'I:

BRAIN, CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITY

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Karl H. Pribram
In J. E. Charon (Ed.),
Z'Esprit et Za Science
Paris: Albin Michel, 1983
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PAR'r 1: SOURCES OF A MODEL OF BRAIN FUNCTIOt~S IN CONSCIOUSJ\ESS

Introduction

A patient has a tumor removed from the occipital lobe on one side

of his brain. The s..rrgery leaves him unable to report the sight of

objects presented to him on the side opposite the removaL yet he can

correctly point to the location of the objects and even correctly

respond to differences in their shape (\~ eiskrantz, Warrington and

Saunders, 1974). Even when repeatedly told that he is responding \o.'e.1L

he insists that he is not aware of seeing anything and is only

guessing.

Another patient has the medial &ructures of the temporal lobes of

his brain removed on both sides. He performs well on tests of

im mediate memory such as recalling a telephone num ber just read out

loua to him, blt a few minutes later is not only unable to recall the

number bJt the fact that he had heard a number or even that he had teen

examined. Even after twenty years of reguJar expcsure to an examiner,

the patient fails to recognize her as familiar (Scoville & Milner,

1957). yet, this same patient, when trained to respond skillfully to a

complex task, or to discriminate between objects, etc., can be S10wn to

maintain such performances over years despite the disclaimer on his

part that he was ever exp:::lSE.'Ci to such a task (Sidman, Stoddard and

Mohr, 1968>'

Still another patient with a simiJar l::ut more restricted bilateral

lesion of her temporal lobe has gaineci over a hundreci [Dunc'..s of weight

since srrgery. She is a voracious eater, tut when asked whether she is

hungry or has any special appetites, she denies this even when
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apprehended in the midst. of grabbing fcxx1 from other patients (Pribram,

1965).
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This is not all A patient may have the major tracts connecting

his cerebral hemispheres severed with the result that his responses to

stirn uli presented to him on opfOSi-te sides are treated independently of

one another. His right side is una ware of what his left side is doing

and vice-versa. The splitting of the brain has praJuced a split in

awareness.
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More com mon in the clinic are patients who are paralyzed on one

side due to a lesion of the brain's motor system. But the paralysis is

manifest especially when the patient attempts to follow instructions

given to him or which he himself initiates. When highly motivated to

perform well ingrained responses, as when a fire breaks out, or as part

of a more general action, the paralysis disappears. Only intentional,

volitional control is influenced by the lesion.

o b3ervations such as these have set the problems that brain

scientists need to answer. Not only do they demonstrate the intimate

association that exists between brain and human mind; they also make it

necessary to take into account the d.iEEociation between conscious

a wareness, feelings and intentions on the· one hand and unconscious,

automatic behavioral performances on the other.

Perhap:; it is not too surprising therefore, that a division in

approach to the mind-brain problem has recently occurred. While philo-

sophers and behavioral scientists have for the most p:irt eschewed a

Cartesian dualism in an attempt at rigorous operational and scientific

understanding, thoughtful brain scientists have inveterately maintained

that a dualism exb,"ts and must be taken into account. A brief review
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of my own S:.r'uggles \'lith the problem may b:! helpful in fX)Sing some of

the .i$ues involved.

Plans

The S:.r'uggle regan mcrlestly with a recounting in the late

nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties of case histories such as

those used in the Intrcrluction of this paper. These were presented as

an antidote to tbe radical rehaviorism that then pervaded experimental

psychology. The formal properties of a more encompagili1g view were

presented in terms of a computer analogy in Pmns and the Structure of

Behavior (Miller, GaJanter, & Pribram, 1960) under tbe rubric of a

"Subjective Behaviorism." The analogy has since recome a fruitful

mcrlel or set of mcx1e1s known as "Cognitive Psychology" which, in

contrast to radical behaviorism, has taken verbal rep:)rts of subjective

conscious experience s:riously into account as problem areas to re

investigated and data to re utilized.

The computer has proved an exa=ll.ent guide to understanding and

experimental analysis. Furtber, it has tecome clear that a host of

control engineering devices can serve as mcrle1s for the brain

scientist. Of special interest here is the distinction that can re

made among such mcrle1s retween feedback and feedforward operations, a

distinction which is critical to our understanding of tlle clifference

between automatic and voluntary control of rehavior. Feedback

organizations operate like therma:,tats, Cannon's (1927) familiar

homeostatic brain processes that control the physiology of the

organism. r-'lore recently it has recome established that sensory

precesses also involve such feedback organizations (:see Miller,

Galanter & Pribram, 1960 and Pribrarn, 1971, Chapters 3, 4 and 11 for
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review>. Thus, feedback control is one fundamental of brain organiza-

tion.

But another somewhat less well understcx:x:1 fundamentaJ has emerged

in the analyses of brain function in the past few years. This

fundamental goes by the name of feedforward. or information processing

(see e.g., McFarland, 1971, Chap. I>. I have elsewhere (Pribram, 1971,

Chap. 5; Pribram and Gill, 1976, Chap. 1; Pribram, 1981) detailed my own

understanding of feed-forward mechanisms and their relation to the

feedback control Briefly, I suggest that feedbacks are akin to the

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processes described in the first la w of thermodynamics (the law of

conservation of energy) in that they are error processing, reactive to

magnitudes of change in the constraints that describe a system. They

operate to restore the system to the state of equilibrium.

By contrast feedforward organizations process "information" which

increases the degrees of freedom of the system. The manner by which

this is accomplished is often pJrtrayed in terms of Maxwell's demon and

Szilard's solution to the problem pJSed by these "demons," ie.how can

energy l:e conserved acrcss a l:x:>undary (a system of constraints), a

l:oundary which "recognizes ll certain energy configurations and lets them

pass while denying paS5age to others (see Brilluin 1962 for review).

.In such a system the energy consumed in· the recognition process must l:e

continually enhanced or the "demon" in fact tends to disintegrate from

the inpact of random energy. Feedforward operations are thus akin to

processes described by the second law of thermodynamics which deals

with the amount of organization of energy, not its conservation.

