itself the
Mim~[Link] has introduced not only a variety of distinctions largely derived
from human experience but also the principle of relative authority between
different parts of the Veda. His doctrine of the si~. exegetic [Link] in
which 9ut/is paramount 12 is tantamount to a modification of the absolute
Vedic authority. If anything has absolute authority its parts cannot be said
to have varying degrees of authority. The crux of the Vedic authority for
the Mim~[Link] is the Vedic command structure (vidhO and even within it
the authority is concentrated in the verb. The verbal authority of the Veda
has thus become literally ~erbal'! What is even more surprising is that the
Mim~q3saka should have taken no notice of the radical challenge to the
entire fabric of the Vedic authority and even to his own cult of sacrifice. In
the face of such facts, to say that no one can have an idea different from
whatever the Mfm~n. saka thinks is right from the Veda, at any time or
place, or under any circumstances is a claim which will need a great deal of
convincing.
As already mentioned, for the Mfm~[Link] the Vedic authority lies in that
part of the Veda which is said to be codana (command inducing action) or
vidhi (command or injunction) expressed in a Vedic sentence (vdkya). Such a
text serves the same purpose as smoke does in the paradigm of inference. It
indicates 'artha' (nib.~reyasa) as smoke indicates fire. This is obviously an
 THE M]M.,~[Link]. CONCEPT OF DHARMA 55

inference, la but since what is inferred is a non-experiential object, it is ruled

out of order as the empirical pram~na of inference.
The Mfm~[Link] examines the nature of the Vedic command on the bases
of two paradigms: (a)Svargakdmo ya]eta (One who desires heaven should
perform sacrifice). Svargakdma.h is the noun and ya]eta is the verb in the
imperative mood. This is the paradigm of dharma. (b) ¢3yenendbhicaran yajeta
(To injure another one should sacrifice with the hawk). Abhicaran is the noun
and yajeta, as in the first paradigm, the verb. This is the paradigm of adharma.
There is another noun in this paradigm, ~yenena, with the affix of the
instrumental case, but this has no bearing on the present problem.
According to the Mfm~[Link] nouns stand for subtances and properties 14
and verbs for actions, ts
The noun stands for what is already in existence (bhatdrtha) or for what
is an experiential object (dr..[Link]).The verb stands for what is not yet in
existence (bhavydrtha) or for what is a non-experiential object ([Link]).
In the first paradigm the object is man ([Link]) with the desire for heaven;
in the second the object is the man with the desire to injure another. This
object is already in existence and is therefore amenable to the empirical
pram~n,as. Since this object already exists it makes no sense to say that it
should be brought into existence. Hence no Vedic command is required for
the purpose. In fact the desire for heaven, which is equated with pleasure
(pr?t/) 16 and the desire for inflicting injury are part of our innate endowment
waiting to be realized through a course of action in accordance with the
Vedic command. It is the verb in the imperative mood, which stands for
action yet to be performed - the verb in which the Vedic command is
concentrated.
According to the Mfm~[Link], what is yet to be accomplished in pursuance
of the desire of man is what should be accomplished. That is, this represents
an obligation on the part of the man who is ordered to undertake the action
prescribed in the command so as to fulFd his desired object. In the first
paradigm this obligation constitutes dharma and in the second, adharma.
There are sacrifices for securing one's happiness as there are for inflicting
injury on others.
Sacrifice is not known to be a very pleasant activity. No one would
undertake such an activity unless one was confident of reaping its fruit nor
can the activity be fruitless. The Mfm~[Link] is not perturbed by the absence
of words in the paradigms which could reasonably suggest any of the notions
56 N.S. JUNANKAR

