ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS – MIDTERM

EXAMINATION
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As experienced in the preceding semester, some students found it difficult to
answer the examination questions using the CANVAS system, thus, I have
formulated this examination in such a way that students are given three (3) days
to submit their answer via email at my email
address: leonbologn631111@[Link]
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Instruction: Read and understand the problem before you answer. All answer shall be
handwritten. Printed or typed answers will not be given any credit. Begin your answer to
each question on a separate page. Explain your answer directly and concisely. A mere
yes or no will not earn any credit. Write legibly.
After you are done answering the examination questions, scan your papers. Make
certain that you scan each and every page of your paper. In addition, the scanned
version must be clear and legible. Each question is worth ten (10) points.
Send your scanned papers to my email address not later than March 23, 2021 at 6:30
p.m.

1. The President of the Republic of the Philippines issued an Executive

Order creating the Truth Commission tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving
third level public officers during the administration of the
predecessor of the current President, and thereafter submit its findings
and recommendations to the Office of the President, Congress, and
the Ombudsman. The concerned public officers questioned the
constitutionality of the Executive Order, contending that the creation of
the Truth Commission is not among the powers of the President as
contained in the Constitution. What is the meaning of “Residual”
powers of the President? Is the contention of the concerned public
officers meritorious? (10 points)
G.R. No. 192935
As declared by the Supreme Court, the residual power is the power borne by
the President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It may also be
viewed as a power implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed. (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668)
No, the contention of the concerned public officers is not meritorious.
Under Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President has the power to
control all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, and the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
With the creation of the Truth Commission, the President has validly
delegated the fact-finding and investigatory powers of the Department of
Justice.
The Truth Commission was established to ensure that the fundamental laws
on public accountability and transparency are observed. The President’s
powers to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute that power,
although not explicitly stated in the Constitution, are within the authority of the
President as entailed in his duty to ensure the faithful execution of laws.
The Truth Commission was validly created by the President of the Philippines
within authority of law. Therefore, the Executive Order is constitutional.

2. A complaint is filed before the Ombudsman against the PNP Chief for
alleged graft and corruption due to the procurement of firearms without
the requisite public bidding. Before the respondent could submit his
counter-affidavit and other evidence, the Ombudsman placed him under
preventive suspension. The respondent files a petition that seeks to
nullify the order of preventive suspension on the ground that he was
denied due process, particularly his right to notice and hearing. Is the
contention of the PNP Chief meritorious? (10 points)
G.R. No. 219501
No, the contention of the PNP Chief is not meritorious.
As held by the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman may issue a preventive
suspension order prior to the filing of an answer or counter-affidavit,
considering that the same is but a preventive measure. The purpose of the
suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him.
Prior notice and hearing for the issuance of a preventive suspension order is
not required because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation.
Therefore, the Ombudsman did not violate the PNP Chief’s right to due
process, particularly his right to notice and hearing, when the Ombudsman
issued the preventive suspension order before the PNP Chief was able to file
his counter-affidavit and other evidence because the issuance of a preventive
suspension does not amount to a prejudgment of the merits of the case.

3. Prior to the effectivity of the Local Government Code in 1991, Ms.

Mahusay was appointed by Provincial Governor Matiwasay as
Provincial Administrator. Sometime in the year 1999, Provincial
Governor Maligalig who succeeded Governor Matiwasay, ordered the
dismissal of Ms. Mahusay on the ground of loss of confidence. Ms.
Mahusay questioned her dismissal from service, arguing that she
occupies a permanent position and as such, she enjoys security of
tenure. She further argues that loss of confidence is not a valid ground
for her dismissal from public service as Provincial Administrator. Is the
dismissal of Ms. Mahusay valid? (10 points)
G.R. No. 185740
 Yes, the dismissal of Ms. Mahusay is valid.
Jurisprudence dictates that security of tenure in public office means that a
public officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for
causes provided by law and after due process. Moreover, since a primarily
confidential employee serves at the confidence of his appointing authority, his
term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in him.

Since Ms. Mahusay was a primarily confidential employee being a Provincial

Administrator, loss of trust and confidence is one of the just causes provided
by law as a valid ground for the termination of her employment.
Ms. Mahusay cannot invoke her security of tenure to oppose her dismissal
because security of tenure in public office does not grant the right to such
office. Her security of tenure only protects her from being suspended or
dismissed for causes other than those provided by law and without due
process. Therefore, the dismissal of Ms. Mahusay on the ground of loss of
confidence was valid.

