🇮🇳 Key Strategic Partnerships

1. India–US Relations

 Post–Cold War transformation from estrangement to comprehensive partnership.

 Key Agreements:
o 2005 Civil Nuclear Deal: Enabled civil nuclear cooperation.
o LEMOA (2016): Logistics sharing agreement for military cooperation.
 Areas of cooperation: Defence, trade, counterterrorism, technology.
 Shared strategic interest: Indo-Pacific security and countering China's assertiveness.
 Collaboration in QUAD reflects shared democratic values and strategic alignment.

2. India–Russia Relations

 Continuity of Cold War-era friendship adapted to current global realities.

 Strong in defence cooperation (Russia supplies ~60–70% of India’s military equipment).
 Other areas: Energy, nuclear cooperation, and space technology.
 Despite Russia’s tilt toward China and India’s tilt toward the US, both seek balanced
global order.
 Multi-alignment policy allows India to maintain robust ties with Russia.

3. India’s Act East Policy

 Evolved from Look East (1991) to Act East (2014) under Modi government.
 Focus: Strengthening economic and strategic ties with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea.
 Major projects: India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway.
 Aims to increase connectivity, trade, and maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

4. Neighbourhood First Policy

 Emphasis on strengthening ties with SAARC and BIMSTEC nations.

 Goals: Regional stability, connectivity, economic cooperation.
 Challenges: Ongoing tensions with Pakistan and border disputes with China.
 Opportunities: Enhanced cooperation with Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka.

🌐 India’s Role in Global Governance & Multilateralism

1. BRICS Participation

 A platform for South–South cooperation.

 India co-established:
o New Development Bank (NDB).
o Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).
 Focus: Reform of global financial systems, reducing dependence on Western institutions.
  Despite India–China tensions, India remains committed to BRICS as part of its
multipolar world vision.

2. QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)

 Members: India, US, Japan, Australia.

 Objective: Ensure free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific.
 India’s contributions:
o Maritime cooperation, disaster relief.
o Vaccine diplomacy, technological collaboration.
 Projects a non-military identity to avoid antagonising non-aligned partners.

3. G20 Leadership

 India became President of the G20 in 2023.

 Focus areas: Inclusive growth, sustainable development, global health security.
 Acts as a bridge between Global North and Global South.
 Advocates reforms in global trade, digital inclusion, and climate finance.

4. UN and UNSC Reform Advocacy

 India seeks permanent seat at UNSC—justified by:

o Being the world’s largest democracy.
o Fastest-growing major economy.
o Long-standing contributor to UN Peacekeeping.
 Calls for more inclusive representation of the Global South in global decision-making.

5. Leadership in Global Challenges

 Climate Change:
o Founded International Solar Alliance (ISA).
o Committed to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris
Agreement.
 Counterterrorism:
o Strong advocate for Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
(CCIT) at the UN.
 Sustainable Development:
o Supports SDGs, technology transfer, and equitable global development financing.
Contrast with China: Continental vs Maritime Outlook

Aspect 🇮🇳 India 🇨🇳 China

Geostrategic
Rimland, Maritime-Oriented Continental Power
Nature
Indian Ocean at the core of its identity Limited maritime geography, seeks
Oceanic
and security (South Asia, East Africa, oceanic access via infrastructure
Presence
Indo-Pacific) projects
Prioritizes openness, democratic
Strategic Pursues assertive expansion through
coalitions (QUAD), and regional
Orientation strategic outposts (String of Pearls)
consensus
Military base in Djibouti, port access
No overseas military bases, values
Military Basing at Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota
strategic restraint
(Sri Lanka)
Expanding PLAN (People’s Liberation
Blue-water navy with indigenous
Naval Strategy Army Navy), increasingly visible in
shipbuilding focus
IOR
Emphasizes inclusive growth (e.g.,
Uses debt diplomacy and economic
Diplomacy SAGAR initiative: Security and Growth
corridors (e.g., BRI) for influence
for All in the Region)

🌊 India’s Oceanic Advantage

 90% of Indian trade by volume and 80% by value moves through the Indian Ocean.
 The Indian Ocean connects India with Africa, ASEAN, and the Gulf, reinforcing its
position as a natural regional hub.
 India's island territories like Andaman & Nicobar give it deep-sea chokepoint advantage
near the Strait of Malacca.

