2012

Balancing Act
European Integration: Apogee or
Perigee?
The accomplishments and achievements of the European experiment while
having been welcomed by some have been criticized and flatly rejected by
others. Europe, as a nebulous entity currently faces one of the greatest crisis
in its brief history. Has the bell finally tolled for European Integration?

James Welch
University of Oklahoma. Master Level
Graduate Class: 5213-490. Politics of the European Union.
Professor: Dr. Mitchell P. Smith
2/26/2012
 BALANCING ACT

Europe is quite possibly at the crossroads of its greatest challenge of its historically brief

existence. Recent budget deficits in Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Greece based on heavy

borrowing, protective employment legislations and irresponsible government spending, have

brought the Union to a point of crisis, bordering on possible dissolution. But this problem is not

only one of economics and finance, it also is tightly bound up with the concept of what Europe

has become, what it is, and what it aspires to become. The recent crisis merely underlines much

of the unspoken malaise which is at the heart of the problem. If the problems, which plague the

EU today, are largely based upon economic woes, it is due to the fact that the European Union

(EU), from its outset, was an economic project and failed to develop an adequate sustainable

political framework to support solid integration.

Political integration, which would encompass not only financial but fiscal integration has

been delayed and forestalled resulting in the current climate of crisis today. Part of this failure to

completely integrate is based upon the structure and composition of the European Union itself.

The EU currently represents 27 different nation states. Each of these states, has a different

national language, a different culture, different perspectives and radically different expectations

about what they are willing to offer in exchange for what they wish to receive. These individual

differences become even more pronounced when there is a question of surrendering national

sovereignty, by any measure, in exchange for the safety and comfort of a more federalized

system of collective polity. Europe is, in fact, struggling against itself in a sense. Having put an

end to the terrible 30 years’ war with the Treaty of Westphalia, the concept of the sovereign

nation-state became the guideline for European power politics for 300 painful and bloody years.
HISTORICAL ROOTS

Following the ravages of two sequential world wars, Europe sought a new framework based

on peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation based itself, upon economic interdependence.

The concept of an integrated Europe was originally elicited by a Romanian born, Briton, David

Mitrany. Ironically, as John McCormick writes, “He was concerned with the achievement of

world peace more generally, not with European integration-in fact, he was opposed to regional

unification because he felt it would replace international tensions with interregional tensions-and

yet his ideas formed the starting point for discussions about the road to integration.” 1 One of the

most influential figures to have an impact upon the road to integration was Winston Churchill.

The former Prime Minister of Britain while speaking at the University of Zurich Switzerland, in

1946, called for the establishment of a “United States of Europe.” His words had a resounding

impact upon visionaries of the time who related to his remarks, “Europe must unite before war
2
destroys the continent, its glorious civilization, and perhaps much of the rest of the world.”

While this fear is understandable in the wake of the massive destruction engendered by WW2,

there was little possibility that the antagonists would gather arm again for a very long time. Still

this motivation was primordial in the shaping of the future of the “Old Continent.” Europe was

not long in heeding the call set out by Churchill and in 1952 the Benelux countries (Belgium,

the Netherlands and Luxembourg), Italy, France and Germany, established the European Coal

and Steel Community (ECSC). The dramatic significance of this act has often been overlooked

and downplayed in world history. The fact is that only four years after a bloody and destructive

war, sworn former enemies, France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, had
1
McCormick, John. The European Union. 4th. Boulder: Westview Press, 2008. p. 20
2
Churchill, Winston S. "The Tragedy of Europe." In The European Union, edited by Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander
Stubb, 7-11. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003. p. 7
agreed to enter into peaceful industrial and economic cooperation. Coal and steel are intimately

forged (pun intended) in the production of the basic goods of war. By combining these two vital

resources France and Germany, in particular, were establishing the framework for peaceful

coexistence through mutual interdependence. Five years later this mutual cooperation led, on

March 25, 1957, to the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the founding of EURATOM and the

European Economic Community.