4. Congress enacts a law deregulating the oil industry wherein “any

person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products and market such crude oil or petroleum or use such
for his own requirement” subject only to the monitoring of the
Department of Energy. This law ended the government’s regulation of
the oil industry. Francisco files a petition questioning the
constitutionality of the law, contending that the deregulation law fails to
meet the completeness and sufficient standard test, as it empowers the
Department of Energy to exercise undue delegated legislative powers.
Explain the meaning of the following: a) Completeness Test; and b)
Sufficient Standard Test.
G.R. No. 124360

a. The completeness test provides that a law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that when it reaches
the delegate, it will have nothing to do but to enforce it. An enactment is said
to be incomplete and invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it.

b. The sufficient standard test provides that the law must stipulate
adequate guidelines to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegate from overstepping its boundaries. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented. The law satisfies the sufficient standard test when sufficient
standards that saliently outline the limits of the delegate's authority by defining
the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected, are indicated.

5. Regional Director Diskitar was administratively charged for

malversation of public funds, violation of COA rules and regulations,
harassment and oppression. During hearings conducted by the
committee that investigated him, he was not assisted by counsel.
Record of the case showed that Diskitar had moved for resetting of the
hearing to enable him to engage the services of a lawyer, and the
motion of Diskitar was granted. However, on the dates he himself has
chosen, Diskitar and his counsel failed to appear, thus the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. Thereafter the committee rendered a
decision finding Diskitar guilty as charged in the administrative case,
and recommended his dismissal from service. The President approved
the recommendation of the committee and dismissed Diskitar from
government service. Diskitar filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the Supreme Court contending that his dismissal
from service is invalid as he was denied due process of law on the
ground that his right to counsel, which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights in our Constitution, has been violated. Is the contention of
Diskitar correct? (10 points)
G.R. No. 187854
No, Diskitar’s contention is incorrect.
As held by the Supreme Court, in administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving of reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to be
heard and to answer the accusations against him, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, constitute due process.
Diskitar was given a reasonable opportunity to answer the accusations
against him when his motion to reset the hearing to enable him to engage the
services of a lawyer was granted.
Despite having been given a reasonable opportunity to answer the
accusations against him, Diskitar did not use that opportunity to be heard
when he and his counsel failed to appear on the dates of the hearings, he
himself has chosen. Therefore, Diskitar was not denied due process.

6. Dimagiba is appointed as Administrative Officer II in a temporary

capacity since he lacks the eligibility requirement. Nine months after his
appointment, he was able to pass the Civil Service Examination.
Dimagiba now asserts that since he passed the Civil Service
Examination, he is now eligible and consequently, his temporary
appointment becomes permanent. Is the argument of Dimagiba correct?
(10 points)
G.R. No. 99336
No, Dimagiba’s argument is incorrect.
As held by the Supreme Court, a permanent appointment is not a
continuation of the temporary appointment because these are two distinct
acts of the appointing authority.
Here, Dimagiba’s appointment as Administrative Officer II was only temporary
because he lacks the eligibility requirement. Upon passing the Civil Service
Examination and acquiring eligibility, a new appointment in a permanent
 capacity should be granted to Dimagiba for him to be able to acquire the
status of a permanent employee.
Therefore, to become a permanent employee, there must be another act of
appointment, other than the temporary appointment, by an appointing officer
to appoint Dimagiba in a permanent capacity.

7. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued a circular to

discontinue payment of other allowances and fringe benefits for
government officials and employees. The said circular was not
published. May the circular be implemented even if it is not published?
(10 points)
G.R. No. 109023
No, the circular cannot be implemented if it is not published.
According to a case decided by the Supreme Court, all statutes shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforced or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
The circular which discontinues payment of allowances and fringe benefits to
government officials and employees is not a mere interpretative or internal
regulation, nor a letter of instruction. It is a regulation of general application,
hence, the government officials and employees concerned should be alerted
through publication of the circular.
Therefore, the circular must go through the requisite publication to be
effective and enforceable.

8. Due to an adverse decision rendered by the Department of Agrarian

Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) regarding the validity of a Lease
Agreement, the Farmers’ Cooperative filed an appeal in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB decision on the
ground that the issues involved are findings of facts, thus, the Court of
Appeals shall not disturb the findings made by the administrative
agency. The Farmers’ Cooperative filed a petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals that
affirmed the DARAB decision. May the petition prosper?
G.R. No. 184950
No, the petition may not prosper.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or
her. Failure of a party to exhaust all the means of administrative processes
may be a ground for dismissal of the case filed in court due to lack of cause of
action.
Since DARAB is an administrative agency, its decision should have been first
appealed to the Office of the President before seeking court intervention from
the Court of Appeals for judicial review.
Since the Farmers’ Cooperative failed to exhaust all the means of
administrative processes afforded to it, the appeal may be dismissed for lack
of cause of action upon motion of the adverse party. Therefore, the petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court may not prosper.

9. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8973 entitled "An Act creating the
Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the Province of Zamboanga del
Sur and for other purposes". As consequence thereof, the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the province of Zamboanga del Sur
(province, for brevity) was reduced by thirty-six percent (36%). Because
of such reduction, the provincial governor sought the opinion of the
Civil Service Commission [CSC] on the possibility of reducing the
workforce of the provincial government. In response, CSC issued an
opinion, the pertinent portions of which are as follows:

"Please be advised also that in the event reorganization is carried out in that
province, the same must be authorized by appropriate Sangguniang Panlalawigan
(SP) resolution, so that necessary funds may be correspondingly released,
among other purposes, to aid the provincial government in the implementation
thereof. Should you have further queries on the matter, please feel free to
coordinate with our Civil Service Commission Regional Office (CSCRO)."
Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur passed
Resolution No. 2Kl-27 approving the new staffing pattern of the provincial
government consisting only of 727 positions and Resolution No. 2Kl-038 which
authorized the provincial governor to undertake the reorganization of the
provincial government and to implement the new staffing pattern. Pursuant to
said authority, the provincial governor appointed employees to the new positions
in the provincial government. Some employees who were occupying permanent
positions in the old plantilla and have allegedly been in the service for a long time
were not given placement preference and were instead terminated. On various
dates, these employees filed their respective letters of appeal regarding their
termination with the provincial governor. However, no action was taken on the
appeals made; hence, private respondents brought the matter to the CSCRO. In
the meantime, the province submitted its Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) to
the CSCRO for attestation.
Upon review of the ROPA submitted by the provincial government, the CSCRO
found that the subject appointments violated the law on appointment of
personnel for allegedly failing to grant preference in appointment to employees
previously occupying permanent positions in the old plantilla. As a result, the
CSCRO invalidated a total of ninety-six (96) appointments made by the governor
after the reorganization. In addition, the CSRO ordered the provincial governor to
reinstate the employees to their former positions.
The provincial governor defended the appointments and removal of the
employees as a consequence of a reorganization made in good faith. The
provincial governor further argued that the governor has the exclusive discretion
to appoint employees of the provincial government and that the CSC does not
have the prerogative to revoke the appointments made by the provincial
governor.
Is the argument of the provincial governor valid? (10 points)

G.R. No. 180845

No, the argument of the provincial governor is incorrect.

Jurisprudence dictates that there is no encroachment on the discretion of the
appointing authority when the CSC revokes an appointment on the ground
that the removal of the employee was done in bad faith. A reorganization is
done in bad faith when the enumerated circumstances in Section 2 of the
Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees law are present.
Moreover, under the same law, officers and employees holding permanent
appointments in the old staffing pattern shall be given preference for
appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern, and no new
employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have
been appointed

There was evident bad faith in the reorganization of the Province of

Zamboanga del Sur as when the provincial governor appointed ninety-six (96)
new employees, circumventing the security of tenure of ninety-six (96) former
employees. It also violated the rule on preference and non-hiring of new
employees when the ninety-six (96) former employees were replaced by
either new employees or those holding lower positions in the old staffing
pattern.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement
and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due
process. Therefore, it is within the power of the CSCRO to invalidate the
ninety-six (96) new appointments made by the provincial governor after the
reorganization and to order the reinstatement of the former ninety-six (96)
employees to their former positions.

10. After due notice and hearing in an administrative case where Makisig
was charged for Gross Misconduct, the Hearing Officer rendered
judgment finding Makisig guilty as charged and imposing upon him the
penalty of dismissal from service. The decision is written in a one-page
document, which merely stated:

“WHEREFORE, finding Makisig GUILTY as charged for Gross Misconduct, he is

hereby DISMISSED from government service, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.”
There is no explanation as to the facts or the law as basis for the decision. Is the
decision valid? (10 points)
G.R. No. 88709
No, the decision is not valid.
Under the Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, no decision shall be rendered
by any court without stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
Due process requires that the parties to a litigation should be informed of how
an order was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court. It would be prejudicial to the rights of
Makisig to not know why he lost and identify possible errors of the court for
purposes of appeal.
Therefore, it would be a violation of Makisig’s right to due process if the order
finding him guilty of gross misconduct and dismissing him from service, with
no explanation as to the facts or the law as basis for the decision, would be
enforced.

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