ProjectEPIC JPM
ProjectEPIC JPM
Within this innovative framework, Kinexys Digital Assets (KDA, formerly known as Onyx Digital Assets (ODA)),
J.P. Morgan’s digital assets platform has emerged as a pivotal infrastructure, demonstrating practical applications
of tokenized assets on blockchain rails. KDA has successfully facilitated trading and settlement activity worth
over $1.5T, enabling clients to leverage traditional assets like U.S. Treasuries, money market funds and fixed
income instruments in novel ways. From intraday borrowing through repo to streamlined margin management, KDA
is redefining how financial transactions are conducted. As we look to expand the capabilities of KDA, we recognize
that on-chain privacy and advancements in identity management are the linchpin for unlocking its full potential for
our clients. Enhanced privacy measures are essential for broadening access to the KDA platform and expanding its
applications in the financial ecosystem. Streamlined identity management is also a crucial enabler for the scalability
of tokenized assets, on KDA and beyond.
Our focus on on-chain privacy and identity is not new. Our journey began in 2017 with the development of the
Zero Knowledge Security Layer (ZSL) 1 , a blockchain-agnostic protocol based on zkSNARKs designed by Zcash to
enable digital asset privacy. In 2019, we developed Anonymous Zether, a protocol for confidential transactions on the
Ethereum blockchain. Throughout the years, the Kinexys Labs team (formerly known as Onyx Blockchain Launch)
has consistently championed decentralized digital identity as key to revolutionizing blockchain adoption while
delivering transformative blockchain solutions. We publicized this exploration through our collaboration with the
Monetary Authority of Singapore, resulting in the “Institutional DeFi: The Next Generation of Finance” report in
2022 2 . We then open-sourced our Self Sovereign Identity Software Development Kit 3 and conducted J.P. Morgan’s
first external hackathon. More recently, our work with KDA on “The Future of Wealth Management” in 2023 4
continued to push the boundaries of what’s possible in financial systems rooted in tokenization, noting on-chain
privacy and streamlined identity management as two key challenges to tackle next.
This report serves as a comprehensive examination of Kinexys’ perspective on privacy, identity and composability in
asset tokenization. Our aim is two-fold: to articulate the challenges and opportunities in this space and to catalyze
industry-wide dialogue and action. By sharing our insights and experiences, we hope to foster collaboration and
innovation that will drive the next phase of evolution in tokenized finance.
The timing of this report is deliberate, coinciding with our increased focus on fund tokenization for streamlined
lifecycle operations and enhanced distribution through 2024 and beyond. As we embark on this next chapter,
we believe that addressing the triad of privacy, identity and composability is crucial for realizing the full potential
of blockchain in finance.
Alexandra Prager
Head of Kinexys Labs
Kinexys by J.P. Morgan
Keerthi Moudgal
Head of Product, Kinexys Digital Assets
Kinexys by J.P. Morgan
Nikhil Sharma
Head of Growth, Kinexys Digital Assets
Kinexys by J.P. Morgan
Findings 33
Contributors:
Sudhir Upadhyay Angela Pratt Shaltiel Eloul
Head of Engineering, Kinexys by J.P. Morgan Lead Software Engineer, Kinexys Labs Applied Research Director,
[email protected] [email protected] Global Technology Applied Research
[email protected]
Manmeet Ahluwalia Ganesh Anantwar
Head of Engineering, Kinexys Digital Assets Lead Software Engineer, Shawn Roling
[email protected] Kinexys Digital Assets Design Lead, Kinexys by J.P. Morgan
[email protected] [email protected]
Imran Bashir
Principal Software Engineer, Abhishek Agarwal Jack Nicholson
Kinexys by J.P. Morgan Software Engineer III, Kinexys Digital Assets Senior Designer, Kinexys by J.P. Morgan
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Securities Services
& Global Technology
Applied Research
The asset tokenization market, currently valued in billions, is poised for exponential growth, with industry analyses
from leading consulting firms projecting a multi-trillion dollar future. However, realizing this transformative
potential hinges critically on addressing institutional-grade privacy and developing composable, privacy-preserving
identity solutions. Without these foundational elements, the industry’s expansion will remain constrained,
particularly in attracting traditional investors who expect robust data protection comparable to conventional
markets.
At Kinexys Digital Assets, we have been at the forefront of implementing tokenization in traditional financial flows,
successfully processing $2-3B worth of tokenized asset transactions daily. Our decision in 2020 to build on an
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM 5)-based permissioned blockchain has been validated by the remarkable growth
within the Ethereum and EVM ecosystems. This strategic choice leverages blockchain’s inherent characteristics:
immutability, trust-minimization, transparency, programmability and decentralization. Using these constructs,
KDA’s current solutions effectively mitigate settlement risk, automate trade and asset lifecycle management and
streamline reconciliation efforts, attracting numerous peers and clients to our platform.
Separately, the institutional landscape has evolved significantly over the past year, with increased activity on
public blockchains driven by asset managers 6 , as evidenced by rising assets under management (AUM) in on-chain
investment products. While operational efficiency remains a key driver, there is a notable emphasis on accessing
new distribution channels, particularly focusing on crypto-native investors.
Regardless of whether assets are tokenized on public or permissioned chains, or whether the immediate focus is
operational optimization or distribution expansion, traditional market requirements remain unfulfilled. The lack
of mature, on-chain cryptographic privacy solutions, coupled with the absence of consensus on implementing
privacy-preserving digital identity, continues to create operational friction in tokenized asset interactions.
While these challenges are not entirely gating – as demonstrated by the $2-3B 7 raised through on-chain funds
and approximately $200B 8 in stablecoins, protocol treasuries and public chain lending protocols — solving for
them could broaden adoption.
Current market activity on public blockchains demonstrates demand from participants for whom robust privacy
and industry-wide identity solutions may be less critical. However, for traditional investors, data privacy is a
baseline requirement, and without comprehensive yet seamless privacy and digital identity solutions, key benefits
of tokenization will remain unrealized.
Our Vision
We envision a future where all parties can transact, build and benefit within public and permissioned ecosystems
efficiently and privately. Success of this vision is hinged on:
This openness is a double-edged sword, offering the benefit of transparency at the cost of privacy. While on-chain
addresses appear random and unattributable, they are pseudonymous and do not guarantee anonymity.
Target State: Participants should have the choice to shield important details and protect sensitive financial
information. In such a state, data would be conditionally disclosed on a unified ledger with a shared state,
ensuring transparency without compromising confidentiality.
• Trustworthiness of Identity: Identity attributes (e.g. Know Your Customer (KYC) status) are only as
reliable as the trusted entity that made the attestation. For example, the New York Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV) is a trusted governmental entity who can attest to an individual’s name and address.
While there are analog systems for validating such trusted entities, these systems are not intrinsically
compatible or integrated with blockchain networks. Additionally, the absence of consistent trust
frameworks across financial market participants prevents the efficient reuse of compliance and
onboarding verifications.
• Challenges with Storing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) On-Chain: Storing PII on a shared
ledger compromises privacy and security, making it potentially unsuitable for regulated financial
applications. The key challenge is ensuring that an on-chain actor acquires relevant attestations and
identity checks without revealing any PII.
