Copyright Robert Jones, 2005

The European Union’s Contribution to Global Community Formation

Dr Robert Jones, BA (Hons); MSc (Econ); PhD

Principal Lecturer in International Business;
EU Fulbright Scholar; Jean Monnet professor;
Sheffield Business School,
Sheffield Hallam University, UK

The European Union (EU) has demonstrated that it has the capacity to change Europe - but does it have the
capacity and the will to change the world? In this article I intend to examine the EU’s potential to contribute to
the formation and development of the ‘global community’. The subject is problematic, not only because of the
difficulties involved in analysing the nature and influence of the EU, but also because the term ‘global
community’ is open to so many conflicting interpretations. Moreover, both the EU and the current global system
(if the complex network of interactions at global level can be called a ‘system’) are changing, mainly although
not entirely due to the forces of globalisation. Therefore, any attempt to assess the capacity of the EU to shape
developments outside its borders is like attempting to hit a rapidly moving target. Nevertheless, this article will
argue that the EU is already making an important contribution to ‘global community formation’ and has the
potential to make an even greater contribution, if it can establish for itself a clearer and more cohesive external
identity and if it can strengthen its decisionmaking capacity. A central theme of this article is that we should
beware of false paradigms: just as it is wrong to argue that the EU model can be transplanted wholesale to other
regions, it is also false to argue that there will be a future system of global governance based on an EU blueprint.
The article will therefore reject the argument that the EU may be a model for the world – based on the idea that
the world will become an ‘EU writ large’. Instead, it will argue that the EU’s influence upon global community
formation is more subtle, diffuse and complex – but nonetheless very significant.

Introduction

The contention that the EU has a key role to play in the processes of global community
formation tends to be justified on a number of grounds: firstly, that the EU is not only the
most advanced regional integration project, but also on the whole a successful one and
therefore might be viewed as a model to be copied or emulated in other regions or even at the
global level (this might be referred to as the ‘exemplar’ or ‘laboratory’ role); secondly,
because of its sheer size and ‘weight’, the EU is exerting a very significant influence on
developments in other regions and indeed globally (whether it wants to or not); thirdly, the
EU is already a global actor on the world stage and therefore is having an influence upon
global community formation – in particular upon the emerging structures and processes of
global governance; fourthly, there is evidence that at least some EU leaders desire the EU to
exert a greater influence in global affairs (a desire which they tend to explain in terms of a
mixture of altruism and enlightened self-interest).

In this article I intend to show that the EU does indeed have an important contribution to
make to global community formation. However, I will also argue that this contribution will
not be based primarily or even mainly on the so–called ‘exemplar’ or laboratory role.
Although it is indisputable that the EU is a very advanced regional integration project, in
many ways it is also unique. The EU’s model of development is unlikely to be replicated,
either regionally or at the global level, at least without considerable adaptation to
circumstances prevailing in other regions or in the world as a whole. Just as the EU has
followed its own path of development, so too must blocs in other regions. I also intend to
argue that the EU is already exerting an influence upon forms of governance at global level
and has the potential to exert an even greater influence, providing certain obstacles can be
overcome. This influence is less spectacular than the ‘carbon copy’ idea of the EU’s
contribution to global community formation: Instead it is taking place on the more mundane
level of contributions to the gradual emergence of global governance regimes in various fields

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of policy – i.e. its influence may be more subtle and incremental (and therefore more difficult
to gauge) than the 'exemplar ' model, in which EU institutions and practices would be
replicated. I will also argue that although the EU deserves to be recognised as a global actor, it
could exert an even greater influence on the global stage if it could establish for itself a clearer
and more coherent external identity and if it could strengthen its decisionmaking capacity.

Preliminary Issues

Before developing the main themes of this article, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by
certain key terms, because of the rather elusive and slippery nature of the central foci of this
study – i.e. the European Union and the ‘global community’. Although the key terms we will
use are very familiar to us, their meanings are open to varying interpretations. We cannot
properly assess the EU’s contribution to global community formation unless we first seek to
ascertain the nature of the EU and also the nature and ‘texture’ of the emerging global
community. A related issue which needs to be addressed in more detail at the outset is why
the EU should be regarded as a potential model for global community formation. These three
preliminary issues will now be examined.

1) What Is The European Union? On a very basic level, we know what the EU is – i.e. it is
a political and economic formation of (currently) 25 states, with a highly developed
institutional structure and a broad and varied range of policies. Among other things, it is a
customs union, a single market, a (partial) monetary union and a political union. However,
once we move beyond these basic descriptions, the question of what the EU actually is
becomes much more problematic and controversial. The main reason why the EU cannot be
accurately encapsulated in a ‘nutshell’ description is that it is a peculiar combination of many
things – for example it has both ‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ institutions; it is an
international actor, but so too are the member states which comprise it; it is not a state, but it
has many of the attributes of a sovereign state, including institutions of government (an
executive, a bureaucracy, a powerful court and a directly elected parliament), a citizenship
and a flag. It has some elements which resemble a federation or confederation (indeed, some
scholars argue that it is already a federation in all but name, or is well on the road to
becoming one). Laffan (1998) has written of the ‘in-between-ness’ of the EU, i.e. it is neither
a state not a fully fledged supranational organisation in its own right. Others (for example,
Marks (1996)) have characterised the EU as essentially a form of ‘multi-level governance’
(although there are many different views on the nature of the power relationships between the
supranational, national and regional levels). A related question concerns whether or not the
EU should still be regarded as a ‘civil power’ or whether it is also a fledgling military power.
It is certainly the case that the EU’s efforts to develop a defence policy have not been a great
success (despite references in EU treaties to the need to develop a common security and
defence policy) largely due to a lack of political will on the part of member states.

There seems to be a broad consensus that the EU is ‘sui generis’, i.e. different from any
other regional formation and indeed different from any other type of actor on the international
stage. The EU shares some characteristics with other types of actor, but its complex whole is
much greater than the sum of its many parts. The discussion about the nature of the EU cannot
be divorced from a wider discussion about the changing ‘texture’ of the international system,
in particular in relation to the effects of globalisation upon international actors and actorness.
This relates in particular to the nature of the modern state and also to the increasing
significance of non-state actors, in particular multilateral organisations and international non-

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governmental organisations (NGOs). The issue of the nature of the EU in relation to the
changing texture of the international system will be examined later in this article.

2) What do we actually mean by ‘global community formation’? The concept of ‘global

community’ is rather vague and is open to widely differing interpretations. In this article, I do
not interpret it to mean the formation of a single ‘world government’ with sovereign powers,
analogous to the powers of sovereign states. At the present stage of world history, this is
obviously highly unrealistic. The world is too diverse, and the principle of state sovereignty is
too firmly entrenched, for this to be a feasible proposition. Indeed, although it is still possible
to find references to the notion of a ‘world government’ or ‘world state’ as an aspiration (see,
for example, Chimni, 2004), closer examination of what the authors mean by these terms will
show that they do not envisage an authority with the powers and trappings of a sovereign
state, with hierarchically organised and centralised structures of authority. Rather, they tend to
argue for stronger forms of global governance, in which power is diffused rather than
centralised amongst a web of actors, and in which there are mechanisms to facilitate
achievement of mutually agreed policy goals and also forms of 'global democracy'. Two basic
reasons why there is a need for improvements in global governance are: firstly, the need to
deal with issues and problems resulting from growing international interdependence; and
secondly the growth in the range and urgency of specific global threats, such as global
warming, global terrorism and global economic instability. As yet, there is no generally
agreed term which accurately describes the form, pattern and texture of the current global
system. What is generally agreed, however, is that stronger forms of global governance are
emerging (as a means of ‘governing globalisation’ (see Held and McGrew, 2002)): these
forms of governance are the outcome of the search for practical solutions to common
problems which no state can solve by itself. They are emerging in an incremental and ad hoc
way rather than as a product of a grand design.

