What Is Philosophy
Philosophy at its inception was considered to be a science – a
paramount science, with a distinctive method and a criterion
of validation of its own. Philosophy can be regarded as a
science if it has its own subject matter and method. What then
is the subject matter of philosophy? Aristotle in his
Metaphysics says it is being qua being. Other sciences study a
particular segment of reality but philosophy seeks to study
reality as a whole. But it may be objected that there is no such
thing as reality as a whole, there only particular segments of
reality so to say and the total number of sciences covering
these potentially infinite segments will inform us about what
reality is in its totality. To this Aristotle could reply the science
studying one part of being would not be able to say anything
about another part of being, how can physics for instance
which according to him studies physical objects so far as they
are movable inform us about mathematical objects that are not
changeable? Our knowledge would be frittered away in
isolated fragments without any understanding of how they
relate to the whole. But there is more to it, it is not the case
that by simply piling up information about particular sciences
we could arrive at a picture of reality as a whole - the question
is what meaning does the phrase ‘reality as whole’ have. If we
say that reality is simply the sum total of facts and ‘Being’ or
reality is nothing over and above the sum total of individual
beings and these individual units have nothing in common that
could justify the treatment of the whole as a distinctive subject
matter of science, then we have a world of structureless facts
where each distinct fact is a distinct world and where order is
something we impose on them through our thinking. The
implication is that this undercuts the very possibility of science
itself because science involves thinking and finding the order
or the law or in Aristotle’s language causes and principles -
that explains its subject matter. However, if the subject matter
is so to say lawless then no scientific study of it is possible
because knowledge is always about the essence of the thing.
Not only then philosophy as a science but even particular
sciences would become impossible if no rational cognition is
possible.
There are other considerations as well. When we analyse the
structure of an individual object, we find that it is composite or
conditioned because it does not contain within itself the reason
for its own existence. Hence it is dependent on another for its
existence, so it refers to something beyond itself. Take for
instance a horse, the white colour, the texture of its skin, its
bodily frame – everything that we can say constitutes the
matter of the horse is not something unique to the horse.
Other living beings can have similar colours or textures, the
matter of the horse does not determine the identity of the
horse because the same material constituents could have been
used to constitute a different object. It is the Form of the horse
that determines the identity of the particular horse, that allows
us to distinguish the horse from other animals and that also
allows us to re-identify the same horse over a length of time
when it may have gained and lost some of its material
characteristics. It is the Form that is the cause of something’s
‘being one’ thing – it determines the possibility of that thing
being referred to as something. The Form then grounds the
possibility of making true and false judgements about the
horse because it is that factor that makes the horse intelligible
to the intellect. What is the Form? It is the logos or the
definition of a thing that determines its essence. It is the
particular way of ordering certain material parts that explains
how these discrete elements can be treated as one single
nature. A house for instance is that which fulfils the function of
house-dwelling which function informs us how certain material
parts have to be gathered together in order to fulfil the
function or the purpose of the house and different types of
material constituents can be used to perform the same
function. So, what it is to be a house is determined by the
Form not the matter. The matter of the house may be a
peculiar arrangement of parts but the Form determines the
manner in which parts can be combined to determine one
single whole. Or when we say for instance that ‘Socrates is
human’, to be human means to be a rational animal. Socrates’s
humanity is unique to Socrates yet the property of being
human is not unique to Socrates and other beings like Plato,
Aristotle etc. are capable of possessing the same property.
Since it is the Form that determines something to be the one
thing it is and the Form is separate from matter – the reason
why something is the way it is lies outside that entity. So
‘Form’ is defined by Platonists as the paradigmatic cause of an
entity because it is the paradigm or the model after which a
sensible image of it is constructed in accord with Reason.
What determines for instance that a picture of Socrates is of
Socrates is not the colour of the paint but the order and
arrangement of the colours and the contour being in
accordance with the paradigmatic or the original Socrates.
The Form is considered to be the object of a Divine Intellect
because the Form does not exist outside the Intellect nor can it
be reduced to the activity of thinking. This should be clear
when we discuss the nature of thought. In ordinary parlance
we take thinking to be a kind of internal monologue or as
empirics we see thinking to consist of nothing but
representations which like imagination is dependent like a
parasite for its material on sensory contents, which then it can
combine in the format of representations that are not tethered
to their sensory origin because they can simply be imagined
even when they are not present to us. When seen in relation to
the senses thought is at its minimum and then gains some
freedom from the senses when it becomes representational
because the word ‘fire’ for instance does not have to be used
only when we see fire. The representation has a life of its own.