Target State: Repurposable digital identities could revolutionize KYC and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) processes.
Investors could efficiently verify their identities across multiple platforms and use cases, significantly reducing
redundancy and enhancing the user experience while maintaining robust compliance standards.
Blockchain and tokenization serve as catalysts to improve upon the composability of finance in the ways below:
1 By enabling the conversion of financial assets and processes into modular, reusable code
2 By driving automation in the execution of operational processes
Once an asset is tokenized, it is much easier to move, settle, and service. The asset could also be used in
purpose-built applications — e.g. applications for financing, secondary trading, collateralization, and more —
which further enhances its utility. The EVM ecosystem, with over 2,000 protocols 10, is a key proof point in
the rapid acceleration of growth and financial innovation that modularity and autonomy can bring.
Well-designed privacy and digital identity solutions can complement and thoughtfully enhance composability and
amplify value creation across the ecosystem (see diagram on next page).
We anchored this exploration to real business problems within the investment funds ecosystem, ensuring our
analysis remained grounded in practical utilities.
This POC builds on past initiatives, including our 2023 report on “The Future of Wealth Management” 11 , where we
showcased the transformative power of managing entire portfolios of tokenized investments using smart contracts.
Our findings showed that approximately 3,000 steps could be collapsed into a few clicks, that end investors could
benefit from the elimination of cash drag and that this technology could help asset managers realize the $400B
annual incremental revenue opportunity 12 in better serving high net worth investors. Importantly, this work
highlighted the need for scalable privacy solutions and robust identity frameworks to enable such transformation
at scale.
Through structured interviews with Apollo, Albourne Partners Limited, Azalea Asset Management Pte. Ltd,
Formidium, J.P. Morgan Securities Services, NAV Fund Services, Schroders, and University of Cambridge
Investment Management, we validated the problem statements, needs, and requirements across all types
of participants within the fund lifecycle. Against this backdrop, we then explored two key themes, spanning
several solutions:
The Technical Deep-Dive: On-chain privacy and digital identity section provides a deeper exploration
of these concepts.
Our technical evaluation phase involved structuring a set of requirements to demonstrate our use cases and
themes pertaining to institutional needs and then implementing these requirements using Zama’s FHE solution
and the Kinexys Self Sovereign Identity (SSI) SDK. Our Applied Research team, Fhenix, AvaCloud and Parfin also
implemented the same requirements.
Finally, we analyzed findings across all implementations to assess the readiness of currently available solutions
and identified gaps that need to be bridged for institutional adoption. We have detailed these findings and their
implications in the following sections of this report.
The complex ecosystem of registered and alternative investment funds consists of various participants,
each grappling with distinct challenges that impede efficiency and innovation.
Blockchain technology and tokenization present a compelling evolution of traditional fund operations.
By leveraging a shared, immutable ledger and smart contracts, the fund industry stands to gain significant
advantages in efficiency, transparency, liquidity, and accessibility. Using a blockchain ledger as a unified source
of truth can significantly reduce manual reconciliation efforts arising from siloed systems and disparate data
structures. Smart contracts can automate repetitive tasks, including AML/KYC checks and cash movement
for capital events, potentially enabling fund managers to lower investment minimums and achieve greater
economies of scale.
The tokenized asset landscape has evolved significantly, with approximately $13B in traditional assets currently
tokenized on public blockchain networks 15 . While this represents less than 0.01% 16 of industry assets under
management (AUM), adoption is accelerating with AUM in on-chain products nearly tripling since early 2024.
Early adopters are pursuing tokenization to realize operational efficiencies, reduce investment minimums and
expand distribution to new investor segments. However, widespread institutional adoption will require robust
solutions for privacy and identity management that provide the comfort and confidence traditional investors
expect from financial markets.
The immutable nature of blockchain ensures that all fund transactions are recorded transparently on a unified
ledger visible to authorized participants, with chronological recordation through consensus mechanisms.
This shared source of truth results in improved capital event tracking, reduced disputes from data discrepancies,
and enhanced oversight capabilities. Recent implementations demonstrate significant cost reductions, Franklin
Templeton reported that processing 50,000 transactions through blockchain would cost only $1.52 compared
to $50K using legacy systems 17. Similarly, Hamilton Lane’s implementation of DLT-share-classes has reduced
investment minimums from $2M to $10K 18 , demonstrating tangible benefits of tokenization.
Privacy Considerations
Reasons to preserve privacy of transactions, positions and balances in tokenized products include:
1 Alpha Protection: Asset allocators like institutional investors, wealth managers, fund-of-funds, and OCIO
platforms 19 want to protect the confidential contents of their discretionary portfolios which serve as a
source of competitive advantage.
•
Public real-time disclosure of portfolio contents could enable competitors to replicate strategies,
thereby commoditizing offerings and eroding the manager’s ability to charge for this value-add.
We would contrast this level of transparency with public pension filings and 13-Fs 20 which are
meaningfully lagged, limiting their usefulness for “front-running”.
•
Similarly, full transparency on fund subscriptions could lead market participants to deploy capital
into a fund’s known holdings, degrading the fund’s entry point and alpha. One could imagine a sizable
tokenized fund specializing in a particular sub-industry, like autonomous vehicles. If investors could
see, in real-time, a large subscription into this fund, they could potentially buy the known holdings
ahead of the actual fund, pushing up the price in the process.
2
Preventing “Runs” on Funds: Full transparency on redemptions could lead to escalating redemptions,
creating a run on the fund.
•
In traditional markets, sudden large redemptions can signal trouble, prompting other investors to
redeem their shares to avoid being left with less liquid assets. This can create a self-fulfilling prophecy
where the fear of illiquidity leads to actual illiquidity, destabilizing the fund. For tokenized funds, this
process could accelerate, meaning fund managers would have less time to sell assets in an orderly
manner, potentially leaving the remaining investors with the least liquid holdings.
3
Ensuring Investor Privacy: Fund managers and investors of all types (large and small, institutions and
individuals) should have the ability to transact privately. In fact, many jurisdictions are legislating these
privacy protections through laws like the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Singapore’s
Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).
•
Investors will prefer privacy for a variety of reasons ranging from personal preference and
professional convenience to potential financial consequences that come from signaling to the
marketplace buying and selling activity.
•
Similarly, fund managers may not be comfortable with their client lists being publicly available.
Even with pseudonymous blockchain addresses, we believe if there is a meaningful financial
incentive to identify the owner of the wallet, a savvy actor will do so.
4
Managing Relationships: Bringing the entire fund lifecycle on-chain could complicate
the relationship between fund managers and investors.
•
Fully transparent ownership ledgers and fees paid on-chain could add more scrutiny to fund manager
fees and how they allocate scarce capacity amongst their investors.
•
Similarly, investors may not want fund managers to know the extent of their relationships with
competitive firms.
Identity Considerations
Pragmatic approaches, standardized identity frameworks and automated identity verification would go a long way
in streamlining the current onboarding processes in the fund ecosystem.