Information has often teen called neg~ntropy (see e.g., Erilluin 1962)

entropy being the measure on the amount of disorganization or

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randomness in a system. In the section on Consciousness and Volition

we will return to these concepts and apply them to the issues at hand.

Nineteenth century psychophysics and psychophysiology dealt

ilirectly with feedforward operations. Thus Helmholtz descri.bes the

mechanism of voluntary control of eye movemt;:!nts in terms of a parallel

innervation of the muscles of the eye and a "s:::reen" upon which the

retinal input faJJs so that voluntary eye movememts are accompanied by

a corollary corrective innervation of the cerebral input systems.

When the eyeball is pushed by a finger, this carrective innervation is

lacking, and the visual world jumj:S about. Merton and Brindley

performed the critical experiment: when the eye muscles are paralyzeC

and a voluntary eye movement is undertaken, the visual world rushed by

even though the eye remains stationary.

Of especi:u. interest is the fact that Freud (1895) anticipated

this distinction between feedback and feedforward in his delineation of

primary and secondary processes (Pribram and Gill, 1976). Freud

distingushed three types of neural mechanisms that constitute primary

processes. One is muscular discharge; a second is discharge into the

blood &.ream of chemical sul:stances; and a third is discharge of a

neuron roto its neighbors. All three of these neural mechanisms entail

potential or actual feedback. Muscular dischart?e elicits a reaction

from the environment and a sensory report of the discharge

(kinesthetic) to the brain. The neurochemical discharge results, by

way of stimulation of other body chemicals to which the brain is

sensitive, in a positive feedback which Freud JaCe1s "the generation of

unpleasure. " (This is the origin of the unpleasure - Jater the

pleasure - principle.) Discharge of a neuron onto its neighbors is tlle

basis of as:;ociative processes tllat leaci to a reciprocal increase in

neural excitation (cathexis) between neurons (a feedback) which is the

basis for facilitation (a lowering of resistance) of their synapses

<learning).

By contrast, secondary or cognitive precesses are based on a host.

of complex neural mechanisms that delay discharge through neural

inhibition. These delays convert wishes (the sum of excitatory

facilitations) to willed voluntary acts by allowing attention (a double

feedback that matches on the wish to external input - a comparison

process)to operate a reality testing mechanism. Thus, an attentional

conscious comparison process is an essential mechanism allowing

voluntary cognitive operations to occur.

For Freud and nineteenth century Viennese neurology in general,

consciousness and the resultant voluntary behavior was a function of

the cerebral cortex. Thus the greater portion of brain which is

noncortical regulates behavior of which we are not aware - behavior

\-"hi.ch is automatic and unconscious. What then becomes of cortical

function and conscious awareness?

Thus, I found that Plans are not enough. As indicated by the case

histories described in the introduction, today's neurcscientist shares

with nineteenth century neurology the necessity to understand the

special role of the brain cortex in the constructions that constitute

consciousness. Freud tackles that problem l:y distinguishing lithe

"qualitative imaging" properties of sensations from tJ1e more

quantitative pror;erties of as:50ciation, memory and motivation. The

distinction remains a valid one today: In Plans and the Structure of

Behavior, the sums of the tests, the ccmt:arisons between input and
 reports of the consequences of operations are called Images. How then

are "images" constructed by the brain cortex?

Images are prcrluced by a brain mechanism characterized by a

precisely arranged anatomical array which maintains a topographic

isomorphism between receptor and cortex b.1t .which can be seriously

damaged or destroyed (up to 90 %) without impairing the capacity of the

remainder to function in lieu of the whole. These characteristics led

me to suggest in the mid-sixties (Pribram, 1966) that in addition to

the digital computer, brain mooels need to take into account the type

of processing performed by optical systems. Such optical information

processing is called holography, and holograms display exactly the same

sort of imaging properties observed for brain: Le., a preci:~ly

aligned mechanism that distrib..Ites information. In the brain the

anatomical array serves the function of paths of light in optical

SYStems and horizontal networks of lateral inhibition ~ndicular to

the array serve the function of lenses (Pribram, 1971; Pribram, Nuwer

and Baron, 1974).

I have prop:sed a specific brain mechanism to be responsible for

the organization of neural holograms (Pribram, 1971, Chap. 1). This

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I mechanism involves the slow graded J:X)tential changes that occur at
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junctions between neurons and in their dendrites. Inhibitory
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il interactions (by hyperpoJarizations) i'1 horizontal networks of neurons
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I that do not generate any nerve impuJses are the critical elements.
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Such inhibitory networks are coming more and more into the focus of
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,I investigation in the neurcsciences. For instance, in the retina they
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are re:,ponsible for the organization of visual processes - in fact,

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i nerve im pulses do not occur at all in the initial stages of retinal

processing (for review see Pribram, 1971, Chap:;. 1 and 3). The
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prop::sal that irnage construction (a mental process) in man takes place

by means of a neural holographic mechanism is thus spelled out in con-

siderah1e detail and departs from claS5ical. neurophysioJogy only in its

emphasis on the importance of computations achieved by the reciprocal

influences among slow, graded IDcal potentiaJs which are well

established neurophysiological entities. No new principles of

mind-brain interaction need be considered.

For the mind-brain issue, the hoJographic model is aJso of special

interest because the image which results from the holographic process

is IDcated separately from the hologram that proouces it. We need

therefore to be leg:; puzzled by the fact that our own images are not

referred to eye or brain rot are projected into space beyond. Von

Bekesy (1967) has performed an elegant series of experiments that

detail the process Oateral inhibition - the analogue of lenses in

optical systems - as noted above) by which such projection comes about.