which are really important, such as dharma, adharma, nih.~reyasa(highest

good) for these can be gathered from other Vedic texts. What worries him
most is that the results of actions do not follow soon after such actions.
Even the worldly results like cattle, land, wealth or conquest come about
after a lapse of time and heaven can be attained only after the performer
of a sacrifice is dead. This gap between action (cause) and fruit (effect) is
disconcerting both from a theoretical and practical point of view. Since the
effect does not appear immediately after the cause, the cause must have
ceased to exist by then; for action is perishable. This implies that the effect
cannot be attributed to the cause. If there is no such causal connection, the
Vedie sacrifice will not command credibility. Hence it is imperative to bridge
the gap between action and its result. This is done through apfova (that which
did not exist before) or [Link] (that which is not or cannot be seen). ~7
Presumably, this entity remains in existence as long as the result does not
appear. This entity is truly linguistic, though it is treated as transcendental.
This is quite consistent with the Mira-.arm_saka's preference for linguistic
objects (artha) with an ontological commitment. The objects of the dharma
complex are reserved for the ~abda pramS.,a and the apf~rva is one of them.
The paradigms of dharma and adharma refer to Man with a desire for
pleasure or harm and consequently the Vedie command should hold good for
all human beings. In fact the Mfm~[Link] holds that the cult of sacrifice is
credible because it is based on our natural endowment. This overall position
is radically altered by the doctrine of eligibility (adhikara)J a On the basis
of various Vedic texts the [Link] has compiled a list of conditions of
eligibility and of those who are and who are not eligible.
The main condition of eligibility is Vedic study and the Veda itself is said
to lay down who can or cannot study it (Veda). It is indeed one of the most
remarkable self-denying ordinances in the history of scripture. Women of all
classes ([Link]) and ~0dras are ineligible. Only the male members of the three
classes - Br~nna_9.a, [Link] and Vai~ya - are eligible. Those with incurable
defects, sages and deities are declared ineligible on various grounds. Certain
classes outside the four-class system like the chariot-makers (Rathak~ra) and
the Chief of the N ~ d a s (N(sddasthapati) are treated as eligible.
Property is not regarded as essential on the ground that the performer of
a sacrifice is bound to find ways and means of acquiring property when the
occasion demands. It must however be remembered that sacrifice involves
legal ownership over the things used and gifted. In fact the transfer of
 THE MiM.~M.S~, CONCEPT OF DHARMA 57

ownership from the performer of a sacrifice to the recipient is one of the

important components of sacrificeJ 9
On a rough computation it can be safely said that only a small minority
could perform Vedic sacrifices. And even this minority consisted of male
members of the community. What is of ominous significance in this policy
of inclusion and exclusion (adhikdranyFo,a) is that the pursuit of happiness
and dharma is reserved for the privileged minority while the majority was
disqualified on no better ground than the Vedic texts. Further, it would
seem that the privileged could inflict injury upon others through Vedic
sacrifices, though the price would be adharma, but the aggrieved could
not resort to such practices. The privileged were thus twice blessed just
as the unprivileged were twice cursed. An unintended consequence of this
deprivation of happiness and dharma must have been some kind of restraint
on the impoverishment of the community. India certainly could never afford
a wasteful pursuit of such happiness or dharma for the few.
Another ticklish problem in the context of the dharma complex is the
Vedic text which speaks of the sacrifice for inflicting injury upon others. If
this is a command which is as sacrosanct and absolute as any other, one will
have to choose between respect for the Vedic authority and the pursuit of
adharma. Both alternatives are obviously awkward. To say that the infliction
of injury is disapproved on other grounds is no answer to this difficulty. Here
as elsewhere, the device of citing convenient texts cannot deliver the goods.
Exegetics may smoothen out superficial difficulties but cannot settle issues
of this kind.
The [Link]'sjustification for the Vedic authority and command
structure may be satisfactory to those who have made an initial commitment
to its presuppositions. Those who had the leisure to acquire Vedic knowledge
and the privilege to enjoy its benefits had obviously no reason to complain.
But such an approach may not inspire a sufficient number of even the
privileged to embark upon a programme involving considerable loss and
labour in the hope of deferred benefits. Even more important is the problem
of preventing the unprivileged from emulating the privileged and thus from
participating in the forbidden activities. Such a policy requires an imaginative
and emotional approach. According to the Mfmamsaka, the Vedas have
furnished such a technique in that portion of the Veda called 'Arthav~da'.2°
This portion has also other important functions in harmonizing various Vedic
texts. Strictly speaking, command is neither true nor false; it is either obeyed
58 N. S. JUNANKAR

or disobeyed. What we really need is not a theory of cognition or truth but

a rationale for Vedic authority and obedience to that authority. Such a
technique devised and operated by those who occupy all the commanding
heights in society can influence the minds and behaviour of men for a long
time to come.
Since the M ~ n ~ . mka's dharma complex is bound up with the structure
of the Vedic text in the form of the Vedic sentence, i.e. command (v/dhO, he
has used a variety of grammatical notions such as noun, verb, gender, number,
case, tense, mood, etc., for clarifying the nature of this complex. According
to him, grammar ([Link]) is a [Link] and thus like all [Link], derives
its authority from ~ut/. 2~ This derivative authority means that what is
remembered is authoritative in so far as it is based upon what must have been
experienced. Further, even though the smrtis, unlike ~ut/, are man-made, we
have no reason to doubt the integrity or memory of their human authors.
Thus grammar is of human coinage and yet authoritative.
The primary concern of grammar is with the spoken language and this
language is not basically different from the Vedic language. In fact, the
M i m e . ~ka insists that in order to implement the Vedic programme of action
it is necessary not only to understand the Vedic language but also to identify
a variety of things in the light of that language and in accordance with current
usage.22 In this sense the grammar in which the Mfm~.msaka is interested is
the grammar of the spoken language; it is an empirical discipline. This view
is consistent not only with the empiricism of the [Link] himself but also
with the concept of the [Link] grammar as based upon the spoken language
at the time.
As already mentioned, for the Mfm~.msaka it is the individual word that is
the linguistic unit and the bearel; of meaning and the sentence is merely a
collection (samuclaya) o f such words clothed in grammatical categories. This
unit (word) has two aspects. As a spoken word, it is perishable (anitya). It is
the manifestation of another word which is eternal (nitya). z3 The word is
both a type and a token. To put it in another way, the word is a universal and
has instances. Similarly, the word is more than a mere linguistic unit; it means
something other than itself. According to the Mfmamsaka, the word stands
for '[Link]" (universal or configuration) and also denotes a particular. Thus the
word as the linguistic and semantic unit stands for two kinds, universals
and instances. The grammar that the Mfm~3saka has used is the gram-
mar of the spoken and heard word; he has dealt with the words of the
 THE M[M.~M..SA. CONCEPT OF DHARMA 59