Scholars are struggling to find a nomenclature which encapsulates the nature of the
contemporary global system, due in no small part to the rapidity of change, which is probably
unprecedented in world history. We need a term for the emerging global system which
embraces the following elements: the diversity of types of actor in the global system; the
multiple interactions which take place between these actors; the rapidity of communications
between actors; the fact that power in the international system is diffused rather than
centralised; the fact that there are many different forms of power in the international system;
that there are cross-cutting cleavages deriving from ideological differences and differences in
wealth and power; and that the system is highly dynamic and fluid. Given this list of
characteristics, it is no wonder that it is probably impossible to invent a term which describes
the form and texture of the contemporary global system in a way which is broadly acceptable
to all and which does not have serious flaws. Ladeur (2003, p. 1) uses the term ‘polycentric
networks’, which covers some but not all of the key characteristics of the contemporary global
system. Gamble uses the term ‘neo-medieval’ system, to encapsulate the fact that loyalties are
given to bodies both above and below the sovereign state (Gamble, 2001). He argues that
what is happening at present is a re-balancing, with the states system becoming less important
The state is unlikely to disappear, but is increasingly forced to share power with other actors
(op cit, p 34). A term which is gaining ground as a means of understanding the role of non-
state actors in the new global system is that of ‘global civil society’ (Iriye, 2004, p.7) which is
an obvious extension of the term civil society used in domestic contexts. However, this can
only be a partial description, because state actors and multilateral governmental actors still
play a major role in the global system. But the more comprehensive a description is, the more
likely it is that it will be vague. The reality is that the contemporary global system is too

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complex to be encapsulated into a precise but comprehensive terminological label. Perhaps

therefore, the term ‘global (or world) community’, although vague, will have to do to embrace
all of the elements we have identified above.

3). Why Is The EU Widely Viewed As A Potential Model for World Community
Formation?

For what reasons is the EU so frequently regarded as a potential model for world community
formation? The main factors usually identified are: the progress made by the EU in
developing a union which has economic, monetary and political dimensions; the experience of
the EU in seeking to reconcile state interests with supranational interests (i.e. the idea that
what can work at the regional level can also work globally, and can also be transferred from
the European region to other regions); the degree of co-operation achieved between the
members states of the EU; the increasingly important role played by the EU as an
international actor; and also the fact that the EU is general regarded as a successful project
(for example if judged by the number of countries wishing to join it; or the fact that no
country has left it etc). Possibly the main reason is that the EU has been forced to tackle issues
of governance which also need to be addressed at global level (for example, the need to deal
with the issue of sovereignty within a multilateral or supranational framework of governance;
the need to reconcile the demands of efficiency with those of democratic accountability; and
the need to develop a system of compliance and enforcement which is acceptable to member
states in the system).

Few would argue with the proposition that it the EU is also the world’s most advanced
project in regional integration. For example, the May 2004 enlargements enabled the citizens
of the ten new member states to participate in the world’s only direct elections to a
supranational parliament. Moreover, the EU is the only regional bloc with its own currency; it
is the only bloc with a highly developed supranational competition policy; it also has a highly
developed legal and administrative system. It also has an ‘integration dynamic’ which
continues to energise and shape its development. In June 2004, governments of the member
states not only agreed a constitutional treaty for the Union, but also agreed to strengthen the
EU’s role as an actor on the world stage (a role to be made more visible by an agreement to
open EU ‘embassies’ in other countries). The argument that the EU is uniquely placed to
influence the emerging system of global governance is based on the twin assumptions that
there are key similarities between EU governance and global governance and that the EU has
valuable experience in developing forms of governance which might have relevance for the
global level. This argument can be broken down into a number of strands and is summarised
below:

 The EU is partly an exercise in multi-level governance, embracing supranational, national

and sub-national levels of government. The EU has shown that it is possible to share authority
between supranational and state actors and to address issues concerning the distribution of
power between the different levels of government. Multilevel governance means that the
boundaries between domestic and international politics are fuzzy and porous and that actors
can operate at various levels. Global governance has been described by Held as a
‘multilayered, multidimensional and multiactor system’ (Held, 2004, p 79). This could also be
a description of EU governance. Given that global governance embraces actors operating at

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sub-state, state and supra state levels, the EU’s experience in designing institutional forms and
procedures appropriate to multi-level multidimensional and multiactor systems of governance
may have a wider relevance;
 The EU is partly an exercise in coping with diversity. So too is global governance,
although on a much greater and arguably on a qualitatively different scale to that of the EU.
But even so, the EU’s experience in this regard may have some value for global community
formation. Thus the EU has developed elaborate mechanisms for dealing with conflicts and
disagreements arising from the diverse interests of member states and of the various
institutional actors in the EU system of governance. The EU has considerable experience in
the development of mechanisms for the management of diversity (and techniques for conflict
avoidance) – in particular the development of a culture of compromise and the use of varied
and flexible organizational forms;
 The EU is not a product of a single ‘grand design’: it has developed in an ad hoc,
incremental way, in response to specific problems, ideas and circumstances. The emerging
architecture of global governance is also likely to involve a patchwork of regimes, embracing
a complex web of institutions at various stages of development;
 The EU has sought to develop democratic forms of governance. It has thus sought to solve
the problem of reconciling the demands of efficiency with those of democratic accountability.
It is the only regional formation with a directly elected supranational parliament. It also has
highly developed institutional procedures for intergovernmental dialogue and decision
making. Any future global community will also need to seek to democratize its institutions
(perhaps to the extent of forming a global parliament of some kind, although initially this is
more likely to resemble the European Parliament (EP) in its early years, when it was little
more than a talking shop). But although the EU has valuable experience in developing
democratic structures for a system of regional governance, this does not mean that the EU has
solved the problem of democratic accountability. There is still a ’democratic deficit’ problem
in the EU – meaning that the majority of EU citizens have little if any involvement in EU
affairs, despite the fact that EP has been directly elected since 1979. However, the attempts by
the EU to wrestle with issues of democratic governance at least provides examples of sorts
(even perhaps, in some cases, examples of what not to do);
 The EU is a voluntary union: The surrender of sovereign powers to supranational agencies
is only likely to take place very gradually, when sovereign states judge that the ‘sovereignty
costs’ are outweighed by the benefits, or when elites are drawn into forms of decisionmaking
which in effect amount to erosions of sovereignty. It is possible that, as has been the case with
the EU, sovereign states in the international system will find themselves locked in to a
framework of co-operation which in effect limits their capacity for independent action. Even
if, at first, very limited powers are given to supranational agencies at global level, these
agencies are likely to seek to strengthen and expand their powers (as has been the case within
the EU of the EP, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice);
 Problem solving experience. Both the decisionmaking elites in the EU and the elites
involved in global governance have been driven by the need to find practical solutions to
pressing problems. Many of the problems confronted by decisionmakers at the global level
have already been addressed in some form by decisionmakers in the EU, such as the
negotiation of complex and difficult agreements between governments with different
interests; the problems of enforcing agreed decisions; and the problem of conflict resolution
between the various actors in the EU policy process. Overall, perhaps the EU’s most valuable
store of experience lies in its ability to build powerful institutions and to develop and
implement major policy regimes (such as its competition regime, its single market and its
monetary union);

