Good morning

.Today, I will be delving into a provision of criminal law that governs the fine line between
unfortunate accidents and criminal liability — Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023, which corresponds to the erstwhile Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
While the title may suggest a relatively minor offence — “causing death by negligence” —
the legal, ethical, and social implications surrounding it are far more layered than they first
appear. It operates in a unique grey area of criminal jurisprudence — one where the mind of
the accused does not possess the intent to kill, yet their reckless or negligent act snatches
away human life.

Let us begin by understanding the essential legal nature of Section 106 BNS. This section
penalizes the act of causing death by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to
culpable homicide. It is crucial to recognize that this section carves out an exception from
Sections 105 and 103 of BNS (which correspond to Sections 304 and 302 IPC, covering
culpable homicide and murder respectively). While those sections require mens rea in the
form of either intention or knowledge, Section 106 deals exclusively with situations where
neither of these mental states exists. Instead, liability arises from carelessness that breaches
the duty of caution a reasonable person is expected to follow.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that Section 304A (now Section 106) does not
create a new offence but acts as a filter to exclude cases from the domain of culpable
homicide. As explained in Mahadev Prasad Kaushik v. State of U.P. (AIR 2009 SC 125), this
provision comes into play only when the act causing death lacks both intention and
knowledge. Thus, any case in which the accused had knowledge that their act was likely to
result in death — such as pushing someone from a height or driving drunk — would fall
outside the ambit of Section 106 and within the purview of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder under Section 105 BNS (304 Part II IPC).

To illustrate the scope of Section 106, we must distinguish between the concepts of rashness
and negligence. The distinction is subtle yet significant. Rashness implies acting with the
knowledge that a particular act might cause harm, but proceeding regardless, often in haste
or recklessness. Negligence, on the other hand, refers to a failure to act with the level of
care that a reasonable person would have exercised in similar circumstances. This
conceptual difference is crucial in identifying the culpability of an accused under this
provision. For example, a person driving at high speed through a crowded area despite
knowing the risks may be said to have acted rashly, whereas a person who forgets to fix a
loose stair railing that later causes someone’s fall may be negligent.

The courts have frequently grappled with the boundaries of these definitions. In the
landmark case of Cherubin Gregory v. State of Bihar, the facts were quite compelling. The
accused had installed a live electric wire across a pathway leading to his latrine to prevent
trespassers. Despite being aware that others, including the deceased, were still using this
passage, he took no steps to warn or prevent harm. Tragically, one such person touched the
wire and was electrocuted. The Court held this to be a clear instance of criminal rashness.
The act was done with complete disregard for human safety, and the justification of
preventing trespassing was rejected outright. The Court’s powerful metaphor — that
placing a live wire was akin to “shooting a man without pulling the trigger” — emphasized
the gravity of his conduct. The conviction under Section 304A was thus upheld.

Contrast this with the case of S.N. Hussain v. State of Andhra Pradesh, which serves as an
instructive counterpoint. Here, a bus driver crossed a level railway crossing where the gate
was open and no train was scheduled. Unfortunately, a goods train collided with the bus,
leading to multiple deaths. However, the Court acquitted the driver under Section 304A,
noting that he had acted reasonably given the circumstances — slow driving, poor visibility,
and the presence of an open gate. The responsibility, in fact, lay with the railway gateman.
This decision highlights that Section 106/BNS is not to be applied mechanically to every
accident resulting in death; rather, the accused’s state of mind and surrounding
circumstances are of paramount importance.

Section 106 is tripartite in structure. First, sub-section (1) establishes the general provision,
applicable to any person whose rash or grossly negligent act results in death. The
punishment may extend to five years’ imprisonment, along with a fine, and the offence
remains cognizable and bailable. However, the law does not stop here—it makes room for
professional realities, particularly in the medical field. Through a proviso, Section 106(1)
provides that if the person responsible is a registered medical practitioner, the punishment
shall not exceed two years. This exception is a statutory recognition of the principles laid
down in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, where the Supreme Court held that criminal
prosecution of doctors should not be based on simple errors in judgment but on acts of
gross or reckless negligence.

The inclusion of this medical exception is deeply rooted in the policy to protect the medical
fraternity from frivolous criminal litigation. However, this does not imply a blanket immunity.
. According to reports by the Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, over 5.2 million cases of
medical malpractice are reported annually in India, with over 80% involving surgical errors,
and more than 70% of emergency-related deaths linked to negligence in timely treatment.
Thus, while the law shows leniency, it remains conscious of the scale of risk involved.

A wide range of older cases continue to influence the modern interpretation of this
provision. In State v. Shahu (1917), a man was found guilty under Section 304A after
violently engaging in sexual intercourse with his underage wife, leading to her death. His act,
though devoid of intent to kill, was deemed rash given the foreseeable danger to the minor
girl. Similarly, in Kamruddin (1905), the accused labeled explosive fireworks as harmless
goods and caused a fatal explosion during loading. Here again, negligence was clearly
established. Another tragic instance involved a young woman abandoning her newborn child
by the roadside. Despite taking some precautions, the child died of starvation, and the
mother was held liable under Section 304A. These cases reflect that a failure to foresee the
natural consequences of one's careless acts — whether physical, emotional, or structural —
can give rise to criminal liability.

Perhaps one of the most disturbing modern illustrations of this offence is found in Alister
Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648. The case concerned a high-profile
individual who, after a late-night party, drove his car in an inebriated state and killed seven
sleeping pavement dwellers. The Supreme Court expressed alarm over the growing menace
of drunken driving, calling it a "scourge" in metropolitan society. The Court categorically
clarified that such cases do not fall under Section 304A if there is sufficient knowledge of the
likelihood of death. Since driving in an intoxicated condition at high speed reflects awareness
of potential consequences, the driver was found liable under Section 304 Part II — i.e.,
culpable homicide not amounting to murder — and not merely for negligence under Section
304A.

The BMW hit-and-run case — State v. Sanjeev Nanda (2012) — further solidified this
position. The accused, while intoxicated, ran over and killed six people including police
officers at 4 AM. Despite lack of intention, the Court held that the sheer recklessness and
knowledge of danger excluded the application of Section 304A. These cases have helped
delineate the limits of negligent homicide and underscore the gravity with which rash driving
is viewed in contemporary jurisprudence.

Amid these legal precedents, it is impossible to ignore the urgent demand for reform.
Originally introduced in 1870, Section 304A was never meant to handle modern-day traffic
fatalities, structural collapses, or medical negligence. Its maximum punishment — two years
of imprisonment or fine or both — is grossly inadequate in the present context. The 42nd
Law Commission Report (1971) recommended enhancing this penalty to five years,
particularly for grave acts of negligence such as drunk driving or institutional dereliction of
safety norms. In Abdul Sharif v. State of Haryana (2016), the Supreme Court echoed this
sentiment, observing that lenient sentencing under Section 304A fails to deliver justice in
cases involving multiple fatalities.

In conclusion, Section 106 of the BNS continues to serve a vital role in distinguishing tragic
misfortune from criminal accountability. It preserves the sanctity of justice by ensuring that
those who act without intention or knowledge are not punished as murderers. Yet, its
effective use depends heavily on judicial discretion and nuanced fact-finding. As societal
risks evolve — from chaotic urban traffic to institutional negligence in hospitals and
construction sites — so must our legal responses. A relook at sentencing norms, greater
clarity in distinguishing between rashness and knowledge, and stronger deterrent measures
are the need of the hour. As aspiring legal professionals, we must understand that the law is
not only about punishment but also about accountability, foresight, and the sanctity of
human life.

Thank you.
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