Strategic Implications:

 India sees the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) not as a turf to dominate, but as a zone of
partnership.
 Through the QUAD (with US, Japan, Australia), India is rebalancing Chinese influence
while avoiding formal alliances.
 The Sagarmala Project and Indo-Pacific partnerships aim to convert India’s
geography into economic strength.
Strategic Heritage and Theoretical Foundations of Indian Foreign Policy

🧠 1. Civilizational Strategic Thought

 Indian strategic thinking is not a colonial or imperial export—it is rooted in indigenous

philosophy and civilizational depth.
 Ancient texts like Kautilya’s Arthashastra describe a pluriverse of competing and coexisting
powers, rather than a single hegemon.

"The enemy of my enemy is my friend"—a classic Kautilyan idea that aligns with fluid, pragmatic
alliances rather than rigid blocks.

2. India’s Alignment with Multi-State Systems

 India’s historical experience has been shaped by plurality of kingdoms, empires, and powers—
from the Mauryas to the Mughals.
 This produced a worldview that values balance, coexistence, and adaptive strategies, unlike
Europe’s “Westphalian” obsession with rigid sovereignty and sharp national borders.

Kautilyan Pluriverse:

 Multiple centers of power

 Dynamic alliances based on shifting interests
 Strategic autonomy over permanent alignments

3. Contrast with Western Strategic Models

Feature 🇮🇳 India 🌍 Western (Post-Westphalian)

Theoretical Legacy Kautilya, Buddha, Gandhi, Nehru Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz

View of Sovereignty Flexible, contextual Absolute, legalistic

Approach to Often interest-maximizing,

Moral, inclusive, regionally grounded
Diplomacy transactional

Forward deployment, power

Security Thinking Strategic restraint, layered defense
projection

Ethos Dharma (righteous order), Vasudhaiva Realism, balance of power, zero-

 Feature 🇮🇳 India 🌍 Western (Post-Westphalian)

Kutumbakam sum

4. Modern Indian State: Anti-Imperial, Inclusive

 Unlike Western powers which emerged through imperial expansion, modern India emerged
from anti-colonial struggle.
 Its foreign policy DNA reflects:
o 🌐 Non-alignment
o 🌍 South-South cooperation
o 🤝 Focus on global equity
o Normative leadership (climate, health, peacekeeping)

India’s diplomacy isn't about domination—it’s about dialogue, dignity, and development.

📌 Summary:

India’s strategic worldview:

 Is not about being the next great power in a Western mold,

 But about offering a new model: rooted in history, open to the world, focused on development
and dignity.

India's Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order – Expanded Analysis

India stands at a critical juncture where it must adapt its foreign policy to navigate a rapidly changing
and uncertain global order. The economic world is now multipolar, but Asia remains strategically
bipolar, tugged between U.S. and Chinese influences. In such an environment, replicating past strategies
is no longer sufficient—India must craft a more agile, proactive, and imaginative foreign policy to secure
its place as a global power.

In its early years, the Modi government largely continued the foreign policy framework of its
predecessors but introduced notable shifts. Three critical deviations were observed:

1. Economic Nationalism and Protectionism: India pulled out of the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019, citing concerns over its trade imbalance with China and
fears about harm to domestic industries. According to a 2020 report by the Indian Ministry of
 Commerce, India’s trade deficit with China had risen to $48.66 billion, making economic caution
understandable, albeit strategically isolating.
2. Weakened Neighborhood Ties: India’s relations with neighbors like Nepal, Bangladesh, and the
Maldives have become strained. The Nepal blockade in 2015, perceived interference in its
constitution, and the subsequent Chinese outreach significantly eroded India’s traditional
influence. Similarly, the NRC-CAA controversy strained ties with Bangladesh—India’s most
reliable regional partner for over a decade.
3. Strategic Tilt Toward the U.S. and Its Allies: India deepened defense and strategic cooperation
with the United States, Japan, Australia (through the Quad), and ASEAN countries. The signing of
key foundational agreements like COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020) with the U.S. cemented
this shift. Yet, this alignment has increased dependency while inviting counter-pressure from
China.

The 2020 Galwan Valley clash with China marked a turning point. India lost 20 soldiers in the worst
border skirmish in 45 years. Since then, the Indian military has repositioned forces and developed closer
defense ties with Quad nations. Yet, relations remain tense, with continued Chinese occupation in
Eastern Ladakh and aggressive behavior in Arunachal Pradesh.