Regulatory requirements mandate that regulated entities verify investor identities and key attributes to prevent
money laundering and other illicit activities, placing the ultimate responsibility on fund managers who often
delegate this task to transfer agents. It is expected that transfer agents maintain strict confidentiality of identity
attributes, ensuring that sensitive information is kept private and secure.
For transfer agents, the AML/KYC process is laborious. On average, global financial institutions have 1,566
employees involved in the AML/KYC process resulting in an average cost of $2,598 per client onboarding 21 .
For some investors and managers, onboarding can be fairly straightforward, but for transfer agents who
are verifying the identity of thousands of investors in more than 100 countries, it hardly feels that way.
Identity verification involves extensive processes, case-by-case evaluations, constant adaptation to evolving
regulations and country-specific requirements. The high volume of communication required for risk ratings,
beneficiary identification and sanction screening adds further complexity. Moreover, investors could be
required to prove document authenticity through cumbersome means such as presenting original documents
or obtaining official stamps and/or certified copies.
The process is also highly duplicative, as investors must onboard with each manager relationship, even if the
managers are working with the same transfer agent and collecting the same documentation. In order for a
transfer agent to re-use information that a given investor has submitted for identity verification—for instance,
when that same investor is onboarding onto another fund—the transfer agent may need self-directed consent
from the investor.
AML reliance letters provide a potential primitive example for the way forward. These letters are generally
provided by fund distributors or another regulated entity attesting that they have conducted the AML/KYC of
their clients and that the fund should trust this firm on the basis that they are a regulated entity in good standing.
The decision on whether to accept this letter is based on a number of factors including the trustworthiness
of the entity, its track record regarding AML/KYC violations, the regulatory regime in which it operates,
willingness to provide periodic verification of underlying investors, and/or submit to an audit or sampling
of their AML/KYC process.
Unfortunately, reliance letters only modestly lessen the burden on the ecosystem. They are not universally
accepted nor owned by investors themselves, and they are not linked to the underlying investor data and attributes
(e.g. investor type, accreditation status). Further, while transfer agents are the entities generally performing the
investor review, the data is not actually theirs. It is being provided to them as a service provider to the fund or
fund manager. As such, for the transfer agent to be able to use this information with another fund manager, they
would need the consent of the investor.
We recognize the risk of missteps in this space can be costly; however, we plan on continuing our exploration from
a viability and incentives perspective. We imagine that a network of like-minded institutions across transfer agents,
fund managers, distributors, banks and broker dealers could be assembled to develop digital-first standards and
processes on investor identity embodied in a decentralized identification construct similar to what we built in this
POC. This network of trusted parties could be incentivized to provide identity verification as a service by charging
for the use of these credentials.
Payment for identity verification could roughly parallel the additional charge that some providers impose for
AML/KYC or investor accreditation checks today. We believe it could also be designed in a way that leverages the
underlying investor attributes to automate some of the manually monitored fund limits. For example, this data and
smart contract-based rules could ensure that ERISA 22 investors’ ownership remains below the regulatory threshold,
currently at 25% of the fund.
Composability Considerations
Although “improved liquidity” is a frequently cited benefit derived from tokenization, our view is that simply
tokenizing an asset does not make it more liquid—though it does make the asset more composable. For instance,
shares of a tokenized investment fund may be operationally easier to utilize in financing, lending and trading
applications than those held on a traditional ledger.
Today, secondary transactions in illiquid assets are bilaterally negotiated between sellers, buyers, and various
intermediaries. The process can be lengthy and manual, with the onboarding, AML/KYC and investor accreditation
status of the buyer becoming a critical late-stage barrier that could be solved with a robust digital identity
framework. The result is that the market for smaller secondary transactions (< $2M) is sparse.
Sellers are generally seeking to exit positions to improve liquidity, eliminate an investment line item, or to
rebalance. Because the marketplace is not particularly deep or organized, these positions are generally sold
at a discount to net asset value. This dynamic can be problematic for fund managers who are marking funds
at a higher valuation than they are priced in the secondary market. In a public blockchain setting, discounted
sales could create problems for fund managers by increasing redemption/sell pressure and impacting their
ability to raise capital for future funds.
We imagine a scenario where a secondary market application can be built upon tokenized funds. The smart
contracts—or software—utilized to implement the application could programmatically enforce that only investors
with verified AML/KYC credentials can bid on an illiquid asset, increasing settlement speed.
•
Access controls, such as UI or API-driven entitlements, impede a network’s ability to decentralize
or allow participants to directly access node infrastructure. This significantly impacts the benefits
that the technology promises.
•
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provides a secure area within hardware to protect data and
computations. While this enhances security by keeping operations confidential, it also limits transparency
and decentralization. This reliance on hardware-based security may also introduce concerns about central
points of failure or trust in the hardware provider, potentially reducing the overall trustlessness of the
blockchain system.
•
Private channels may protect information but undermine the blockchain’s role as a single source of
truth, potentially requiring trusted intermediaries or complex manual reconciliations in disputes or
synchronization failures.
On-chain cryptographic privacy ensures that even with full ledger access, an observer cannot discern transaction
details or addresses, and therefore cannot discern identities. This is achieved by integrating privacy mechanisms
directly on-chain, either at the protocol level (Zcash) or smart contract level with privacy pools 23 , using techniques
including, but not limited to, ZKPs and FHE. On-chain privacy ideally doesn’t rely on trusted intermediaries or
manual processes; instead, the privacy solutions themselves are often freely scrutinized, as they are created
using public cryptographic research.
This report explores a number of on-chain and off-chain privacy techniques, which can be used in tandem.
Importantly, any privacy solutions applied would preferably not erode the core benefits of using blockchain
including efficient settlement, reduced reconciliations, trust-minimization, a shared ledger, transparency,
decentralization, and programmability.
1 Anonymity: Shielding the on-chain accounts, and by extension the identities of the parties involved
in a transaction, from anyone outside of the transaction.
2 Confidentiality: Shielding the asset type and quantity being transacted from anyone outside
of the transaction.
3 Auditability: Ensuring transactions adhere to regulatory requirements without over-exposing sensitive
data. Depending on the context of the transactions, this may involve granting select actors—outside of
the transaction—the ability to identify the parties involved to permit or deny the transaction prior to
execution, and to maintain records for audit purposes.
Demystified: Consider a simple illustration: proving knowledge of a padlock’s combination. The prover
demonstrates possession of the correct combination by unlocking the padlock outside the verifier’s view, then
presenting the opened lock. The verifier gains certainty that the prover knows the combination without learning
the combination itself.
Scenario: Entity A wants to transfer on-chain assets to Entity B using a ZKP-based on-chain privacy ledger
to achieve anonymity and confidentiality.
1 E ntity A generates a transaction containing a number of ZKPs created from their private data:
A Proof that Entity A owns the assets they want to send
B Proof that Entity A has enough of the asset (in order to send it)
C Proof that Entity A intends to send to Entity B
2
Entity A sends the transaction to a verifier smart contract which validates the ZKPs without revealing
the private data. The ZKP system ensures each transaction’s correctness by proving that the transaction
sender owns the assets they are trying to transfer, the asset hasn’t previously been transferred, and that
no assets would be created or destroyed during the transfer, all without revealing the private data.