Concepts are then nothing but those representations that
allow us to correctly identify a sensory content. If this is the
end of the story about human cognition then human beings are
nothing more than animals – the difference being a difference
in degree rather than kind and no science, no mathematics, no
morality and no religion is possible. It is because we are
rational that we can think propositions that are universally and
necessarily true and seek the reason ‘why’. Even in our
ordinary ways of thinking we believe that by thinking a thing
through we arrive at the inner kernel or its truth or in other
words its essence. We are not satisfied with appearances but
seek their inner truth. When we ask what are animals, we do
not merely want a list of animals but we seek the reason for
listing them the way we do or the rationale behind it. In other
words, we seek the ‘Form’ that unifies the manifold into one
and cognition then is seeking that one over the many. This is
the basis of scientific thinking where we search for the
principle that unites distinct appearances together and
explains why it has certain essential properties. This is also the
basis of religion that seeks the unity behind the plurality of the
world or the One that is the ground of the many.
When thinking has freed itself from the limitations of both
senses and the representational thinking that too is enmeshed
with the senses then it becomes pure thought. In the
phenomena of self-consciousness we can notice that we have
awareness of an object and in the self-reflexive awareness of
being aware of something these two states are not different
from one another because the subject of thinking is the same.
In a materialistic world-view self-consciousness is impossible
because matter is nothing but parts outside parts or pure
externality lacking an inner core. This self-reflexive awareness
is what distinguishes me from material objects that absolutely
lack consciousness. More importantly for our purposes within
self-consciousness I am aware of an object that is distinct from
me and yet not outside my consciousness. If it was external
then there would be no object of consciousness and if it is
identical to my consciousness then there is no consciousness
of consciousness. So, self-consciousness is also a gathering
together of the consciousness of an object and the object into
one single consciousness. The case of Divine Intellect and the
Form is similar, the only difference being that in pure thought
no image or representation of an object is needed because
Forms are immaterial, so there is no form-matter distinction
and they are directly present to consciousness. Forms are
neither outside the Intellect nor identical to it, there is both
identity and difference.
The Divine Intellect also explains the possibility of eternal
truths like the necessary truths of mathematics and contingent
truths that nevertheless depend on necessary truths. For
instance, when we say that ‘fire is hot’, the validity of this
statement depends on the Form of Fire and the Form of
Hotness. Each Form is both what it is and in relation to
another. The interconnectedness between Forms explains why
their instances down below are interconnected. It is the
intellect’s activity of thinking the Forms that relates the two
and explains why down here wherever we find fire we also find
heat. The sensible fire and the sensible heat are instances of
Form like images of an original archetype. In Platonic
parlance, Socrates is human because he participates in the
Form of humanity; it is what it is owing to participation in a
Form. Socrates’s humanity then is the sensible image of the
Form of Humanity. The relation between the Form and its
instances is analogous to the relation of a paradigm and its
instantiation in a sensible medium like the original Socrates
and his painting.
Now, according to Platonists the paramount objects of thought
– the Forms as separated from matter are the objects of a
divine intellect that contains within itself all that is thinkable.
Human beings in their embodied state are not capable of pure
thought and always require an image or a symbol to think.
Even though the representations are human constructs certain
constructions can be regarded as valid because they represent
the Forms and so they are in accord with Reason. This is made
possible because human thinking is a sensible image of the
divine activity of thinking and within a human being there is
an implicit awareness that allows him to combine
representations in a certain way that they can be considered
as imitations of eternal Forms. Plato in his dialogue ‘Meno’ has
Socrates elicit truths of geometry from Meno’s slave through
his incisive line of questioning, proving thereby that an implicit
knowledge of these truths were innately present within him
and education merely elicits what is already present within
oneself. The ability to give a logos or an explanation does not
constitute knowledge but rather presupposes knowledge. For
Plato knowing is a kind of seeing – seeing orders or patterns
within a manifold. It is considered to be an intellectual
intuition because it is an immediate or direct seeing of an
intellectual object as present to a subject. Sense-perception is
a deficient kind of immediate seeing. The Divine Intellect
intuits as it were the entire range of Forms as one whole. Here
we see that Platonic conception of Reason is very different
from the Enlightenment version. It is not finite human
understanding or discursive, inferential reason that is
primarily referred to as Reason although it is considered to be
an instance of it and being an instance it presupposes the
original. If every proposition is justified by referring to another
then there will be an infinite regress and we will never be able
to comprehend the validity of any proposition without taking
an infinite number of steps. The solution of the problem is to
trace the source of validity of any proposition to a first
principle that is proven by itself rather than through the
mediation of another. The validity of this first principle is
grasped by an intellectual intuition which then is ground of our
ability to provide scientific explanations. Aristotle in his
Posterior Analytics says that that which is known through itself
is well known than that which is known through another.