Essentially the process is similar to that which characterizes the

placement of auditory images between two speakers in a stereophonic

music system. From this fact, it can be seen how al::surd it is to ask

questions concerning the ''Jocus'' of consciousness. The mechanism is

obviously in the brain - yet subjective experience is not of this brain

mechanism per se b.1t of the resultant of- its function. One would no

more find "consciousneg:;" by dissecting the brain than one would find

"gravity" by digging into the· earth. Let us therefore look at the

brain processes that make consciousness p:>ssible, the control programs

that organize the distrihIted holographic process into one or another

image. ordinarily we speak of such control operations as governing

'.'attention. II
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'rhe digital computer and optical hoJograrn thus provide mooeJs of

mechanism which when tested against the actual functions of the primate

brain go a long way toward explaining how human voluntary and imaging

capabilities can become differentiated from unconscious processes by

man's brain.

PART II: DEFINITIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness and Attention

Just. as did Freud, William James (1901) emphasized that meet of

the issues involved in delineating "exmsciousness" from unconscious

prC>CeS3eS devolve on tlle mechanism of attention. James, however, took

the problem one step further by rx:>inting out that attention sets the

limits in com p8tence - the limits in an attention span - of the

organism to process information from the external and internal

environments. Gilbert Ry1e (1949) has reminded us that in fact the term

"mind" is derived from "minding", ie., attending. viewed from tllis

vantage consciousness is a state that results from attentive processes

- consciousness ceases to b= cause rot rather is itself caused. Two

separate issues can therefore be discerned in reJa.ting consciousness to

brain: 1) description of the attentional processes, the control

operations that determine consciousness, and, 2) description of tlle

brain state(s) coordinate with consciousness. Thffie two issuffi are, of

course, the same as those delineated in the previous sections: the

brain mechanisms responsible for the programming of p;ychological

processes and behavior, and those involved in image construction. Let

us turn once more, therefore, to the programming, the control

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operations performed by the brain that allocate attention and thus

differentiate conscious from unconscious processes.

For over a decade and a haJf my Jaboratory (as well as those of

many others) has l:::een investigating the neural mechanisms involved in

the control of attention. A comprehensive review of these data

(Pribram & McGuinness, 1975) discerned three such mechanisms: one deaJs

with short phasic response to an input (arousal); a second related to

proJonged. tonic readiness of the organism to respond selectively

(activation); and a third (effort) acts to coordinate the phasic

(arousal) and tonic (activation) mechanisms. Separate neural and

neurochemical (Pribram, 1977) systems are involved in the phasic

(arousaD and tonic (activation) mechanisms: the phasic centers on the

amygdaJa, the tonic on the basal ganglia of the forebrain. The

coordinating system critically involves the hippocampus, a

phylogenetically ancient part of the neural apparatus.

The evidence suggests that the coordination of phasic (arousal)

and tonic (activation) attentional processes demands "effort." Thus

the relation of attention to intention, ie., to volition and will

comes into focus. Again, ~villiam James had aJready PJinted out that a

good deal of what we call voluntary effort is the maintaining of

.attention or the repeated returning of attention to a problem until it

yields solution.

Consciousness and Valiton

William James had apposed will to emotion and motivation (which he

called instinct). Here, once again, brain scientists have hao a great

deal to say. Beginning with vlalter Cannon's experimentally Cased

critique of ,James (1927), followed by Lashley's critique of Cannon

(1960), to the anatomically based suggestions of Papez (1 Q37) and their

more current versions by MacLean (1949), brain scientists have been

deeply concerned with the mechanisms of emotional and motivational

experience and expression. Two maj)r discoveries have accelerated our

ability to cope with the isSues and placed the earlier more specuJative

accounts in to tetter prcspective. 0 ne of the discoveries has been the

role of the reticular formation of the brain stem (Magoun, 1950) and

its chemical systems of brain amines (see e.g., review by Barchas,

1972; and Pribram and McGuinness, 1975) that regulate states of

alertness and mcx::rl. Lindsley (1951) propcsed an activation mechanism of

emotion and motivation 00 the basis of the initial discovery and has

more recently (Lindsley and \\lilson, 1976) detailed the pathways Uj

which such activation can exert control over the brain processes. The

other discovery" is the system of brain tracts which when electrically

excited results in reinforcement <ie., increase in the probability of

occurrence of the behavior that has proo.uced the electrical brain

stimulation) or deterrence <ie., decrease in probability that such

behavior will recur) by Olds and Milner (1954).

In my attempts to organize these discoveries and other data that

relate brain mechanisms to emotion, I found it necessary to distinguish

clearly between those data that referred to emotional experience

(feelings) and those that referred to expression, and, further to

distinguish emotion IT0n1 H:otivation (Pribram, 1971b). Thus feelings

vlere found to encompass roth emotional ana motivational experience,

emotional as affective and motivation as centered on the readiness

(activation) mechanisms already alluded to in the discuffiion of

attention. Not surprisingly tJ1e affective processes of emotion v,'ere

found to be based on the machinery of arousal, the ability to make

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phasic responses to input which "&.op" the ongoing activit.y of the

organism. Thus feelings were found to be based on neurochemical states

of alertness and mood which tecome organized by appetitive (motivation,

"go") and affective (emotional, II s:.op II) processes.

'I'he wealth of new data and these insights obtained from them made

it fruitful to reexamine the Jamesian rositions with regard to

consciousness and unconscious processes and their relationship to

emotion, motivation, and will. (Pribram, 1976b and in press c). James

was found in error in his emphasis on the visceral determination of

emotional experience and his failure to take in to consideration the

role of expectation (familiarity) in the organization of emotional

experience and expression. On the other hand, James had rightly

emphasized that emotional processes take place primarily within the

organism while motivation and will. reach beyond into the organism's

environment. Further, James was apparently misinterpreted as hoJding a

peripheral theory of emotion ana mind. Throughout his writings he

emphasizes the effect that peripheral stimuli (including those of

visceral origin) exert on brain processes. The confusion comes about

because ·James' insistence that emotions concern bodily processe;, that

they stop short at the skin. Nowhere, however, does he identify

emotions with these lxxill.y processes. Emotion is always their

resultant in brain. James is in fact explicit on this !X'int when he

discusses the nature of the input to the brain from the viscera. He

comes to the conclusion, borne out by subsequent research (Pribram,

1961), that the visceral representation in the brain shares t."1e

representation of oo1er I:::ody structures.