3
Once the proof is validated, the verifier smart contract sends the encrypted outputs to the ledger smart
contract.
4
The ledger smart contract updates its encrypted global state and stores the new encrypted balances
on-chain.
5
Entity A and Entity B, using their own off-chain private data, are the only parties who can decrypt their
new on-chain balances for tracking. Note: Entity A and Entity B will compute their respective aggregate
balances off-chain.
Demystified: Consider an online mailbox system where each transaction generates a unique mailbox accessible
only to the intended recipient. The sender creates this mailbox but cannot access it themselves, ensuring complete
privacy of the receiver’s identity and transaction patterns.
Walkthrough
Scenario: Entity A wants to transfer on-chain assets to Entity B using stealth addresses to improve anonymity.
1
Entity B generates and shares a “meta-address” with Entity A. A meta-address is similar to a public
address (e.g. Ethereum EOA) in that it is publicly shareable; however, its distinct use of keys allows for
the creation and use of stealth addresses.
2
Entity A uses Entity B’s meta-address to create a new unique address for the transaction. This ensures that
the transaction is sent to an address not associated with Entity B’s identity, or their previous transactions;
hence the address is “stealth”.
Demystified: FHE allows users to do mathematical operations on private inputs and arrive at the correct output
without ever revealing the input or the output. Imagine a deconstructed 1,000-piece puzzle where each piece
has an image, but the full picture is unknown. You want your friend to solve it without seeing the imagery on
the puzzle pieces. You remove the images from the puzzle pieces (encryption) and give them to your friend.
They assemble the puzzle by matching edges (computation) and return the completed, imageless puzzle.
You then reapply the images to the puzzle pieces (decryption) and see the full picture.
Scenario: Entity A wants to transfer on-chain assets to Entity B using on-chain FHE to improve confidentiality.
1
Entity A locally encrypts the amount they want to transfer to Entity B and includes the encrypted amount as
part of the transaction but otherwise submits the transaction on-chain through normal methods.
2
The transaction is broadcast to the blockchain. Since the amount being sent is encrypted, it remains shielded
from external observers.
3
The on-chain FHE checks the validity of the transaction and then executes the transaction without decrypting
the encrypted amount. Since FHE allows for on-chain computation, aggregate encrypted balances are updated
on-chain.
4
Once the transaction is confirmed as valid and settled on-chain, Entity A and Entity B are able to use their
private keys to decrypt their new balances.
Privacy Features
Different solutions for enhancing privacy on the blockchain, both on-chain and off-chain, offer unique benefits and
trade-offs. The radar charts below illustrate how various approaches perform across some of the key technical
features essential for enterprise privacy on the blockchain.
•
Anonymity: The ability to shield the identities of the parties involved in a transaction from
anyone outside of the transaction.
•
Confidentiality: The ability to shield the asset type and quantity being transacted from anyone
outside of the transaction.
•
Scalability: The ability of a system to handle an increased transaction rate or expand in capacity
without performance degradation.
•
Flexibility: The capability to program custom logic into the solution on-chain.
•
Trust Minimization: The reduction of the need to rely on third-parties or intermediaries for
security and correctness.
Each solution was assessed according to the criteria above for its level of effectiveness, where:
•
A score of low indicates minimal effectiveness in the respective category.
•
A score of medium signifies a medium level of effectiveness.
• A score of high represents a high level of effectiveness.
Example: A transfer agent could issue AML/KYC attestations to investors, enabling them to access and share
their credentials directly from their digital wallets. Each investor could be identified by a unique DID, linking all
attestations seamlessly. This integration of DIDs, VCs, and VPs helps to ensure that AML/KYC attestations are
portable, trackable, and revocable, enhancing compliance and operational efficiency.
Example: Transfer agents could issue AML/KYC attestations in the form of soulbound tokens to investors’ wallets.
These tokens could be permanently linked to the investor’s wallet, providing a seamless verification process. When
investors connect to financial platforms, verifiers could instantly confirm the presence of an AML/KYC soulbound
token, streamlining compliance checks.
Example: Transfer agents could issue AML/KYC attestations in the form of an NFT to investors’ wallets. This
approach allows financial platforms to quickly verify whether an investor holds the necessary AML/KYC NFT,
ensuring compliance and enhancing the onboarding process.
Example: Transfer agents could store AML/KYC attestations on-chain, associating them with investors’
public addresses. This setup functions as a dynamic ledger, linking attestations to wallets.
For illustrative purposes only, the ratings reflect Kinexys’s current understanding and
assumptions based on available research and are subject to change as technologies evolve
Example: ZKPs enable investors to present proofs of their AML/KYC VCs to verifiers, such as other transfer
agents, without sharing the underlying issued credential.
Example: Transfer agents typically have their own rules and identity requirements that investors must
meet before being onboarded to a fund. This may include AML/KYC attestation and on-chain sanction lists.
These attestations can be encrypted on-chain, allowing transfer agents to verify the identity requirements against
their rules without needing to view the underlying data.
For illustrative purposes only, the ratings reflect Kinexys’s current understanding and
assumptions based on available research and are subject to change as technologies evolve
The ecosystem of participation and trust extends beyond technical solutions, emphasizing the importance of
establishing trust among participants such as transfer agents, fund administrators and other financial institutions.
Without this trust, any identity or privacy technology will face headwinds in achieving widespread adoption,
regardless of its robustness or sophistication.
On-chain privacy is primarily concerned with the ability to maintain AML/KYC identity claims on public blockchain
without revealing any PII. Ensuring on-chain privacy is essential for protecting individual identities, while still
allowing the necessary verification processes for expedited investor onboarding.
• evocability: The evolving regulatory landscape and investor dynamics demand the ability to revoke
R
and update identity credentials. This capability is essential for maintaining accurate and reliable identity
information, particularly as transfer agents navigate changing regulations and ongoing monitoring.
• on-Transferability: The need for identity credentials to remain uniquely tied to individuals is crucial for
N
preventing misuse and maintaining the integrity of the verification process. Digital identity facilitates a
world of portable, reusable credentials without compromising their integrity.
The radial diagrams illustrate that solutions like VCs and their associated trust frameworks effectively fulfill the
criteria for achieving ecosystem trust. Conversely, technologies such as ZKP and FHE effectively meet the criteria
for ensuring privacy-preserving identity.
Based on the above assessment, the optimal strategy for meeting all five criteria involves integrating digital
identity solutions with privacy-preserving technologies.
These flows and requirements are summarized below. Individual case studies pertaining to each implementation
can be found in the Appendix.
1 Ensure Delivery vs. Payment (DvP) settlement An institutional investor is able to subscribe
of transactions can occur privately: into a fund, but their identity, the fund
being entered, and the amount being
Confidentiality of transaction amount invested remain private.
Confidentiality of transaction type
Confidentiality of token type
Anonymity of investor addresses
3 Demonstrate new use cases can be built An institutional investor is able to take fund
atop private assets and private identity units they own and privately sell them on
infrastructure: the secondary market to a buyer whose
AML/KYC status has been pre-verified.
