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Ahsan

The document discusses the OSI Security Architecture, detailing security attacks, components, and their relationships. It distinguishes between passive and active threats, outlines key security concepts such as authentication, access control, data protection, and nonrepudiation, and emphasizes the importance of system availability. Additionally, it presents an attack surface and an attack tree to illustrate potential security vulnerabilities and their implications for various organizations.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
20 views9 pages

Ahsan

The document discusses the OSI Security Architecture, detailing security attacks, components, and their relationships. It distinguishes between passive and active threats, outlines key security concepts such as authentication, access control, data protection, and nonrepudiation, and emphasizes the importance of system availability. Additionally, it presents an attack surface and an attack tree to illustrate potential security vulnerabilities and their implications for various organizations.

Uploaded by

john kevin
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

COMPUTER SECURITY

Mohammad Ahsan Junaid


BS CIS Serial 19

1.1 The OSI Security Architecture is a design that gives a purposeful

strategy for describing the necessities for security and depicting the

ways of managing satisfying those necessities. The record portrays

security attacks, parts, and organizations, and the associations

among these arrangements.

1.2 Passive perils have to do with snoopping on, or checking,

transmissions. Electronic mail, record moves, and client/server

exchanges are occasions of transmissions that can be noticed. Dynamic

perils fuse the change of sent data and tries to

secure unapproved induction to PC systems.

1.3 Passive attacks: appearance of message substance and traffic assessment.


Dynamic attacks: mask, replay, modification of messages, and

denial of organization.

1.4 Authentication: The certification that the passing on substance is the

one that it maintains to be.

Access control: The countering of unapproved use of a resource (i.e.,

this help controls who can move toward a resource, under what

conditions access can occur, and what those getting to the resource are

allowed to do).

Data protection: The security of data from unapproved

disclosure.

Data dependability: The insistence that data got are really as sent by

an endorsed substance (i.e., contain no change, consideration, wiping out, or

replay).

Nonrepudiation: Provides protection from repudiation by one of the

components drew in with a correspondence of having taken an interest taking everything together or
part

of the correspondence.
Availability organization: The property of a system or a structure resource

being accessible and usable upon demand by a supported system

substance, as shown by execution judgments for the structure (i.e., a

system is available in case it offers sorts of help as demonstrated by the structure plan

whenever customers request them).

1.6 Authentication: The affirmation that the passing on substance is the

one that it claims to be.

Access control: The evasion of unapproved use of a resource (i.e.,

this assistance controls who can move toward a resource, under what

conditions access can occur, and what those getting to the resource are

allowed to do).

Data protection: The protection of data from unapproved

divulgence.

Data uprightness: The insistence that data got are all things considered as sent by

an endorsed component (i.e., contain no adjustment, consideration, eradication, or

replay).
Nonrepudiation: Provides protection from repudiation by one of the

components drew in with a correspondence of having shared taking everything together or part

of the correspondence.

Openness organization: The property of a system or a structure resource

being accessible and usable upon demand by an endorsed system

substance, as demonstrated by execution subtleties for the system (i.e., a

structure is open if it offers sorts of help as shown by the system plan

whenever customers request them).

1.7 An attack surface involves the reachable and exploitable

shortcomings in a structure. An attack tree is a spreading, moderate

data structure that tends to a lot of expected procedures for

exploiting security shortcomings.

1.1 The system should keep individual distinctive evidence numbers characterized, both

in the host system and during transmission for a trade. It must

secure the reliability of record records and of individual trades.

Availability of the host system is basic to the money related flourishing


of the bank, but not to its trustee commitment. The availability of

individual teller machines is of less concern.

1.2 The system doesn't have high necessities for genuineness on individual

trades, as suffering mischief will not be achieved by inconsistently

losing a call or charging record. The genuineness of control programs and

configuration records, regardless, is fundamental. Without these, the trading

limit would be squashed and the principle characteristic of all -

availability - would be compromised. A telephone trading system must

also save the mystery of individual calls, preventing one visitor

from getting another.

1.3

a. The structure should ensure mystery in the event that it is being used to

convey corporate prohibitive material.

b. The system should ensure uprightness in the event that it is being used to laws or

rules.

c. The structure should ensure availability in the event that it is being used to disperse
a consistently paper.

1.4

a. An affiliation supervising public information on its web server

finds that there is no conceivable impact from an insufficiency of

protection (i.e., order requirements are not proper), a

moderate anticipated impact from an insufficiency of dependability, and a moderate

anticipated impact from an inadequacy of availability.

b. A law execution affiliation administering unquestionably sensitive

logical information checks that the conceivable impact from a

loss of order is high, the logical impact from an inadequacy of

uprightness is moderate, and the possible impact from an inadequacy of

openness is moderate.

c. A financial affiliation managing routine legitimate information

(not security related information) affirms that the logical impact

from a lack of characterization is low, the reasonable impact from an inadequacy of

trustworthiness is low, and the normal impact from a lack of availability is


low.

d. The organization inside the contracting affiliation affirms that:

(I) for the delicate understanding information, the normal impact from a

loss of protection is moderate, the logical impact from an insufficiency of

decency is moderate, and the possible impact from a lack of

availability is low; and (ii) for the routine definitive information

(non-assurance related information), the possible impact from an inadequacy of

mystery is low, the conceivable impact from an insufficiency of decency is

low, and the normal impact from an insufficiency of availability is low.

e. The organization at the power plant confirms that: (I) for the

sensor data being obtained by the SCADA structure, there is no

reasonable impact from an insufficiency of security, a high anticipated impact

from an inadequacy of decency, and a high conceivable impact from a lack of

availability; and (ii) for the administrative information being

taken care of by the system, there is a low anticipated impact from an adversity

of grouping, a low conceivable impact from an insufficiency of reliability, and a


low conceivable impact from an insufficiency of availability. Models from FIPS

199.

1.8

We present the tree in message structure; call the association X:

Survivability Compromise: Disclosure of X restrictive insider realities

On the other hand

1. In reality scavenge discarded things from X

On the other hand

1. Survey dumpster content close by

2. Survey reject after removal from site

2. Screen transmissions from X machines

Moreover,

1. Study real boundary to choose ideal noticing position

2. Obtain significant actually looking at equipment

3. Game plan really looking at site

4. Screen spreads from site


3. Select help of trusted in X insider

Then again

1. Plant spy as trusted in insider

2. Use existing trusted in insider

4. Really access X associations or machines

Of course

1. Get physical, on the spot permission to Intranet

2. Get genuine induction to external machines

5. Attack X intranet using its relationship with Internet

Then again

1. Screen correspondences over Internet for spillage

2. Get trusted in cycle to send sensitive information to attacker over Internet

3. Gain limited induction to Web server

6. Attack X intranet using its relationship with public telephone association (PTN)

Then again

1. Screen correspondences over PTN for spillage of tricky information

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