The distinction between the brain mechanisms of motivation and

will are less clearly enunciated by James. He grapples with tl~e problem
 ···T-·---

and sets the questions that mlEt !:e ans wered. As already noted,

clarity did not come Wltil the late 1960's when several theorists

(e.g., MacKay, 1966; f1itteJsteadt, 1968; Waddington, 1957; ASlby,

personal communication; McFarland, 1971; Pribram, 1960, 1971b) !:egan to

p:>int out the difference !:etween feedback, hQmecstatic processes on the

one hand and feedforward, homeorhetic processes on the other. Feedback

mechanisms depend on error processing and are therefore sensitive to

perturbations. Pr09rams, unless completely stopped, run themselves off

to completion irrespective of ol:stacles placed in their way.

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Clinical neurology had classically distinguished the mechanisms

involved in voluntary from these involved in involuntary rehavior. The

clisti.ncti.on rests on the observation that Jesions of the cerebellar

hemispheres impair intentional behavior, while basal ganglia lesions

result in disturbances of involWltary movements. Damage to the

cerebellar circuits are involved in a feedforward rather than a

feedback mechanism (as already described by Ruch in the 1950 Stevens

Handbook of Experimental Psychology, although Ruch did not have the

term feedforward available to him). I have extended this conclusion

(Pribram, 1971b) on the basis of more recent microelectrooe analyses by

Eccles, Ito and Szentagothai. (1967) to suggest that the cerebellar

.hemispheres p:rform calculations in fast-time, ie., extrap:>late where

a particular movement would end were it to be continued, and send the

results of such a calculation to the cerebral motor cortex where they

can be· compared with the aim to which the movement is directed.
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Experimental analysis of the functions of the motor cortex had &'1own

that this aim is coml,"X)Sed of an ''Image of Achievement" constructed lI1

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part on the l:Bsis of past experience (Pribram, Kruger, Robinson and
Berman, 1955-56; pribram, 1971b, Chapters 13, 14, and 16; Pribram, in

press).

Just as the cerebellar circuit has been shown to serve intentional

behavior, the basal ganglia have been shown to be important to

involuntary processes. We have already noted. the involvement of these

structures in the control of activation, the reac1inessof organisms to·

respond. Lesions in the l::esal ganglia prcduce tremors at rest and

markedly restricted expressions of emotion. Neurological theory has

long helrl (see e.g., BUey, 1944) that these disturbances are due to

interference by the lesion of the normal feedback relatinnshirs between

basal ganglia and cerebral cortex. In fact, surgical removals of motor

cortex have been performed on I:Etients with basal ganglia lesi.ons in

order to redress the im balance proo.uced by the initial lesions. Such

resections have proved to be remarkably successful in alleviating the

often distressing continuing disturbances of involuntary movement tllat

characterize these basal ganglia diseases.

Self-C onsciousness and Intentionality

A final ol::servation is in order regarding y,'illiam James' analysis

of this set of related problems. James clearl.y distinguishes

consciousness from self-consciousness and -suggests that

self-consciousness occurs when attention is p:lid (ie., willed, effort

is made) to internal bcx:1y processes. Tcx:1ay we would P=TIlaps call this

meta-consciousness. James sees no ~ecial problem here, rot his

contemporary, Brentano, Freud's teacher, identifies the issue of se1£-

consciousness or intentionality as central to what makes man human.

Brentano derives his analysis from the scholastics and uses

intentional inexistence (usually referred to as "intentionality") as

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the. key concept to distinguish observed from oeserver, the subjective

from the obj=ctive. I have elsewhere (Pribram, 1976b) romewhat

simplified the arguement by tracing the step:; from the distinction

l:etween intentions and their realization in action to perceptions and

their realization as the obj=ctive world Brentano is credited along

with James as the source of current American realism of which my own

version "ronstructional realism" (Pribram 1971a) can be considered a

part.

How then is Brentano's dualism, the di::,tinction l:etween subject

and object, related to that of . Descartes? CCXJito and intentionality

are of course the S3me. Brain must always be a part of the objective

world even if it is the crgan critically responsible for the subjective

- from which in turn the objective is constructed. Brentano is

perfectly· clear· on this p:>int, and suggests that only the study of

intentional consciousness, ie., seJf-reflective consciousness, is the

province of the philcsopher-p3YchoJogists, not the brain physiologists,

to unravel Recent work, reviewed below, on the occurrence of neglect

syndromes, indicates that brain physiology does, in fact, have

something to S3y even atout intentional consciousness. Of historical

interest is the fact that a pupil of Brentano's, Sigmund Freud, later

to become an outstanding neurologist, (and competent brain

physiologist) also became the champion of the importance of unconscious

proces:;es in determining everyday and pathological behavior (Pribram &

Gill 1976), The case ristor1es presented at the outset of this paper

make Brentano's general point perhap:; more strongly than any

philosophical argument: minding is of two sorts, instrumental and

intentional
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 Part TIl: DIM ENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Neural States as Instruments of Consci.ousnes:;

The instrumental aspect of consciousness is ~haps mcst readily

illustrated by asking the following question: woulrl you say that your

pet dog is conscious? Why, you answer, of course he is. We all

attri.b.1te awareness to organisms when they mind their environment, when

they app::ar to pay attention. Gilbert Ry1e (1949), the behaviorist.

philosopher, made note of this when he lX'inted out that the English

term "mind" is derived from minding - and \\1illia.m James in his

Principles of Psychology (1950) asks whether in fact we need the term

consciousness since what we mean by it is sO intimately interwoven vlith

attention and its limited !:pan. We crdinarily distinguish

consciousness from unconsciousness much as does the physician and

surgeon: when someone responds to prodding (e.g. by grumbling, "Oh

leave me alone! Can't you see rm trying to get some sleep!> we

attribJte to him a conscious state. When, on the other hand

hisresponse is an incoherent thrashing about, we say he is stuperous

and if there is no response at ~ we declare hi.m comatose.