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 Experience in the formulation and application of rules. The EU is a rules-based form of

governance. It has developed elaborate procedures for making effective rules, which embrace
both legally binding and non-binding agreements. These rules embrace both 'hard law' (EU
law is paramount over national law, whenever there is a conflict between the two) and 'soft
law'. Abbott and Snidal (2000) refer to ‘hard law’ as legally binding obligations and argue
that soft law begins once legal arrangements are weakened ‘along one or more of the
dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation’ (op cit., p.422). The Madelin report on the
EU’s contribution to global governance argued that soft law included voluntary measures,
binding but not enforceable rules, codes of conduct and core principles (Madelin, et al, 2001,
p. 22). Abbott and Snidal (2000) argue that an advantages of soft law are lower contracting
costs and lower ‘sovereignty costs’. They do not view soft law as an inferior type of law,
because it enables agreements to be reached and policies to be implemented which would
otherwise probably not be implemented. Eberlein and Kerwer (2004) argue, the EU’s
decisionmaking capacity is greater than is often supposed because it relies not just on hard
law, but also on an ‘open method of coordination’ based on sharing experience and
encouraging the spread of best practice. These are forms of ‘soft law’ and of informal
governance. The rules-based nature of the EU also has external implications: thus Cremona
(2004) identifies a 'rule generator' role for the EU - in other words the EU's agreements have
been used to export regulatory norms. She argues that the EU is playing a key role in rule-
setting in the WTO and other multilateral organisations and also in exporting values to third
countries (p. 558);
 Experience in institution building and in ‘institutional balancing’- in particular, through
ad hoc and incremental methods rather than through a once and for all design. The EU has
particular experience in what might be termed institutional balancing - i.e. in developing a
network of institutions which interact together and which together form a coherent
policymaking and implementation system. This does not mean that the EU system is a
perfectly designed machine, or that it is neat and tidy (far from it). Contemporary governance
structures in Europe embrace overlapping authorities, fuzzy boundaries and competing
competencies. But despite its flaws, the EU system of governance ‘works’;
 Experience in the development and co-ordination of specific policies. One of the EU’s
most distinctive characteristics is that it embraces a very broad range of policies, many of
which are now highly developed. It also has mechanisms to formulate, implement and co-
ordinate these policies. In addition, it also has an extensive track record in promoting its
policy goals through budgetary incentives (i.e. awarding grants to specific programmes etc).
However, the various aspects of EU policy are not always effectively coordinated, so it should
by no means be regarded as a perfect role model;
 Experience of participating in multilateral institutions. Although the EU does not speak
with a single voice (nor is it likely to for the foreseeable future), EU states are making efforts
to co-ordinate their activities in multilateral institutions (see below). The Commission and
Council have an extensive range of communications with, and participate actively in, various
global fora. But EU representation in these fora tends to be fragmented, patchy and in many
instances rather fuzzy. The coherence of the EU’s external presence cannot therefore be
compared to that of, say, the US, because member states still do not speak and act with one
voice in international fora;
 Experience in developing inter-regional relationships. The EU has undoubtedly been a
key actor in forging interregional relationships and in developing global dialogues with the
US and with regional groupings (for example, in this regard, we could mention the annual
EU-US summit; the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD); the Asia-Europe Mechanism
(ASEM); the EU-ASEAN partnership; the Euro-Mediterranean partnership; the EU-Latin
America/Caribbean strategic partnership; or the partnership with Mercosur etc). `It has a

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highly structured agreement (the Cotonou partnership) with a large group of developing
countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP countries). It also has a
‘neighbourhood policy’ towards countries to its south and east. These relationships are
becoming increasingly institutionalised and in some cases may serve as a framework for the
emergence of new global structures;
 Experience in developing working relationships with NGOs. The EU policymaking system
cannot be properly understood without taking into account the important role played by
NGOs at all stages of the EU's policy process. The European Commission in particular has
developed elaborate formal and informal networks in which NGOs are able to contribute to
policy formation in the EU, mainly through advice and consultation, but also in some cases
through participation in the delivery of policy. It has also encouraged cross-border dialogue
between groups in civil society. There is already participation of NGOs in some EU
environmental agreements and in the formulation and operation of the EU’s development
policies. The EU’s experience in networking with NGOs and in drawing them into the
policymaking process could hold some useful lessons for decisionmaking at the global level.
The European Commission has already sought to foster informal meetings between the WTO
and representatives of civil society on trade, development and environmental issues, reflecting
the Commission’s own extensive experience in promoting civil society participation within
the EU.

THREE MODELS OF INFLUENCE

The above analysis has shown that there is a diverse range of ways in which the EU might
influence governance at global level. However we should not ignore factors which might limit
the relevance of the EU’s experience. For example, there is a much greater diversity of
cultures and levels of development at the global level (indeed, Huntington has even spoken of
a ‘clash of civilizations’ and has warned against the belief in the universality of Western
cultural norms (Huntington, 1998, p.310)); secondly, in Europe there has been a commitment
to deeper integration (albeit to varying degrees) which has been largely absent amongst the
elites at global level; thirdly, the EU is but one of many actors at global level and these other
actors (states, other regional formations, international governmental organisations, NGOs, and
multinational corporations) are also having inputs into global community formation.
Moreover, although we may be living in a ‘post-hegemonic’ era, fundamental reform of
global governance likely to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without the active
participation and support of the US. However, if the US continues to adopt the unilateralist
positions associated with the 2000-2004 presidency of George W. Bush, then arguably the EU
will also have a vital role to play as a multilateralist ‘counterweight’ to US unilateralism in
global affairs.

We also need to examine in more detail the possible ways in which the EU might exert an
influence on global community formation. For purposes of analysis, I have divided these into
three ‘models’: the ‘Magnetic Pull’ model; the ‘Laboratory’ model; and the ‘Global
Engagement’ model. The first is based on the idea that the EU will continue to grow in size
and weight and this will exert a magnetic pull on other countries and regions, both within and
outside Europe; the second is based on the assumption that the EU’s path of development and
ways of doing things have relevance for, and can be applied to, other regions and indeed
globally; and the third is based on the idea that the EU is involving itself in institution
building and policy formation at global level in multiple ways and that this engagement at
global level is shaping the form and pattern of global governance. We do not of course have

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to choose between these three models in any absolute sense. Each may be true to some extent
and it is quite possible that each is exerting some influence on global community formation.

1) THE ‘MAGNETIC PULL’ MODEL

The enlargement of the EU in May 2004 to include ten new member states (bringing the
current membership to 25, with a combined population of 450 million) was yet further
evidence of the magnetic pull of the EU on the European continent. It also confirmed the
unrivalled status of the EU as the world’s largest and most highly developed regional
formation. The May 2004 enlargement, the sixth in the EU’s history was further confirmation
of the Union’s ability to attract new members. It reinforced the EU’s status as the world’s
largest regional political and economic bloc, with a quarter of the world’s GDP. The
membership of the EU is also set to increase further. The eurozone (comprising the EU
countries which have adopted the single European currency) is also set to expand at some
point, which may increase the clout of the representatives of this zone in global financial fora.
The increase in the EU’s absolute size (in terms of population and GDP) has the potential to
increase the EU’s influence on the global stage. The bigger the EU becomes, the greater the
magnetic pull it may exert on states and regions outside it.