India’s neighborhood diplomacy has become more visibly politicized. Domestic communal rhetoric, such
as statements labeling Bangladeshi immigrants as "termites," has international consequences.
Bangladesh, whose economic growth has been remarkable (with a per capita income surpassing India's
in 2020), has become increasingly cautious about aligning too closely with New Delhi.

Relations with Nepal have seen further deterioration. In 2020, Kathmandu released a new map including
the Kalapani-Limpiyadhura-Lipulekh region, straining diplomatic ties. India's past quiet diplomacy has
been replaced by overt posturing, which has weakened its image as a benevolent regional power.

Despite the “Neighbourhood First” policy, India’s delivery on development cooperation has slowed. In
FY2020-21, India’s aid disbursal under the Ministry of External Affairs fell by nearly 12%, undermining its
soft power strategy.

On SAARC and the Pakistan Factor

India’s refusal to engage in SAARC forums due to Pakistan’s presence has diminished regional
cooperation. SAARC summits have been stalled since 2014. Even amid rising Chinese activity in South
Asia—through infrastructure, loans, and military ties—India has not created a strong alternative
platform for regional dialogue.

India-Pakistan relations, post-2016 Uri attacks and the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot escalation, are at their
lowest point since the 1999 Kargil War. J&K’s revocation of Article 370 in August 2019 internationalized
the Kashmir issue once again, with Pakistan raising it at the UN and drawing comment from the OIC and
even China. While India insists this is an internal matter, the global narrative is harder to control.
In Kashmir, data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) shows that terror incidents and local
recruitment rose sharply between 2016 and 2020, despite the government’s security clampdown. The
policy of muscular nationalism has not translated into long-term peace or political engagement with the
region’s population.

The China-Pakistan Nexus

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), valued at $62 billion, is central to China’s Belt and Road
Initiative and directly passes through disputed territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This gives China a
strategic interest in Kashmir and in maintaining Pakistan as a counterbalance to India. Additionally,
China has aided Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities—India's Defence Ministry confirms that this relationship
extends to missile and space technology cooperation.

In Afghanistan, as the Taliban resurged in 2021, Pakistan's intelligence support and sanctuary for its
leadership played a pivotal role. While India had invested over $3 billion in Afghan development
projects, it found itself sidelined during the U.S.-Taliban Doha talks, exposing a gap in its West Asian
strategy.

The Way Forward

India cannot restore the idea of a South Asian geopolitical unit overnight, but it can:

 Rebuild trust with neighbors through economic integration, infrastructure development, and
non-intrusive diplomacy.
 Use initiatives like BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) and BIMSTEC more effectively as
alternatives to SAARC.
 Decentralize diplomacy and empower states like West Bengal and Tamil Nadu to lead border-
region engagement with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, respectively.
 Depoliticize neighborhood ties, move beyond hyper-nationalist rhetoric, and emphasize mutual
prosperity.

India’s foreign policy must now embrace complexity, manage unpredictability, and rebuild its soft power
through sustained engagement. The strategic theater has shifted, and unless India retools its
instruments of diplomacy, it risks not only economic marginalization but also the erosion of its regional
primacy.

Let me know if you'd like a visual representation (e.g., a flowchart or comparative table) of India’s
neighborhood diplomacy or strategic partnerships—happy to build that out for you!

4o
You said:
do like previous answers

ChatGPT said:

Absolutely! Here’s a clean, structured rewrite of the passage, broken down into key thematic sections
and expanded with contemporary references and data—just like we did before:

India’s Foreign Policy in a Shifting Global Order

India today stands at a strategic crossroads. The world has entered an era of uncertainty: while the
economic order is multipolar, with power distributed among many actors, Asia’s strategic landscape
remains bipolar, dominated by U.S.-China rivalry. In this shifting context, India can no longer rely on its
traditional approaches. It needs a foreign policy that is more proactive, flexible, and imaginative to
protect its interests and elevate its global stature.

Three Notable Shifts Under Modi’s Foreign Policy

While the Modi government broadly continued the foreign policy of earlier administrations, it
introduced some key changes:

1. Protectionism and Economic Nationalism

India walked out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019, citing fears over
Chinese economic domination and harm to domestic industries. This decision, though framed as
protecting Indian interests, reduced India’s leverage in shaping the future of Asia-Pacific trade. At the
time, India’s trade deficit with China was over $48 billion, sparking domestic concerns. However, by
stepping out, India also gave up the chance to counterbalance China from within the bloc.