Reason in this world-view is the Divine Reason which is infinite
self-consciousness – the unity of thought and being or subject
and object, it is the eternal paradigm or the measure of all
things. In Intellectual Intuition the object is directly present to
us but human temporalized discursive thought proceeds
through steps from one proposition to another. But the
purpose of human thinking is to imitate divine thinking by
bringing greater order, coherence and unity within
representations and the ability to do so depends on an similar
ability within human beings to notice the Form that unites
disparate representations together. This Intellectual Intuition
is referred to as knowledge because knowledge is infallible. It
is infallible because the object is directly present to one
without the mediation of representations and because this
knowing is non-propositional. Wrong cognition consists in
predicating some property of a subject that the subject does
not actually possess. Since, there is no subject-predicate
structure concerning Forms there is no possibility of mis-
predication. Also, the entity that explains must be different
from the explanandum or else the explanandum will be taken
to be its own explanation. The explanandum is a compose
entity composed of the enmattered form which is an image of
the transcendent Form and matter. Forms can explain these
composites because they lack the complexity found within
their instances and since they lack such a complex structure,
they are better known than the composite. In Aristotle’s
terminology Forms are prior in the order of knowledge but
sensibles are prior in the order of familiarity. Also, since Forms
are prior in the order of explanation, they also have ontological
priority over composites. The existence of sensible composites
is derivative while Forms exist independent of the composites.
This is to say that the existence of composite objects depends
on intelligible entities but not visa-versa. Knowledge has
immaterial Forms as their objects and beliefs have sensibles as
their objects. Sensible objects contain an image of the
transcendent Form and these enmattered forms are the basis
of definition and explanation. In a similar manner – God – the
First principle of all is both transcendent and immanent in his
creation. Sensible objects because they contain matter are not
intelligible to us without their relation to the pure intelligibles
or the Forms which are the reason composite sensible objects
can be the objects of true belief. All beliefs are however
defeasible and contingently true. The Form down below can be
understood to be the rule or the ratio for combining matter in
a certain way so that it can be considered as one whole and so
it can function as one single entity. Whenever within our
experience we see that two or more numerically distinct
objects share a common nature we can hypothesize the
existence of a Form through an abductive inference. This is the
dialectical method. Forms are the ontological foundation of the
judgement of sameness and difference. Here both ‘unity’ and
‘difference’ should be equally emphasized, a unity without
difference is indeterminate and inarticulate. Through
analytical understanding this initial unity has to be broken up
into distinct parts. The discursive understanding is the
principle of difference. It allows us to define and classify an
object into appropriate categories. However analytical
understanding cannot grasp the unity that allows us to see
many things as grounded in one and it cannot supply us with
more than a list of things. For instance, in empirical view of
knowledge we posit unstructured facts on which form is
imposed externally or violently as it were. Our concrete
composite objects of everyday life are broken into discrete
atoms consisting of visual, tactile, olfactory sensations etc. At
this stage the original object – the table or the chair or even
natural objects like a tree and the cow are analysed away.
Since what is real about these objects is the atomic sensations
– each a discrete individual, the macro-objects can be said to
exist only in opinion not in reality. The unity exhibited by these
objects then is a mechanical unity which is forged by stitching
together discrete parts where each part is nevertheless a
distinct whole. At the third stage we retrieve the true unity of
an object or its inner essence which is an object of rational
cognition. It is a unity in difference where the mutual
differences of the individual units is subordinated to the whole
and the whole articulates itself through the parts. Consider
again the example of a house, the unity of house is the purpose
of home dwelling and we see the discrete parts of the house
are arranged in a certain way where their mutual differences
are subordinated to serve a single purpose. Since human
understanding is the principle of difference it separates two
things that in reality exist in unity despite their mutual
differences like a single tree that is articulated in the
differences of its branch, root, stem, flowers, etc. The essence
is something that is knowable only through the intellect
because it is the Form which makes a thing what it is or gives
it its identity. The senses are restricted to material content
which has no principle corresponding to it that can explain the
identity of the thing.
The distinction between intelligible and the sensible is the
cornerstone of Platonism. So according to Platonism if
philosophy as a science is possible, it is possible only if it has
intelligible or in more modern terms if thinking has an a-priori
content. Note that a-priori can refer both to thinking as such
which is pure thought and it can refer to the object of pure
thought. The distinguishing mark of a-priori concept is that we
have these concepts solely because of our ability to think as
these concepts belong to pure thought that do not depend on
sensory content. The intelligibility of sensory content is
derivate and it depends on intelligible content while the latter
is intelligible in-itself. Plato understood the relation of
Intelligible to Sensible in terms of the relation of a Paradigm to
its copy but it is not the only way to understand this relation.
A comparison with mathematics will be helpful here. The
arithmetic truth ‘2+2=4’ is not true because it represents a
sensible object. Sensible objects are intelligible to us through
mathematics and mathematical truths are applicable
indifferently to all kind of objects which is why they are
universally and necessarily true. They allow us to group
different sensible objects together to serve our interests and
purposes. We cannot prove the validity of mathematical truths
by counting, on the contrary that we can count correctly
presupposes the validity of mathematical truths. Mathematics
does not take its law from experience but rather gives its laws
to experience. The validity of mathematical truths is proved
within mathematics which has its own method and criteria of
validation distinct from empirical sciences. The case of
philosophy is similar, it deals with a-priori concepts that are
universally and necessarily truth, that are the objects of pure
thought, that are applicable to all possible forms of thinking
and all objects of thought alike and the method and criteria of
validation is determined by Reason itself because philosophy is
Reason turned inwards in order to measure itself or to trace it
back to its original source. These a-priori concepts or Forms
are present within any mode of thinking and philosophy only
makes explicit what is implicitly present within us by virtue of
being rational beings. Intelligible content is not however easily
retrievable because reflective human understanding is
dependent on signs and symbols and as we saw it is analytical
and incapable without the intervention of a higher faculty to
grasp the unity in difference of an object. Also, just as we
distinguish between pure mathematics and applied
mathematics, we can distinguish between first philosophy
which deals with intelligible objects and second philosophy
which is the application of these a-priori concepts to other
subjects.