Note that we are now distinguishing between various nervous

states of consciousness such as sleep and- wakefulness (and p:rhaps a

hypnotic st.ate and others as well) and states of unconsciOusness -

unresponsiveness (such as stupor and coma>. The interesting thing

about such states is their mutual exclusiveness regarding experience:

what is experienced in one state is not available to experience in

another. Such state exclusiveness emerges in all sorts of

observations: state dependent learning in animal experiments; the fact

that salmon ~a wning fEY no attention to food, while when they are in
their feeding state sexual stimuli are ignored; the ol:servation in

hypnosis that a person can be made tma ware post-hypnotically of

suggestions made during hypncsis (although he carries out these

suggestions; and the dissociation between experiences (and behavior)

taking place during "automatisms" in tem};X)ral.lobe epileptics and their

ordinary state. I v,'ould add to these the mutual exclusivenes:; of

natural language systems which makes translation EO difficult. The

evidence obtained in all of these situations suggests that the sa me

basic neural - or more likely, on the ba.sis of current evidence (for

review see Pribram, J!977), neurochemical - substrate becomes variously

organized to prc:duce me or another state. Hilgard has conceptualized

this sul:x5trate as a "hidden ol:::server" and the manifestations of various

organized states as a more cr less "vertical" rearrangement of the

sul:strate.· One might picture such arrangements to resem ble these that

take place. in a kaleidescope: a slight rotation and an entirely new

configuration presents itself. Slight changes in relative

concentrations of chemicals and/or in neural firing thresholds in

specific neural locations couJd, in similar fashion, result in totally

different states.

Consciousness as Process

These state, ie. instrumental, definitions of consciousness are

not what Freud or mcst philosophers have meant by the term. Recall

the em phasis by Brentano on intentional consciousness which arises frem

the distinction between the contents of awareness and the p.:.rson who is

aware; the dualism of subj2ctive mind and ob~ctive matter t::rain) in

tlle writings of Ernst 1-1 ach and that of Renee Descartes. Although

Cartesian dualism is r;erhap:; the first overt ncn-trivial expression of

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the .issue, the duality between subject and object and some causal

connection eetween them is inherent in language once it emerges from

simple naming to predication. Neuman (1954) and Jaynes (1977) have

suggested that a change in consciousness occurs somewhere between the

time of the Iliad and the Odys:;ey. My interpretation of this

occurrence links it to the invention and prom ulgation of writing.

Pre-history was transmitted orally/aurally. Written history is

visual/verbal. In an orall aural culture a greater share of reality is

carried in memory and is thus ~nal; once writing becomes a ready
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means of recording events they l::ecome a part of extrape.rsonal reality.

The shift described is especiall.y manifest in a clearer externalization

of the sources of conscience - the Gods no longer speak personally to

guide individual man.

Thi'5 process of ever clearer distinctions between personal and

extrapersonal realities culminates in Cartesian dualism and Brentano's

intentional inexistence which was shortened by Von Uxkull to

"intentionality. " It is this reading of the Slbject-object distinction

which philosophers ordinarily mean when they speak of the difference

between conscious and unconscious processes.

Freud had training both in medical. practice and in philosophy.

When he emphasized the L'11portance ci. unconscious processes, was he

implying the medical definition or the philosophical? Mcst interpreta-

tions of Freud suggest tllat unconscious processes of:'€rate without

awareness in the sense that they oP=rate automatically much as do

respiratory and gastrointestinal processes in someone who is stuperous

or comatcse. Freud himself seems to have promu]agated this view by

suggesting a "horizontal" s,:.lit tetwecn conscious, preconscious and

unconscious processes with "repression" operating to push memory-motive

.,...
 structures into deeper layers where they no longer access awareness.

Still in the "Project", memory-motive structures are neural programs -

located in the core portions of the brain which access awareness by

their connections to cortex which determine whether a wish comes to

consciousness. When the neural program becomes a secondary process, it

comes under voluntary control which involves reality testil1g and thus

consciousness, thus to use Janguage as an example, one might well know

two languages I::ut at anyone time connect only one to cortex and thus

the other remains "unconscious" and voluntarily unexpressed.

The linking of refl.ecti.v"e "consciousness to cortex is not as naive

as it first appears. As the recently reported cases ci. Weiskrantz and

~"arrington (1974), which introouced this manuscript have shown,

"blind-si.ght" results when t;ateints are subj:!cted to unilateral removal

, ,

of the visual rortex., As noted, these patients insist they cannot see

anything in the field contralateral to their lesion blt when tested

they can locate and identify large obj:!cts in their blind hemi£i.eld

with remarkable accuracy. Furthermore there are patients with

unilateral neglect following p:u:i.etal lobe lesions (see Heilman and

Valenstine, i972, for review.) Neglect p3tients can often can get

around using their neglected lim I:s appropriately and H. M., the patient

descril:ed in the introouction who sustained an amygda.1a-hippocampal

resection defect, has teen trained in operant tasks and the effects of

training have p:rsisted without decrement for years, despite

:: protestations from the patient that he doesn't recognize the situation

:,':
"

II and that he remembers nothiI1g of the training (Sidman and Mohr,

I:
I',I
,I
1968).In monkeys Witl1 such lesions we have shown almost {:errect
II
!I retention of training over a tv.'o year peri.od, retention that is better
II
Ii
than that shown by unor..erat.eCi control subj3cts. ThESe rr.onkeys and H. M.
fC(
and the blind-sight patients are clearly conscious in the medical and

ordinary sense. What has gone wrong is their ability to refLect on

theirl:ehavior and experience, an inability within the impaired sphere

of clearly distinguishing r;ersonal from extra-personal reality. This

leaves them with impaired consciousness in th~ philcsopber's sense:

behavior and experience are no longer intentional

The thrust of some recent p:;ychoanalytical thinking as well as

that of experimentalists such as Hilgard (noted above) is in the

direction of interpreting the conscious-unconscious distinction in the

phiksophical sense. For instance, Matte BJanco (1975) proposes that

consciousness be defined by the ability to make clear distinctions, to

identify alternatives, to process information.· Making clear

distinctions would include l:eing able to tell personal from extraper-

sanal reality. By contrast unconscious processes would, according to

H atte Blanco, I:e compc.sed of infinite sets "where paradox reigns and

oppcsites merge into sameness". When infinites are l:eing computed the

ordinary rules of logical and rationality do not hold Thus, dividing

a line of infinite length results in two lines of infinite length, ie

one = two. Being deeply involved allows Jove and ecstacy blt aJso

suffering and hate to occur.