2. Erosion of Neighborhood Ties

Relations with key neighbors—Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Maldives—have weakened. The 2015 Nepal
blockade and India’s public objections to its new constitution created deep mistrust. China capitalized,
significantly expanding its presence in Nepal through infrastructure and investment. In Bangladesh,
India’s domestic moves—especially the CAA and NRC—sparked concern. The phrase “termites” used for
Bangladeshi immigrants by Indian politicians was widely criticized, and Dhaka has since grown more
cautious in aligning too closely with New Delhi.

3. Closer Strategic Ties with the U.S. and Allies

India has moved closer to the U.S. and its partners in the Indo-Pacific. It signed COMCASA, BECA, and
LEMOA, foundational military agreements enabling intelligence and logistics sharing. India has also
become an active player in the Quad (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia) and increased joint naval
exercises in the Indian Ocean. While this has strengthened India’s deterrence posture, it also increases
its exposure in U.S.-China rivalry.

Post-Galwan: The China Factor

The Galwan Valley clash in 2020 marked a turning point. It was the first deadly border conflict in 45
years, with 20 Indian soldiers killed. Since then, military standoffs continue in Ladakh, and Chinese
infrastructure development along the LAC has intensified.

This has led to:

 A rapid Indian military build-up along the northern border.

 Strengthened partnerships with Western allies.
 A strategic rebalancing—India is now more cautious with China and openly critical of its
behavior.

The Decline of India's Regional Influence

Despite the “Neighbourhood First” policy, India’s traditional primacy in South Asia is fading.

A. Nepal

In 2020, Nepal issued a new political map including Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura, leading to a
diplomatic standoff. This signaled Nepal’s willingness to challenge India’s position and revealed how
China’s influence has emboldened neighbors.

B. Bangladesh

Long considered a success story in Indian diplomacy, relations have cooled. Bangladesh’s per capita
income surpassed India’s in 2020, and Dhaka is increasingly confident in dealing with New Delhi. India’s
focus on nationalism at home, especially around migration, threatens the goodwill built over a decade.

C. Maldives and Sri Lanka

India’s political overreach and military presence in these island nations has sparked a “India Out”
sentiment. Simultaneously, China’s Belt and Road investments have given it economic and political
leverage.
D. SAARC’s Collapse

Since 2014, SAARC has been defunct, mainly because India refuses to engage with Pakistan. In its place,
India has backed BIMSTEC, but its success remains modest. The result: India’s vision for regional
integration is incomplete and fragmented.

Kashmir, Pakistan, and International Fallout

The revocation of Article 370 in 2019 intensified India-Pakistan tensions and internationalized the
Kashmir issue once again. Although India insisted it was a domestic matter, China, the OIC, and Pakistan
raised it at international forums. Meanwhile, on the ground in Kashmir:

 Terror recruitment and violence rose between 2016 and 2020 (SATP data).
 There has been no major political outreach or engagement with Kashmiri civil society.
 The use of a “muscular nationalism” approach may have won domestic approval but alienated
the local population and damaged India’s international image.

The China-Pakistan Axis and Afghanistan Factor

China-Pakistan Nexus:

 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), valued at $62 billion, runs through PoK, giving
China a strategic stake in Kashmir.
 China has supplied nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan.
 Their strategic cooperation has deepened as India moved closer to the U.S.

Afghanistan:

 India had invested over $3 billion in Afghan infrastructure and institutions.

 But in the 2021 U.S.-Taliban deal, India was left out.
 After the Taliban’s return, India’s lack of access highlighted how its West Asia policy lacked
depth and coordination.

The Road Ahead: Reclaiming Strategic Space

India cannot restore a united South Asian order overnight, but it can take practical steps to rebuild
influence:
 1. Economic Integration: Prioritize trade, transit, and infrastructure with neighbors. Projects like
BBIN and BIMSTEC should be revitalized.
2. Decentralized Diplomacy: Let border states like West Bengal and Tamil Nadu lead sub-national
engagements with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
3. Depoliticize the Neighborhood: Tone down nationalist rhetoric. Stable regional ties are based
on trust, not dominance.
4. Revive Soft Power: Use cultural, educational, and developmental tools to counter Chinese hard
infrastructure and build goodwill.