Further, metaphysics was defined by Aristotle as the science of
being qua being. The object of a-priori thinking being or reality
as such. Note, that we are not talking about individual real
objects but reality as such – which refers to Forms. What is
real and intelligible in sensible composite objects is due to the
Forms and hence Forms can be said to be the cause of the
Being of the thing or what makes something real. In this
capacity they are objects of study of first philosophy – the
science of being qua being. On one interpretation Aristotle in
his ‘Categories’ divides the genera of Being into: Substance,
Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Condition,
Action and Passion These are called Categories and they are
divisions of the Form or the Genus of Being. The view of the
Nyaya-Vaisesika school of thought in Indian Philosophy is
similar. The object of study according to the latter is Being or
Tattva – so called because it is something capable of being
referred to as ‘that’ (tat). This school divides Being into seven
categories or padarthas (word-meanings): Substance, Quality,
Activity, Universals, Particulars, Inherence, Non-Existence.
According to this philosophy the logical analysis of cognition
or judgements will yield primitive concepts that cannot be
analysed into further concepts and so these concepts can be
called logical atoms. They are the basic building blocks of
thought since they determine the logical form of a judgement
or the basic constituents of a judgement and rules for
combining them in such a way that they would constitute a
single thought. The primitive concepts that we extract are
ultimate categories revealing the structure of reality because
anything that exists must belong to one of these categories.
Philosophy is not concerned with particular real objects but
with the structure of reality as a whole. While Nyaya believes
that philosophy has Being as its subject matter there are other
kinds of philosophy which do not believe that philosophy has a
distinct subject matter but which still retain the method of
conceptual analysis. Philosophy then can be treated as the
handmaiden of theology where scripture is believed to be the
source of knowledge about God and the task of philosophy is to
give a conceptual analysis of concepts that will be helpful to
decipher and elucidate the meaning of scriptures while also
refuting rival interpretations. Alternatively, philosophy can be
made the handmaid of science and philosophy through
conceptual analysis adds order or structure to the basic
assumptions and clearly defines concepts within a science or
else assists in interdisciplinary studies. In all these cases the
subject matter is not peculiar to philosophy but given to it.
This is the way analytical philosophy functions in current
times. Analytical philosophers generally use first-order
predicate logic and modal logic in conceptual analysis. The
former is the logic of propositional functions like ‘and’, ‘or’, if-
then’, ‘not’ i.e. conjunction, disjunction, implication and
negation together with existential and universal quantifiers.
Modal logic deals with concepts of necessity, possibility and
actuality.
Platonists are however adamant that philosophy should not be
reduced to logic and the dialectical method should not be
confused with the above-mentioned logical method which may
or may not come with a distinctive subject matter for
philosophy. The reason is first, philosophy is concerned with
the ontological foundations of logic and semantics so studying
the latter to draw conclusions about ontology is to get things
backward. Second, logic and semantics are the products of
reflective understanding that do not inform us about the
ontological structure of reality but only the way we represent
them in language and in discursive thought. Third, ordinary
judgements are about sensible beings and ways of classifying
sensible being – they ignore the priority of the intelligible to
the sensible treating the latter as intelligible in itself. Further
we could use Immanuel Kant’s suggestion that the categories
of thought must not itself be just a list but must be deduced
from the first principle – thereby we could claim that these
concepts are truly a-priori untinged with sensible matter and
we can explain why anything that exists must belong to one of
these categories. Aristotle, too agrees with these ideas since in
his Metaphysics he sets aside the individual substance which
comes first in his list of Categories because it is the primary
being on which other predicates depend and he shows that the
metaphysical composition of sensible substances in terms of
Form and Matter. Plotinus in his Enneads uses the five Great
Kinds listed in Plato’s Sophist as the Platonic Trans-Categories
– Being, Sameness, Difference, Rest and Motion. Ontological
discussion can be understood through the following example –
fire is the cause of smoke. The inference of fire from smoke
cannot be justified through sense-perception since that would
demand that we verify all instances of fire and smoke to
confirm that they are found together in each and every case.