Preserve composability
Drive asset utility
Automate compliance checks on
AML/KYC attestations
Reuse identity infrastructure
Business Requirements:
• elective Disclosures: Mechanisms that would allow certain parties to receive authorized access to view
S
specific attributes of private information (e.g. an auditor or regulator).
• tomic Delivery vs. Payment (DvP): Simultaneous delivery and payment for assets within a block 25 ,
A
the core element that reduces settlement risk.
• Block Explorer: Validation through a block explorer to transparently demonstrate privacy features.
Technical Requirements:
• Open-Sourced Solution: Understand which open-source libraries have been utilized in the implementation.
• rust-Minimization: Determine the solution’s ability to operate within a fully decentralized network
T
of peers and its reliance on security mechanisms, such as Key Management Services.
• imilarity to Development on EVM: Determine the extent of necessary changes to standard Solidity26
S
smart contracts (e.g. ERC-20; KDA-FACT; etc.) to integrate with the privacy solution.
• I dentity Handling: Examine flexibility in handling on-chain and off-chain identity, including support
for claims, proofs, encrypted verifiable credentials, and decentralized identifiers.
• erformance: We acknowledge that performance metrics are critical for production usage. However
P
standardizing all technical variables is infeasible across varying implementation and infrastructure
in the given timelines. The evaluation focused on feasibility as opposed to optimization.
Overview of Kinexys used Zama’s PADL, developed Avacy anonymizes Rayls’ Private Subnets Fhenix is an Ethereum
Privacy Provider open-source fhEVM- by JPMC’s Global user identities and use segregated Layer-2 solution that
native solution to Technology Applied obfuscates balances and Privacy Ledgers enhances privacy
keep balances and Research team, transaction amounts (PLs) run by each by utilizing FHE to
transaction amounts leverages ZKPs for using Distributed institution, connecting perform computations
encrypted, ensuring on-chain verification, Homomorphic via a permissioned on encrypted data
confidentiality ensuring confidentiality Encryption (DHE), EVM network called such as balances and
while maintaining and anonymity by stealth addresses, and a Commit Chain. transaction amounts.
composability through hiding transaction ZKPs (zk-SNARKs) while Transactions are
FHE. Kinexys also used details and identities enabling auditability. encrypted and posted
stealth addresses to while maintaining to the Commit Chain,
maintain anonymity. auditability. and validated with
cryptographic inclusion
proofs.
Privacy Technology FHE, Stealth Addresses ZKP ZKP, Segregated ledgers, FHE
Used Distributed cryptographic
Homomorphic inclusion proofs,
Encryption (DHE), and encrypted point-
and Stealth Addresses to-point messaging
Confidential
Ownership Balance
Confidential
Transaction Value
Confidential
Transaction Type
Confidential
Token Type
Confidential
Bids
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified, and no representation nor warranty, express or implied,
is made as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Confidential In PL
Smart Contract
Logic On Commit Chain
Identity DIDs, VCs, Encrypted ZKP DIDs, Encrypted Ethereum Attestation Encrypted on chain
Features on-chain claims on-chain claims, ZKP, Service claims in an NFT
Enabled Separate Compliance
Chain
Sanctions But could use same But could use same But could use same
Check method as KYC/AML method as KYC/AML method as KYC/AML
check check check
1. W hat attributes 1. A
ny attribute can be 1. A
ny attribute can be 1. A
ny attribute can be 1. A ny attribute can be 1. A
ny attribute can be
can be included incorporated provided included. included. included. incorporated provided
in credentials/ it can be represented by it can be represented by
identity system? encrypted data types. 2. I n the implementation, 2. I n the implementation, 2. T he attribute that encrypted data types.
several representative identity credentials was checked in the
2. W
hat attributes 2. Two variable claims rules were encrypted consist of encrypted implementation was the 2. I n the implementation,
were actually were utilized: an AML into a token and name, surname, ‘suitability’ attribute a KYC check was
used in letter with a true/ verifiable by any government ID, birth determined by the bank done with ID, name,
verification false value and a auditor. date, phone, and issuing the credential and phone number
& sanctions Country Code, both country of residence, on its PL. All identifiers attributes which were
checking encrypted using FHE which reside in a are kept off-chain and kept encrypted on-chain
process, where and kept on chain smart contract on the only the attestations are in an NFT and could then
were they in a smart contract. main chain and can in the PL; the merkle be homomorphically
stored, and We also included the be homomorphically root is shared through checked.
how were they issuer of the original checked or relayed to encrypted messages to
checked? VC, from which these the compliance chain to a destination PL over
claims are derived, decrypt and send back a the Commit Chain which
along with the VP hash. Boolean result. can then decrypt the
These claims were message and check the
then homomorphically inclusion proof.
checked by the specified
asset rules.
Auditability The network’s KMS 3 different ways to do so: The ZK system requires Not implemented in POC Utilizes on-chain
operator would need to 1. U
se ZKP for specific users to encrypt but can use the ‘God View’ permissions contract
provision the auditor with questions. transaction summaries functionality which would which can specify parties
the FHE decryption key to 2. S pecify parties to with public visibility allow any auditor to access that can decrypt.
review all transactions. decrypt transactions keys. Entities managing details of any transaction
The trusted stealth with audit signatures. the application own the by a PL.
address service could also 3. Perform a full audit by corresponding private
specify addresses that decrypting and sharing keys, which can be shared
are allowed to decrypt results using ZKP for with auditors.
transactions. validation.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified, and no representation nor warranty, express or implied,
is made as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Composability Interact with assets Interact with assets with Must generate ZKPs to To interact with an asset Assets interaction is
similarly to ERC-20 tokens, ERC20 like functions on reference the asset smart in a separate PL, a user’s similar to ERC-20 tokens,
enhanced by Zama’s the PADL contract and can contract and if approved, identity is checked and enhanced by Fhenix’s
encryption functions. extend a PADL contract provide a ZKP for identity asset balance updated encryption functions.
Asset contracts link to to support additional checks as specified by the through Rayls Protocol Assets specify an NFT
rules requiring on-chain functionality. asset contract and verified which manages cross- contract for attribute
identity verification. on the compliance chain. chain messaging and verification, requiring
This solution allows for In order to interact with an cryptographic proofs of users to verify their
reusable encrypted claims asset, to maintain privacy inclusion via the Commit identity and add their
and smart contracts can in own contract, builders Chain. address to the NFT
specify their required must create their own ZKP contract to interact with
rules. circuits or use DHE. the asset.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified, and no representation nor warranty, express or implied,
is made as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) ZKPs are particularly compelling for fund tokenization While technically viable, implementing ZKPs
as they enable critical verifications while maintaining requires adapting current fund processes and
confidentiality. Fund managers can validate investor standards. The computational requirements,
eligibility, process transactions, and meet compliance though manageable for institutions, need
requirements without exposing sensitive data. consideration when designing systems. The
The technology is already in use in live blockchain lack of established industry-wide cryptographic
environments and can be implemented without standards means early adopters will need to
fundamental changes to existing infrastructure, making carefully plan their implementation approach.
it a practical choice for institutional adoption.