India must now accept that strategic ambiguity and balance are no longer enough. It must become an
active shaper of the regional order—not just a reactive power managing crises.

India’s Strategic Core: Asia First

India’s primary strategic theatre must be Asia, especially as China becomes an unavoidable
reality—a power India must engage with, not simply oppose or ignore. As China's political,
military, and regional clout grows, India finds itself constantly interacting with it—across
trade, diplomacy, and defense. At the same time, the U.S.-China rivalry unfolds around India,
affecting its options and maneuverability.

The ideal Indian approach:

→ Actively engage both the U.S. and China, maintaining better bilateral ties with each than
they have with one another—a continuation of the balanced policy from the 1980s onwards.

This approach emphasized:

 Strategic autonomy.
 Flexibility to engage based on national interest.
 Shaping the broader environment through cooperation.

Disruption of the Balanced Approach: Galwan 2020

China’s military aggression in Galwan (2020) shattered the older strategic framework. Instead of
cooperation, India now faces a more adversarial China, undermining the vision of balanced
triangular diplomacy (India–U.S.–China).
India–U.S. Relations: Deepening but Asymmetric

India’s ties with the U.S. have deepened dramatically, especially under the Modi government:

 Signing of four foundational military agreements (e.g., COMCASA, BECA).

 Strategic convergence in countering China’s rise.
 Increasing interoperability of military logistics.

This marks the most extensive strategic dependence on the U.S. by any Indian government.

However, the relationship remains asymmetrical:

 The U.S. is far more powerful economically and militarily.

 India retains autonomy, occasionally frustrating U.S. policymakers.
 No mutual defense clause makes it a quasi-alliance, not a formal one.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Limitations

The U.S. response to China's rise is the Indo-Pacific Strategy, with the Quad (India, U.S.,
Japan, Australia) at its core.

But India’s challenges are not only maritime:

 India faces continental threats, especially at its land border with China.
 The Quad offers limited help for these, as the U.S. presence in continental Asia is
minimal (e.g., Afghanistan exit).
 India's strategy must work with land-based Asian powers—Russia, Iran, and even
China—not just maritime democracies.

Also, to be effective, the Quad must:

 Include ASEAN voices, especially Singapore and Indonesia.

 Address different security geographies distinctly: Indian Ocean ≠ South China Sea ≠
Western Pacific.

The U.S. Under Trump: A Transactional Partner

Trump-era foreign policy brought a major shift in U.S. global engagement:

 Withdrawal from TPP, Paris Agreement, Iran Nuclear Deal.

 Sanctions on allies and economic confrontation with China.
 Undermining multilateral institutions like the WTO.
  Troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq.

This showed a reduced willingness to provide global public goods, shifting toward a
transactional, tactical foreign policy.

Despite this, India–U.S. relations continued growing due to shared concerns about China and
convergence in rules-based order preferences.

The U.S.: A Power in Flux

The U.S. has often been underestimated but has shown an ability to adapt and reinvent:

 Dominance in tech, energy, AI, and digital manufacturing could allow it to shape new
global norms.
 But its domestic polarization and deglobalization trends—like reshoring production—
challenge its leadership credibility.

Under Trump, even loyal allies like Germany and Canada were alienated. For India, this
meant:

 A realization that it can’t fully rely on the U.S.

 The need to build issue-based coalitions and multipolar partnerships.

West Asia: Balancing in a Divided Region

India has long managed a careful balance in West Asia:

 Historically, it engaged both Iran and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, despite their
rivalries.
 Now, proxy wars and fragmentation (Yemen, Syria, Libya) complicate the region
further.

India must:

 Continue non-interference in internal disputes.

 Protect energy supply chains, diaspora interests (7 million Indians in the region), and
strategic autonomy.
 Deepen cooperation with regional powers—Iran, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia
—as the U.S. and Europe disengage.

Iran remains especially crucial:

  Strategic geography.
 Role in Chabahar, Afghanistan, and energy security.
 India must engage Iran despite U.S. objections, as a strong Iran policy may even
pressure the U.S. to accommodate Indian interests.

Economic Integration: The RCEP and ASEAN Dilemma

India must rethink its approach to Asian economic integration, particularly with:

 ASEAN (goal of $200B trade by 2022 unmet).