Thought however is able to grasp their rational structure in
terms of cause and effect and these concepts can be used to
justify the inference of fire from smoke. So how we understand
the concepts of cause and effect will not depend on sense-
perception but on reason. Are cause and effect two distinct
being or is it the case that the existence of the effect is nothing
over and above the existence of the cause? Appealing to
experience alone will not help to resolve the issue. We may
count curd and milk as two because their name and form are
distinct but from an ontological point of view it may be the
case that the same entity exists in a different shape and the
difference of name and form does not imply that a new
independent entity has been born. Further, are cause and
effect two primitive categories or can they be reduced to more
basic categories of thought? What is the rational connection
between cause and effect? How can cause be said to
necessitate the existence of the effect if cause and effect are
two independent entities? Is it possible that there can be an
effect without a cause? Should cause be understood in terms
of a temporal antecedent condition or has time nothing to do
with causation? To resolve such disputes, one needs an a-priori
methodology that studies Reason and becomes a knowing
about knowing. Philosophy is the self-conscious rather than the
blind use of Reason.
This brings us to the final strand of Platonist view of
philosophy as a science – the unity of the science of being qua
being with theology. As noted, before in order to have a
distinctive subject matter there must be a unified subject
matter – in this case ‘Being’ as something over and above the
sum total of beings. Whether we say with Plato that there is a
Form of Being or with Aristotle that Being is used equivocally
presupposing a primary referent – what we can certainly say is
that Being is a one over many, a complex entity which is the
unity of all Forms and it would not be a unified whole without
the unifying activity of God (this latter word I use indifferent
for Plato the One and Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover). So, there
would be no science of being qua being if there was no unified
single subject matter – Being as such and it is the unifying
activity of the Divine Intellect that allows us to treat Being as a
single complex whole which makes the scientific study of being
possible. The Divine Intellect is the source of all intelligibility
in the world. God is the paradigm of the world because it is
Being in the primary sense whereas the being of others is
derivative. Just as the architect is the cause of the building
through the use of the blueprint of the building similarly God
is the cause of Being through the instrumentality of Forms. So,
First Philosophy has God as its object because this science
studies the cause and principle of Being. In the capacity of
being the highest cause and principle of Being, God makes
possible the study of being qua being. Hence God is the
subject matter of metaphysics. Anyone who denies the
possibility of metaphysics also denies that Being is one single
whole and is forced to accept that there are only different
perspectives and no reality as whole, no objective measure
over our pretensions.
Something is finite because it is conditioned which is to say
that the reason for its existence is outside itself and within
another and so on and so forth. This series of explanations
cannot go on forever because the entire series would consist of
conditioned entities and we would have no explanation for the
series. Second, the entity that explains must be a different
type of entity from the entity in need of explanation or else the
same entity or the same kind of entity is being appealed to for
giving an explanation which would not explain anything. So,
what is conditioned must be explained by what is
unconditioned. What is unconditioned or the first principle is
that which has no composition of existence and essence within
it or whose essence is to exist and so it itself is in no need of
an explanation. Here, Aristotle and Plato differ in that the
former believes that the Divine Intellect fulfils the condition of
absolute simplicity because it lacks matter thereby it lacks
potentiality and so it is pure actuality. Plato believes that
within the Divine Intellect there is a minimum of complexity
between thinking and the object of thought and hence the
First Principle is beyond the Divine Intellect - the Ineffable
One also referred to as the Good. It is so referred to because it
is the efficient cause of all existence and also the Final Cause.
All beings strive to return to their original source and the
human desire for happiness has as its end the highest
metaphysical principle – the One. This One is absolutely simple
and there is nothing outside it. Since ‘Being’ is derived from
the First Principle, the science of being qua being has as its
object the First Cause or the Highest Principle of Being and so
is called Theology.
Before turning to ethics and philosophy of religion of
Platonism, I will briefly discuss other methods of philosophy
which I will treat in greater detail in the future. We came
across what I called the logical method where philosophy is
logical or conceptual analysis that may or may not be
accompanied with a distinctive subject matter. The third is
what I call the intuitive method that we find in Rationalism of
Descartes et al. These philosophers believe that intellectual
intuition is humanly possible and through clear and distinct
cognition we arrive at simple concepts about which, because
of the self-certainty of consciousness, we cannot be mistaken.
Leibniz in Platonic vein argues against this that primitive
concepts are found within a rational structure where they are
positioned in accordance with how they can be deduced from
the first principle of knowledge like the law of non-
contradiction. The certainty of consciousness does not
guarantee the simplicity of the concept. This method however
paves the way for critical philosophy. The point of departure of
critical philosophy is that before we can make pronouncements
about reality, we must investigate the instrument by which we
measure reality. This means that human nature becomes an
object of investigation and what see seek to know is whether
human beings are capable of comprehending reality. Critical
philosophy can be divided into two – the empirical method and
the transcendental method. In the former there is an empirical
psychological investigation of the mode of human cognition.
This is really antithetical to philosophy as a science because
the essence of the latter view is that thinking cannot be
reduced to material conditions or be understood in terms of
empirical laws. The laws of logic are not descriptive but
normative – they do not describe how we reason but prescribe
how we ought to reason. Critical philosophy in order to justify
itself has to assume that concepts get their meaning from
subjective consciousness and the content of concepts does not
contain anything more than what is thought within it.