The EU is now such a large presence on the international stage that it can hardly help
influencing global developments. This argument was put forward by Rosecrance in 1997,
who, although sceptical about the prospect of the EU developing into a state-like formation,
or of the EU developing a powerful common European foreign or defence policy, argues that
the sheer size of the EU means that it will exert a very significant international influence and
that its foreign policy strengths are reshaping the international system (Rosecrance, p.2). His
arguments embrace several strands: for example, as the EU grows larger, it is exerting a
stronger pull on other countries and regions which seek to associate with it, not least the US,
which is drawn closer to the EU both politically and economically; it is also playing a pivotal
role in relation to the network of overlapping multilateral clubs (p.9) and is coming to set
world standards in normative terms (p.10). Even European countries which are not members
of the EU are influenced by EU policies, not least because they are required to conform to EU
norms and standards (including standards on human rights) if they wish to gain access to the
world’s largest single market. The contribution of the EU's specific policy regimes to global
policy formation (for example, the extent to which the EU's competition policy is shaping
competition policies of non-EU states) is another product of the EU’s weight in the global
system. Even if individual countries have no intention of seeking to replicate the EU’s model
of development, the importance of the EU in global trade and investment may be impacting
upon their policies (and not only in the fields of competition law and trade policies). The EU
may therefore have become such a large mass in the firmament of global governance that it
may be exerting an influence upon global community formation, even without trying – even
though we should not assume that size and weight always translate into actual influence.

Another possible idea is for the EU to continue to expand, even beyond the boundaries of
the European continent. It is certainly the case that some countries outside the geographical
boundaries of Europe (in particular some countries in central Asia and North Africa), have
expressed interest in joining the EU at some point. It may well be that in the future some
countries which technically do not lie within the boundaries of Europe may be admitted to the
Union, not least because the boundaries of Europe have ‘fuzzy’ edges and also because the
EU is now seeking, to some extent, to define itself in terms of moral and cultural values (see
Title 1 of the Constitutional Treaty (2004). Turkey has been accepted in principle for

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membership, even though from a geographical (and also arguably a cultural) viewpoint, it lies
largely outside the boundaries of Europe. But the expansion of the EU to include non-
European countries might be at the expense of the Union’s cohesion and clarity of identity.
Size by no means always equates with strength and therefore a bigger EU might in practice be
a weaker one (for example, the 2004 enlargements lowered the EU’s GDP per capita and also
possibly made it more difficult for the EU to reach decisions). In any case, there is some
evidence that EU decisionmakers are beginning to at least think about the limits of EU
expansion, so that future enlargements might be very rare rather than fairly regular events.
Moreover, the idea that the EU will continue to expand, even beyond its borders, is
questionable, not least because the EU still seeks to define itself as a European’ project. The
idea therefore that the EU has a virtually limitless capacity to expand seems unconvincing.

What seems more likely is that the EU will develop a stronger and more extensive
network of relationships with both non-EU countries and also with other regional blocs and
that these relationships will embrace joint policy regimes, in which the EU will have a major
(and in some cases a dominant) influence. An example of this is the ‘neighbourhood’ policy
which the EU is developing with non-member states on its southern and eastern borders. A
related idea is that the European Union could be linked in some form with other blocs, in
particular with NAFTA, to form a transatlantic free trade area (TAFTA) or an Atlantic Union.
It is certainly the case that the economies of the EU and North America are becoming
increasingly intermeshed and that the EU and the US and NAFTA have developed elaborate
mechanisms for dialogue and co-operation. However, at the present time it is at least as easy
to make the case for the EU and the US becoming global rivals rather than global partners
(indeed, for the foreseeable future, they are likely to be both).

2) THE LABORATORY (OR 'EXEMPLAR') MODEL

The ‘laboratory’ model is based on the assumption that the EU’s system of governance might
be studied and copied by other regions and therefore that other regional formations might be
based, in some measure at least, on an EU blueprint. It is certainly the case that the EU has
frequently been singled out as a model which may hold valuable lessons for other regions
(particularly in Asia and Africa). In a speech in 2002, Javier Solana, the EU’s High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) claimed that there ‘is a
demand for Europe: linked to our know-how in regional integration….our aim must be to
match this demand with an adequate offer’ (Solana, 2002, p. 4). Cremona (2004) examines
the notion of the EU as a laboratory or model for integration or for economic governance in a
more general way (p. 554). Similarly, Joffe (2001) argues that the EU has not only been the
vehicle through which many ideas informing the new regionalism have been first tested, but is
also an experiment in new forms of political co-operation (p. xiv). At the very least, the EU’s
experience demonstrates what can be achieved, from very small beginnings. There may,
however, be a difference between recognizing that the EU may hold some lessons for other
regions and actually making practical use of these lessons. For example, the decision by the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to rename itself the ‘African Union’ was influenced by
the EU’s own name for itself, but this does not mean that the resulting ‘African Union’ bears
much resemblance to the European Union. The laboratory model raises questions such as the
extent to which the EU can be regarded as unique and the extent to which lessons accrued in
one region can be applied to other regions. Testing the proposition that the EU is indeed
serving as an exemplar for regional governance would require a comparative analysis of the
EU's development experience with that of other regions around the world.

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My 2001 study of the EU’s possible lessons for regional integration in North East Asia
was largely pessimistic about the possibility of an EU-type regional formation developing in
this region, largely because the EU contains many unique features which cannot be easily
replicated (Jones, 2001a). However, other regions might still learn from the EU’s experience
in a more general way – for example by following certain general principles, such as
progression through incremental change; developing a culture of compromise; and not being
too specific about the ultimate ends of the regional integration project. It should be
remembered that it has taken the EU over fifty years to achieve its current level of integration.
We should not expect other regions to achieve similar results overnight (even if they wished
to follow the EU’s path of development, which is by no means certain). Another important
issue concerns the impact of the emergence of so many regional formations upon the structure
of the global system. It is possible that the creation of regional formations might be a stage on
the way to deeper global integration, through inter-regional dialogue and co-operation. A key
issue here concerns how regional organisations might be brought within a framework of
dialogue within the UN, particularly in view of the fact that the UN was founded on the
principle of state sovereignty (however, there are already regional groupings that function
within the UN, and also regional organisations which have UN observer status - see
Langenhove (2004, p. 4).

There are some distinctive features of contemporary regionalism (the ‘new regionalism')
which distinguishes it from regionalism in previous periods: in particular the sheer number of
regional blocs; the fact that the idea of regionalism has gained ground in Asia (with for
example both Japan and China now showing interest in developing regional links); the depth
of regional integration, when compared with the regionalism of the 1950s and 1960s; and the
variety of types of regional formation. A key feature of the new regionalism is that the
regional blocs are becoming important international actors, although to greatly varying
degrees. The idea that at some point in the near future the world will be largely divided into
different and powerful regional blocs seems fanciful, not least because many sovereign states
still insist upon a considerable measure of autonomy. However, it is possible that regional
organisations of various kinds will make an increasingly significant contribution to the
development of policy regimes in various spheres at the global level, with the EU being at the
forefront of these developments.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the EU’s Pattern of Development. Most of the thinking
about the EU's potential contributions to global community formation is predicated upon the
assumption that the EU is broadly speaking a successful project and therefore that there are
good lessons to learn from the EU. However, critics of the EU project (of which there are
many in Europe, not least in the UK) might argue that the EU's development project provides
many examples of what not to do. It is certainly the case that the EU has weaknesses, which
even its most ardent enthusiasts are now likely to acknowledge. So perhaps the key to
utilising the EU's integration experience successfully lies in identifying its achievements and
borrowing from the factors which have contributed to these achievements; and secondly
identifying and seeking to avoid replicating its mistakes. Before proceeding further with the
analysis of the ways in which the EU might contribute to global community formation, it
might be useful to summarise the main factors which have contributed to the progress made
by the EU as a regional formation – because it is surely the perceived successful aspects of the
EU project which are likely to command attention outside the EU. It will also be useful to
summarise its main weaknesses.