Technical Challenges:
Core Capabilities: • Smart contract standards differ from current
• Addresses anonymity and confidentiality institutional techniques
• Enables transactions without revealing information • R equires client-side computing power,
• Enables flexible and programable auditability although the blockchain community has
driven significant improvements
Technical Benefits:
• S calable, effective anonymity and composability Implementation Hurdles:
• U sable on-chain without blockchain modification • Computational requirements remain
substantial
Implementation Advantages: • D ecentralization needed for transaction
• W idely used in live blockchains submission service, if used
• ZK Domain Specific Languages (DSLs 27) accessible
• Effective relayer services or stealth addresses for Current State Limitations:
anonymizing transactions • C ryptographic standards not established
• P ath to industrializing ZK unclear
Stealth Addresses Stealth addresses offer a straightforward and effective The primary hurdle is the cost structure on public
solution for transaction privacy in fund operations. blockchains, where generating new addresses
They enable confidential fund interactions—from
for frequent fund transactions could become
subscriptions to distributions—without exposing investor
expensive. While this has been solved in some
relationships or transaction patterns. The technology’s
simplicity and compatibility with existing systems makes implementations through gasless blockchains,
it particularly attractive for near-term implementation. institutions need to carefully consider the cost
implications for their specific use cases.
Core Capabilities:
• S cales well in practice
Technical Challenges:
• P rovides anonymity for single transactions
• Simple to implement • G as requirements on public blockchains can
link back to owner
Technical Benefits:
• Achieves anonymity levels not available in FHE EVMs
Implementation Note:
• U sed for anonymous smart contract transactions
• U sed in a gasless blockchain to eliminate
Fully Homomorphic FHE presents the possibility of performing crucial The new technology sees significant practical
Encryption (FHE) fund calculations and processes while maintaining hurdles in its current state. It requires
complete data privacy. It could enable confidential NAV modifications to blockchain infrastructure, faces
calculations, portfolio management, and regulatory scalability challenges, and introduces complexity
reporting while keeping sensitive information encrypted that could impact time-sensitive fund operations.
throughout. The ability to upgrade existing smart While solutions exist for some challenges, they
contracts to incorporate FHE makes it an interesting often involve trade-offs between efficiency and
option for enhancing current systems. centralization. The technology’s maturity level
suggests it may be better suited for longer-term
Core Capabilities: implementation planning rather than immediate
• Keeps sensitive data encrypted throughout deployment.
computation
Technical Challenges:
Technical Benefits: • E VM modification required for on-chain
• E xisting smart contracts can be upgraded to use FHE implementation
• C lear applications outside of blockchain • Computational complexity impacts scalability
and gas fees
Implementation Note:
• O ff-chain processing improves scalability but
introduces centralization
• D evelopment challenging due to evolving
capabilities
• Compressed FHE calculations require some
centralization
Summary
Privacy technologies present varying degrees of maturity and applicability for institutional adoption.
ZKPs demonstrate the most comprehensive capability for meeting privacy requirements, though their implementation
necessitates significant shifts in development approach and integration patterns. The emergence of standardized
frameworks for ZKP implementation in smart contract privacy pools signals growing industry maturity.
While FHE alone cannot fully address institutional privacy needs, its combination with ZKPs and/or stealth
addresses creates a more complete privacy solution. FHE’s unique ability to process encrypted data offers
promising innovation potential, though its required modifications at the EVM level may complicate future
blockchain upgrades.
Stealth addresses represent an elegant, scalable solution that shows promise beyond current applications.
Their simplicity and effectiveness make them particularly attractive for specific use cases.
The optimal approach to achieving comprehensive on-chain privacy will ultimately depend on specific use cases
and requirements. Implementation decisions must consider the characteristics of the target blockchain—for
instance, gas fees on certain networks may make computationally intensive operations impractical.
As these technologies evolve, continued evaluation and adaptation will be crucial for maximizing their potential in
institutional applications.
While initial asset tokenization efforts can progress without comprehensive privacy and integrated
identity solutions, scaling institutional adoption requires both. The transformation of traditional finance
through tokenization depends on meeting these fundamental requirements.
2
On-chain cryptographic blockchain privacy solutions promise stronger guarantees and openness
than traditional off-chain (segregation-based) privacy approaches, yet must balance sophistication
with pragmatic deployment needs for adoption.
EVM blockchain ecosystems offer innovative privacy solutions through ZKPs, FHE and stealth addresses,
integrating directly with the blockchain rather than relying on off-chain data segregation and access
controls. While this native integration provides robust confidentiality guarantees and eliminates compromise
points, the path to institutional adoption requires careful consideration of implementation challenges.
The optimal solution varies by use case—some applications may demand a multi-faceted approach combining
multiple technologies, while others might achieve their objectives through a single solution.
Current implementations demonstrate that on-chain privacy is achievable and performs adequately at
modest scale. However, institutional adoption requires deeper exploration and validation across several
critical dimensions: intensive computational requirements, fundamental infrastructure adaptations,
network cost considerations and lack of standardized integration patterns. Advancing these solutions
demands focused development in processing optimization, resource efficiency and comprehensive
developer frameworks suitable for institutional-scale deployment.
3
Reusable digital identity promises operational transformation; however its implementation must
be commercially viable, i.e., it must align with established trust frameworks and create compelling
participation incentives for adoption.
Success requires several critical dimensions: scalable performance that meets institutional demands, seamless
integration with existing trust frameworks while maintaining security standards, sustainable economics that
incentivize adoption, and robust governance that establishes trust between market participants. The path
forward requires not just technological sophistication, but thoughtful design of incentive structures that
encourage institutions to participate in, trust, and leverage these digital identity networks.
Build
We are continuing on the journey of expanding access to our network—Kinexys Digital Assets—and our digital
identity capabilities. Come with us on this journey.
Check out our Kinexys Self Sovereign Identity (SSI) SDK which enables the creation and management of
decentralized identifiers (DIDs) and verifiable credentials (VCs). It supports integration into end-to-end SSI
ecosystems, adhering to W3C standards and offers tools for creating custom schemas.
Stay tuned
Watch this page—we’re committed to discovering and implementing privacy and identity solutions across the
Kinexys Digital Assets suite. As we progress our thinking and collaborate with the ecosystem, we’ll leverage this
site to provide updates for the public.
1 KDA fhEVM Network: We used Zama’s native fhEVM solution to ensure that balances and transaction
values were kept encrypted on the network. This set the foundation for the rest of our solution.
2 Stealth Addresses: An off-chain stealth address service, a modification to ERC-5564, provided anonymity
by obfuscating the main addresses of each party in a transaction.
3 Digital Identity: We utilized our open-source Kinexys SSI SDK alongside FHE privacy technologies to
develop a digital identity solution tailored to the business requirements of this proof-of-concept. This
solution allowed the investor’s encrypted identity claims to be programmatically verified on-chain
according to the AML/KYC checks set by transfer agents and fund managers.