Transcendental Method can be divided into two – Kant’s
transcendental deduction and Husserl’s Phenomenological
Method. These latter two are not opposed to philosophy as a
science even though they do not believe that philosophy has
Being as its subject matter. They nevertheless believe that a-
priori cognition is possible where the object of cognition is
cognition itself.
Kant defines a-priori cognition as that which is independent of
experience and whose defining characteristic is universality
and necessity. His method is the method of transcendental
deduction. Deduction is a proof that establishes right or legal
entitlement but the proof of entitlement is different from the
proof of the fact of entitlement and the latter presupposes the
former. Kant calls the former kind of proof quid juris and the
latter quid facti. My citizenship may be proved by producing
certain relevant documents but that assumes that there is a
criterion for determining citizenship and the document merely
proves the fact of citizenship and all the rights that come with
it, informing us what a citizen will be entitled to. So, the
question of who should be counted as a citizen is different
from the question whether or not I am a citizen. The latter
question depends on the application of a criteria and so the
proof of the criteria cannot be settled by fact of application.
Before giving a proof, we need to inquire into what constitutes
a proof. In answer to the question who should be counted a
citizen one cannot answer anyone who has a certificate of
citizenship because the question is who should be issued such
a certificate in the first place. So, the question of objectivity of
truth or of moral values can be settled not by practical use but
by establishing which fact would count as a relevant fact on an
objective basis. Kant however does not believe that we have
any access to mind-independent reality because we can access
only our subjective representations and the meaning of these
representations is tethered to the subject of knowledge. The
distribution of meaning is however not arbitrary but obeys
laws of cognition which are a-priori not empirical and as
explained through the through the transcendental method. The
method begins by assuming the truth of a cognition and then
looks into what conditions determine the possibility of such a
cognition. Thereby we learn the limits of human cognition and
what can and cannot be proved through it.
Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology relativizes the
content of thought not to the empirical self but to the
transcendental self which is not limited by any particular ego.
What is an object for the transcendental consciousness is
universal and necessarily applicable to all particular selves
and hence is a-priori. To arrive at the standpoint of the
transcendental ego one has to perform an epoche or
abstraction from all content and bracket the question of being
in order to focus on an object of consciousness only not as it is
in reality but only as it appears to this transcendental ego.
Using this method Husserl explains how different forms of
cognition arise due to the contribution of consciousness in
constituting its object.
Finally, there is the dialectical method of Hegel. His dialectical
method differs from the Platonic method in that the method of
dialectics is not external to the Form but determines the
content of the Form itself. In Platonism every Form has a
nature of its own while also being internally related to other
Forms. Hegel makes this relation to the other a part of the
identity or the content of the Form and the process of thought
is the negation of other-being or the negation of negation.
Hegel’s Science of Logic is till date the most sophisticated
treatment of intelligible concepts. Hegel should be counted as
a Platonist because he believes that philosophy is a science
that is capable of revealing the nature of reality.
Further, philosophy should be distinguished from anti-
philosophy. The characteristic feature of the latter is that it
uses philosophy to undermine philosophy. Pyrrhonian Sceptics
for example use the equipollence strategy to show that for
every valid conclusion established by reasoning its contrary
can be shown to be equally plausible. These sceptics reject the
possibility of knowledge and suspend all beliefs. Academic
scepticism on the other hand is a weaker form of scepticism
which holds that we are missing is a criterion of truth to
establish knowledge claims. Both reject Plato’s theory of
infallible knowledge. Critical philosophy as we have seen uses
psychologism to undermine philosophy – tracing the origin of
our metaphysical ideas to human nature expounded by
empirical laws of psychology. Similarly, anthropology can be
used to undermine philosophical claims. From Platonic point of
view such views are bound to be circular i.e. they must assume
the very thing they seek to explain away by the use of
psychology or anthropology. Moreover, within the sensible
realm there can be no essences, its intelligibility as said before
is derivative. The matter that, say is informed by the Form of
horse could also instantiate its contrary; hence no explanation
of identity and predication is possible at the sensible level. It
should be noted at this stage that the intelligible concepts are
found in all forms of thinking and they can be correctly or
incorrectly applied. To become conscious of these intelligible
concepts also enables us to develop a skill in thinking. The
choice is not between philosophy or no philosophy but
between good philosophy and bad philosophy.
Further, there is the existential phenomenology of Heidegger,
the hermeneutical method of Gadamer and the Deconstructive
method of Derrida. The common point of these diverse views is
their effort to undermine reason. These modern views are very
self-consciously the reversal of Platonism. In a series entitled
‘Philosophy of Philosophy’, I will address all objections to the
possibility of philosophy as a science and at the very least I
want to prove that there is a substantial case to be made in
favour of Platonism.