My interpretation of the conscious-unconscious distinction as it

relates to human behavior and experience is in line with Matte BJanco's

and others which are clc6ely related to the philcsophical distinction

and oot to the medical Thus bringing the wellsprings of l:ehavior ana

experience to consciousness means to provide alternatives, to become

informed. Carl Jung defined unconscious processes as those involving

feelings. In current terminology this would mean wenti fication

between an intensive dimension of experience which I have called

i

"protocritic" (see aoove and Pribram, 1977) and unconscious processes

on the one hand and on the ether, t:etween epicritic (as defined by

Henry Head 19 ) and conscious processes. I would add to the epicritic

dimension of consciousness the personal dimension which clearly

constructs and identifies r:ersonal reality and differentiates this from

external reality and from feeling states via cortical-basal ganglia

connecti.vity.

An important change in views becomes necessary when these inter-

pretations are considered seriously: unconscious processes as defined

by I:SYchoanalysis are not completely "submerged" and unavailable to

experience. Rather, unconscious processes prcduce feelings which are

difficult to locate in time or space and difficult to identify

correctly. The unconscious processes construct the emotional and

motivational context within which extrapersonal and r:;ersonal realities

are constructed. As the classical experiments of Schachter and Singer

(1962) have shown, emotional and motivational feelings are to a large

extent undifferentiated and we tend to cognize and Jabel them according

to the circumstances in which the feelings become manifested.

It is in this sense that behavior comes under the control of the

unconscious processes. When I have h.u:st out in anger, I am certaL'11.y

aware that I have done ro and of the effects of the anger on others. I

mayor may not have attended the b.J.ilil-up of feeling prior to the blow-

up. And I may have projected the b..rild-up on to others or introjected

it from them. But I couJrl have become aware of all this (with the

guidance of a friend or therapist) and stiJl found myseJf in

uncontrolled anger. Only when the events leading to the anger become

clearly =eparated into alternative or harmoniously related di.s+-J.ncti.ons

is unconscious control converted into conscious centrol It is

ridicu10us to think that a ~n with an ol:::sessi.on or ccmpuJsion is

una ware, in the medical sense, of his experience or behavior. The

patient is very aware and feels awful But he cannot without aid,

differentiate his feelings into viable Qistinctions in p:rsonal and

extra-t:erEOnal reality, distinctions which allow his alternative and/or

more harmonious behaviors and experience.

PART IV: NEURAL SYSTEMS AND THE CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS:

Ext.rins:i.c and Intrinsic Systems:

I wish this were all there were to the· problem of defining

consciousness. But we are not yet finished with the issue. So far we

have noted that the conscious-unconscious distinction is sometimes

defined instrumentally (as in medical practice) in terms of alternative

states; that in d:her contexts (such as when philosophers and fSYcho-

analysts are discussing it) the distinction is made "intentional," in

terms of process. A third basis for the distinction is one that is

intertwined with the intentional aspects of the problem rot emphasizes

the contents of consciousness rather than the processes by which

.consciousness is achieved.

Surrounding the major fissures of the primate brain lie the

terminations of the sensory and motor projection systems. Rcse and

WooJsey (1949) and Pribram (1960) have labelled the;e systems extrinsic

I:::€cause of their cl.cse ties (by way of a few synap:;es) with P=riPheral

structures. The s:=nsory surface and muscle arrangements ere mapped

more or less isomorphically onto the perifissural cortical surface by

..,ray of discrete practically parallel lines of connectincr titre tracts.

I "I

When a local injury occurs vlithin the;e systems a sensory scotoma or a

scotoma of action ensues. A scotoma is a spatially circumscribed hole

in the "field" of interaction of organism and environment: a blind

spot, a hearing defect limited to a frequency range, a location of the

skin where tactile stimuli fail. to be respondeq to. The=e are the

systems where Head's epicritic processing take; place. These extrinsic

sensory-motor projection systems are 00 organized that their function-

ing allows the organism to project the results of processing a way from

the sensory (and muscuJar) surfaces where the interactions take place,

out into the \'1orld external to' the organis m. Thus processing within

these extrinsic systems constructs an external extrapersonal reality

for the organism.

In between the peri£issural extrinsic regions of cortex lie other

regions of cortex variously named association cortex (FJ.echsig),

uncommitted cortex (Penfield, 19 ) or intrinsic cortex (Pribram).

These names reflect the fact that there is no apparent direct

connection between these regions of cortex on the convexity of the

cerebrum and p=>..Dpheral structures.

Elsewhere (Pribram, 19 ) I have presented evidence which shows

the frontal intrinsic cortex deaJs with probability distribution

(pribram, 19 ) and the {X)Steri.or intrinsic cortex with the setting of

sample size, functions which depend on processing prior- experience

(Pribram, 19 ). _ The evidence was obtained on non-human primates in

research aimed to make animal mooels of human neurq:sycholDgical

Cisturbances prcduced by lesions of the intrinsic regions of the

cortex. Such mooels allowed prolonged and precise exr;::erimental

analyses of the functions of these regions, analyses precluded in

!=Ctients v,'itll similar disturbances. However, non-human primates and

hum.ans differ considerably i'1 their I::€havioral repetoire and in

proces:iing experience - and much of the difference is attributed to the

very regions of cortex under consideration. It is therefore necessary

now to turn to human as well as monkey neurop;ychoJogical studies to

ascertain how mechanisms of probability estimation and these of setting

sample size manifest in man.