 Its exit from RCEP in 2019 (even in final stages) diminished India's economic footprint
in East Asia.

Trade realities:

 India–ASEAN trade was $70B in 2016–17, despite massive growth over two decades.
 India has raised customs duties three years in a row.
 Protectionist sentiment is growing, especially post–COVID-19.

Meanwhile:

 China is promoting alternatives, like an East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN, China,
Japan, Korea).
 India’s turn inward contrasts sharply with its earlier success via globalization.

Key Takeaways: Strategic Recommendations

To secure its place in a volatile world, India must:

1. Engage actively with both the U.S. and China, avoiding rigid alignments.
2. Balance maritime and continental strategies, recognizing geography-specific threats.
3. Strengthen economic integration with ASEAN and East Asia, not retreat from trade.
4. Bolster autonomy in West Asia, cooperating with multiple poles and securing critical
interests.
5. Use the strategic fluidity of U.S. retrenchment to expand India’s partnerships and
influence.
🌊 1. Maritime Security & the Indian Ocean

 Strategic Importance:
The Indian Ocean is vital — carrying 70% of global oil, 50% of container traffic, and
35% of bulk cargo. India's prosperity and energy security are directly tied to it.
 India’s Role:
India’s focus isn’t on excluding other maritime powers — which isn’t realistic — but
ensuring freedom of navigation and security of sea-lanes, even beyond the Indian
Ocean, into areas near China.
 Collaborative Approach:
Unlike land borders, the maritime domain is non-zero-sum — security benefits all. Thus,
cooperation with powers like the US, Japan, China, ASEAN members, and Australia
is essential.

💻 2. Cyberspace and Global Commons

 Nature of Cyberspace:
Difficult to regulate due to the lack of attribution and the speed of attacks, which
render traditional deterrence mechanisms ineffective.
 India’s Strategy:
India must build strong cyber capabilities — both defensive and offensive — to protect
its interests in this new domain.
 Multilateral Cooperation:
Like in maritime issues, India finds alignment with countries like Japan, ASEAN, and
Australia in keeping the cyber, maritime, and space commons open and resisting
efforts to "territorialize" them.

☢️3. Nuclear Deterrence

 Current Posture:
India’s nuclear doctrine of No First Use (NFU) has so far deterred threats effectively.
Since 1998, there has been no credible nuclear threat or blackmail against India.
 Pressure to Change:
Some voices argue for a shift from NFU to a war-fighting posture, especially given
India’s conventional asymmetry with China.
 Technology & Risk:
As remote sensing and precision strikes improve, the deterrence balance may shift,
risking preemptive strikes and arms races. India needs constant review and adaptation
of its doctrine.
🧨 4. Internal Threats and Social Violence

 Urbanization & Demographic Change: Rapid urbanization is transforming India. By

2025, more than half of Indians will live in cities. This brings:
o Young, aspirational, but potentially alienated populations.
o New forms of violence and polarization, not easily managed by traditional
institutions.
 Nature of Violence:
o Communal and gender-based violence is rising.
o Social violence is becoming more widespread than terrorism or insurgency.
o Institutions like the police are outdated, built for agrarian societies, not modern
urban dynamics.
 Impact on Foreign Policy:
o These internal challenges sap India's energy and coherence in foreign and
security policy.
o Shared challenges with neighbors may allow for some regional cooperation, but
primarily, it weakens India’s external posture.

🧩 Summary: India’s Strategic Tasks Going Forward

Domain India's Strategic Task

Ensure sea-lane security, cooperate with maritime powers, uphold freedom of
Maritime
navigation.
Build capabilities, shape global norms, deter and defend amid attribution
Cyberspace
challenges.
Nuclear Maintain credible deterrence, review NFU posture, adapt to tech-driven
Doctrine changes.
Internal Address root causes of social violence, modernize institutions, prevent
Security polarization.