Next, we turn to practical philosophy and the relation of
philosophy to religion. The practical goal of philosophy is the
cultivation of virtue which Plato calls assimilation to God. The
basic difference between modern ethics and ancient ethics is
that the former believes that you cannot be ethical till you are
free while the latter believes you cannot be free till you are
ethical. According to Platonism human existence in nature is
alienated from itself. Its true nature is its higher self but this
higher self is present within us as an endowment not as an
achievement. Through practice of virtue, we become who we
are. Virtue is possible through identification with the higher
self which brings about a unity within the individual who
otherwise would be chasing different sensible impulses. Virtue
is order and in order there is freedom. In his Philebus Plato
says that the One is the Good and the Good should be
understood as the combination of truth, commensurability and
beauty. Since Forms gather together discrete elements to
make one nature, they are the source of commensurability in
the world. Truth is transparency to an intellect – that which
allows us to think and make valid judgements about an object.
Beauty is proper symmetry of the parts to constitute a whole.
God is referred to as the Good because he is the reason we are
given a nature and allowed to exist. God’s Goodness consists in
allowing something different from Himself to exist while it is
also true that nothing outside God has any existence. We can
relate this possession of an essential nature with that feature
that determines our own well-being. In his Function Argument
Aristotle tells us that to fulfil one’s own nature constitutes the
good of man and since human beings are rational beings or
atleast reason is that part of us which is closest to the Divine,
to act in accordance with Reason is what is ultimately good for
man. This acting in accord with Reason in its theoretical
aspect is the cognition of God and in its practical aspect the
cultivation of virtue. When it is said in Platonism that God is
the paradigm of the world what it means is that when a Form
is instantiated in a sensible composite it also constitutes an
instantiation of God’s Goodness because the latter is the
source of the former and just as there are multiple Forms
there are multiple ways for God to instantiate himself in the
world – by bestowing an essential nature on an object and the
fulfilment of this nature constitutes its own good. So, the
essence is the best possible way a thing could have been and
to act in accordance with one’s own nature is the best for an
individual. Opposed to this view is primitivism according to
which man’s existence in nature constitutes his moral
goodness and it is through education and civilization that man
loses his original innocence and becomes corrupted. Against,
this Platonism would hold that man is alienated from himself
within nature and if we see the mode of living of people closest
to nature, we find not that they are innocent but rather brutal
and barbaric. Morality comes through knowledge and
education. If man’s existence in nature is what constituted his
essential nature, then no practice of virtue would be possible.
Human predicament is that he has one foot within the sensible
world and another in the intelligible world, the more one acts
in accord with Reason and extricates himself from sensible
impulses the closer he is to God. This does not imply becoming
an ascetic because both appetitive desire and rational desire
converge in the same object – God and God works through
persuasion not force or suppression. The lower self has to be
convinced that its happiness is in the higher nature that limits
the lower nature but does not destroy it or invalidate it
completely. Also, Platonists distinguish between political virtue
and philosophical virtue. The former is a weaker form of virtue
because its source is belief and opinion while the latter’s
source is knowledge. Since knowledge as we saw is infallible
no deviation from this virtuous state is possible while virtue
founded on belief may be lost when our beliefs change.
However, this is the stage of the sage who is not the lover or
wisdom but the wise. Anyways, we can say that a philosophical
life is life lived in accordance with reason. It should be
emphasized over here that categories of practical reason like
rational agency, moral responsibility, free will cannot be
explained in a materialistic world view because they demand
the priority of the intelligible world over the sensible world as
their foundation. Ancient Ethics is based on the unity of theory
and practice. It is knowledge that corresponds to the freedom
of the will – the ability to act in accordance with what has
validity in and for itself. We find this even in Indian Philosophy
where classics like Bhagavad Gita and Yoga Vashista are based
on a line of inquiry that knowledge is opposed to practical
engagement with the world and demands the abandonment of
the world. The philosophy taught in these sacred texts then
shows how to reconcile knowledge and will. We see the unity
of theory and practice for instance in Bhagavad Gita when Shri
Krishna tells Arjuna that birth and death are the constant
affairs of life and consequently there is no reason to lament
them. What further needs to be shown is that not only does a
state of affairs obtain and that we should resign ourselves to
our fate but that it is the best that they should obtain and it is
reason that gives us this knowledge. This in essence is also the
teaching of Plato’s Republic – the reconciliation of theory and
practice, philosophy and poetry or as we would say in Indian
Philosophy jnana-karma samuccayya, the unity of knowledge
and action. Also, in Plato’s Euthyphro we find the question is
raised whether something is Good because the Gods like it or
is it that God’s like it because it is Good. In the former case it
is the whims and fancies of God that have to be regarded as
good while in the latter case the Good is not the object of
God’s Will but of God’s Knowledge and God’s Will is
subordinated to his Knolwedge. It is because of this reason
that Platonists emphasize that Forms are objects of Divine
Thought but cannot be reduced to Divine Thinking. They are
what connect human cognition with Divine cognition – it is
because human thinking is an image of Divine thinking that we
can access Forms and it is because enmattered Forms are the
images of immaterial Forms that we have an object of thought
similar to the object of Divine thought. This is what makes
science, morality, aesthetics and religion possible.