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Factors contributing to the progress made by the EU. The EU has shown an ability to
design, launch and implement major projects such as the Single European Market (SEM) and
the single currency. It has also shown a capacity to survive periodic crises and also to
continue to attract new members. Some of the main reasons which have been given to explain
this success are:

 a powerful initial stimulus to integration which provided the EU project with its initial
momentum and which still exerts some influence on its development. This initial stimulus
was the ‘never again’ mood after the Second World War, which encouraged member states to
consider radical solutions to the problems of inter-state conflict in Europe. The Bretton
Woods institutions are arguably a result of a similar ‘never again mood, but other factors
required for deep and sustained institution building on a global scale were not present. EU
regional integration has been propelled forward by a more powerful set of inspirational forces
than exists at the global level. It is possible that some major event, such as a major
environmental catastrophe or financial collapse, could provide a strong impetus for the
development of stronger governance regimes at global level;
 country similarity in the early stages of the project (the six original members were on
roughly the same stage of development and therefore this eased the path of economic
integration to some degree. The sixth enlargement, which has markedly increased the
diversity of the EU, has undermined the strength of this factor, but even so there is a sense in
which the idea of ‘European-ness’ provides a feeling of commonality between the members of
the EU (a ‘we-feeling’), even though it is not possible to clearly define the contours of this
‘European-ness, But what can be said with some justice is that a sense of a common regional
identity appears to be stronger in Europe than it is in, say, in Asia or Latin America;
 leaders and elites committed to the integration project. This has certainly been true in the
case of the EU. But where are the counterparts of Monnet, Schumann, Spaak or Delors in
other regions, or on the global stage? There are, of course, global federalist movements, but
these do not command the influence or attention of those which inspired the formation of the
EU. Indeed, according to Huntington, the world is not only multipolar, but also
multicivilizational and may become more divided rather than less so (see Huntington, 1998,
ch. ). The prospects for a global union, based on agreement on fundamental values, seem
remote;
 moving in steps or stages rather than through one big leap. The incremental approach to
institutional and policy development has been crucial to the EU’s success. It was recognised
at an early stage that the chasm from a Europe of completely separate sovereign states to an
integrated Europe would not be crossed in a single leap. Thus the position of the European
federalists at the Hague Congress in 1948 was rejected and the six founding states of the EU
pursued a different strategy based on a relatively limited project (the European Coal and Steel
Community) – although from the beginning this had political as well as economic objectives
and was viewed as a means to an end rather than an end in itself;
 conceptual hybridization: i.e. allowing the integration project to be shaped by various
ideas: e.g. functionalism, federalism and intergovernmentalism etc. The confluence of these
ideas (some of them at odds with each other) partly explains the institutional and procedural
complexity of the EU. This eclectic style of community building in the EU may be of value to
other integration projects, either on a regional or on a global scale;
 a culture of compromise. Even the most cursory acquaintance with the EU’s decision-
making processes, whether these relate to constitutional, institutional, procedural or policy
questions, will be struck by the range of issues about which EU policy makers argue. But on
most issues, an agreement is eventually reached, due to an embedded culture of compromise,
which keeps disputes within certain bounds. This culture of compromise is by no means ideal

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– for example, it frequently results in lowest common denominator agreements, in fuzzy

decisions, or in long delays in decisionmaking. But it has enabled the EU to move forward
and also to survive some very serious conflicts between its members;
 the management of diversity. The EU has built up considerable experience in managing a
diverse group of countries. Of course, the world is far more diverse than the EU. But there
may be some lessons from the EU’s experience when dealing with the issues deriving from
diversity at the global level (for example, the use of ‘opt outs’ and derogations to make
agreements possible);
 agreement on fundamental values (e.g. market principles and democracy). Again,
agreement on fundamental values is the bedrock of the EU’s development. But it is to be
questioned as to whether an agreement on fundamental values could be agreed at global level,
without considerable leeway in the interpretation of these values, a point made by Huntington
in ‘The Clash of Civilizations’(Huntington, 1998, p. 310).

The Weaknesses Of The EU might include:

1 the democratic deficit: meaning in particular the failure of the EU elites to connect with the
people they serve. From its inception, the EU project has been an elite project, in which
ordinary citizens have played a minimal role. This weakness has long been recognised For
example, in 1984, the EU launched the ‘Citizen’s Europe’ project, with the aim of bringing
the EU project closer to the people it was designed to serve. But despite much fanfare and
many specific initiatives, it seems to have had little practical effect. The same has also been
true of the European Convention launched in 2002 to involve the peoples of Europe in the
debate about Europe’s future. Nor has the accretion of powers by the EP increased voter
turnouts at EP elections. Indeed, turnouts have declined in every EP election since 1979.
Moreover, despite the production by the European Commission of paper mountains of free
literature on the EU, levels of public knowledge in Europe about the EU remain extremely
low;
2 the institutional complexity of the EU: the EU is a very complex phenomenon, of which few
people in Europe can claim to have a firm understanding. This complexity is by no means
solely due to the fact that the EU has so many institutions and agencies: it is rather due to two
other factors: firstly, to the fact that the roles, powers and functions of these bodies tend to
overlap to some extent with those of others, so it is frequently difficult to discern precisely
which body is responsible for what; secondly, the EU’s method of decision-making, which
has derived from the need to balance different interests, and also to seek compromise through
negotiation, has resulted in extremely complex and protracted decisionmaking procedures.
The EU’s institutional complexity has long been recognised to be a major fault of the EU.
However, the EU has had no more success in dealing with this problem than it has in its
efforts to eradicate the democratic deficit. Why cannot the EU’s institutional framework be
effectively and easily streamlined? The answer is that to do so would be to upset the
institutional balance which enables the EU to work;
3 the failure to define the ends of the EU integration project. The famous statement of Jean
Monnet (widely regarded as the most influential of the founding fathers of the EU), that the
European integration project is a journey to an unknown destination still holds true, despite
the efforts of those responsible for drafting and negotiating the EU constitution to clarify the
EU’s final status. However, the EU constitution is unlikely to be the final chapter in the EU’s
development. It is clear that there is no common, agreed objective amongst the members of
the EU concerning how far European integration should proceed. Again, as was the case with
negotiations for previous EU treaties, agreement on the EU constitutional treaty (which has
not yet been ratified) was only reached by leaving certain issues unresolved and also by
allowing groups of countries the option of pursuing (or not pursuing) deeper integration. We