Personal and Extrapersonal Reality: As is well known, frontal

lesions were produced for a pericd of time in order to relieve

intractable suffering, corr,puJsi.Ons, ol::sessi.ons and endogenous

depressions. When effective in r:ain and depression, these

psychcsurgical procedures portrayed in man the well. established

functional relationship I::€tween frontal intrinsic cortex and the limbic

forebrain in non-human primates. Further, frontal lesions can lead

either to r::erservative, compulsive b=havior or to distractability in

monkeys and this is also true of humans (Pribram, Ahumada, Hartog and

Rcx:s, 1964; Oscar Berman, in press). When compulsions and oJ::sessions

have become established - P=!hap; by weighting the probability of their

effectiveness in diminishing risk, much as conceived in I=SYchoanlytic

theory - then damage to the probability assigning tissue might well

change the probability of assignment as it seems to do. Certainly

clinical ob5ervations attest to the fact that an impressive array of

patients with frontal lesions whether surgical, traumatic, muscuJar or

neoplastic fail to be guided by the consequences of their I::€havior

(Luria, Pribram and Homskaya, 1964; Konow and Pribram, 1970).

Lesions of the intrinsic cortex of the pc6t.erior CFrebral

convexity result in sensory ~ecific agncsias in both monkey and man.

Re;earch on monkeys has shown that these agnC6i.as are not due to
 failure to distinguish cues from one another rot due to maJr.ing use of

those distinctions in making choices among alternatives (Pribram and

Mishkin, 1955, 19560., b). As noted this ability is the es3ence of

information processing and the fX)Sterior intrinsic cortex determines

the range of alternatives, the sample size which a particular informa-

tive element must address. A patient with agnosia can tell the diff-

erence between two obj=cts rot does not know what that difference

means. As Charles Peirce 0935) once noted, what V.'e mean by something

and what we mean to do with it are synonymous. In short, alternatives,

sample size, choice, cognition, "information and meanin:: are closely

interwoven concepts. Finally, when agnosia is severe it is often

accompanied by what is termed "reglect." The patient appears not only

not to know that he doesn't know rot to actively deny the agnCEia.

Typical is a pa'tient I once had who repeatedly had difficulty in

sitting up in t:eci. I pointed out to her that her arm had become

entangled in the bedclothes - she would acknowledge this momentarily

only to "lose" that arm once more in a tangled environment. Part of

the "person" seems to have become extinguished

These results can readily be conceptualized in terms of

extrape.rsonal and ~rsonal reality. For a time it was thought that

I
i',J
I personal reality depended on the integrity of the frontal intrinsic

cortex and that the fX)Sterior convexal cortex was critical to the

construction of extrape.rsonal reality (See e.g. Pd1l, 1973). This

scheme was brought to test in my laboratory during the past decade in

experiments with monkeys (Brcdy and Pribram, 1978) and patients <Ruff,

Hersh and Pribram, 1981; Hersh, 19 ) and found wantin0. In fact, the

personal and e>-trapersonal distinction involves the parietal cortex.

Perhaps the most clearcut example of this comes from studies by

Hountcastle and his group (Mountcastle, Lynch, GeorqOI::x:mlos, Sakata and

Acuna, 1975) \.;hich show that cells in the convexal intrinsic cortex

respond when an object is within view rot only when it is also within

reach. In short, our studies on patients and these of others have been

unable to clearly separate the brain locations. which prcrluce agncEi.a

from these that produce neglect. Furthermore, the studies on monkeys

indicate that agncsia is related to t:erSOnal meaning and use.

We di'3tinguish, therefore, 1) the extrinsic p:ri.-fissural systems

which construct for us external reality and 2) the intrinsic convexal

systems - frontal and ~ot" - which construct for us a f€!'SOnal

reality: frontal cortex providing a probabalistic context of

di.spcsi.tions to behave; parietal cortex the space/time references which

relate personal to extrapersonal reality. We found, much to Our

surprise, that the intrinsic systems are heavily connectFd with the

basal ganglia (including the amygdaJa)(Rei.tz and Pribram, 1969).

Furthermore, in monkeys the disturbances produced by restricted lesions

of the convexal intrinsic cortex are also prcduced by lesions of the

parts of the basal ganglia to which these parts of the cortex project.

This finding takes on special meaning from the fact that lesions of the

thalamus (which is also intimately connected with this cortex) fail to

proouce such effects. Further, recent experiments have shown that the

neglect syndrome can be prcrluced in monkeys by lesions of the

dopaminergic nigrcstriatal system (Wright, 1980. rrhis special

connection between intrinsic (recall that this is also called

association) cortex and the basal ganglia (including the amygdala)

further supports the conception that these parts of the corL.e>C deal

with the construction of self: when to stop and when to go, when to
 switch and \'Jhen to remain steady are certainly very personal

processes.

I do not want to leave you with the idea that agnosia and neglect.

are prcduced by identical mechanisms. Nor do I want to suggest that

separate systems will not be - and P=t'ha.r;s already have been - located

for each. .AJso there are other syndromes, apraxias, prosopagnosia and

the Janguage related disturbances such as aphasia and alexia which are

prcduced by lesions in the general region of the rx::staior intrinsic

cortex of the convexity. My tx>int is that all of these disturbances

are disturbances of personal reality and that together they make up

our conception of self which in the r;:sychoanalytic frame is called the

"ego." In the ''Project'' Freua used this term in several different ways
·.
- one, a functional definition dealing with delay and executive

functi.ons,the dispcsi.t:i.ons to I::ehave and thus frontal; and the other a

more structural definition which addresses the space/time referents of

that· function which appear to necessitate the oPerations of the

posterior convexity. I believe that currently p:;ychoanalysts also LEe

the term in both ways and may thus be helped to distinguish them by the

results of the neurobehavioral and neuro.r;sycho-logical studies reviewed

here. The results of these investigations have also shown that one of

.the major functions of the ego, the self, -is to bias behavior toward

risk or caution (I;XJSterior convexity) and that this biasi.ng is a

function of se1£-<xmfidence. Of course good c:linicians have known this

all along rut r;erhap:; they did not know that the brain is bJilt along

the lines suggested by their clinical experience.