1. Institutional Evolution: The National Security Council (NSC)

 Origins & Function:

o India set up its NSC in 1998, pioneering among parliamentary democracies.
o Modeled to address cross-ministerial, cross-sectoral security threats (cyber,
terrorism, nuclear).
o Other democracies like the UK, Japan, and Spain followed suit later.
  Structure:
o Assisted by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)—comprising
experts.
o Policy implementation is managed by the Strategic Policy Group, now led by
the NSA instead of the Cabinet Secretary, increasing the NSA’s operational role.
o NSC became increasingly involved in day-to-day operations rather than long-
term strategic planning.
 Context of Formation:
o Driven by:
 Cross-border terrorism (especially in J&K),
 The Kargil War (1999),
 India’s nuclear weapon status (post-1998),
 Growing cyber threats.
 Achievements:
o Development of India’s nuclear doctrine and Strategic Forces Command.
o Created integrated responses like Rashtriya Rifles, tech intelligence agencies
(NTRO), and cyber security frameworks.
o Provided a rare high-level forum bringing together political leadership and
military chiefs for national security discussions.

2. India’s Strategic Environment and the Importance of Engagement

 Shift in Global Landscape:

o More uncertain world order, with rising Chinese assertiveness and shifting U.S.
commitments.
o Debate in India: whether to lean on powers like the U.S. (via Quad, Indo-Pacific)
or maintain autonomy.
 Strategic Dilemmas:
o Alignment vs. Autonomy:
 Menon critiques both:
 Overreliance on powers like the U.S. due to fear of China.
 Retreat into protectionism (seen in resistance to RCEP, trade
reluctance).
 Advocates "engaged strategic autonomy"—cooperate pragmatically but
on India’s own terms.
 Economic Imperatives:
o India must remain globally connected for:
 Access to capital, tech, and resources.
 Driving internal transformation (poverty alleviation, modernization).
o A strategic policy must have an economic engine—security policy can't work
without trade engagement.
3. Strategic Autonomy as a Guiding Principle

 Historical Consistency:
o Strategic autonomy has been a thread from Nehru’s non-alignment to UPA’s
pragmatism.
o Not about neutrality or isolation but about maintaining freedom of decision-
making.
 Why Autonomy?
o India’s diverse identity, history, and unique national interests set it apart from
other powers.
o No alliance system would fully cater to India's unique mix of challenges and
ambitions.
 Not Isolationist:
o Strategic autonomy ≠ autarky.
o It's about building capability, diversifying relationships, and resisting
dependency.
o Domestic reform (like 1991 economic liberalization) supported external
engagement.

4. Role in the Emerging Multipolar Order

 India’s Place:
o Not a revisionist power—seeks reform, not revolution.
o Interested in peaceful evolution of global norms (e.g., nuclear agreements, climate
cooperation).
o Strategic autonomy helps India navigate multipolarity, balancing relationships
without entanglements.
 Opportunities Ahead:
o Engage more in West Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe.
o Be proactive in shaping cyber norms, energy governance, ICT rules, etc.
o Domestic consolidation + bold external engagement = best strategy.

5. Final Insight: Need for Institutional Flexibility

 Menon closes with a call for adaptability.

o India’s institutions must evolve with change.
o Embracing complexity and change is the only constant in effective strategy.
o Quote-worthy takeaway:

“Avoiding war and attaining one’s goals is the highest form of strategy...
India has not done badly in moving toward its main goal of transforming
India.”
🧭 Is a Stable Asian Order Emerging?

Menon argues that stability is neither realistic nor desirable in Asia today. Why?

 The region is experiencing rapid change: new powers (India, China, Indonesia,
Vietnam) are rising, and old ones (Japan, Australia) are recalibrating.
 The U.S., traditionally a status quo power, is itself unhappy with the current order and
wants to renegotiate terms.
 Stability can become a code word for preserving an unjust status quo, similar to post-
WWI Europe, which led to WWII.
 Asian powers are revisionist to varying degrees; they are actively trying to reshape the
order, not just maintain it.

🛑 Trying to enforce strategic stability may be perceived as asking rising powers to "know their
place" — which is counterproductive.

🔄 Managing Change > Chasing Stability

Instead of seeking a rigid order, Menon proposes:

 Issue-based coalitions to address specific problems (cybersecurity, maritime security,

etc.).
 Bottom-up institution-building, like the India-China confidence-building measures,
despite their tensions.
 Institutions like ASEAN and East Asia Summit could serve as platforms for
coordination.
 Practical rules of the road, even if imperfect (like the U.S.-China cybercrime
agreement), are better than chasing a perfect order.

🌏 Asia’s Geopolitical Landscape

 The continental order (Eurasia) is slowly taking shape, with China at its center.
 The maritime order is more contested, despite shared interests in open sea lanes.
 In West Asia, there's a void — no clear order exists.