THE ROAD TOWARD INTEGRATION

The road toward European integration was paved not with roses but with strife. The dividing

lines were sharply drawn and protagonists and antagonists on both sides of the aisle drew up

their prospective political battle lines. While the war of arms had subsided, the war of words and

ideas had just commenced. One of the most vociferous critics of European integration was

Charles DeGaulle. Loved by some, respected by others and detested by many, DeGaulle did not

mince his words. A staunch nationalist, Degaulle, held little trust in Germany and had little use

for the various institutions taking shape on the continent. In a rather typically arrogant French

posture DeGaulle withdrew France from The NATO integrated command structure in 1966.

Author Stanley Sloan writes, “DeGaulle believing as strongly as he did in the nation-state as the

heart of the international system, hoped to lead his European partners away from the

supranational inspiration of the Rome treaties and toward a Europe des Patries, a European

unity based on sovereignty of the nation-states and led, of course, by France.”3 Later, in 1988,

Maggie Thatcher would abide with the vision of DeGaulle while mounted of her charger of the

nation-state. Thatcher’s Britain looked to the Community with a jaundiced eye as an unnecessary

3
Sloan, Stanley R. Permanent Alliance? New York: Continuum International Piublishing, 2010.p. 46
evil and an unwelcome commercial competitor. On the side of the integrationists, however,

powerful voices also rang out in favor of unification and solid integration. Not least among these

was Jacques Delors, spoke one year following the controversial speech by Dame Thatcher in the

exact same spot, Bruges University. The propos of former president of the European

Commission and Die hard integrationist was, however radically different from the stance

afforded by Thatcher. Delors insisted upon the necessity of integration, nuancing such

integration with the concept of subsidiarity. The EU would be an organ carrying out the wishes

and desires of its constituent members through its various institutions. History delivered the final

score, at least until the present, and that the score is DeGaulle and Thatcher 0 and Schuman and

Delors 1. Still the European Union faces many challenges and at the present moment faces its

most substantial challenge since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in late 1993 after initial

Danish rejection.

PRESENT DAY EUROPE

Europe has become unquestionable a power to contend with exceeding the expectations of

many of its most adamant critics, while falling far short of the aspirations of its most ardent

supporters. The European Union has decided to opt for the use of soft power and diplomacy,

combined with economic power to define its position in global relations. Often seen as the polar

opposite of the United States, such a vision is inherently flawed. If anything the European Union

represents a balanced counterpoise to the American system. As writer Mitchell P. Smith points

out, “There is a looming gap in global leadership that the EU, at least in part, may be positioned

to fill.” 4

4
Smith, Mitchell P. "Soft Power Rising." World Literature Today, 2006: 20-23.
Other writers invariably see the European adoption of the soft power stance as understandable if

regrettable and short sighted. Robert Kagan outlines the differences, which not only underscore

the disparity between soft and hard power and their application in today’s world. According to

Kagan, Europe’s ability to adopt such a position is due in large part to the security umbrella,

under which Europe has found collective security for over 60 years now. The ability to have a

reduced defense budget has allowed Europe development in its industries and economies, which

would not have been possible without the insurance of an American security guarantee.

European criticism of U.S. might and unilateralism, in the view of those who adopt Kagan’s

position, presents a case of biting the hand which feeds. It is a fact that without three vital

elements provided by the United States, Europe, as it exists today, would be a far different place.

First there was the Marshall plan for the economic recovery and development, secondly the

Bretton Woods which established U.S. support for free trade and the dollar as a lynchpin for

international monetary transactions. Finally, there was the establishment of the transatlantic

bargain and the establishment of collective security under NATO.