 The contents of consciousness are not exhaustively described by

feelings (which in IEychoanalysis are the basis of unconscious

processes as \ole have seen) nor by perceptions of common s:nsory

extra-personal and personal reality. The esoteric tradition in Western

cUlture and the mystical traditions of the Far. East are replete with

instances of uncommon states that are achieved by a variety of

techniques such as meditation, Yega or Zen. The contents of processing

in such states appear to differ from ordinary feelings or Perceptions.

Among others, ext=eriences such as the following are described: l)

oceanic, i e. a merging of persOnal and extra-personal reality which at

the same time are still clearly distinguished; 2) out of I::ody, ie.

personal and extra-personal reality continues to be clearly

distinguished b.1t are experienced by still another reality (personal

reality is termea the ego; the new reality, the self); or 3) the "seJf"

becomes a transparent throughput which exr:eriences everything

everywhere, merging t11e oceanic and out of I::ody types of experience.

All of these experiences have in common a transcendental relationship

between ordinary s:nsory-motor based mental experience some more

encompassing organizing principle. It is this relationship which, as

noted by Jcse Delgado ( this volume) is ordinarily termed "Spiritual"

The "~irtual" contents of conscioness can I::e accounted for by the

holographic-like microstructure which characterizes cortical receptive

fields,

'l'his holoqraphic-like rricrcstructure is manifested in addition to

the grcss correspondence cortical receptive field and s:nsory surface

organization. The internal organization of receptive fields eml:odi.es,

among ether characteristics, a frequency sensitive domain: Over t11e

past 15 years evidence has accumulated that, indeed, neurons

in the extrinsic sensory-motor cortex are tuned to limited bands

of frequencies in the specific sensory mOde in which they operate <ie.

with respect to the s=nsory rereptors to which they are reJativel.y

directly connected). I have reviewed this evidence extensively on a

number of occasions (1974: 1982).

Perhaps the mcst dramatic of the:;e data are these which p:=rtain

to vision. The cortical neurons of the visual system are arranged as

are the other sensory systems so a'3 to refl.ect more or less

isomorphically the arrangement of the receptor surfaces to which they

are connected. (Thus, the "hommunculi" which Wilder Penfield and

others have mapped onto the cortical surface of the extrinsic

projection sys+-...ems). However, within this grcss arrangement lie the

receptive fields of each of the neurons - a receptive field being

determined by the dendritic arborization of that neuron which makes

contact with the more peripheral parts of the system. Thus the

receptive field of a neuron is that p3rt of the environment which is

processed by the parts of the system to which the neuron is connected.

By studying the micro-organization of receptive fields at various

levels of the system, we can unravel. the-sensory processing mechanism.

It is· this micro-organization which has been shown to refl.ect the

operation of sets of neurons each of which is sensitivE' to

approximately an octave (range from '1/2 to 1 1/2/ octaves) of spatial

frequency. It is the frquency selective microprocess which transforms

the input into a holoqraphic-like mechanism.

The grcss and micro-organization of tile cortical neurons in the

extrinsic systerr:s thus resembles to some extent the organization of a

),(.:'1
muJtiplex hologram. Such hoJograrns are composed by converting (e.g.

via Fourier transformation) successive sensory images (e.g. frames of a

movie film) into their frequency re-presentations and stripping (or

patching) these micro-representations into orderly spatial arrangements

which represent the original temporal order of successive images. When

such conversions are linear (as e.g. when they employ the Fourier

transform) they can readily be ·reconverted (e.g. by thE> inverse Fourier

transform) into moving (ie. successive) s=nsory images. This domain

is p:culiar in that information tecomes lx>th distritr uted over the

extent of each receptive field and enfolded within it. Thus sensory

image reconstruction can occur from any part of the total aggregate ci

receptive 6elds. This is what gives the aggregate its holographic

holistic aspect. All input becomes dist.ril::uted and enfolded including

the dimensions of time and !:pace. It is this timeless/spaceless aspect

of processing which could be responsible for the extra-sensory

dimensions of experience which characterize the esoteric traditions.

Because of their enfolded prop:rty these dimensions are as likely

to be attriwted to extrapersonal as to personal reality. Conscious

prop:rties are therefore, in these traditions, not limited to p:rsonal

reality.

An intriguing and related development (because it deals with the

specification of a more encompassing, "o::s mic" order) has occurred in

quantum and nuclear physics. For the past 50 years it has tecome

obvious that when certain measurements are taken, others are excluded.

Thus there is no way to characterize all of the properties of the

microstructure of matter without specifying the ob3ervations that led

to inferring those properties. 'I'his has led many noted physicists to

write some sort of representation of the ol::server into the description

of the ol::servable and some of these physicists have ncted the

similarity of this sort of representation to the esoteric descriptions

of consciousness. Books with such titles as The Tao of Physi~ (Capra,

1975) and The Dance of the Wu Li Masters (Zukav, 1971) have result.ed.

Conclusion

There is therefore in tJ1e making a real revolution in Western

thought. The scientific and esoteric traditions have been cleady at

odds since the time of Galilee. Each new scientific discovery and the

theory deve1Df€d from it, has up until now, resulted in the widening of

the rift I:::etween objective sc:i.ence and the subj=ctive spiritual aspects

of man's nature. The rift reached a maximum toward the end of the

nineteenth century: mankind was asked to chocse between Goo and Darwin;

heaven and hell were shown by Freud to reside within us and not in our

relationship to 'the natural universe. The discoveries of twentiet..~

century science briefly noted here but reviewed extensively elsewhere,

do not fit this mould. The recent findings of science and the

spiritual experiences of mankind are for once in consonance. 'I'his

augurs well for the upcoming new millenium - a science which comes to

terms with the spiritual nature of mankind may well outstrip the

technological science of the im mediate past in its cont.ri.bJ.tion to

human welfare.

31
 ·
.
.

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