Together, the KDA fhEVM network, stealth addresses and digital identity solution enabled confidential, anonymous,
compliant fund subscriptions and transfers across a global shared state network.
Implementation Overview
A bank deployed an encrypted deposit token contract to enable the transfer of cash from off-chain to on-chain –
where deposit tokens would be issued to the address requesting a balance.
Two transfer agents deployed encrypted fund tokens on behalf of two respective fund managers on the fhEVM KDA
network, making both available for subscriptions.
An institutional investor requested $10M of deposit tokens, triggering the creation of a stealth address to ensure
their original on-chain address is not linked to their new address receiving tokens. An off-chain verifier service was
used to verify the institutional investor’s VC and subsequently encrypt specific claims from the VC and map them
to the stealth address in a smart contract on-chain. Throughout, the tokens values were kept encrypted.
From this stealth address, the investor subscribed an encrypted $5M of fund tokens into each fund, preapproving
the transfer of their encrypted deposit tokens to the funds. Both fund contracts call for an identity check to
perform on-chain verification of the investors encrypted claims. On-chain verification ensured that an investor was
in compliance with A ML/KYCfund rules and not on the sanctions list—all the while, keeping their claims encrypted
and private due to FHE.
Upon successful identity verification, atomic delivery vs. payment (DvP) completed and the investor received $5M
in encrypted fund tokens of each fund to their stealth address. Both fund managers received $5M in encrypted
deposit tokens each for the investor’s subscriptions into the funds.
The investor then decided to sell $5M of their Fund A tokens on the secondary market, which prompted the
creation of a new stealth address to ensure their identity was kept private. Using this new stealth address,
the investor listed their Fund A tokens for auction at the encrypted auction contract—where the highest
bid would win.
Prior to bidding, each institutional investor prompted the generation of a stealth address for anonymity—following
the same process as the prior flow. Each institutional investor submitted their encrypted bids of deposit tokens to
the auction contract:
•
Investor B bid $5.2M
•
Investor C bid $5M
•
Investor D bid $5.3M
Before bids were accepted, the auction contract called for an identity check to perform on-chain verification of
each investor. On-chain verification ensured that only verified investors were able to place bids—checking that
the investors mettransfer agent and fund managerA
ML/KYC rules and were not on the sanctions list, while
ensuring that claims were encrypted and private. Investor B and C’s identities were successfully verified and
their bids were placed, however, Investor D’s identity check failed at the sanctions check and therefore, their
bid was not submitted.
Trust Assumptions
We maintained key trust assumptions to operate the POC:
•
We assumed the role of a trusted operator to deploy essential services.
•
We used a trusted key management service (KMS) to securely handle cryptographic keys.
•
We relied on a trusted verifier service as an on-chain publisher to request and verify a VP
from an investor, checking the DID registry, validating schema and signatures—and ultimately
posting results on-chain by extracting encrypted claims.
•
We relied on a trusted stealth address service to generate new stealth addresses to maintain
anonymity for users as well as to enable selective disclosures through an encrypted allowlist.
•
Finally, we also trusted certain actors within the flow—including the bank and transfer agents
as issuers of assets within the flow.
Auditability: The setup of the POC allows an auditor to view transaction details as required. With the centralized
KMS and established trust assumptions, an Operator can decrypt specific transactions for the auditor as needed.
Additionally, future enhancements could include granting the auditor with allowlist access to specific smart
contracts, which programmatically defines which transactions and contracts an auditor is privy to.
Advantages
• Confidentiality of Transaction Balances: fhEVM kept transaction balances encrypted and unknown to the
public.
• Anonymity of Addresses: Stealth addresses allowed users involved in a transaction (sender and receiver)
to maintain anonymity where new stealth addresses were generated every time a new transaction was
conducted—resulting in a user’s ability to keep their actions private.
• Reusable and Privacy-Preserving On-Chain Investor KYC: By leveraging the Kinexys SSI SDK as
well as privacy-preserving technology, a user benefits from an efficient and compliant onboarding
experience—and will continue to benefit from those efficiencies throughout the lifecycle of the use
case (or additional use cases).
Enabling selective disclosures for encrypted transactions is key for institutions to maintain privacy across the
ecosystem but allows permitted actors like auditors to be able to access and view certain transactions. In the
POC, we implemented a centralized solution with the Stealth Address Service that filters which addresses can
call decryption/re-encryption
of the transaction balance. For institutional readiness, the ability to enable selective
disclosure in a more automated, but flexible way, will be key.
Finally, while we were able to make the transaction balance confidential through fhEVM and addresses anonymized
through stealth addresses, neither solutions were able to natively shield the token type being transferred between
parties, allowing an outside observer to see, for example, that a particular fund was being transacted.
Implementation Overview
Use Case 1: Streamlining Investor Onboarding
Operators deployed essential contracts for fund tokenization, including fund and cash tokens, auction contracts
and governance contracts. Avacy combines zero-knowledge proofs and cryptographic commitments to safeguard
balances, transaction details and participant data. Avacy's self-custody design ensures its security relies solely on
established cryptographic assumptions.
At deployment, the operator selectively enabled auditors and implemented role-based configurations, granting
specific key holders visibility into transaction data. This ensured transfer agents and fund managers maintained
appropriate oversight of asset data, while regulators retained full ability to review.
Additionally, investors received on-chain identification through Decentralized Identifier (DID) solutions. These DIDs
could then be reused and verified in subsequent transactions, streamlining the onboarding process and reducing
the risk of fraud.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Upon approval, investors could purchase fund assets in a non-custodial manner with obfuscated transaction
amounts. To settle this transaction, the issuance of the fund tokens to the investor and the corresponding transfer
of cash were executed atomically.
this proof of concept, there was a focus on protecting both investor portfolio composition and market liquidity
In
as investors listed assets for sale and participated in bidding. The auction logic and final settlement were
executed using the DHE protocol, enabling full anonymity and confidentiality for all participants. Transfer agents,
fund managers, banks, and auditors gained access strictly to the information essential to their roles, preserving
privacy across the process. All computations within the Auction Smart Contract were performed homomorphically,
negating the need to decrypt underlying data thanks to the DHE protocol's efficiency. Settlement of the winning
bid and fee payments occurred confidentially and atomically within the same block.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Advantages
•
Markets stayed continuously active and accessible, where transactions remained fully protected
by DHE and Avacy protocols. Participants did not need to risk exposing their positions or losing
a competitive advantage.
•
The solution was composable, meaning it could meet the needs of operators who were looking to
devise highly specific solutions.
•
Auctions utilized a novel DHE system, enabling secure execution of arbitrary computations.
By integrating various cryptographic techniques, Avacy achieved higher performance for
operations that typically incur significant computational overhead.
Scalability Considerations
1
DHE traded off some computation for communication efficiency, causing latency to vary significantly
with the geographic distribution of the participating validator set. The current POC offered reasonable
performance, but adjustments were needed for institutional need. A globally distributed validator
set would impact the potential throughput negatively, in the current phase, institutions would need
to co-locate validators in similar regions, but not necessarily in the same data centers.