Coming, to philosophy’s relation to Religion – both philosophy
and religion have the same content. Where they differ is in the
mode of knowledge. Religion accesses this content through
symbolic thinking and myths while philosophy seeks to access
this content in the form of truth which is only possible for pure
thought. Plotinus points out that myths and discursive thinking
are alike since they both present their content which is eternal
in temporal terms and where every symbol is externally
related to one another. So, we need Reason to convert these
representations to the form of pure thought – to grasp their
internal connection. If one takes these myths very seriously
then one makes the content of religion to be contingent
depending on miracles and historical occurrences whereas
according to philosophy one’s own soul must testify to the
content of religion. Platonism does not believe in the humility
where God is out there and we are over here free to do as we
like within our own sphere. Even though Plato’s Ineffable One
is beyond cognition, He is known indirectly through his effects
and the Demiurge or the Divine Intellect is the paradigm of
human thinking. In order to be closer to the One, there should
be assimilation to the Divine Intellect and no assimilation is
possible if one does not know God. The knowledge of God is
the source of virtues. Platonic philosophy is theophany – that is
to say the world is the revelation of God. According to Plato
and Aristotle, God is not jealous and so he communicates his
God-Self to us but his mode of operation is persuasive rather
than violent. God’s nature is the most well-known though last
in the order of familiarity. A jealous God is a God who hides his
inner self from others but according to Platonism an
unmanifest God is a contradiction and what does not express
itself is as it were non-existent. So, God must manifest himself
or God will not be God. Within Indian Philosophy, Bhartrhari’s
Shabda Brahman, Ramanuja’s Vishistha-Advaita Vedanta and
Kashmir Shaivism come closest to this point of view.
Some may object that religion is concerned with feeling and
Platonism can agree with it because philosophy is not opposed
to feeling. What it does oppose is seeing feeling to be the
source of justification of religious and moral truth. It may also
be pointed out that in the Bhakti schools of Vedanta or those
dedicated to the devotion of God, Bhakti as Upaya is
considered as different from Bhakti proper. The former is a
means to an end – the end being knowledge of God and true
Bhakti only begins when there is knowledge of God. Feeling is
one way to access content whose ultimate justification lies
with pure thought. If feeling is taken to be the measure, then
we cannot discriminate between a saint and the sinner
because both can act in conformity with what they feel is true.
Only by considering the object of their actions can we
distinguish the worth of their actions. The sameness of content
and difference in the mode of knowledge reconciles philosophy
with poetry. The poetry however which takes its feelings and
mythical stories to be factual and views philosophy as its
enemy because it converts poetry of its world to prose – has
gone astray along with the reflective understanding which is
the principle of Enlightenment which makes poetry its enemy.
Both regard God as unknowable and hold onto the finite
human nature over and against the infinite and in antithesis to
it. The true religious consciousness is however seen in the
knowledge that everything is conditioned and nothing except
God has unconditioned existence. The finite has no existence
of its own, its existence is derived from its ground. Poetry
encloses us within our feelings and subjective representations
and makes us hold on to them in the belief that otherwise all
meaning would be lost. This is a form of self-love and it is the
natural human condition. It also leads to a conceit where one’s
own customs and traditions or mode of existence is seen as
superior to others and others are seen as a threat to oneself. It
is the worship of religion at the cost of worship of God because
God can only be the Universal. In the name of religion, it gives
full sway to one’s whims and fancies with no objective measure
because it is suspicious of any sense of measure or its measure
comes only from within itself. Reflective thinking is correct to
try to break through this narrow sectarian world-view to bring
to human consciousness the knowledge of the universal. Till
one does not shed one’s particularity there is no possibility of
dwelling in the universal – that which has existence on its own
account. But in the process reflective understanding leads us
to another error. This is the human predicament – we think
that when we do the opposite of what we know is wrong we
will be set on the right path but unbeknown to us we reach the
same destination through another route. Reflective
understanding refuses to see the truth in poetry and
entrenches itself against poetic thinking in the cause of the
victory of prose. In the process all meaning is lost because the
particular and its interests and feelings are invalidated and
reason becomes mechanical – the relation of external parts
lacking an inner core. The true Universal however retrieves
the particular and justifies it - not in its natural mode of
existence but in allowing it redemption. The universal of
reflective understanding however sees the particular as sinful
and seeks its destruction. It sees no meaning in custom and
tradition, in the ordinary practical way of life. There is no good
and evil, no truth and falsehood. Reflective understanding is
then reason turned against itself. The human being under the
sway of reflective understanding loses all interest and its
purpose in the world and so seeks repose within itself and sees
another as its prison. The practical everyday life of human
being is seen as the locus of untruth and vices whose only
redemption lies in negation of self. Poetry is right to insist
against this reflective understanding that its reflections are
finite and in a one-sided way it has given more importance to
prose than to poetry thereby thwarting the individual. But just
as self-love is harmful, so also the absolute denial of self is
unhealthy. Philosophy gives us a third option avoiding the
excesses of the two. In this respect it can be seen as of
fundamental importance in today’s world where we need the
reconciliation of the individual with the universal and the
accommodation of the individual by the universal so that
human beings can be at home with themselves.