Europe of today is a political horse without a rider. While the institutions which generally

define a government are in place and working, they are limited in their decision making their

foreign policy and in their overall sway and power. So, while it has many of the trappings of a

federal system, including a set of laws, a Parliament, a single currency, a common executive

[The EU Commission] and can sign off on international treaties in the name of its independent

members, it lacks other vital elements which constitute a federal government, notably a

constitution, and semi-national citizenship. People tend to speak of governance as opposed to

government in the European context. The actual search to define the actual political nature of the

European Union has defied all attempts and remained the center of academic debate.
CURRENT CRISIS

Whatever the EU was or is, may change radically in the very near term. As mentioned at the

very outset of this research paper, the EU is embroiled in its most complex and challenging

situation to date. Much of this has to do with a possible Greek Default on its payments to

creditors and a German fear of destabilization due to a possible Greek withdrawal from the EU

economic zone. Default in the case of Greece is a real possibility. The flexibility of devaluation

of their former currency no longer exists due to their adhesion to the Euro. While the Germans

reluctantly provide funds to bail out Greece, there is resentment at home concerning such

assistance and in Greece there have been violent protests and riots over the strict impositions and

restrictions imposed by the Germans and the ECB upon the Greeks. According to Hugo Dixon

writing for Foreign Affairs, “The option of defaulting in a controlled manner ought to be part of

the current crisis-management approach for the governments that really cannot support their

debts: certainly Greece and possibly Ireland and Portugal too.”5 This underscores the divisions

between economic and monetary union, on the one hand and the lack of fiscal union on the other.

The fact that the economic stability is the heart of European unification and is the measure pulse

of EU health also plays a significant role in the hopes for more integrated unification. The

opinions vary wildly at present, from the most optimistic forecasts for recovery to gloomy

perspectives of destabilization and total dissolution. Martin Feldstein, minces no words when he

writes, “The Euro should now be recognized as an experiment that failed.”6 This is a pretty clear

stamen of what many Euroskeptics are voicing at the moment. According to Feldstein the

driving force which led to monetary union in the first place was based more on politics than on

5
Dixon, Hugo. "Can Europes Divided House Stand?" Foreign Affairs 90, no. 6 (11/12 2011): 74-82.
6
Feldstein, Martin. "The Failure of the Euro." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (01-02 2012): 105 - 116.
economics. From this viewpoint Feldstein insists that “The political goal of creating a

harmonious Europe has also failed.” 7

SUMMARY

The EU stands upon the precipice of its greatest challenge. While the illness of fiscal

instability may gnaw away at its lofty ambitions as a world political leader, the death knell has

not yet rung on the European Union. Whether Europe and the European Union are up to that

challenge and can avoid plummeting into the dark void of nothingness is anybody’s guess. One

possible outcome could be a north-south divide with separate Euro values. Stringent controls and

austerity measures will need to be implemented to save the Eurozone. These measures are

unwelcome by the public and will meet with strong resistance and violent opposition. If there is

any positive aspect that can be pulled from this lesson, it is that the less productive economies

need to tighten their belts and place a control on borrowing and spending. In the long run fiscal

union may be born of necessity. Should that occur, then perhaps political integration will follow

to its logical conclusion as well.

7
Feldstein, Martin. "The Failure of the Euro." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (01-02 2012): 105 - 116.
RFERENCES:

Churchill, Winston S. "The Tragedy of Europe." In The European Union, edited by Brent F.
Nelsen and Alexander Stubb, 7-11. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
Dixon, Hugo. "Can Europes Divided House Stand?" Foreign Affairs 90, no. 6 (11/12 2011): 74-
82.
Feldstein, Martin. "The Failure of the Euro." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (01-02 2012): 105 - 116.
Jr, Joeseph S. Nye, and David A Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperaton. 8th.
Boston: Longman, 2011.
Kagan, Robert. "Power and Weakness." Policy Review 113 (06/07 2002).
McCormick, John. The European Union. 4th. Boulder: Westview Press, 2008.
Sloan, Stanley R. Permanent Alliance? New York: Continuum International Piublishing, 2010.
Smith, Mitchell P. "Soft Power Rising." World Literature Today, 2006: 20-23.

IMAGE References: All images reproduced under title 17 of the USC fair usage clause for

educational purposes.

http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2721/4166286290_1d622dff02.jpg Europe as a flag

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Flag_of_Europe.svg.png European flag

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