2
Wallet solutions had to ensure investors felt comfortable participating in market activities in a self-
custodial manner. For a trustless implementation, users would need to be secure using the technology,
or abstractions had to be provided without sacrificing security.
3
Validator set management for DHE, including key re-sharing, required operational overhead that needed
optimization before scaling to a production-ready environment.
4
The DHE protocol required validators to have up-to-date knowledge of which other validators were online
or offline before beginning any evaluation process. A mechanism was necessary to effectively manage
these validator states to ensure system reliability.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Implementation Overview
The POC showcased how Fhenix could manage confidential financial data, KYC information and fund management
for institutional investors. FHE ensured that sensitive data, such as encrypted balances and KYC certificates,
could be processed without decryption. This met the requirements by allowing fund managers to view encrypted
balances while maintaining the privacy of investors’ data. FHE’s ability to perform operations on encrypted
data enabled secure management of complex transactions, auctions, and fund subscriptions without exposing
underlying information.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
•
Fund Issuer/Transfer Agent Trust: The transfer agent was trusted to manage fund creation (FHERC20
contracts). While processing encrypted data, they had to correctly deploy new funds and follow privacy
and security protocols.
•
K YC Verification Trust: The KYC process relied on service providers to verify users accurately. Once a
KYC certificate was issued, it was assumed to represent the verified identity of the investor. KYC data
confidentiality was ensured through encryption, but the accuracy of the KYC process depended on the
KYC agent.
•
Smart Contract Trust: FHE protected privacy during computations, but there was trust needed in smart
contracts to perform as intended. These contracts managed token transfers and interactions, assuming no
harmful code existed that could compromise user privacy.
Advantages
1 Data Security: FHE kept sensitive institutional data encrypted during computations, which prevented
unauthorized access and reduced risk while on-chain.
2 Compliance Readiness: FHE helped meet data privacy regulations by keeping information private.
3 Versatility: FHE could be integrated into various institutional workflows, allowing secure computations
without compromising data privacy.
Scalability Considerations
The main bottleneck was computational efficiency. FHE required more resources than traditional encryption, which
lead to slower processing times, especially with large datasets. For institutions that need fast data processing, the
latency FHE introduces could be a limitation.
Hardware could also pose a challenge. To efficiently process encrypted data, institutions would need to invest
in high-performance computing resources, which may not be widely available or economically feasible at scale.
Optimizing FHE algorithms for better performance is ongoing and scaling, to meet high throughput demands
requires future work.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Implementation Overview
Privacy: PADL’s transaction scheme is designed with a “no-trust setup” meaning PADL doesn’t rely on, but can
incorporate if required, parties that can decrypt all private transactions. PADL achieves privacy via a combination
of public key encryption and zero knowledge proofs. Thus, a participants’ transactions and balances are always
encrypted. PADL provides multi-asset confidentiality and anonymity, meaning participants are not able to learn
about other participants’ asset transactions. Our accompanied whitepaper provides proof for the PADL transaction
scheme to be computationally hiding and statistically binding. The PADL token, in principle, is encrypted with
Pedersen Commitment and an audit signature, ensuring the correct maintenance of an immutable ledger on-chain.
Auditability: PADL supports transaction inspections and selective disclosures via zero knowledge proofs or via
opening token values. KYC/AML, trading rules, and governance rules are also encrypted and verifiable in a similar
manner. Each transaction includes several proofs to assure the transaction integrity, confirmation that assets
aren’t spent twice, assurance that assets aren’t created or lost, verification that transactions remain untampered
and auditable, and confirmation that the spender has authorized the transaction. Other conditions that can be
added are proof of rate/liquidity and traceability. Finally, PADL supports auditing on specific values, that is, the
participants can reveal only the requested information without compromising another participant’s privacy. This
provides full traceability when required.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
No-Trust Setup: PADL’s transaction scheme does not require a trusted body for set up. It is achieved by using
publicly verifiable and extractable tokens. i.e. the party who makes the transaction does not provide the hiding/
blending factors, however, other participants are able to recover their own values using their secret/private keys.
•
Investors do not need to trust other investors: they do not share any information besides their anonymized
registration address to the ledger.
•
Operator can see bids in auction.
•
Transfer agents can verify AML/KYC rules.
Composability and EVM Support: The PADL smart contract is an EVM-compatible smart contract that supports
all PADL features, such as maintaining the balance and state of the ledger, allowing participants to check balances
and make transfers, and includes the ability to verify on-chain. This means that PADL smart contract verifies
a transaction on-chain before it is accepted. Proof generation is off-chain by design, meaning the participants
do not ever have to share their secret key. PADL is able to interact with other smart contracts. This allows for
composability, that is, new contracts with new functionality can inherit all the capabilities of PADL smart contract
leading to setup of secondary markets such as an auction. In the specified use-case, the PADL smart contract’s
multi-asset atomic swap is used for the exchange of cash and fund tokens. The use case also demonstrates an
auction smart contract is deployed easily and interacts with the original PADL smart contract. Tokens can also be
derived from ERC20 contract and be deployed/traded privately with a PADL smart contract.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Scalability Considerations
The main bottleneck in scaling the solution is that the PADL library and API are still in the development phase,
and not yet product-ready solutions. It requires further resources to build the library to a deployable product
standard with a client facing application. The auction flow required a trusted actor to compare bids and submit
transactions but this could be further automated with ZKP range proofs in the future for added privacy.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Implementation Overview
Institutional Onboarding: The onboarding process used Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS) to streamline KYC
validation. A bank issued a Merkle root attestation proving an investor’s KYC data was part of their larger dataset,
shared across subnets as needed. Sensitive data was obscured, with only verifiable proofs exchanged between
participants, meeting compliance without unnecessary exposure.
Fund Subscription Workflow: Once onboarded, institutional investors exchanged demand deposits for on-chain
cash. Subscription requests were processed within private-ledger environments. Atomic Delivery versus Payment
(DvP) ensured simultaneous exchange of payment and fund tokens, mitigating counterparty risks. The privacy-
ledger design ensured that only authorized entities could view subscription details, while maintaining compliance
standards throughout.
uction Process and Trust Assumptions: During auctions, the seller submitted shares to the transfer agent’s
A
subnet using atomic teleport. Oracle contracts distributed auction information across subnets, with Merkle
root attestations validating bidder eligibility. DvP mechanisms settled the transaction securely between buyer,
seller, and fund manager. Trust assumed all participants adhered to the subnet compliance rules, with encrypted
attestations from the transfer agent deemed sufficient for validation.
The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors and/or J.P. Morgan believe to be
reliable and accurate. However, such information has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made
as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties.
Advantages
• Privacy by Design: Privacy ledgers protected sensitive data on-premise, with end-to-end encryption and
Merkle root attestations enabling confidential interactions.
• Regulatory Compliance: Integrated with AML/KYC frameworks through attestation services, ensuring
trust and meeting institutional requirements.
• Interoperability and Scalability: The modular architecture supported cross-chain transactions via atomic
teleport protocol, allowing participation in multiple markets without sacrificing security or privacy.
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