Veda as spoken and heard by the authorized speech community. But the
Veda is not merely a collection of spoken and heard words tied together by
the grammar of the spoken language. In its eternal aspect it must be regarded
as indicating a collection of classes or universals. These classes are undoubtedly
logical objects and according to the Mfm~[Link] they constitute the eternal
texture of the eternal universe; they are real and independent of our mind.
All that we have to do is to discover them and we have the capacity to do so.
The [Link] accepts three broad classes: classes of words, classes of
objects and classes of society ([Link]). These constitute the framework of the
M~[Link]'s universe. In this framework the concept of dharma becomes
the function of the class-structure of society which for him is eternal. The
crucial question is whether the elaborate structure of authority, command,
dharma and adhanna, incentive and disincentive, and pleasure and pain, can
be raised on such foundations and if it be raised, whether we can be called
upon to give our assent. In the context of the [Link] system such a
question can only be addressed to those who are authorized by the Veda to
entertain it. The unauthorized have no business to meddle in this matter.
In fact, they are said to owe none of the debts which the authorized owe.
They are born free but ffmd themselves in chains forged by human beings.
As is known, the concept of dharma is not easy to deffme. Whether it is
a moral, religious or social concept is a large question. Even within the
Mfm~n..saka's framework there are several questions - who is really a moral
agent, where can we fix responsibility for consequences of actions and can
we bring actions like sacrifice under the rubric of morality? - which require
thorough investigation. The M f m ~ . saka has no God and the deities have
an honorific function. He has no programme for salvation. All that he is
concerned with is pleasure (prTt0 and pain ([Link]) - more with pleasure
than with pain - and apart from heaven (svarga), the fruits of sacrifice are
of a kind that would appeal to those who are interested in wealth and power.
Even heaven is equated with pleasure and only those who already have wealth
or power are entitled to acquire more wealth or power. Such pursuits are
restricted to the few. Knowledge and education are equally restricted. In view
of these considerations it is an open question whether the programme of
sacrifice can be regarded as religious simply because it has been dressed up
in moral or spiritual language and backed by an impersonal authority. Such
questions, as I have said above, must be left for further scrutiny.

University o f London
60 N.S. JUNANKAR

NOTES

I The Mimfimsi concept of dharma discussed in this paper is based on the following
edition: The Aphorisms of the Minui.~ by Jaimini, with the commentary of Savam-
S~m/n, edited by Pandita Mahe'sachandra Ny~yaratna, Bibliotheca Indica, 2 Vols.,
Calcutta, The Baptist Mission Press, 1878-87.
All references in this paper are to the aphorisms and commentary as given in this
edition (MSBh).
The following editions have also been consulted:
The ~ M~[Link] S~tra of Yaimini, Chapters I - I l l , translated with an original
commentary by Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Ganganath Jha, Sacred Books of the
Hindus, Vol. X, Allahabad, Indian Press, 1916.
Shabara-Bhdsya, translated into English by Ganganath Jha, Gaekwad's Oriental Series,
Vols. LXVI, LXX, LXXIII, Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1933, 1934, 1936.
2 It is assumed in this paper that ~abara has faithfully interpreted the aphorisms of
Jaimini and his views.
3 I.I, 2 - 5 .
4 III.1, 6.
s III.3, 14.
6 I.I, 5-26.
7 ILl, 46.
a I.I, 2; I.I, 27-32.
9 I.l, 2.
1o l.I, 2.
11 II1.3, 5.
12 III.3, 14.
la I.I, 2.
14 ILl, 3.
15 II.I, 1; II.I, 4.
16 IV.3, 15-16.
17 II3, 5.
18 VI.I, 1-52.
19 IV.2, 27-28.
2o 1.2, 1-30.
21 1.2, 1-30.
22 1.2, 40; 1.3, 30.
23 I.I, 6 - 2 3 ; 1.3, 30-35.
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