Menon notes the U.S. “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy is vague and under-resourced.
He advocates for an order that integrates new powers (India, China, Iran, Brazil) into the global
system, rather than isolates or sidelines them.
📚 Lessons from History

 Contrary to analogies with WWI, Menon suggests today's dynamics are more complex.
 It was declining powers (not rising ones) that triggered WWI — a point that could signal
a different outcome in modern Asia.
 He sees multipolarity not as a risk but as an opportunity for greater stability, citing:
o Asian history before European dominance.
o Concert of Europe as a successful example of multipolar peace.

⚠️However, achieving multipolarity is hard in an era of authoritarian nationalism, where

leaders are less inclined to compromise.

🔥 Where Does the Danger Lie?

Menon doesn’t believe a major great-power war is inevitable. However:

 Uncertainty is rising, especially in regional flashpoints.

 Local conflicts and the inability to manage cross-sectoral challenges (climate, economy,
tech) are more immediate threats.
 The U.S.-China rivalry isn't about building a multipolar order — it's about primacy.

🇮🇳 India’s Role and Challenges

 India should pursue a grand strategy grounded in what kind of nation it wants to
become: modern, prosperous, secure.
 Domestic transformations (economic, social) must be India’s core focus, with foreign
policy serving this goal.
 However, India’s current political trajectory — polarized, communal, prestige-driven
— risks undermining this.

For example, the Jammu & Kashmir reorganization and citizenship law changes have
backfired diplomatically, re-hyphenating India with Pakistan and weakening regional goodwill.

🧠 Final Reflections

 Menon is cautiously optimistic about Asia muddling through — particularly the Asia-
Pacific.
 But he warns of declining capacity for global crisis management.
 He advocates a “world safe for diversity” — where both liberal and illiberal states can
coexist peacefully and focus on internal transformation.
🌏 1. Change Is Constant, History Is Not Linear

 Key Idea: The inevitability of change is central—what seems dominant today (like
globalization or great-power competition) will generate its own counterforces.
 Critique of Presentism: Menon warns against "presentism"—the fallacy of believing
that the present trend will continue indefinitely. This is a strong critique of both
doomsayers and triumphalists.

🔁 Implication: India's strategy cannot rest on assuming the current global order will persist. It
must remain adaptable.

🌐 2. We're Between Eras: No Going Back, No Clear Future

 Menon describes our time as an interregnum—an unstable, transitional phase between

two global orders.
 There’s no comfort in nostalgia: The post-Cold War, US-led unipolarity is over.
 Nor in clear bipolarity or Chinese dominance: Neither China has the power to lead,
nor the US the will.

🧭 Implication: India must avoid aligning with any fixed global bloc and instead adopt a
flexible, multipolar diplomacy—what he calls strategic autonomy.

🧩 3. Asia’s Future Will Be Fragmented and Regional

 Asia is too complex to be ruled by a single hegemon. Regional orders will likely emerge:
o East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, etc.
 Power will be dispersed among local and regional actors—not dominated by great powers
alone.

Implication for India: Focus on subregional partnerships and maintain influence in its
immediate periphery (like the Indian Ocean, South Asia, Southeast Asia).

🇮🇳 4. Strategic Autonomy as India’s Guiding Principle

 Don’t overreach. Menon draws parallels with historical powers:

o US before WWII
o China in the 80s–90s
o England under the Tudors
 Core Strategy:
o Build internal strength (economic, institutional, social)
 o Avoid dramatic or status-driven foreign policy moves
o Rely on coalitions, not rigid alliances

🔑 Implication: India should prioritize development over status, restraint over ambition, and
pragmatism over ideology.

5. Domestic Transformation Is the Real Foreign Policy Goal

 The goal of foreign policy isn't prestige or dominance—but to create an enabling global
environment for internal transformation.
 A great power, Menon argues, is one that ensures safety, prosperity, and dignity for its
people.

💡 Implication: India's diplomacy must serve domestic growth, stability, and inclusion—not
geopolitics for its own sake.

🧨 6. The Real Threat Is Internal, Not External

 Menon subtly but clearly emphasizes that India faces no existential external threat.
 Instead, internal challenges—social cohesion, governance, economic disparities—pose
the real risks.

⚠️Implication: External posturing cannot compensate for internal weaknesses.