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still do know what a ‘finished’ EU will look like. It may be that it will be in a state of
permanent evolution, because the tensions between different EU objectives and interests will
continue to ensure that the EU has no settled state;
4 uneven development: some EU policies are very well developed (e.g. agriculture, the single
market; the customs union), whereas others still have a considerable way to go (e.g. foreign
and security policy, taxation, transport). Uneven development should not however, be
perceived in terms of failure. It might be argued that it reflects a spirit of sensible pragmatism,
which holds lessons for governance regimes on a global level. In other words, it is naive to
assume that all governance regimes will develop at the same pace. It is of course already the
case that the development of global governance has been extremely uneven (exemplified, for
example, by the failure to develop a strong environmental regime at global level, or the failure
at Bretton Woods to create an organisation for trade to in parallel with the IMF and World
Bank). Where EU governance differs from global governance is that in the EU’s case there
are coordinative mechanisms (however imperfect) which link EU policy regimes together in
some form. There is also evidence of ‘spillover’ from one EU policy area to another, meaning
that uneven development in the EU is a dynamic process;
5 policy failures, particularly in relation to the rather uninspiring economic performance of
the EU in recent years; in the failure to develop a credible foreign and defence policy; in the
failure to radically reform agricultural policy etc. One of the reasons why the EU has in the
past been cited as a potential model for other regional formations has been due to its
perceived success as an economic bloc. It has certainly many substantive achievements to its
credit in this regard, not least the achievement of a customs union, a single market and a
single currency. Until fairly recently, it was also credited with impressive economic growth.
However, the EU economy has been accused of being too rigid and inflexible to adapt to new
circumstances in an increasingly globalised economy. Many of the EU’s policy failures have
arguably been due to weaknesses in policy implementation, which has been due in no small
measures to the EU’s tendency to set itself very ambitious goals.

3) THE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT MODEL

A central feature of ‘actorness’ in the international system is that actors engage with and seek
to influence other actors. They may also seek to influence the structures and processes
through which decisions are made in the international system. Influence may be sought for
selfish reasons, for altruistic reasons or for a combination of both. The EU has sought to
engage with the world in multiple ways and for a variety of reasons. Thus it has sought to
influence the shape and content of specific policies and also the values of the international
system. Its policy of engagement has also been justified on several grounds, including self-
interest and moral responsibility. There has always been a tension between on the one hand
the EU’s insularity, self-interestedness and self-absorption and on the other its posture of
engaging with, at times even preaching to, the world. By engaging with other external actors
(whether multilateral institutions, regional blocs or with individual states) the EU is more
likely to be able to influence global developments in ways favourable to itself.

The aspiration for the EU to play a more active role in global affairs has been voiced
many times in official EU statements (for example in statements by the European Council, the
Council and Commission and also in speeches and articles by high ranking EU officials. (see,
for example, Prodi (2000), Lamy (2002) and Solana (2003). The main thrust of these speeches
tends to be that the EU’s size, strength and level of development carry with them global duties
and responsibilities. Prodi, the former President of the European Commission, has argued that
the EU had a major contribution to make to global governance and should become a ‘truly

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global leader’ (p. ). He argued that a system of world government must have three elements,
namely: strong institutions based on shared values; co-operation between increasingly
integrated regions of the world; and democratic accountability. He argued that:

Our European model of integration is the most developed in the world. Imperfect though it
still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale. Given the necessary institutional
reforms, it should continue to work well after enlargement, and I believe that we can make a
convincing case that it would also work globally’

In a speech in November 2003, Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) argued that the EU can make a difference in
three areas; a policy of preventive engagement, to deal with international threats of various
kinds; secondly, the promotion an arc of well-governed states in the EU’s neighbourhood i.e.
a circle of good governance; and thirdly, helping to create a fairer and more secure world. He
argued that, as a Union based on the rule of law, the EU had a particular responsibility to
ensure a rule-based international order (Solana, 2003). Similarly, the report of the EU’s
Madelin Working group (2001) entitled ‘Strengthening Europe’s Contribution to World
Governance’ argued that the global aspects of governance must be at the centre of EU
thinking because the EU has a clear interest in promoting global governance as a means to
achieving the core of objectives of sustainable development, security, peace and equity,
objectives no territorial actor can achieve alone (p.3). In addition to specific policy statements
championing the idea of a stronger role for the EU in global governance, we can also identify
various ways in which the EU is engaging with the global system in practice:

1 the attempts by the EU to establish a global presence in specific policy field.: Before
examining the EU’s global presence, it is necessary to examine the nature and limitations of
the EU as an external actor. The EU's ability to contribute effectively to global fora and
decision-making is still constrained by the complex, multi-faceted, nature of the EU - which is
neither a state nor a fully developed supranational entity with sovereign powers. Indeed, some
doubt might be expressed as to whether the EU deserves to be regarded as an actor in its own
right. Thus the EU is made up of sovereign states, who still insist on individual representation
in most of the institutions of global governance. Member states have been reluctant to
surrender their individual voting rights in international bodies, even when the Commission
has been given de facto rights to negotiate on behalf of all member states (most notably in the
WTO).

A key problem which has posed a legal barrier to the EU’s participation in its own right in
international organisations has been the fact that the EU has not given a legal personality in
any of the EU treaties (although the EU constitutional treaty, agreed in 2004, if ratified, will
remedy this). The institutional formula used by the EU to reconcile its complex mixture of
intergovernmental and supranational elements has been the 'pillars' structure (which
essentially divides the EU's policy regimes into those subject to the European Community's
institutional and decisionmaking procedures (the 'Community pillar') and those which are
very largely subject to intergovernmental decisionmaking and in which individual states retain
important veto powers (the common foreign and security policy (the CFSP (or second ) pillar
and the security and justice (i.e. the 'third') pillar. The European Community does have a legal
personality and therefore can sign international treaties in its own right. But even within this
pillar, the extent of the ability of the Commission or Council to negotiate or speak on behalf
of all member states is often unclear. The ability of the European Community to act on the
international stage in a clear and cohesive way remains constrained by the unwillingness of
member states to give up too much power. The result is a very complex and messy set of

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arrangements through which the EU as a whole interacts with the rest of the world. The
constitutional treaty, if ratified, will remove the three pillars structure and give the EU a legal
personality. But what it will not do is transform the Union into a single entity, with a single
external face and voice (because member states will retain their individual seats and also very
largely their power in multilateral fora).

The EU has yet to establish clear and comprehensive formulae by which it can accede to
international organisations and speak with one voice in international affairs. It is often
difficult to make watertight legal distinctions between who is responsible for what in relation
to the external actions of the EU and member states. For example, who negotiates on behalf of
the Union? In trade talks it is the Commission; on climate change and in the Kyoto
negotiations it has been the Council presidency, with the Commission playing an important
role. We might for example point to the difficulties experienced by the EU in developing a
coherent and cohesive common foreign and security policy; or the divisions between EU
member states on the issue of the Iraq war; or to the fact that each member state still has its
own representation in global bodies, such as the UN, the WTO, IMF and World Bank.
Although the Commission has been given, in very large measure, de facto powers to negotiate
and to make agreements on behalf of all member states in the WTO, member states still
currently have formal autonomy in trade negotiations and still hold individual WTO
memberships.

The EU’s participation in international fora is now so extensive that a comprehensive

treatment of this subject is not possible in a short article. It now embraces a wide variety of
types of relationship, from observer status to full membership (although the latter are in fact
few and far between). Petersmann (2002) identifies five types of EU (usually European
Community (EC)) participation in international organisations, namely: exclusive EC
membership (e.g. the North Atlantic Fishery Organisation (332)); mixed membership of the
EC and member states (such as the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the
joint representation in the WTO); multilateral treaties which provide for mixed participation
of the EC and only some member states (e.g. a treaty negotiated in relation to the Rhine
Navigation Commission); co-ordination of policies by member states within some state-
centred organisations, such as the IMF, leading to the conclusion of international agreements
by the member states; and finally the pragmatic co-ordination of policies by EU member
states in a variety of other organisations, not least in the UN and its agencies (see Petersmann,
331).

The EU is continuing to extend its responsibilities in various areas of policy. It (in this
context, usually meaning the European Community (EC)) has observer status in many
international organisations, such as the World Health Organisation and the International
Maritime Organisation. The EC has been granted membership of the FAO, although the
member states have not entirely given up their right to vote on an individual basis within this
organisation (see Govaere et al, p. 165). The EU is also represented in global summits, such
as the World Economic Forum, the World Social Forum, the World Food Summit and the
Sustainable Development Summit. The European Community’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
cooperates with the UN and other donors of humanitarian aid. European Commission
members attend meetings of the Organisation for European Cooperation and Development
(OECD). The European Commission participates in the annual meetings of the IMF and
World Bank. The EU, represented by the European Commission and member states,
participates in the activities of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). The
Commission is also involved in the work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and

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in the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Together
with member states, the Council presidency and the European Commission participate in
meetings of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and also in
meetings of the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
In the UN General Assembly, the president of the Council issues statements on behalf of the
EU (the European Commissioner for External Affairs also attends). In 2003, the Commission
had 130 delegations in countries or international organizations. In December 2003, the
European Council welcomed the European Commission’s guidelines for a more fruitful EU
contribution to the UN system.

As Smith has noted, the EU also has a wide variety of diplomatic instruments, including
declarations; visits; support for actions by other organisations; sanctions; recognition;
dialogue; offering EU membership; making peace proposals; sending envoys; sponsoring
peace conferences; sending cease fire monitors; It has an array of economic instruments both
positive (trade agreements; association agreements; tariff reductions and quota increases;
granting inclusion in generalised system of preferences; providing aid; extending loans) and
negative (embargoes; boycotts; delaying conclusion of agreements; tariff increases; quota
decreases; reducing or suspending aid; or delaying the payment of loans (see Smith, 1997). As
the world’s largest trading power and also the world’s largest provider of aid, the EU has the
potential to give teeth to these instruments.

Both the European Council and the EU Council of Finance Ministers have repeatedly
called for the EU to play its full role in international financial and economic policy co-
operation in international financial and economic institutions, in particular in the IMF and G7.
But individual member states still play the dominant role in these institutions. Some attempts
by EU states to present a united front in the IMF and G7 have already developed. For
example, at the spring and autumn meetings of the IMF, the finance minister of the country
holding the EU presidency gives a speech on behalf of the EU (Smaghi, 2004, p. 235). In
meetings of the G7 and G20, the president of the eurogroup (made up of the 12 eurozone
countries) and the president of the European Central Bank represent the eurozone in certain
discussions (Smaghi, p. 235). But there seems very little likelihood that EU states will
combine their seats in the IMF, World Bank or G7 for the foreseeable future. However,
Smaghi argues that it would be both feasible for them to form a single constituency in the
IMF, which would increase the combined impact of EU member states upon IMF policies.
This would not require them to merge their IMF quotas, but it would require changes in EU
representation and in decisionmaking and would also require changes in external
representation in other fora and institutions, such as the World Bank, the G7 and the G20.
Achieving a stronger external presence for the EU in multilateral fora is not as easy as might
be first thought.

Nor can the EU be said to have a coherent and powerful foreign and defence policy. The
EU’s efforts to develop a foreign policy for the Union can be traced back to the 1980s, when
an attempt was made to strengthen the EU’s capacity for coherent and effective action on the
international stage, by including clauses on foreign policy in the Single European Act (ratified
in 1986) and later in the Maastricht Treaty (which formally established the EU’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in the Amsterdam and Nice treaties. It was an issue
addressed by the EU’s constitutional convention and new provisions to strengthen the EU’s
capacity to act externally are included in the EU’s constitutional treaty (see below). Tonra
(2003) disputes the consensus view that the EU’s CFSP has so far largely been a failure. He

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argues that the critics of CFSP tend to give insufficient credit to developments in bureaucratic
structures, substantive policy remit or to the decisionmaking capacity relating to CFSP. He
argues that there has been a ‘Europeanization’ of national foreign policies (p.749) and that
national foreign policies are to some degree being shaped and constrained by the CFSP. It
would be indeed surprising if the CFSP had no influence on the foreign policies of member
states, given the attention given to it in European Council and Council meetings. The sheer
number of statements on foreign affairs by the Council presidency indicates that the EU
would like to be counted as an actor on the international scene. EU treaty obligations require
member states to co-ordinate their actions in the international field, and also to refrain from
actions which are incompatible with EU policies.

Another area in which the EU has sought involvement has been peacekeeping, through the
enunciation of the so-called ‘Petersburg tasks’, which are humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping and crisis management. A declaration on European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) was attached to the Nice Treaty, following discussions of the issue at various
European Council meetings). The aim of the ESDP is to give the EU a crisis management and
crisis prevention capability, manifested in a ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ comprised of military
forces from EU member states. The EU has built new institutions in order to fulfil these
objectives, the creation of a Political and Security committee, a Military Committee and a
Military staff. In 2003, the EU took over the Concordia military operation in Macedonia from
NATO; it is engaged in police missions in Bosnia and in Macedonia (‘Proxima’). It also has a
military mission in the Congo (‘Artemis’). However, all of these missions are on a relatively
small scale and none would be possible without the involvement in these contexts of member
states and of other forces. (NATO in the case of Bosnia and Macedonia and France and the
UN in the case of the Congo). They are nonetheless significant: for example, the Congo
mission shows the willingness of the EU to become involved in peacekeeping outside Europe.
As Missiroli argues, the EU is now in the peacekeeping business (Missiroli, 502), despite the
many weaknesses and uncertainties surrounding the operation of the ESDP.

But actions of this kind by the EU are likely to remain on a minimal scale and may be
further weakened by burden sharing disputes or disputes about substantive issues of policy
between the member states. Given the continuing existence of NATO, there has been an
underlying current of opinion that an EU security and defence policy is unnecessary because
it would needlessly duplicate defence instruments and resources. However, developments in
the Balkans in the 1990s, coupled with the failure of the EU to respond effectively to crises on
its doorstep, energised the demand for a coherent and effective EU defence policy. It also
resulted in the creation of new mechanisms to facilitate more effective co-ordination in the
fields of foreign and defence policy between the member states and also the creation of a new
post (A High Representative for CFSP), in order to give the EU a face and a voice on the
international scene. But during the Iraq crisis of 2002 and 2003, this did not prevent bitter and
open disputes from occurring between the member states. There is still a gap between the
EU’s expectations and its capabilities in the field of CFSP. Moreover, the efforts to create a
security and defence policy worthy of the name risks conflict with the US, as Washington has
become increasingly suspicious that the real aim of these developments may be to downgrade
NATO and to sideline the US in relation to European security. Despite the efforts of EU
policymakers to reassure the US that these developments will not undermine NATO,
suspicions remain on the other side of the Atlantic.

Time and again the EU has shown that it is far more effective at wielding ‘soft power’, in
the form of economic carrots and sticks, than in the area of ‘hard power’ (i.e. power exercised

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though the threat or use of military force). Moreover, efforts to develop a military capability
for the EU may weaken the EU’s credibility as a civil actor with a powerful international
presence (thus not only does it distract the EU from other forms of integration, it may create
conflicts with the US and may also damage the EU’s image as a largely successful project).
The implication is that the EU should concentrate on becoming a more effective global civil
power – thereby playing to its strengths - rather than seeking to become a superpower in the
‘conventional’ sense. It might be argued that the EU faces a dilemma: if it tries to become a
‘full’ superpower, it is likely to fail, damaging its credibility as an international actor in the
process; but if it concentrates on fostering a ‘civil power’ image, it may be viewed
disparagingly as a ‘one dimensional superpower’. However, given the sheer range of
diplomatic and economic instruments at the EU’s disposal, the EU’s potential as a powerful
international actor should not be underestimated.

2 the role of the EU in developing a global community of values - for example, the
contribution of the EU to the development of common global values, in the fields of human
rights, ethics and environmental standards. In recent years, the EU has been very explicit in
seeking to promote and foster these values. Indeed, in recent treaties and in the draft EU
constitution, the EU has sought to define itself in moral terms. Thus the constitutional treaty
(agreed in June 2004, but not yet ratified) states that the EU is 'founded on the values of
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities'. It goes on to refer to the
values of pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
men and women (Title 1, Article 1-2). In the preamble to the constitutional treaty, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and the inviolable and inalienable rights of the person are
referred to as universal values'.

The constitutional treaty requires the Union to uphold and promote its values and interests
in the wider world. The Union is required to 'contribute to peace, security, the sustainable
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade,
eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child,
as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect
for the UN Charter' (Title 1, Article 1-3). The European Charter of Fundamental Rights,
which was attached as an appendix to the Nice treaty, is incorporated into the constitutional
treaty. However, the Charter includes references to ‘social rights’(such as the right to social
security, health care and employment rights) as well as to rights which are widely regarded as
universal human rights. These rights form part of the ‘European Social Model’ (based on
strong commitment to public welfare systems and social safety nets) which is often identified
as a means of distinguishing the EU’s social and economic systems from those of the US.
Given the diversity of cultures, socioeconomic systems and levels of development around the
world, it seems highly unlikely that the EU’s interpretation of ‘social rights’ based on the
European Social Model will be accepted as global social rights.

In a sense, the EU seeks to justify itself as something more than a single market or as an
amalgam of states – i.e. as a moral force in the world, with a mission to bring harmony to a
divided world. The EU’s self-appointed role as a promoter of moral values can also be
discerned on a practical level also – for example, not only has it formally abolished the death
penalty, but member states are not permitted to extradite criminal suspects to other countries
if they are likely to face the death penalty; the EU also attaches human rights and good
governance conditions to its application criteria for admission to the EU and to its external aid
policies. The influence of the EU in developing a global community of values is therefore

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incremental and often happens without fanfare: it is often buried in the text of agreements
which the EU signs with other actors in the international system. All members of the EU
belong to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and are required to accept its
judgements. Moravsik (2000, p. 218) argues that the ECHR system is widely accepted as the
most advanced and effective international regime for enforcing human rights. Thus the ECHR
has a compulsory jurisdiction over its members, thereby placing limits on the sovereignties of
the signatory states. Although a rights regime which is as strongly developed as the ECHR
system is unlikely to emerge at the global level in the near future, the EU is nevertheless
seeking to project human rights values beyond its borders.

How the EU’s Policy of ‘Global Engagement’ Might Be Enhanced

We have argued above that the EU has already established a presence for itself within the
emerging system of global governance. For example, it is already has some kind of status
(albeit in some cases of a largely token or marginal kind) within the existing global
institutions; it is play a leading role in the development of inter-regional links; it is promoting
good governance in developing countries, by tying aid to the maintenance or improvements in
standards of domestic governance and emphasis on human rights. It has sought to develop
new global governance regimes, notably in the field of environmental protection and human
rights. In the latter regard we can cite its role in fostering the development of international
criminal courts; its efforts to mediate in international conflicts; its role in providing
humanitarian assistance to civilian populations; it is also playing a major role in shaping
competition and trade policies at the global level.

However, it is also the case that the EU has the potential to have even greater external
influence, if it plays to its strengths and if the EU member states can learn to act in a more
cohesive way in global affairs. By playing to its strengths, I mean utilising its many
diplomatic and economic instruments (forms of civil power) which provide it with
considerable external leverage and influence. In my view, the pursuit by the EU of a ‘hard
power’ commensurate with its civil power strengths would be counterproductive (and also
probably doomed to failure). A global reach is not necessarily achieved by means of aircraft
carriers and cruise missiles. Instead, in my view it should pursue a vigorous policy of pro-
active multilateralism. In order to achieve enhanced influence in global affairs, it will need to
undertake further institutional reform and to clarify the degree to which member states are
prepared (in practice) to speak and act with one voice in international fora. But there are
several factors which might prevent the EU from developing a more effective role on the
global level. Firstly, there is the possibility that the EU will become more self-absorbed, given
the difficulties in coping with current and future enlargements. The EU is also likely to
become absorbed for the foreseeable future in the debate about its constitutional future.
Moreover, an enlarged Union is more likely to experience splits (not least on foreign policy
issues). The development of a clear identity (a clear external face and voice) for the EU may
be difficult to achieve. For example, member states with seats on the UN Security Council
will be loathe to give them up (and even if they did, they would demand an enhanced
representation for the EU, which would be resisted by other Security Council members, not
least by the US). Similar problems are likely to arise if attempts were made to seek a single
EU representation in the IMF, World Bank and other international institutions. Another
concern is about the EU’s strength of will in relation to the development of a world role.

It is true that recent constitutional developments in the EU – for example recent treaties
and the draft constitution – have sought to address some of issues raised above. For example,

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the constitutional treaty contains measures to strengthen the EU’s presence on the
international scene, including an EU foreign minister (by combining the current roles of
Commissioner for External Relations with the Council’s High Representative for Foreign and
Security Policy) and the creation of EU embassies and a diplomatic service. There are also
plans to further develop the EU’s rapid reaction force for peacekeeping operations. However,
progress in these fields has been very slow and there is still considerable uncertainty about
whether the measures set in place to enable the EU to project itself more effectively on the
international stage will actually materialise. For example, the EU’s foreign minister will exist
along side the foreign ministers of each member state, so the ability of the EU to speak with
one voice in external affairs remains in doubt.
CONCLUSION

The EU’s real potential as a contributor to global community formation does not lie in its
potential as a prototype for a global union. The conditions which have shaped the EU’s
peculiar form of governance do not exist in the same form at global level, nor are they likely
to emerge in the near future. The EU's most promising potential contribution to global
community formation will be through a policy of pro-active participation in global affairs:
this would involve, for example: participating in reform agenda setting and policymaking in
multilateral institutions; continuing to play a leading role in developing inter-regional
dialogues and relationships; establishing closer links with individual countries; and
contributing ideas to discussions about reform of the system of global governance. In each of
these cases, the EU will have opportunities to promote its values and also to offer the benefit
of its unrivalled experience in developing a form of ‘supranational’ governance (but in which
sovereign states continue play a key - and arguably a central – role). The EU could and should
use its considerable weight and influence to help shape future developments with regard to
global community formation. But its degree of success in this regard is at least partly
dependent upon the extent to which the EU is successful in addressing issues concerning the
clarity and coherence of its external identity and its decisionmaking capacity.

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